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Reason versus power : genealogy, critique, and epistemic injustice

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Lorenzini, Daniele (2022) Reason versus power : genealogy, critique, and epistemic injustice. The Monist, 105 (4). pp. 541-557. doi:10.1093/monist/onac016

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/monist/onac016

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Abstract

In this paper, I take issue with the idea that Michel Foucault might be considered a theorist of epistemic injustice, and argue that his philosophical premises are incompatible with Miranda Fricker’s. Their main disagreement rests upon their divergent ways of conceiving the relationship between reason and power, giving rise to the contrasting forms of normativity that characterize their critical projects. This disagreement can be helpfully clarified by addressing the different use they make of the genealogical method. While Fricker’s genealogy of Testimonial Justice aims to ground her claim that reason and power can be neatly pulled apart, thus avoiding the reductionist and relativist conclusions entailed (in her view) by Foucault’s genealogies, I argue that Foucault’s mature, overlooked definition of genealogy is based on a sophisticated distinction between games and regimes of truth, and is thus not vulnerable to these criticisms. Consequently, Foucault’s genealogical inquiries prove helpful for understanding issues that normally fall under the umbrella of epistemic injustice in a new light, while also allowing us to avoid some of the main objections that threaten Fricker’s project.

Item Type: Journal Article
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title: The Monist
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISSN: 0026-9662
Official Date: October 2022
Dates:
DateEvent
October 2022Published
13 September 2022Available
1 January 2022Accepted
Volume: 105
Number: 4
Page Range: pp. 541-557
DOI: 10.1093/monist/onac016
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access
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