When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
Dhillon, Amrita and Lockwood, Ben (1999) When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable? Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.549).
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This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of plurality rule voting games. For K > 3 alternatives and n > 3 voters, we find sufficient conditions for the game to be dominance-solvable (DS) and not to be DS. These conditions can be stated in terms of only one statistic of the game, the largest proportion of voters who agree on which alternative is worst in a sequence of subsets of the original set of alternatives. When n is large, “almost all” games can be classified as either DS or not DS. If the game is DS, a Condorcet Winner always exists when n > 4, and the outcome is always the Condorcet Winner when the electorate is sufficiently replicated
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Voting research, Elections, Voting, Plural, Game theory|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||December 1999|
|Number of Pages:||40|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
First version, March 1999; this version, December 1999
1. T. Besley. and S.Coate , An Economic Model of Representative Democracy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, (1997),.85–114.
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