Dhillon, Amrita and Lockwood, Ben (1999) When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable? Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers.

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Abstract

This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of plurality rule voting games. For K > 3 alternatives and n > 3 voters, we find sufficient conditions for the game to be dominance-solvable (DS) and not to be DS. These conditions can be stated in terms of only one statistic of the game, the largest proportion of voters who agree on which alternative is worst in a sequence of subsets of the original set of alternatives. When n is large, “almost all” games can be classified as either DS or not DS. If the game is DS, a Condorcet Winner always exists when n > 4, and the outcome is always the Condorcet Winner when the electorate is sufficiently replicated

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Voting research, Elections, Voting, Plural, Game theory
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	December 1999
Number:	No.549
Number of Pages:	40
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Description:	First version, March 1999; this version, December 1999
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1630

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