Page, Frank H. and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2002) Elections and strategic positioning games. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

We formalize the interplay between expected voting behavior and stragetic positioning behavior of candidates as a common agency problem in which the candidates (i.e. the principals) compete for voters (i.e. agents) via the issues they choose and the positions they take. A political situation is defined as a feasible combination of candidate positions and expected political payoffs to the candidates. Taking this approach, we are led naturally to a particular formalization of the candidates’ positioning game, called a political situation game. Within the context of this game, we define the notion of farsighted stability (introduced in an abstract setting by Chwe (1994)) and apply Chwe’s result to obtain existence of farsightedly stable outcomes. We compute the farsightedly stable sets for several examples of political situations games, with outcomes that conform to real-world observations.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Voting research, Social stability, Game theory, Political sociology
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	August 2002
Number:	No.545
Number of Pages:	26
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Description:	Original version, November 1999; revised September 2002
References:	[1] Besley, T. and S. Coate (1997) “An Economic Model of Representative Democracy,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 85-114. [2] Chwe,M. (1994), “Farsighted Coalitional Stability,” Journal of Economic Theory 63, pp. 299-325. [3] Coughlin, P. J. (1992), Probabilistic Voting Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. [4] Downs, Anthony (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, Harper & Row, New York. [5] Enelow, J.M. and Hinich,M. J. (1990), Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. [6] Hotelling, H. (1929), “The Stability of Competition,” Economic Journal 39, pp. 41-57. [7] Ledyard, J. O. (1984), “The Pure Theory of Large Two-Candidate Elections,” Public Choice 44, pp. 7-41. [8] Lin, T. M., Enelow, J. M., and Dorussen, H. (1999), “Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Voting,” Public Choice 98, pp. 59-82. [9] McKelvey, R. D. and Patty, J. W. (1999), “A Theory of Voting in Large Elections,” Mimeo, Caltech. [10] Mueller, D. C. (1989), Public Choice II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. [11] Myerson, R. B. (1998), “Large PoissonGames,” Discussion Paper No. 1189, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Sciences, Northwestern University. [12] Myerson, R. B. and Weber, R. J. (1993), “A Theory of Voting Equilibria,” American Political Science Review 87, pp. 102-114. [13] Osborne, M. J. (1993), “Candidate Positioning and Entry in a Political Competition,” Games and Economic Behavior 5, pp. 133-151. [14] Osborne, M.J. and A. Slivinski (1996) “A Model of Political Competition with Citizen Candidates,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 65-96.
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1632

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