Time-inconsistent candidates vs. time-inconsistent voters: imperfect policy commitment in political equilibrium
Pani, Marco and Perroni, Carlo (1999) Time-inconsistent candidates vs. time-inconsistent voters: imperfect policy commitment in political equilibrium. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.544).
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This paper examines whether policy commitment mechanisms, when available, will be used by the elected policymaker in a political-economy equilibrium. We describe a two-period repeated voting model where second-period outcomes depend on commitment choices made by an elected policymaker in the first period, and where elected candidates may choose to deviate from their preferred level of commitment, retaining discretionary control of policy variables, in order to secure a favourable second-period political outcome. The implications of different political tenure systems for the candidates who are elected, the policy targets that are selected, the degree of commitment to their implementation, and the policies that are actually implemented in the model are examined.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Voting research, Economic policy, Policy sciences, Choice (Psychology), Commitment (Psychology)|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||October 1999|
|Number of Pages:||25|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
First draft, March 1998; this version, October 1999
Aghion, Philippe, and Patrick Bolton (1990) \Government Domestic Debt and the Risk of Default: A Political-Economic Model of the Strategic Role of Debt," in Dornbusch, Rudiger, and Draghi, Mario (eds.), Public debt management: Theory and history, Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 315-45.
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