Kovalenkov, Alexander and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (1999) An explicit bound on " for nonemptiness of "-cores of games. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on E so that all suffciently large games in the collection have non-empty E-cores. Our result makes explicit the relationship between the required size of E for non-emptiness of the E-core, the parameters describing the collection of games, and the size of the total player set. Given the parameters describing the collection, the larger the game, the smaller the E that can bechosen.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Game theory, Differential games, Mathematical models
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	September 1999
Number:	No.537
Number of Pages:	28
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Departmento Governmental de Investigaciónes Cientificas y Técnológicas (DGICYT), Universitats of Catalonia (UCat), Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (UAdB)
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1638

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