An explicit bound on " for nonemptiness of "-cores of games
Kovalenkov, Alexander and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (1999) An explicit bound on " for nonemptiness of "-cores of games. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers).
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We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on E so that all suffciently large games in the collection have non-empty E-cores. Our result makes explicit the relationship between the required size of E for non-emptiness of the E-core, the parameters describing the collection of games, and the size of the total player set. Given the parameters describing the collection, the larger the game, the smaller the E that can bechosen.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Game theory, Differential games, Mathematical models|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Number of Pages:||28|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Departmento Governmental de Investigaciónes Cientificas y Técnológicas (DGICYT), Universitats of Catalonia (UCat), Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (UAdB)|
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