Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments
Kovalenkov, Alexander and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (1999) Epsilon cores of games and economies with limited side payments. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.
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We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility. Under the assumption that the payoff set of the grand coalition is convex, we show that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty E-core. Our main result is that, when some degree of side-paymentness within nearly-effective small groups is assumed, then all payoffs in the E-core treat similar players similarly. A bound on the distance between E-core payoffs of any two similar players is given in terms of the parameters describing the game. These results add to the literature showing that games with many players and small effective groups have the properties of competitive markets.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Cooperation, Approximation theory, Game theory, Parameter estimation, Small groups|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Number of Pages:||23|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Description:||Original version, March 1997; revised version, May 1999|
|Funder:||Departmento Governmental de Investigaciónes Cientificas y Técnológicas (DGICYT), Universitats of Catalonia (UCat), Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (UAdB)|
|Grant number:||PB92-590 (DGICYT)|
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