Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs
Kovalenkov, Alexander and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2001) Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.535).
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We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems for arbitrary games with and without sidepayments. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. The theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are then applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Q Science > QA Mathematics
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Group theory, Clubs, Approximation theory, Small groups -- Research, Game theory|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||August 2001|
|Number of Pages:||41|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Description:||Original version, January 1997; this revision, August 2001|
|Funder:||European Union (EU), Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona (UAdB), Universitats of Catalonia (UCat), Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), Departmento Governmental de Investigaciónes Cientificas y Técnológicas (DGICYT)|
|Adapted As:||Kovalenkov, A. and Wooders, M.H. (2002). Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. [Coventry] : University of Warwick, Economics Department. (Warwick economic research papers, no.634).|
 B. Allen, Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: Approximate NTU cores in large economies," Chapter 11 in Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics: Proceedings of the Eighth International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics (W.A. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles, and N.J. Scho¯eld eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
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