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Beyond the Phallus: A Re-Reading of Drama Education
through the works of Luce Irigaray

By

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Abstract: The thesis sets out to re-read drama education via Luce Irigaray’s re-reading of western cultural discourse. Chapter Two outlines her feminist-philosophical project, detailing her critique of Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis from the point of view of the cultural feminine, and setting her work alongside other feminist intersections with psychoanalytic theory. Irigaray reads Phallogocentrism as a manifestation of western metaphysics, a privileging of the Concept, the Idea, over the materiality on which they depend, a cultural dichotomization that is contiguous with sexual dimorphism. Looking at key philosophical figures with whom Irigaray’s work interacts, the thesis outlines her challenge to dominant theories of ontology, epistemology and ethics, reconfiguring these according to interrelationality, fluidity and flow, rather than separation, individuation and stasis. In Chapter Three, the terms ‘double syntax’ and ‘sensible-transcendental’ become central to a discussion of knowledge, which, through Irigaray’s re-reading of Kant re-illuminates discussions of the bifurcation of feeling and reason in the arts. Irigaray’s ‘placental economy’ and ‘fecundity of the caress’ re-configure self-other relationality; these inform the discussion of pedagogy and creativity in Chapter Four. Chapter Five formulates an Irigarayan approach to key concerns and debates that are currently demarcating and defining drama education in the context of National Curriculum and the influence of postmodern thought. It also points out the obfuscation of embodied ‘selves’ throughout many of these discussions. Consideration of the embodied constitution of expression and meaning is developed in Chapter Six, which in turn feeds into a reading of drama education practice as radical epistemology. I conclude by asserting the affirmatory potential of this reading, which locates embodied performance as a development beyond confines of rational discursive thought. The ‘beyond’ of the title has an expansive and developmental connotation rather than one of dissociation.
Chapter One  Introduction

To suggest that my re-reading of drama education takes a particular perspective is in one sense accurate and in another misleading. For although this project practices an 'Irigarayan' reading of drama education, Irigaray's own writing eschews the distanced perspectival gaze, preferring instead an 'embodied', though textual encounter with cultural discourse. Similarly, due to the slipperiness and play of ambiguities in her work it is recommended that readers 'engage' with Irigaray productively, rather than try to operate a restrictive closure on her work (Whitford, 1994a: 15). The 'engagement' enacted in this thesis between drama education discourse and works of Luce Irigaray, seeks therefore, not to totalize or encapsulate either but to explore the productive possibilities of this unusual encounter. In view of the context, this is clearly not an accidental meeting, at the outset of the project there seemed to be very good reasons why such an encounter might indeed be productive. Broadly speaking, Irigaray's is a feminist project but unlike many feminisms, stemming for example from Beauvoir or Wollstonecraft, her starting point is not equality but difference. Irigaray reads sexual difference as a morphological entity, an interface between embodiment and the cultural codes definitions and values with which that embodiment is assigned, and the projection of those values, codes and definitions onto the cultural setting. On one level this means that whilst culture, language and discourse reflect the sublimation of male morphology as paradigmatic of 'being', knowledge and truth, then woman's subjecthood is precluded; on another level this means that notions of being, knowledge and truth are restricted or cathected according to one particular world view. The consequences for divergent 'knowledges' or modes of engagement with the world are the same as those for 'woman', they become
marginalized, excluded, suppressed or fall 'outside' the gaze that determines what can be known.

Following this simplified version of Irigaray's contention, it was my contention that 'embodied' subjects of study such as drama and dance that are arguably marginalized within the British National Curriculum as adjuncts of English and P.E. respectively, and can be read alongside Irigaray's reading of 'woman' as lack, absence or 'hole' in discourse. This project was conceived in anticipation of what might result from applying Irigaray's theoretical strategies concerning the proposition of woman's subjectivity, to a re-affirmatory consideration of drama education. It soon became clear that Irigaray's project moves beyond simply affirming 'woman' in her particularity to address the ontological, epistemological and ethical confinements of western thought. It is in engaging with this broader project that the thesis develops its particular voice in relation to drama education.

In the Lacanian topography of the symbolic that is so influential to Irigaray's work, masculine 'self' and culture are not only inter-implicated but determined in relation to an over-arching dominant signifier, the Phallus. This is not merely Lacan's construction, but an interpretation of the dominant principle of 'Oneness', of presence over absence, affirmation over lack, which dominates western thought. What Irigaray critiques is the argument that this structural systematization is intractable, but she also disagrees with the postmodern tenet that such foundational structures are circumscribed by the 'death' or fragmentation of the subject. This she argues, merely creates multiples of One, but does not challenge the basic defining principles of subjectivity such as individuation, separation and predication upon the object or 'other':
The 'subject' henceforth will be multiple, plural, sometimes di-formed, but it will still postulate itself as the cause of all the mirages that can be enumerated endlessly and therefore put back together again as one (Irigaray, 1985a: 135)

In order to offset or discursively displace ontological assumptions based on separation, loss and individuation, Irigaray draws symbolism from a radically re-morphologized version of the female body, offering an alternative version of ontology that prioritizes movement, flow and 'becoming'. Neither the stable, unified subject of modernity, nor the fragmented, dispersed rendering of subjectivity in postmodernity, but an image of self in process, of self in relation to otherness. Similarly, in the case of epistemology, Irigaray offers a way beyond intractable oppositions between knowledge and lack, by conceiving of a possible relationality between oppositional terms that avoids dispersal into relativism; thereby enabling a more fluid, contingent and kinetic conceptualization of knowledge. Likewise Irigaray's ethical approach explores the possibility of a self-other relationality that avoids appropriation or negation, but holds positions of difference in mutual subjective recognition, and interrelational creativity.

This thesis demonstrates how such aspects of Irigaray's work can intersect with contemporary discourse in British drama education. It is not an attempt to re-read the history of drama education, although some reference is made to practitioners of the past, nor is it an attempt to form a global picture, although I will refer to international practitioners whose arguments have been influential in shaping discourse within the British context. As such, the thesis does not form an exhaustive study, an attempt to produce a 'theory of drama', but applies Irigarayan strategies and alternatives to debates and practice within the discipline in the post National Curriculum context,
that are intended to re-work these in new and interesting ways. I would argue that the recent history of drama education discourse, the seemingly intractable dichotomies of the 1980s, and the emergence of postmodern perspectives through the 1990s, make an Irigarayan reading all the more pertinent. The chief concerns expressed by drama educators regarding the growing influence of postmodernism, include the position and status of (the) ‘self’ in drama, particularly drama pupils as creative selves (Ackroyd, 1995), and the nature and applicability of notions of knowledge and truth (Dobson, 1996). Postmodern feminism in particular is perceived as a threat to ‘process drama and class-room based inquiry’ (Taylor, 1996: 4).

As my reading demonstrates, an Irigarayan approach to these issues provides a theoretical basis for inclusivity, which is not merely an ‘anything goes’ approach but draws on Irigaray’s ontological and epistemological shift away from fixity toward ‘becoming’ and flux; thereby avoiding oppositional choices such as those between theatre/drama, art/non art, whilst acknowledging developmental journeys within the medium taken by students of arts subjects. The conceptions of selfhood and knowledge that emerge from Irigaray’s work emphasize ‘embodiment’ and ‘relationality’ as well as ‘becoming’. These feed into discussion of the collaborative emphasis of drama, both in terms of collaboration between pupils and between pupils and teacher, and the role of (the) body as maker of meaning and repository of knowledge.

Although my reading begins with a consideration of key themes of enquiry, as the discussion progresses and becomes engaged with increasingly more specific arguments and finally practice, it becomes clear that the main focus of attention is secondary education. Indeed my own experience of drama teaching is of working
with students from KS 4 and beyond. It is significant to draw attention to this from
the outset in deference to Michael Fleming’s point that discussions of drama
methodology often neglect to differentiate by age (Fleming, 1994: 59).

Clearly, this introduction gives only a very generalized account of the intent of the
project and its key areas of exploration, stated in bold terms. Before these are
elaborated upon and carried through in Chapters Three to Seven, it is crucial to
provide a more detailed introduction to Irigaray’s work, one which locates and
explicates her own project in relation to cultural discourse, in particular those of
psychoanalysis, philosophy and feminism.

\[\text{\footnotesize 1} \text{ These are addressed simultaneously in Irigaray (1985a) Speculum of the Other Woman, but}
\text{emphasized more distinctly in Irigaray’s later works.}\]
Before any attempt to construct a dialogue between Luce Irigaray’s work and arts education, or even more particularly drama education, it is necessary to introduce her project in the context of the cultural discourses with which it engages directly. To speak of her work as a project, in the singular, is already problematic because, as this chapter will demonstrate, her writing is characterized by elusiveness, and a liminal quality that defies categorization as either psychoanalysis, philosophy or feminism, whilst merging, interweaving, and in some cases colliding these discourses together.

In an attempt to clarify Luce Irigaray’s position vis-à-vis the European post-structuralist milieu from which her work emerges, I will be addressing these three key areas separately and identifying how and where her work intercedes with, or relates to, each of them. Because Irigaray’s engagements with cultural discourse transgress boundaries of discipline, important themes or strands of her work will, of necessity, exceed the provisional divide between the three sections of this chapter. In addition to contextualisation and explication, the aim of the chapter is also to identify elements of thematic, strategic or analytical importance, which will be carried forward into my reconsideration of drama education.

Luce Irigaray’s publication history spans over three decades, to date, with the first translation into English of ‘Women’s exile’ appearing in 1977. From that point on a regular stream of her books and articles have appeared in translation, accompanied by a wealth of commentaries, interpretations and readings, which have presented Irigaray’s work to the Anglo/American reader as a form of palimpsest. Although it is this mediated version of her work with which I am familiar, it has become a feature of her commentators to refer back to the original French texts, draw attention to the
problematics of translation, and try to convey something of the linguistic nuances that are an important part of Irigaray’s textual practice. For this reason, even the reader in translation is now able to appreciate the significance of Irigaray’s writing style as a contributory factor in her complex rereading of influential psychoanalytic and philosophical texts. It is hoped that even while presenting a relatively concise account of Irigaray’s interventions within and across these disciplines, some of that complexity can be conveyed here.

Psychoanalysis

Irigaray’s professional relationship with the Lacanian psychoanalytic establishment changed upon the publication of *Speculum de l’autre femme* in 1974, when she was suspended from teaching at the University of Vincennes. Although Irigaray does not mention Lacan by name in this book, her reading of the cloaked male desire implicit in Freudian analysis and its alienation of women’s desire implicate Lacan in the phallocentrism he describes. This critique of the economy of phallic desire is developed in *This Sex Which Is Not One*, where Irigaray employs Lévi-Strauss’ concept of exogamy (the exchange of women) to undermine the supposed neutrality of psychoanalytic theory. The severity of the reaction to Irigaray’s work is partly explained by her methodology, her questioning of theory from within, thereby challenging its foundational logic. As Jane Gallop suggests,

Irigaray churns up the current in Lacan that is always threatening to overturn the ‘phallocentric system’ (Gallop, 1982: 41)
Before looking at Irigaray’s rereading in more detail it is necessary to outline certain key features of Lacan’s topology, which sees the subject divided between conscious identity, the unconscious and the symbolic.

**Lacan’s return to Freud:** Lacan’s founding of the *ecole freudiene* in 1964 marked a return to the Freud of psychoanalytic theory and Lacan’s rejection of trends in post-Freudian clinical psychoanalysis that posited a normative role for the discipline. Lacan’s interest is in how the subject comes to attain sexual identity in language rather than how sexually pre-identified beings ‘should’ develop. This distinction relies upon basic premises that Lacan suggests are already implicit in Freud’s writing, but which, with the benefit of linguistic theory he is able to make explicit. One such premise is that the subject is bound by its relation to ‘desire’, to take up a position as either man or woman. To understand Lacan’s concept of desire requires our return to Freud’s account of the Oedipus complex. Freud suggested that for the little boy and little girl the first object of desire is the mother. This constitutes, for Freud, a ‘masculine’ or ‘phallic’ phase of development, which as Lacan clarifies, is termed phallic because both boy and girl wish to satisfy the mother’s desire (Lacan, 1982: 116-7), in addition to the phallic mother representing the desired object for each child. Satisfaction of the child’s desire is precluded by the castration complex, which is different for each child. For the boy there is a two-fold effect. The knowledge of castration (the perception that women, girls do not have a penis) debases the mother in the eyes of the boy and initiates an anxiety over the threat of castration which causes him to give up his rivalry with the father and repress his desire for the mother. For the girl, a similar debasement of the mother occurs as a result of her perceived castration, accompanied by a shift in desire onto the father’s penis and the initiation of penis envy, eventually manifest in the girl’s desire for a baby. In Lacan’s reading of Freud,
the castration complex is not the conceptualization of a pre-existent sexual difference, but the 'event' which activates that difference (Lacan, 1982: 75-6). This is because, for Lacan, sexual subjectivity is never reducible to biology, just as the term 'penis' in Freud's analysis is not merely representative of the biological organ but an allusion to the prohibitive power that it symbolizes and which is mediated through the name-of-the-father:

Through which the subject binds himself for life to the law (Lacan 1998: 282)

The desiring subject is, therefore, never satisfied. Not only is desire always marked by loss of the first object, the mother, but having acceded to culture through oedipalisation, sexed identity is constituted by one’s relation to the phallus in terms of (for the man) desiring to have the phallus, and (for the woman) desiring to be or represent the phallus (Lacan, 1982: 84). Thus the concept of penis envy is retained but in keeping with the socio-symbolic meaning of the organ this association of privilege is sublimated to the level of the symbolic, with the phallus as structuring signifier. In response to Freud's question, Was will das Wieb? (What does the woman want?), Lacan replies that the woman is wanting... She is identified with the Other as guarantee of man’s subjectivity, but there can be no Other of the Other, therefore she is designated by Lacan as 'the Woman' (Lacan, 1982: 151-2). The 'insatiable' quality of the 'child's avidity' which results in the subject’s inevitable sense of loss, as Freud expresses it in his 1933 essay on Femininity (S.E. vol. XXII. P. 122), becomes in Lacan’s analysis the subject necessarily split between subject and object as it is constituted through language. This splitting is first enacted at the mirror stage.
Prior to the mirror stage, the child experiences itself as fragmented into the disparate functions and sensations of each body part, the body-in-bits-and-pieces. It is necessary for the child to form an externalised self-image as the basis for its own self-identification, which it does in relation to its immediate cultural context, i.e. parental figures, immediate family etc. This is analogous to a mirror image, but is also the first stage in ego development, 'the imaginary', characterized according to Lacan by specular distancing, alienation and sexual neutrality. There are two fundamental aspects of this self-identification. The first is that the child identifies its 'self' as distinct from the mother; the mother becomes a reference point, an 'other' in relation to whom the child recognizes its self-image (Lacan, 1998: 257). The second is that this self-image is a fiction, or ideal of coherent identity a 'gestalt' image which enables the subject to enter into language as 'I'. The 'I' is a continuous deferral; it is the subject's representation in language, which can never be a complete rendering of the subject. The 'I' carries with it a sense of loss, alienation and instability (Lacan, 1977: 2-3). The cost of entry into the symbolic realm, or oedipalization, is to 'desire' a completion that can never be fulfilled. Desire, in this sense, is the gap between identification and the idea of certainty represented by the phallus, the privileged signifier that 'marks where the share of the logos is wedded to the advent of desire' (Lacan, 1982: 82). The fantasized locus of truth to which the subject appeals for wholeness is termed the Other:

If the phallus is a signifier then it is in the place of the Other that the subject gains access to it. (Lacan, 1982: 83)

Drawing on Saussurian linguistics, which 'born since Freud, could not be taken into account by him', Lacan argues that there can be no point of certainty in language, that
meaning is established through the referral of one ‘sign’ to another. For Lacan, as for Freud who could not theorize in terms of the gap between signifier and signified, yet anticipated the consequences of such a relation from his own perspective, sexuality and identity are bound together in their instability (Lacan, 1982: 78-9).

The phallus is only able to function as a privileged signifier, to initiate the cathexis of desire, which constitutes male and female subjectivity, by being ‘veiled’ (Lacan, 1982: 82-3). The phallus is never reducible to the penis, it is the signifier upon which signification is based, the organizing principle that functions precisely because it is not available to scrutiny. And yet the relationship between penis and phallus does appear to be significant, as is testified by the points of continuation between Freudian and Lacanian theory; not least of which is the destiny allotted to woman by phallic signification, to occupy a position of lack or objectification as ‘other’. Woman is doubly castrated, first by the process of alienation required of all subjects to enter into language and secondly because in order to ‘speak’ she must undertake a mode of ‘masquerade’, an imitation of the masculine phallic subject. This is the starting point of Irigaray’s critique, but her broader project is to refute the very foundations of a theoretical perspective which would identify this phallocentric structure as inevitable and intractable. Irigaray interrogates Freud and Lacan’s underlying beliefs.

The Blind Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry: Irigaray describes *Speculum of the Other Woman* (Irigaray, 1985a) as a book which ‘has no beginning or end’, a book which:
Confounds the linearity of an outline, the teleology of discourse, within which there is no possible place for the “feminine”, except the traditional place of the repressed, the censured. (Irigaray, 1985b: 68)

The structure in fact replicates the concavity of the speculum from which the book takes its name:

A mirror which curves back upon itself... an instrument for penetrating the interior (Irigaray, 1985a: 144)

At the very heart of the text Irigaray juxtaposes an investigation of constituent matter with an essay on the Cartesian cogito, ‘penetrating the interior’ of western binary logic. The central section ‘Speculum’ is flanked by readings of foundational exponents of western masculine discourse, first Freud the modern and finally Plato the ancient. This ‘going at history “backwards”’ as Irigaray puts it (1985b: 68), is not to be read as a suggestion that mere reversal will enable the articulation of woman. In each of these readings Irigaray enacts a disruption, a folding of texts in upon themselves, subjecting them to their own logic in order to dislodge, to open gaps, to approach the feminine. The feminine is ‘not already there just waiting to find expression’ (Whitford, 1991a: 38), but is constituted by such deconstructive, or (re)constructive, readings as these.

The opening section, The Blind Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry, is a reading of Freud’s 1933 essay on Femininity, the Freud read by Irigaray, is therefore, the Freud alluded to by Lacan. Irigaray’s reading strategy includes fragmenting the original text, quoting from it and commenting on it in the form of questions and associations. As Jane Gallop suggests, this staging of a form of psychoanalysis used to analyse
dreams is not merely in order to, 'decipher Freud's peculiar psyche, but rather to unravel, 'an old dream', everyone's dream'. (Gallop, 1985: 36). It is not, therefore, surprising that Irigaray begins with Freud – the master interpreter of dreams, and reveals that, Plato is always already present in Freud's text as part of the cultural unconscious:

It is not a matter of naively accusing Freud, as if he were a 'bastard'. Freud's discourse represents the symptom of a particular social and cultural economy, which has been maintained in the West at least since the Greeks (Irigaray, 1977: 63)

The Blind Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry, a text which aims to defy linearity, is a reading of another text which is in turn a reading of 'The enigma that is woman' (Irigaray, 1985a: 13). Irigaray peels away the conscious and unconscious layers of Freud's essay to reveal its foundational logic, exposing the normalizing and deterministic aspects of Freud's theoretical account, which render phallic supersedence inevitable. A masculine morphology becomes the model against which female sexuality is adjudged a 'Dark Continent'. Irigaray identifies the 'zigzag' arguments that, 'defy all resumption of a linear discourse and all forms of rigour (1985a: 17) but which are necessitated by Freud's unconscious and foundational assumptions, leading him to conclude that:

Psychology too is unable to solve the riddle of femininity (Freud, S.E. vol. xxii: 116)

Why, asks Irigaray, is the riddle, the mystery – 'the mysteria/hysteria?' – only applied to women. Freud's brief discussion of the 'bisexuality' of the sexes implies equally problematic questions for defining masculinity. It is, Irigaray states,
As if, for the argument to be possible, “male sexuality” at the very least had to impose itself as clearly defined, definable, even practicable (Irigaray, 1985a: 20)

This suggests that in Freud’s discussion of what constitutes sexual difference, there is an a priori concept of difference at work. Freud’s reliance on the opposition of paired terms requires that one of these terms be constituted as ‘origin’, against which differentiation is brought about:

The same re-making itself – more or less – would thus produce the other (1985a: 20)

The foundational logic of Freudian psychoanalytic theory is, according to Irigaray, constituted by an, ‘appropriation of the relation to origin and of the desire for and as origin’ by the ‘phallus’ – ‘woman is well and truly castrated from the viewpoint of this economy’ (1985a: 33). She is either constituted as ‘lack’, or in terms of ‘atrophy’ or ‘envy’ (1985a: 60). This, as Irigaray states, does not constitute a ‘sexual heterogene’ or pure sexual difference, but rather produces a negative other that, ‘sustains and confirms the homogeneity of masculine desire’ (1985a: 63).

Complicitous in the formulation of this ‘economy of the same’ is ‘the Gaze’. It is the gaze, which determines women’s castration. The ‘nothing to see’, which constitutes women as ‘having nothing’ is a specific and specifying perspective. Rather than signalling the possibility of another libidinal economy, the phallomorphic orientation of what Irigaray calls, ‘this age old occulocentrism’, means that,

Nothing to be seen is equivalent to having nothing. No being and no truth (1985a: 47-8)

Irigaray’s text begins as a critique of Freud, but burgeons into a deconstruction of the phallocentric tradition of western ontological thought. As Jane Gallop writes in her
analysis of Irigaray’s *Blind Spot of an Old Dream of Symmetry*, the dream is not merely Freud’s but everyone’s; the blind spot itself is ‘woman’ who cannot be ‘seen’ by theory only repeatedly reproduced as, ‘the masculine subject’s own original complementary other’ (Gallop, 1982: 57-9) or (m)other. As Irigaray explains, Freud’s account allows for only one object of desire or pleasure, not an interplay of desires between two sexes. There is no place for the possibility of female desire in an economy of the same, therefore the primal desire of daughter for mother cannot be represented. At the pre-oedipal phase, it must be remembered, the little girl is regarded as a little boy. For the woman therefore, there is a severance from relation to origin, whereas for the man, woman serves to re-enact this relation (1985a: 42):

Even a marriage is not made secure until the wife has succeeded in making her husband her child as well and in acting as mother to him (Freud, S.E. vol. xxii: 134)

Female homosexuality is therefore identified by Irigaray as both exceeding and threatening Freud’s imaginary economy (1985a: 101), governed as it is by the need to maintain the primacy of the phallus. In her next major book, *This Sex Which Is Not One* (1985b), Irigaray begins to explore the disruptive potential of the woman to woman relationship, a theme of her work that I will be returning to later in this chapter. It is in *This Sex Which Is Not One* that Irigaray also coins the neologism Hom(m)osexuality to describe society’s, ‘exclusive valorization of men’s needs/desires’ (1985b: 171) and the economy of exchange that exists between men. The notion of a hom(m)osexual logic is also evident in Irigaray’s critique of Freud in *Speculum of the Other Woman* where Irigaray identifies a bias towards anal eroticism:

The concepts *faeces* (money, gift), *baby* and *penis* [Freud’s italics] are ill-distinguished from one another and are easily interchangeable (1985a: 74-5, referring to Freud S.E. vol. xxii: 101)
she also notes that in the sexual economy described by Freud, woman merely tends each of these ‘gifts’ given to her by man and expected back in due course:

The penis (stool), the sperm (seed-gift), the child (gift), all make up an anal symbolic from which there is no escape (1985a: 75)

Margaret Whitford reminds us that Irigaray is not merely castigating Freud, but using his account of sexuality to reveal that speculation in the West is dominated by anality, in the form of a single masculine imaginary (Whitford, 1988:118). The function of the female in symbolic processes is to be that which is absent in discourse:

She functions as a hole... in the elaboration of imaginary and symbolic processes (1985a: 71)

It is important at this stage to highlight key principles identified by Irigaray as foundational to Freud’s account of sexuality, principles that reflect the ‘old dream’ and in which can be discerned glimpses of Platonic philosophy, curved back upon themselves by Irigaray’s Speculum. As well as processes of, ‘analogy, comparison, symmetry, dichotomic opposition, and so on’ (1985a: 28), Irigaray identifies a prevalence of the idea or ‘Idea’ over the materiality of the ‘sexuate body’; in particular the maternal body over which ‘theory’ and the ‘logos’ achieves mastery through an organised set of signifiers that surround, besiege, cleave, out circle, and out-flank the dangerous, the embracing, the aggressive mother/body (1985a: 37)

It is also through Freud’s adherence to an ‘economy of “presence”’, that woman is constituted in terms of lack or absence. Freud substitutes desire for the penis (Phallus) in place of the vacancy or void that the girl’s place of origin, or the
designation of her relation to the place of origin, has become (1985a: 40-2). Perhaps most pervasive in Freud’s writing, as Irigaray’s reading of it demonstrates, is the use of theory to cathect observations, indicating another dichotomous relation in which homogeneity is valorized and heterogeneity feared. Irigaray argues that the phallus functions in psychoanalysis as,

The guarantee of sense, the sense of sense(s), the “figure”, the “form”, the ultimate signifier through which the ancient metaphors of onto-theology would be set straight’ (1985: 44)

Where as, woman’s ‘enigmatic bisexuality’, the ‘undecidable quality of her sexual conditioning’, provides the ‘unconscious’ of masculine sexuality (1985a: 110-11), conceptualized by Freud in terms of pre-history, ‘the Minoan-Mycenaean civilisation behind the civilisation of Greece’ (S.E. vol. xxi: 226); as a precursor to the direction taken by her work in This Sex Which Is Not One, Irigaray states that:

If one day [woman’s] sexuality was recognised, if it did enter into “History”, then his-story would no longer simply take place or have a place to take (1985a: 112)

Psychoanalytic Theory, Another Look: Although Lacan is not referred to by name in Speculum of the Other Woman there is certainly an implied criticism of his perspective in Irigaray’s reading of the ‘phallicized’ Freud. In This Sex Which Is Not One, Irigaray is seen to turn her attention more directly to Lacan, and in this it is possible to detect the extent to which Irigaray’s work both relies on yet departs from the Lacanian topography. Whereas the project of Speculum of the Other Woman could be described as a form of deconstruction which points towards the potentiality of reconstruction, This Sex Which Is Not One explores the possibilities of the creative potentialities to be gained by disruption of the ‘masculine’ imaginary. Irigaray rejects
Lacan’s interpretation of the imaginary on the grounds that it is governed by the laws of the phallic symbolic. In Lacan’s account of subject development heterogeneous bodily sensations are renounced in favour of the ‘Imaginary Anatomy’, a process of evacuation from and reflection of the male body that precludes subjective status for woman reducing her to, at most, maternal function. Irigaray questions the plausibility of the ‘neutral’ imaginary is questioned on the grounds that the sexed body of the child would illicit meaning from the immediate familial context through which the external image is formed; the body as ‘imaginary’ is an interface between ‘the real’ and ‘the symbolic’. Irigaray identifies this supposed ‘neutrality’ of the Lacanian Imaginary Anatomy as the necessary precondition for masculine discourse, which speaks of and for woman by virtue of the distance or space required for ‘metalanguage’ (analysis of the object) to take place. For Irigaray, Lacan’s insistence upon the sexual neutrality of this externalized image is both symptomatic and constitutive of the ‘sterility’ of thought. Rather than negate the ‘feminine’, Irigaray argues that a re-affirmation of subordinated possibilities is necessary in order to render discourse ‘fertile’ (Irigaray, 1993a: 19).

The first chapter of This Sex Which Is Not One picks up the motif of Alice passing through the looking glass, referred to in Speculum of the Other Woman (1985a: 136), and takes the form of a narrative journey, in which the possibilities of an alternative world are glimpsed, and through which the paralysis of phallic sameness is exposed. Before turning her attention back to psychoanalytic discourse, Irigaray considers woman in the context of the masculine imaginary, focusing on what is necessarily excluded or displaced by the phallic sexual economy, and therefore what has disruptive potential. In the context of an economy that privileges the visual, the
'individualisation of form', and where homogeneity constitutes truth, Irigaray posits a radical morphology of the female body that stresses multiplicity and touch:

For her genitals are formed of two lips in continuous contact. Thus, within herself, she is already two – but not divisible into one(s) (Irigaray, 1985b: 24)

In the chapter, *Psychoanalytic Theory: Another Look*, Irigaray begins by re-stating the problematic areas of Freud’s account of female sexuality and emphasising its underlying phallocentrism. For example, she focuses on the repression of instincts in the little girl and the unnecessary transformation of activity into passivity through the repression of sexual desires (1985b: 36-7), emphasising that the phallus is responsible for the ‘regrouping’ and ‘hierarchisation’ of disparate instincts in infantile genitality (1985b: 39). In the context of psychoanalytic theory’s interpretative influence on the understanding of female sexuality, Irigaray considers the work of Karen Horney and Melanie Klein. She records that Freud endorsed the psychoanalytical work of women such as Ruth Mack Brunswick, Jeanne Lample de Groot and Helene Deutch because they adhered to Freud’s key principle that the castration complex marks the beginning of the process of sexual identification for the boy and girl. Irigaray’s interest in Klein and Horney’s respective departures from Freudian theory is that their hypotheses about female sexuality are, ‘somewhat less predetermined by masculine parameters, somewhat less dominated by ‘penis envy’ (1985b: 49).

Both Horney and Klein respectively challenge Freud’s account of the ‘phallic’ phase through clinical reassessment of the importance and role of the vagina and clitoris in the sexual development of girls. They are therefore cited by Irigaray as part of her challenge against the supposed neutrality of the Lacanian imaginary. Irigaray’s use of
Horney and Klein is not, however, unproblematic. From the point of view of a Freudian feminist perspective Horney and Klein’s emphasis on prior physical or biological difference is tantamount to biological essentialism and the suggestion that boys, girls, men and women already exist and are not, as Freud suggests formed in relation to their culture. Indeed, this is the criticism made by Juliet Mitchell, in the first of two introductions to *Jaques Lacan and the Ecole Freudien* (1982). In the second introduction, Jacqueline Rose makes an equation between this argument and Irigaray’s intervention with Lacanian theory (Rose, 1982:53). However, it is precisely this intersection between cultural discourse and ‘the real’ with which Irigaray contends. Not in order to give the status of prior truth to an entity beyond discourse, but to highlight the biased nature of the scrutinising interpretative gaze of Freudian analysis, as Irigaray states:

> For Horney it would not be appropriate to speak of the relation of the girl child to her vagina in terms of ignorance, but rather in terms of “denegation” (1985b: 50)

It is clear that Horney was also aware of the sexed cultural context of psychoanalytic theory:

> Like all sciences and all valuations, the psychology of women has hitherto been considered only from the point of view of men (Horney, 1967: 56)

Similarly Klein’s account of female sexuality is not suggestive of a fixed libidinal position, wholly determined by pre-existent physical characteristics. Although Klein’s work emphasises the importance of drives, these are never merely reducible to biology, as Freud himself states in his *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (S.E. vol. vii :182-83), but determined in relation to instincts, objects (which are not fixed
but interchangeable) and erotogenic zones that can be attributed to any part of the body. In short, positing difference at a physical level does not preclude an understanding of wider relational and contextual influences on the formation of sexuality. More importantly, in terms of Irigaray's work, the body is never considered as a 'purely' biological entity, but always in terms of its 'morphology', its psycho-social meaning in culture. In order to elaborate upon this and to challenge Jacqueline Rose's dismissal of Irigaray it is necessary to look more closely at Irigaray's specific intervention with Lacanian psychoanalysis.

Irigaray's critique of Freud, of his unwitting or unconscious phallocentrism is based on his 'failure' or inability to conceive of his theories within their cultural, historical, philosophical context. Consequently:

"He interprets women's sufferings, their symptoms, their dissatisfaction, in terms of their individual histories, without questioning the relationship of their "pathology" to a certain state of society, of culture." (1985b: 70)

Lacan, on the other hand, provides the necessary contextualization. His re-reading of Freud illuminates the phallocentrism at the heart of western culture, and shows 'Woman' to be 'a category constructed around the phallic term' (Mitchell & Rose, 1982: 137). Irigaray begins the chapter *Cosi Fan Tutti* (Women are like that), a chapter in which she rereads Lacan's *Encore, Seminar XX* using the notion of 'truth' as a means by which to open his text to scrutiny, with the declaration that:

"Psychoanalytic discourse on female sexuality is the discourse of truth. A discourse that tells the truth about the logic of truth: namely, that the feminine occurs only within models and laws devised by male subjects" (1985b: 86, Irigaray's italics)
What is the ‘truth’ of female sexuality? Irigaray argues that when psychoanalysis takes discourse itself as the object of its investigation, the ‘truth of the truth about female sexuality is restated’ (1985b: 87), language is both the cause and the symptom. That is, sexuality is defined in and through language which projects its own ‘truths’ about sexuality. In language, Lacan reveals, woman is not constituted as a subjective identity but is a negative condition upon which masculine identity is predicated:

There is no woman who is not excluded by the nature of things, which is the nature of words, and it must be said that, if there is something they complain a lot about at the moment, that is what it is – except that they don’t know what they are saying, that’s the whole difference between them and me (1985b: 87)\textsuperscript{vi}

Here Irigaray uses a technique familiar from *Speculum of the Other Woman*, of employing direct quotations which acquire a critical irony within the context of her argument. Irigaray’s point is that woman’s exclusion from discourse becomes the truth of the nature of discourse, ‘the nature of words’ according to Lacan. The phallogocentric symbolic order that Lacan describes is the ‘all’ of discourse, therefore his account of the truth of discourse becomes ‘the’ truth. Woman’s exclusion, Irigaray states, ‘is internal to an order from which nothing escapes’, if one suggests that (man’s) discourse is not all that there is, the Lacanian response is that ‘it is women who are ‘not-all’” (1985b: 88). Irigaray goes on to argue that when Lacan states that there is ‘no pre-discursive reality’, that ‘every reality is based upon and defined by a discourse’ (1985b: 88), he is assigning for himself a privileged position in relation to discourse, or more specifically to psychoanalytic theory as a discourse about discourse:
He makes laws, going so far as to confuse them with science – which no reality resists. The whole is already circumscribed and determined in and by his discourse (1985b: 88)

Whereas Lacan views his truth of the truth of woman as intractable Irigaray attempts to offer the possibility of its provisionality.

As Lacan challenged the claim to truth of the post-Freudian ego psychologists, i.e. of the analyst as repository of knowledge (Lacan, 1953), Irigaray challenges the Lacanian claim to neutrality, indifference and universality, turning his linguistic theory back upon Lacan himself. Irigaray argues that psychoanalytic theory is the product of man’s self-representation, and as such can only tell its own version of the ‘truth’ about woman. Irigaray identifies that this claim to neutrality, the speaking of and for women, occurs because masculine discourse has rid itself of relation to the body. This evacuation of the body is a pre-requisite of the transcendent ‘male’ specular gaze, that allows man to be his own object of scrutiny whilst retaining for himself subjective status. This self-mirroring creates an illusion of the pure reflection of truth:

Does the subject derive his power from the appropriation of this non-place of the mirror? And from speculation? And as speculation constitutes itself as such in this way, it cannot be analysed, but falls into oblivion, re-emerging to play its part only when some new effect of symmetry is needed in the system. (1985a: 205-6)

In contrast to this flat mirror of one-dimensional and distanced specularization, the curved mirror proposed in Speculum of the Other Woman is one that touches upon female specificity, rather than reflecting woman as man’s other, or consigning her to association with the Other. In relation to expression and creativity, as the thesis will
go on to discuss, Irigaray proposes a form of enunciation that touches upon the sensible rather than ridding itself of contact with materiality.

In *Encore*, Lacan elaborates upon woman’s association with the Other, a signification of that which is lacking as certainty in conscious knowledge, she is ‘not all’, this is her designation in relation to the phallic function, i.e. the operation of language and the symbolic (Lacan, 1982: 144). Yet she is also an object of desire, the ‘*objet a*’, the filler-in of the void of being that stands in for the lost maternal/material object, that which underpins symbolisation. As Jacqueline Rose describes her, woman is the ‘symptom’ of man’s loss (Rose, 1982: 48). In *Così Fan Tutti*, it is this designation of woman as ‘function’ rather than subject that Irigaray is opening to scrutiny: that woman ‘does not exist’ yet ‘sustains the desire of these “speaking beings” that are called men’, that she is a ‘place for the deposit of the remainders produced by the operation of language’, not functioning as a body of her own but as a ‘bodily reminder’, a ‘body without organs’ (1985b: 89-90).

One of the central themes of Lacan’s *Encore* is the incongruity of the concept of ‘sexual relation’ within the operations of phallic discourse. He describes this relation as a fantasy of Oneness that is supported by woman’s non-existence, her designation as ‘not all’ and her function as *objet a* – potential filler of the void in being. He exemplifies Courtly love as the most extreme form of this fantasy, where woman’s association with the transcendental Other, as fantasised location of completeness and knowledge, results in her deification. In response to this, and as part of her attempt to undercut the claim to truth made by psychoanalysis, Irigaray asks, with characteristic irony, whether psychoanalysis might,
in its greatest logical rigour, be a negative theology... since what is postulated as the cause of
desire is lack as such (1985b: 89)

According to Lacan, in the context of this fantasy of Oneness there is a remainder that
exceeds the phallic term:

If she [woman] is excluded by the nature of things, it is precisely that in being not all, she has,
in relation to what the phallic function designates of *jouissance*, a supplementary *jouissance*
(Lacan, 1982: 114)

Here is where Lacan appears to skirt the theoretical borders of his own topology. On
one level he appears to be taking an interest in the possibility of a *jouissance*, of
woman that remains free of, or goes beyond language and the Law:

There is a *jouissance*... a *jouissance* of the body which is, if the expression be allowed,
*beyond the phallus* (Lacan, 1982: 145)

He even suggests the possibility that female analysts might be able to tell him
something of this *jouissance*: ‘we’ve been begging them... begging them on our
knees to try to tell us about it’ (Lacan, 1982: 146). Irigaray however, reads this as
confirmation that what Lacan is actually talking about is that which exceeds man’s
phallic fantasy of totalization, in other words, man’s version of woman’s *jouissance*,
his estimation of this ‘remainder’. For this reason the term *jouissance* is also linked
with the concept of an *objet a*, a promise of fulfilment that is itself a signification of
loss, it cannot be expressed in words (Wright, 1992: 298). In a double gesture of
exemplification, that shows and yet negates explanation of this *jouissance*, Lacan
directs his reader’s gaze towards Bernini’s statue of St Theresa in Rome:
She's coming, there's no doubt about it... It is clear that the essential testimony of the mystics is that they are experiencing it but know nothing about it (Lacan, 1982: 147)

Irigaray reads this as symptomatic of woman's mere functionality, because she is a 'body without organs', 'the geography of feminine pleasure is not worth listening to', and furthermore within this phallic logic woman's inability to speak or be heard is not even questioned by Lacan for whom, 'on the subject of female sexuality, our lady analyst colleagues tell us... not everything' (1985b: 90). For Irigaray woman's objectification is exemplified most ludicrously by Lacan's entreaty to his audience to view a statue carved by a man:

In Rome? So far away?... her own writings are perhaps more telling (1985b: 91)

Irigaray's suggests that Lacan not only reveals the workings of phallocentric discourse for his reader, but that he promotes a phallocentric perspective in his own work. In order to exemplify the 'truth' of female jouissance he looks to a man's representation of St Theresa rather than to her own writings, in which 'traces' of the feminine might be discernible. However, as Irigaray then adds:

How can one "read" them when one is a "man"? The production of ejaculations of all sorts, often prematurely emitted, makes him miss, in the desire for identification with the lady, what her own pleasure might be all about. And... his? (1985b: 91)

thereby indicating the investment masculinity has in disavowing alterity, but also alluding to possible disadvantages of negating the potentiality of otherness outside masculine self-definitions. Irigaray is particularly critical of what appears to be Lacan's a-historicization of this masculine universal, his claim to 'truth' that there is, 'no exit from this logos, which is wholly assimilated to the discourse of knowledge'
Also that Lacan's psychoanalytic explanation of sexual relation at the level of discourse, whilst itself, 'entangled in the discourse of truth', provides the 'surest way of perpetuating the phallic economy' (1985b: 100). In this respect, psychoanalysis is likened to a type of feudalism that, 'perpetuates the subjection of women' (1985b: 103-4).

The claims of the Lacanian feminist position refute this reading. Ellie Ragland - Sullivan, for example, argues that Irigaray's reading of Lacan as a 'phallocrat' is mistaken because it construes his concepts of phallus and castration in too literal a sense:

I find no a priori Lacanian support for phallocentrism – any more than for Lacanian-supported feminism. Lacan discovered the phallic signifier, its effects and the resulting structure of substitutive Desire. These intrinsically neutral elements give rise to ideologies of the masculine and feminine that cluster around the male-female difference and dramatise themselves in a parade. (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986: 298)

In consequence Ragland-Sullivan suggests that where as Lacan talks of masculinity and femininity at a symbolic level, as effects of discourse, Irigaray's criticism draws upon the female body as a 'natural' and 'primordial' entity (Ragland-Sullivan, 1986: 302-3). Jacqueline Rose on the other hand admits Lacan's implication in phallocentrism, but only in as far as all discourse is implicated in this way, she too views feminist critique of Lacan as falling back on biologistic claims:

There is... no question of denying here that Lacan was implicated in the phallocentrism he described... But for Lacan [questions of the unconscious and of sexuality] function as the question of that speech, and cannot be referred back to a body outside language, a place to which the 'feminine', and through that, women, might escape. In the response to Lacan,
therefore, the 'feminine' has returned as it did in the 1920s and 1930s in reply to Freud, but this time with the added meaning of a resistance to a phallic organisation of sexuality which is recognised as such. (Rose, 1982: 56)

I would argue that rather than referring questions of female sexuality and identity back to a 'body outside language' it is precisely the intextuation of subjectivity within the phallic order that Irigaray concerns herself with. As such, the body is always understood morphologically, through psychical and linguistic processes. The term 'ideal morphology' (1985a: 320) is used by Irigaray in reference to the western conception of rationality through phallomorphic metaphors. The valorization of presence, identity, non-contradiction etc. is based on a prioritisation of stable form over ambiguity, a logic that is equated with the phallic symbolic. Irigaray argues therefore, that if the logic of western thought is phallomorphic, this is predicated by a negative morphology of the female body:

The one of form, of the individual, of the (male) sexual organ, of the proper name, of the proper meaning... supplants, while separating and dividing, that contact of at least two (lips) which keeps woman in touch with herself, but without any possibility of distinguishing what is touching from what is touched. (1985b: 26)

It is clear that Irigaray is not making an unmediated, biologistic or empirical reference to male or female bodies here, but is drawing upon their morphological interpretation in cultural discourse. As Genevieve Lloyd (1984) explains:

In the Pythagorean table of opposites, formulated in the sixth century BC, femaleness was explicitly linked with the unbounded – the vague, the indeterminate – as against the bounded – the precise and clearly determined...Thus 'male' and 'female', like the other contrasted terms, did not here function as straightforwardly descriptive classifications. 'Male', like the other
terms on its side of the table, was construed as superior to its opposite; and the basis for this superiority was its association with the primary Pythagorean contrast between form and formlessness. (Lloyd, 1984: 3)

If, according to Irigaray, western thought is shaped by a ‘male imaginary’, as is demonstrated in her reading of the unconscious levels of thought in the work of Freud and Lacan, the notion of a ‘female imaginary’ is construed in two different ways. It is either the unconscious, or underside of western thought (1985b: 25, 73), or it does not yet exist, it is merely the fragmented excess or waste of the male imaginary (1985b: 30). In either case, within the co-constitutive relation of the imaginary, the symbolic and the real that Lacan identifies, the female is always constituted as an excluded by-product of male subjectivity, ‘an excess of all identifications to/of self’ (1985a: 230).

Margaret Whitford (1988) argues that Lacan in fact conflates the imaginary with the real in his statement, ‘there is no pre-discursive reality’ (Lacan, 1975: 33), taking the real to be ‘co-extensive with the categories of discourse’ rather than an implied ‘state of non-differentiation from which [the imaginary and the symbolic] have emerged’ (Whitford, 1988: 119-20). Whitford likens ‘the real’ to Castoriadis’s ‘magma’, an equation also made by Irigaray in *An Ethics of Sexual Difference* (1993a: 104). If ‘the real’ remains ungraspable, by its very nature outside of discourse, this implies that discourse is itself mutable, that is, there is always something in excess of discourse that offers potential for change. However, if the real and the imaginary are conflated, in theory there would be no possibility for change because everything would be subjected to the same categories of discourse:

What poses problems in reality turns out to be justified by a logic that has already ordered reality as such. Nothing escapes the circularity of this law. (1985b: 88)
Irigaray identifies that in order to overcome the universality of phallic law; a radicalization of the symbolic is required. Elizabeth Grosz clarifies the problem in terms of post-Lacanian feminist positions when she states that:

Unless the symbolic order is conceived as a system where the father and the penis are not the only possible signifiers of social power and linguistic norms (even if they are the dominant ones here, today), feminism is no better off with Lacan than without him. (Grosz, 1990a: 145)

As a means of specifying Irigaray's position vis-à-vis post-Lacanian feminisms, and by way of elaboration upon Elizabeth Grosz' point above, it is useful to explore how Irigaray's project contrasts with the work of Julia Kristeva. Like Irigaray, Kristeva's work takes as its starting point Lacan's topographical relationship between the symbolic, the imaginary and the real. Kristeva applies this structural topography on both an individual developmental level and a cultural level. As with Lacan, the symbolic is therefore associated with oedipalisation into phallic sexuality and entry into the social order of law and language. Therefore in Kristeva's account, it is a 'male' superimposed order that is subtended by the semiotic, the condition of pre-oedipal polymorphous sexuality identified as female, and associated with the maternal. The semiotic can be likened to Freud's 'Dark Continent' or Lacan's concept of female jouissance; it is the enigmatic, heterogeneous, inexpressible underside of the symbolic order. For Kristeva, whose concern is with the 'speaking subject', the symbolic, or regulated order of the phallic logos, is characterized by unified texts, discourses and knowledges, but these are dependent upon the more material properties of the semiotic such as, phonic graphic and corporeal supports. Both the symbolic and the semiotic are necessary for the speaking subject, but as Kristeva argues, culture's necessary dependence upon the semiotic remains unrepresented, unspoken. Kristeva presents the semiotic as both the precondition of
the symbolic and its excessive overflow; it is defined as a space or 'chora', the boundaries of which may be transgressed, bringing disruption to symbolic norms. Although associated with the female, or 'woman' in the Lacanian sense, women do not have privileged access to the semiotic. Indeed, Kristeva attributes textual disruption from the semiotic to avant-garde male artists/writers of the modernist period (Kristeva, 1974b: 138). To a certain extent, it is these male artists who speak for woman, because for Kristeva, in accordance with Lacanian theory, '[W]omen cannot be':

The category woman is even that which does not fit in to being. From there, women's practice can only be negative, in opposition to that which exists... What I mean by 'woman' is that which is left out of namings and ideologies. (Kristeva, 1980:166)

Although Kristeva acknowledges the reliance of the symbolic upon the semiotic, and of phallic order upon the maternal, these are constituted as binary oppositions organized in relation to a phallic principle. The semiotic is a product of the symbolic, or as Gail Schwab (1994: 353) suggests, 'just another phallic privilege'. The imagery of the maternal that Kristeva draws upon, is of the phallic pre-oedipal mother; fragmented, subjectless, reduced to bodily processes (Kristeva, 1980: 242).

Throughout Kristeva’s work there remains a problematic even negative conception of the maternal, with the semiotic chôra characterised as it is, as a site of confusion and loss of identity. Even the art of the male avant-garde writer, open as it is to the 'pulsions' of the semiotic, is referred to as a type of death:

It is as if death becomes interiorized by the subject of such a practice; in order to function, he must make himself the bearer of death (Kristeva, 1974a: 120
In spite of Kristeva’s concern with the radical potential of the semiotic in the artistic expression of the male avant-garde, this interplay between masculine and feminine differentiation within the subject and within social signifying practices is pervaded with a sense of ‘threat’ from within the semiotic. The ambiguity of this position is criticised by Judith Butler (1989), who accuses Kristeva of, ‘alternately [positing] and [denying] the semiotic as an emancipatory ideal’ (Butler, 1989: 105). This ambiguity between potentiality and threat is expanded in Kristeva’s later work on ‘abjection’ in *Powers of Horror* (1980/1982). The abject is best understood as a process rather than as a thing, it marks the formulation of the first tentative boundary between infant and mother. Preceding the Lacanian mirror stage but indicating an initial movement away from the pre-oedipal mother, it is instigated through horror and revulsion, and characterized by a sense of emptiness (Kristeva, 1983: 257). The empty space is a precondition for ego development and representation, the gap between signifier and signified. The ‘Third Party’ or phallic symbolic is required in order for the production of signs to emerge from the emptiness (Kristeva, 1983: 258). However, that which has been abjected in order to create this space is ever present at its borders, challenging and threatening the lines of subjective demarcation, and causing the subject to exist, ‘in perpetual danger’ (Kristeva, 1982: 9). The imagery of abjection inevitably draws upon dichotomous representations of masculine and feminine, and their concomitant binary associations with good and evil, purity and defilement, structure and fluidity (Kristeva, 1982: 65).

Equally problematic is the way in which Kristeva advocates the marginality of women; taking the notion of woman as other from Lacanian theory, and re-endorsing this as a political, or speaking position – the language of exile (1977: 296-8). Indeed Toril Moi, editor of *The Kristeva Reader* suggests that,
Many of Kristeva’s most valuable insights draw at times on highly contentious forms of subjectivist politics (Moi, 1985: 169)

This is largely due to Kristeva’s approach to sexual difference. At one level she can be seen to advocate the binary opposition of male and female belonging to western metaphysics (Schwab, 1994: 359), as in the relationship between the symbolic and the semiotic outlined above. At another level, the differentiation of masculine and feminine within both male and female subjects, and more particularly the threat of ‘the feminine’, is offered as a subversion or dissolution of all sexual identities (Kristeva, 1974c: 165-6). However, Kristeva does not indicate how this might be harnessed as a positive political strategy for women, leading to Dorothy Leland’s criticism of her as a political pessimist:

For Kristeva, as for Lacan, the Symbolic Order is an “implacable structure” and the only escape is psychosis (Leland, 1989: 96)

For Irigaray the question of sexual difference is one of sexual specificity. Because women and women’s bodies are negated or inscribed as lack, or ‘not all’, in the dominant representational system and effectively silenced, she proposes a concept of difference without positive terms. Rather than a system of oppositions or binary divisions organized around a single term, ‘the Phallus’, Irigaray posits the possibility of ‘pure difference’ where woman is not defined in relation to a male imaginary but in her own terms (1985b: 23-33). This does not mean that Irigaray claims to have located a pre-symbolic ‘feminine’ that women can appropriate for themselves. On the contrary, Irigaray’s work attempts to re-read back through the discourses of subjectivity, ontology and metaphysics that have perpetrated the marginalization or negation of woman within phallocentric culture, and by interrogating these discourses,
reconstruct or re-inscribe woman with a positive morphology. This involves the close reading of theoretical text, power-relations and linguistic structure. However, unlike Kristeva, who looks upon sexual difference in the abstract, for Irigaray this difference is always associated with the interface of culture and the sexed body. Although for Irigaray potential change in culture is hypostatized by the existence of the real, an intangible entity that exceeds language and culture, the real cannot be drawn upon in any direct sense, disruption has to come from within discourse. The space from which woman might speak has to be created (1985b: 153-4), and the female body becomes instrumental in Irigaray’s operation of this discursive disruption, as I shall come on to discuss presently. The point I want to make here regarding Jacqueline Rose’s criticism of Irigaray’s evocation of feminine specificity:

Feminine specificity is... predicated directly onto the concept of an unmediated and unproblematic relation to origin (Rose, 1982: 54)

is that it misses Irigaray’s point. It is because of woman’s problematic relation to origin, made problematic by phallic appropriation of origin, that it is necessary to approach the question of feminine specificity at all. Margaret Whitford suggests that whereas, ‘the Lacanians take Irigaray to be talking about feminine specificity at the level of drives’ she takes Irigaray, ‘to be talking about feminine specificity at the level of the symbolic, or representation’ (Whitford, 1989: 114). It is the possibility of woman’s representation that Irigaray addresses.

Irigaray does not propose that it is possible to slot a new conceptualization of woman into existing systems of representation, but that ‘a disruptive excess is possible’ from
the negative, feminine underside of discourse. By exploiting this, she sets out to challenge the primacy of the very system that Lacan describes:

The issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of which woman would be the subject or the object, but of jamming the theoretical machinery itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of a truth and of a meaning that are excessively univocal. Which presupposes that women do not aspire simply to be men’s equals in knowledge. That they do not claim to be rivalling men in constructing a logic of the onto-theo-logic as its model, but that they are rather attempting to wrest this question away from the economy of the logos. (1985b: 78)

It is characteristic of Irigaray’s deconstructive – reconstructive approach that such proposals seem unimaginable, it is as though the proposition itself lays challenge to discursive truth. For example, when Irigaray asks, ‘what if the “object” started to speak?’ (1985a: 134), the question itself begins to undermine the very logic that it calls upon to operate as a question.

The Mother/Daughter relation and the Symbolic: In respect of a female imaginary the two lips (labia) are evoked as a powerful synecdoche, representative of a radical female morphology through which heterogeneity challenges the universality of phallic law. Both Freud and Lacan posit the sexual neutrality of the pre-symbolic being in order that sexual differentiation be made in accordance with the phallic symbolic:

A man minus the possibility of (re)presenting oneself as a man = a normal woman (1985a: 26-7)

Likewise, the mother is represented in terms of the hom(m)mosexual economy as either phallic or castrated. Irigaray however, by stressing the sexual specificity of the female body (i.e. if the female body is different it should not be represented as ‘male’
or ‘not-male’) argues that the unsymbolized mother/daughter relationship could provide a means of disrupting the phallic symbolic order:

In our societies, the mother/daughter, daughter/mother relationship constitutes a highly explosive nucleus. Thinking it, and changing it, is equivalent to shaking the foundations of the patriarchal order. (1981b: 50)

In both propositions Irigaray seeks to re-write the female body as a potential site for the production of diverse knowledges. But in order to conceive of the mother/daughter relation in an affirmatory sense it is necessary to work through the psycho-symbolic specificities of Irigaray’s proposal.

Irigaray argues that women’s residual position arises from a location in the symbolic order that is confined to maternal function. As such, woman serves a purpose as part of the phallic economy but is unable to assume an identity that is distinct from her maternal function. In the absence of symbolization woman is without subjectivity and is said to be in a state of déréliction (1993a: 67), or abandonment. This means that:

There is no possibility whatsoever, within the current logic of sociocultural operations, for a daughter to situate herself with respect to her mother... they make neither one nor two, neither has name, meaning, sex of her own, neither can be “identified” with respect to the other (1985b: 143)

In positing a mother/daughter relationship, Irigaray constitutes what Rosi Braidotti refers to as ‘a new paradigm’ in the image of:

A couple that enacts the politics of female subjectivity (Braidotti, 1989: 96)
However, Irigaray is conscious that merging identities with the mother, ‘un fusionnel’ functions as a:

seduction or bondage that annihilates any possibility of subjecthood (1993: 69)

This would be the equivalent of psychosis or foreclosure in Lacanian terminology. Irigaray argues that it is in being woman and/or mother that the possibility of female subjectivity lies, her emphasis is on the distinction between the two identities. For this reason, Margaret Whitford warns that in claiming that Irigaray is, ‘celebrating the feminine’ it is necessary to be, ‘wary of how one describes that feminine’ (Whitford, 1991b: 81). The distinction is to be found in the contrast between mother/daughter relations depicted in Irigaray’s essays, *When Our Lips Speak Together* (1980) and, *And the One Doesn’t Stir without the Other* (1981). The first can be described as an idealistic or utopian vision of horizontal ‘woman to woman’ sociality exemplified by vertical or ‘sensible-transcendental’ mother/daughter relationality. In an escape from phallic tropes of rationality, the essay is characterized by exploration, plurality and becoming, rather than assimilation into a fixed system of meaning. Carolyn Burke, in her introduction to the essay, quotes from it in commenting how:

 Appropriately, the many lips of Irigaray’s female speaker(s) are never simply “opened or closed upon a single truth” (Burke, 1980: 68)

*And the One Doesn’t Stir without the Other* examines the mother/daughter relationship as it appears within a phallic economy. This time the plurality of mother/daughter forms a negative picture, frozen, immobilized in a mirror image that fuses the two identities together (1981b: 66), thereby preventing the possibility of separate existence or relationship between ‘whole’ women.
This fusion between mother and daughter is similar to the problem of individuation discussed by object relations theorists such as Nancy Chodorow (1978). Chodorow argues that the asymmetrical ego structures in our culture are brought about because it is women, not men, who mother. This becomes a self-deprecat ing cycle for women because a closer pre-oedipal bond between mothers and daughters results in a weaker sense of self:

Mothers tend to experience their daughters as more like, and continuous with, themselves. Correspondingly girls tend to remain part of the dyadic primary mother-child relationship itself. This means that a girl continues to experience herself as involved in issues of merging and separation, and in an attachment characterised by primary identification and fusion of identification and object choice. (Chodorow, 1978: 166)

Chodorow’s account of the reproduction of mothering is, however, confined to an experiential, psychosocial or phenomenological reading; she does not consider the extent to which discourse itself reproduces these roles and relationships. Whilst Irigaray would agree with the clinical picture given by Chodorow, for her it is symptomatic of women’s position in the symbolic order, symptomatic of women’s déréliction:

As our tradition has it, this dimension [love of/for herself] is covered over, swallowed up, or relegated to the beyond. Which places the female in an oblivion that entails the abyss, the abandonment and the dispersion of the other-man (1993a: 71)

But what would it mean, according to Irigaray, to bring about a radicalisation, or feminization, of the symbolic? It is clear that Irigaray is not proposing the exchange of one monolithic symbolic for another, but that a symbolised mother – daughter
relation, or maternal genealogy might not only facilitate women's subjective status but also offset the reductive tyranny of the phallic symbolic. Margaret Whitford encapsulates this as:

A symbolic recognition that two parents are involved in reproduction, and that there is a relation between them (Whitford, 1991a: 92)

This is expressed by Irigaray in the term 'double syntax' (1985a: 139, 1985b: 132). On one side is the Logos, rationality, stable form, the Idea; on the other side everything that subtends these dominant values, materiality, heterogeneity, nature etc. a symbolic 'division of labour' (1993a: 118). The former is isomorphic with the male imaginary, the latter with the feminine, the excess or by products of phallocentric logic. A radicalised symbolic would place both of these as positive terms, allowing reciprocity instead of domination and subjugation. For Irigaray this involves questions of epistemology and creativity alongside issues of subjectivity. Irigaray identifies that although present discourse gives the appearance of neutrality or universality, the split or 'scission' between the two syntaxes positions men and women very differently in relation to discourse. This is expressive of the postmodern dilemma for feminism:

In this division between the two sides of sexual difference, one part of the world would be searching for a way to find and speak its meaning, its side of signification, while the other would be questioning whether meaning is still to be found in language, values and life (1993a: 126)

In terms of epistemology, this is also applicable to the scission, for example, between Reason and feeling. There is no suggestion that this shift from hierarchical difference
(+-) to pure difference (+/+), as Irigaray explains:

I tried to put that syntax into play in Speculum, but not simply, to the extent that a single gesture obliged me to go back through the relation of the masculine imaginary. This I could not, I cannot install myself just like that, serenely and directly, in that other syntactic functioning — and I do not see how any woman could. (1985b: 135)

The project that Irigaray undertakes — to explore the potential (re)symbolisation of sexual difference, is one that extends beyond psychoanalytic discourse. The second part of this chapter will elaborate how Irigaray’s project intersects with western philosophical thought.

**Philosophy**

Although there is an aptness in beginning this chapter with psychoanalysis, Irigaray is after all trained in psychoanalysis and linguistics and began her career as a pupil of Lacan, she does however, insist that her primary focus of concern is philosophy, ‘the discourse on discourses’ (1985b: 149), and regards psychoanalysis as only, ‘a possible enclave of philosophical discourse’ (1985b: 160). It is precisely this positioning of philosophy as ‘the master discourse’ (1985b: 149) that is significant for Irigaray, for in both its prescriptive and descriptive functions, which for Irigaray amount to the same thing, philosophy has maintained a ‘stranglehold on history’ (1985b: 149). For Irigaray, the teleological project of western metaphysics is marked by, ‘turning away’, ‘deviation’, ‘reduction’, convolutions that are necessary, as is discernible in Freud’s work, to maintain the ‘artifice of sameness’ (1985b: 150) and obscure the feminine. It is for this reason that Irigaray sets out to re-read philosophy, ‘so that something of the feminine as the limit of the philosophical might fully be heard’ (1985b: 150). The
proposed methodology employed in this re-reading involves textually playing the feminine that is pre-supposed by the 'master discourse', or 'having a fling with the philosophers' (1985b: 149-50). Caroline Burke, in her article *Romancing the Philosophers* (1989) refers to the erotics of Irigaray’s writing, suggesting that,

She advocates not an intellectual tête-à-tête but a physical ‘corps-a-corps’ (Burke, 1989: 229)

For Irigaray, ‘the bodily encounter’ is always prefigured by the bodily encounter with the mother, thereby defying reduction to phallic unity. Burke (1989) identifies *When Our Lips Speak Together* (1980), *And the One Doesn’t Stir Without the Other* (1981b) and *Le Corps-a-corps avec la mere* (1981) as experimentations in ‘feminine modes of embodiment and contact’ which form part of a transitional stage or hyphen between phases of Irigaray’s work (Burke, 1989: 229). It is these texts which inform the textual methodology used to re-read the philosophers, where, borrowing her terminology from Rene Char, Irigaray proposes to, ‘destroy... with nuptial tools’ the ‘artifice of sameness’ (1985b: 149). Or as Burke describes it, Irigaray reasserts the silenced feminine,

By countering one form of seduction with another (Burke, 1989: 227)

Irigaray argues that it is only possible to carry out this ‘seduction’ with means already assigned to the female condition, that is by ‘mimicry’ or ‘mimesis’, described in *This Sex Which Is Not One* as a means by which to,

Convert a form of subordination into an affirmation, and thus to begin to thwart it (1985b: 76)
Irigaray proposes that by deliberately assuming the exploitative role assigned to the feminine in discourse it may be possible to reveal the operations of that exploitation. However, as Irigaray suggests, this operation is not without dangers of re-appropriation, ‘that the philosopher may exploit for (self-)reflection’ (1985b: 151). For this reason it is crucial that in mimetic mode ‘the philosopher’s wife’ does not become a mere reflection, but ‘keeps something in reserve’, maintains something of the ‘otherwise’ the ‘elsewhere’ of the feminine (1985b: 151-2). Therefore in this discursive operation Irigaray likens the feminine role not to the reflective image in the mirror but to the materiality of the mirror itself. Mimesis, the redeployment of the feminine in discourse is a way of ‘jamming the theoretical machinery’, but more subtly, as ‘corps-a-corps’ it is a way of reintroducing materiality to discourse:

[Men] have become culturally distanced from their bodies. Historically, they have chosen sex and language against or in spite of the body. The depositories of the body are women... It would be necessary for women to be recognised as bodies with sexual attribute(s), desiring and uttering, and for men to rediscover the materiality of their bodies. There should no longer be this separation: sex - language on the one hand, body - matter on the other. Then perhaps, another history would be possible... (1977: 96)

Clearly, Irigaray’s ‘fling with the philosophers’ has the underlying intent of performing a deconstruction - reconstruction of western metaphysics, forcing theory to re-encounter the body. Perhaps the most famous cathexis of rationality is to be found in the Cartesian subject or ‘cogito’, a subject who represents the incorporeal and the universal. In An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993a), Irigaray’s reading of Descartes’ The Passions of the Soul examines the scission between thought and the physical, extended to the subject/object, male/female split. Irigaray argues that according to Descartes, ‘the object becomes no more than the result of the alchemy of
the subject’s passions’ (1993a: 77). That is, the subject constitutes the object for
‘himself’, and as Irigaray demonstrates, the ‘place of inscription’ is situated ‘solely in
the brain’ (1993a: 77). Irigaray attempts to break down the static opposition of
subject and object by introducing a third term ‘wonder’, a space of ‘freedom between
the subject and the world’ (1993a: 76). Wonder exceeds and resists the reduction of
the other to ourselves, wonder is inspired and instigated by the other, it can be located
*between* entities as relational space:

> The point of passage between two closed worlds, two definite universes, two space-times or
two others determined by their identities, two epochs, two others... (1993a: 75)

> A third dimension. An intermediary. Neither the one nor the other. Which is not to say
neutral or neuter... (1993a: 82)

It is this relational space, prefigured in this context by ‘wonder’, that Irigaray most
closely associates with the radical possibilities of artistic creativity (1993a: 13) and
where I will be attempting to locate the creative practices of drama education later in
the thesis.

Clearly not all of the philosophers with whom Irigaray engages can be said to ‘bar the
corporeal’, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty for example both seek to reinstate
considerations of physical being. It is in the edifice of sexual neutrality, or failure to
adequately represent sexed identity that Irigaray suggests an implicit recourse to the
divisions of western metaphysics persists. In the context of my project, which seeks
to re-examine drama education in the light of Irigaray’s work, it is important to stress
that Irigaray’s project extends beyond critique of phallocentrism into forms of
productive philosophy, thereby to ascertain how reapplying Irigaray’s work can
constitute a productive dialogue rather than a merely critical reading. In an interview with Elizabeth Hirsh and Gary Olsen (1995), Irigaray outlines what she describes as the three phases of her work. The first is to critique the 'auto-mono-centrism of the western subject' or construction of western subjectivity and thought according to a masculine perspective; the second involves exploration into the possibility of a second subject, 'to define those mediations that could permit the existence of a feminine subjectivity'; and the third phase is to explore the potentiality of intersubjectivity or, 'how to define a relationship, a philosophy, an ethic... between two different subjects' (Hirsh & Olsen, 1995: 97). At first glance, Irigaray's re-reading of the philosophers might seem to fall into the first phase only, but it is possible to discern ways in which the other two phases are implied or prefigured in these readings. Mimesis, as an 'embodied' method of interaction and a means of opening up sites of subordination, can be seen as an enactment of Irigaray's second phase exploration. The third phase is evidenced in Irigaray's evocation of a pre-Socratic 'elemental' world-view, which she argues has been obfuscated by Reason's monopoly of western thought (1993b: 57). Several of Irigaray's commentators have identified the strategic implications and productive potential of drawing upon this elemental imagery. Margaret Whitford for example, draws attention to discursive potential:

It provides a vocabulary for talking in the most basic terms about the material of passional life, about opposition and conflict, or love and exchange, about fertility and creativity, or sterility and death, a vocabulary which is more immediate and direct in its language than the abstractions of conceptualization. (Whitford, 1991a: 61)

Elizabeth Grosz also picks up on the linguistic advantages, for Irigaray's exploration of relationality as a productive alternative to binary logic:
Empedocles' representation of the four elements provides a startling yet appropriate metaphor of the meeting of different substances, a perilous meeting which, through Love, can bring productivity and unexpected creation, and through Strife can break down apparent unities and stable forms of co-existence. It is thus a rich metaphor for contemplating the possibilities of autonomy and interaction between the two sexes. (Grosz, 1989:169)

Irigaray posits this creative relationship, this erotic imaginary, as a basis for the renewal and recomposition of thought. This is not a crude prioritization of matter over form, but a challenge against the dichotomization of these two in western metaphysics.

In golden light you flow. Firm density, so light. Before the separation of earth and sky, sea and continents, light and dark. A mixture of rock, fire, water, ether. Where violence can still espouse gentleness. The heroic body overflowing with tenderness. Its weapons still those of a native innocence. Which blurs all sharp distinctions and brings all divisions back to their original nuptials. An alliance in which the opposing parties unite in an intense intermingling. (1992: 102)

From this ‘intense intermingling’ comes a state of perpetual change, flux or ‘becoming’. For Empedocles the drawing together of elemental particles is a process described as ‘Love’ or attraction, whereas through ‘Strife’ or hate components can be broken down (Grosz, 1989: 168). Irigaray uses this notion of Love as an intermediary and combinatory force but warns against destructive forms of ‘attraction’ which seek to appropriate rather than unite (1992:27). In Sexes and Genealogies (1993b), Irigaray outlines her project in the, so called, elemental texts as follows:

Writing Marine Lover, Passions elementaires, and L’oubli de l’air, I had thought of doing a study of our relations to the elements: water, earth, fire, air. I was anxious to go back to those natural matters that constitute the origin of our bodies, of our life, of our environment, the
flesh of our passions... These elements, which, since the beginning of philosophy, have been a focus of meditation of every creation of a world, have often been misunderstood in our culture, which has tended to refuse to think about the material conditions of existence. (1993b: 57)

This should not be read as the search for evidence of a primordial ‘feminine’ past, but as part of the three stage project outlined above; as a means by which to deconstruct metaphysical and ontological theories, and explore possibilities for feminine subjectivity and intersubjectivity. I will be looking more closely at Irigaray’s readings of Nietzsche and Heidegger, with whom these texts relate, later in the chapter.

If Irigaray’s movement back to the ‘elemental’ world-view of the pre-Socratics can be read as an endeavour to tergiversate the sublimation of rationality and form, her attention to classical mythology and philosophy can be seen as an attempt to intersect, at the level of theory, with the instigation of patriarchy. If, as discussed in the first section of this chapter, the western imaginary is in fact a masculine imaginary, based on the ideal morphology of the male body, then the basis for Irigaray’s epistemological challenge has to come from the marginalized or excluded body of the maternal feminine.¹⁰

Plato: In her reading of Plato’s myth of the cave, Irigaray takes the tripartite structure of the myth as a figurative depiction of the phallocentric economy, or economy of the same. The Sun, equated in Plato with the Idea, becomes, for Irigaray, the law of the father, metaphorically reflected in the world and literally onto the wall of the cave. The cave itself represents, for Irigaray, the maternal feminine, the material substratum on which representation depends. Plato’s original myth or parable (The Republic, VII, 514-517)¹⁰ depicts the mind’s ascent from illusion to pure philosophy. It takes the form
of a discussion between Plato and his pupil Glaucon, who is asked to imagine a cave with a passageway leading out to daylight. In the cave are prisoners, bound so that they are only able to look at the wall ahead of them. Behind them a fire is used by men to cast shadows on the wall, these images are the only dimension of reality known to the prisoners. The parable/discussion continues in the form of a supposition over the release of one of the prisoners and his gradual acquisition of knowledge, turning first towards the fire, then ascending out of the cave towards the world of light, and eventually looking at the sun.

In Irigaray’s reading of Plato’s myth, the topography becomes a metaphor for the primal scene, ‘confusion of the hysteria and the sun in an ecstasy of copula’ (1985a: 254). But it is a primal scene in which the mother is gradually forgotten, as the sun appropriates all notions of origin to itself:

The unrepresentable Idea, guarantees that replicas and copies are engendered and conform, and the fiction of the being-present masks the ancestry of its reproduction – production with repetition... Sun, anchor of origin. Closing off and arresting the cycle of phallic scenography and its system of light metaphors in an unreflected glare. (1985a: 256)

Irigaray notices that within the myth there is an obfuscation of features corresponding to female morphology. The passage between the cave and the outside world, the ‘forgotten vagina’ (1985a: 247) seemingly disappears, as do all material supports required for representation to take place. The prisoners never see the mechanics behind the illusion, their eyes are directed either towards images of representation or blinded by light which actually prevents them seeing how the illusion works:
They are under the spell of magic tricks and have nothing to oppose or compare to them, no “other” truth (1985a: 267)

The economy of representation, or metaphor, keeps mother/father, cave/idea apart. Truth must remain pure and appear to have no material supports, so the physicality/materiality of the cave is incorporated, appropriated, but remains hidden (1985a: 346). Margaret Whitford sums up Irigaray’s interpretation by suggesting that:

Truth has come to mean leaving behind the Mother (the cavern) and her role in reproduction (Whitford, 1991: 110)

Christine Battersby (1998) highlights the differences between Platonic and Irigarayan methodology, pertaining to notions of forgetting and recollecting the mother’s body. She describes the dialectics of the Platonic philosopher as a sublimated form of wrestling match (agon) between men, hidden behind which lies, ‘a less agonistic body to body contact with the mother’ that is never called upon. The accession of knowledge through dialectics, the approach toward pure Form, is an attempt to recollect in a flash of inner vision an abstract state of being prior to birth, one that is also returned to after death. For this reason Battersby argues that:

Bodies and birth are what Plato himself has repressed, and thus cannot ‘recollect’ (Battersby, 1998: 117)

Irigaray, in contrast, does not attempt to ‘recollect’ in the disembodied Platonic sense, but:
Via the work of intermingling philosophical voices and personae... mimes the process of birth itself: conjoined blood and corporeal fluids, body to body contacts, and the reproductive labour of the mother, (Battersby, 1998: 118)

Relationality itself, symbolised by the viscous interplay of identities to be found in the morphology of the maternal feminine, is at the heart of Irigaray’s critical rereading of western thought, characterised as it is by division, opposition, metaphorosity and sublimation. Throughout such rereadings Irigaray evokes a politics of the ‘threshold’, the ‘between’ or placental economy, as a powerful deconstructive, though simultaneously reconstructive, proposition. This is clearly discernible in Irigaray’s reading of ‘Diotima’s Speech’ from Plato’s Symposium in Sorcerer Love (1989).

Irigaray begins by emphasizing that Diotima is not present, she does not actually speak. Her location in Plato’s dramatic discourse on love is secured through the voice of Socrates, who re-enacts a former discussion between himself and Diotima. The character Diotima, as presented by Plato, therefore simultaneously represents pre-Socratic knowledge and also the Socratic re-presentation of that knowledge. Irigaray argues that through Socrates’ re-enactment of his discussion with Diotima it is possible to glimpse a world where love is an ‘intermediary’ between Gods and mortals, where:

that which stands between... makes possible the passage between ignorance and knowledge
[where] everything is always in movement, in a state of becoming (1993a: 21)

But the master discourse focuses on the moment of scission where love is split between mortality and immortality through the introduction of ‘causality’:

A chain that skips over or often forgets about the intermediary as a generative middle term (1993a: 26)
When 'procreation' is offered as a 'raison d'etat' for love between man and woman, love loses its 'daimonic' character, it becomes split between divine love, reflected in the love between men - a 'higher reality', and animalistic functionality which is to be transcended (1993a: 29, 31). This leads Irigaray to ask whether this is in fact:

the foundational act of metaphysics? (1993a: 27)

Irigaray declares that at this point Diotima's method 'miscarries', qualifying her criticism with a reminder that, 'she is not there. Socrates relates her words' (1993a: 27). Tina Chanter (1995) highlights Irigaray's unusual use of the verb 'to miscarry', suggesting that it recalls the famous image of Socrates as midwife, 'one who delivers people of their thoughts' (Chanter, 1995: 160). It may, therefore, be either or both Diotima's thinking and/or Socrates' delivery that is under question. Andrea Nye's critique of Sorcerer Love suggests that Irigaray reads Diotima out of historical context, or as a 'lapsed French Feminist struggling to maintain the "correct method" against philosophical orthodoxy' (Nye, 1989: 47). However, Nye's location of Diotima as an historical figure, caught in a transitional phase between pre-Socratic and Platonic values overlooks Irigaray's attention to dramatic context and discursivity. Irigaray is aware of the clash of values, but also that Diotima's speech is related through the context of the prevailing value of Platonic Truth. Andrea Nye herself draws attention to the problem of dissemination when, in defence of Diotima, she observes that:

In Plato's hands, Diotima's loving conversation becomes the Socratic elenchus: a programmed course of study in which pupil is guided toward a "correct" conclusion determined in advance. (Nye, 1989: 57)
What Nye fails to recognise is that Irigaray's criticism is of this Platonicized Diotima. The generative potentiality of love as intermediary between mortality and immortality, and by corollary, of philosophy as intermediary between opposing values (1993a: 24), is stifled, halted by the insertion of a goal. The teleological organisation of opposing categories in relation to a single principle perpetuates their separation:

A sort of teleological triangle is put into place instead of a perpetual journey, a perpetual transvaluation, a permanent becoming (1993a: 27)

These distinctions will be drawn out more fully in my discussion of pedagogy in Chapter Four. If Plato's handling of Diotima's speech marks the instigation of patriarchal pedagogy, the story of Antigone represents a challenge to the single, overarching principle of organization, or 'Law of the Father', because Antigone's determination to perform the rites of family law goes against the law of the king (patriarch). Irigaray's attention to this story also provides a point of intersection with Hegel, or even, as Christine Battersby suggests, a three-way conversation between Irigaray, Hegel and Lacan (Battersby, 1998: 109).

**Hegel:** Shannon Winnubst describes Hegel's 'totalizing' philosophy as a manoeuvre away from Kant's 'rigidifying of antinomies into intractable figures frozen in opposition' (Winnubst, 1999: 109). The Hegelian dialectic, in contrast, operates as a productive process that incorporates both sides of the dialectic. The Concept, or outcome of dialectical thinking, is not mediated according to an external 'Concept of Truth' but is founded by the dialectical process itself, 'It is a question of embodying the concept' (Winnubst, 1999: 16). Winnubst argues that in Lacan's totalizing field of the symbolic, 'the Concept becomes embodied – and thereby strangely
disembodied... as the phallus’ (Winnubst, 1999:16). The Concept (phallus) itself becomes the organizing principle of language according to desire. The self/other relation is no longer articulated as the desire for recognition (as in Hegel’s master/slave dialectic), requiring two self-consciouses, but as the desire to have or be the phallus. As with most of the male theoreticians with whom Irigaray engages in her writing, she is both influenced by and departs from their philosophical perspective. For example, Winnubst’s article goes on to discuss Irigaray’s repudiation of the Concept as a stronghold of phallocentric thinking\textsuperscript{4}, but also her attempt to recuperate the body in language as having a broadly Hegelian resonance.

Where Irigaray contends with, or departs from Hegel is in his attempt to universalize, conceptualize or fix meaning through dialectical thinking, which she argues, paradoxically produces or reproduces the oppositional structures that Hegel sought to overcome. This is most clearly demonstrated when Irigaray discusses Hegel’s reading of Antigone as *The Eternal Irony of the Community* (1985a: 214 – 226). In Sophocles’ drama, Antigone the daughter of Oedipus and Jocasta defies Crion’s (the king) edict and performs burial rites for her brother Polynices despite his misdeeds against the state. In *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel reads this as an exemplification of two ethical spheres, ‘the natural’ which is associated with women and ‘the cultural’ which is devised and occupied by men (Hegel, 1979: 280). Antigone’s actions are not deemed consciously ethical because they are born out of ‘natural’ familial feeling. Only men are capable of self-consciously ethical action because they have access to both familial and cultural, or individual and universal spheres (Hegel, 1979: 267). Hegel designates the brother/sister relationship as properly ethical, however, for three key reasons: It is not marked by sexual desire, they are of the same blood and there is the possibility of mutual self-recognition (Hegel, 1979: 274 – 275).
Irigaray regards Hegel’s suggestion of symmetry between brother and sister as a ‘consoling fancy’ an ‘Hegelian dream’, after all the parity or complimentarity of brother and sister is born out of a ‘dialectic produced by the discourse of patriarchy’, the nature/culture dialectic (1985a: 217). Only men can ‘be for themselves’ (1993a: 107), women function for men through the natural familial sphere, as with Antigone’s burial of Polynices:

What an amazing vicious circle in a single syllogistic system. Whereby the unconscious, while remaining unconscious, is yet supposed to know the laws of consciousness... and will become even more repressed as a result of failing to respect these laws. (1985a: 223)

Irigaray argues that although Hegel’s theory of ethical order is based on sexual difference, ‘he gives no thought to the living being as a sexed being’ i.e. to sexual specificity (1993b: 140). As Tina Chanter suggests, Irigaray’s reading shows that Hegel posits Antigone’s prohibition from ethical action as though it were ‘inscribed in her body... which Hegel reads as passive’ (Chanter, 1995:122). In other words, Hegel’s understanding of female ‘nature’ is suffused with cultural assumption. Sexed beings, Irigaray argues, are not reducible to opposition, but that such polarization is a manoeuvre required in order to maintain the claim that there is a ‘neuter universal’ (1993b: 140). It is not possible to maintain a free play of the heterogeneic factors which comprise sexed beings, and provide a universal conceptualization of beings, some form of reduction or negation must take place. Kelly Oliver suggests that negation is crucial to the operation of the Hegelian dialectic:

Dialectical logic always pits two terms against each other and the conflict is resolved by negating one term and then negating that negation so that the synthesis can take place... In the
case of the dialectic between the sexes, the masculine affirms itself by negating the feminine.

( Oliver, 1996: 83)

Irigaray describes Hegel’s Antigone as ‘the other of the same’ because she represents the negated side of the dialectic, but also because all of her actions are ultimately recoupable to the universal Concept (1993b: 111). For example, Christine Battersby compares Antigone’s (woman’s) status as the irony of the community as depicted by both Hegel and Lacan. For Hegel it is because she both sustains and threatens the ‘patrilineal’ community from within. For Lacan, she represents, as other, the boundary of the oedipalized/masculinized self, again both threatening and yet necessary for the delineation of the self (Battersby, 1998: 110 – 112). That woman is not only positioned as other, but that this positioning is necessary for the formulation of masculine self-identity, demonstrates the rigidifying effect of Hegel’s totalizing narrative. However, Irigaray seeks to find a way of circumventing this ‘vicious circle’ of the ‘single syllogistic system’ by interrogating the notion of ‘sameness’ or same blood that flows through brother and sister. In doing so, Irigaray draws attention to maternal genealogy, indicating that Polynices was the only sibling of Antigone to be born of the same mother but not the same father (1985a: 219). This maternal genealogy is represented by the term sang rouge (red blood), in contrast to this the sharing of the same father or ‘sperm’ is marked by the term sang blanc or ‘semblant’, referring to the ‘other of the same’. Irigaray argues that on the question of sexual difference Hegel is, ‘doomed to do what he wished not to do’ i.e. create a split between nature and the spirit, because he appeals to an over-arching concept of the same (the universal) that forces male and female into an oppositional conflict (1993b: 139 -140). In drawing attention to the genealogy or bond of red blood between Antigone and Polynices, Irigaray proposes a more fluid relation between male and
female, one that refuses the Hegelian split between immanence and transcendence (nature/spirit). Both Tina Chanter (1995: 125) and Christine Battersby (1998: 115) recognize this as synonymous with a radicalization of the symbolic, necessary in order to think women’s specificity and to (re)conceptualize the civic sphere. Battersby Likens the ‘impossible space’ of Antigone’s imprisonment to the, ‘apparently solid and dense metaphysics of closure’ but suggests that Irigaray’s splitting of nature into two – ‘the red and the white’ – opens this space into ‘another dimension’ for ‘thinking identity in female terms’ (Battersby, 1998: 116). This might equally apply to the notion of thinking itself, as I will explore in the next chapter. A consideration of a more fluid relation between ‘male’ and ‘female’ terms, formerly set into opposition and latterly fragmented, can perhaps generate productive ways of thinking about ‘knowledge’ in the context of drama education.

Nietzsche: Irigaray pursues the exclusion of ‘the feminine’ from dominant modes of thought in her reading of Nietzsche. The non-hierarchical elemental world view of the pre-Socratics is something which Nietzsche also draws upon, but as Irigaray makes clear the element of water, associated by Irigaray with the feminine (1985b: 106–118), remains obscure or forgotten in his works (1981a: 48-9):

I chose to examine Nietzsche in terms of water because it is the place of the strongest interpolation, it is the element of which he is most afraid. In Zarathustra, we hear his fear of the deluge. Water is what disturbs rigidity of both frozen forms and mirrors. It is a place which I wouldn’t call opposite but different, in relation to the sun. (1981a: 43, trans. by Elizabeth Grosz, 1989: 168)

In Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche (1991a) Irigaray makes use of powerful imagery to suggest the boundary struggle between sea and land, between the solidity
of the male imaginary and the threat of an engulfing flood of otherness. A different female voice is adopted for each section of the book, Ariadne, Athena and Persephone, are all women to whom Nietzsche refers in his writing. In this context each is given 'a mask custom-made to beguile' the philosopher (1991a: 89). Ariadne, who is most closely associated with water and the sea, speaks through the first section. Described as 'Zarathustra's ideal woman' (Burke, 1989: 231), she is both alluring and dangerous (1991a: 47 & 52), and capable of escaping the philosopher's attempts to contain or enclose her in an icy marriage (1991a: 36-7). Ariadne is responsible for rescuing Theseus from the labyrinth, but she is abandoned by him on the island of Naxos, home to the god Dionysus who consoles and marries her. To understand the significance of Irigaray's use of Ariadne, and the other female figures, it is necessary to consider Nietzsche's critique of the dominance of objectivity and rationality in the western philosophical tradition, and the inextricable association of this critique with woman. A good place to start with Nietzsche is with his assertion that, 'all values hitherto have been devalued' (Nietzsche, 1967: 9), hence Zarathustra's musing that 'God is dead!' (Nietzsche, 1968: 124). In place of 'absolute value' Nietzsche proposes a transvaluation of values, rather than an appeal to universal truth a belief in man's ability to:

Wilfully inscribe the circumference of his own being through his perspectival perception of what is (Mortensen, 1994: 212)

But as Irigaray points out, although woman produces, gives birth to "visible" being (1991a: 92), she cannot present herself (1991a: 87), 'she is "foreign" to the unit. And to the countable, to quantification' (1991a: 86). Or put another way, this 'phenomenological optics'... 'cannot possibly do justice to le feminin's potentiality'
(Mortensen, 1994: 220). It is the 'impossibility' of subjective representation for women (their exclusion from 'what is') that Nietzsche refers to when he says:

And I think it is a real friend of women that counsels them today: *mulier taceat de muliere!*
[woman should be silent about woman]. (Nietzsche, 1974: 164)

i.e. what there is to discover about woman will not further her egalitarian claim to equality. However, a recent article by Cynthia Kaufman explores feminism's reclamation of Nietzsche's work at the level of epistemology:

Nietzsche's theory that the best forms of knowledge grow out of socially mediated forms of embodied perception helps to lay the epistemological groundwork for more democratic and less misogynist cultural systems. (Kaufman, 1998: 64)

However, the article goes on to demonstrate that, such a view of Nietzsche's epistemological approach should be tempered by his own warning against too zealous a search for 'embodied' truth:

We no longer believe that truth remains truth when her veils are stripped away (Nietzsche, 1974b: 38)

The revelation of truth is, for Nietzsche, like the grotesqueness of the naked female body, it provokes the philosopher to determine, 'I want to hear nothing about the fact that a human being is more than soul and form' (Nietzsche, 1974b: 122). As Irigaray suggests, proximity to the 'horror of the abyss, attributed to woman. Loss of identity – death' leads to a reaction of self-preservation in the philosopher (1991a: 91).
Irigaray’s reading of Nietzsche relies, to a certain extent, on Derrida’s interpretation of Nietzsche in *Spurs* (1979). Derrida argues that Nietzsche’s suspension of truth, the view that truth only exists as an unattainable other is a ‘feminine operation’ (Derrida, 1979: 65). He takes here Lacan’s meaning of the feminine as that which exceeds language, the symbolic, and therefore meaning. This evocation of the feminine is analogous to the figure of Ariadne in *Marine Lover*... ‘the other of the other’. The position of woman constituted within patriarchy or the symbolic is that of a lie, a semblance, woman masquerading as man (Nietzsche, 1974a: 232: 1974b: 361).

Margaret Whitford argues that Irigaray reads Nietzsche as providing an accurate description of the place of woman in the economy of the same, but giving no possibility of emancipation from the role of ‘other of the same’ (Whitford, 1991:114). The role of ‘other of the same’ is analogous with the figure of Athena, who sprang from the father’s head not the mother’s womb, and acts as a representative of paternal law, she represents woman, ‘hidden in the thought of the father’ (Irigaray, 1991a: 96).

In Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche, a distance must be kept from Truth and Woman as unattainable other (Ariadne), in order for the symbolic to function under an illusion of solidity. As Cynthia Kaufman argues, Irigaray ‘shows how the discourse of distance has mortal consequences for women’ (Kaufman, 1998: 78). This is exemplified in the following extract from *Veiled Lips*:

The distance does not come from her, even if, for him, it is at a distance that her seductive charm works. Even if, in the present, he lends her that element of authority. Because he does not wish to see the effect of his operation: the abyss enters. Which holds him off and fascinates him like the attraction of a knife thrust into the other. The other’s belly. The other that he no longer approaches simply, except at the risk of his life: some horrendous retaliation
for his own act. The removal of one’s own self, the decisive incision between the lips that leaves (the other) mute and alluring like the tomb. (1991a: 105)

What Derrida proposes as a valorization of woman – being the other of Reason (Derrida, 1979: 67-69), or woman as the transvalued value at the centre of the nihilism problematic (Mortensen, 1994: 222), does not address woman as living being. Persephone frozen for a season in the underworld of her husband, but returning cyclically to the realm of her mother Demeter during which time the earth is fruitful represents the impossible reality of divided femininity. She moves between the mutually exclusive roles of ‘other of the other’ and ‘other of the same’, between ‘Dionysian flux’ and ‘frozen parodic appropriation’; she is pure dissimulation, always appearing veiled, and in her ambiguity she exceeds both of these roles (1991a: 113-115). Irigaray argues that the only way to circumvent woman’s relegation to roles and functions and man’s imprisonment within his own labyrinth is for each to become the labyrinth for the other (1991a: 73). She suggests that ultimately, in spite of Nietzsche’s radical intentions and supposed rejection of universal truth, he never wavers from the economy of the same:

The sacrifice he makes to the Idea is inscribed in this – that he preferred the Idea to an ever provisional openness to a female other. That he refused to break the mirror of the (male) same, and over and over again demanded that the other be his double. (1991a: 187)

**Heidegger:** As with her reading of Nietzsche, whilst acknowledging Heidegger’s part in overcoming tradition, Irigaray demonstrates how he can be incorporated into the very tradition he seeks to overcome when the question of sexual difference is introduced. Heidegger’s concern is the notion of ‘Being’ itself. He suggests that the question, what is ‘Being’ is overlooked or presupposed in western metaphysics
Also, that the prioritisation of presence occludes the question of the meaning of being (Heidegger, 1980: 44). Heidegger’s phenomenological approach is influential in Irigaray’s work, for example he talks of ‘Being’ in terms of ‘being-in-the-world’ rather than as ‘cogito’ (Heidegger, 1980: 86-90), and of the body as a ‘lived-body’. He also returns to the work of the pre-Socratics, prior to the foreclosure of the question of ‘Being’. However, as Irigaray argues, Heidegger’s embodied philosophy, his attempt to move beyond metaphysics remains grounded and therefore ultimately fails:

Metaphysics always supposes, in some manner, a solid crust from which to raise a construction... As long as Heidegger does not leave the “earth”, he does not leave metaphysics. (1999: 2)

Irigaray goes on to explain that air is the element which Heidegger neglects in his thought, the most illusive of all the elements, compelling ‘neither the faculty of perception nor that of knowledge to recognise it’ (1999: 8). Air also defies the solidity on which metaphysics is grounded, ‘the philosopher can think that there is nothing but absence there, for in air he does not come up against a being or a thing.’ (1999: 9). Irigaray also associates air with origin, with the material source of being, and therefore with the generative properties of the feminine:

No other element is in this way space prior to all localisation, and a substratum both immobile and mobile, permanent and flowing, where multiple temporal divisions remain forever possible. Doubtless, no other element is as originally constitutive of the whole world, without this generativity ever coming to completion in a primordial time, in a singular primacy, in an autarchy, in an autonomy, in a unique or exclusive property... (1999: 8)
Irigaray suggests that not only are 'beings' determined in cultural thought as a specific type - men, but that the notion of 'Being' itself is determined in accordance with male morphology. In order to demonstrate Heidegger's adherence to this principle she introduces the question of sexual difference by suggesting that being must acknowledge the 'co-existence, co-essence, and co-presence of two' before it can be thought of as one (1999: 4). Heidegger uses 'space' or 'place' as a means by which to define being. His term 'Dasein' implies a contextualized, or contained, being; the difference between animate and inanimate beings is denoted by the 'concernful absorption' of the former (Heidegger, 1980: 101). However, the being itself is always that which is contained and appropriates the other (the container) for itself, Heidegger never considers the container in terms of 'Being' (Irigaray, 1999: 103).

The theme of woman as man's container recurs throughout Irigaray's work, in connection with the objectification of women through systems of exchange. Irigaray traces woman's function as 'envelope' for man as part of metaphysics since Aristotle:

Every 'thing' has a place except woman, she is the place for others (Irigaray, 1993a: 34-35)

Irigaray points out that woman as container is rendered as a form of protective encasement, anything which might mark out the specificity of her morphology is omitted; boundaries, passages, bodily fluids, placenta etc. do not feature in Aristotle's account (Irigaray, 1993a: 41-55). Furthermore:

The womb is never thought of as the primal place in which we become body

(Irigaray, 1993b: 16)
Heidegger also looks back at Aristotle in order to demonstrate an 'aporia' (gap), in which Aristotle's notion of 'Time' is predicated upon a previously unquestioned notion of 'Being' that privileges the present. Heidegger suggests, therefore, that addressing the question, what is Time? must be built into the question of 'Being' (Heidegger, 1980: 48). Irigaray points out that such correlative features of Heidegger's critique do not extend to notions of 'Space', or 'dwelling', in relation to 'beings' of sexual difference. Just as Being remains an unthought but necessary condition that is problematized by Heidegger, for Irigaray woman remains the unthought in relation to man (1993b: 19: 1999: 67).

Metaphorized within the male imaginary, the topos of 'woman as dwelling place' becomes a 'house of language' (Whitford, 1991: 156). In *The Forgetting of Air* Irigaray explains as follows:

Isn't this the sexual destiny that man has recalled-forgotten in his language *langue*? And out of which he has made truth? Unfolding this destiny as that which envelops and surrounds his ek-stasis with a house: the house of Being. The essence of language *langage* should thus be understood as a shelter for man's essence. As a shelter for man.... This language [*Le langage*] would always already have been fabricated to conceal and assist this destiny: making it manifest itself [*se pro-duire*] but keeping it still in a state of reserve, in wrapped/warped condition. This language [*Le langage*] would be the technology – the architechnology, the architectonics – for man's fashioning the living according to his sexual project. (1999: 91)

Irigaray argues that the emergent distance between Being and Space, or originary materiality, is implicit in the metaphysical Logos, 'the archetechne' must remain the site of fundamental ontology's expression of the whole' (1999: 87). Thus when Heidegger 'revisits the whole of metaphysics' searching for what, at the start was lost,
the ‘phuen’ (nature) of physical beings, what he seeks is already implicit, incorporated though forgotten in the architectonics itself – ‘Nature is re-created by the logos’ (1999: 87).

Crucially, as Margaret Whitford explains, this division is diagnosed by Irigaray in terms of ‘sclerosis’, ‘cultural pathology’, with detrimental effects on both men and women:

Man may think he is active, dynamic, propelling himself upwards from earth to sky, but he is in a sepulchre, while woman, like Antigone, is imprisoned and buried alive. (Whitford, 1991a: 157)

The ‘house of language’ constructed to protect man from his fear of death (Irigaray, 1999: 61) becomes a kind of death in life, ‘Being’s grave’ (1999: 165). The reason for this, according to Irigaray, is the division between ‘Being’ and nature. In Plato, as we have seen, the appropriation of nature allows culture’s dependence on ‘the mother’ to be forgotten (Irigaray, 1999: 18). In Kantian philosophy, the imaginary is rested from its bodily, sensible origin, and given to understanding (Irigaray, 1985a: 204, 210). Similarly, Space and Time, two forms of the sensible that Kant refers to as a priori knowledge (Critique of Pure Reason A22, B36), usurp the place of the mother’s womb:

In this way, bit by bit/room by room, the subject will have constructed his dwelling (Irigaray, 1985a: 212)
In *The Forgetting of Air*, Irigaray attempts to call upon a 'purer' form of the sensible, that has remained relatively untouched by discourse: air, as a means by which to question thinking itself:

But is air thinkable? Through what transformation must the Logos pass in order to think this unthought? ... What becomes of the essential truths fashioned, until the present day, by man? What becomes of this very "man"? And is it not today the task of thinking to question itself about that reality that lives in it, and which it lives as mortal? Wishing itself immortal. There remains air, from which thought draws its subsistence. (1999: 12)

Heidegger's attention to Being as 'copula' is used by Irigaray to emphasise the association of Being with the male imaginary. The 'bridge', which in Heideggerian terms penetrates and organizes female space, can be likened to the phallus (Whitford, 1991b: 164). Irigaray, on the other hand, attempts to formulate 'an exchange that is prior to bridge' (1999: 84), a discourse of interrelation between 'being' and 'space' drawn from the morphology of the maternal feminine, that obscures the boundaries between the categories 'being' and 'space':

The subject and "things", as well as "things" among themselves, are in a relation of interpenetration: no longer one and another, a subject and a thing, a thing and a thing, no longer near each other in the sense of being "in contact", or "close to", or "gathered together within"... but near each other in the mode of a permeability of their envelopes which requires thinking out an other relation to space-time. (1999: 84)

Carolyn Burke describes Irigaray's voice in *The Forgetting of Air* as a more than usually 'reasoned philosophical style' but growing more 'ecstatic' as she considers Heidegger's representation of the 'poet' as inhabiter of 'l'entre-deux' the 'space between' (Burke, 1989: 253). Taking Heidegger's [das dichtende Denken] 'thinking
poetry’ or ‘poeticising thought’, Irigaray extends this beyond a mediation between mortal and immortal (1999: 172) to a Trans-metaphysical phenomenon, or ‘absolute venture’ (1999: 174) where language recalls the sensible, the material, in its sensuous texture, as well as touching upon the spiritual. (1999: 177-178).

**Levinas:** Heidegger’s question of Being can be seen as a turning point in modern philosophy, paving the way for existentialism and, in skirting the edges of the thinkable, his work has been a major influence for many post-structuralist thinkers. As Emanuel Levinas has suggested, ‘one cannot seriously philosophize today without traversing the Heidegerian path in some form or other’ (Levinas/Kearney, 1986: 15). Clearly, Heidegger’s interrogation of Being along phenomenological lines has influenced Irigaray’s approach in discussing beings of sexual difference. Likewise, Levinas’ work on alterity (otherness) has become a major influence in Irigaray’s work on difference, ethical relation and relationality between sexually different subjects. In *Totality and Infinity* (1969) Levinas focuses on the self/other relation, not as a battle of conscious will, as in Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, but in a way that de-centres the self. Levinas argues against the western philosophical tradition of reducing the other to the same, based on an ‘equation of truth with the intelligibility of presence’ (Levinas, 1986: 19). Such ‘ontological imperialism’ is, he argues, merely a means of offsetting the shock of alterity (Levinas, 1969: 33-4). Instead, Levinas conceives of the other as beyond comprehension, and irreducible to the same. For Levinas ethics comes before ontology, he uses the term ‘meontology’ to suggest a mode of meaning beyond being, an ethical subjectivity that is ‘anteceded by an obligation to the other’ (Levinas, 1986: 27). Levinas’ view of alterity constitutes the ‘self’ as an ‘other’ among others, with no privileged relationship to ‘totality’ (Davis, 1996: 44). This is clearly of importance to Irigaray’s notion of ‘the other of the other’. The focal point
of Levinas' discussion of alterity is the 'ethical moment', described in terms of an event, the ethical moment is not empirical but foundational, originary (Levinas, 1966: 222):

The self cannot survive by itself alone, cannot find meaning within its own being-in-the-world (Levinas, 1986: 24)

This moment, 'epiphany', or 'revelation' is encapsulated in the 'face to face' relation. The face of the other is not reduced to an object of scrutiny (Levinas, 1961: 211), the face speaks, its vulnerability provokes responsibility, thereby producing meaning from beyond experience of the self (Levinas, 1969: 65-6, 211, 222). The face commands, 'you shall not kill' (Levinas, 1969: 217; 1986: 24). What is striking about this encounter is that it is the 'self' that is rendered passive:

The ethical rapport with the face is asymmetrical in that it subordinates my existence to the other. (Levinas, 1986: 24)

Levinas introduces the concept of the 'third party' to complete the ethical reciprocity of the encounter. It would be ethical, for example, to suggest that one should make sacrifices for the other, but not that the other should make sacrifices for me (Davis, 1996: 52). The notion of a third party creates another dimension, or distanced perspective of symmetry between self and other that is simultaneous with their asymmetry (Levinas, 1969: 234). Levinas is not so much concerned with ethics as such, laws, rules etc. but with 'the ethical'. In this respect his work is distanced from Kant's notion of the categorical imperative. Influenced, as he is, by Judaic tradition and Talmudic texts, the ethical for Levinas is drawn from the context of existence, not based in reason but in the fundamental appeal of the other (Davis, 1996: 50; Grosz,
Because of the de-centring of the self and non-tractarian approach to ethics, Levinas' work is suited to the postmodern situation. The points of interface between Levinas' work and that of Irigaray can be summarised as follows: Firstly, there is Levinas' ability to think difference without reverting to sameness. This includes a rejection of oppositional or complementary relations between self and other that amount to a totalising logic. In Tina Chanter's words:

His refusal to submit the otherness of the other to the demands of logic (Chanter, 1995: 221)

Secondly, there is a deprioritization of ontology and therefore a weakening of teleological impetus in Levinas presentation of the ethical moment:

Ethics, for Levinas, is not a movement toward the light or away from the light. Rather it is a trembling movement, that cannot be measured, toward the height and destination of the other person. (Cohen, 1986: 4)

Linked to this is the sense of 'wonder' or surprise that characterises the encounter with the other. In similarity with Irigaray's writing on relationality between subjects of sexual difference, the meeting of self and other constitutes new forms of knowledge:

Against Socrates', Levinas finds in teaching the possibility of absolute novelty – a novelty which comes from the other and is not always already implicit in me. (Chanter, 1995: 196)

It is also of significance that alterity is conceived of as 'activity', as an event, an encounter. The self and other are embodied beings, there is a response to the other's materiality and proximity, and an emphasis on contact before the 'word'. The influence of this approach to alterity is not only central to my consideration of
'appropriation' in the use of drama forms from other cultures in Chapter Five, but also to teacher-pupil relationality discussed in Chapter Four, and my approach to drama as a collaborative medium.

In particularizing Irigaray’s approach it is also important to highlight where this diverges from Levinas and leads to her specific critique of his work. Unlike Irigaray, Levinas avoids the term ‘difference’ as this implies knowledge of the other (Davis, 1996: 42). For Irigaray, encounter with another is not about gaining knowledge in the form of appropriation of the other, but about being awakened to the possibilities of new knowledge, and about the creation of knowledge through the co-mingling of identities (Irigaray, 1991b: 110). Levinas refers to his conceptualisation of the ethical moment as, ‘relation without relation’ (Levinas, 1969: 79) because the other remains resolutely other. For Irigaray, although the other is never fully appropriable, both parties are affected by the encounter. This anomaly between Irigaray and Levinas is attributable to a contrast in approach to sexual difference. Whereas for Irigaray sexual difference is emblematic of all difference, and therefore used as a model for the self/other relation, in Levinas’ *Totality and Infinity* the feminine presence is addressed as ‘*tu*’, not ‘*vous*’, she is part of man’s world and not an Other (*Autrui*) (Levinas, 1961: 164-7). For Levinas, the ‘phenomenology of eros’ is quite different from the ethical relation.

It is in *The Fecundity of the Caress: A reading of Levinas’ Totality and Infinity section IV, B, “The Phenomenology of Eros”* (1986b) and *Questions to Emmanuel Levinas: On the Divinity of Love* (1991b) that Irigaray details her critique of Levinas’ treatment of the erotic relationship. Levinas relegates the female lover (l’aimee) to animality in respect of desire (1991b: 114, 1993a: 195), it is for the man (l’amant) to
transcend what Levinas refers to as the ‘ambiguity’ of the erotic (1993a: 198). It is ambiguous because man’s descent into the ‘abyss’ is necessary in order to perpetuate the male genealogy, ‘from these nocturnal depths, he may be carried off into an absolute future’ (1993a: 194). Levinas’ focus on the relation between God, man and his son, dominates the nuptial scene and, as Irigaray observes, it ‘belong[s] to the imperatives of the metaphysical tradition’ (1991b: 113). The productive possibilities of the caress are measured by Levinas in terms of the potential son, this does not take account of the fecundity of the encounter itself (1993a: 195-7) unlike his discussion of the ‘ethical encounter’, and as Irigaray suggests, ‘the son [as man’s other] does not resolve the enigma of the most irreducible otherness’ (1993b: 189). Irigaray identifies problems with the assimilation of philosophy with theology, it is ‘equivalent to assimilating philosophy with the thought of a people at a particular moment in history’ (1991b: 114). There is also the incontrovertible association of monotheism with patriarchy, and the division between the spirit and the body, which is linked to the relation of women with carnality and objectification (1991b: 114-16). She suggests, however, that within the Old Testament in particular, it is possible to find hints of female subjectivity subsequently buried:

The Song of Solomon bears the trace of woman as lover [l'amant] rather than as now l'aimee
(1991b: 117)

In discussing the genealogy of thought between Levinas and Irigaray, both Tina Chanter and Elizabeth Grosz refer to Levinas’ adoption of the maternal imago as the ethical par excellence in Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence (1978/1981). This is presented unproblematically by Grosz as a rare prioritization of the maternal feminine (Grosz, 1989: 146). Chanter views this more problematically however, and
asks whether Levinas in fact reduces woman to a maternal function, as in *Totality and Infinity* he reduces her to Madonna or whore, 'gentle discreet presence' or 'vice of the clandestine' (Chanter, 1995: 198). There is certainly some veracity for this interpretation to be found in Irigaray's critique, not least in Levinas' substitution of the son for the feminine, as ethically other to the man (1991b: 111), and the reduction of woman to a disregarded generative materiality that is cut off from the divine (1993a: 195-7). For Irigaray, the lost potentiality of Levinas' analysis lies in his failure to recognise God 'in the sensibility of the female lover' (1993a: 196).

Touch is central to Irigaray's dialogue with Levinas. Irigaray argues that for Levinas the other is touched but untouched. In the caress, the female body is reduced to 'the elaboration of a future' for the man; the other (the prospective child) remains ungraspable. The caress itself is merely 'the anticipation of this pure becoming, without content' (Irigaray, 1991b: 110). For Irigaray this falls short of an ethics of sexual difference. In *The Fecundity of the Caress* she elaborates a scene in which 'man and woman can love each other in reciprocity as subjects' (1991b: 115). In doing so Irigaray draws upon the 'face to face' relation of Levinas' ethical moment, stressing that the other is not appropriable to the self. Irigaray also identifies the particularity of the sexual encounter, that it moves beyond the face to face relation, that the boundaries of self and other are put into question, but that this need not constitute objectification or profanity (1993a: 201). For Irigaray voluptuousness is itself productive, creative. Both lovers hazard something of the self in sharing something of each other, an 'extase instante' a creation that is prior to the child:

For Levinas, the distance is always maintained with the other in the experience of love. The other is 'close' to him in 'duality'. This autistic, egological, solitary love does not correspond
to the shared outpouring, to the loss of boundaries which takes place for both lovers when they
cross the boundary of skin into the mucous membranes of the body, leaving the circle which
encloses my solitude to meet in a shared space, a shared breath, abandoning the relatively dry
and precise outlines of each body's solid exterior to enter a fluid universe where the
perception of being two persons [de dualite] becomes indistinct, and above all, acceding to
another energy, neither that of the one nor that of the other, but an energy produced together
and as a result of irreducible difference of sex. (1991b: 110-11)

Following the above Irigaray quickly points out that in contrast to Levinas' erotic
relation, which is always in anticipation of the child, her prioritisation of shared
'becoming' in the ethical moment does not preclude same sex relation from the
theoretical frame; thereby answering the charge of heterosexism that has been levelled
at her for focusing on alterity through sexual difference (Borghi, 1989: 65). In the
final section of this chapter, issues of difference are central to my discussion of
Irigaray's position in relation to feminist discourse. As a bridge between these
discussions I intend to outline points of intersection between Irigaray's work and that
of two key figures in modern and postmodern thought in France, Jacques Derrida and
Simone de Beauvoir.

**Derrida:** Like Lacan, Derrida appears 'intertextually' in Irigaray's writing, and
because of Irigaray's resistance towards citation and referencing in all but a few of her
later works, it is difficult to establish direct lines of influence. However, the essay *La
Question of Style* (1973), in which Derrida coins the neologism 'Phallogocentrism'
(Derrida, 1973: 247), suggesting that psychoanalysis conflates the Phallus with the
Logos as a transcendent, originary cause for being and meaning, is identifiable as an
intertextual influence of both *Speculum of the Other Woman* and *This Sex Which Is
Not One* (See Burke, 1994: 42).
Key areas of consideration in establishing Irigaray's position vis-à-vis Derrida include his concerns with the category 'woman', the feminine and feminism. In his readings of Levinas (Derrida, 1973 & 1982), like Irigaray he identifies a degree of phallocentrism, whereby Levinas' human, originary and ethical being is drawn along 'masculine' lines, but unlike Irigaray Derrida argues that originary 'being' should be a sexually neutral category:

The masculine should come, like all sexual marks, only afterwards (Derrida, 1982: 73)

Derrida's position on sexual identity is to advocate what for feminism might be described as a self-annihilatory telos:

I would like to believe in ... the multiplicity of sexually marked voices, this mobile of non-identified sexual marks whose choreography can carry, divide, multiply the body of each 'individual', whether he be classified as 'man' or as 'woman' according to the criteria of usage (Derrida, 1982: 76)

Sexual difference, for Derrida, comes to represent the prototype of dualism and is therefore the very foundation or condition of logocentrism. As Derrida denotes with the term 'différance', this condition is one that marks both difference and identity. In linguistic terms, the presence of the 'sign' always implies the absence or deferral of the signified - the 'psychic imprint' of the material, physical phenomenon (Derrida, 1972: 63). Elsewhere this materiality which subtends cultural discourse is likened to 'the mother', who:

Gives rise to all figures by losing herself in the background of the scene like an anonymous persona. Everything comes back to her, beginning with life; everything addresses and
destines itself to her. She survives on the condition of remaining at bottom (Derrida, 1985a: 38)

This quotation gives a sense of the ambiguous position of the feminine in Derrida’s writing. On one level ‘woman’ as metaphor is that which subtends or supports discourse, but in so doing simultaneously draws attention to its instability. It is in this sense that woman acts as ‘the affirmation of the untruth of truth’ (Derrida, 1979: 97) as discussed earlier in relation to Nietzsche, and why in this double role of affirmation and ‘dissimulation’, ‘woman’ is occasionally used to stand in for the term ‘différance’.

It is against this theoretical background that woman operates as a privileged term for Derrida, as synonymous with deconstruction and freedom, ‘a way out of the closure of knowledge’ (Spivak, 1976: ixxvii). This notion of teleological dismantling is denoted by the term ‘becoming woman’, which is used most frequently to refer to a form of feminized textual practice. This can be viewed positively as an answer to Lacan’s intractable symbolic, and negatively as an appropriation or ‘exchange among the master-thinkers of the feminine body’ (Braidotti, 1991: 101 & 123). For Irigaray who views it as the latter, the metaphor ‘becoming woman’ has the potential to effectively silence real women:

As for men, it is up to them to speak for themselves. I have no desire to speak for them as they have spoken for us, nor to speak ‘universal’ … They ask themselves certain types of questions which, as such, must not be confused with women’s questions because many women at the moment say: Now we are becoming women… As soon as something worthwhile manifests itself concerning women, men want to become women. What interests me is the difference. Why, all of a sudden, should one be in a reversal of power in a
problematic of the Same? Above all, don’t become women sirs! (Irigaray (1981a) trans. in E. Grosz, 1990b: 102)

The notion of ‘becoming woman’ only makes sense if one is a man (Spivak, 1983: 183-4). In textual terms, ‘becoming woman’ signifies a form of textual jouissance or excess, ‘a sensuous pleasure forbidden by patriarchal language’ (Nye, 1988: 195). However, there are sharp contrasts between Derrida’s ‘feminine operation’ and Irigaray’s feminist textual practice. Whereas Derrida’s aim appears to be contained within the experimentation, free-play and subversive potentiality of text itself, Irigaray’s mimeticism attempts to probe the matter-(mater)iality of language with the external political aim of formulating a female feminine; an anathema in Deridian terms. Derrida occupies an ambivalent position in relation to feminism. For Derrida, feminism as identity politics is a metaphysic to be deconstructed (Derrida, 1985b: 30), but in his refusal to offer a definition of the place of woman, ‘why must there be a place for woman?’ (Derrida, 1982: 67), he offers a liberatory alternative based on the negation of such topographies and the dissolution of sexed identity.

**Simone de Beauvoir:** When asked in an interview about the influence of Simone de Beauvoir on her work, Irigaray pointedly distanced herself from Beauvoir’s existentialist project:

> She refuses to be Other and I demand to be radically Other in order to exit from a horizon

(Irigaray in Hirsh and Olsen, 1995: 113)

However, to accept this as conclusive is to overlook ways in which their works relate, and the extent to which Irigaray can be seen to re-work some of Beauvoir’s themes in a post-structuralist context. Both reject the notion of an ‘eternal feminine’, a
transhistorical essentialising appellation designating woman's social role (Irigaray, 1983: 237). Both argue that the subject is exclusively male, but their interpretation of masculine subjectivity differs. From the perspective of existentialism, Beauvoir adopts a dualist perspective, interpreting the human subject as distinguishable by a constant reaching beyond its present state, by a capacity for transcendence over immanence (Beauvoir, 1975: 28-9). For Irigaray, the subject is 'the speaking subject' the 'I' of discourse, a position which the linguistic structures of western metaphysics designate as male (Irigaray, 1987: 83). Beauvoir argues that woman's position as absolute Other is linked to an association with the body (Beauvoir, 1975: 96, 285), and culture's negative interpretation of the female body (Beauvoir, 1975: 17, 285-6). Beauvoir links woman's oppression to her 'reproductive overdetermination' (Mackenzie, 1986: 152). From an existentialist perspective which values 'free acts' as the product of a self present rationality, Beauvoir's position seems to be that in order to transcend her immanence and attain subjective status, women must repudiate the female body and femininity, and 'take them as her absolute Other' (Gatens, 1991: 59). Knowledge and control of the female body are for Beauvoir the key to transcendence and woman's accession to subjectivity. The following passage from *The Second Sex* illustrates the pejorative connotation placed on female immanence:

> The sex organ of a man is simple and neat as a finger... but the feminine organ is mysterious even to the woman herself, concealed, mucous, and humid as it is; it bleeds each month, is often sullied with body fluids, it has a secret perilous life of its own... man dives on his prey like the eagle and the hawk; woman lies in wait like the carnivorous plant, the bog, in which insects and children are swallowed up (Beauvoir, 1975: 406-7)

In contrast, Irigaray argues that both self and other are appropriated by the masculine in western discourse. If the other is a mirror image of the masculine 'same', then
woman can be said to figure as the materiality of the mirror itself (1985a: 134), and therefore be incapable of self representation. The crucial question posed by Irigaray, ‘What if the object began to speak?’ (1985a: 135) proposes a radicalization of difference whereby the very materiality to which the feminine in discourse is consigned becomes its potential for expression. As Naomi Schor argues:

It is on the rock of materialism and not of essentialism that Irigaray seeks to establish the truth of her claim (Schor, 1994: 69).

The morphological features of female immanence that Beauvoir pathologizes, are those that Irigaray reclaims as possibilities for re-thinking subjectivity, creativity and thinking itself:

A remaking of immanence and transcendence, notably through this threshold which has never been examined as such: the female sex. The threshold that gives access to the mucous. Beyond classical oppositions of love and hate, liquid and ice – a threshold that is always half open. The threshold of the lips, which are strangers to dichotomy and opposites (Irigaray, 1993a: 18)

It is by highlighting drama’s occupation of such threshold positions, and the crucial thresholds of intersubjectivity that constitute creative becoming within the medium, that I posit drama’s possibilities as radical epistemology in Chapter Seven, following on from my discussion of the interrelationality of immanence and transcendence in dance education. Although this is influenced mainly by Irigaray’s feminist re-construction of epistemology and ontology, the implications of her feminist approach to women’s subjectivity are also relevant to my concern with the agentive and expressive ‘subject’ who ‘speaks’ through drama.
Feminism

Early reactions to Irigaray’s work by Anglo-American feminist writers have been well documented, and are often characterized by a misunderstanding of Irigaray’s project. She is accused of being a biological essentialist (Sayers, 1982: 131), of trying to give a definition of ‘the feminine’ (Moi, 1985: 148), and of elitism, obfuscation and a lack of attention to social context (Kuykendall, 1983: 269). In the latter of these examples, Eleanor Kuykendall is found reading Irigaray’s representation of the mother-daughter relationship in *And the One Doesn’t Stir Without the Other* (1981b) against socio-political or materialist feminist criteria, rather than as a critique or analysis of the cultural symbolic. Although Irigaray has become an important figure in the context of Twentieth Century feminist theory, the scope of her work is broader than feminism itself, whilst seeking to recoup key philosophical themes to feminist thought. Readers familiar with the philosophical and psychoanalytic context of her work have provided more fruitful commentaries, giving guidance on how to read Irigaray rather than attempting to pin her texts down in search of conclusiveness. We are warned to ‘guard against privileging predicative meaning...[to] listen with another ear’ (Whitford, 1986: 103-4), and advised that Irigaray’s complex and challenging textual styles form the ‘quest for an ideological space in which to “speak female”’ (Burke, 1980: 67). Notions of access to a female feminine, beyond?, before?, within?, without?, discourse, have caused the most controversy and confusion in relation to Irigaray’s work. Sometimes the commentaries which accompany translations of Irigaray’s texts, whilst perfectly legitimate in their ambiguity, and appropriately evocative of Irigaray’s own stylistic intentions, could be read as adding to the confusion. Helene Vivienne Wenzel in the introduction to her 1981 translation of *And the One Doesn’t Stir Without the Other*, writes that it is:
A daughter's retrospection carefully designed to bring her reality into strong relief after its long obfuscation by psychoanalytic discourse (Wenzel, 1981: 58)

But how should the word 'reality' be read? Does it refer to the daughter's discourse, or the daughter's experience? What is the object of this retrospection? Is it an unmediated and originary relation with the mother, or a mother-daughter relationship constituted by and in relation to psychoanalytic discourse? Irigaray's provocative writing style calls into question any supposed validity or rigidity of the very boundaries that are evoked by a constructivist/essentialist opposition. When her readers reinforce such boundaries, confusion occurs, as with the charge made by Jacqueline Rose [discussed in the first section of this chapter] that Irigaray promulgates women's unproblematic relation to origin (Rose, 1982: 54). It is in the phrase 'her reality' that Wenzel's guidance on how to read And the One Doesn't Stir Without the Other, is encapsulated. The phrase is suggestive of a discursive position, but one that is dependent upon the interlocutor's embodied identification as a woman.

Charges of essentialism have frequently been levelled against Irigaray despite her own claims that she is concerned with sexual difference in the cultural symbolic sphere, not as a deterministic biological truth (1977: 89), that she reads the female sex as 'a hole in representation' (1977: 83), and that her 'feminist' project rests upon an understanding of representation, and therefore the meaning of woman, as subject to historical change (1977: 89). Irigaray argues that what is required is a questioning of the system of representation that places woman in a position of lack, and that one of the ways of affecting this is by prioritizing its subordinate terms. In her valorization of female morphology therefore, the two lips touching act as a means by which to
question the status of the phallus and displace the logic of the gaze. As Diana Fuss argues:

The point for, Irigaray, of defining woman from an essentialist stand-point is not to imprison women within their bodies but to rescue them from enculturating definitions by men (Fuss, 1989: 61)

In *This Sex Which is not One* Irigaray makes it clear that she is not attempting to offer a ‘theory of woman’ but to ‘secure a place for the feminine within sexual difference’ (1985b: 159). In doing so she acknowledges the complex relation between cultural discourse and the body, that neither is entirely reducible to the other. This enables her to offer a challenge to Simone de Beauvoir’s assertion that one becomes a woman:

We are women from the start... we don’t have to be turned into women by them, labelled by them, made holy and profane by them... It’s not that we have a territory of our own; but their fatherland, family, home, discourse, imprison us in enclosed spaces where we cannot keep on moving, living as ourselves (1985b: 212)

Though she is clearly not a biological essentialist, the argument that Irigaray adopts a so called ‘essentialist stand-point’ for strategic purposes is helpful in keeping an open perspective on statements such as ‘we are women from the start’.

As discussed in the first section of this chapter, Margaret Whitford uses the ‘strategy’ argument in order to deflect charges made against Irigaray of ‘psychic essentialism’, or positing the existence of two distinct libidos (term coined by Lynne Segal, 1987: 132). Whitford argues that Irigaray is challenging the phallocentrism of Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse, and that she invokes feminine specificity as a means of symbolic disruption and as a statement on the inadequacy of representation (Whitford,
1989: 114). But more importantly, Whitford emphasizes that in both of these operations Irigaray is not talking about feminine specificity at the level of ‘drives’, but at the level of the symbolic (Whitford, 1989: 114), in other words, in terms of their interpretation and or negation. It is important to stress that Irigaray does not claim that it is possible to retrieve a pre-existent feminine that lies beyond discourse, but that by converting forms of subordination into affirmation it is possible for woman to, ‘recover the place of her exploitation by discourse’ (1985b: 76). Naomi Schor refers to this as a ‘transvaluation rather than a repudiation of the discourse of misogyny’ (Schor, 1994: 67), an operation that involves reappropriating positively woman’s association with the body (Irigaray, 1981a: 29). It is this manoeuvre of returning woman to the body that is regarded as dangerous from the more egalitarian feminist perspectives, or feminisms of equality. But Irigaray’s operation is not one of ‘retour’, transcendence dependent upon an immobilized and passive maternal feminine, as with the male imaginary (1993a), but that of ‘retouche’ an assertion of woman’s self identification that refuses to be merely passive, inert ‘nature’ (1985a: 134) xviii.

Elizabeth Grosz identifies what she regards as the false dichotomy of feminism, being the choice between maintaining theoretical purity in order to avoid essentialism, and the pursuit of a political struggle centred on the category ‘woman’. Grosz argues that the theoretical and the political are necessarily implicated in each other, that furthermore there are no ‘pure’ alternatives for feminism, and that all are ‘implicated in patriarchy’, ‘involved in patriarchal power relations’ (Grosz, 1990e: 341-2). Even feminisms of equality, which seek to repudiate essentialism, naturalism, biologism and universalism, operate within other patriarchal power relations that underpin inequality between the sexes. For example: Taking male values and standards as the norm; minimised concern with women’s specific needs and interests, such as those related to maternity; reduction of all specificities that distinguish between the
oppressed and the oppressor; social meanings of acts performed by either sex remaining unchallenged.

Spivak argues that a conscious and strategic use of patriarchal frameworks, methods and presumptions is necessary in order to counter them:

It is absolutely on target to take a stand against the discourses of essentialism, universalism as it comes to terms with the universal – of classical German philosophy or the universal as the white upper class male… etc. But strategically we cannot. Even as we talk about feminist practice, or privileging practice over theory, we are universalising. Since the moment of essentialising, universalising, saying yes to the onto-phenomenological question, is irreducible, let us at least situate it at the moment; let us become vigilant about our own practice and use it as much as we can rather than make the totally counter-productive gesture of repudiating it. (Spivak, 1984: 184)

This can be read as an accurate summation of Irigaray’s position, at once deconstructing the universalising and essentializing constructions of phallocentrism, whilst forging productive ways of thinking female specificity. Irigaray does not seek a position of theoretical ‘purity’; she operates from within the very frameworks that she seeks to dismantle, locating those most problematic, contentious areas as points of weakness. It is for this reason that she immerses her thought in the relationality between the feminine and the bodily sexed reality of the female, strategically refusing the topographical separation between the empirical and the symbolic, the material and the discursive. For Irigaray:

Feminism’s most dangerous impasse is its desire to decondition itself of its feminine identity in order to join a neutral universal (Irigaray, 1994: 106)
However, in the light of the postmodern context, where does Irigaray’s prioritisation of sexual difference fit into a theoretical climate where notions of essentialism and universality are being dismantled?

Nancy Hartsock frames the question of female identity in this context perfectly, when she says that:

Somehow it seems highly suspicious that it is at the precise moment when so many groups have been engaged in ‘nationalisms’ which involve redefinitions of the marginalized Others that suspicions emerge about the nature of the ‘subject’, about the possibilities for a general theory which can describe the world, about historical ‘progress’. Why is it that just at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand the right to name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects in history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes problematic? (Hartsock, 1990: 163-4)

This position differs from Irigaray’s in that Irigaray would argue that the only subjective position hitherto available to be taken up in the context of phallocentric culture is that of ‘man’. This explains why, according to the postmodern perspective against which Hartsock complains, ‘woman’ is designated as a privileged metaphor for the crisis of identity, masculinity and rationality (Derrida, see above; Deleuze, 1987: 277). The feminine, as ‘the’ question of difference is linked to the critique of dualism but not to, ‘either the discursivity or the historical presence of real-life women’ (Braidotti, 1989: 89). Feminisms of sexual difference, as typified by Irigaray, affirm an ontological, political and subjective desire to posit women as corporeal, therefore sexed female subjects, with an emphasis on subjectivity as a biocultural entity.
Irigaray’s prioritization of sexual difference is to a certain extent a politics of location, to be read against postmodern deconstructions of sexed identity, such as the multiplicity of free-floating signifiers envisaged by Derrida, and Deleuze’s ‘body without organs’ – a process of intersecting forces played out upon the body’s surface thus rendering it a free play of desire, and the person a ‘desiring machine’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 1984: 8-9 & 29). Whilst there is much in common between these writers and Irigaray, especially in terms of undermining the phallocentric logic of psychoanalysis and positing the possibility of emergent or ‘becoming’ identities, Irigaray remains critical of them on feminist grounds. Because there is asymmetry between the sexes, she argues that it is impossible to move to sexual neutrality or value-free multiplicity without a re-formulation of sexual difference, that neutrality is not really neutral if it is conceptualized from a masculine position (1985b: 140-1). The particularity of Irigaray’s position is that she refuses to separate embodied woman from the cultural metaphor ‘woman’, derived from an association with immanence. Rosi Braidotti explains the political significance of this as follows:

Feminism has revealed the fact that our socio-cultural order rests on the exchange and silence of women; it follows that the project to express an other feminine coincides with the invention of an other relation to feminine sexuality. In this perspective, it is impossible strictly speaking, to talk about the feminine independently of the lived experience of women, of their social, sexual and textual reality. (Braidotti, 1991: 139)

If the collapse of the classical order of dualism has opened ‘new possibilities’ in respect of male identity, ‘for dialogue between reason and its others’ (Braidotti, 1991: 141), Irigaray’s project is to explore what possibilities this might open for the subjective identification of women.
Judith Butler (1990) highlights the main criticisms levelled at Irigaray from the position of postmodern feminism. These include:

Criticism of the ‘globalising reach’ of Irigaray’s analysis:

Is it possible to identify a monolithic as well as monologic masculinist economy that traverses the array of cultural and historical contexts in which sexual difference takes place? (Butler, 1990: 13)

Criticism of the ‘form’ which the category woman takes:

Insistence upon the coherence and unity of the category of woman has effectively refused the multiplicity of cultural, social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of “women” are constructed. (Butler, 1990: 14)

Criticism of Irigaray’s positing a specific female sexuality:

Is specifically feminine pleasure “outside” of culture as its prehistory or as its utopian future? If so, of what use is such a notion for negotiating the contemporary struggles of sexuality within the terms of its construction. (Butler, 1990: 30)

In response to the first I would argue that Irigaray’s deeply contextualized theoretical position, rather than denoting a ‘globalising reach’ is more indicative of the kind of ‘local knowledge’ that Butler refers to in connection with the work of Clifford Geertz (Butler, 1990: 39). The structuralist texts with which Irigaray interacts have, to varying degrees, a universalist intent; Irigaray’s treatment of them is best described as ‘symptomatic reading’ (Spivak, 1981: 177). Spivak offers this interpretation of Irigaray’s localized deconstructive reading practice as a contrast to other writers identified under the then umbrella term ‘French feminism’, who’s theoretical
perspectives she refers to as, 'grandiose solutions with little political specificity' (Spivak, 1981: 177). The notion of specificity leads on to the second criticism because I would argue that Irigaray's determination to preserve the category 'woman', in reference to sexual specificity, is not intended to be an all encompassing category which negates difference between women. What Irigaray does not do, is attempt to speak for or from different subject positions; what she does do is to assert that her contextualized elaboration of woman is neither normative or exhaustive but indicative of the discursive possibilities available in the climate of post structural critical analysis, which may be drawn upon to constitute affirmative representations of the feminine (1985b: 78, 120, 121, 135, 138-9, 141, 158 etc. 1995: 102-103). In relation to this, Irigaray espouses the use of terms such as, 'women's liberation movements' or 'women's struggles' (1983: 233, 1985b: 164) both to denote differences among women and to differentiate between roles occupied by various forms of feminism:

For my part, I refuse to let myself be locked into a single "group" within the women's liberation movement. Especially if such a group becomes ensnared in the exercise of power, if it purports to determine the "truth" of the feminine, to legislate as to what it means to "be a woman", and to condemn women who might have immediate objectives that differ from theirs. I think the most important thing to do is to expose the exploitation common to all women and to find the struggles that are appropriate for each woman, right where she is, depending upon her nationality, her job, her social class, her sexual experience, that is, upon the form of oppression that is for her the most immediately unbearable. (Irigaray, 1985b: 166-7)

Thirdly, what Butler describes as, 'Irigaray's occasional efforts to derive a specific feminine sexuality from a specific female anatomy' (Butler, 1990: 30) falls short of conveying the complexity of Irigaray's theoretical position in relation to issues of female pleasure as 'gap' in western cultural discourse, the possibility of
representation, and the relevance of morphological interpretations of the female body to actual embodied experience; it also underestimates the centrality of these themes in the Irigarayan oveure. However, in confining my response to the specificity of Butler’s critique, I would first of all re-assert that Irigaray does not call upon anatomy as, in any sense, unmediated or as a ‘natural pre-given’.

The body is always conceived of as an interface between the symbolic and ‘the real’. As such, Irigaray argues that woman’s pleasure and the social practice on which that pleasure depends must be thought together (Spivak, 1981: 182, referring to This Sex Which is not One, essay reprinted in Marks and Courtivron eds. 1981: 105). Butler’s negative emphasis on ‘specifically feminine pleasure’ misses the point of Irigaray’s call upon female sexuality as a discursive strategy used to undermine phallic sameness. Irigaray’s assertion that:

Woman has sex organs more or less everywhere. She finds pleasure almost everywhere. Even if we refrain from involving hystericization of her entire body, the geography of her pleasure in more diversified, more multiple in its differences, more complex, more subtle, than is commonly imagined – in an imaginary rather too narrowly focussed on sameness. (1985b: 28)

This is neither limiting nor prescriptive, but evocative of the multiple and heterogeneous possibilities at stake in attempting to articulate female pleasure. Although Butler’s criticisms suggests a somewhat conflictual relationship between Irigaray’s work and postmodern feminist discourse, in her later book Bodies That Matter (1993), she emphasises the productive possibilities of Irigaray’s deconstructive and mimetic strategies in elaborating upon her theories of performativity.
In connection with debates on the subversive potentiality of women’s creative, expressive output, in the early 1970s-80s Kristeva, Cixous and Irigaray under the collective appellation ‘French feminism’, became closely associated with the practice of ‘écriture feminine’ or ‘writing on the body’ as was the transposition of this term into English. Gradually as an increasing number of works by these writers became available through translation, the differences in their theoretical perspectives became apparent. It is not my intention here to detail these differences (contrasts between the theoretical approaches of Irigaray and Kristeva are dealt with in the first section of this chapter), only to refer to them where necessary in outlining Irigaray’s position vis-à-vis creativity in the postmodern context. Braidotti asks, what is it that makes Irigaray’s project different from the general trend of feminisation in postmodern thought? This theme is expanded upon by Alice Jardine’s book *Gynesis* (1985) where she asks:

Given that “woman” – as real or imagined – has always been that which allowed for (male) “contemplation”, how can we avoid once again the absence of women while we are attempting to think difference differently? (Jardine, 1985: 43)

Spivak refers to Cixous as the most Derridian of the ‘French anti feminist feminists’ (Spivak, 1981: 172), displacing the phallus through ‘feminine’ textual practice, and positing that because woman is constructed she can be deconstructed. Cixous’ textual performances – experiments, however, in contrast to Derrida’s move for desexualization, involve direct identification with the ‘female feminine’ embodied subject. Cixous’ feminine textual body represents the resurfacing of the repressed of phallogocentric culture, evoking ‘another feminine world’ (Nye, 1988: 204). But as Braidotti argues, according to Derrida’s association of *logos* with theory and *pathos*
with the feminine, literature is able to communicate at levels where theory fails, this
begs the question:

What has Cixous done except confirm the centuries-old association of the female with *pathos*
and the male with *logos*, of women with literature and men with philosophy (Braidotti, 1991:
242)

Irigaray, in contrast, explores the relationality between *pathos* and *logos*:

[operating] on both registers at once, producing texts where theoretical elaboration is
accompanied by textual performance (Braidotti, 1991: 248)

or as Jardine explains:

She limits her deconstructive strategies to dissections of the “male text”, interspersed with
lyrical invitations to women to join with her in desacralising male theory and liberating while
valorising the feminine repressed in male texts. (Jardine, 1985: 262)

Irigaray’s own theory of a language of female specificity is more properly termed
‘*parler-femme*’ or ‘speaking (as) woman’. Irigaray stresses that her own textual
practice marks a gesture towards women assuming the ‘I’ of discourse, and not an
exemplification of women’s language (1985b: 144). In the context of her
deconstructive articulations with texts by male writers, the primary concern of
‘*parler-femme*’ is ‘enunciation’ – ‘the ability to generate new responses... the ability
to respond to the speech of the other speaker’ (Whitford, 1991: 39). This is
influenced by Irigaray’s linguistic research into the clinical situation of
psychoanalysis'. For Irigaray, ‘enunciation’ implies a ‘different mode of articulation
between masculine and feminine desire...’ (1985b: 136). ‘*Parler-femme*’ is, in this
sense, a pre-requisite for a more dialogic approach. Irigaray is as concerned with the position from which one speaks and to whom, as with what is said and how.

In her reading of Irigaray’s propositions for textual subversion, Diana Fuss argues that Irigaray does not evoke a literal relationship between language and the body or a metaphoric one, but one that is metonymic. The touching of the two lips:

Facilitate[s] a deconstruction of the metaphor/metonymy binarism operative in Western culture (Fuss, 1989: 71)

Irigaray argues that the phallic tendency to metaphorize woman has imprisoned, fetishized and effectively silenced her; an insidious operation in which woman becomes complicit in her own objectification:

We must go on questioning words as the wrappings with which the “subject”, modestly clothes the “female”. Stifled beneath all these eulogistic or denigratory metaphors, she is unable to unpick the seams of her disguise and indeed takes a certain pleasure in them, even guilding the lily further at times. (1985a: 142-3)

By identifying woman as the ground of subjectivity with materiality as the ground of language (1985b: 110-1), Irigaray emphasises the importance and emancipatory potential of language which, ‘changes deeply the position of the subject who masters discourse’ (1983: 244). Through the pursuit of an enunciatory position that approximates or gestures towards ‘speaking (as) woman’, Irigaray engages women in simultaneously constructing and deconstructing their identities. Alice Jardine observes that in work such as Irigaray’s which approaches the question of woman as
speaking subject, rather than as textual metaphor for the dissolution of subjectivity, there is recognition that:

The status of woman is determined not only at social and political levels, but by the very logical processes through which meaning is produced (Jardine, 1985: 44)

Irigaray does not offer 'woman' as a transhistorical, monolithic entity to be rediscovered (1983: 237), hence her refusal to project deterministically onto the future a theory of what woman is likely to be. So when Spivak identifies woman's present condition as that of 'gendered subaltern' – disenfranchised, marginalized, especially in post-colonial contexts, and adds:

I want to be able not to lament when the material possibility for the name disappears (Spivak, 1989: 220)

her deconstructive position and Irigaray’s quest for a radical female subjectivity are not as antithetical as might first appear.

The possibility of subjective status for women forms the second stage of Irigaray’s theoretical project; the third stage, outlined above is devoted to the possibility and consequentiality of mediation between the sexes as a form of productive relationality that will herald a new phase in human creativity and knowledge (Irigaray, 1995: 97). As with her labial – metonymic interventions into language and enunciation, once again this is a double operation that projects forward in 'utopian' fashion while simultaneously deconstructing notions of phallic sameness or singularity, prefigured by dichotomy and the economy of the Idea. And once again this is enacted via affirmatory re-workings of morphological imagery derived from the female body and
maternal feminine. What these affirmatory re-workings share are qualities of mediation, contiguity, liminality and relationality, as with the 'placenta' and the 'angel' in 'Belief Itself' (1993b: 23-54), and 'mucous' and 'Love' in An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993a). Female imagery, or the feminine imaginary, is as much about what has remained neglected what western culture has chosen not to take up, as it is about female corporeality (Whitford, 1986b: 8). As Gail Schwab argues, the mediating terms sought by Irigaray differ from the familiar binarisms of psychoanalysis, drawn upon for example by Kristeva, where:

The Phallus as third term spells prohibition, difference, and individuation by castration

(Schwab, 1994: 371)

Thinking the 'between' in Irigarayan terms is not about merely bridging two disparate terms, but about exploring their reciprocity:

To overflow and exceed all boundaries and oppositions... speaking from a position in the middle of the binaries (the so called position of the 'excluded middle') affirming both poles while undoing their polarisation... with meanings that resonate, that are tactile and corporeal as well as conceptual, that reverberate in their plurality and polyvocity. (Grosz, 1989: 132)

This quotation from Elizabeth Grosz encapsulates what is most original and exciting about Irigaray's approach to the problematics of western metaphysics and what as the thesis will go on to show, can provide a productive and refreshing approach to areas of debate within drama education.

ii Margaret Whitford (1991a) *Philosophy in the Feminine*, pp. 31, describes how Irigaray was censured for being politically committed by a psychoanalytic community, which thought that being a psychoanalyst precluded political commitment.

iii Freud's account of the Oedipus complex was developed throughout his writings on sexuality. The version which Lacan draws upon is outlined in Freud's 1933 paper on 'Femininity', Vol. 22 S.E. in which the disparity between oedipalisation for the boy and the girl is fully formulated in relation to desire.

iv Phrase coined by Irigaray in *This Sex Which Is Not One* (1985b: 74)


vi I am quoting Irigaray's quotations of Lacan, in Catherine Porter's 1985 translation of Ce Sexe qui n'en est pas un (1977), unless otherwise stated.

vii French term for extreme pleasure. Psychoanalytically opposed to 'Lack', jouissance also connotes sexual orgasm, especially of the father of the primal horde as in Freud's *Totem and Taboo* (1913). See Wright (1992: 185-7)

viii 'that from which one can extract (or in which one can construct) an indefinite number of ensemblist organisations, but which can never be reconstituted (ideally) by an ensemblist composition (finite or infinite) of these organizations.' (Castoriadis, 1975: 461-3, trans. In Howard, 1977: 297)

ix Genevieve Lloyd (1984) *The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy*, details the long standing association between the mind/matter dualism and male/female, beginning as the evocation of a master/slave relation in Platonic thought:

this Platonic theme recurs throughout the subsequent history of western thought in ways that both exploit and reinforce the long-standing associations between maleness and form, femaleness and matter. (Lloyd, 1984: 5)

x See Translator's note, Irigaray (1985a: 147)

xi See, Irigaray (1985b: 122-123)

xii Examples occur throughout the first section of the book, *Speaking of Immemorial Waters*, Irigaray (1991: 1-69)

xiii See particularly, *Women on the Market in This Sex which is not One*, (1985b: 170-191)


xv Carolyn Burke's translation first appeared in Richard A. Cohen ed. (1986) *Face to Face with Levinas*, but I have taken quotations from the revised version published in *An Ethics of Sexual Difference* (1993a) as the subjective distinction between male and female lovers (l'amant/l'aimee) is more emphasized.

xvi For the most recent discussion of Irigaray's complex view of homosexuality and heterosexuality in her analysis of patriarchal culture, see Grosz (1994b) *The Hetero and the Homo: The sexual ethics of Luce Irigaray*, in Burke et. al. (eds.) Engaging with Irigaray, pp. 335-50

See Whitford (1991a: 152-3), for more detailed explanation of these terms.


Chapter Three  Knowledge, Marginalization and Difference

Having looked more closely at Irigaray's work in the contexts of psychoanalytic theory, philosophy and feminism, in the next three chapters I will be suggesting what Irigarayan theory can contribute towards issues of knowledge, pedagogy and creativity. In this chapter I will be looking at how Irigaray's strategy for challenging dichotomous thought can provoke a reconsideration of contested areas of debate on the specificity and constitution of 'knowledge' associated with the arts and specifically drama education, especially where these involve culturally marginalized aspects of learning, such as feeling, emotion, the body etc. This leads into a discussion of how Irigaray's reconceptualization of subjectivity and expression might enable a reconsideration of the position of the individual learner within drama education as one of contiguity and reciprocity with their wider and more immediate cultural setting, and the implications of such a theoretical perspective upon issues of pedagogy and creativity. Such discussions necessitate the imbrication of questions on the nature of drama as an educational subject, and (the) subject as learner within drama education.

Many of the dichotomous positions, such as theatre/drama, process/product, drama as art/drama in education, that characterized debates on drama education in Great Britain through the last two decades have been challenged and declared to be false dichotomies in the light of structuralist and post-structuralist thought. The tenor of approach by many writers on drama education in the mid-to-late 1990s has been to summarize, challenge and move on from these restrictive oppositions (Fleming, 1994: 14-30; O'Neill, 1995: xv-xviii; Somers, 1994: 8-9). However, this does not mean that discourse in drama education is no longer effected by dichotomous thought, on the
contrary it can be argued that the so called dichotomies of the past have given way to new emergent polarities that are products of this contemporary theoretical context. For example ‘semiotics/phenomenology, structuralism/post-structuralism, form/content, inner/outer dimensions of experience’ (Fleming, 1999: 96). As suggested in Chapter Two, Irigaray’s rereading of western metaphysics identifies the oppositional rendering of male/female difference as crucial to the inception of binary logic; a logic which in fact upholds a single economy, an economy of the same, by negating that which is ‘other’ of the dominant term. This is referred to by Irigaray in its various guises as the economy of the Idea, the Logos, the Phallus, or the Ho(m)osexual economy. The privileged term or dominant side of the binary is characterized by qualities such as form, singularity and transcendence, qualities associated with morphological interpretations of the male body. The contrasting or pejorative side is characterized by formlessness, heterogeneity, fluidity and materiality, which are morphologically associated with the feminine. The concomitant association between the masculine, dominant half of the cultural binary and ‘Reason’ is well documented in feminist philosophy. For Irigaray, the opposition of male/female symbolism and its associated binarisms, form/formlessness, mind/body, reason/materiality, truth/‘Woman’ as the untruth of truth etc. constitutes the textual material of her deconstructive – (re)constructive strategy. This, I would argue is one of the reasons why the relevance of Irigaray’s work extends beyond feminist discourse, and can be of use in a variety of contexts where such dichotomous positions are most vehemently contested or upheld.

Writing on drama education is pervaded with dichotomous positions which can be linked to this basic masculine/feminine divide because the operational practices of drama education cover a prospective range or ‘continuum’ (Somers, 1994: 9) of
learning activities, many of which cannot be comfortably accommodated by the term ‘propositional knowledge’, and many of which can, and have been, associated with feeling, affect, emotive functioning or embodiment. Following Irigaray’s deconstructive – (re)constructive approach to rereading cultural discourse, it is not sufficient to claim that these dichotomies no longer exist because we understand them as constructions of discourse. As Irigaray’s work continues to demonstrate, they are present at the very foundations of discourse itself, and in value systems that continue to operate even within postmodern reconfigurations of subjectivity and thought. In this chapter I will be considering ‘knowledge’ within the context of drama education, not in an attempt to define or pin down what knowledge is or should be in drama, but as a way of opening notions of ‘knowledge’ to scrutiny, using strategies that Irigaray adopts to challenge dominant or ‘phallogocentric’ discourse. Such a rereading will problematize the reconfiguration of dominant values that prioritize or universalize public scrutiny and rational judgement as principle paradigms of arts education.

Whilst maintaining that such factors are nevertheless highly significant, an Irigarayian approach would stress their dependence upon the emotive, physical being of the artist-performer-audience as relational entities. It is intended that this thesis will go beyond arguing merely for a broad and inclusive approach to knowledge and learning within drama education, by examining ways in which Irigarayan theory challenges traditional and postmodern aesthetics in their marginalization and appropriation of certain ‘knowledges’ or forms of expression.

**Double Syntax:** In Chapter Two I introduced the term ‘double syntax’ used by Irigaray to counter the negation of feminine terms that subtend dominant values. In her chapter *Any Theory of the ‘Subject’ Has Always Been Appropriated by the ‘Masculine’* (1985a), Irigaray explains how Freud’s topography of the subject
perpetuates the Platonic scission between form and formlessness and its concomitant association with sexual dimorphism:

\[\text{The movement to speak of the 'other' in a language already systematised by/for the same (1985a: 139)}\]

Beyond the 'self' is a 'Dark Continent' a 'still blind and incomprehensible horizon' (1985a: 139). Irigaray asks her reader not to consider this excluded excess pejoratively, as confusion or as a subtending threat, but to consider it as an alternative logic; a logic of the unconscious or repressed of the Greek Logos (rationality). Although she uses the term 'double syntax' she points out the insufficiency of alluding to only two logics, and that the notion of 'two' is always already mitigated by a deference to 'one' through comparison and opposition. As with Irigaray's critique of Hegelian dialectic, through which the oppositional categorization of male and female is actually seen to support universality (Irigaray, 1993b: 140), the purpose is to 'jam' the discursive machinery by insisting upon positions of difference rather than opposition. Therefore, an alternative or feminine syntax would be better characterized by multiplicity, heterogeneity and proximity, qualities that defy singularity and are, 'not reducible to the economy of sameness of the One' (1985b: 133-4). Irigaray suggests the need for a radicalized symbolic in order to redistribute masculine and feminine terms so that they no longer occupy polarized positions of priority and subordination, transcendence and immanence, but that as equal or plurally positive terms these syntaxes might be able to articulate with each other (1985b: 132). It is this possibility of reciprocity that Irigaray's work moves towards; evoking what could be described as a kind of teleology without telos, a constant state of movement or flux. The nature of the feminine syntax and the meaning of its relationality with
the masculine syntax cannot be projected with certainty but can be speculated upon by examining the meaning and consequences of oppositional structuration in current discourse. Irigaray argues that disastrous consequences of the division between the two sides of sexual difference are apparent in the déréliction of the feminine, but are also discernible on the masculine side in the ‘quest for its meaning’. Trapped in a web of signifiers or house of language man is immobilized, divided from his body, a subject in crisis (1993a: 126-127). Although the applicability of such an argument to feminist discourse is obvious, Irigaray’s use of the terms masculine and feminine is contiguous with but seldom reducible to man and woman only; it also encapsulates all that is associated with masculine and feminine as symbolic functions. What Irigaray describes as the split or ‘scission’ between masculine and feminine which denies the feminine, ‘a right to the ‘for itself’” (1993a: 117) is also,

A split in the order of reason that leaves nature without gods (1993a: 119)

Irigaray attributes what she describes as this cultural pathology to a forgotten debt owed to the subjugated half of the cultural binary, the (mater)riality that subtends man’s house of language. (1993a: 127)

Having interpreted this ‘scission’ between masculine and feminine as damaging, Irigaray offers the notion of relationality between these terms as potentially positive for the recreation and growth of identity, knowledge and expression. The divisive tension between the mobility and fluidity of the feminine, and immobility or rigidity of masculine phallomorphic identity that is occasioned by the polarisation of these terms, would be transformed in acts of reciprocity into a more creative tension or ‘becoming’ (1992: 37, 1993a: 129). Not to be confused with Derrida’s ‘becoming
woman' which continues to fix identity along axes of truth and untruth, but a fecund relationality that would reorientate the very meaning of such terms. This is commensurate with what Irigaray defines as the third stage of her project, as outlined in Chapter Two (page 46). However, before a state of reciprocity can be attained it is necessary to challenge the universality of the dominant term by identifying and prioritizing what has been constituted as its negative, as she does in the case of woman (1995: 97). For Irigaray, the postmodern dissolution of fixed male/female sexed identity and movement towards multiple and polymorphous sexual signification does not preclude the dominance of an overarching economy of sameness:

"Doesn't the “desiring machine” still partly take the place of woman or the feminine? Isn't it a sort of metaphor for her/it that men can use?" (1985b: 141)

"You feel you could abandon your ‘I’? But your ‘I’ holds you fast, having flooded and covered the whole of everything it ever created... With each new inspiration do you not become more than ever that ‘I’? Reduplicated within yourself." (1992: 83)

In other words, the feminine as abstraction or linguistic device becomes merely a means for re-articulating or reconstituting the masculine self, and fragmentation of that self is still an emanation of the whole. This is why Irigaray deploys the language of onto-theology. To particularize, or as some would say ‘essentialize’, the negative term ‘woman’ii; in order to change her position of enunciation, to bring about a change in discourse. I will be returning to issues of identity and expression later in the chapter, as part of my discussion of the learning subject. First, it is important to formulate more specific connections between Irigaray’s notion of a double syntax and its relevance to drama studies.
In Chapter One I referred to the marginalized position of drama in relation to the National Curriculum, suggesting that to a certain extent subjects such as drama and dance could be said to occupy a feminine position in relation to the dominant discourse. In saying this I am not, however, attempting to draw a direct association between drama education and the cultural feminine or to suggest that drama is the 'other' of rationality and stable form. I am suggesting that because the activities of drama education, both in practical reality and discursive representation, are deemed to transgress boundaries and incorporate threshold positions between cultural polarities, encompassing qualities from both sides of what Irigaray describes as the 'symbolic division of labour' (1993: 118), it is useful to consider this educational discipline in terms of Irigaray's image of the double syntax. The object of this would not be to re-open oppositional debates, indeed Irigaray's politics of sexual difference attempts to preclude opposition, but to explore the productive possibilities of relationality. As Irigaray suggests, before productive relationality can take place, it is necessary to reclaim and prioritize the negative half of the binary, the subordinate term or 'feminine'. She maintains that this is possible because the feminine is never entirely absent from discourse, as Michelle Boulous Walker explains:

The spaces of the imaginary or the real are not spaces outside or beyond the symbolic; they are its structuring possibility (Walker, 1998: 64)

The initial stages of Irigaray's deconstructive-reconstructive project then, requires her to:

1. go back through the masculine imaginary, to interpret the way it has reduced us to silence, to muteness or mimicry... attempting, from that starting point and at the same time, to (re)discover a possible space for the feminine imaginary (1985b: 164)
The key conceptualizations of knowledge dominating drama education discourse over
the last three decades can be identified broadly as follows. There are aspects of
Romantic aesthetics to be discerned in approaches to drama, which stress personal
development, emotional engagement through issues-based work and attunement of
personal understanding in terms of universal ‘human’ qualities. The work of Dorothy
Heathcote and Gavin Bolton has, for example, been identified with ‘Humanist
essentialism’ and ‘Romantic notions of authenticity and truth’ (Nicholson, 1993: 19-
20). Summative descriptions that seek to encapsulate key notions of a practitioner’s
approach cannot adequately cover the breadth of that approach, and often have to rest
on matters of emphasis. Consequently, whilst in hindsight Bolton emphasizes the
importance of ‘the sign’ in reference to Heathcote’s work (Bolton, 1998: 178), it is
fair to say that the established impression gained from her work suggests a belief in
the reality of the deep interior of the individual and its relationship to totalizing
discourse. For example, it is further suggested by Bolton that, for Heathcote,
‘dramatic action, by its nature, is subordinated to meaning’, and that the two
underlying assumptions of her drama praxis are that, ‘participants engage with
making meanings and those meanings relate to human struggle’ (Bolton, 1998: 176-
8). In contrast to this is the modernist, Marxist-identified, approach associated with
David Hornbrook, which prioritizes drama as art, as theatre, as a form of cultural
currency, a mode of language and empowerment. The rationalist assumptions
underlying this approach emphasize interpretation and place learning in drama
education along a continuum that includes key canonical texts, practitioners and
genres as providing exemplification of the most accomplished forms of
communication within the dramatic ‘community of discourse’ (Hornbrook, 1998: 123,
1998b: 63). A postmodern perspective on drama education, as exemplified through
the work of Helen Nicholson seeks to move beyond totalizing narratives of truth,
knowledge and the subjectivity; admonishing modernism's 'failure to consider what or who, is absent from its 'rationalist' definitions of self' (Nicholson, 1993: 19).

However, her emphasis remains at the level of discursivity or theatre art forms, though this is fragmented into a cross-cultural, cross-gendered melange of prospective signifiers. 'Knowledge' becomes a textual 'surface' to be arranged by the artist-practitioner:

Drama education should celebrate its intertextuality - the divergent discourses of multivocal children, the values of teachers, the complex heritages of historical and contemporary dramatic culture - and give students the opportunity to interpret, and create, through physical, visual and verbal language, their own dramatic art. (Nicholson, 1995: 36)

Even from this brief overview it is possible to identify implied though concomitant oppositions such as those between interiority/exteriority, feeling/reason, nature/culture, which can be related to a prototypical masculine/feminine divide; in other words, a potential interplay of masculine and feminine syntaxes.

Addressing the cultural claims of modernism and postmodernism, whilst seeking to retain an interest in personal significance from the 'drama-in-education' tradition, Michael Fleming approaches the problem of dichotomous thought, or 'false choices' in drama education through the use of Wittgenstein's linguistic theory. This hinges on the notion that concepts relate via a process of family resemblances rather than clearly defined boundaries. The term 'drama' for instance can have a variety of meanings or emphases according to the circumstances or context of its use.

According to Fleming, this understanding allows a shift in emphasis away from the definition and polarization of terms, and towards a concern with context, the way in which language is embedded in human experience, or to use Wittgenstein's term,
forms of life' (Fleming, 2000: 36-8). This is the basis of Fleming's more 'inclusive' analysis of drama education, in which inner and outer, personal and cultural dimensions of experience are viewed as being 'integrated' with each other rather than polarized or synthesised in a way which negates inner experience (Fleming, 2000: 42-4). However, even Fleming demonstrates how Wittgenstein's approach can render the concept of an 'inner self' necessarily 'redundant' in the context of assessment by observation (Fleming, 2000: 41), or is it that linguistic concepts per se, are apt to crumble when we scrutinise the complexity of the experiential world? In view of this possibility, there is a Wittgensteinian interpretation to be made of Irigaray's philosophical project.

In a recent article Joyce Davidson and Mick Smith (1999) drew out some points of comparison between Wittgenstein's work and the second phase of Irigaray's project, her exploration of the requirements of a feminine subjectivity and language. They argue that parler-femme can be seen as Irigaray's attempt to develop a specifically feminine 'language game', for which, the female body would be the 'form of life'; not in a reductive or biologicist sense, but as part of a web of 'family resemblances' that defies, 'either an essentialist ontology or a representational conception of language'.

For example:

The 'labia' gain their specific meaning through their role in Irigaray's language-game

(Davidson and Smith, 1999: 85)

What is stressed by Davidson and Smith, is Irigaray's recognition of the subversive yet productive potential of an unfixed, reciprocal relationality between the body and language:
The philosophical and rhetorical strength of [Irigaray’s] discourse lies in *articulating the imprecision and mutability of this relationship*... [its] 'vagueness' (Davidson and Smith, 1999:86)

For Irigaray the female body is a powerful resource, drawn upon to abrogate the power of phallic Oneness. This has implications beyond the second phase of Irigaray’s project, in terms of knowledge and expression within the field of cultural discourse as it undermines notions of a nature/culture dichotomy. But isn’t this merely re-stating Fleming’s position, that the choices offered by language are false and that its ‘embeddedness’ in human experience is therefore significant? Whilst suggesting that a reciprocity and fluidity in language production and meaning are implicit in Irigaray’s theory of *parler-femme* and its exposition, I would argue that Irigaray moves beyond or exceeds Wittgenstein’s position for the following reasons. At the level of discourse, Irigaray does not merely identify dichotomous thought as a ‘false’ construction but the product of a phallic economy with implicit inequalities:

> Why should the solidity of an erection be more valuable than the fluidity of a flow between two? (Irigaray, 1992: 16)

In stressing the mucosity or permeability between dominant and negative, included and excluded terms Irigaray maintains a relation of reciprocity or creative tension that prevents any reductive sleight of hand into dissipation or synthesis:

> To retain-contain the oneness of this whole, you [masculine discourse] push out to the limit whatever has the greatest denseness, will not be pierced or puts obstacles to any passage through, or, simply, between. You separate within from without, inside from out. You, and the rest. The rest? Where is it? Where and what has become of me? (Irigaray, 1992: 16)
As part of her attempt to move beyond, or signal the potentiality for change within, this seemingly intractable linguistic system, Irigaray continually re-emphasizes the 'forgotten' materiality or 'real' that subtends and acts as material support for discourse. The designation of this as a 'feminine syntax' suggests not only the potential for a fecund relationality between the two syntaxes but an a priori relationality or co-dependence:

But when I leave, there is a gap in your horizon. A hole in your skin. If I hold back from your consummation, you discover an opening you never knew existed. An unsuspected mouth. A voiceless call... Your wholeness crumbles, flows away into nothing that could be named

(Irigaray, 1992: 16)

It is Irigaray's contention that western thought has become stultified, frozen by its denial of the sensible, the body, the feminine (1992: 18), and its recognition of only one 'syntax' predicated upon what is 'unthinking', 'unspeakable' (1985a: 139). It might appear that reclamation of sentient life is surly possible through the arts, but even here 'the sensible' is problematic, being divided between the imaginary and the 'real', the sublimated and the unthinkable.

Reason and its 'others'

In considering the category 'knowledge' it is appropriate to give some attention to Reason and the marginalization of other entities, namely feeling, emotion, nature, the body etc. Following Margaret Whitford's reading (1988), I am not intending to present Irigaray as an anti rationalist per se, but as a theorist who is critical of the dominance and universality of rational deductive thought as means of experiencing, articulating and understanding. I am aware, as is Irigaray, of the provisional dualism required in order to make such a statement, but it must be remembered that holding
dual terms in reciprocity is not intended to rigidify dichotomous thought but to act as a means by which to challenge it. In the light of Irigaray’s project it is possible, for example, to revisit the work of Susanne Langer and read her re-assessment of the importance of feeling and non-discursive symbolization without condemning her for presenting a dualistic argument; but recognising the tactical necessity within her analysis, for particularizing and emphasizing subordinate terms, in order to dislodge oppositional structures.

Langer’s *Philosophy in a New Key* (1942) begins by addressing the problems of oppositional configuration in western metaphysics, through which, she argues that knowledge has become reduced to the identification of truth with empirical fact. Central to Langer’s ‘new key’ is the fundamental notion of symbolization; a function, which she argues, will provide a ‘new conception of mentality’ that defies or problematizes boundaries inimical to western metaphysics:

To face the deadlocked paradoxes of mind and body, reason and impulse, autonomy and law, and... overcome the checkmated arguments of an earlier age by discarding their very idiom and shaping their equivalents in a more significant phrase. (Langer, 1942: 25)

Drawing on the fields of linguistics and semantics, Langer brings our attention to the self referentiality of language and meaning; their occupation of a:

realm of logic, where one does not deal with qualities, but only with relations [where] The meaning of a term is likewise a function; it rests on a pattern, in which the term itself holds the key position. (Langer, 1942: 54-5)
Having considered how language functions she focuses on its structural consequences, revealing an exclusionary model built on the opposition of 'the knowable' and the 'inexpressible realm of feeling' (Langer, 1942: 86-7). She quotes from Wittgenstein in referring to the latter as a 'beyond' of logic, an 'unspeakable'. Further, Langer suggests that in the context of philosophy this 'realm of feeling' is associated with danger and mysticism, defined as 'unreason' and 'irrationalism' (Langer, 1942: 92). In contrast, however, Langer presents this non-discursive sub-stratum in terms of an untapped potentiality that exceeds propositional thought, and could be drawn upon to develop and broaden theories of epistemology (Langer, 1942: 92).

To this extent Langer's project shares certain similarities with Irigaray's proposition of a double syntax, where an interplay of alternative logics is conceived of as revitalizing epistemological thought. The main differences between their approach, however, stem from Irigaray's detailed re-reading of western metaphysics from the point of view of the excluded or appropriated feminine. This broadens the range of her critique beyond challenging the primacy of neo-positivistic or propositional thought, as in the case in Langer's work. This difference is evidenced by their contrasting approach to Kant, for example Langer makes an unproblematic referral to Kant's 'categories of understanding', as a means by which to question supposed divisions between sensate experience and 'knowledge', arguing that sense experience is always already a form of understanding (Langer, 1942: 89). Irigaray however, reads Kant as appropriating and reallocating aspects of the sensible to the intelligible whilst perpetuating an intrinsic divide between these terms (Irigaray, 1985a: 204). For Irigaray this concerns philosophy's association of the body, of materiality, with woman, stemming from Plato. Symbolism, or the metaphorization of the sensible is identified by Irigaray as, 'the exploitation of the body-matter of women' (1985b: 85).
an interpretation that I will return to later in the chapter. What I want to identify initially as significant in this look back at Langer are the similarities to Irigaray’s project, her undertaking to challenge the bifurcation of sense-experience and understanding, and its implicit relationship of dominance and exclusion. Along side this runs the argument that there are dimensions of human actuality that exceed language or are not reducible to it, but which could be recoupable to alternative forms of expression. Embedded in this proposition is an understanding that what exceeds language actually subtends or enables it, is contiguous with it:

All our signs and symbols were gathered from sensuous and emotional experience and bear the marks of their origin (Langer, 1942: 283)

Whereas Irigaray pursues similar possibilities in terms of a re-embodied language or parler-femme, Langer explores the potentiality of the non-discursive through artistic expression.

In her later books, Feeling and Form (1953) and Philosophical Sketches (1962), Langer develops her argument for the cultural importance of art as a, ‘practice of creating perceptible forms expressive of human feeling’ (Langer, 1962: 84), and as a means of intensifying our, ‘awareness of subjective reality’ (Langer, 1962: 92). Picking up on her earlier references to the non-reducibility of discursive and non-discursive symbols to each other, Langer argues that artistic symbols do not merely communicate ideas but create knowledges; that there is a heuristic impetus within the production and reception of artistic symbols (Langer, 1953: 22, 376), which is contiguous with sentient life (Langer, 1953: 40). For Langer, attention to the arts is therefore crucial in developing a more holistic approach to epistemology:
A wide neglect of artistic education is neglect in the education of feeling [which Langer argues is] at the very heart of personal education (Langer, 1962: 93)

In order to reprioritize this culturally neglected or marginalised entity – ‘feeling’, it becomes necessary for Langer to attempt to particularize it, as Irigaray does in the case of ‘woman’. Furthermore, it is in the very act of provisionally ‘essentializing’ the unessentializable that the supposed rigidity and isolation of dominant form is brought into question:

Human feeling is a fabric, not a vague mass. It has an intricate dynamic pattern, possible combinations and new emergent phenomena. It is a pattern of organically interdependent and interdetermined tensions and resolutions, a pattern of almost infinitely complex activation and cadence. It belongs to the whole gamut of our sensibility – the sense of straining thought, all mental attitude and motor set. These are the deeper reaches that underlie the surface waves of our emotion, and make human life a life of feeling instead of an unconscious metabolic existence interrupted by feelings (Langer, 1962: 89)

For Langer, the formulation of a work of art is dependent upon the necessary interdependence of feeling, knowledge, the embodied artist and the medium; an interrelational matrix that calls boundaries into question. Some of those disrupted specifically by Langer include boundaries between, form and content (Langer, 1953: 51-2), subjectivity and objectivity (Langer, 1953: 177), ethos and pathos (Langer, 1953: 17) and the personal and the public (Langer, 1953: 177).

Whilst it is not my intention in this thesis to reduce art, or more specifically drama, to an equation with the ‘feminine’, I do contend that by drawing upon Irigaray’s notion of a ‘double syntax’, or play of heterogeneous logics, it is possible to regard drama as a ‘dynamic pattern’ of syntaxes, not all of which are reducible to rationality or the
language of propositional knowledge. For example, Langer’s presentation of feeling as Reason’s other, a seemingly ‘ineluctable’ though ‘venerable assumption’ in western thought (Langer, 1962: 1), and her evocation of the popular association of feeling with formlessness and fluidity (Langer, 1962: 94), does highlight an association between ‘feeling’ and the qualities that, as Irigaray points out, are identified with the cultural feminine. Irigaray states of discourse that there is a ‘complicity’ between rationality and ‘the mechanics of solids alone’ (Irigaray, 1985b: 107). What is overlooked or remains uninterpreted is the ‘economy of fluids’, their ‘specific dynamics’, ‘internal frictions’, ‘pressures’, ‘movements’ etc. However, she suggests that these properties are determinable in their relation with the dominant term:

That it [fluidity] enjoys and suffers from a greater sensitivity to pressures; that it changes – in volume or in force... That it allows itself to be easily traversed by flow by virtue of its conductivity to currents coming from other fluids or exerting pressure through the walls of a solid; that it mixes with bodies of a like state... which makes distinction problematical; and furthermore that it is already diffuse ‘in itself’, which disconcerts any attempt at static identification... (Irigaray 1985b: 111)

In the current educational context where it could be argued that a pervasive atmosphere of, ‘excessive rationalism and quasi-scientism’ (Fleming, 1999: 91) dominates and delineates the discursive field, earlier attempts to discuss those ‘fluid’ or less rationally tangible elements of learning in drama education have become either compressed, channelled out of discourse or consigned to the ‘vagar[ies] of history’ (Hombrook, 1998: 3). In considering the possibilities for a ‘feminized’ theory of knowledge, it is necessary to pick up the threads of Langer’s influence on discourses in arts education in order to reclaim something of the concern for an ‘education of
feeling’, that has it seems become so unfashionable today. In pursuing this idea I will be provisionally prioritizing the notion of ‘feeling’ and examining what writers on arts education have construed of this ‘unspeakable’ entity. Then using Irigaray’s own intervention with aesthetic discourse and notions of the creative subject, I will explore possibilities beyond dichotomization, by re-considering approaches to knowledge meaning and aesthetic learning through an economy of the ‘threshold’ rather than of ‘the same’.

Following Langer, Louis Arnaud Reid argues that art exceeds propositional logic by virtue of the fact that it is not merely a repository for symbols but that it is the, ‘whole work as experienced which is the art-symbol’ (Reid, 1980: 9), that because the meaning of a work is inseparable from the work itself, it cannot be translated into any other form without loss or distortion. He refers to this as the work’s ‘embodied meaning’ (Reid, 1980: 3). In the practice of making art, the formulation of this embodied meaning involves the ‘utterly inseparable even indistinguishable’ interrelation of feeling and cognition as distinct yet equal forms of knowledge (Reid, 1980: 12). This he regards as ‘knowing holistically’ (Reid, 1980: 12), or what he describes later as a ‘plural concept of knowledge’ (Reid, 1984). In questioning the ‘tyranny of the propositional view’, Reid suggests that all knowledge has an intuitive base and that any intellectual knowledge is necessarily accompanied by feeling, conviction and faith (Reid, 1984: 13). It is important to stress that this is not intended as a reductive argument, a suggestion that all knowledge is ‘merely’ intuitive, but an assertion that knowledge be thought of in pluralistic terms, allowing for a more complex interplay of knowledge forms where balance differs according to activity. Reid not only stresses the importance of such a pluralistic view in terms of artistic
understanding or aesthetic knowledge, but also because ‘feeling’ is an intrinsic part of human existence, an:

Inseparable part of everything that happens in the life of the conscious psycho-physical organism (Reid, 1983: 22)

For Reid, feeling is ‘strictly indefinable’, yet can encompass cognitive feeling [I feel that...], affective feeling [identified with pleasure and non-pleasure] and physical feeling, all of which he argues are present in aesthetic knowledge (Reid, 1983: 22):

When we are thinking aesthetically in the arts, our bodies are actively and intimately involved... The union of body and mind, of thinking, imagining, acting, feeling... stands out, perhaps as nowhere else (Reid, 1983: 25)

When Reid talks of the body’s involvement he is not only talking of the physical processes or efforts required in any art making activity, but of the body as an active maker of meaning, or what he refers to as ‘creative evolution’ (Reid, 1984: 19). The artist, as holistic being, working in dialogue with the medium is a precondition for the embodied meaning of the work of art. This ‘existent embodiment of value’, Reid argues, points towards the specificity or particularity of the arts as repositories of knowledge (Reid, 1983: 29). This specificity is determined by a connection between the arts and what Reid identifies as the sentient emotive quality of ‘human’ existence. A quality that is held in ambiguity by Reid, but which is evidenced for him by a contiguity between process and product, matter and form, the making of a work of art and its expressive meaning. This touches upon what Irigaray identifies as requisite in order to proceed into a new epistemological age, the porosity of boundaries between matter and form, body and discourse (1993a: 7).
It is the interstice of process/product, making and meaning that Robert Witkin focuses on in attempting to provide a theoretical account of sensate knowing, or what he refers to as ‘an intelligence of feeling’ (Witkin, 1974: 19). Witkin argues that our cultural propensities and educational systems develop the individual’s capacity for ‘object-reflexive action’:

\[
\text{a medium of impression, through which the specific properties of the external world are apprehended in actions displaced by them (Witkin, 1974: 19)}
\]

But, he argues that this is not a sufficient explanation for the more sophisticated or existential forms of human interaction with the world. Left out of the Piagetian framework that Witkin builds upon is ‘subject reflexive action’, the ability to relate meaningfully and personally with the world. Without this Witkin argues, the individual reaches a crisis of motivation, conceiving of ‘himself’ as an object in relation to other objects. Alternatively, subject reflexive action is a process whereby,

\[
\text{Being is transformed and thereby transcends its former relationship to the world (Witkin, 1974: 29)}
\]

Because of an ‘absence of specific explanatory research’ (Witkin, 1974: 175) in the area of sensate experience, Witkin adopts the epistemological framework used by Piaget in relation to the development of logical thought, transposing onto each developmental stage the corresponding stage of sensate development. These range from ‘sensing in relation to objects’ to ‘recognising the universes of symbol and object as truly separate from one another’, and form part of a complex and detailed scheme accounting for the ‘crystallisation’ of sensate experience (Witkin, 1974: 176-
This tightly structured, highly systematised and universal phenomenon can be summarised as:

The projection of a sensate impulse through an expressive medium, the outcome of which is feeling-form' (Witkin, 1974: 44)

Yet Witkin regards each experience as unique, by virtue of the individual’s subject reflexivity. It is important to stress in relation to this process – product continuum, that ‘self-expression’ for Witkin is not an expression of the ‘self’ as such but a,

Realisation of this sense of myself as a subject… the sense of being in the world… the extent that the active subject can become perceptible to himself (Witkin, 1989: 28-9)

Whereas Reid suggests the possibility of implicit meaning derived from the embodied actualization of the work of art, what Irigaray describes as contiguity or ‘touching’ between body and meaning (1985a: 29), Witkin emphasises a secondary ‘realisation’ or knowledge, but one that is constituted through the act of expression. In Irigarayan terms Witkin’s combination of existentialism and expressivism seems to perform both an actualization and an appropriation of the sensible. Witkin’s account of subject-reflexive action would suggest a teleology that favours transcendent distance from the sensible, whereby Being ‘transcends former relationship to the world’ (Witkin, 1974: 29). A crucial element of expressivist theories such as Witkin’s, however, is the founding of ‘public space’, not so much bringing knowledge to light, or externalising internal thought, but formulating meanings through expressive acts (Taylor: 1980: 262). Irigaray’s assertion that ‘woman’, the sensible, the body, is the ‘matter upon which [man] will ever and again return to plant his foot in order to spring farther, leap
higher' (1985a: 134), is discernible in Witkin’s existentialist project, but his expressivist aims do not reflect this appropriative account of symbolisation.

Peter Abbs also argues that ‘aesthetic intelligence’ is of a distinct form, working not through concepts but precepts, ‘the structural elements of sensory experience’ (Abbs, 1989b: 3). However, in his call for the clarification of aesthetic intelligence, he stresses the limitation of an arts vocabulary based on ‘self-expression’, suggesting that the ‘transpositional acts of aesthetic intelligence’ belong to ‘an open and public realm’ (Abbs, 1989b: 6). For Abbs, the arts are an inextricable part of their cultural tradition, but whilst depending upon what is ‘symbolically available’ they also form an, ‘interrogation of existence’:

[The arts] have a power to create, to make new, to make different, to extend, in radical ways, both perception and... artistic grammar (Abbs, 1989b: 7)

Abbs is very careful to stress that the arts are not merely subject to ideological determination, that they not only reflect reality but create reality. In support of this point he draws a distinction between ‘symbols’ and ‘signals’ the former eliciting ‘reflection’ the latter ‘reaction’ – an automatic, predictable and uniform response (Abbs, 1989a: 32-5). Abbs uses this distinction to explain how symbolism is at once cultural and individual:

The power to create symbols creates a psychic space within the natural space, a psychic time within natural time, where through the play of mind upon its own symbolic constructs, the possibility of meaning is established (Abbs, 1989a: 35)
Demonstrating Langer's influence, as well as that of expressivist theory, Abbs argues that non-discursive symbols, the symbols of dream, myth, religion and art, have meaning that is inextricably embedded in their specific symbolic formation, and which cannot be extricated without being diminished or transformed. As well as locating meaning and value within the cultural—historical situatedness of such symbols, Abbs also emphasises sentient qualities:

[Art symbols] are expressions of our bodies, of the pulsing rhythm of the blood, of the inhalation and exhalation of breath, of the immediate delighting in sensations; in sounds, colours, textures, movements, perceptions (Abbs, 1989b: 7)

Finding both positivist and progressivist approaches inadequate for the formation of a comprehensive aesthetic, Abbs identifies the need for a 'broader epistemology and a deeper recognition of the significance of historic culture' (Abbs, 1994: 43-4). It is particularly noticeable in Abbs work that as the opposition of feeling/reason, the aesthetic/the rational are problematized:

Feeling without form cannot be comprehended, and form without feeling has nothing worth comprehending (Abbs, 1989a: 41)

the argument gives way to an emphasis on the relationship between inner/outer, personal/public experience, wherein Abbs stresses a dialectic between the conscious, preconscious and unconscious facets of the 'self' and the cultural symbolic that establishes meaning (Abbs, 1989a: 35), a 'symbolic order' (Abbs, 1989b). However, as Irigaray's reading of Lacan suggests, a co-constitutive dialectic between symbolic and 'self' produces its own exclusionary boundaries by which, not only 'meaning' and
'expression', but also notions of 'self' are determined. Abbs does not undertake to question who or what the 'self' is that he refers to.

Taking the argument in a different direction, David Best presents a philosophical repudiation of the myth of opposition between feeling and reason (Best, 1985: 1), and the association between feeling, creativity and individuality (Best, 1989: 71). Creative thinking, feeling and imagination are he argues, just as important to science as the arts, and are indeed part of all thinking (Best, 1985: 10-5). Consequently, Best calls for a recognition of the, 'crucial place of understanding and cognition' in arts education, as a necessary precondition for an 'intelligible account of educating in the arts', suggesting that an emphasis on the non-cognitive, affective, emotional faculties is ultimately damaging to the arguments in favour arts education (Best, 1989: 71). Best clarifies that he is not arguing, like Reid, for the close relation of feeling and reason, but that, 'artistic feelings are rational in kind', and that to speak of a 'relation' between feeling and reason is a 'continuance of the myth' (Best, 1989: 74). In other words, that the distinction between 'feeling' and 'thought' only exists as an historical discursive construction. Best contravenes this 'myth' with demonstration that 'cognition is inseparable from emotional feelings' (Best, 1989: 75). In terms of Irigaray's critique of the narrow conception of knowledge dominated by rationality, this view could serve as a propaedeutic for more expansive theories of knowledge, indeed Best does argue that, 'the ability to use and understand interpretive reason involves imagination, creativity' (Best, 1989: 77). However, a closer look at Best's method of demonstration, or exemplification, reveals that his own argument depends upon the discursive separation of feeling and reason, slips into a reinforcement of the bifurcation of internal and external realms, and reprioritises reason in accordance with cultural value. For example, Best uses the subject's comprehension of objects to
demonstrate cognition's inseparability from emotional feelings. In doing so he calls upon images of the specularizing self, construing the world via logical operations that inform and constitute feelings:

There is a logical relation between my feeling, and my understanding or cognition of the object. I am likely to be afraid if I believe it to be a snake, but not if I believe it to be a rope... it makes no sense to suppose that one could normally have an emotional feeling about a wholly inappropriate object (Best, 1989: 75)

Best's claim that 'feelings are always answerable to reason' (Best, 1989: 79), whilst attempting to negate the notion of a totalizing inner realm of 'feeling' by pointing out a 'logical connection between emotion and its object' (Best, 1989: 74), constitutes that logical connection as one in which the reasoning self forms a totalizing conception of the object, 'takes' the object to be... (Best, 1989: 75). Best fails in his attempt to overcome binary thought because he cannot let go of a conception of rationality based on the appropriation or interpretation of external factors by internal logic. It is useful to consider Irigaray's reading of Heidegger here. Irigaray reads Heidegger's term 'Dasein' (being-in-the-world) to imply a self that is contained and appropriates the container, or other, for itself thereby precluding reciprocity between container and contained. Irigaray maintains that more complex interrelationality that might expand notions of Being is overlooked because of Heidegger's forgetting of air (Irigaray, 1999: 12). Similarly Best seems to employ a reductive form of analysis that seeks clarity and certainty, rather than one that opens into complexity. Best's rhetorical exemplification quoted above might be summarised by the following choice: Is a person who avoids circumstances that produce anxiety, being influenced by their thoughts or by the object of fear? Surely a more complex understanding of this situation is to be derived from acknowledging a reciprocal relationship between
both. Likewise, Best's homogenization of feeling and reason could be said to amount to a reductive logic of 'the same' in which rationality is reprioritized.

In order to develop my analysis of what might be construed as productive or problematic in the arguments of each of the writers on arts education looked at so far, it is necessary to consider Irigaray's re-reading of Kant.

**Space-Time and the Imaginary**

The basis of Irigaray's critique of Kant is that his philosophy refuses to acknowledge its debt to the sensible, to the maternal-feminine; further that his reallocation of the imaginary to the intelligible acts as a means of controlling that which cannot be dominated, immobilizing in language that which threatens castration or loss of identity:

This is the first instance of the passage from sensation to understanding whereby – not unmysteriously – a schematism arises that will never do justice to the sensible world. For the most sophisticated faculty of the senses, the imaginary, will remain the slave of understanding. Anything conceded to nature is immediately and imperiously taken back and will be found useful only insofar as it ensures more rigorous domination over her. Thus the function of the transcendental schema will be to negate an intrinsic quality of the sensible world, and this irremediable... the immediacy of the relationship to the mother is sacrificed. The intuition of the transcendental aims, under some vague and undetermined generality, to unify all the various sensations that take place or have taken place. In this way the multiplicity of unlabeled sensations is blacked out, reduced to a single entity that can be used to legislate – in the cruelty of understanding – the bond to the empirical matrix (Irigaray, 1985a: 204)

For Irigaray, Kant's theory of the sublime not only constitutes as negative an unmediated relation with nature, but specular distance allows nature itself to be
organized, interpolated either through discourse into culture – language, or projected as Other, transcendent-alized. Best’s critique of so-called subjectivist theorists such as Langer, Witkin and Herbert Read, is that influenced by Kantian aesthetics they perpetrate a mystification of the arts by attempting to consign artistic meaning to a transcendental realm of feeling and intuition that is inaccessible to reason and therefore disassociated with rationality. As suggested above it is certainly possible to read Witkin’s account of art as ‘subject-reflexive action’ in terms of transcendence (Witkin, 1974: 29). However, following Irigaray’s reading of Kant it is also possible to read Best’s repudiation of ‘emotional intelligence’ or ‘the intelligence of feeling’ as an attempt to recoup the ‘non-specularizable’ to discourse. According to Irigaray, Kant’s schema operates according to the desire to make everything ‘answerable to reason’ (1985a: 204).

Irigaray subversively reinterprets Kant’s categorical imperative as ‘noli tangere matrem’ – do not touch the mother (Irigaray, 1985a: 210). Although Kant’s system appropriates nature, as with the Platonic move to re-appropriate origin to the Idea, this remains unacknowledged within a scheme of a priori concepts:

Henceforth such schemas will regulate the imagination of the scene in all kinds of indirect ways that remain pure representations for all that. This does not mean that the mind has simply given itself the object that it sees – that would be to claim the intellectual intuition possessed only by the Supreme Being — but rather that the mind has taken this way of defining the a priori conditions whereby it apperceives objects and whereby those objects that it represents to itself spontaneously will be properly conceived. (Irigaray, 1985a: 205)

Irigaray’s further implication is that this ‘exploitation of nature by man’ risks leading him to his ‘death’ by freezing, immobilising nature into a mirror for masculine self
representation (Irigaray, 1999: 18). Irigaray argues that if we regard everything as reduced to, or attributable to reason, we run the risk of being entombed in a sepulchre of our own making (Irigaray, 1999: 165).

For Irigaray, the most insidious example of this appropriation is Kant’s designation of space and time as a priori conditions of the existence of things, as features of rationality, logical functions that supersede the place of the maternal womb as man’s container (Irigaray, 1985a: 212). Irigaray argues that space and time are, ‘always already defined in/by the subjectivity of man’ (Irigaray, 1985a: 205); the role of container-object being associated with or projected onto woman (Irigaray, 1993a: 5, 34-5), and the relationship of subject to container-object being one of specularization:

The space-time of specularization is implicit in the intuition of space (Irigaray, 1985a: 205)

As with Irigaray’s reading of Lacan’s topography of the symbolic, it is important to stress that the specular relationship between subject and object is one of reflection, hence the suggestion of stasis, of a frozen imaginary:

The mirror that constitutes the world of man, by means of its envelopment, already being a projection of his desire (Irigaray, 1999: 17)

This is a process of projection and reflection in which, ‘difference could not be mirrored’ (1985a: 210), is a solipsistic mechanism whereby ‘man’ construes the sensible world as a ‘knowable’ container a ‘sheath, which enfolds representation in the subject’ (Irigaray, 1985a: 210). This carries associations of both protection and threat, of boundary, distance, gaze, exclusion, and repulsion:
Fear and awe of an all-powerful nature forbid man to touch his/the mother and reward his courage in resisting her attractions by granting him the right to judge himself independent, while at the same time encouraging him to prepare himself to continue resisting dangers in the future by developing (his) culture. Culture, also, is based upon this abyss that reason represents for the imaginary. (Irigaray, 1985a: 210)

This mirroring can be likened to the self-culture dialectic evoked by Abbs and Hornbrook, as culture, language and discourse constitute a sublimated, mediated version of the ‘real’ that reflects masculine morphology, that which is not answerable to this scheme is unthinkable.

Although Abbs is more amenable to the psychodynamic aspects of personal lived experience and expression, and Hornbrook is more concerned to emphasize, in materialist terms, the shaping of the creative self by culture, both see drama (and, or the arts) as ways in which culture represents itself. The active engagement of students is one of interpretation, understanding and acquisition of the necessary forms of representation and expression. This approach, however, does not preclude notions of interrogating or challenging cultural assumptions, both Abbs and Hornbrook incorporate modalities of critique and radicalization in their work (Abbs, 1989b: 6; Hornbrook, 1989: 128), but these exist within a tightly bound discursive system or ‘aesthetic field’ beyond which nothing is allowed to exist (Hornbrook, 1989: 123-4).

Although Abbs does regard as conscionable the possibility of flirting with the boundaries of the symbolic (Abbs, 1994: Chapter 4) there is a sense of safety, a reassurance to be had from locating ‘self’ and art within culture as a man-made ‘womb’ or house of language. This is allied to Best’s argument that the arts are ultimately knowable, or reducible to reason, because derived from the ‘shared arts, language, attitudes and activities of culture’ (Best, 1985: 33). Reid also argues that:
For the subject's expression to be meaningful, knowable, it too must be contained within space-time (Reid, 1989: 18)

In contrast, Irigaray's evocation of reciprocity and the porosity of boundaries between subject and object, not only contravenes the 'specular' relationship of distance and division but also resists a merging of subject and object, which in the work of Richard Rorty, for example, renders indistinguishable or redundant, concepts of the knower and the known, the world and the mind (Rorty, 1979: 7).

In her earlier writings Irigaray refers to the intrauterine relationship, and in her later writing she calls upon 'air' and 'water', elemental forms of the sensible existing prior to space-time, in order to re-think the relationality of subjectivity to space according to fluidity and permeability, rather than mere containment, division or synthesis. The importance of this for Irigaray is to keep 'other' possibilities in play, possibilities that challenge the 'single syllogistic system' (1985a: 223) whereby the universal Concept of masculine self-identity and representation is perpetuated. For Irigaray, these other possibilities can be derived by a process referred to as 'aletheia', uncovering what has been forgotten in the scene of representation (Irigaray, 1999: 9-10)

The "I" thinks, therefore this thing, this body that is also nature, that is still the mother, becomes an extension at the "I" 's disposal for analytical investigations, scientific projections, the regulated exercise of the imaginary... [but] you have to "breath" before you think, and therefore exist (Irigaray, 1985a: 182-6)

Central to Irigaray's critique of epistemology is her assertion that 'the feminine' is always already there, an integral, but unrecognized, part of all cultural operations. Implicit dependence upon 'the feminine' as expressed in Irigaray's reading of Plato's
myth of the cave, negates oppositional logic and the totality of an all encompassing masculine symbolic. It provides a locus from which to re-read discourse and to offer alternative configurations. Christine Battersby likens Irigaray’s critique of Kant’s schema to Adorno’s theory of ‘blind spots’ of reason, where:


Like Adorno, Irigaray disrupts the Kantian model of subjectivity based on subject/object differentiation located in space-time, but whereas Adorno focuses on historicity as a means by which to challenge the constitution of ‘objective reality’ as ‘other’ to the subject, Irigaray uses sexual difference as a lever with which to dislodge the systemic co-production of a masculine subjectivity and world-view, that obscures the feminine:

For where he projects a something to absorb, to take, to see, to possess... as well as a patch of ground to stand upon, a mirror to catch his reflection, he is already faced by another specularization. Whose twisted character is her inability to say what she represents (Irigaray, 1985a: 134)

Irigaray argues that this universality is merely extended in postmodern accounts of subjectivity and representation:

The fact that you no longer assert yourself as an absolute subject changes nothing... You feel you could abandon your ‘I’? But your ‘I’ holds you fast, having flooded and covered the whole of everything it ever created. And it never stops breathing its own emanations into you. With each new inspiration do you not become more than ever that ‘I’? Reduplicated within yourself (Irigaray, 1992: 83)
Irigaray's attempt to theorise the possibility of female subjectivity and expression is less concerned with feminine specificity as such, than with challenging the fiction of a neuter 'universal'. This is implicitly linked with issues of epistemology and representation, because it raises the possibility of knowledge or meaning that is not reducible to 'One', and involves challenging the closure of metaphysics with an economy of 'reciprocity' that stresses flow and movement between terms. Following Irigaray's corollary, accounts of arts education that confine 'knowledge' to either the Kantian transcendent imaginary or to rational discursivity, render that knowledge, and being, as static and immobile (1999: 18). Irigaray presents her challenge to the sovereignty of the Logos, or Idea, as a means of re-mobilizing thought.

**Sensible-transcendental:** This term is used to convey a notion of productive relationality between sites of metaphysical opposition. It features in connection with a number of Irigarayan themes and re-readings outlined in Chapter Two. In this instance I will be focusing on her attention to reuniting the sensible with the imaginary whose divide is exemplified in Plato's myth of the cave, and reuniting the space-time of man with the feminine whose divide is exemplified in the story of Antigone, cut off from her own becoming. The term is also used in connection with problematizing the divide between 'Truth' and 'the untruth of Truth' (Irigaray, 1985a: 310-12, 319) which I will return to at the end of the chapter. In theorising the possibility of female subjectivity Irigaray calls for the necessary reunion of the physical and the divine, answering Lacan's assertion that there is no 'Other of the Other' (Lacan, 1977: 311). Similarly, notions of the sensible-transcendental also influence Irigaray's re-reading of the amorous relation in the light of Levinas' work on alterity (1993a: 196). As discussed in Chapter Two, Irigaray's concern with the space 'between' is not to be understood as an Hegelian third term or bridge, but as a
threshold characterized by 'mucosity', a site of relationality that allows mutability and
mobility to flourish (Irigaray, 1993a: 21, 27-8). Similarly in terms of language, and
possible transformation of the discursive realm, Irigaray is not so much concerned
with 'langue', the corpus of language available, but with 'langage' and 'énonciation',
the position of the speaking subject and language as a passage between and their
disruptive potentiality (Whitford, 1991: 45-7). The notion of a sensible-
transcendental attempts to avoid the 'closure' of metaphysics, and of dialectics based
on dominance and subordination, by envisaging mediation as productive possibility
characterized by movement 'transvaluation' and 'becoming' (1993a: 27). Carolyn
Burke clarifies that for Irigaray becoming is, 'not an evolution toward some higher
state but an ongoing flow' (Burke, 1994b: 252).

It could be argued that Kant's separation of the imaginary from the sensible, drawing
on Platonic separation of the idea from materiality, has caused substantial problems in
terms of aesthetic theory. These are quite neatly exemplified in David Best's critique
of Langer. Best (1974) argues that Langer, in her discussion of dance, separates form
from content by suggesting that the artist projects a 'form' of feeling. This, he argues,
is because the notion of a 'form of feeling' separates the 'physical medium and what
is being expressed in it', leading Langer to introduce an 'extra entity', in order to
explain how dance evokes meaning:

'She has to make it transcendental and discoverable by intuition (Best, 1974: 186)

Alternatively, Best suggests that meaning resides in the movement of the dance itself
and its contextual location:
The meaning of a particular movement is given by the whole dance, the meaning of the dance is given by the dance tradition of which it is a part or extension, and the meaning of that tradition is given by the culture, society, form of life to which it belongs. (Best, 1974: 187)

There are a number of points to be made in connection with this. Following Irigaray’s reading of Kant it is possible, like Best; to view Langer’s recourse to ‘intuition’ as a metaphysical manoeuvre that reinforces the mind/body split. However, following Best’s own suggestion that it is crucial to consider expression in context, a closer look at Langer’s argument is required. In the section from Langer (1957) that Best cites, it is evident that Langer is engaged in a discussion of difference, more specifically the differences between discursive and non-discursive symbolisation, whereas Best is concerned with sameness. In a Wittgensteinian sense they are playing two different language games. Langer’s use of the term ‘intuition’ is used by Best to indicate a Kantian operation, the suggestion of a transcendent level of understanding. However, a closer look at the context reveals an anti-metaphysical intent:

It [the art symbol] formulates and objectifies experience for direct intellectual perception or intuition, but it does not abstract a concept for discursive thought. Its import is seen in it; not like the meaning of a genuine symbol, by means of it but separable from the sign. (Langer, 1957: 11)

Rather than abstraction, or metaphorization, as occurs with linguistic symbolism, Langer locates meaning in the sentient actuality of the art itself. Elsewhere Langer refers to the metaphorosity of language (Langer, 1942: 141), its systemic self-referentiality (Langer, 1942: 135), and here too she is emphasising the contrast between discursive and non-discursive symbolic operations. In contrast to Best, and in the light of Irigarayan theory, I would argue that it is possible to read Langer as
expressing contiguity between the sensible and artistic expression, rather than presenting them as two separate reaches or entities. The particularity of artistic expression and meaning lies in its more obvious relation to the sensible:

The limits of language are not the last limits of experience, and things inaccessible to language may have their own forms of conception, that is to say, their own symbolic devices. (Langer, 1942: 265)

Nick Kaye (1994) in his analysis of postmodern performance, reads Langer's theory of art along neo-Kantian lines as a necessary 'transcendence of its objecthood' (Kaye, 1994: 84). He interprets Langer's argument that art forms are not reducible to rational discourse as a 'metaphorization' of significant form, a suggestion that art 'separates itself from the material elements upon which it is reliant' (Kaye, 1994: 81). My suggestion is that reading Irigaray enables a different interpretation of Langer, that her distinction between art symbols and language is in reference to the very immanence of which art is constituted; not a metaphorical operation, as in language, but a metonymical one as instanced by Irigaray's parler-femme, a contiguity between sensible and intelligible. The strengths and weaknesses of Best's thesis are found in his insistence upon a single entity rather than a relation between the sensible and reason:

We do not have two entities; therefore there is no difficulty about getting them together (Best, 1974: 189)

Its strength is in challenging dichotomous thought, but its weakness lies in supposing that discourse is universal and unbiased. Best unproblematically locates art and meaning within a 'masculine' discursive framework based on the forgetting or
appropriating the feminine. Best's writing therefore performs its own forgetting of the feminine by attributing everything to discursive rationality.

Best's critique could be more aptly applied to the view present in arts discourse, that art is only concerned with inspiration and the expression of emotion and not technique, which is associated with lesser crafts (Collingwood, 1974: 111). Indeed, skills have also been construed as habitual and therefore constraining, holding the artist down on a 'trivial plane' by 'invisible' 'bonds' (Koestler, 1964: 363). In drama education a residual form of this argument is detectable in the dismissal of physical exercises and drills, and the caution against 'behaviourism' as a possible though extreme consequence of teaching theatre arts skills (Fleming, 1994: 53). An alternative view is that such skills enable the artist to engage in dialogue with the medium:

Each artist must bring to the creative enterprise an entire background of habits, theories, habitualized techniques, methods, and ideas for what he wants to achieve. As he works, some of these forehavings will determine certain choices, and as the work emerges some of these forehavings may have to be modified or given up entirely. In any case, the work of art grows from the artist's dialogue with himself and his forehavings on the one hand and the emerging work of art and its demands on the other. (Maitland, 1976: 407)

This is very similar to Louis Arnaud Reid's view of artistic creativity, with the addition that, following Langer, Reid maintains that the specificity of a work's meaning is dependent upon a condition of embodied dialogue with the physical medium (Reid, 1989: 19). An extension of this notion of dialogue, is to view skills as a means by which the artist is enabled to exercise creative imagination, to 'go beyond or change the rules if this seems necessary' (Bailin, 1994: 97).
In drama education discourse this view is supported by Hombrook and Nicholson who argue that ‘subversion’ (Hombrook, 1989/98: 105) or ‘empowerment’ (Nicholson, 1994: 21) is enabled through knowledge and understanding of drama forms and languages. They each present an image of the artist/dramatist as expert and of drama as a locus for bringing together and rearranging diverse forms. Irigaray’s analysis of cultural discourse, however, refuses division between expressivist/constructivist positions. The notion of a ‘transcendental’ and universal aesthetic impulse residing within the individual, and concepts of cultural form and discourse, whether universal or plural both are predicated upon an unacknowledged debt to the feminine:

The “subject” henceforth will be multiple, plural, sometimes di-formed, but it will still postulate itself as the cause of all the mirages that can be enumerated endlessly and therefore put back together again as one (Irigaray, 1985a: 135)

Reuniting masculine space-time with the feminine is not simply a matter of acknowledging the importance of physical skills. There is an overarching question important to feminist discourse on the arts, of whether innovative forms of expression exceed the space-time of man or merely extend it. In other words, is cultural expression always automatically ‘masculine’ or is there a possible process of feminization to be made. In relation to ‘ecriture feminine’ Cixous is concerned with change at the level of form, i.e. how one expresses. Irigaray’s ‘parler-femme’ is different in that it emphasises the importance of enunciation, i.e. it implies dialogue, speaking position, where one is speaking from and with whom. I will be considering this in relation to Nicholson’s feminist emphasis in my discussion of creativity in the next chapter.
Examples of drama that might arguably be said to exceed or push at the boundaries of masculine space-time include Boal’s Forum Theatre with its blurring of the distinction between performer and audience, and similarly ‘Playback Theatre’ where members of the audience inform the performance. In art, Rose Garrard’s three-dimensional self-portraits are seen to ‘challenge the conventionality of the frame’ by literally exceeding their boundaries and the fixed categories of convention (Askew, 1996: 25-7), and in literature Karoline von Gunderode’s work is described by Christine Battersby as consciously subverting Kantian aesthetics by a refusal of the ‘I’ to ‘exalt itself over matter’ (Battersby, 1994: 135). It does not follow then, that an Irigaray intervention into the field of representation, an attempt to express ‘something of the feminine’, would necessarily espouse ‘non-art’. Irigaray’s parler-femme is an active locus of change in the sphere of representation, an attempt to create a ‘space’ from which woman can speak; but also an organic process that requires reciprocity between masculine and feminine syntaxes, rather than distance and specularization. Irigaray’s own writing exemplifies the possible outcome of such a project, described in terms of ‘becoming’ (Irigaray, 1985b: 78-9 & 135). As I will go on to discuss in the next chapter, there may be some usefulness to be gained from thinking in terms of ‘becoming-art’, rather than in terms of opposition between art and not art. The term ‘becoming-art’ implies both a sense of the pupil-artist’s growing proficiency and allows for the possibility of change in the sphere of representation, in what is designated as art. This may be particularly relevant in the context of drama education, not because it harbours an intrinsic difference, as in Slade’s term ‘child-drama’, but in terms of positionality, the cultural location or ‘speaking position’ of the pupil-artist in their own becoming.
Plurality and specificity: Irigaray’s challenge to the masculine imaginary involves a movement beyond structures of dominance/subordination to a consideration of heterogeneity, and the possibilities evinced by flow between multiple entities; this as a means by which to revitalise cultural thought. A broadening of theories of epistemology to include what have been culturally construed as reason’s ‘others’, the sensate, the emotional etc. is of particular significance to issues of personal development. Howard Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligence (1993), which includes bodily-kinaesthetic intelligence, broadens the range of epistemology, albeit in a compartmentalized or fragmented account of intelligences. The importance of Gardner’s work lies in the breadth and diversity of the multiple intelligences that he identifies, and his critique of educational systems for having too narrow a view of what constitutes knowledge and intelligence. Also significant, is his discussion of individual aptitude and difference, that individuals excel in particular areas of intelligence, all of which should be catered for in an education system that is designed to allow all students to pursue their individual aptitudes.

Emotion, seems to be a particularly difficult aspect of ‘the feminine’, or of sensate life, to reconcile with a masculine space-time dominated by rationality. However, some of the most interesting recent writing on emotion comes from scientific discourse. I am not sure whether Irigaray herself would regard this as another appropriation of the feminine to rationality, but as specific ‘accounts’ of emotion from within rational discourse, they form a relevant addition to the discussion. Daniel Goleman’s distillation of neurological discourse on the operation of ‘emotional centres’ in the brain dispels the traditional notion that reason must guide the emotions, and in fact reverses this assumption by demonstrating the influential status of ‘emotional centres’ of the brain (Goleman, 1996: 12). However, the postmodern
account of emotion presented by psychologist James Averill (1982), suggests that emotions are in fact cultural performances, learned and enacted on specific occasions. Goleman’s is what I would describe, loosely, as a more ‘Irigarayan’ account, not only because of the imagery of fluidity used to evoke the workings of the brain, but also because by his account what we describe as emotion subtends and is a crucial part of all thought (Goleman, 1996: 4, 27). He also discusses the cultural context of emotion, presenting a more dialogic account of the way emotion is manifested in relation to cultural custom and convention. Unlike Averill, Goleman suggests that emotion, as a physical entity ‘imprinted’ through evolutionary history, exceeds cultural explanation because there are times when powerful manifestations of emotion occur out of sync with cultural context (Goleman, 1996: 17). It is significant, however, that Goleman highlights the crucial place of emotional engagement or ‘flow’ in successful learning experiences including arts and sciences (Goleman, 1996:94).

*The Arts in Schools* (1982) highlights the ‘variety of human intelligence’ as a specific raison d’être for arts education, suggesting that the logico-deductive, though important, is one form of intelligence amongst many that should fall under the developmental concerns of education (1982: 10). The various forms of ‘rationality’ (including sensate forms) related to the arts are presented as distinct yet interrelated, without hierarchy and expressly linked to communication and symbolism through their own characteristic language (1982: 18-19). The report seeks to reunite emotion with intellect, emphasizing that the arts are not consigned to feeling, or ‘outpourings of emotion’, but are ‘disciplined forms of inquiry and expression through which to organise feelings and ideas about experience’ (Gulbenkian Foundation, 1982: 11). The cultural context of the arts is emphasized though not as a pre-supposition of an
appreciation of 'high art', but rather in respect of students' practical engagement, enabling them to:

formulate and clarify their own ideas and feeling, while developing their personal powers of creative thought and action (Gulbenkian Foundation, 1982: 21)

Indeed, *The Arts in Schools* re-configures 'culture' in the context of the contemporary comprehensive school, where a multiplicity of cultures is represented:

For this reason schools are best seen not as transmitters of culture but as complex cultural exchanges (Gulbenkian Foundation, 1982: 43)

In this context, the arts are not envisaged simply as modes of expression, but as ways of making meaning and garnering understanding through an active restructuring of symbolic and cognitive patterns:

Putting old ideas together in novel ways or creating new ones to alter new sources of insight and illumination and to afford new visions of the 'truth' about the world (Gulbenkian Foundation. 1982: 22)

Lev Vygotsky not only talks of the necessary dependence of thought upon affect (1962: 150), but also of the particular nature of understanding that is endemic to art, 'A way of thinking embodied in form' (Vygotsky, 1971: 31). He suggests that this crystallization of understanding or 'incarnation' of content through form is particular to each of the arts, and in each case provides its own nuance of meaning:

Art takes its material from life, but gives in return something which its material did not contain (Vygotsky, 1971: 31)
By Vygotsky’s analysis, the arts are a crucial aspect of human ‘social – psychological’ existence and progression, ‘without new art there can be no new man’ (Vygotsky, 1971: 259). Jerome Bruner makes a similar case for the specificity of drama as a means of story-telling that suffuses its material with meaning; a ‘modus operandi’ for exploring, questioning and ‘making the all-too-familiar strange again’ (Bruner, 1996: 99). Later in the same volume Bruner uses the term ‘rebus’ to consolidate notions of embodied learning, or ‘knowing as doing’ (Bruner, 1996: 151). Such discussions have influenced writing on drama as a specific learning medium within its own and cross-curricular contexts:

It is this ‘realness’ of drama, in which role-players give and receive (write and read) each other’s messages simultaneously, which makes drama a unique form of literacy (Neelands, 1992: 6)

Drama has the ability to pull together disparate facets of knowing, acting as an effective catalyst for the integration of this often compartmentalised knowledge. Its very eclecticism allows it to embrace the concerns of many other areas of student’s educational experience (Somers, 1994: 13)

However, the image of drama as an experiential learning medium is not unproblematic, particularly if experience is accorded with notions of truth.

**Truth Claims:** Helen Nicholson presents a broadly ‘postmodern’ approach to ‘Truth’ wherein the ‘modernist’ reliance upon ‘Grand Narratives’ gives way to competing metanarratives whose value and self interests are open to deconstruction (Nicholson, 1993: 18-19). Further, this fracturing of ‘Truth’ into multiple discourses also exposes what has been left out or rendered ‘absent’ from the totalizing narratives of
modernism. For drama, this means that it is no longer pertinent or politically accurate to talk of 'the child' or to suggest that there are certain 'human' or 'cultural' truths that can be accessed through dramatic exploration:

Knowledge and the value of knowledge is not stable, but contingent (Nicholson, 1993: 20)

For this reason, Nicholson argues that it is imperative that student's are taught in ways that will enable them to adopt a more pluralistic approach to dramatic form, where learning about diverse dramatic forms from different historical periods and cultural backgrounds encourages 'multivocality' (Nicholson, 1995a: 36) rather than universality (Nicholson, 1995a: 32).

Warwick Dobson (1996) critiques the claims of postmodern input into drama education, particularly the hostility against notions of value and truth. Citing Lyotard's term 'heterogeneous phrase regimes', Dobson suggests that it is irresponsible for teachers to foster a belief that the world is unknowable and in which the possibility of adjudicating between subject positions is negated (Dobson, 1996: 31-2). Further, he argues that far from perpetuating dogmatic absolutes, drama teachers engage their students in a variety of fictional worlds that enable them to, 'reflect critically' on 'unquestioned, debilitating consensus beliefs', 'to examine established values and beliefs', and to 'step back from their habitual ways of behaving in order to question their own meanings, conditions and goals' (Dobson, 1996: 32). This he argues is more in keeping with what Foucault calls, 'a problematization of thought' (Dobson, 1996: 32, citing Foucault, 1986: 388-9).
An Irigarayan approach to notions of truth has many similarities to Nicholson’s account of the postmodern critique of the ‘hegemony of reason’, but there are also divergent particularities that make the ‘problematization of thought’ a key aspect of her work. Irigaray exposes the contingency of values present in the Grand Narratives of western culture, demonstrating how these can be exposed and questioned from the point of view of what is suppressed. This is achieved through her enactment of the ‘speaking position’ of the maternal-feminine. However, Irigaray is not convinced by the postmodern assertion that the negation of ‘Truth’ as a totalizing concept and its fragmentation into multiple perspectives necessarily changes the discursive balance of power for subordinated terms, because such ‘multiplicity’ only exists in that it is recoupable to totalizing discourse, beyond which nothing is said to exist. An implicit critique of this shift from ideological truth to perspectival relativism can be perceived in Irigaray’s reading of Plato’s myth of the cave:

The relation to truth will no longer be organized through the identity of posture – and imposture – of gaze, of point of view, of ‘shadows’, an identity imposed upon men chained up in the cave, but instead through the discourse of a master who is supposed to guarantee the pertinence of the analogies, the adequateness of the relations between each ‘being’ and truth.

(Irigaray, 1985a: 273)

Irigaray proposes instead, a disruption from within, a displacement of values that will block reconfigurations of ‘the same’. This can be seen in her deconstruction-reconstruction of rationality as discussed earlier in the chapter, where through proposing a ‘double-syntax’ the subordinate or feminine term can be prioritized, leading to notions of a sensible-transcendental, or contiguity between immanence and transcendence. With regard to re-conceptualizing ‘Truth’, although Irigaray emphasizes a politics of location, highlighting ‘speaking position’ rather than style
and therefore refusing to speak on behalf of all women (Irigaray, 1985b: 120; 1995: 110), she does not think of the problem of truth in terms of opposition between ‘One’ and multiple perspective(s). Instead she uses ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ to represent difference at a symbolic level (i.e. positions of pure, non-hierarchical difference), exploring the possibility of ethical relationality between the two in terms of fluidity and flow. Truth, or knowledge as such, is always contingent, rendered neither whole nor fragmented but in a perpetual state of movement or ‘becoming’ that denies closure (Irigaray, 1993a: 27).

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i See for example Genevieve Lloyd (1984)

ii See La Mysterique, in Irigaray (1985a: 191-202)

iii Here Langer is influenced by the work of Edmund Husserl, Charles Peirce, Rudolph Carnap and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

iv Irigaray does not overlook Heidegger’s use of this term in reference to the possible dangers of technology harnessing the powers of nature (Irigaray, 1999: 7)

v A similar view is expressed by Herbert Read (1958) Education through Art, pp. 114-5, 209

vi Irigaray’s argument to the effect that scientific discourse is particularly preclusive to the feminine has been critiqued elsewhere. See Battersby (1998) The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Patterns of Identity, pp. 50
Before moving on to discuss issues of pedagogy and creativity in more detail, it is necessary to look briefly at the educational context of contemporary drama studies in Great Britain. It is well documented that drama has not been recognised as a discrete subject within the National Curriculum, but whether this can be linked, as is suggested by Peter Abbs (1994: 124-5), to the pervasiveness of the educational drama (referred to elsewhere as drama-in-education) movement through the 1970s and 80s, is impossible to determine. This marginalization has to be viewed in relation to the general position of disenfranchisement that arts subjects now find themselves in, and is directly comparable to the positioning of dance within Physical Education. As suggested in Chapters One and Three, such marginalization may have far deeper and more complex roots in cultural conceptualizations of knowledge and the status allotted historically to particular forms of learning.

The post-National Curriculum situation has not, however, been one of utter despondency for drama, in that it has maintained a plural existence as discrete GCSE subject, learning medium and sector of the English curriculum; as well as sustaining a more tacitly plural identity as artistic discipline and medium for personal development. Indeed the HMI’s report Drama 5 – 16 (1989) which was influential in setting the debate for drama’s place within the National Curriculum, reflected this plurality in identifying drama as a ‘practical artistic subject’ in its own right as well as highlighting its possible connections to and uses within the English curriculum and wider curriculum areas such as PSE (HMI, 1989: 1-2). The report also identified a range of knowledges appropriate to drama studies, including experiential knowledge, and knowledge gained in and through drama, such as cultural - historical knowledge
and technical skills-based knowledge. The report also recognizes a place in drama for the use of 'disciplined imagination' within structured contexts (HMI, 1989: 7-10).

The breadth of the report's focus is continued in its outline for 'principles of planning and teaching', where it is suggested that 'local heritage and cultures' be drawn upon in the teaching of drama as well as a 'variety of artistic, oral and literacy traditions' (HMI, 1989: 12). Two key criticisms of the report, though matters of emphasis, are relevant to discussions in this chapter and Chapter Three. They are, that the report,

Underplay[s] notions of the area of feelings, emotional learning through emotional investment and emotional growth (Abbott, 1989: 15)

and that the report seems to emphasize knowledge and understanding about culture, the world etc. as a fixed entity, rather than entertaining the possibility of pupils exploring and reconfiguring the 'forces that shape the world':

Drama is not only a method through which children can explore the world, but also one through which they can tell the world how they want it to be (Readman, 1989: 9)

The Arts Council's *Drama in Schools* (1992) was compiled as a direct response to drama's positioning within the National Curriculum, and as such, stresses the status of drama as a discrete arts subject with a focus on developing the proficiency of pupils as dramatic artists; although drama's cross-curricular application is mentioned (ARTS Council, 1992: 2). Suggested programmes of study include a broad range of practices covering the three key areas of making, performing and responding, including 'experimentation within dramatic form', 'learning how drama communicates meaning', exposure to a 'variety of live and recorded plays' and to 'drama from different cultures and times; and opportunities to take part in both 'devised' and
'scripted' performances in a 'variety of venues' and for a 'variety of different audiences' (Arts Council, 1992: 15). However, as with Drama 5 to 16, the emphasis is on acquisition from a body, or bodies of knowledge and experience, and not the use of dramatic media for exploring and making meaning.

Despite its marginalized position within the National Curriculum, drama is still a significant feature of secondary education according to the recent SHA report Drama Sets You Free, which states that of the 80% of schools that offer drama as a discrete option, 83% reported good – excellent exam results (SHA, 1998: 12-15). Despite the shifts in emphasis within drama education over the last decade, however, the SHA report is much clearer about the value of drama education in terms of personal development, including the promotion of, 'personal maturity and emotional literacy', 'confidence, communication, teamwork and understanding', than it is about drama’s value as an arts subject, which it describes rather vaguely as, 'stimulating [the] national spirit of creativity' (SHA, 1998: intro.). In a recent article, Michael Fleming (1999) refers to the level of consensus reached in British drama education discourse, exemplified in publications by Jonothan Neelands (1998a) and David Hornbrook (1998), where:

both authors subscribe to a view of drama which embraces making, performing and responding; both go beyond realistic naturalism as the only form available to teachers; both acknowledge the importance of knowledge, progression and continuity. (Fleming, 1999: 92)

Through the course of this chapter I will demonstrate how attention to Irigarayan theory can be used to formulate a more comprehensive version of this consensus. First of all I will develop an 'Irigarayan' response to what have been termed 'personal development' and 'constructivist' emphases in arts pedagogy, then apply this reading
to contemporary discussions of drama pedagogy including postmodern approaches. The second half of the chapter will pursue the inevitable extension of pedagogic concerns into discussions on creativity. There is a regrettable schematism about separating out issues of knowledge, pedagogy and creativity in discussing drama education, but the exigencies of applying a particular yet wide-ranging body of theory necessitate some compartmentalisation of themes that are implicated within each other. This chapter therefore, should be regarded not so much as a linear continuation of the last, but as a more lateral expansion of discussions opened up in Chapter Three.

**'Personal Development' pedagogic models:** The work of Malcolm Ross and Robert Witkin, based on respective accounts of developmental psychology from Winnicott and Piaget has been influential in determining approaches to arts education based on students' personal and aesthetic development. Ross's direct transposition of Winnicott's theory of 'potential space' between mother and child onto the educational setting, not only leads him to equate 'spontaneous' play with creativity as an 'aesthetic impulse', but also to make the teacher – pupil relationship central to his work. Similarly Witkin's adoption of a detailed 'Piagetian' model of personal development makes his whole raison d'être for arts education, the child's progressive accomplishment of more and more demanding and complex levels of sensate experience. A philosophy that is projected onto his detailed structural scheme for interaction between teacher and pupil, throughout each phase of creative development. Both are influenced by Herbert Read's notion of the 'natural child', which, drawn from Gestalt Psychology, is one for whom the innate,

Disposition to feel the completeness of an experienced event as being right and fit constitutes what has been called the aesthetic factor in perception (Read, 1958: 60)
A consequence of this disposition, for Read, is that 'the activity of self expression cannot be taught' (Read, 1958: 209).

For Ross who also has misgivings over the idea that the artistic expression can be 'taught', as such (Ross, 1978: 16), notions of 'instruction' are at worst anathema, and at best a misguided approach that fails to engage students in the processes of learning:

> It is easier to transfer educational freight from teacher to learner than it is to release the springs of self motivation that bring in the prospect of personal knowledge (Ross, 1984: 12)

Referring to Raymond Williams' distinction between the 'values of use' of popular art and the 'values of exchange' associated with the so-called 'high arts' (Williams, 1976), Ross challenges the assumption that arts education should be an induction into the artistic predilections of a privileged social minority:

> Reverence for art condemns children to feeling inadequate... taking as 'good' what others apparently value but in which they themselves can see, or for which they can feel, nothing intrinsically satisfying. (Ross, 1984: 29)

Instead Ross emphasises the 'universal' phenomenon of the 'aesthetic impulse' as part of everyday experience (Ross, 1984: 32-7), suggesting that it is the role of arts education to enable 'values of use' to be experienced as part of an, 'absorbing, entrancing and rewarding' experience (Ross, 1984: 41). Drawing directly from Winnicott (1971), Ross presents the 'good enough teacher' as one who successfully negotiates between the Scylla of 'intervention' and the Charybdis of ineffectuality. As the potential space between mother and child, teacher and pupil, therapist and patient, is constituted as part of the establishment of conditions of trust, Ross
interprets that the teacher's aim in relation to the pupil's creativity should be one of enrichment:

I see the creative teacher as asserting the full flowering of the creative potential of the developing and maturing child (Ross, 1978: 21)

Similarly, Witkin's complex guidelines on arts education and drama pedagogy are instigated by the foundational principle that the child's 'sensate experience' is 'unique to him' and that:

Since the teacher does not have access to the particularity of the pupil he can only enter the expressive act of the pupil through the demands that he makes in respect of structuring (Witkin, 1974: 170)

Witkin's prescribed stages of 'entry' by the teacher into the 'expressive act of the pupil' can be outlined briefly as follows: Setting the 'sensate problem' or giving a stimulus in form(s) relevant to the pupil's experience; The making of a 'holding form', a title or theme used to consolidate and preserve the integrity of the sensate impulse throughout the process of experimentation and exploration; Movement through successive approximations to a resolution. It is suggested that pupils must 'remain reflexively in control of the medium' but that the teacher may enable a 'refinement of control' by 'conceiving of the same task in terms of a series of successive approximations to a resolution of the sensate problem', i.e. breaking down the task into smaller, more manageable tasks that build up to a more sophisticated, complex representation (see Witkin, 1974: 171-88).
The criticisms of this approach are many and varied, some of which have been discussed in Chapter Three, such as the reification of the ‘deep interior’ of the self, and the implication that arts education cannot be taught. However, before outlining a feminist critique of developmentalism, I would want to highlight the positive attributes that have been built upon by recent writers on drama education, and that will go towards informing my reading of pedagogical issues based on Irigaray’s reconfiguration of the self-other relationship. These include attention to the teacher-pupil relationship as a locus for development within the subject; attention to issues of progression and continuity, but not towards an elitist ideal; attention to pupil’s engagement and interest in activities; attention to pupil’s individual ability, and concern to locate specific and effective ways of helping pupils to realize their project.

Feminist critiques of pedagogic models derived from developmental psychology stress the ways in which hegemonic gender roles and identities are perpetuated, exaggerated and cathected through their transposition onto notions of ‘the teacher’ and ‘the child’. For example, the teacher who is usually designated a female-maternal role, as in Winnicott’s ‘good enough mother’ (Winnicott, 1971), or Read’s ‘psychic midwife’ (Read, 1958: 209), is always held responsible for the success or failure of the child. Since the pupil cannot be deemed to have failed in the innate process of development, or expressing ‘the self’, the female identified teacher is often placed in a no win situation where too much or not enough intervention are deemed equally damaging for the child (Burman, 1994: 164, Walkerdine, 1989: 275). This situation of fine-balancing for the teacher also, perhaps ironically, undermines the active agency of the child, because it becomes the sole responsibility of the teacher-mother to be ‘good enough’ in exercising the correct approach, while the child is prefigured in a passive role of ‘natural’ progression (Walkerdine, 1984: 275).
198, 1989: 270-5), under the scientific gaze of the phallicized mother figure (Walkerdine, 1984: 171).

Despite Herbert Read’s assertion that the ‘natural’ child is not a universal child (Read, 1958:73), there is evidence to suggest that ‘the child’ in discourses of developmental psychology is usually assigned a culturally recognisable male identity (Burman, 1995, Walkerdine, 1989: 277). For example, Winnicott’s ‘good enough mother’ can be seen as ‘other’ to a developing ‘male’ self who is successor to the realm of cultural expression. Also, personal development models such as that proposed by Piaget are based upon developmental features of white middle class male society, and as such locate female pupils as other within their discourse (Walkerdine, 1993: 457). The normative configuration of ‘natural’ progression can also be seen to pathologize ‘work’ and valorise ‘play’; features that have been allotted gender specificity in some instances. The key issue within these feminist critiques is extent to which developmental psychology discourse produces the identity patterns that it describes:

The discourse of the observing, nurturing mother/teacher figure sensitively supporting the development of the active, exploratory developing male child exerts a strong disciplinary force over both parties. (Peachter, 1998: 60)

**Le Corps-à-corps avec la mère:** One of Irigaray’s earliest attempts to reconfigure the self/other relationship is through a re-reading of the intrauterine relationship of mother and child. Irigaray’s use of the bodily relation between mother and child is not sited as an experiential or developmental process, but as a symbolic configuration intended to circumvent models of subjectivity based on sacrifice, splitting and
opposition. It is an interpretive representation of imagery from the maternal-feminine and as such, it works on several levels to challenge, for example, the partitioning of the subject from the body as a necessary condition of discourse, and the way in which material and relational origin is overwritten, obfuscated or vilified according to the 'phallogocentric' cultural matrix (1993b: 10-14). A closer look at Irigaray's representation of the body to body relation with the mother reveals a number of key differences between this and other representations of mother-child relationality found in psychoanalytic discourse and developmental psychology:

Doesn’t the phallic erection occur at the place where the umbilical chord once was? The phallus becomes the organiser of the world through the man-father at the very place where the umbilical cord, that primal link to the mother, once gave birth to man and woman. All that had taken place within an originary womb, the first nourishing earth, first waters, first sheaths, first membranes in which the whole child was held, as well as the whole mother, through the mediation of her blood. According to a relationship that is obviously not symmetrical, mother and child are linked in a way that precedes all dissociations, all tearing of their bodies into pieces. (Irigaray, 1993b: 14)

Irigaray presents the subjectivities of mother and child as interrelational yet whole. Both have subjective identities, and although their relationality has fluid qualities this does not imply a reduction of identity to mere fluidity or a merging of identities. The relationship is necessarily asymmetrical but this is not meant to denote a self/other relation in the Hegelian sense of master and slave. Irigaray is drawing more particularly on notions of the maternal imago as ‘other’ and challenging this through Levinas’ conceptualisation of alterity in which, ‘my existence is subordinated to the other’ (Levinas, 1986: 24). For Levinas, alterity is neither oppositional nor complimentary, as there is always something of the other that remains out of reach,
that is beyond self-appropriation. Irigaray also presents this relationship as one of envelopment, not in order to present woman as 'mere' container but to postulate the notion of subjectivity as space, subjectivity for 'matter that can birth' (Battersby, 1998: 103); thereby questioning the premise that being contained is a condition of being. For Irigaray the maternal-feminine is also a primal and spiritual image, the 'cause of causes' obfuscated or pathologized by masculine culture (1993a: 70, 100). Elsewhere, Irigaray focuses on the maternal genealogy of mother-daughter relationality but in this case the bodily encounter or corps-a-corps is also a reminder of the scission between body and culture, between masculine and feminine:

By cutting off the maternal genealogy, metaphor also cuts off the possibility of the sexual relation (Whitford, 1991: 181)

The *corps-à-corps* is therefore closely associated with what Irigaray calls 'the fecundity of the caress', which deals specifically with the transposition of Levinas' model of alterity onto the sexual difference (1993a: 185). The fecundity of the caress implies a creative relationality or becoming, a meeting that constitutes new knowledges (1991b: 110), and in which both parties are affected. The mother-child relation, or placental economy as presented by Irigaray, is neither active nor passive but both. Similarly, in her treatment of the sexual relation Irigaray bypasses traditional representations of activity and passivity by honing in on the threshold of mucous membrane and skin (1993a: 188). Mucosity and porosity are called upon by Irigaray to refute the scission between self and other, in the same way that she uses air to problematize boundaries between subjectivity and space in her critique of Heidegger (Whitford, 1991: 163). Christine Battersby describes this as:
An alternative ontology in which self exists in a tacky relationship with otherness (Battersby, 1998: 103)

Rosi Braidotti also makes use of the relationality evoked by Irigaray’s symbolism in her account of subjectivity as ‘nomadism’, marked by an, ‘ability to flow from one set of experiences to another’ by ‘emphatic proximity’ and by ‘intensive interconnectedness’ (Braidotti, 1994: 5). In applying this alternative symbolic to the teacher-pupil relationship, I will be adhering as closely as possible to the meaning and intentionality behind the key features of Irigaray’s reconfiguration of the self-other relation.

**Teacher-pupil relationality**: Whole person - Whole person: The corps-a-corps relation evoked by Irigaray is not presented as a self/other relation but one in which each is the other of the other, as neither is prioritized as an authentic or model self, served by, or predicated upon the other. In terms of teacher-pupil relationality in the context of drama, neither is reducible merely to the legitimization of the other, each is a ‘whole’ person in their own right’ each brings with them to the relational situation of the drama lesson a personal history, personal experiences, knowledges, abilities, propensities. Just as the teacher has their ‘personal luggage’ (Morgan & Saxon, 1987: 160), so do pupils, and as well as abilities etc. this includes personal needs expressed through behaviour patterns (Neelands, 1998a: 45). The nature of teacher-pupil relationality is not something fixed or certain; it is variable and subject to the vicissitudes of situation and human diversity. This is further complicated by the dual nature of teacher-pupil relation, which operates on interpersonal and group levels. This is particularly relevant to drama where activities not only rely upon group dynamics but are formative in shaping the group itself:
Drama both reflects and shapes community (Neelands, 1998a: 47)

Whilst teacher and pupil remain ‘whole’, neither partial or merged identities, there is perhaps a greater level of interdependency between teacher and pupil in drama than in many other subjects, because the success of activities that constitute the learning medium of making, performing and responding, is reliant upon the co-dependence of pupil interest - engagement and the structural - organizational praxis of the teacher. There is the potential for this in all teaching, but in drama activities those perpetual moments of transfer where responsibility passes back and forth or is shared between teacher and pupil(s) are endemic to the medium, the terms upon which teaching and learning progress are negotiated. Jonothan Neelands evokes this sense of interdependency in what he calls the ‘learning contract’ for drama (Neelands, 1984, 1998a), a ‘dynamic process’ that tries to ‘honour the learner as much as the teacher’ (Neelands, 1984: 28. This can often mean finding a balance between structure and serendipity, by adopting a flexible approach to planning and allowing room for pupils to make choices within the structure of an activity (Somers, 1994: 48; Fleming. 1994: 55).

That this is a relationship between ‘embodied’ individuals is especially relevant to drama. The body is a key signifier in drama, and therefore the way in which the bodies of teacher and pupil(s) are used and read is central to teaching and learning. It is also possible to think of the body as a repository of knowledge and experience, capable of expressing what has been ‘deeply inscribed’ upon it (bell hooks, 1994: 91). Because it is relatively unusual in the school setting to physicalize one’s knowledge, there is for some students a much greater sense of vulnerability, which needs to be taken into account in the tacit contractual operations of teacher and pupil(s)
(Neelands, 1998a: 56). This is also true of the emotional investment often required by
drama, if not the experience of actual or empathized feelings then at least the
enactment of recognized significations of feeling, which can be just as daunting.

Acknowledging that teachers are also bodies, as well as thinking of the teacher
reading and assessing the students' embodied work in drama also disrupts the notion
of teacher as 'omnipotent all knowing mind' (bell hooks, 1994: 91). bell hooks also
discusses the place of 'eros' in the classroom, not in its sexual-erotic implication but
as 'passion', a 'motivating force', an energy that can 'invigorate discussion' and
'excite the critical imagination' (bell hooks, 1994: 194-5).

Regarding both teacher and pupil(s) as 'whole' and therefore jointly responsible for
the conditions of teaching and learning or 'drama contract' does not imply a totally
open arrangement in which the identities of teacher and pupil merge or become
diffuse. The institutional structure of education ensures that the teacher always carries
the larger burden of responsibility (bell hooks, 1994: 8).

**Asymmetry:** The implications of asymmetry are quite complex and need to be
discussed on two levels of theory. First there is the notion of asymmetry derived from
Levinas, in which the self is subordinated to the other by a sense of 'wonder'. This is
easily translatable into the educational setting as a sense of respect for the other.

Following the notion of teacher and pupil(s) as both 'whole' would be to regard each
as 'self' and 'other' for each other, rendering the asymmetry as merely relative to
which subjective identity one is focusing on at a given time. For the 'third party' or
critical gaze, this would seem to evoke a sense of symmetry, as is suggested by
Levinas (1961: 234); that ratifies the ethical equation. The distanced perspective
would be of two persons each effected by their response to the other. However, in an
Irigarayan sense, it is the very ‘difference’ and therefore mutual asymmetry of these subjective positions that allows this perceived symmetry to be possible. In Irigaray’s representation of the sexual relation each sex is captivated by the other’s difference (1993a: 13). In the teacher-pupil(s) relation it is hoped that each respects the other but for different reasons, i.e. that the pupil respects the teacher for their knowledge and experience within the field, as well as their abilities ‘dramaturge’, ‘structurer’ and ‘facilitator’ of drama lessons, experiences (Neelands, 1998a: 48-50, Somers, 1994: 48-50), and that the teacher respects each pupil for their individuality, their potential contribution and their areas of expertise.

The second level of theory is specific to Irigaray’s use of the intrauterine relationship between mother and child, where the traditional configuration of asymmetry, which operates in favour of the developing male child is problematized by allotting the mother a subjective, active role rather than that of passive container. Transposing this onto the educational setting, instead of a teacher-mother figure who is paradoxically caught between allowing ‘natural’ progression to take place and yet responsible for being ‘good enough’ yet not too pro-active. Following the Irigarayan model, the ‘mother-identified’ teacher is an active and interactive agent, an identity that is both ‘whole’ yet relational. Similarly the child-identified pupil is a ‘whole’ yet relational identity. Both roles exist in interdependence. As notions of growth and development are implicit in the intrauterine imago and as Irigaray’s term ‘becoming’ is central to the reconfiguration of ‘fecundity’ in her treatment of the sexual relation, a consideration of progression is also important to discussions of teacher-pupil relationality.
There are two key theorists whose work I have found relevant and helpful in my attempt to transpose Irigarayan theories of relational subjectivity onto the educational setting. This is because, although the focus of Irigaray’s notion of ‘becoming’ is that it should remain open and non-teleological, a useful consideration in terms of creativity, as I will discuss later in the chapter, when applied to issues of pedagogy there has to be some attention to the raison d’être for the teacher-pupil relation for the discussion to be relevant within the context of education. However it is possible to preserve the flavour of Irigaray’s notion of ‘becoming’ within a discussion of progression that does not attempt to pin down outcome to fixed concepts. I would argue, in respect of this, that J. S. Bruner’s comments on ‘instruction’ are illustrative of this broader sense of progression. He argues, for example, that in terms of the teacher-pupil relationship, instruction should be regarded as a ‘provisional state’ the object of which should be to make the learner ‘self-sufficient’ (Bruner, 1966: 53). It is important to stress that the term self-sufficient need not be evocative of a totally autonomous ‘self’ in every sense, but is being used very specifically by Bruner to denote a raison d’être for the teacher-pupil relation in which the teacher should not become a ‘perennial source of information’ (Bruner, 1966: 70), or for that matter, that ‘merely imparting information’ is the totality of the teacher’s role (Bruner, 1966: 73). Indeed, Bruner’s later work demonstrates his advocation of collaborative and ‘scaffolded’ learning, and his view that discursive relationality is a key process of learning for active, ‘agentive’ minds (Bruner, 1996: 93).

I would also argue that Vygotsky’s theory of the ‘zone of proximal development’ is particularly relevant to considerations of teacher-pupil relationality. There are aspects of Vygotsky’s work that seem to sit particularly well with Irigarayan perspectives because as Bruner explains, Vygotsky ‘strived mightily ... to provide a means of
bridging the gap between historical determinism and the play of consciousness. To find a way of understanding *man* as a product of culture as well as a product of nature' (Bruner, 1986: 78). For this reason there are two popular, though contrasting, readings of Vygotsky in effect in educational discourse: one signalling the relevance of Vygotskian thought to the 'individual child', and the child's active contribution to her learning' (Burgess, 1993: 4); the other, influenced by Gramscian theory of hegemony is more concerned with 'semiotic mediation' and the need for a 'politics of culture and critique' (Burgess, 1993: 4-6). It is this very liminality that makes Vygotsky's approach to language and learning interesting from an Irigarayan perspective, because he locates his investigation at the interface between thought and culture:

The conception of word meaning as a unit of both generalising thought and social interchange is of incalculable value for the study of thought and language. It permits true causal – genetic analysis, systematic study of the relations between growth of the child's thinking ability and his social development (Vygotsky, 1962: 9)

In Chapters Two and Six of *Thought and Language* (1962), Vygotsky criticises the Piagetian scheme of development on the grounds that it proffers a too egocentric view of development, and that this is simplistic in its linearity of progression from egocentric thought to socialised expression. Vygotsky's own 'sociocultural' approach to development stresses that the individual and the social are mutually co-constitutive elements of cognitive development. His theory of the zone of proximal development is based on the observation of behavioural changes denoting development, and the interactional nature of these changes, described in terms of 'shifting control' within activities. Rather than gauging a child's developmental stage or level according to 'innate' factors such as IQ, Vygotsky focuses on the potential for development
existing between the child and those people who constitute her immediate educational environment:

It is the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers. (Vygotsky, 1978: 86)

The relevance of this approach in amplifying the Irigarayan model of relationality as I apply it to education, is its double perspective on subjectivity, which is held to be simultaneously autonomous and relational, and that the specificity of the child’s progression or becoming is at the interface of ‘individual’ and relational or social processes. Vygotsky emphasises both, that:

Human learning presupposes a specific social nature and a process by which children grow into the intellectual life of those around them (Vygotsky, 1978: 88)

and that:

Learning awakens a variety of internal developmental processes that are able to operate only when the child is interacting with people in his environment and in co-operation with his peers. Once these processes are internalised, they become part of the child’s independent developmental achievement. (Vygotsky, 1978: 90)

In terms of asymmetry, the proposition that there is a zone of proximal development highlights the importance on the teacher’s own demonstrable knowledge and their levels of expectation for pupils’ development and progression.
Evoking the 'mucosity' of the threshold between pupil(s) and the influential factors of environment, through a consideration of Vygotsky's zone of proximal development calls forth other key aspects of Irigaray's relational imagery. The idea of a 'fecundity of the caress', as used in Irigaray's re-reading of Levinas (Irigaray, 1986b), implies a state of mutual becoming that is not subordinated to the concept of product, similarly the notion of a zone of proximal development confounds the separation of process and product, in that process becomes its own form of product. The slippery nature of the terms process and product in the context of drama education is discussed at some length by Fleming (1994: 16-19), where he argues that it is the consequences of the usage of such terms that is important:

The important question in drama is to ask whether exclusive preference for one or the other concept closes our mind to possibilities (Fleming, 1994: 17)

If Irigaray's suggestion of the 'fecundity of the caress' implies creative relationality, her attention to 'mucosity' implies something of the nature of that relationality. This perhaps seems more relevant to the discussion of creativity and knowledge constituted between pupils, that I will be moving on to later in this chapter, but it is also worth considering teacher-pupil relationality in this diffuse sense rather than in the more traditional sense of a 'penetrative' imparting of specific knowledges and skills. Mucosity in this context, implies a sharing of drama experiences in a mutually explorative way, where 'knowledge' and 'meaning' relating to both content and formal skills, develop out of the work and become part of the pupil's own developmental progression through the questioning interventions of the teacher; these are subsequently actualised through the ongoing performative work of the pupils, and the articulation of their own questions and comments. This process requires
reciprocity on the part of both teacher and pupil as well as demonstrative skills and
the giving of ideas. Charles Garoian talks of the liminality between roles of
‘artist/teacher’ and ‘spectator/student’ that is endemic to performance art pedagogy as
a means of challenging the ‘ideologies of institutionalised learning’ and promoting
‘critical citizenship’ (Garoian, 1999: 39). Listening might also be considered in terms
of mucosity, as a necessary precursor to responding. Gemma Corradi Fiumara’s
recent book on the philosophy of listening identifies an epistemic prejudice against
listening present in logocentric rationalism, which determines that dominant
orientations of discourse are bound to prevail:

In order to avoid the labour of listening – a labour comparable to the germination of any real
dialogue – a single tradition is recognized in which everything alien is considered irrelevant
(Fiumara, 1990: 26)

Envelopment: Irigaray’s image of the ‘envelope’ links with many of the themes of
relational subjectivity discussed above. Just as the mother is not reduced to mere
container by Irigaray’s analysis, the teacher cannot be reduced to a mere facilitator of
the pupil(s)’s natural progress. The teacher is an active agent in constituting a
‘setting’ that is conducive to learning in and through drama. This includes providing
a metaphorical ‘safe – space’ in which drama can take place, as well as managing the
actual space in which drama lessons occur. This can include additional
responsibilities for the use and operation of technical equipment, as well as the more
integral responsibility of structuring drama lessons. John Somers points out two key
considerations in helping to foster a positive setting for drama studies: ‘the
contemplation of worthwhile material’, rather than ‘trite content’, and ensuring that
‘students do not embark on work that is likely to fail’ (Somers, 1994: 46-8).
Although the teacher holds the larger burden of responsibility, particularly in planning
and structuring, the notion of a protective ‘envelope’ need not return the teacher to a position of exclusive responsibility for the working environment. The activities of drama are actualised within a collective community, and community is built upon notions of ‘shared commitment’ and ‘common good’ (bell hooks, 1994: 40). The idea of a safe-space for drama has to be collectively supported in order for it to be realized.

Constructivist emphasis in pedagogy: This can be described as an implicit understanding that the expressive and aesthetic practices of arts education should feed upon and be shaped by the traditions and vocabularies of the arts. Works first published by David Hornbrook and Peter Abbs in 1989 both express this view, though with slightly different emphases. As suggested in Chapter Three, Peter Abbs is concerned with formulating a theory of aesthetic education that embraces the necessary relationship between personal and cultural existence. Central to this is his image of child as active agent within the cultural milieu, which is exemplified by a matrix in which the conscious, preconscious and unconscious ‘personal’ spheres appear along the vertical axis, and the cultural symbolic emblematised by the phrase, ‘symbolic forms create symbolic forms’ appears as the hypostatizing horizontal axis (Abbs, 1989a: 10). Abbs clarifies that the ‘symbolic field’ is not to be regarded as a separate entity, but as one which is inherently bound with the conscious, preconscious and unconscious of the individual:

The two axes always act in some kind of conjunction, too subtle for definitive description

(Abbs, 1989a: 22)
Abbs argues that the implications for teaching are made quite clear by the cultural contextuality of creativity, i.e. that the teacher must address both of the axes in a dialectical mode of practice that is:

Constantly switching from one axis to another... connecting the individual to the culture and the culture to the individual (Abbs, 1989a: 24)

Abbs' emphasis on the 'aesthetic' and its place in the 'renewal of culture' lead him to stress an 'holistic' view of the individual, in which conscious, unconscious, body and mind operate in a dialectic relationship with the 'form[s]', 'technique[s]' and 'critical concept[s] of culture, community and history' (Abbs, 1989a: 23-4).

David Hombrook presents his pedagogical case in the form of a critique. He argues that expression does not merely take place within 'communities of discourse' but that these enable expression and discourse to take place. Implicit in his critique, therefore, is not that the practices of 'drama in education' operate outside of communities of discourse, but that the pedagogic emphases employed by teachers are inappropriate. The specific pedagogic emphasis to which Hombrook takes exception is the belief that through the operation of 'drama in education' methodology students are able to attain levels of 'truth' that 'transcend language and culture' (Hombrook, 1989/98: 125). Instead, the gist of Hombrook's argument is that to engage in 'drama' is to engage in a cultural language. He quotes from Gadamer (1975) in support of this:

Understanding should not be thought of so much as an action of one's subjectivity, but as the placing of oneself within a process of tradition, in which past and present are constantly fused. (Gadamer, 1975: 258, in Hombrook, 1989/98: 126)
Hornbrook’s pedagogic position, which is not explicit or prescriptive but implicit in the case of this particular text (Hornbrook, 1989/98: xi), centres on the promotion of ‘dramatic literacy’ and engagement with the aesthetics of ‘dramatic art’ as an appropriate, culturally mitigated means of expression and interpretation (Hornbrook, 1989/98: 131). Hornbrook presents the classroom as an arena of collectivity and consensus presided over by ‘history’ and the ‘communities of value and meaning’ (Hornbrook, 1989/98: 131), which he sets in contrast with the ‘world of competing individuals’ that he identifies with ‘drama in education’ and the ethnomethodology of Erving Goffman (Hornbrook, 1989/98: 116-20). Although Hornbrook locates his argument and praxis in opposition to ‘drama in education’ it is not my intention to perpetuate this oppositional understanding by discussing his work comparatively. As with my discussion of influences on contemporary drama education from pedagogic discourses associated with ‘personal development’, I will be outlining advantages and disadvantages of constructivist, or formalist, arguments and developing my discussion through Irigarayan analysis. So, for example, whilst Abbs’ and Hornbrook’s representation of (the) drama pupil as culturally located within and shaped by a discursive community is commensurate with Irigaray’s broad acceptance of the Lacanian topography of the symbolic, their neglect of issues of positionality and difference in relation to that community, or symbolic, is problematic. (The) teacher’s decision on which aspects of the canon to study is presented as a matter of personal choice or taste from within a neutral universal:

So long as what I am doing is helping my students to develop their dramatic skills and their knowledge and understanding of drama, then the range of content from which I am able to choose remains as large as the subject of drama itself (Hornbrook, 1989/98: 134-5)
Although Hornbrook identifies essentialism in perspectival approaches to drama (Hornbrook, 1989/98: 117), he does not explore the extent to which ‘theatre arts’, ‘history’ and the ‘communities of value and meaning’ are loaded with hegemonic values. This has been a major contention for feminist theatre practitioners:

It is clear that dramatic meta-codes organizing certain aspects of stage action continued throughout history to be largely male-originating and gendered, such that Woman as character is directly informed by historically-specific ideologies (Susan Melrose, 1998)

Whilst the notion of ‘dramatic literacy’ as the means by which dramatic expression is enabled is crucial, it is not unproblematic; it is also important to consider how one articulates with modes of cultural expression and the discursive position that one is able to adopt in relation to other dramatic forms. Just as Irigaray’s own discursive practice requires a detailed knowledge of philosophical tradition it also requires a discursive position from which to engage with and challenge that tradition. An uncritical adoption of cultural-historical forms can result in unwittingly perpetuating ‘universal’ and ‘normative’ values, which is as relevant to pedagogical praxis as it is to theatrical form.

A later book by Peter Abbs, in which he includes a chapter on ‘educational drama as cultural dispossession’, calls for a re-awakening of Socratic principles in education. These centre around the notion of the Socratic ‘elenchus’, a process of questioning which attempts to disorientate the learner’s security within commonly held opinion, bringing about a movement from certainty to ‘floundering uncertainty’, to a ‘quest for meaning’. For Abbs this process denotes an:
Opening out of the mind that transcends detail and skill and whose movement cannot be predicted (Abbs, 1994: 15)

However, feminists, including Irigaray have re-read Socratic methodology from the point of view of the ‘forgotten feminine’, thereby identifying an association between the theoretical questions, meta-level speculations and the divine or transcendental idea, which is predicated upon contempt for the body, matter and sensuality:

Men who are ‘pregnant in the body only’ betake themselves to women and beget children. But there are men who are ‘more creative in their soul than in their bodies, creative of that which it is proper for the soul to conceive and bring forth – vision and virtue (Genevieve Lloyd, 1984: 21, paraphrasing from Plato’s Symposium)

This can be compared with Irigaray’s reading of The Symposium as foundational to western metaphysics, when, through the mouth of Socrates, Diotima separates love into mortal and immortal (Irigaray, 1993a: 27).

The supposed ‘openness’ of the process and its resulting knowledge is also the subject of speculation and critique. To what extent does the process of the elenchus prescribe its outcome? Abbs suggests that the role of the questioner is to, ‘penetrate the protective armour of custom and opinion’ (Abbs, 1994:17). However, Tina Chanter suggests that this is not in search of ‘originality’ but knowledge that is subject to a pre-conceived ‘universal’ ethics: ‘the interlocutor awakens in me knowledge which was lying dormant’. This is contrasted by Chanter with Levinas who, ‘finds in teaching the possibility of absolute novelty which comes from the other and is not always implicit in me’ (Chanter, 1995: 196). Yet the popular image of Socrates is that of the ‘sterile midwife’ who gives birth to the conceptions of others, but is without
knowledge himself (Abbs, 1994: 33). If this is the case, who decides which are the ‘viable’ births and which the ‘still-born’ (Plato, 1987: 41), which are the ‘right’ answers and which the ‘wind-eggs’ (Plato, 1977: 157d). Abbs’ own assertion that ‘any truth established must remain open’ (Abbs, 1994: 21) is itself open to question. His discussion of the generative force of Socratic methodology as ‘energy surging between [the] opposites’ of ‘theoretical negation’ and ‘ontological affirmation’, mitigated by a desire for ‘authentic’ learning (Abbs, 1994: 17 & 20), is a clear representation of Hegelian dialectic; pitting oppositional terms against each other to constitute a ‘neuter’ universal. Rather than producing openness and inventiveness, it is possible to read the Socratic elenchus as closure, as a movement towards the ‘correct’ conclusion, the ‘one idea’ (Nye, 1989: 57-8, Lloyd, 1984: 40). The context of this form of enquiry is also relevant to the consideration of drama studies. Abbs describes the Socratic community as a ‘learning community’ but the garden scene in which Socrates and his pupils discuss philosophy is a ‘protected place’ of thought isolated from the sordid business of life, the Platonic philosopher longs to dwell in the transcendental world of forms. Similarly Abbs’ desire for pupils to transcend ‘experiences’, the ‘functional’, the ‘pragmatic’ (Abbs, 1994: 15), is cast as a journey towards true educational values. In view of this it is worth taking note of Andrea Nye’s warning about this Socratic quest:

To cut oneself off from the natural generative center of human life, is to be content with only abstract, unreal ideas of virtue and to fail to achieve real virtue which must be lived and generated in the visible, physical world. (Nye, 1989: 47)

Where Irigaray considers pedagogy it is in attempt to confront the transcendental with the inadmissible physical-sensual world of the feminine. Jane Gallop, for example, presents Irigaray’s reading of Sade’s *Philosophy in the Bedroom* as a ‘meditation on
teaching’ in which the confrontation between libertine and ingenue, the confrontation between:

ignorance as innocence and knowledge as power [is read as] a confrontation constitutive of the classroom dialectic (Gallop, 1988: 42)

Gallop refers to Lacan’s observation that Sade exposes the ‘anal-sadistic’ in education, the Sadian libertine’s term for anal examination being – *socratiser* – to socratize, adding that:

Pederasty is undoubtedly a useful paradigm for classic European pedagogy. A greater man penetrates a lesser man with his knowledge... (Gallop, 1988: 43)

Irigaray’s reading questions the role and location of woman in this ‘anal economy’:

I am to give myself over, voluptuously, to his practices. Or to those of his acolytes, as Socratic preference demands. (Irigaray, 1985b: 198)

Woman appears either as object of investigation or validation, or is negated in the role of ‘novice’, as an apprentice but ultimately flawed ‘man’. This process therefore silences woman as woman. Woman as insufficient man, as witness to the exclusivity of the phallocratie economy, however, is encouraged to make the appropriate ‘ejaculations’:

“Yes, yes, yes...” “To be sure.” “Obviously.” “Of course.” “How could it be otherwise?” “Who could disagree with that?” and other sounds, less clearly articulated, which prove to the master that I am ecstatic about what he knows how to say or do. (Irigaray, 1985b: 198)
Irigaray, in demonstrating this acquiescence, is ultimately concerned with circumventing this economy:

If I could somehow remain outside the scene and resist or survive the grip of this sovereign authority I would risk asking the libertine master a few questions (1985b: 198)

This is, in effect, a reversal of the Socratic elenchus, but these are questions which, according to the exigencies of discourse, 'he would not hear'. How then, to disrupt the economy from within? As in all such cases, Irigaray returns to the female body to find a counter-symbolic, and as in her deconstruction-reconstruction of Hegel's reading of Antigone, she focuses on contrasting representations of blood. Not, this time, the contrast between the red and white blood of maternal/paternal genealogy, but the contrast between blood loved by the Sadian libertine, that which he causes to flow, and menstrual blood that 'generally remains taboo' (Irigaray, 1985b: 200). The first, under the control, and at the behest of the libertine, can be compared with the investigatory incisions of the Socratic inquisitor, bringing forth knowledge from discomfort:

Pain as a necessary component of pleasure: that of the male who penetrates, that of the male or female who is penetrated (Irigaray, 1985b: 201)

The second is of a different 'nature', this is blood that exceeds the practices of the Sadian libertine, a pouring forth that would not be 'from' the question but literally out of the question amongst Socratic acolytes:

Subtending our pedagogy and our research, underlying the pursuit of knowledge in our society, is a drive for order, a drive to subordinate the disorderly body to man's categories. (Gallop, 1988: 54)
To that end, the 'transcendental truth' of Heathcote and Bolton's methodology and Hornbrook's canonically approved 'expression' and 'interpretation', are both axiomatic of an economy of the same. In fairness to Abbs' call upon Socratic learning, and Hornbrook's allusion to teachers' potential as 'serious egalitarians' (Hornbrook, 1991: 111), both are honourable in their intention to broaden pupil's cultural knowledge and experience. The question to be asked is, who's perspective of cultural tradition are teachers being implored to convey, and to what end?

Postmodern influences on drama pedagogy: Developing from, but moving beyond the constructivist approach to drama, and eschewing Romanticist notions of the 'individual' child, the postmodern approach articulated by Helen Nicholson has many practical similarities with that of David Hornbrook, but some key theoretical differences. Nicholson rejects the universality of Hornbrook's modernist position in favour of an emphasis on difference, for her 'pluralism' replaces the 'absolutism of cultural production' (Nicholson, 1993: 20). For example, Hornbrook's swipe at ethnomethodology, referred to above, can be construed not only as a rejection of individualism but also as a failure to acknowledge difference. As discussed in Chapter Three, Nicholson stresses the critical advantages of a postmodern perspective that focuses on the contingency of values and power in discourse, yet makes no claim to establishing the 'Truth' itself (Nicholson, 1993: 19). Both Nicholson and Hornbrook, however, draw upon Charles Taylor's conception of 'communities of discourse'. For Hornbrook this provides a framework to discuss the contextualization of meaning and the individual as part of a cultural matrix (Hornbrook, 1989/98: 123-5). For Nicholson, the argument that we are constructed by communities of discourse that are themselves constituted by discourse, provides a 'liberating ability to disrupt from
within' and a 'resistance to metanarratives' (Nicholson, 1995a: 29-30). The similarities between Hornbrook and Nicholson's arguments are themselves constituted by a slippage between the terms culture(s) and discourse(s), which necessitates the importance for both, of having the appropriate cultural/discursive 'tools' to enable expression (Nicholson, 1999: 88 ref. to Bruner 1996: 98. The key points of Nicholson's pedagogic approach include the teaching of arts-specific subject knowledge such as genre, style, period (Nicholson, 1993: 20), forms and conventions (Nicholson, 1994: 21); with a balance between valuing 'the craft of drama' (1994: 21) and 'children's own dramatic narratives' (1993: 20). Nicholson places emphasis on promoting pupils as artists, active producers of dramatic texts. This carries a double implication of 'extension and democratisation of the aesthetic' (1993:20), and via the expertise of the teacher, an increased 'repertoire of styles', 'formal vocabulary' and more 'informed choice' for pupil(s) (1994, 21-2). In avoidance of a Eurocentric or too canonistic view of formal vocabulary, Nicholson also stresses the importance of cultural pluralism and an 'intertextual' approach to dramatic representation (1993: 20, 1994: 21). Nicholson also gives a positive account of collaborative arts work not in an attempt to essentialize the arts, but to seek affirmation for drama as an arts discipline; taking that to mean part of the 'discursive family' of the arts (Nicholson, 1994: 21; 1998b: 112). Collaboration can also be read as a form of intertextuality, an extension of the expressive field which students occupy, and a way of challenging accustomed practices of a particular discipline through juxtaposition with those of another.

There are, of course, many facets of postmodernism, or indeed, many postmodernism(s). Educational discourse, and in particular discourses of 'critical pedagogy' have bifurcated postmodernism into two broad categories: Ludic
postmodernism, which emphasises the combinatory potential of signs, the playfulness of the signifier and the heterogeneity of differences (Teresa Ebert, 1991: 115), and 'Resistance' or 'Critical' postmodernism, which stresses the need for individuals to rethink the relationship between identity and difference (Ebert, 1991: 118, Peter McLaren, 1994: 199-200). The extent to which Nicholson could be said to occupy one or the other, or both of these positions will be an implicit part of my discussion in this and the next chapter. Suffice it to say here, that there are a range of critical and practical implications that Nicholson's work opens up, only some of which are clarified by Nicholson in explications of pedagogic praxis. It is my intention to open up the 'postmodern approach' to critical scrutiny in a way that looks both beyond the specificities of Nicholson's published works, and returns to them in order to identify Nicholson's 'take' on key issues. Although I have identified key pedagogical recommendations raised by Nicholson, and intend to utilise them as separate headings, there is a great deal of inter-implication between these areas.

**Teaching subject knowledge:** Nicholson's assertion that teaching forms, styles and conventions of artistic expression in turn enables pupils to participate in the discursive operations of that expressive medium, has clear advantages in terms of empowerment and articulation; as Abdul Janmohamed argues, drawing on Freire (1985), Literacy is an 'act of knowing' (Janmohamed, 1994: 242). However, Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1963) cautions against an over valuation of the knowledge imparted by teachers as 'cultural capitol'; what he refers to as the 'banking system' of education:

> an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositaries and the teacher is the depositor (Freire, 1963: 53)
because this carries with it the danger of effectively silencing marginalized voices. A postmodern approach to arts education that emphasizes the acquisition and manipulation of form, particularly where this is aligned with the ‘shaping of the self’ (Nicholson, 1998a: 78, quoting from Bruner, 1996: 35), needs to be balanced with a consideration of pupils’, ‘identity and self-esteem’ (Bruner, 1996:35). To cite Baym’s discussion of feminist approaches to teaching literature, she states:

I take it that whenever there is teaching there is a power relationship; the question is what is produced by and through that relation. (Baym, 1990: 66)

Paul Willis’ book *Moving Culture* addresses these very issues by questioning what exactly our definitions of artistic form might be. He argues for a ‘grounded aesthetic’ that accepts a continuum of expressive forms, practices and resources, through which young people already ‘symbolically portray their meanings’ in everyday life (Willis, 1990: 10). In other words, forms about which the pupil may be an expert and the teacher may have very little practical knowledge; or in an Irigarayan sense, ‘blood’ which the Sadian libertine has not caused to flow. Indeed, Willis concedes that much of the cultural creativity that he identifies:

Would evaporate when transferred to institutions [and that] many of the real symbolic energies of young people are essentially informal in their logic, meaning and motivation (Willis, 1990: 55)

Are these forms of expression examples of voices that remain unheard by the ‘Socratic’ teacher?
A pedagogic model in which the Socratic teacher is also subjected to questioning and is able to listen to ‘other’ voices, is not one in which the teacher’s knowledge is contravened or disallowed, but is a dialogic process that enables creative movement or ‘becoming’, both in terms of the student, the teacher and the development of expressive form. Nicholson’s work variously emphasizes, on one hand, the role of teacher as ‘expert’ along with the value of forms, genres etc. to be learned, stored and utilised by pupils (Nicholson, 1994), and on the other, a ‘scaffolded’ approach (derived from Vygotsky) where the teacher’s role is depicted as one of support, and the emphasis is upon student’s own ‘understanding’, and the possible range of formal sources (Nicholson, 1998a: 83). Where these are drawn together in Nicholson’s work, a more dialogical or ‘horizontal’ (Gore, 1993: 120) relationship is evoked:

To argue that students should become practitioners in the craft of playmaking is not to say that they should be persuaded simply to accept the cultural values of traditional theatre practice. On the contrary, it aims both to validate their home cultures and to expand the cultural field, with the recognition that practising the craft of the playwright allows new and familiar ideas to take shape. (Nicholson, 1998a: 89)

However, the skill of ‘writing’ plays is not in itself unproblematic when considered in the context of postmodern approaches to drama. Drawing on Gadamer’s emphasis on the necessary ‘contiguity’ and ‘particularity’ of performed representation (Gadamer, 1975) and Artaud’s repudiation of the theatrical text (Artaud, 1970: 82-3), strains of postmodern theatre, for example Richard Forman, Robert Wilson and Lee Bruner’s ‘Theatre of Images’, associated with avant-garde theatrical companies such as Ontological-Hysteric Theatre, the Mabou Mimes, the Living Theatre and the San Francisco Mime Troupe (Kaye, 1994), have sought to free performance from the
perceived constraints of a pre-existing script. Derrida reads Artaud’s
detheatricalization of the theatre as a fight against logocentrism:

\[\text{The hand lifted against the abusive wielder of the logos, against the father, against the God of a stage subjugated to the power of speech and text (Derrida, 1978: 239)}\]

This is theatre without history, without the operations of repetition, a ‘pure presence as pure difference’ (Derrida, 1978: 239). Later however, Derrida draws attention to the impossibility of this ‘purity’, suggesting that theatre is, of necessity, a (re)presentation (Derrida, 1978: 248). Although it is not my purpose in this thesis to devise an Irigarayan poetics of the theatre, it is certainly relevant to consider how Irigaray’s perspective of mimesis could be made to articulate with this discussion. Through Irigaray’s rereading of the myth of the cave (Irigaray, 1985a: 243-364), we are given an image of culture that is always already mimetic; not as in the Platonic representation of pure form, but as a performative projection upon the immanence of the maternal-feminine. Whilst it may not be possible to envisage such ‘pure difference’ as theatrical form, it is my view that Irigaray’s idea of a sensible-transcendental suggests, in this context, thinking in terms of a contiguity between immanence and artistic form, thinking in terms of the traces or residues of the immanent occupying theatricality. In this sense, Artaud’s physicalized theatre of sensation, sound, colour and movement (Artaud, 1970: 82-3) would provide much to draw upon. Yet an Irigarayan approach would also distance itself from, or critique, Artaud’s universal association of these devices with objectivity, or more specifically ‘objective materialisation’ (Artaud, 1970: 118), on the grounds that this would seem to preclude thoughts of subjective materialisation in connection with the sensate.
Pupil as artist: There are two identifiable yet interrelated themes involved in Nicholson’s advocacy of pupil as artist, subjectivity and formalism. Embedded assumptions about each of these are informed by the discourses of postmodernism and postmodern feminism. Nicholson (1993) highlights postmodernism’s deconstruction of stable, rational identity as part of its repudiation of ‘grand narratives’, and the consequential shift towards reading identity as constituted through discourse. With regard to formalism, Nicholson (1993, 1994) emphasises the manipulation of historical and cross-cultural forms, styles and techniques as an expression of decentred subjectivity, professing neither ‘self-expressive’ individualism or ‘absolute cultural understanding’ (Nicholson, 1994: 20), but occupying a space of liminality between the two. Rather than viewing the postmodern resistance to metanarratives expressed by Lyotard (1984), as an a-politicising move, Nicholson, drawing on Seyla Benhabib (1992: 14), sees this as inimical to the possibility of postmodern political projects that eschew universality and expose the contingency of values such as ‘truth’, ‘power’, and ‘rationality’. As discussed at the end of Chapter Three, throughout her work Nicholson calls upon both a ‘politics’ and ‘celebration’ of difference. In opening out the proposition of a ‘postmodern’ approach for drama to critical scrutiny, I intend to unpack notions of a postmodern poetics and (the) postmodern artist from a feminist – Irigarayan perspective. This will include some attention to how an Irigarayan perspective articulates with or differs from the postmodern feminist perspectives drawn upon by Nicholson.

For Irigaray, postmodernity represents an historical moment reached in the ontological project of male subjectivity, wherein the dissolution of previous forms of that identity is operated from within a gendered position (Irigaray, 1985a: 135, 205; 1991: 78-9). Rather than viewing postmodernism as a break with former modes of
thought, feminist writers have stressed postmodernism's development out of modernist or concerns, such as Nietzschean 'radical fictionality' and Heidegger's notions of 'non-conceptualizable Being' (Waugh, 1992: 193). However, postmodern thought can be characterized by a disjoining of signifier from signified, and a resulting instability of meaning. Through this basic premiss accounts of 'being' and expression or art, become coterminous. For Baudrillard the contemporary condition is one of 'simulacrum', material imitation without an original, hence his account of the operation of signifying systems as 'hyperreal', without 'transcendence or depth' (Baudrillard, 1987: 11). Similarly, Lyotard's famous 'incredulity toward metanarratives' (Lyotard, 1984: xxvii), can be recognised in his account of postmodern art as a 'transgression of that which is known' (Lyotard, 1984: xxiv). For Barthes the dissolution of gender identity is a projection into the future of subjectivity and a textual strategy where 'writing the body' – a celebration of ultimate female pleasure becomes synonymous with losing the self (Moore, 1988: 167-8). Woman, femininity etc. as a trope for the other of identity, the untruth of truth is something that has endured the transition from modernism to postmodernism (Irigaray, 1985a: 230-1). Indeed, in terms of speaking position, position within discourse, masculine identity, though dissipated, remains central:

When a man says, "I too am woman", he is sure of himself (Jardine, 1985: 39)

In terms of postmodern textuality and its relationship to identity, experience may be 'textually constructed' and the self, 'an ever-revisable script', but the notion of text as an autonomous linguistic structure merely disguises its author:

Hovering behind these texts is Nietzsche's self-creating and self-affirming artist... (Waugh, 1992: 193 & 201)
Feminist critics have uncovered the slight of hand by which masculine subjectivity is re-constructed as hidden self in the form of the postmodern author-artist, whilst woman, the female body, is constituted as text. Irigaray’s *Speculum of the Other Woman* (1985a) could be said to have lead the way for this type of critique.

Such a reading clearly presents problems in terms of the relationship between feminism and postmodernism. ‘Woman’ as Derrida’s ‘allegory of truth’ (Derrida, 1982: 69), is no better off with postmodernism than she is within modernist discourse. She remains a victim of the logic of the same, and is denied access to theory as a speaking subject (Irigaray, 1985a: 224). Irigaray argues that the cultural feminine can be used strategically within discourse as a lever with which to off-set the centrality of the masculine speaking position and facilitate a dialogic relationship of pure difference (Irigaray, 1993a). Other feminist approaches, rather than seeking affirmation for gendered or marginalized identity, find their political project in the resistance to identity, arguing that the postmodern questioning of identity puts all identity into question.

It is such a position that Helen Nicholson’s articles *Performative Acts: from polemic to practice, celebrating ourselves as experts* (1995a) and *Genre, Gender and Play: Feminist Theory and Drama Education* (1995b) draw from Judith Butler’s *Gender Trouble* (1990). Nicholson reads Butler’s account of gender and selfhood constructed through performative acts, her repudiation of essence and her representation of self as text, as a model for radicalizing and questioning identity through performance.

Alluding also to Cixous *écriture feminine*, Nicholson argues that textual play, or more specifically for drama, ‘free play of visual, aural and bodily signifiers’ can be used as a means of ‘trying new selves’ (Nicholson, 1995b: 21) or a way to ‘rewrite’ reality in
the imagination (1995a: 35). Bringing Butler and Cixous together creates a curious effect, in that it highlights the endurance, even into feminist discourse, of the subject/object divide whose persistence and re-emergence in postmodern discourse Irigaray describes. Cixous' attempts to evoke another feminine world, for example, not only displace but attempt to replace the Phallus (Nye, 1988: 204). Nicholson's description of Cixous' poetic, 'where through creating texts women may physically materialise thought' (Nicholson, 1995a: 35), can be read as a discursive 'will to power' that merely replaces the ideological 'will to power' associated with the work of Heathcote and Bolton, and dismantled by Nicholson earlier in the article (Nicholson, 1995a: 28-9). The further suggestion that *écriture feminine* reflects 'not a confessional of real life experiences but a recognition that the world can be re-written in the imagination' (Nicholson, 1995a: 35), is comparable with Barthes' assertion that, 'to write an essay on oneself may seem a pretentious idea, but it is a simple idea, simple as the idea of suicide' (Barthes, 1977: 56). Paradoxically, for postmodernism to be an author of one's own life is death, yet to 'disappear' behind textual free-play is life. In my view Cixous' practice is very close to this form of self-actualization, though without the duplicity of professed self-effacement. As Patricia Waugh observes of Barthes:

The shelves of books by Barthes in libraries all over the world proclaim a confidence in his authorship even as he disclaims it (Waugh, 1992: 198)

For Butler, whose work attempts to deconstruct gendered identity, textuality, or 'performativity', is both the other of identity and yet constitutive of identity. Even materiality, bodies themselves, are rendered possible through discursive production and iteration, making them transformable and able to perform their own parody or
‘queering’ (Butler, 1990: 136-41). The conflation of self with textual surface presupposes the conflation of textual disruption with political subversion. It is this that leads Nicholson to stress the reconstitutive powers of form, ‘how genre works to create meaning’ (Nicholson, 1995b: 23). Yet the example chosen by Nicholson from feminist theatre reveals an agentive decision to seek appropriate forms in order to challenge conventions of ‘masculine’ theatre practice, and demonstrates a necessary reciprocity between form, meaning and content. Even Susan Sontag, a renowned formalist and proponent of the ‘sensuous surface of art’ argues that experiments in form at the expense of content ‘commit art to being perpetually on the run’ (Sontag, 1966/1982: 53).

Grounding this discussion back in the realm of drama education, what I am leading to is the suggestion that for the pupil as artist, a postmodern poetics offers the same ontological choices as the modernist, of either being avant-garde artist or text; In Irigaray's terms, of being ‘the same’ or ‘other of the same’, subject or object. This, of course, has implications for the way in which the relationship between form and content is understood. In order to highlight the specificity of Irigaray’s approach compared with postmodern approaches to textuality it is necessary to take a brief look at what is referred to as Derrida’s ‘hymenal fable’. ‘Hymen’ is another of the terms used by Derrida to signify ‘différance’, its presence signifies the absence of consummation, and it also undoes the opposition active/passive, being ‘always intact as it is always ravished’ (Derrida, 1981: 260). In textual terms the hymen metaphorically represents a hinge or fold between text and author, where ‘dissemination’ from the pen of the author takes place:
The (n)ever – virgin, (n)ever – violated hymen of interpretation, always supplanting through its fold which is also an opening, is spilled the seed of meaning; a seed that scatters itself abroad rather than inseminates (Spivak, 1976: Ixvi)

Derrida is offering a post-hermeneutic interpretation of meaning as dispersal, as diffusion, a perpetually deferred consummation between author and text. This can be compared with Irigaray’s use of the two lips (labia) as an alternative significatory device, always touching but never one. Irigaray re-emphasizes as significant the materiality of the author-speaker, as an embodied discursive position that is fundamental to the production of meaning within the text or ‘enonce’. This neither proclaims the author as omnipotent nor denies the plasticity and interpretability of the text. Following the work of Emile Benveniste (1966), who saw the relationship between the ‘I’ of enonce (spoken ‘I’) and the ‘I’ of enunciation (speaking subject) as neither reducible to each other nor definitively separated, Irigaray is concerned with the corporeality of the author or speaker and the textual residues or traces left by their touching upon the text. This concern also extends to the effect of such traces upon the reader or person with whom one is speaking. Irigaray variously focuses upon discourse between women (1985b), or between positions of sexual difference (1993a); the point being that the ‘text’, or ‘enonce’ has depth, content, an interior as well as a surface, and that these are inter-implicated. In An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993a), Irigaray argues that the relationship of art to sexual difference needs to be rethought. The conflation of inscribable exteriority and inhabitable space with the feminine, and subjective interiority (time) with the masculine, needs to be reworked according to an economy of ‘threshold’ (1993a: 13, 18). I would argue that such a way of thinking would be particularly relevant to the dramatic arts where performer and performed are embodied in the same person but are not collapsible to each other.
In the case of drama education where making, performing and responding are not separable but necessarily interrelated, Irigaray’s notion of threshold seems particularly appropriate.

Returning to Nicholson, many of the issues raised by my comparison between Derrida’s ‘hymenal-fable’ and Irigaray’s labial economy are relevant both to the examples Nicholson draws from feminist theatre, especially Peta Tait (1994) and her response to them (Nicholson, 1995b). Peta Tait’s work having evolved from the more polemical practices of feminist theatre in the late 1960s and 1970s embraces the personal and the political as well as the aesthetic and the formal. Whilst decrying that feminist theatre continues to be ‘analysed according to its content rather that its form’ (Tait, 1994: 225) she characterizes feminist theatrical practice as ‘aligning form with content’ (Tait, 1994: 226). Her discussion of how space, voice and body are reclaimed by female performers suggests that the performers occupy self-created speaking positions, making ‘female identity or self the pivotal presence within the text’ (Tait, 1994: 226). In other words, it is possible to denote an emphasis on the gendered material presence of the ‘author’ within the theatrical ‘text’ that Peta Tait describes. However, a different emphasis can be located in Nicholson’s discussion of Tait’s work, here the body is construed as ‘text’ to be ‘read’ and ‘interpreted’ with an emphasis on ‘pluralistic meaning’ and a suggestion that pupils should, likewise, ‘play with form’ (Nicholson, 1995b: 23). Nicholson does not entirely negate notions of authorship, indeed this is qualified towards the end of the same article where she describes the ‘playful manipulation of signifiers’ as being, ‘in Foucauldian terms, about insidership, locating and situating self and cultural form in fluid dialogue relationship’ (Nicholson, 1995: 24). Citing Foucault in the context of a call for ‘feminist’ approaches to expression and ‘authorship’ however, is not itself
unproblematic, since throughout Foucault’s work the notion of selfhood refers to a ‘masculine’ self (Braidotti, 1986: 1-13; Sarup, 1993: 85-7). Clearly Nicholson’s intention is not to draw upon this blindness to sexual difference, and feminists have made much use of Foucault’s interpretation of social forces as polymorphous and formative, but this citation does reinforce the argument that postmodern practices of accumulation, manipulation and defamiliarization do not in themselves constitute theoretical purity. In the case of postmodern poetics it is by no means certain that these offer a viable challenge to the self/other binary. This has been of concern within feminist discourses that adopt postmodern textual practices for some time, but has acquired new relevance in the light of post-colonial feminist critique as ‘western’ feminism recognises the implications and ethical consequences of its own ‘will to power’.

**Intertextuality:** Not only does Nicholson argue that a genre based approach to teaching drama broadens the expressive field available to students, but it is also a major contention of Nicholson’s work that the intertextuality of dramatic forms from a variety of historical periods, contemporary genre and diverse cultural locations, is a direct means by which the universality of masculine, western culture and subjectivity can be challenged through a ‘celebration of difference’ (Nicholson, 1993: 20; 1995a: 30). Although I will be looking at the implications of this for drama more closely in Chapter Five, it is relevant in the context of this discussion of postmodern arts practice and feminist discourse to look at some of the ways in which this approach has been problematized. Notably, bell hooks points out that the celebration of difference within intellectual discourse, ‘fails to ask who is sponsoring the party...’ (hooks, 1991: 54). Of more relevance to issues of textual play and heterogeneity of form, is the possible displacement of the appellation ‘other’ and the tropes of ‘femininity’,
'untruth', 'nature', 'body' etc. onto cultural plurality. As a subtle twist in the postmodern textualization of the feminine, 'woman' can be construed metaphorically as, 'the gateway to the other world' (Moore, 1988: 186), a means by which the selfhood of the artist, though reconstituted once again, is reconfirmed:

The centre, though claiming to be in disintegration, still operates as a centre (Richard, 1978/9: 11)

I will be suggesting ways in which Irigaray's approach to alterity can be made to articulate with this discussion and its implications for drama education in the next chapter.

**What to do with Irigaray:** Irigaray's unique position which incorporates a post-structuralist, deconstructive approach whilst positing the possibility of transformation within the symbolic, and an ontological shift away from identity based on opposition or dispersal, means that her work is particularly suited as a position from which to critique other discourses. However, because her deconstructive project is always balanced by reconstructive implications, it also carries potential for considering the productive possibilities of applying her alternative view to other discourses. This is enabled by the way in which Irigaray's work seeks to bring oppositional categories together into relationships of reciprocity, contiguity and 'becoming', or flow, which exchanges either/or modalities for an economy of 'both-and...' (1985b: 28-9). This is not to suggest that in the context of drama education, attention to Irigaray's work would promote an 'anything goes' approach, but that it would provide a theoretical basis for interrelation between approaches that stress formalism and those which emphasise subjective identity. In my view Irigaray's representation of identity in
terms of relationality and becoming, is of particular relevance to issues of creativity and learning in drama education.

Relationality between self and other is a key concern of Irigaray’s work, which can be applied to drama education at both the micro and macro level. Christine Battersby’s description, referred to earlier in the chapter, of Irigaray’s reconfiguration of ontology in terms of ‘tacky’ relationality (1998:103) is wonderfully evocative of the kind of collaborative work that occurs between pupils, and pupil – teacher in drama education. By re-emphasizing notions of subjectivity, as relational, it is possible to think of work in a way that not only pre-supposes a knowledge of form, but that problematizes the distinction between subjectivity and text, performer and audience; and allows us to think of the inter-implication between art and identity in terms of ‘becoming’. Irigaray’s notion of a sensible-transcendental can be used to think of contiguity between lived reality and artistic expression, as well as corporeality and form. Baudrillard’s idea that postmodern art creates its own significant present by being ‘without transcendence or depth’ (Baudrillard, 1987: 11), can be contrasted with an Irigarayian perspective on expression that would emphasise both depth and transcendence but not as separable entities.

Through an approach to drama that values and acknowledges ‘speaking position’, thereby balancing lived reality with ‘difference’, it may be possible to reconsider whether ‘acts of community’ always necessarily perpetuate hegemonic values (Nicholson, 1995a: 29), and like-wise, whether it is possible to challenge such values from within the ‘master-discourse’. Such an approach, rather than reifying the free-play of form, might also consider the free-play of concepts and avoidance of closure upon a single idea. The notion of a speaking position itself need not be held as a fixed
entity but rather as one in constant movement, transition or development. However, subjectivity in the context of drama, needs also to be thought of as embodied subjectivity, and in Irigarayan terms this goes beyond a recognition of the significatory qualities of the body as surface, to 'fleshy' reality and lived experience.

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See for example Walden and Walkerdine (1985) *Girls and Mathematics: From Primary to Secondary Schooling*, who identify a pathologization of girls' high performance in maths as stemming from 'rote learning', and boys' relatively low performance being valorised as 'real understanding'.


See Irigaray (1993c: 38-42) for further interrogation of placentarian relationality

See Moira Gatens (1991) *Feminism and Philosophy: Perspectives on Difference and Equality*, Chapter One, for a feminist critique of egalitarianism as based on gender dimorphism and division of labour between public and private spheres.


Derrida uses a different term according to context, to prevent any one term becoming a master signifier such as the Phallus.

This is evident in her early linguistic studies of dementia patients, and in her later work on *parler-femme* – 'speaking as a woman'

See Waugh (1992) *Postmodernism a Reader*, pp. 200

See, for example, Ofelia Schutte (1998) *Cultural Alterity: Cross Cultural Communication and Feminist Theory in North – South Contexts, Hypatia 13*: 2 pp. 53-72
The title of this chapter is an echo of the imagery adopted by Irigaray in her book *Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche* [*Amante Marine*]. In this book she deals with the territorialization of knowledge. The body of land in the first section of the book, is mapped onto a female body that has been colonized, divided and inscribed over by ‘masculine’ knowledge (Irigaray, 1991: 21, 27). Female time and space are not located ‘outside’ but simultaneously included and excluded (Irigaray, 1991: 56 – 57). The sea is a pathologized feminine other, feared by and yet utilised by the masculine coloniser, a primeval force capable of destroying his accomplishment (Irigaray, 1991: 36 – 37, 47, 58). In asking her reader to think in terms of the other, of fluidity rather than frontiers, she consciously prioritizes the other of the same as a transient strategy but only after she has declared her overall position vis-à-vis the masculine ‘you’:

> And if your hour ends when mine begins, that gives me no pleasure. For I love to share whereas you want to keep everything for yourself... Does it mean tearing those dearly won shrouds of glory away from you rag by rag when I say: now begin again, you have yet to begin to live.  
> (Irigaray, 1991: 19 - 20)

This notion of the ‘territorialization’ of knowledge, of dividing and demarcating, is relevant to a discussion of drama education because of its immediate history. By this, I am referring not only to the territorial boundaries set by the National Curriculum, but also to those seemingly dichotomous positions discussed in Chapters Three and Four, including tensions between rationality and feeling, form and subjectivism. The period
the construction of the National Curriculum, DES (1989) *Drama from 5 to 16*, and the Arts Council’s *Drama in Schools* (1992), has been a time for re-grouping, re-defining and negotiating through residual arguments. This chapter will consider how the ‘land’ of drama education is being mapped, divided and contested, using Irigarayan theory to suggest ways in which some of the boundaries being erected can be made permeable. My reading begins by identifying two key texts both published in 1994, which can be seen as declaring the identity of drama in this new context. Michael Fleming’s *Starting Drama Teaching* (1994) and John Somers’ *Drama in the Curriculum* (1994). I choose these two because they both constitute the time of writing as a significant watershed moment. Both texts deal with the past in their opening chapters, draw a figurative line underneath it and move on to give their account of what constitutes drama now, they state what drama’s positive and unique qualities are, and suggest practical approaches which are aimed at new teachers in the profession. Both then are engaged in the process of demarcation, definition and cartography.

Somers (1994) sets about locating drama within the curriculum as a whole, both as a discrete subject and as a teaching method that can be applied to other subjects. In trying to establish a sense of ‘value’ for drama within the curriculum, it is interesting that he emphasizes its plasticity and adaptability by suggesting that its methodology may be applied even to subjects such as mathematics and science, the implication being that in making ‘more central the role of drama in relation to other subjects’ (Somers, 1994: 10) it might accrue a higher value within the curriculum. This is not cited as a criticism of Somers’ effort to establish drama’s wide ranging application, but as an indication of how the dominant discourse (in this case the National Curriculum) determines the shape of
other related discourses, even in what Somers himself identifies as a ‘potentially subversive’ subject such as drama (Somers, 1994: 3). Viewed in a different light, the cross-curricular application of drama could be used as an indication of its fluidity and its refusal to be compartmentalised by divisive, formal structures; as Somers suggests, drama draws on ‘the full range of human experience’ its eclecticism allows it to ‘embrace the concerns of many other areas of the student’s educational experience’ (Somers, 1994: 12 - 13). Drama, it would appear, embraces multiple forms of knowledge, making boundary transgression between disciplines inimical to its application as a form of exploratory learning. Yet, where he expands upon the practical application of drama methodology, it is interesting that in the case of science education the examples of practice are all situation based, exploring the social consequences of scientific advancement (Somers, 1994: 110 – 116), rather than an embodied exploration of scientific principles such as gravity, balance, centrifugal force etc. which could be attempted through a number of trust exercises or warm-up games frequently found within the context of drama lessons. In the case of mathematics, however, he outlines a project in which one class creates a ‘Land of Straight Lines’, and another a ‘Land of Circles’, although the activities suggested seem to prioritise visual, rather than other forms of experience. Other integral aspects of drama identified by Somers related to the learning process include a relationship between the imagined and the real, and the value of experiential learning, ‘rooted in the moral, social and aesthetic concerns and judgements of individuals, played out in the real social network of the drama group’ (Somers, 1994: 14). Such an approach can be seen to have grown out of ‘personal-development’ models of education discussed in Chapter Four, which Somers tries to render compatible with the rigidity and compartmentalization of the National Curriculum. The central chapters of the book,
which consider the pedagogical aspects of drama, describe the role of the teacher in terms of a movement away from the ‘fallacious’ self-expression model. A view that is influenced by, or at least in agreement with, Neelands’ ‘contract’ model (1984, 1998), outlined in Chapter Four.

It is in the chapter on Techniques and Approaches that Somers outlines a particular set of criteria that define the learning process in drama. These indicate a certain amount of tension between what Somers believes is integral to drama, and what he knows is required in order to ‘legitimate’ it as a subject of study within current educational discourse. He emphasises that the process of learning in drama is of a collaborative nature. This is both in terms of the relation between teacher and pupil, where the successful ‘launch’ of a project of study and the engagement of student interest is of prime importance (Somers, 1994: 52), and collaboration between the pupils themselves, where ‘discussion and negotiation’ are used to ‘modify the chosen models’ of representation, and where acts of representation themselves can lead to ‘new insight’ (Somers, 1994: 52). Implicit in the process outlined by Somers; there is a sense in which knowledge is produced organically through the embodied act of making drama.

However, at the explicit level of Somers’ discussion, his reduction of this process to four stages: speculation, exploration, shaping, and communication, resembles as a version of positivist experimentation, or movement from hypothesis, through experimentation to ‘knowledge’, in which the rational operations of the mind are prioritised over the body’s secondary function. For example, Somers explains that, ‘students create drama models to explore situations which will advance or illustrate their thinking’, or that, ‘shaping and crafting the dramatic metaphor’ is carried out in order to, ‘make it a more effective
representation of their [the student’s] thinking’, which is ‘aided by an ability to use drama skills.’ (Somers, 1994: 52, my italics). Where Somers discusses ‘Communication’ this is illustrated in terms of the knowledge or insight reached at an end-point in the process, i.e. ‘reporting back’, ‘a full public performance’, and ‘the sharing of shaped drama with other class members’ (Somers, 1994: 52), rather than on-going discussion. Although each of these examples could also be recontextualized to express the embodied making of meaning or dialogue, the process as defined by Somers seems to highlight a self-present rationality. The term ‘understanding’ pervades throughout the process, materialised in the constantly updated ‘holding form’, whilst aspects such as ambiguity or uncertainty (O’Neill, 1996) are not identified as central to the drama process, although implied by the suggestion that enactment can actually ‘challenge insight’ (Somers, 1994: 52). Within this sequential model which, as described by Somers, begins and ends in rational proposition, whatever exceeds or disrupts the ‘idea’ could also be construed as fundamental to its production.

As the title of Fleming’s book, Starting Drama Teaching (1994) suggests, it is intended for those new to the profession, or training as drama teachers. As such, it attempts to set the role of drama teacher in context with the debates and divisions that have, in the past, ‘not served [drama] well’ (Fleming, 1994:15), thereby engaging in a process of definition, or elaboration, which is also an active contribution towards unifying the discipline. This requires Fleming to take an authorial position which offers sensible resolutions founded in practice and experience, whilst amplified by theory. The three main divisions which he identifies are those between, drama/theatre; process/product; drama education/drama in education. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s linguistic theory,
Fleming problematizes such dichotomous positions and reformulates them as part of a continuum, arguing that it is not always helpful to conflate or reduce differences, but that these should be opened up to productive forms of discussion that will identify positive ways to move forward. For example, asking what the characteristics of a balanced approach might be (Fleming, 1994: 22 – 27). Fleming doesn’t cite Nicholson (1993), yet this argument can be seen as a reply to her suggestion that debates between the ‘cultural materialists’ and ‘expressivists’ are dead (Nicholson, 1993, 1994). It could be argued that in a neo-Hegelian or Derridian manoeuvre, the postmodern approach deconstructs this dichotomy by negating the expressivist half of the binary and reworking cultural materialism as all-encompassing discourse. This is the kind of manoeuvre identified by Irigaray as a re-emergence of master discourse (Irigaray, 1985a: 273). Coming from a background in ‘drama-in-education’, Fleming has an understandable interest in keeping these positions of difference in dialogue.

Fleming demonstrates how a productive discussion of difference might work, by assessing the value of drama through an interrogation of the oppositional debate between ‘drama as method’ and ‘drama as subject’. He contextualizes the much-vaunted description of drama as a classroom resource rather than a subject, in the light of less structured or stratified conceptions of curriculum than are prevalent today, arguing that, 

The future of drama as a school subject will have to be built in the context of the political realities of the present but also with an awareness of the considerable achievements of the past. (Fleming, 1994: 33)
Fleming highlights the concern with process, attention paid to the role of the teacher, and a focus on active learning as achievements of the past, whilst marshalling Hornbrook’s notion of ‘the dramatised society’ (Hornbrook, 1989: Ch.10), in order to endorse the position of drama as a subject within a socially relevant curriculum. This is tempered by Fleming’s concern that in establishing separate subject status, emphasis should not be placed purely on the, ‘surface acquisition of knowledge’, rather than a ‘deeper notion of understanding’, which he clarifies by adding that,

_Drama should never merely be about ‘actors, theatres and plays’ stated in this bald fashion._

(Fleming, 1994: 35)

Fleming argues that it is in considering the value of drama as a teaching method that recognition of the nature of drama as an art form or discrete subject is revealed. These being, its _motivational force_ which harnesses the ‘inclination to play’; its identity as a _concrete activity_ concerned with the ‘absorption in the moment’; and that it works through _focus and selection_ involving an understanding of ‘dramatic form’ (Fleming, 1994: 36 – 41). Such values form the basis of Fleming’s argument for contextual learning and his emphasis on learning ‘through’ rather than just ‘in’ drama (Fleming, 1994: 139, 143). Fleming’s discussion operates at the boundaries of former debate but also reveals a tension between the progressive traditions of educational drama and the exigencies of the National Curriculum. In discussing planning for drama, he indicates the importance of planning with the group in mind, but highlights the potential problems of adopting an ‘aims and objectives’ model that might focus the teacher’s attention onto those aspects of drama which are most easily assessed (Fleming, 1994: 50 – 51).
Fleming’s approach seeks to unite a concern with the quality of experience for students, with a clear defining concept of what ‘experience’ should entail in a drama context.

Fleming engages in a sophisticated process of productive mediation, in which the defining boundaries of drama are presented, as a synthesis of ideas derived from previous arguments, but not necessarily in a reductive sense. However, as with Somers’ book it is possible to identify what are emphasised as defining qualities and what is revealed only by implication, especially where the notion of ‘learning’ is discussed. In reference to DES (1989) *Drama 5 – 16*, Fleming describes the 1990s climate as one in which there is a more specific focus on what it means to improve ability in drama. Again, Fleming approaches this through a consideration of dichotomous positions, this time between learning and development. He points out, that if taken in its broadest sense, learning can be conflated with the term development, but that in current educational discourse, learning has become more narrowly defined, creating a false dichotomy between learning and development which in reality is a more complex relationship (Fleming, 1994: 43).

He argues that drama is particularly vulnerable to seeming inadequate where narrow conceptions of learning are applied, but that a consideration of the complex way that language ‘relates to reality’ can emphasize drama’s power as a form of learning, through the concept of ‘expression’ (Fleming, 1994: 43). Drawing on the work of Taylor (1985), he suggests that linguistic expression founds a ‘public space’ between people, and that in formulating expression, what may be ‘known’ implicitly is brought to explicit awareness. Therefore, where practitioners have been unable to articulate precisely what learning has taken place in drama an emphasis on:
the process of articulation and expression as a form of learning makes sense of this dilemma
(Fleming, 1994: 43)

However, Fleming focuses exclusively on linguistic expression in making this point. Considering learning as a relational activity that both constitutes and is constituted by the founding of 'public space' is highly relevant to the Irigarayan approach of this thesis, but there is more to drama's constitution of public space than purely linguistic expression. What of that which is expressed through the body in addition to speech, such as facial expression, gesture and movement? Fleming does not address these specifically; they remain implicit to his understanding of drama as art form:

In successful drama the same process of bringing about explicit awareness... is happening but far more intensely because the art form serves to select, focus and heighten the feeling content.
(Fleming: 1994: 43 my italics)

In his concluding remarks Fleming alludes to the contrast made between 'internal' and 'external' realms of identity in the context of drama discourse, as 'part of a wider debate in philosophy stemming from the notion of mind/body dualism' (Fleming, 1994: 160). Fleming argues that he seeks to refute the division of drama into a choice between internal and external dimensions of experience, whilst preserving a notion of 'inner' and 'outer' as complimentary perspectives on the world and art (Fleming, 1994: 160, 167). However, a closer look at this discussion in the light of Irigaray's reading of Kant, discussed in Chapter Three, reveals that both Fleming and Hornbrook fall back on a metaphysics of presence that prioritises their particular version of the 'rational'. This also demonstrates how realms of so called 'inner' and 'outer' experience have been colonized by 'the rational' at various points in history. Hornbrook, for example,
conflates 'inner' experience with the lesser realm of feeling and the imaginary, whilst manifestations of 'outer' experience are presented as more worthy of consideration in terms of education, being subject to rational scrutiny and visual determination (Hombrook, 1989/98: 69). Whilst arguing in favour of an approach that acknowledges relationality between what are linguistically understood as 'internal' and 'external' facets of experience, Fleming constitutes 'inner' life as the seat of 'subjectivity', 'authenticity' and 'feeling', as a location where 'learning' takes place (Fleming, 1994: 163). In contrast, externality is represented by, 'craft', 'imitation' and 'superficiality', where the body as tool is secondary to the inner workings of the mind (Fleming, 1994: 161).

Fleming qualifies this representation by stating that:

> The key point... is not that the physical exercise is of no value but that it is not in itself sufficient

(Fleming, 1994: 162)

Surely the more salient point is that the physical never is 'in itself' but that this is subject to the view of the drama practitioner. A consideration of Irigaray's notion of the sensible-transcendental means that such categorisation needs to be thought of in terms of contiguity without hierarchy. This makes sense if thought of in terms of what might be described as the 'always already' of the maternal feminine; through which there is no possibility of an 'either/or' choice since corporeality is always already that upon which rationality depends. Learning can be thought of as 'embodied' in all subjects and contexts, but it seems all the more incongruous to marginalize or negate (the) body in discourse on drama education, where 'embodied learning' appears to be integral, according to our cultural understanding of the terms 'body' and 'learning'. It is my view that the recurring metaphysics of presence is at the heart of current debates in drama
education. Therefore Irigaray's theoretical 'retouch' upon the maternal-feminine is not only relevant to drama at an experiential level, where a consideration might be made of the status, location and function of (the) body in drama discourse, but also at an ontological level where notions of subjectivity and creativity can be addressed. For example, Irigaray reads Kant's reallocation of the imaginary to the intelligible as a refusal of the sensible which causes subjectivity itself to be characterised by the intelligible - 'the deep interior'. In the transition from modern to postmodern thought, where the hegemony of reason is challenged and the 'deep interior' of Romanticism eventually dispersed, what is left in 'bodily' terms is a surface, a 'body without organs'. This is the inevitable direction taken by rationality and the flight from the body, an 'historical condition' (Irigaray, 1985b: 141), that can be seen latterly to reduce the body to cyberspace.

Anton Franks (1996) in an article on drama education subtitled 'the mystery of the missing bodies', argues that contrary to being 'missing' the body is in fact the 'main means and form of mediation' in drama, and that this includes 'representation', 'the communicative resources of speech, gesture and act', and signification 'through speech, gesture, posture and relative position of one body to another' (Franks, 1996: 105). The sense in which the body is 'missing', Franks argues, is that:

> Despite the fact that drama education relies on bodies and the body as the main means and form of mediation, there is very little in theories and ideas around in education which raises the body as an object of study and as a problem' (Franks, 1996: 105)
Although there are few direct references to (the) body, rather than being absent altogether it can be thought of as hidden, or obscured, in language. The body evoked in Franks’ article is the body as ‘sign’. This refers to both ‘bodied art’, where the sign is ‘completed in the gaze of the spectator’ (Van den Berg, 1996: 224), and ‘artful embodiment’, where bodies can be interpreted as ‘motivated signs that create texts and generate meanings in social and cultural encounters’ (Franks, 1996: 106, drawing on Judith Butler’s analysis). Irigaray’s work seeks to re-connect thought with corporeality, but with the fleshy, sexed body, where interiority and exteriority become problematized through Irigaray’s attention to ‘tacky’ relationality. With this view applied to drama, qualities such as ‘ambiguity’, ‘uncertainty’, and the bodily disruption of ‘insight’, are not problems to be suppressed or resolved, but are inimical to the forces of inquiry through the medium.

Contestation at the boundaries of discipline and discourse: In the introductory chapter to this thesis, I referred to a dialogue between Helen Nicholson (1994) and Judith Ackroyd (1995), as an exemplification of a new dichotomy between postmodern aesthetics, based on the potential of using dramatic forms as free-playing signifiers, and a concern for the position of the ‘self’ in drama education. At this point in the thesis I want to return to the brief debate between Ackroyd and Nicholson as constitutive of another boundary between postmodern - formalist approaches and more experiential forms of drama, and to develop my discussion of how Irigarayan theory can be used to transgress such boundaries.

The article, Drama and the Arts: from polemic to practice (Nicholson, 1994), begins with the question of ‘what has happened’ to drama education in secondary schools since its
marginalization by the National Curriculum, and in the light of the NCC Arts in Schools Project. Like Somers and Fleming (above), Nicholson identifies her time of writing as a watershed moment for drama education, and a time for reconvening discussions on drama’s identity. This article can be seen as a continuation of, *Postmodernism and Educational Drama* (Nicholson, 1993) in which she outlines her postmodern approach to drama education, and where the identity of drama is not reduced to a choice between, ‘universality of the individual’ and ‘the absolutism of cultural production’, but where, cultural pluralism and the complex intertextuality of artistic inheritances might be opened for fictional re-interpretation, by students, through creative and performative acts.’ (Nicholson, 1993: 20)

This point is echoed in the second article, which is concerned more particularly with the issue of teaching drama alongside other arts subjects, whilst maintaining its separateness. She calls for the centrality of ‘genre’, ‘style’ and ‘period’ in the drama curriculum, and the teaching of ‘critical vocabulary’, which, she suggests, will bring clarity to students in terms of their learning and progression within the subject (Nicholson, 1994: 21). However, her own claims for the content of the drama curriculum are foiled against criticism of role-play and improvisation, which she argues,

perpetuate a ‘eurocentric version of ‘universal’ truths... frequently to the exclusion of other dramatic art forms – and by implication content – where cultural expectations are different.

(Nicholson, 1994: 21)

Judith Ackroyd’s response takes the article to task on a number of levels, only some of which are relevant here. Firstly, as the title would suggest, she is concerned with what
she refers to as ‘the absence of the voice of the child’ (Ackroyd, 1995: 2), but she is also critical of the exclusivity of Nicholson’s argument, her prioritisation of certain formal aspects of drama over other widely used conventions of educational drama, such as hot-seating, role-play etc. (Ackroyd, 1995: 3). In addition, she criticises what appears to be Nicholson’s assumption that use of these conventions precludes drama’s identification as art, or with theatre (Ackroyd, 1995: 3). Finally, there is a criticism of Nicholson’s argument on theoretical grounds, that despite its claims to a postmodern perspective which denounces binary oppositions and absolutism, Nicholson sets up her own dualism between theatre arts and experiential forms of drama, then essentializes drama by process of prioritisation and devaluation (Ackroyd, 1995: 4, 5). In terms of pedagogy, Ackroyd identifies Nicholson’s underpinning assumption as one in which, ‘children are ‘empty vessels’ waiting to be filled’ (Ackroyd, 1995: 3), because of her advocacy of technique, skills based teaching and the inscription of subject knowledge (Nicholson, 1994: 22). Ackroyd adds that the teaching of technique is only meaningful if contextualized (Ackroyd, 1995: 6). Nicholson, however, presents the teaching of ‘knowledge and understanding of the cultural iconography of the medium’ as a form of ‘empowerment’ for students (Nicholson, 1994: 21), and warns against the dangers of universalising concepts of ‘human nature’ through broad liberal-humanist approaches. This is what, I think, Ackroyd defends most vehemently in her article, believing her own values to be challenged by Nicholson’s suggestions. These values are exhibited in her recourse to ‘the child’ of drama education, and her criticism of, ‘the absence of the voice of the child’ in Nicholson’s article (Ackroyd, 1995: 2). Ackroyd’s antipathy towards ‘theory’ and ‘theoreticism’ (Ackroyd, 1995: 2) also betrays a view that practice exists beyond or is
untouched by theory, and that theoretical arguments merely obfuscate the 'truth' that is practical reality.

From an Irigarayan perspective, there are a number of interventions to be made into this argument, on the level of both theory and practice. First of all, Irigaray's reading of the symbolic as implicitly phallocentric allows a more complex understanding of the invidious location of grand narratives in cultural discourse. The problem with the postmodern declaration of the death of the mind/body dichotomy made by Nicholson, is that knowing it is a construct does not eradicate its effectual presence in the cultural domain. The divide which, 'sees drama education as either emotion - self-expressive individual growth - or reason - absolute cultural understanding' may be 'killed off' but as this debate demonstrates, it has affected Nicholson and Ackroyd's values regarding the possible content of a drama curriculum. Nicholson's own bifurcatory view is particularly evident in her presentation of 'creativity' as a problematic term because, 'following Witkin, there is perceived to be a 'natural' psychological creative process' (Nicholson, 1994: 2). Later Nicholson seems almost reluctant to refer to 'creativity' tentatively using the term to explain that:

Drama becomes creative in the sense that it requires children to consider how they are shaping their material, and encourages them to articulate this with an awareness that there is a formal vocabulary as well as one of spontaneity. (Nicholson, 1994: 22)

Although Nicholson is describing a process that takes place within a discursive idiom, she is obliged to use what was earlier described as the 'naturalised' term creativity, however, her emphasis is on the acquisition of 'formal vocabulary' as a means of re-
weighting the balance between 'spontaneity' and control, excess and form. Nicholson's argument is that the formalisation of expression actually constitutes discursive expression within the cultural idiom, that without form, the full range of expression is, in fact, denied. Nicholson asserts that in this way the postmodern approach is both personal and social. In this claim she distances herself from Hornbrook's approach, couched in the 'absolutism of cultural production' (Nicholson, 1993: 19, 20), yet her suggestions for practice are not dissimilar to those made by Hornbrook (1998: 63). They are located in the realm of cultural expression (from many cultures), yet, fragmented in terms of history, cultural origin etc. and decontextualized from pupils. Nicholson does not enter into a discussion of selection, re-codification and control of forms, only the benefits of empowerment and pluralistic articulation to be had by making forms available for 'use' in a spirit of intertextuality. I would argue that this reflects the 'penetration' of form and 'dissemination' of meaning characteristic of Derrida's 'hymenal' metaphor for textuality, as discussed at the end of Chapter Four, 'a sexual union forever deferred' (Spivak, 1976: lxvi). In contrast, an Irigarayan approach would abandon such penetrative models in favour of a stress on contiguity and interrelation between self, form and content. It is my contention that such an approach is achievable in drama by drawing together elements from both sides of the postmodern/expressivist divide. However, before exploring such productive possibilities it is important to open up the problematics raised by both sides of the debate.

One of the key features of Nicholson's argument is the rejection of role-play on the grounds of universality, and the preferred use of a broad range of theatrical genres and of multiple conventions from divers cultures, as an expression of difference and multiplicity.
The object of my discussion is not to perpetuate an either/or argument but to illuminate the problems and possibilities of both approaches. The argument that role-play promulgates a notion of ‘universal’ identity, whereas the hybridization of multicultural forms does not is highly problematic. It does not require a great deal of probing beneath the surface of western theatre genres other than naturalism to discover their own essentialisms, and universal claims. As Phillip Zarrilli points out, practitioners such as Brecht, Grotowski, Artaud, Benedetti and Barba, draw on non-western performance traditions in search of ‘dynamic essence’, or ‘foundational psychophysical process’, or in search of exemplification of the ‘total’ actor (Zarrilli, 1995: 76). Intertextuality is clearly in keeping with the spirit of postmodern poetics, but if there are questions to be asked of role-play regarding universality, there are questions to be asked of intertextuality as well, through considerations of multiplicity and the politics of difference, which both Nicholson and Ackroyd allude to.

**Role-play and charges of universality:** The notion of role-play as a self contained emotive out-pouring which is disconnected from the cultural idiom, has already been challenged from within the field. What may have been interpreted as purely personal, can also be read as a display of vernacular forms of knowledge, including knowledge of drama derived from television and film. The question concerning role-play then becomes one of validity – is this knowledge appropriate? If (as suggested in Chapter Four) drama teaching is concerned with students as, ‘active meaning – makers who have already made considerable learning progress in their immediate environment before they ever come into classrooms’ (Neelands, 1984: 2), then the answer must be ‘yes’. Indeed Nicholson
recognises that vernacular forms have a place in the intertextual landscape that she
endorses (Nicholson, 1993; Nicholson & Taylor, 1998), adding, however, that:

Seen in the context of world cultures, naturalism offers a potent but limited means of

Hornbrook (1991) recognises the importance of ‘electronic-text’ and the naturalistic style
adopted by students in role-play as an, ‘indication of their desire to operate on familiar
semiological ground’ (Hornbrook, 1991: 96). There is also the argument that, ‘drama in
education must begin to take a more representative view of what constitutes drama in the
1990s’ (Armes, 1993: 25), accompanied by the suggestion that INSET courses on camera
technique and the practicalities of televisual production should be available for drama
teachers. There certainly appears to be some wisdom in the idea of considering form,
convention and mediation in an area of drama in which students are already ‘experts’
(Armes, 1993: 23) as a precursor to learning about theatrical media with which they may
be less familiar, where this approach pre-supposes a desire to teach about performance.
This has much in keeping with Vygotsky’s notion of a zone of proximal development
outlined in Chapter Four, and with the possible ‘Irigarayan’ model of teacher-pupil
relationality that I rehearse in the same chapter.

There is also the use of role-play for exploratory and active learning which need not,
though can, address issues of ‘theatrical’ form. This is what Neelands (1984) describes
as ‘active sociology’, where the focus is on the quality of the ‘experience’ of the role
rather than the quality of the ‘presentation’ of the role (Neelands, 1984: 74). Although
this view of role-play pre-dates the Arts Council publication, *Drama in Schools* (1992),
which outlines the triple emphasis of drama being to make, perform and respond (pp. 23), criticisms of role-play in Nicholson's 1994 article seem to collapse its various possible applications into this one; an application which is also evoked in promoting drama's suitability as a cross-curricular learning method.

Nicholson's concern, however, extends beyond thinking of the 'form' of role-play as an inadequate mode of expression (although this is part of her criticism), to thinking of the form as inherently reductive. That is, that role-play perpetuates eurocentric and phallocentric universality (Nicholson, 1995a.). Nicholson (1995a.) associates this marginalization of the other through liberal essentialism, with the work of Heathcote, Neelands and Bolton. It is important to clarify that it is the 'process' of role-play that is under criticism, and that in Nicholson's view overbearing assumptions that affect content are implicit to the form:

this is evident in role-play where it has been specifically used to change children's minds (Nicholson, 1994: 21, referring to Bolton, 1979).

The criticism is that drama work which uses role-play, the naturalistic enactment of social situation, is founded upon a belief in 'universal truth' and the 'essential self', and that change of mind or acquisition of knowledge under these circumstances actually promotes an acceptance or strengthening of hegemonic values. For example, Nicholson (1995a.) pays particular attention to the issue of phallocentrism, identifying the masculine bias within 'universals' listed by Gavin Bolton (1986: 226):
Ownership and property, with the mixed duty of providing protection and tools, and the imperative to colonise one's own wisdom, and perpetuate one's own moral codes (Nicholson, 1995a: 28)

The issue here is of what has been omitted, or as Nicholson suggests who is rendered 'invisible' or as 'living outside of the discourse and marginal to the educational drama text' (Nicholson, 1995a: 28). Nicholson identifies collusion with predominantly masculine themes, found in examples of material connected with Bolton, Heathcote, Neelands and O'Neill, as a false affirmation of essential gendered identities. I would want to question whether this is in fact endemic to the form or merely identifiable in certain examples of practice.

There are, for example, accounts of role-play activities where the aim is to meet the challenge of dealing with issues of difference head-on, whilst acknowledging the problematics of taking a broadly humanist or essentialist view of humanity. Interestingly, such an account is provided in Ackroyd & Pilkington (1997). The article begins with a problematization of the blanket term 'multicultural education', as one which has often led to representations of minority cultures as 'static' or 'other' (Ackroyd & Pilkington, 1997: 7). The article then problematizes the term 'cultural identity' in the light of globalization, post-colonial migrations and developments in identity theory and the politics of difference:

If drama in education is to respond to recent developments in social theory, what is needed, in our view, is drama which does not privilege the notion that individuals have one essential identity and that cultures should be preserved in their entirety, but one that allows pupils to explore how, within social constraints, people construct their identities. (Ackroyd & Pilkington, 1997: 13)
The project outlined in the article does not attempt to portray a ‘real’ social situation, but transposes issues of difference onto a fictitious setting which allows students to approach the concept of difference through fictional experience in role, without making judgements based on prior knowledge or understanding of specific cultures. The scenario involves two potentially incompatible cultural groups forced by volcanic eruption to share the same island. One group believes in equality and has a tradition of mechanisation; the second group is eco-conscious and has a ruling minority. The sub-text is that both cultures are equally valuable and worthy of preservation. In addition to the obvious role-play exercises where, in various settings, the two cultures negotiate their habitation of the island, the drama moves on to consider the situation twenty years into the future. To explore ways in which cultural identities may have strengthened, adapted or fused into new hybrid identities. (Ackroyd & Pilkington, 1997: 7, 13-15) The ethic embedded in this set of drama activities is one of relationality, not the identification of ‘universal’ or ‘essential’ truths, but a sharing of common experience or space – the island. Part of this work would involve confronting prejudice as well as acceptance.

The important contention raised by Nicholson, is that drama practitioners may unwittingly reinforce hegemonic or phallocentric values by setting up role-play situations which hinge on the ‘discovery’ of ‘universal truths’, this is opposed by an assertion that no truths exist. Phrases such as, ‘authentic experience’, ‘universals’ and ‘archetypes’ might, using Irigarayan terms, be cited as instances of a practitioner’s adherence to an ‘economy of the same’. However, Irigaray’s work, whilst eschewing universal Grand Narratives of modern discourse, offers its own provisional truths by enacting a shift in
focus away from the universal, inviting a consideration of the particular, the proximal, the
relationality between identities. This can be likened to what Brian Edmiston refers to as
the opening of ‘ethical spaces’ (Edmiston, 1998: 65), where similarities and differences
are encountered in the immediate real and fictional contexts of the drama lesson.

Jonathan Neelands suggests that,

Young people will carry their own expectations of what will happen and what to say into an
improvisation, but they will soon find themselves interacting with others whose expectations
might be different. (Neelands, 1992: 21, my emphasis)

It is also significant that Neelands emphasises the ‘physical’ and ‘temporal’ contexts of
such interactions. Role-play can also involve students’ emotional engagement in
fictional situations, an aspect of experiential learning not to be overlooked in any
broadening of notions of epistemology. One of the most useful applications of role-play
is the exploration of truth(s) in multiplicity, truth claims can be conflicting and the
representation of multiple perspectives can leave questions open rather than narrowing
possibilities down to a single concept. In this context it is useful to apply an Irigarayan
notion of knowledge and truth as fluid, provisional, in a state of becoming rather than
fixed. This depicts a world-view in which essentialisms are not ‘essential’ as such, but
historical, cultural and contextual.

Cecily O’Neill applies an existentialist reading of role-play. Drawing on Satre and
Camus, she suggests that role-play involves students not only, ‘playing with their
condition’, but also the ‘construction of possible selves’ and ‘alternative realities’
(O’Neill: 1995: 79). Through Irigaray’s notion of the sensible-transcendental it is
possible to extend this analysis. Elin Diamond in her book *Unmaking Mimesis* (1997), refers to Irigaray's re-reading of Plato as unmasking 'mimesis without truth', as 'undermining the ideality of the logos as truth' (Diamond, 1997: xi.), in other words, what the prisoners in the cave experience as 'origin' is already a reflection. Transposing this onto the existentialist view, 'lived reality' is itself a form of 'performativity' (to use Butler's expression). Role-play then, can be described as a form of heightened performativity, mimicry or mimeticism, which is able to comment on or give insight into the condition of lived experience. Whereas readers of Butler might suggest that this designates the performer as 'sign', in my view, an Irigarayan approach wrests the performer from this reduction by reading the performer's embodiment of role as contiguous with the 'lived body', and also with immanent origin on which performativity and reflection depend. The capacity for understanding and insight generated by role-play is not totalizable because there is always something that exceeds discourse, but this flexible capacity is susceptible to restriction depending on the discursive frame placed around the performance.

**Intertextuality and self/other relationality:** The term intertextuality is not descriptive of one particular practice, even when applied to drama education. It could refer to a number of practices that involve bringing together diverse forms of expression from a range of contemporary, historical or cultural origins. Increasingly however, Nicholson's work has come to focus on intertextuality as a means of challenging ethnic absolutism and promoting a re-evaluation of accepted norms concerning western subjectivity and aesthetic unity (Nicholson & Taylor, 1998; Nicholson, 1999). It is my intention to present some of the critical responses to this form of work from within the spheres of
post-colonial theory, feminism and critical pedagogy; not to dismiss such an approach out of hand, but with the intention of using Irigaray's work on the ethics of difference to create a dialogue with Nicholson. As suggested in Chapter Four, the addition of post-colonial perspectives to feminist discourse has prompted some re-evaluation of the treatment of 'otherness' by mainstream feminist academics in western universities, with notable writers like bell hooks asking:

What does it mean when primarily white men and women are producing the discourse around otherness? (hooks, 1991: 53)

Chandra Talpede Mohanty similarly expresses concern about the 'commodification of race' in higher education, and the determination of 'voice' on behalf of third world peoples (Mohanty, 1989/90: 148). Both hooks (1991) and Toni Morrison (1992) raise the idea that there may be spaces of consciousness, or of 'the imaginary', that are inaccessible to white theorists. Morrison warns in particular, of the danger involved in conflating notions of the literary imagination as a sharable world of endlessly flexible imagination with an imagination that considers itself to be not raced (Morrison, 1992: xiv-xv). Nicholson also raises the problem of reception and 'mistranslation' suggesting that her work with students on the Ngugi wa Thiong'o play, Ngaahika Ndeenda, was concerned with:

'Blurring the genres' in order to encourage students both to learn from African theatre practice and to reconsider their perceptions about a particular social context and the cultural significance of performance (Nicholson, 1998b: 121)
However, adapting the words of Chandra Mohanty, to what extent does this comply with the 'knowledge-as-accumulated-capital model of education' (Mohanty, 1989/90: 148), and if so, who is the consumer and what the capital?

In the context of postmodern poetics or performance, the 'use' of diverse forms from 'other' cultures can be linked to the postmodern appropriation of the feminine (Moore, 1988:186). It is this spirit of artistic appropriation and commodification that Rustom Bharucha criticises in his discussion of western avant-garde theatre (Bharucha, 1990). He sites Richard Schechner's paper, *The End of Humanism*, with its declaration upon the discovery of cultural diversity that: 'we could enrich our own experience by borrowing, stealing, exchanging' (Schechner, 1982: 19, in Bharucha, 1990: 16) as 'naive' and 'unexamined ethnocentricity'. Part of this validation on the grounds of self-growth stems from a genuine fascination with the 'other', which Bharucha exemplifies in the eclectic and orientalist influence of Antonin Artaud on the trend of interculturalism in Euro-American theatre (Bharucha, 1990: 17). Bharucha raises a number of issues that problematize the practice of cultural intertextuality. Drawing on Geertz (1983: 178) he emphasises that form and content differ according to cultural setting, and that a pragmatic belief in the inseparability of meaning and form is, in fact, endemic to western performance traditions:

> Mere virtuosity of technique should not be mistaken for an innate understanding and control of it (Bharucha, 1990: 31)

He also reminds his reader that 'cultural tourism' as an effect of globalization, is only available to the materially advantaged. The process of interculturalism, therefore, is not
an exchange among ‘equal’ partners, but dominated and orchestrated by the west, and furthermore, it has the potential to impoverish those cultures that it feeds upon.

Nicholson refers to the way in which meaning is produced as an act of communication, and of the provisionality of the languages of performance (Nicholson & Taylor, 1998: 125-6). However, in drawing upon postmodern theatrical practitioners such as Philip Zarrilli and Philip Auslander, the notion of ‘contingency’ is already loaded with a theoretical investment in the instability of the sign. Henry Giroux (1994) writing on critical pedagogy, argues that meanings are produced within relations of power, and suggests that:

Relation between difference and identity must be located within rather than outside of the mediations of history, culture and ideology (Giroux, 1994: 48)

Rustom Bharucha incorporates this view into his critique of contemporary theatrical practitioners Eugino Barba and Peter Brook. He asks what their commitment is to the cultures which they ‘borrow’ from (Bharucha, 1990: 82, 116). The question turns out to be a rhetorical one, as in the case of Barba’s concern with ‘bios’ or ‘pre-expressive’ physical ‘laws’, and the emphasis of Brook’s staging of the Mahabharata as having ‘human’ rather than ‘Indian’ identification, the projects are revealed to be of ‘universal’ relevance, expressive of the ‘human’ condition. Of course, Bharucha demonstrates that these projects are in fact a reflection of western identification and personal ambition (Bharucha, 1990: 82–83, 95). Even when articulated through a postmodern perspective, the justification of intertextuality is expressed as an essentializing narrative of sorts:

I want to celebrate my fragmentation (Schechner, 1978: 92)
Patrice Pavis (1992) attempts to work out a detailed methodology for the practice of intercultural transfer, which is referred to as the 'hourglass of culture' (Pavis, 1992: 4). A closer reading, however, reveals this hourglass to be a 'filter' (Pavis, 1992: 18), the purpose of which is to reduce the 'inexhaustible babble' of myriad traditions and languages of expression from 'foreign' cultures to a readable form (Pavis, 1992: 1) thereby demonstrating the kind of 'power relations' in play:

Change in the level of readability often corresponds to an ideological struggle between dominant and dominated cultures. In the transfer... certain elements are assimilated and disappear... other elements on the contrary, emerge and are integrated into the dominant ideology... this emergent ideology can become a normative world of sociological or more generally cultural codification. (Pavis, 1992: 18)

Inter-culturally intertextual performance is not however, confined to the practices of the avant-garde elite. The expressive fusion described by Paul Gilroy (1995) is one which:

Accentuates [cultural expression's] plastic, syncretic qualities and which does not see culture flowing into neat ethnic parcels but as a radically unfinished social process of self-definition and transformation (Gilroy, 1995: 61)

This quotation also illustrates the connection between intertextuality and postmodern interpretations of identity. As well as describing a conscious politics in art making, the term intertextuality can also be applied to less contrived experimentation with form. The practice that Gilroy goes on to describe, is articulated from the point of view of minority cultures in England, located within the context of the African Diaspora and post-colonial immigration. What Gilroy identifies are the localised, and in some cases ghettoised,
formation and reformation of vernacular art forms which result from the juxtaposition of specific youth cultures; for example, Bhangara as a fusion of hip-hop with genres and styles of 'Indie' music. But there are issues of power differential to be considered in relation to intertextuality, even in this context. For example: where white working class involvement with fusion is referred to, it is in the context of reappropriation or legitimisation through the idea of neighbourhood (Gilroy, 1995: 61). Gilroy highlights the integral link between this form of youth culture and the 'autonomous illegal broadcasting' of bhangara music as the creation of an 'alternative public sphere' (Gilroy, 1995: 62). It is doubtful that fusion of this kind, which is underpinned by their subversive quality, could be enacted within an educational context. Where Gilroy turns his attention to Fine Art, it is again from the point of view of the minority artist's attempt to make art out of being both black and English (Gilroy, 1995: 76). Rather than discussing this as an exercise in drawing together diverse artistic forms, Gilroy explores the implicit intertextuality of identity. By looking at the long micro political task of recoding the 'cultural core of national life', Gilroy suggests that it is possible to deconstruct notions of ethnic absolutism and relocate the significance of black suffering as central to the English cultural identity of the Eighteenth Century, from which modern understandings of arts practice are derived (Gilroy, 1995: 81 – 84). An example of positive ethical intentions linked to the practice of inter-cultural intertextuality is associated with the politics of diasporic identity and potential freedom from ethnic absolutism by enabling the discovery of historical, social, cultural and artistic links (Brahmachari, 1998).
This can be compared with the theoretical position evident in Nicholson’s latest article, where she draws on the pluralist arguments of Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe, she suggests, argues in favour of a form of democratic pluralism which makes difference visible (Nicholson, 1999: 85), where division and contestation should be ‘brought to the fore’ (Mouffe, 1993: 149, cited in Nicholson, 1999: 84), and where tensions between positions of difference should be ‘defended, not eliminated’ (Mouffe, 1993: 133, cited in Nicholson, 1999: 89). At first glance this might appear to resemble Irigaray’s discursive strategy of pitting feminine difference against dominant discourse, of keeping positions of difference in play rather than submitting to an homogenisation of identity (Irigaray, 1985b). However, whereas Irigaray directly challenges established power structures by prioritising the feminine in order to dismantle implicit assumptions of masculine discourse, arguing that this is necessary in order to create conditions necessary for dialogic relationality (Irigaray, 1995: 97), Mouffe has been criticised for her lack of attention to power differentials and the ongoing strength of identity politics, and a failure to attend to the ‘actual’ differences between the positions she identifies (Spivak, 1988; Mostem, 1994: 257). Chandra Mohanty (1989/90) notes that it is a political ‘reality’ that knowledges, subjectivities and social practices are forged within ‘asymmetrical and incommensurate cultural spheres’ (Mohanty, 1989/90: 181). For example, for cultures on the capitalist periphery, an inter-cultural dialectic is rather like:

> Coming to the game after the rules and standards have already been set, and having to prove oneself according to these rules and standards (Iris Marion Young, 1990: 164)

What particularises Irigaray’s work is that she moves beyond a politics of difference to consider an ‘ethics’ of difference and the possibility of productive relationality (Irigaray,
As suggested in Chapter Two, this both draws upon and departs from Levinas' theory of 'alterity'. Irigaray moves from the 'face to face' relationship to one of 'touch', and the inter-subjective implication of the 'caress', but both of these stress proximity and an encounter in which the other exceeds knowledge and can never be appropriated to the self. Although both Levinas and Irigaray discuss ethical relation at a symbolic level, neither professes a universal 'ethics' existing beyond situatedness as ethical subject and responsibility to the other. In other words, 'totality' becomes the particularity of the encounter:

The idea of infinity delivers subjectivity from the judgement of history to declare it ready for judgement at every moment (Levinas, 1969: 25)

In Irigaray's formulation of *The Fecundity of the Caress* (1993a), 'productivity' is located within relationality itself, as the more diffuse 'becoming'. There is no prioritization of projected productivity that is external to, or after the encounter, though this [i.e. 'the child'] is not dismissed.

Fecundity is constituted as the very boundaries of self and other are put into question, at the site of mucosity (Irigaray, 1993a: 188). Both Peter McLaren (1994), who uses Levinas in constructing an approach to cross-culturally discursive pedagogy, and Ofelia Schutte (1998) who uses Irigaray in her discussion of cross-cultural communication and feminist theory, argue that effective dialogue must be preceded by a decentering of the 'self' (McLaren, 1994: 212; Schutte, 1998: 68) in order challenge the inherent asymmetry of discursive power, and encourage a view of 'self' as also 'other'. This seems contrary to Nicholson's view, influenced by Charles Taylor (1985) that 'Other – understanding
can change self—understanding’ (Nicholson, 1999: 87). As suggested by my earlier references to hooks and Morrison, the notion of ‘other—understanding’ is itself highly problematic. Ofelia Schutte argues that not only is there ‘incommensurability’ in cross-cultural dialogue, but that this is often papered over by the dominant speaker who takes it upon herself to totalize the said and the unsaid (Schutte, 1998: 62). It could be argued that in Nicholson’s article ‘other—understanding’ is posited as a means to an end, thus relationality between cultural perspectives becomes a method through which the product of changed self—understanding can be achieved. In Levinas’ model of the ‘face-to-face’ relation, the other can never be entirely ‘knowable’ or appropriable to the self, similarly Irigaray’s ethics of sexual difference insists on positions of difference that are irreducible to each other.

Sita Brahmachari argues in favour of a culturally pluralistic approach to arts education, identifying preferred practice as that which stresses ‘mediation, or ‘partnership’ between schools and black or Asian theatre companies (Brahmachari, 1998: 25, 33). Nicholson (1998b) gives a more detailed outline of a collaborative drama and dance project that aims to encourage experimentation with intertextuality of cultural forms, whilst being mindful of issues of cultural appropriation and misrecognition (Nicholson, 1995: 121). Students are described as being encouraged to:

Learn from African theatre practice and to consider their perceptions about a particular social context and cultural significance of performance (Nicholson & Taylor, 1998: 121)

The performance project described includes learning about theatrical form through a scene from Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s play, *Ngaahika Ndeenda* (1981), where song and dance
is used to develop the dramatic action. This is not presented as an attempt to produce an 'authentic' version of enactment but rather to develop an understanding of the cultural and artistic context. Marina Gashe's poem, *The Village*, provided stimulus material for students to devise their own piece of performance, drawing on their experience of working with Ngugi wa Thiong'o's play. Nicholson acknowledges that in projects such as this, 'issues of representing 'other' cultures [are] far from resolved' (Nicholson, 1998: 121), but that learning something of the sensibilities and concerns of 'others' is made possible by exploring their symbolic language of performance. Whilst Nicholson's account illustrates the possibilities of facilitating an intercultural exploration of artistic form designed to extend students' own dramatic vocabulary, it is not possible to gauge the extent to which the use of this play-text, and exposure to African dance forms can be regarded as a 'dialogic' approach. In the Bakhtinian sense engagement with textual discourse constitutes dialogue, when discourses are challenged or formed between reader and text, this is also commensurate with Bakhtin's notion of 'self' as inherently dialogic (Edmiston, 2000: 72-3). In this instance it is possible to recognise 'dialogic' intentions in Nicholson's aim of challenging her student's cultural assumptions about dramatic representation. However, there is danger in such an approach that the text itself might be presented as a static representation of 'other' culture. The issue of proximity is relevant here, as, whilst fostering a climate of knowledge and understanding which does not gloss over difference, there runs the risk of exacerbating the sense of distance between actual people. However, as Iris Marion Young argues, the 'normative privileging of face-to-face relations' can be construed as an inadequate model for modern cosmopolitan life, and one that may actually, 'suppress difference in the sense of the time and space distancing of social processes, which media facilitate and enlarge' (Young, 1990: 314). The
privileging of 'touch' in Irigaray's model of relationality could of course be translated in a number of ways in this context, meaning that it does not preclude relationality through textual media. My point is that this approach is not unproblematic, as such media can also make the processes of commodification and exploitation possible.

A recently published example of work that addresses issues of collaboration, dialogue and the creative productivity of relational encounter itself, is Kate Donelan's article on 'The Gods Project' (1999), a collaborative performance project located in Melbourne Australia, which promoted artistic relation between high-school students and the local African-Australian community. Interestingly, what Donelan and the students identify as the 'critical act' of the project, is a weekend performing arts camp described by Donelan as:

A liminal space... outside [the students'] school environment where they began to engage with aspects of African culture in an intensive and communal environment [that] enabled many of them to relate imaginatively and kinesthetically to the cross-cultural context of the performance project (Donelan, 1999: 70)

I would stress that thinking of such work in terms of Irigaray's 'fecundity of the caress', does not mean prioritising inter-personal relationality above artistic exploration. Indeed such distinctions or oppositional constructions would be negated. Instead, such a reading would stress the inter-implication of relationality and creativity. 'Mucosity' in this context, could be thought of as the relational 'matter' of experimentation and exploration within the medium of drama and with the dramatic forms selected. In a spirit of ethical relationality this should be negotiated between cultures, not orchestrated on the terms of
one culture alone. In the case of 'The Gods Project', the necessary decentering of 'self' that enabled dialogue, would seem to have occurred through the performing arts camp experience, where pupils were relocated away from their everyday environment, in an 'African village nearly in the centre of Melbourne' (Donelan, 1999: 20). Of those I have encountered, most drama teachers would be very enthusiastic about the possibility of involving students with such a project, but opportunities and funding for inter-cultural collaborative work, or even workshops with professional artists are minimal in local authority or grant maintained schools (SHA, 1998: 90). It would appear that Ken Robinson's observation, made in the early 1990s:

A minimalist reading of the National Curriculum, combined with the exigencies of LMS, will produce an impoverished arts education (Robinson, 1993: 98)

has become a reality for many schools. In the light of such an economic context, it is possible that the call for intertextuality between a range of inter-cultural forms could produce some very superficial outcomes.

Acts of Community: The rest of this chapter will consider practical ways in which notions of creativity, exploration within the medium, and decentred approaches to subjectivity can be imbricated, without looking for a single resolution, or closed 'theory' of drama. I would suggest that with an Irigarayan perspective it is possible to draw together formalist and experiential concerns, to consider various ways of addressing issues of difference and subjective absolutism through drama practice, at an ontological and aesthetic level, by focusing on notions of relational, or 'tacky' subjectivity and
collaborative acts of learning and expression. This section will consider, problematize, and reconsider notions of ‘community’ pertaining to concerns within drama education.

Drawing on Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ (1977), the shaping of our cultural (including bodily) identities by hidden coercive forces specific to the local social environment, Jonothan Neelands emphasises that for its inhabitants, particularly children, culture is an, ‘intensely local and physical experience’ (Neelands, 1998: 71). Furthermore, that school reinforces, through negation and omission, the ‘naturalized’ dominant conception of culture. In an attempt to embrace difference and respect for collective identities, Neelands suggests that:

Within the field of cultural production we should be working towards an active collective solidarity between cultural positions and traditions (Neelands, 1998: 71)

The role of drama education within this field of cultural production would be to, ‘offer students a conception of theatre as “acts of community”’ (Neelands, 1998: 76). This is meant in the double sense of producing ‘acts’ of theatre that, in themselves, will constitute ‘acts’ of community making. Theatre, in this sense, is described as a ‘theatre of social action’, the purpose of which is to enable young people to make critical examination of their local situation, to ‘rehearse’ change at a personal and social level:

Through making their own theatre and working with the ‘voices’ of playwrights, students can make the invisible influence of habitus visible and discussible in all its temporal and spatial specificity. (Neelands, 1998: 76)
The view of drama education as a means of exploration and enquiry through acts of community theatre is an effective means of challenging perceptual boundaries, whilst establishing a collective 'authorial' position. It is also an approach through which the significance of content can be re-prioritised along with form:

Drama resides in the tensions that exist in our daily lives both personal and social and between conflicting ideologies that constantly demand the scrutiny of the aesthetic intelligence (Pearce, 1992: 19)

However, notions of community have also been subject to criticism. Nicholson (1995a) argues that, 'communities tell us who we are', that:

A kind of clubbable sameness is re-enforced, where you are either included or excluded from the gang (Nicholson, 1995a: 29)

Citing Herrnsten-Smith she also questions the radical potential of a community approach, as community suggests achievement of consensus:

Where difference continually emerges, it must be either continuously negotiated or continuously suppressed (Herrnsten-Smith, 1988: 94, cited in Nicholson, 1995a: 29)

I think that 'community' can be read on two levels in this context; there is the community in which students live and in which their school may be located, and there is also the somewhat artificial community of the drama lesson. I use the term artificial because in the drama lesson, unlike in life, there is a teacher whose role it is to arbitrate and 'manage' the way in which 'voices' and differences are exposed and received on various
levels within drama practice. The role of the teacher in this respect is discussed at length by Neelands (1998: 40-70). Separating out these communities it is possible to see how one may comment upon the other, revealing the very operations of exclusion and marginalization that Nicholson refers to. The specific image of community suggested by Nicholson's critique is one that privileges sameness and stasis, as opposed to difference and fluidity. But, is it not possible to envisage communities as heterogeneous as well as homogenous?

In response to feminist privileging of 'community' Iris Marion Young (1990) makes similar points to those raised by Nicholson, and in doing so invokes an oppositional relation between notions of 'community' and 'politics of difference'. However, she also makes the point that as psychoanalytic models reveal, subjectivity is itself heterogeneous, decentred and not entirely available to self-present knowledge, and that subjects also, therefore, escape comprehension by one another, rendering problematic the notion of homogenous community (Young, 1990: 310-1). What Young is resistant to, are the ideological associations between the term 'community' and the 'urge to unity'. Ultimately Young's discussion rests on a question of nomenclature, or word games, with the suggestion that, 'in the end it may be a matter of stipulation whether one chooses to call such politics as play of difference 'community'' (Young, 1990: 320).

Whereas Nicholson and Young's approach to community exemplifies the degree to which oppositional logic is embedded in language and determines thought, in this case offering a choice between 'community' and a 'politics of difference'. Irigaray's reading of Antigone, as discussed in Chapter Two, offers an alternative approach to sociality that
circumvents this either/or logic by suggesting that ‘difference’ is in fact inherent to the existence of the ‘polis’, and re-framing the problem as one of allowing difference to speak itself (1985a: 224-5, 1993b: 111-12). In her reading of the Hegelian and Lacanian Antigones, Irigaray’s conception of difference moves beyond its operation as an underlying guarantee or boundary of the self, to consider a more fluid inter-implication of difference and selfhood. As is often the case Irigaray uses the tropes ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ to work through these ideas. By regarding brother and sister (Antigone and Polynices) relation in terms of maternal genealogy as well as paternal genealogy, *sang rouge* as well as *sang blanc*, Irigaray is able to emphasise their inter-implication as each the other of the other. This reciprocal relationality symbolised by the flow of red blood between the siblings, refuses the Hegelian division, or complementarity, between female immanence and male transcendence, which is determined by an economy of *sang blanc*, or semblance (Irigaray, 1985a: 216), and provides a way of envisaging both as self and other. Three aspects of Irigaray’s reading are of specific relevance to the discussion concerning drama education: the issue of voice, or speaking position, circumvention of the single Concept, or the avoidance of closure, and the vindication of immanence. The first of these not only concerns the possibility of enunciation from disenfranchised positions but also ways in which such voices are able to re-determine their location. Irigaray’s placental economy is not merely suggestive of relationality between subjectivity and space, but the possibility of rethinking subjectivity as space. Such is Antigone’s threat to the order of patriarchy that she is entombed, cut off from the community, but while Hegel reads her death as an ennobling self-sacrifice (Hegel, 1955: 441), Irigaray reads it as a curtailment of Antigone’s own becoming (1985:225).
Jennifer Simons (1998) writing within an Australian context, talks in terms of a 'cohesive sociality', where the significance of difference is acknowledged, yet the drama classroom is constituted as a site for the promotion of 'collaborative creativity'. Simons suggests that in order to approach 'difference' in the collaborative theatre, it is necessary to avoid the need for closure, to be open to possibilities and multiple interpretations (Simons, 1998: 70 – 72). The avoidance of closure is an area of enquiry also taken up by Penny Bundy (1999), another Australian writer on drama education. In her work on 'playbuilding' technique\textsuperscript{ix}, she aims young people towards devising plays that will open questions to the audience rather than communicating a predetermined message. This requires an approach which embraces ambiguity as a means of fostering creative tension, and a conception of identity which Bundy refers to as the 'self in flux' (Bundy, 1999: 63). In other words the exploratory nature of the work is likely to bring about a 'changes' in the consciousness of those involved in its making, but these should not be predetermined either. Similarly, the notion of 'ethical space' evoked by Brian Edmiston is not concerned with 'giving the right answers' but 'helping students to ask the right questions' (Edmiston, 1998: 64). It is not a space for resolution and closure, but one of inherent ambiguities, similarities and differences born out of the relationality between individuals. Drawing on Bakhtin, Edmiston also talks of the self in terms of multiplicity, as 'conversation' or 'struggle' (Edmiston, 1998: 66).

These examples of collectivity all stress the relationality, or the 'interval', between people engaged in dramatic activity, evoking the unique possibilities implied by conjunction between different 'embodied' identities, and heightened by liminality between the fictional and real that constitutes dramatic exploration. The emphasis on
subjective relationality does not suggest that the study of dramatic forms or the art of theatre is precluded, on the contrary these are fundamental to the embodiment of dramatic expression, and crucial to the formation of ambiguities, tensions and the refusal of closure. The location of such an approach to drama within contemporary society is what Steve Ball (1999) identifies as encouraging students to be 'critical thinkers' rather than telling them what to think, an approach that 'requires us all to take risks in terms of form and content' (Ball, 1999: 31)

Abdul Janmohamed (1994) in his account of 'border pedagogy' uses the work of Paulo Frier and Henry Giroux as models of practice in which 'learning' is determined by a 'shift in agency', a questioning of identity boundaries (Janmohamed, 1994: 247). This, he argues, begins with a reading, or understanding, of 'self' as a 'potential heterotopic site', these are:

'countersites' in which all other real sites that can be found within a culture are simultaneously represented, contested and inscribed (Janmohamed, 1994: 241, referring to Foucault, 1986: 22)

By performing this reading, Janmohamed argues, the figure of the 'border intellectual' becomes 'subjectivity-as-space'. In this context, learners are described as,

archaeologists of the site of their own social formation' (Janmohamed, 1994: 248)

This involves reading and 'excavating' the physical as well as the social bod[ies] in order to transform the relation between learner and the 'boundaries' of their identity from a passive to an active one. As Janmohamed suggests, although such boundaries are
transitory, being constituted by ‘acts’, they ‘belong’ to those who control them (Janmohamed, 1994: 249). Such control begins with an understanding of ‘self’ in terms of cultural constitution, and an approach to the future as ‘pure possibility’ (Janmohamed, 1994: 251). The pedagogical claims of Giroux and Frier find their dramatic parallel in the work of Augusto Boal (1985). Boal argues that knowledge of the body's language and action is essential in its challenge and liberation from oppressive and historically determined performance texts (Boal, 1985: 126). He places emphasis on experimentation and exploration with the body's expressive resources not their interpretation (Boal, 1985: 130-131). A drama student's location within the community at large need not be one of acquiescence, or identification. What Neelands envisages as ‘acts of community’ within drama education are acts of collective creativity which seek to understand, comment upon or question society from particular identity locations that are themselves implicated by the term ‘difference’. Janmohamed's account of border-pedagogy highlights the potentiality of such an approach with regard to self-understanding and ‘becoming’

Baz Kershaw (1998) explores similar issues of creative radicalisation operating in the liminal spaces between ‘selves’ and systems of formalized power:

> in any system designed by some to control others, there will almost always be a space for resistance, a fissure in which to forge at least a little freedom (Kershaw, 1998: 68)

A key example is *The Rat Run*, a screenplay that arose out of a drama/film project which he worked on with the inmates a ‘semi-open’ prison. The section of screenplay discussed by Kershaw recalls an encounter between a con and a screw in which a liminal-radical space is constituted through subtly turning the systems of enclosure and control
back upon themselves (Kershaw, 1998: 80). The resultant screenplay is created because of the con’s participation in and understanding of these co-constitutive processes. Kershaw refers to this liminality as ‘creative space’:

Such spaces and fissures are not best seen as openings into which drama can be inserted, like a scalpel that can be used to dissect the body of ideology. Rather, we should see them as crucially constituting the dramaturgies of freedom because they *present* an *absence* which creativity seeks to grasp (Kershaw, 1998: 68, my italics)

The contradiction inherent in the suggestion of ‘present[ing] an absence’ evokes a strikingly similar effect to that of Irigaray’s figurations of relationality between ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’, subjectivity and space, such as ‘mucous’ or ‘air’. Kershaw is confident that what takes place within this space is a process of constitution, not the insertion of what might be termed a ‘phallic bridge’ (see Chapter Two page 53 - 4.), yet he also depicts creativity as ‘grasping’ rather than emanating out of this relational space. Kershaw refers to this ‘freedom to reach beyond’ systems of formalised power as a ‘transient sense of the radical’ (Kershaw, 1998: 69), yet he fails to explore the relationship between ‘transcendence’, the knowledge or insight constituted, and the role of bodily, experiential performance in constituting that knowledge. This absence is most striking in his final example, of the resistance enacted by Chilean citizens under the rule of General Pinochet who showed that they knew which were the houses of torture by silently pointing at them as they passed (Kershaw, 1998). Kershaw identifies the co-constitution of this act and the power of its collectivity to transcend the control of the regime, but does not highlight the specificity of its power as ‘gesture’.
The communal act of ‘making’ drama is an embodied act in which ‘performing’ and ‘responding’ are implicit; art form and learning process are inseparable. Victor Turner’s term ‘communitas’ denoting a collective experience which is paradoxically both within and beyond the ideologies which shape society, is at the heart of Kershaw’s article; but in addition to collectivity Turner stresses the way in which the, ‘abrogation, negation, or inversion of normative structure’ is symbolised (Turner, 1982: 47). In the case of drama, this highlights the significance of embodied acts, or as discussed in Chapter Three ‘knowing as doing’ (Bruner, 1996: 151). Louise Townend (1998) advocates the use of enactment as a stimulus for initial questions, suggesting, like Bruner, that the economy and symbolic resonances of representation are more likely to elicit inquiry or interested response. She suggests that:

The power of art to prompt the learner to grapple with experience and knowledge, and to begin to order it for themselves, is enhanced by the unity of the safety of its distance and the draw of its proximity (Townend, 1998: 84 - 85)

She discusses the process of devising as a, ‘process of learning’ rather than teaching what is already known (Townend, 1998: 80).

According to Bruner (1966) learning or ‘growth’ is constituted through reciprocity between understanding and representation:

much of growth starts out by our turning around on our own traces and recoding in new forms, with the aid of adult tutors, what we have been doing or seeing, then going on to new modes of organization with the new products that have been formed by these recodings... The new models are formed in increasingly powerful representational systems. (Bruner, 1966: 21)
Put more succinctly, this could be described as, re-coding the ‘familiar’ by producing an ‘awareness’ of it (Bruner, 1966: 161). Bruner identifies exploration through drama as one of the most effective methodologies for achieving this, for ‘making the all too familiar strange again’ (Bruner, 1966: 162). As a process of learning and means of embodying ‘new’ perspectives through collective engagement, the methodologies of drama education can be read according to what Irigaray terms the sensible-transcendental; not as a separation of body and mind, matter and form but as reciprocity between these terms that exacts a, ‘perpetual transvaluation, a permanent becoming’ (Irigaray, 1993a: 27).

Bruner (1966: 21) [see the quotation above] alludes to the crucial role of ‘adult tutors’ in negotiating these reciprocal relations and constituting threshold spaces between perspectival position and the community at large. Irigaray’s re-appropriation of the Antigone story as an assault upon the phallocentric symbolic is partly attributable to Hegel’s positioning of Antigone as ‘irony of the community’. Her antimonous position is employed by Irigaray as a location from which to deconstruct-reconstruct the community itself. Cecily O’Neill (1996a) suggests that a skilful deployment of irony by the teacher-figure, can be used not only to avoid the, ‘obvious, the stereotypical and the didactic’, but also to expose the inherentness of, ‘the world as ambiguity’ (O’Neill, 1996a: 117 & 121). By performing the role of ‘ironizer’ the teacher can prevent the homogenization of ideas by introducing tension into the processes of creative exploration.

The notion of tension as a productive agent is often evoked where discussion centres on the idea of the artist, or actor, entering the educational setting with a view to contributing
something to students’ ‘becoming’ proficiency in making, performing and responding to
drama. Joe Winston suggests that in France, where the use of professional actors in
education is a common practice, the collaborative relationship between school and theatre
is seen as one of ‘permanent confrontation’ between systems of thought. Not with a
negative connotation, but in a positive productive sense that is suggestive of the creative
tensions implicit in theatre (Winston: 1998: 47). Jo Trowsdale’s article, Harnessing the
Potential of Artists in Education (1996) identifies the productive quality of creative
tension embodied within the figure of the artist:

The professional artist who embraces conflict as a vital and necessary part of being and who
journeys in their craft to explore and discover a new synthesis is central to revitalising the arts in
education (Trowsdale, 1996: 92)

In the same article Jo Trowsdale introduces the idea of artist/teacher as ‘shaman’, at once
‘grounded in the culture of their particular society’ and yet able to arrive at new
perspectives through harnessing ‘oppositional states of tension’, thus bringing about
‘transformation’ (Trowsdale, 1996: 93). This image is very similar to that of ‘the divine’
in Irigaray’s work, also figured as a poet or angel; a figure associated with intermediary
spaces as sites of creativity and becoming; in particular the threshold between sensible
and transcendent (Irigaray, 1993a: 129). Or, as Margaret Whitford explains, ‘flesh
made word’, but not word as a ‘rigidified corpus’ or langue, rather the possibility of
exchange (Whitford, 1991a: 48). Jo Trowsdale identifies similar intermediary qualities in
her exploration of the productive implications for education of the ‘shamanistic’ identity
of the artist:
The artist negotiates between constraining social frames and personal artistic visions as a way of life... The artist's key way of working is exploring and testing existing 'boundaries' of form and content (Trowsdale, 1996: 94-5)

It is central to Irigaray's project that the process of enunciation, a dialogic or 'bodily encounter' with dominant discourse, is a process through which transformation is affected. Irigaray associates the 'fecundity' born of relationality between masculine and feminine spheres with 'art' and creativity as well as 'becoming' and subjectivity. Both are implicated in the transvaluation of the symbolic, and figured as the 'birth into transcendence of the sensible' (Irigaray, 1993a: 82). Art does not merely comment upon its contextual field, but has a specific part to play in constructing-reconstructing the social world because artists are actively engaged in dialogue from within; they are not 'on parole' from society (Robinson, 1980: 174).

Repelling the borders... The case of the 'Seal Wife' drama: The 'episode' in the history of drama education discourse that this section discusses, crystallises some of the areas of discussion raised in this chapter. It concerns the problems and potentialities of a situation where the artist/teacher in question is critiqued for returning the drama work to traditional, hegemonic perspectives, rather than creating opportunities for new insight. It also concerns the reception, or otherwise, of feminist critique within the community of drama education discourse, raising issues of boundary politics and legitimisation. The example of work discussed continues to problematize the notion of homogenous community, and also offers an opportunity to consider Irigaray's reading of the stimulus material or 'pre-text' that is under question. In 1995, Helen Fletcher wrote what became a controversial article, titled, *Retrieving the Mother/Other from the Myths and Margins of*
O'Neill’s ‘Seal Wife’ Drama, in which she critiques the claim that ‘process drama’ (also known as drama-in-education) is capable of enhancing transformative ethical perspectives and creating ideological shifts. The intention of this critique was to demonstrate how, ‘uncritical acceptance of patriarchal family structures and conventional social roles’ on the part of the workshop leader (in this case Cecily O’Neill), ‘disempowers’ students and serves to reconstruct or naturalise hierarchical and inequitable structures (Fletcher, 1995: 25-26). Whilst acknowledging that Fletcher’s reading is an important, and very detailed, feminist reappraisal of drama praxis, which reads the workshop as a reinforcement of hegemonic values in spite of dissent from within the group, it is also possible to read the workshop as an instance of how radical spaces can form between what appears to be the teleological intent, or dominant agenda, of the project and its participants.

The stimulus material, or ‘pre-text’ used by O’Neill, is a version of the traditional folk tale of the Selkie or Seal Maid who is captured into marriage and motherhood by a fisherman who hides her ‘seal-skin’ thus preventing her from returning to the sea. Some years later their children find the skin, and that very night the Selkie flees back to the sea, never to return again. Fletcher’s first criticism is that the version chosen by O’Neil, and its title – ‘The Seal Wife’, marginalizes and objectifies the nameless female character. Fletcher points out that the ‘seal wife’ is admired by Patrick (the fisherman) for her beauty while she sits on a rock combing her hair, and that he is the only character with a name and a legitimate occupation. But more damning is Fletcher’s account of O’Neill’s handling of this tale, that many of O’Neill’s comments, instructions and directives seemed to preclude a subversive reading. For example, Fletcher suggests that as
participants were about to form tableaux to encapsulate a moment from their initial reading of the story, O’Neill added, “we know nothing except that they were married for seven years and that there were three children”, thereby informing and dominating the dramatic outcome (Fletcher, 1995:29). Later, she describes a tableau orchestrated by O’Neill to depict the children’s reactions as their mother runs away as, ‘powerfully emotive’, and that,

The performative experience which valorised female subjugation to family ensured that the feminine as subject was invisible (Fletcher, 1995:30)

Fletcher quotes from O’Neill’s own description of the work to describe the next exercise in which participants become members of the fishing community, voicing their opinions and rumours about the ‘seal wife’ in a, ‘chorus of suspicion and alienation’ (O, Neill: 1994:40, in Fletcher: 1995:31). Fletcher describes what emerged from this exercise as:

A simplistic social view of the seal woman that deliberately alienated her from the norm and, in so doing, perpetuated the context in which it was acceptable to continue denying her character (and by implication any character who is marked off by her or his ‘difference’) (Fletcher, 1995:31)

However, as Fletcher’s description of the workshop progresses it is possible to discern gaps emerging between participants and, ‘the ‘universal values’ belonging to a specifically masculinist dominant culture’ (Fletcher, 1995:26). When split into two large groups, one to depict the fisherman’s dream or nightmare, the other the Seal Wife’s, a more complex approach to her character seems to develop. Fletcher concentrates on the contrast between the two dreams, which she suggests, ‘accorded neatly with theories of postmodern-feminist and masculinist perceptions of the world’ (Fletcher, 1995:32).
What interests me is that both of these perspectives have emerged. Fletcher explains that O’Neill worked exclusively with the ‘fisherman’ group, guiding their work with questions which, ‘influenced the archetypal nurturer and thwarted any exploration of the fragmented self’ (Fletcher, 1995: 32). The dream constructed by the ‘seal wife’ group, however, showed a ‘multi-faceted individual’ with elements ‘divorced from her roles of wife and mother’, where these relations were explored ‘the violence of her condition was paramount’. The structure of her dream sequence is described as, ‘fragmented with a plurality of imagistic actions occurring simultaneously which imbued the drama with a sense of agony and non-closure’ (Fletcher, 1995: 32). It would seem, in fact, that such an interpretation has not been precluded by the choice of ‘pre-text’ or by O’Neill’s “engendered” orchestration of the initial exercises. That space was forged for this ‘subversive’ interpretation to develop, I would argue, is to this being what Fletcher identifies as, ‘a very social exercise’ (Fletcher, 1995: 32, my italics). It is between the multiple identities and possibilities of interpretation embodied within the group, and the ‘traditional’ nature of the tale that such radical responses are constituted. This is also illustrated follow-up exercise. Although this exercise is described by Fletcher as ‘private’ and ‘individually performed’, asking the workshop participants to ‘write on the cumulative events of the day’ could also be considered as constituting relational spaces between the writer, the pre-text, the other participants in the workshop and the embodied events of the day. Fletcher explains that through this exercise members of the group were able to:

explore beyond the cultural/social constructs and into a self separate from the Seal Woman’s prescribed roles [and that] the poetry reflected feelings that were not given a place in any of the weekend’s controlled drama exercises (Fletcher, 1995: 33)
However, Fletcher presents this as a conflict of self-contained wills, that of O’ Neill and those of the participants who had turned to a broader interpretation of the ‘seal wife’ s’ character. This is suggested by Fletcher’s comment that, ‘From this point [sharing the poetry] the group were led firmly back to O’ Neill’s own agenda’ (Fletcher, 1995: 33). There is no consideration of the extent to which the ‘radical’ outcomes of the written exercise are constituted in relation to what is described as O’ Neill’s own agenda.

The final exercise of the workshop is in some ways the most problematic, but it also provides an interesting example of how dramatic representation can seem to reflect normative values whilst undermining them. The exercise projects beyond the culmination of the traditional narrative to consider the ‘seal wife’s’ return to the seal colony. Workshop participants become members of this ‘other’ community and are asked if they would accept her back. Fletcher reveals that the majority of verbal responses indicated a refusal to reinstate the ‘seal wife’, because:

1. She had deserted her children
2. She had deserted her husband
3. She was polluted by her associations with humans, and
4. Her own vanity had been the cause of what then became a deserved fate (Fletcher, 1995: 34)

Fletcher interprets this as ‘complicitous’ with dominant values because it perpetuates notions of social inequality as part of a ‘natural human condition’. This, Fletcher argues is reinforced by a choral reading of Shamus Heaney’s poem *Maighdean Mara*, where the Seal Maiden drowns on returning to the sea:
her own death is the final inevitable fate of a woman who bucks the patriarchal system (Fletcher, 1995: 34)

Fletcher's criticism is that this praxis affects a closure, a blocking of alternatives that might look beyond patriarchal sameness. In the first instance the 'other' world of the sea is constituted as a mere reflection of normative values, and in the second reinforces this totalization of the 'patriarchal system' through the inevitability of the 'seal woman's' death. However, in the context of drama, how could a world 'beyond' patriarchy be evoked? And is there not an implicit criticism of 'the patriarchal system' in its seeming perpetuity and its victimization of the 'seal woman', that already begins to affect a disruption from within its own constraining discourse. Fletcher herself comments on the opportunity that this work may have afforded to reflect on instances such as rape, where women are doubly victimized by their assailant and by society. Does this not suggest what happens to women when they 'buck' the patriarchal system? The death, alienation and victimization of the seal 'woman' may echo patriarchal domination but this need not be 'complicitous' with these values.

Letters to the editor published in the following edition of *NADIE Journal* testify to some very different engagements with this workshop. Julie Dunn argues that the 'seal wife's' lack of power, her 'subservience, 'fear' and 'despair', rather than producing a 'negative' and 'demeaning' experience for participants, had created a 'wonderful example of dramatic irony' (Dunn, 1996: 5). The place of 'multiple perspectives' in drama is an important point raised by these responses to Fletcher's article, not least because this is central to the praxis of process drama; for example Joanne O'Mara's letter refers to O'Neill's own term for this, 'webs of meaning' (O'Mara, 1996: 9). Fletcher's charge of
universality is therefore all the more condemnatory, causing fellow practitioners to defend O'Neill against what is perceived as 'personal attack', and to defend process drama against 'highly selective re-reading' (Neelands, 1996: 7). The question, 'Is this scholarship?' however, and the admonishment of the Journal for damaging its own academic reputation by publishing Fletcher's paper, tarnish this example of collegiate comradeship with a chilling indication of the possible workings of institutionalized censorship. The issue of universality and multiplicity is, however, turned back upon Fletcher's own analysis, which rather than questioning the 'openness' of O'Neill's directives can be seen to question their trajectory, and to imply a preferred alternative. Phillip Taylor, in a demonstration of editorial partiality, asks of Fletcher's article:

Why does she [Fletcher] champion a unitary perspective with monolithic outcomes? (Taylor, 1996: 4)

To a certain extent Fletcher's article pre-empts this response with its own question:

How do we answer the detractors of new paradigms who claim that, in theoretically critiquing popular practice using myth and folklore, ideological questions will 'spoil' the experience or predetermine the outcome? (Fletcher, 1995: 26)

Fletcher's most important 'ideological question' concerns the myth of theoretical purity, and advocates that practitioners should be critically aware of their own 'theoretical underpinnings' (Fletcher, 1996: 26). However, whilst each perspective fires rhetorical questions at the other, designed to undermine or negate their position, the opportunity for valuable dialogue concerning this issue is precluded. In discussing the problematics and possibilities of a feminist politics, Irigaray warns against the dangers of replacing one set
of monolithic values with another, and therefore re-establishing an ostensibly 'phallic' logic (Irigaray, 1985b: 33, 81 & 166). Instead she advocates strategies that dismantle from within, the 'single syllogistic system' (Irigaray, 1985a: 223), to 'interrogate the conditions under which systematicity itself is possible' (Irigaray, 1985b: 74), to 'make visible... what was supposed to remain invisible' (1985b: 76).

Perhaps the most telling of Fletcher’s criticisms is that the focus of many of the workshop exercises was, 'really on a universal state - on being as opposed to becoming' (Fletcher, 1995: 29). I regard this as telling because it not only encapsulates the key point of Fletcher’s critique, but also highlights its own problematic foundationary concept; the opposition of 'being' and 'becoming'. For Irigaray 'becoming', whilst problematizing the metaphysics of 'being', must develop from out of the oppositional structures of this logic, hence her concern with 'l’entre-deux' the space between, the interval (Irigaray, 1993a: 8). Following Irigaray’s example it is possible to see how dramatic explorations of the ‘seal wife’, her victimhood, her alienation and subjugation within a repressive regime, could become a deconstructive tool.

For what is important is to disconcert the staging of representation according to a phallocratic order. It is not a matter of toppling that order so as to replace it – that amounts to the same thing in the end – but of disrupting and modifying it (Irigaray, 1985b: 68)

It is of interest that in her paper Divine Women (1993b) Irigaray refers to a French version of the ‘seal wife’ story, Melusine, as an historical – mythological example of the attempt to understand and therefore delineate identity through narrative:
Revealing and hiding some-thing of our identity, of the difficulties we have in situating ourselves in relation to ourselves and to our fellows, something of the dramas and spells that captivate us, capture us, bind us, separate us (Irigaray, 1993b)

Irigaray suggests that it is precisely because of their cultural constitution and their correspondence with a ‘stage in our imaginary’ that such stories are ‘still thoroughly relevant’ (Irigaray, 1993b: 58). Joe Winston, in discussing the use of traditional tales in connection with moral education through drama, suggests that arguments for the rejection of such tales on the grounds of universality are difficult to sustain since local variations and subtle shifts in meaning have developed over time, and that the location of such tales within oral traditions marks their evolution as a ‘shared public process’ (Winston, 1998: 41-42). Irigaray identifies ‘the elements’ as a form of originary association within the Melusine tale, not as a suggestion of fixed or universal meaning, but in order to highlight a sentient dimension that seems to underpin such tales:

Traces and remains of the elements are often laid down in myths and folk tales as mysteries, those stories of birth, initiation, love, war, death, and passion delivered in images and actions with all innocence of knowledge. Such affections have yet to be decoded, thought through, interpreted, not as a ‘failure’ but rather as a stage in history. (Irigaray, 1993b: 58)]

Irigaray suggests that such ‘traces’ can be detected in the ‘monstrous’ incarnation of woman, caught between the worlds of sea and land, the passage from ‘life in the womb to life in the air’ (Irigaray, 1993b: 59). For Irigaray this acts as an attempt to articulate woman, to fix her meaning. These images, she suggests, settle upon a moment of her ‘becoming’ that is associated with the material-maternal, the corporeal and ‘natural’, as an anterior dimensionxi (Irigaray, 1993b: 59):
In the monsters produced by culture, we may seek a sense of the darkest part of our becoming, which is the most deeply tactile... Surely man favours the visual because it marks his exit from the life in the womb?... and his opportunity to overcome a mother whom he experiences as amorphous, formless, a pit a chasm in which he risks losing his form? (Irigaray, 1993b: 59)

Irigaray utilises such limiting or negative cultural constitutions as analytic tools. In this case, the distinction drawn between woman's 'corporeal' and man's 'symbolic' avatars, and the prevention of their 'consummation', belies a resistance to the sense of 'touch'. In the wider context of the paper, Irigaray discusses the necessity of a female 'divine', a transcendental marker that will enable women's sublimation, the continuation of their becoming beyond consignment as 'bodies for men' (Irigaray, 1993b: 73-5). 'Touch' is used as a means through which Irigaray 'jams' the discursive machinery that separates or dichotomises masculine/feminine, physical/spiritual, sensible/transcendental, an operation, as I have suggested throughout, that inter-implicates subjective 'becoming' with epistemological renewal.

There seem to be two key points that Irigaray's reading of the Melusine tale can contribute to the discussion of the 'seal wife' drama. The first concerns re-appropriation, the second concerns drama as an embodied medium. It can be argued that the attempt to represent or treat the 'seal wife' as woman, incorporating her dreams, her perspectives, her desires into the drama, disconcerts the staging of representation in an Irigarayan sense. Although at other points activities seem to draw upon the 'monstrous' image of the 'seal wife' it is possible to suggest that this construction is already made 'visible' by those exercises that approach the story from her point of view. The feminist position
advocated by Fletcher could be seen as a means by which to extend or inform this process rather than as a departure from it. Jonothan Neelands alludes to the version of the tale used by O’Neill as ‘an Irish story about the historical place of women in traditional Irish communities told by an Irish woman’ (Neelands, 1996: 7). Indeed this shift in the sexed positioning of the storyteller allows a re-appropriation of the monstrous, alienated and entrapped figure of the ‘seal wife’, that can be likened to Irigaray’s own mimetic representations of female morphology. The extent to which embodied explorations and representations of these themes through various drama conventions is able to contribute to a radicalised reading of the tale is not considered by Fletcher, or dealt with explicitly in O’Neill’s elaboration of this work (O’Neill, 1995: 86-89). However, her outline of workshop activities indicates movement between naturalistic and stylised modes, between intensely physical and linguistic approaches.

In the following chapter I will be considering the body as an expressive and creative medium through Irigaray’s notion of the sensible-transcendental; a productive relationality between fleshy materiality and the abstract world of ideas that seeks to circumvent the ‘closed universe’ of the ‘absolute’, which ‘kills, saps vitality’, ‘destroys its first roots’ (1993b: 109). For Irigaray the body is not merely a surface on which ideas can be mapped but a material constituent of those ideas:

Anything that conceives has its origins in flesh (1993b: 109)


iv Hornbrook's approach is also condemned on the grounds of universality, but through his Marxist identification and belief in theatre's power to affect political consciousness.

v This position is also relevant to the work of Helen Fletcher (1995) which sets out to deconstruct the 'transformative' politics of Cecily O’Neill’s Seal Wife drama.

vi I use the term 'readers of Butler' because Butler has tried to distance her work on 'performativity' from application to theatrical discourse and conflation with 'performance' as inappropriate (Butler, 1993: 234)


viii See Armes, K. (1993) Television and Drama in Education, Drama 1: 3 pp. 21-26 regarding student’s negative response to teachers' attempted appropriation of their vernacular forms of music.

ix See Erol Bray (1991) Playbuilding: A Guide for Group Creation of Plays with Young People, for details of 'playbuilding', a technique for devising theatre with young people

x See Foucault (1986a) 'Of Other Spaces' Diacritics 16: 1 pp. 22-27, these include cemeteries, fairs, libraries and prisons. Janmohamid also includes 'pedagogic sites' as a further example.

xi The children of the story are held firmly within a paternal genealogy, and are not associated with this evocation of a 'maternal' dimension.
Chapter Six Drama as Radical Epistemology: A Reading of the Realisation Test

Methodological Introduction: My application of Irigarayan theory to practice in drama education forms an interpretative reading whereby practical experience is constituted as cultural text. This introduction is intended to outline and explain the framework by which the 'text' itself is conveyed to the reader. In keeping with the tenets of Irigaray's own philosophical project this reading is designed to operate as a dialogue with the inherent aims and agendas of the practical experience, not as a totalizing 'theory' or 'truth' about them. It is Irigarayan theory itself that provides the critical nuance or 'paradigm' for the reading. As already discussed, an Irigarayan approach is not one of theoretical purity, as James Scheurich suggests, 'all perspectives imply political arrangements and invariably exclude some groups, some voices' (Scheurich, 1997: 40).

My reading of the drama realisation test represents the selection of one particular form of drama examination that exemplifies criteria I am drawing out in my imbrication of discourses on drama education and Irigarayan theory. This is not to suggest that these are not present in other or all forms of drama, nor does it imply that my observations are intended to totalize drama education within a particular conceptual frame. My reading of the realisation test merely offers an alternative consideration and does not set out to prove a propositional truth. In line with this corollary Scheurich identifies 'methodology' as 'the enactment of an epistemology', an actualization of theoretical assumptions that:

'can no longer be founded on picking the best epistemology in terms of which one brings the researcher closer to some sort of foundational truth' (Scheurich, 1997: 49)
I would describe my methodological approach as one of 'engaged observation', neither supposing detachment nor fully 'participant' in the sense of actually performing the teaching. By 'engaged' I am referring to three specific modes of engagement. The first could be described as my participation within the practical experience at some level, for example acting as a reflexive sounding-board for the teacher and students during the realisation test, and contributing to the assessment procedure by compiling a video of work. None of these are dealt with directly in my reading but contribute to my relationship with, and experience of, the practical work. The second is actualized in the reading itself, as the engagement of theory and practice. The third concerns the constitution of practical experience as text, that the engagement between observer and observed is in fact a process of compilation:

Data collection is data construction (Farran, 1990: 91)

Although for the purposes of this research 'text' is a more appropriate word than 'data', such points relating to the 'authorial' nature of date collection are equally valid:

Data might be better conceived as the material for telling a story where the challenge becomes to... vivify interpretation as opposed to 'support' or 'prove' (Lather, 1991: 10)

If we take the experience itself to be the 'real', an ultimately non-totalizable or quantifiable entity, the 'text' is a representation, an extrapolation from the real that includes the arbitrariness of the observer's gaze, their choice of words and the meaning that these words come to represent for the reader. Elliot Eisner describes writing ethnography as necessarily blurring the boundaries between truth and fiction, applying a
certain artistry that will enable the reader to ‘empathetically participate’ in the events that
the writing describes (Eisner, 1985: 141). Patai (1988) takes this further, converting
interview text into poetry, thereby courting ambiguity and indeterminacy as part of the
revelatory or illuminatory procedure of research mediation.

In this Chapter I consciously create a narrative of the observed practice, pausing
intermittently to amplify through theoretical engagement. Such interpretative
interjections perform a different type of abstraction from that exemplified by Patai. In
explaining, argues Spivak, ‘we exclude the possibility of the radically heterogeneous'
(Spivak, 1988: 105), in the case of an Irigarayan engagement this would be to defeat the
purpose of her own philosophical project. I would argue that my method of presenting
text attempts to avoid this trap on three counts. First, that in declaring the self-conscious
reflexivity of my reading, the Irigarayan ‘filter’ through which I engage with the material,
I am acknowledging its particularity in relation to a possible heterogeneity of other
interpretations. Secondly, the content of the reading and its Irigarayan precepts, are in
defiance of absolutes; notions of ‘becoming’, productive relationality, improvisation and
indeterminacy suffuse the paradigmatic assumptions that inform the reading process.
Thirdly, practice is not only mediated through words but also through the inclusion of a
video. Although the compilation of a video as text is equally self-conscious and
perspectival, it does provide a more ‘tactile’ contiguity between practice and textual
interpretation. Where the object of the reading is art, it is questionable whether it is
necessary to re-metaphorize this into an alternative art form, as in the case of the
performance of work-in-progress during the realisation test. The appearance of this on
video, in all its ambiguity and indeterminacy, is intended not merely as a material support
for my interpretative writing, but as a presentation of infinitely interpretable texts in their own right.

**Embodiment of thought:** The aim of this chapter is not therefore to define a new poetics of drama according to Irigarayan precepts, but to suggest that from an Irigarayan perspective it is possible to read practices within drama education as forms of radical epistemology. This hinges upon a conception of drama as an embodied art form. I will be considering drama in terms of embodied practice, in this case a practical drama examination, reading this according to Irigaray’s radical use of body metaphor (metonym). Central to Irigaray’s re-morphologization of thought is her re-prioritization of ‘touch’, founded in imagery derived from the female body. For Irigaray, the mucous spaces of reciprocity between masculine and feminine, self and other, are suggestive of movement and becoming, rather than the frozen stasis that is prefigured by phallic oneness, and according to Irigaray exemplified in the mechanics of specularization (1985b: 79; 1993a: 18). Eluned Summers-Bremner in a recent article *Reading Irigaray, Dancing* (2000) has explored the possibility of dance as metaphor for epistemological and subjective becoming. She suggests that Irigaray’s notion of the sensible-transcendental, figured as bodily ‘fluids’ or mucous membranes, allows female sexuality symbolic representation whilst recasting the terms on which materiality is understood, as amorphousness, changeability, flux and motion:

As a means of providing cultural expression for the as yet unsymbolised and immanent, that is, female sexualities and forms of embodiment, Irigaray’s sensible transcendental is intimately related to the subject’s material being and physical moves (Summers-Bremner, 2000: 94)
Whilst Summers-Bremner focuses specifically on female subjectivity she does refer to the implied relevance of the sensible-transcendental to phallic notions of subjectivity per se:

The kinetic aspect of the sensible transcendental suggests, then, a transferential dialogue or interlocution whereby a privileged model of subjectivity must meet its own exclusions in an unprecedented encounter face-to-face (Summers-Bremner, 2000: 93)

Through such an interpretation it is possible to regard contemporary dance’s privileging of tactile and kinaesthetic modes of creative exploration, where expression and meaning are implicit in movement, as an approximation or actualization of Irigaray’s sensible-transcendental. Central to this is a relationship between masculine and feminine, but not formulated as an exclusionary model. Rather than identity formed in opposition to lack, the performance identity and language of contemporary dancers is mitigated in terms of reciprocity between the immanent and the symbolic. This includes bodily relationality and inter-kinetic knowledge between dancers, which is arguably at its most acute in the case of contact improvisation, where bodies interact through mutual support, using shifts in weight, balance, fall, momentum and flow to create dynamic patterns of kinetic relationality. It might not appear as straightforward to read drama in these terms, after all dance, especially those genres that prioritize the kinaesthetic, the exploratory and the expressive properties of movement for its own sake, seems more closely akin to ‘touch’, to tactility. Drama, on the other hand, occupies a seemingly less ‘pure’ position; as well as an embodied medium it is also cerebral, linguistic, it involves a viewpoint. However, I would suggest that to enforce this distinction would be a misrepresentation of Irigaray’s intentions with regard to understandings of ‘vision’ and ‘touch’, because it would
intentions with regard to understandings of 'vision' and 'touch', because it would reinforce the very oppositions, the very boundaries that she seeks to problematize.

**Vision as touch:** Read as an actualisation of Irigaray's sensible-transcendental dance exceeds boundaries between the symbolic and the sensible as 'unspeakable', rendering these false dichotomies. In the case of drama, it too can be seen to occupy a threshold position, which in western culture has been read primarily in terms of the symbolic - the rational, with, as referred to in Chapter Five, attempts to locate and harness essential properties of the sensible by drawing on dramatic forms from other cultures. This chapter will elaborate a reading of existent practice according to Irigaray's placental economy (1993c: 39 - 41), or fecundity of the caress (1993a: 188). Not a gap or the insertion of a bridge between distinct and separate entities, but a consideration of their reciprocity, their contiguity, their inter-implication. Irigaray, whilst championing 'touch' and problematizing 'the visual', is not suggesting a mere reversal, but presenting these as radically coterminous. As Cathryn Vasseleu explains:

Irigaray's regard for the indeterminacy of touch... invites a reconsideration of the constitution of vision (Vasseleu, 1998: 17)

Irigaray's reading of Merleau-Ponty's *The Visible and the Invisible* (1968), is titled *The Invisible of Flesh... “The Intertwining – The Chiasm”* (1993a: 151-84). In the opening, Irigaray agrees with Merleau-Ponty that the specular gaze of philosophy constitutes what it considers, and that it is therefore necessary to reject the 'instruments' of reflection, engaging instead at the interstices of subject and object (1993a: 151). However, Irigaray argues that Merleau-Ponty in approaching this project, evokes a 'pre-discursive' through
imagery of intrauterine existence, as an ‘insurmountable other of the visible’ (1993a: 153). She argues that although Merleau-Ponty dismisses the opposition of subject and object, he retains the polarity of seer/visible by ‘returning privilege to the seer’s look’ (1993a: 153), not as a distanced specular mastery, but as a ‘carnal look’, an enveloping of things that erases the possibility of his own envelopment:

Enveloping things with his look, the seer would give birth to them, and/yet the mystery of his own birth would subsist them...’ (Irigaray, 1993a: 154)

Merleau-Ponty suggests that his is a theory of vision as a variant of touch, Irigaray reads his analysis as one in which tactility is reducible to the properties of vision, and marked by a ‘labyrinthine solipsism’ (1993a: 157). For example his image of touching one’s own hand, and his theory of the recognition of a common anonymous flesh, are read as an appropriation of the object to the subject, of the visible to the seer (1993a: 160-4).

Irigaray suggests that touch, the tangible, is received ‘prior to the dichotomies of active and passive’, it is never completely reducible to the visible (1993a: 164). Irigaray posits the notion of a ‘tangible-invisible’, a figuration of the body that exceeds its reduction to the visible or to an intangible ‘other’. This is exemplified by Cathryn Vasseleu’s suggestion that for Irigaray the eye becomes a threshold between the tactile and the visible:

The blink maintains the eye as mucous, as a latency which, while not of the visible, resuscitates the eye as a body passage, or a reserve in which another vision can begin. (Vasseleu, 1998: 70)
For Merleau-Ponty, the eye operates an ‘intentional grasp’ (Vasseleu, 1998: 70), a metaphorization of tactility that is pre-determined by vision. Irigaray describes this configuration of vision as ‘a sense that can totalize, enclose, in its own way’ (Irigaray, 1993a: 175), as Merleau-Ponty suggests, ‘vision comes to complete the aesthesiological body...’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 154). Irigaray rejects such closure, arguing that:

Movement is a more adequate way of building myself an aesthesiological body... moving through the world, across the universe, or dancing I construct more of a dwelling for myself than through vision (Irigaray, 1993a: 175)

Irigaray’s analysis refers to planes of inter-subjective relation, and interrelationality between the sensible and the symbolic; in both cases the ‘tangible-invisible’ as material reserve, blocks the possibility of reduction or reversal whilst prefiguring renewal, movement and flux (1993a: 161-2).

For a consideration of drama practice, the methodological advantages of reconsidering ‘the visual’ according to the ‘indeterminacy’ of touch, are two-fold. Firstly, the creative activities of improvisational drama can be read, like those of contact improvisation in dance, against the grain of totalizing discursive practice, as a form of interdependent, embodied exploration. Not, as in the distinction made by Christine Battersby, the agonistic ‘wrestling match’ between Platonic philosophers, a bringing to light of inner vision behind which the bodily encounter with the mother is forgotten; but an intermingling of ‘voices’ and embodied ‘personae’ that ‘mimes the process of birth itself’ (Battersby, 1998: 118). Related to this, in terms of liminality between the sensible and the symbolic, Irigaray’s analysis highlights the inter-implication between performer and
audience, embodiment and meaning, corporeality and the sign. This is in similar vein to Bert States (1987) drawing together of phenomenology and semiotics as a 'binocular vision' of theatre (States, 1987: 8), but it exceeds the visual by also embracing the tactile. Irigaray’s radicalisation of epistemology is founded in a refutation of Phallocentric principles of pure form, divisive binary logic, and the distanced specular gaze. Her re-appropriation of ‘touch’, of liminality, of ‘mucosity’ and flux, are not formulations ‘from nowhere’, but represent what, according to Irigaray, has remained hidden, obscured and excluded. Lili Galván (1996) refers to the possibilities that drama education affords in discovering the powers of corporeal communication that are repressed in lived experience, as ‘the dance of life’, an opportunity to:

recapture inner energies, enrich our corporeal language (Galván, 1996: 108)

In choosing the realisation test as a form of drama practice through which I hope to exemplify drama’s properties as radical epistemology, I am not suggesting opposition or mutual exclusivity between this type of examination and other more formal or traditional modes, but that the realisation test prioritizes what others try to obscure. For example, that bodies also constitute ideas, and that examinations are not an end-point in themselves but part of a process of becoming.

Introduction to the OCR drama syllabus and the realisation Test: The OCR drama syllabus is derived from former MEG drama syllabuses, no longer distinguished as modes I and II, but conjoined as one syllabus reflecting a history of distinct approaches and emphases yet with an overall set of assessment criteria. With this syllabus schools
may choose assessment by route of 60% coursework and 40% written examination, or by 100% practical examination, the Realisation Test (RT). The RT is designed to operate as a practical exploration – investigation of ideas generated from a given stimulus over sixteen hours of work. It is requested that this work should take place through 'extended working sessions' rather than timetabled lessons in order to encourage the required 'intensity of focus' and to confirm its status as a terminal examination (OCR Drama Syllabus, 2000: 7). The RT is recognised as a collective activity, 'set material must be developed practically and co-operatively using the resources available', although students are assessed on their 'individual practical contributions' (OCR Drama Syllabus, 2000: 12, 34).

This form of examination is a legacy of the former Leicestershire Mode III drama syllabus; devised at the inception of GCSE by a working party made up of drama teachers and advisory drama teachers from the Leicestershire LEA, this was the first syllabus to introduce the RT as a form of assessment. The underlying philosophy of the syllabus was influenced by the ‘teaching for understanding’ movement (Ebbutt & Elliott, 1985), a response to the then HMI’s concern regarding the extent to which it is possible to teach for understanding where educational systems are dominated by the requirements of public examinations at 16+ (HMI, 1979). The HMI’s suggestion that compatibility between teaching for understanding and examination success is dependent upon pedagogic approach underpinned the development of the Leicestershire drama syllabus (Cross, 1990: 18). There are a number of points to emphasize in relation to this. Firstly, that ‘understanding’, in the context of this syllabus represented both understanding of how to use, or operate within conventions of dramatic art, and also to develop the capacity,
through experience of working within these conventions, to ‘ask new questions of [given] information and construct novel and original meanings out of it’ (Cross, 1990: 19, referring to Ebbutt & Elliott, 1985). The RT was devised to operate as part of the learning and understanding process, with the teacher present to set tasks, assess outcomes and through questioning to encourage a greater depth of engagement with stimulus material. The importance of the teacher’s role in the RT and the collective approach to inter-school moderation of teacher assessment, has meant that this form of examination has had direct bearing on pedagogical developments within the subject area. As David Cross the chief examiner of the syllabus has stated:

Linking assessment to the formative process of teaching has been a major achievement of the syllabus and led to a generally more thoughtful and rigorous pedagogy than was the case in previous drama syllabuses I have worked with (Cross, 1993: 140)

Although the Leicestershire syllabus was influenced by the pedagogic developments and concerns of ‘drama in education’, a tacit questioning of the divide between ‘drama in education’ and ‘theatre’ was implicit to the rationale of the RT from the beginning; described as an example of ‘living theatre’ or ‘ensemble theatre’ by David Cross (Cross, 1993: 150), work conducted within an RT can be informed by a whole range of drama-theatre influences. The openness of the syllabus, considering itself not so much ‘content free’ as having ‘no prescribed content’ (Cross, 1993: 170), has meant not only that a range of approaches to drama could be accommodated but that the syllabus has been able to evolve in relation to the needs of schools and the influences of thinking on drama education as they have developed. For example, the reassertion of drama’s place within arts education, as outlined at the beginning of Chapter Four, is reflected by changes in
nomenclature of the assessment criteria as the syllabus has passed through various phases to its present structure. For example, 'plan and predict outcomes', 'use skills relevant to task' and 'organise and shape the material', have developed into, 'select and employ Drama genres/styles/conventions and shape the drama'.

The openness of the assessment criteria in the original mode III syllabus has been criticised (Hombrook, 1989: 23 note 32; Nicholson, 1994); however, these criteria reflected a movement away from the emphasis of former syllabuses on acting out sections from plays or writing about them, towards an emphasis on how students shape their own work and on the investigative potential of the medium. In other words, a shift in emphasis from the written word towards embodied exploration and the formation of knowledge and meanings. Charles Garoian (1999) argues that it is part of the pedagogical function of performance art to reposition the body from its marginal status, reinstating its 'capacity to act and struggle' (Garoian, 1999: 19, drawing on Jameson, 1984: 91-2). This prioritization of embodied exploration and formation of meaning has produced other implications for the syllabus. As David Cross suggests, due to the openness of the syllabus students from a wide range of cultural backgrounds have been attracted to the subject because, 'their strengths and knowledge are brought into conjunction with the forms and craft of drama' (Cross, 1993: 192-4). This is not to suggest, however, that the forms which learning take within the syllabus are purely solipsistic; through the course it is intended that students will acquire the necessary knowledge and skills in order to respond imaginatively to a given stimulus, embodying their dialogue with stimulus material in realised form. This form of dialogic exploration is reflected in Maxine Greene’s conception of aesthetic education, where students
approach arts subjects from their own situation as 'perceiving feeling, imagining and reflecting beings' (Greene, 1999: 13). Although there is not an inherent prioritization of western theatrical cannon, knowledge and exploration of this is not precluded.

Exercising practical knowledge through a variety of drama approaches has remained the object of the RT throughout subtle developments to the mode and criteria of assessment that have occurred in the syllabus' history. This includes the introduction of the compulsory 'working notebook' for students to complete during the examination period. Writing in the notebook is part of the organic process of collective creativity within the RT, it is used for planning, evaluating and in some instances scripting sections of work. The notebook also provides another source through which the student's own voice enters into the assessment procedure, as it is available for teachers and moderators to use in order to glean further 'evidence' of involved working practice.

**Becoming:** My interest in the RT for the purposes of this thesis is the extent to which it offers a radical approach to epistemology that is commensurate, or at least compatible, with Irigaray's proposals for the radicalisation of thought. The RT can be said to embrace a sense of 'becoming', in its encouragement of the formation of knowledge and meaning, and the continuing development of dramaturgical skills throughout the process. But also, it works with rather than against notions of liminality, problematizing distinctions between, performer/audience, process/product, expert/pupil, which can be read through Irigaray's more general questioning of perceived divisions between mind/body, subjectivity/space and masculine/feminine. For Irigaray 'becoming' is dependent upon the porosity of boundaries, the 'flow between' that constitutes pure Potentiality, perpetual transvaluation (Irigaray, 1992: 27, 1993a: 27). The creative
processes occurring within the RT operate similarly at the interstices of former oppositions.

In *An Ethics of Sexual Difference* (1993a) Irigaray writes that:

> The transition to a new age requires a change in our perception and conception of *space-time*, the *inhabiting of places*, and of *containers*, or *envelopes of identity*. It assumes and entails an evolution or a transformation of forms, of the relation of *matter* and *form* and of the interval *between*: the trilogy of the constitution of place (Irigaray, 1993a: 7)

As outlined in Chapter Three, the philosophical conceptualization of space according to the morphology of the maternal-feminine or chôra determines space as passive receptacle, bounded entity, malleable matter (Plato, 1965: 69). In its sublimated form as discourse, or ‘house of language’, space becomes a metaphorized container for masculine subjective identity, retaining its feminine and predicative function as matter for man. Irigaray interprets this symbolic process as, ‘the exploitation of the body-matter of woman’ (1985b: 85), which creates a scission between sensible and transcendental, body and culture, masculine and feminine. Woman becomes:

> ‘Matter’ upon which [man] will ever and again return to plant his foot in order to spring farther, leap higher (Irigaray, 1985a: 134)

Man is positioned as:

> the transcendent subject whose only connection to the corporeal is his imprint left upon ‘his’ object – the body of woman (Sue Best, 1995: 187)
In the second phase of her work Irigaray focuses on the meaning of this for the woman’s ‘subjectivity’, in her later work and prefigured in *Speculum of the Other Woman* (1985a), Irigaray emphasises the epistemological implications of this foundational division; the constant mediation of matter via the Concept:

> We have to reject all the great systems of opposition on which our culture is constructed. Reject, for example, the oppositions: fiction/truth, sensible/intelligible, empirical/transcendental, materialist/idealist. All these opposing pairs function as an exploitation and negation of a relation at the beginning and of a certain mode of connection between the body and the word for which we have paid everything (Irigaray, 1988: 159)

This has great bearing on my reading of drama education as potentially radical epistemology. Irigaray’s re-thinking of textuality as embodied, of metaphor as metonym, hinges upon this ‘relation at the beginning’, an actualisation of the materiality of discourse which in Derrida’s term ‘différence’ is perpetually deferred (Derrida, 1974: 63). The Platonic myth of origin critiqued by Irigaray in *Speculum of the Other Woman* (1985a) gives primacy to masculine form, to the Idea as originator, but Irigaray’s insistence upon a ‘relation at the beginning’, a ‘copula’ or ‘fission’ (1985a: 274-5), makes apparent the underlying corporeality of text, of representation. In the case of drama, where it is the actual body that is textualized, Irigaray’s contention means that representation need not be read as wilful inscription upon passive body-matter, but can be read as a formative relationality in which body-matter becomes an active signifying substance. The contiguity between the body and the word not only affects body matter, but also concepts. Similarly, subjectivity need not be thought of in terms of bounded or contained identity alone, but by drawing upon what the Platonic myth represses, matter
and birth, subjectivity can be reconfigured according to proximity, movement and becoming (1985a: 346, 356).

As suggested in Chapter Four, Irigaray’s notion of a ‘placental economy’ offers an alternative model of subjective relationality in which each is the other of the other, and through which each is afforded a subjective status that acknowledges the significance of the body (Irigaray, 1993c: 39). It is a model that refutes the scission between self and other, body and culture, an ‘emphatic proximity’ (Braidotti, 1994: 8) or ‘tacky’ relationality (Battersby, 1998: 103). This is relevant to the role of the teacher within the RT as well as to the relationality between students themselves. As Charles Garoian argues, under the circumstances of performance art pedagogy the roles of ‘artist/teacher’ and ‘spectator/student’ are not absolute positions but ‘shifting’ and ‘interchangeable’ (Garoian, 1999: 39). In the RT the teacher is not merely a detached observer, similarly in regular lessons the teacher is not merely an artist-exemplifier. The operations of the teacher cover a continuum of roles that work in relation with those of the students. As suggested in Chapter Four, there is a necessary asymmetry between teacher and pupil(s). The teacher is also an active agent with responsibilities to administer and facilitate an RT experience that will enable students to engage with and respond to stimulus material in imaginative and effective ways, whilst gathering and recording evidence of their achievements. In this context the teacher can be seen as ‘dramaturg’ (Neelands, 1998: 49), setting tasks intended to enhance and intensify dramatic exploration through their theatricalization of the process of enquiry. There are other points at which the students occupy the role of ‘expert’, in outlining or justifying their creative aims, and in evaluating outcomes. In such instances the skill of the teacher is employed in listening, affirming or
challenging, in ways that constitute the students' growth or artistic development through the task. Clearly such positive working relationships cannot develop by chance during the RT, but represent the continuance of strategies of scaffolded learning throughout the course; making the RT part of a perpetuated teaching and learning process.

Realisation Test 2000: The group discussed, and featured in the accompanying video, is based in a large comprehensive school in the midlands, it is one of two groups from the centre taking their RT during summer 2000. The group has already selected which stimulus material they intend to work with, it is a photograph from David Brauchli's Kosovo Diary depicting a girl standing with her head in her hands surrounded by the devastation of war. As is permitted, the group has already spent time in lessons considering the photograph as part of this selection process, and has decided to use it because of its potential to arouse questions and because it focuses in on an intense moment of 'trauma' for the person involved. They had decided that these two factors would provide much scope for dramatic exploration.

Day One 04-04-2000: The first task set by the teacher is one that is intended to refocus the group's attention on the photograph but through physicalizing, or embodying, the moment at which the photograph is taken, rather than just regarding the photograph itself [Vid. 0:00:06]. The effectiveness of this can be identified with Koestler's notion of 'bisociative thinking' a kind of 'punning' augmented by the coexistence and intersection of two or more mental approaches to the same stimulus (Koestler, 1975). In this case the students' previous experience of or encounter with the photograph as external, as a record of a prior event, is imbricated with and augmented by their experiential embodied
representation of the moment of the taking of the photograph. Unlike traditional
discursive models of dialectical thinking, dramatic art enables the co-existence or
doubling of complex ideas, images and impressions. In pairs, one person acts as the
subject of the photograph and the other as the photographer during the moments leading
up to the taking of the photograph. The teacher talks them through this physicalization of
the event asking them to freeze at the point at which the photograph is taken, and hold
this image for a few moments. This is followed by a thought-tracking exercise in which
each member of the group vocalises their thoughts in role at that moment. A range of
responses are produced, but perhaps most interesting are the diverse representations of the
photographer’s thoughts, ranging from expressions of compassion to callous delight that
the image will make ‘good copy’. The teacher picks up on this, identifying it as an
important, interesting issue. He asks them to work in small groups, this time with a few
minutes to prepare a representation of the same sequence of events but drawing upon this
issue of the photographer’s ‘responsibility’ to the subject of the photograph. The way of
working in these groups demonstrates an integration of cognition and physicalization, of
discursive and embodied exploration in which meaning and representation are
inseparable [Vid. 0:03:09 – 0:14:32]. Some groups use a form of doubling in order to
juxtapose verbalized thoughts and feelings with a ‘naturalistic’ integrity of action.
Physicalization is part of the planning-experimenting process, not an adjunct of this.

The teacher then gathers the group together to discuss the work so far, giving students the
opportunity to suggest what, for them, has arisen from this work in respect of their
broadening response to the picture [Vid. 0:14:40 – 0:23:30]. The word ‘trauma’ becomes
prevalent in this discussion, with suggestions that such experiences ‘change you as a
person', that you never know how you will react to such experiences until they occur therefore you learn something about yourself, that such experiences can enable you to grow as a person as well as having devastating effects. From this discussion a key question emerges, 'how do traumatic experiences effect people's lives?' The discussion is couched not in terms of identifying a totalizing 'truth' about traumatic experiences and their effects on people, but in terms of keeping perspectives open, exploring a variety of responses, identifying a particular question for exploration, but recognizing that this is not the only relevant question and that others will be approached at a later stage. The teacher's questions, 'What are the key questions we might explore?', and 'How might we explore these?' can be read alongside my discussion of the Socratic elenchus in Chapter Four, it is clear that these are intended to elicit a range of responses, and also that they are inviting questions from the students that will have a material effect in shaping the drama work to come. The questions are reciprocal, dialogic, they produce multiple responses rather than closing upon a single concept. This is suggested by the range of traumas and situations that are brought to the discussion, and a movement away from the war in Kosovo as a focus, towards a broader consideration of traumatic experiences. This is something that was discussed at the stage of choosing the picture as stimulus material, that the group did not want to try to establish a narrative, explanation or 'truth' behind the picture, but to use the picture as a starting point. As a representation of emotional intensity it is arguable that the image becomes a focus for the exploration of their own fears, of what might, conceivably, be traumatic for them.

**Inter-subjective relationality:** Even though this discussion is not as audible on the accompanying video as later examples, it is still possible to infer something of the
teacher's role in relation to the students and their investigation; as listener, as facilitator of
a discussion forum between students in which listening to each other is important, in
affirming and enabling by using student comments to guide his approach to setting tasks.
At the end of the discussion the teacher formulates a task that is intended to focus the
group's attention on form in relation to content. He asks them to develop a short piece of
work that will establish the nature of the traumatic experience and who it involves, but
without the physical presence of the traumatized individual in the piece. Setting this kind
of formal challenge or 'problem' is intended to promote an exploratory approach to form
as well as content. In this instance groups choose to develop largely naturalistic work,
setting up internal dialogues between past and present that gradually reveal aspects of the
trauma, but which experiment with suspense and narrative exposition by creating further
questions as well as answering the task [Vid. 0:22:45 – 0:33:10]. As the continuing work
throughout the RT demonstrates, it is part of the teacher's role to facilitate situations in
which students are expected to rise to challenges of form, in order to promote learning
within and through the medium. This pedagogic function reflects Vygotsky's notion of a
zone of proximal development between teacher and pupil. This example of teacher –
pupil liminality does not mean that the work is orchestrated in any straight-forward way
or determined by the teacher, as subtle variations in the intent of each piece demonstrates.
What are comparable between Vygotsky's zone of proximal development and Irigaray's
placental economy are a lack of rigidity and determinism, and an openness to possibility.
From the evaluation discussions that follow it becomes clear that one group at least has
subverted the original intention of the task, creating a new arguably more sophisticated
approach [Vid. 0:34:40 – 0:36:42]. In conversation with this group, their teacher accepts
and affirms this reconfiguration of the task, recognising it as an interesting idea full of
dramatic potential, and reminding them to make account of it in their notebook. They have decided to keep the photograph as the focus-point of their character’s emotional trauma, but to leave open the question of whether she is simply a victim. Although they have decided upon a background scenario amongst themselves, their discussion centres upon making their work as enigmatic as possible for the audience, on prompting the audience to ask questions. This creates an interesting interface between form and content, where the mode of performance, especially the behaviour of the central character, is intended to create a subtext that will be gradually revealed as their work progresses.

After morning break the teacher again opens up possibilities for exploration with a range of conventions and formal approaches [Vid. 0:36:47], when he draws attention to the etymology of the word ‘trauma’, from the German word for ‘dream’. He then re-casts the representational challenge by setting a task for each group to attempt to show the nature of their character’s trauma as a dream, highlighting the ‘underlying feelings’ and ‘emotions’ through the use of ‘movement, speech and sounds’. The group followed in the video [Vid. 0:41:37 – 0:50:00] decide to present their dream as a series of flashbacks in which the central character is doubled to represent both past and present. One ‘self’ stays within these remembered encounters whilst the other moves between memory and the recollection of memory, between participation and commentary. Another group depicts movement between past and present through spatial arrangement. Their traumatised character lies asleep in the middle of the performance space, surrounded by voices, images and events of the past. They set up a convention whereby these are reactivated as flashbacks or nightmares as the central character ‘returns’ to each of them.
They also create an appropriate atmosphere and gradual build in tension by repetitively calling the girl's name. This not only depicts voices from her past and the disturbance of her sleep, but also helps to set up the idea that she is compelled to return to and relive these memories [Vid. 0:51:55 – 0:54:52].

Following this exercise the students are invited to comment on each other's work [Vid. 0:54:53]. This serves a number of purposes, one of which is that the students themselves become part of the evaluative process of the RT, and can enter into dialogue with evaluative remarks made about their own work. The teacher's remarks become part of a range of responses to the work, and are able to feed back into the work in progress rather than occurring only after the examination as a summative analysis. This discussion also highlights the range of possible meanings that each piece of work suggests, and that different people can give different aspects of the work particular attention; sometimes identifying nuances that the devising group had not envisaged. Although the teacher completes written evidence for candidates across a range of grades, implicit to this are comments that the students have themselves made about their work, and details accounting their movement through embodied actualizations. In other words, not the summation of a polished production, but an attempt to exemplify student approaches and their success in relation to the task, or the group's own creative aims.

The afternoon begins with a 'hot-seating' exercise [Vid. 1:00:56], a means by which to refocus the group after their lunch break and an activity that can be used to inform the work that follows. Students return to their groups from the morning session using the central character from this earlier work as the subject of their hot-seating exercise, paying
particular attention to range of feelings and emotions felt by the character in connection with their trauma. This acts as a means of generating material in a fairly spontaneous way, which is in contrast to the more considered approach adopted in the previous section of work. It also provides evidence of sustained work in role for those playing the character in the 'hot seat'. Following this, groups are asked to prepare a sequence that depicts the range of emotions that have emerged from the hot-seating exercise. It is hoped by the teacher that in the case of groups who have tended to stay with narrative explication through mainly naturalistic styles of presentation, this task will challenge them to be more experimental with form.

The work that follows provides an interesting example of the 'tactility' of the medium, not only because it employs physical exploration of ideas, but because of the interrelational creativity occurring between students, the inter-implication of sensate and cognitive investigation and even the consideration of 'audience' as part of the devising process [Vid. 1:04:52]. It approximates the qualities of contact improvisation discussed in Chapter Six, in terms of inter-dependence and inter-developmental collaboration. Each member of the group followed on video contributes to the initial discussion, with ideas generated in relation to and because of each other's contributions. Physical experimentation becomes a key feature of the decision making process of the group, including use of different levels, spatial relationality, gesture, voice, expression and pace. Other examples of work shown to the whole group also suggest the presence of such considerations in their realised form [Vid. 1:14:40].
As a way of rounding off or 'underlining' the work of the first day, groups are asked to produce a very short piece in which other people comment upon their impressions of the traumatised person. This begins with some discussion in groups and collective scripting in working notebooks. For the group followed on video [Vid. 1:16:26] the time constraint acts as a challenge that leads them to adopt a more stylised and economical performance style which proves effective for this purpose.

**Performance – epistemology:** In addition to concerns of pedagogy, of teaching and learning, it is also important to consider the form of enquiry, drama itself, as constitutive of a radical epistemology. Within the RT situation it is virtually impossible to forge distinctions between notions of process and product. Although discrete tasks produce provisional, multiple outcomes these are either fed back into the general enquiry and development of skills, or become part of a bank of experiential knowledge to draw upon at later stages. Indeed, examples of work from the RT, especially those that demonstrate an active, embodied formulation of group responses to tasks, project performance as process and process as performance; an epistemology and ontology of liminality and flux. Such work cannot be reduced to 'mere' process because it performs a response to a preconceived task through which, the students occupy a liminal role of artist-performer-audience. Neither can it be considered merely performance, if we take this to mean display or presentation. Reading such work in terms of liminality neither totalizes nor negates these properties but holds them in relation. David George (1996) argues that the theatrical notion of performance as the ‘translation of a written dramatic text into representation is the result of a ‘brief phase’ in the recent history of western drama influenced by the modernist paradigm of the text and the metanarrative:
an example of a compulsive tendency in western philosophy, namely to deduce from primary experiences a putative, prior source and a post facto effect and then rewrite the whole sequence as if the case had really preceded the effect (George, 1996: 19)

This is an example of what Irigaray would refer to as an appropriation of origin. In contrast to this George offers a theory of performance, not as secondary to text, but as a radical paradigm which, according to its ‘liminality, contingency and ephemerality’ he likens to ‘contemporary scientific research and its manifestations in quantum, chaos and complexity theories’ (George, 1996: 18). This is an area which, according to Christine Battersby (1998: 50) Irigaray overlooks in her critique of ‘masculine’ discourse, her ‘discourse on boundaries’. However, it is possible to take up George’s contention and through engagement with Irigarayan theory pursue a reading of the RT as a radical performance art, as a reclamation of ‘primary experience’ formerly superseded by text. In doing so I will be highlighting performance as ‘event’, stressing the implicitness of process and embodied experience in the actualization of knowledge and meaning. Once again, a consideration of Irigaray’s approach to re-thinking space, time and subjectivity is crucial to understanding her project and how it might be applied to dramatic art. As Irigaray states of her own work:

What is important is to disconcert the staging of representation according to exclusively ‘masculine’ parameters, that is, according to a phallocratic order (1985b: 68)

Space-time: Irigaray reads ‘time’ in western philosophy, consolidated in Heidegger’s Being and Time (1980), as equated with masculine subjectivity, and the exclusion of the
place of woman (1999: 95). Masculine time, as represented by the linear trajectory of the fort-da (Irigaray, 1993b: 95), is implicit to the understanding of Being that dominates western metaphysics, i.e. the subordination of space and time to the present. In the process-performance work of the RT, it is possible to perceive time as doubled and ambiguous. Parallel presents exist as students move in and out of role, or rather the interplay of experience and analysis creates an ambiguity of past, present and projected futures. It is this very liminality between temporal states that instigates progressive shifts in cognitive perception, flows between experimentation, self-evaluation and movement into modified ideas. Christine Battersby summarises Irigaray’s attempt to rework the topography of space and time as the movement from, ‘an optics that privileges straight lines, particles and clean-cut identities’, to a, ‘morphology of the female body: structured by gradations, shadows, flows and intensive magnitudes’ (Battersby, 1998: 99).

The photograph used as stimulus, though crystallising the moment of its taking as a permanent present, is quickly problematized by the investigatory processes of the RT, which move on to pre-suppose possible pasts and futures. Temporal liminality is not only problematized at the level of methodology but also in dramatic realisation. Past and present are doubled and conflated in the drama sequences used to establish the emotional focus of the trauma investigated through dream. It is the attempt to embody, to represent this (inter)temporality that is instrumental in intensifying possible ‘meanings’ of the two pieces discussed, the emotional response becomes as applicable to the memory as to the event. Fels and Stothers (1996) in an article on drama as an active medium constitutive of knowledge, suggest that it is through:
exploration and communication in the interstices that Academic Performance draws on and reaches out to individual and collective experience (Fels & Stothers, 1996: 258)

As suggested earlier in the chapter. Space, traditionally equated with the ‘inert’ materiality of the mother’s body, is frequently prefigured as the passive substance from which and upon which the works of man are created. But the desire to control space, to make of it a ‘house of language’ is coupled with a fear of unbounded space and loss of identity. Therefore, what remains untotalizable in discourse is conceptually bounded a transcendental Other and thereby circumscribed within the ‘closed universe of thought’ (Irigaray, 1999: 96). For Irigaray this represents stasis and death, ‘Being’s grave, matrix of this everything-there’ (1999: 165). Irigaray’s notion of a sensible-transcendental proposes reuniting body-matter with enunciation; the relationality between, reconstituting subjectivity and creativity in terms of movement and flux rather than containment and stasis, ‘without being fixed – frozen in one cohesion… a supple and mobile dwelling’ (Irigaray, 1992: 69). It also implies an interrelation of subjectivity and space that has implications for both (1999: 83-4). In respect of feminist ontology, this allows a conception of self that does not negate ‘matter that can birth’ (Battersby, 1998: 103); ‘place can take place’ (Irigaray, 1992: 67). As for the ‘re-staging of representation’, this is enabled by an affirmation of the liminality between subjectivity and space.

In the case of the RT, the students’ liminality between performer and audience, character and self already alluded to, exemplifies the occupation of a threshold between subject and object, where both are active and reciprocal. Even when maintaining a role over a period
of time, as in the example of hot-seating above, subjectivity and space, like time, remain doubled and ambiguous. The active agentive representation of character is in contiguity with the subjective existence of the student-performer, yet the 'here' of the character and the 'here' of the performer are also different but contiguous. All of which is problematized further by the questioners who are not in character at all, and therefore accentuate the interrelationality of reality and fiction. However, at the 'mucous membrane' of this intense relationality occurs potentiality, spontaneity, the constitution of plausible responses, the creative matter of the hot-seating exercise that would not occur without this necessary intermingling of doubled identities and spatialities. The interpretation of drama as radical epistemology is not therefore confined to specific genres of dramatic representation. Such fields of liminality exist even in so called 'naturalistic' modes, Stanislavski's entreaty for actors to draw upon their own experiences and emotions in preparing a role can, for example, be re-interpreted as a dialogue rather than as an appropriation of performer to the 'truth' of the text. Richard Schechner expresses such doubling, however, as a double negative:

Oliver is not Hamlet but also he is not not Hamlet, (Schechner, 1985: 4)

My Irigarayan reading draws on a similar threshold or 'paradigm of liminality' (Schechner, 1980: 4), but it is one which takes account of embodied materiality. Schechner's elaboration metaphorizes performance, the 'not not' places liminal identity in remove of body-matter. Postmodern approaches such as Schechner's therefore embrace notions of ephemerality, the ungraspability of performance. For example, David
George's article, with which this section began, concludes that the paradigm of liminality equates 'dispersal' and 'emptiness':

In performance we create who we are and it is always another (George, 1996: 22)

Irigaray's sensible-transcendental, a reassertion of the contiguity between body-matter and enunciation, blocks this manoeuvre forcing us to consider the relationality between embodied self and signification, keeping the elusiveness of performance in touch with the mechanics of performance.

Returning to the performance work within the RT, where students are seen to move through and between realised outcomes, it is in occupying the threshold between subject and object that such movement or becoming is constituted. Each student is simultaneously performer and audience, undertaking a process of self-other scrutiny that is both active and constitutive of meaning. Christine Battersby identifies the, 'disintegration of the ability to distinguish 'subject' and 'object' as a feature of Irigaray's writing and its privileging of the 'female' and 'matter', but also 'a mode of thinking identity as emerging out of movement' (Battersby, 1998: 133). Rather than 'ephemerality' or 'transience' the sudden passing of the encapsulated moment, an Irigarayan approach privileges 'becoming'. The emphasis therefore would not be on consummate presentation or metaphorization intended to make 'self' disappear, but on the flux, the 'tacky' relationality and movement between subjects, and subjects and objects, required to constitute meanings and learning. In Elemental Passions (1992), Irigaray uses love (eros) to symbolise this relational milieu:
The only difference between the love which flows through the envelope-walls of skin or mucous fluids and the love which appropriates for itself in and by the same, lies in the 'through' which allows each one their living becoming (Irigaray, 1992: 27)

In the context of drama this can be likened to Boal's term 'metaxis':

the state of belonging completely and simultaneously to two, different autonomous worlds (Boal, 1995: 43)

For Boal these worlds, through the embodied performance of the actor, become reciprocal and co-constitutive.

**Day Two 05-04-2000:** The teacher has downloaded from the Internet some additional material, in the form of text and images from David Brauchli's *Kosovo Diary*. The students are divided into small groups and given extracts from the diary text to use as the basis of a short piece that will capture the mood and atmosphere of the events described. Students have to decide collectively how they want to use the words, i.e. choosing key words, reciting a whole section, overlapping words and phrases etc. and work physically in conjunction with the words to create their realised form. In addition the teacher has identified four students to act in a directorial role. This is either because he has not been able to glean enough assessment evidence for them up to now, or because they have been less influential than other students have in shaping work so far. After each group has worked on their short extract, it is up to these four students to decide how the elements can be worked together to create whole cycle or continuous piece of work [Vid. 1:19:53]. At the evaluation stage [Vid. 1:32:15] comments both reflect back over the planning and
execution of the piece but also reveal new insights for the group into the work they have performed, for example what was symbolic, what was unclear, what were the constraints and benefits of only using three people, that the integration of words and images created layers of meaning. This whole phase of the work moves through various exercises in the occupation of different thresholds. The initial movement piece experiments at the threshold of body and words, through inter-subjective, collaborative experimentation with form. The ‘directors’ who are also performers in the movement sequences, work collaboratively in order to plan how these sequences can be linked together and be presented, with the teacher also contributing to this discussion in a formative capacity and asking questions in order to gain clarification for his assessment evidence. In the evaluation discussion that appears on the video [Vid. 1:32:15], the students begin by giving summative comments but gradually move on to engage with their own creative decisions made in the planning stages, to engage with their realised piece suggesting how this could be developed, and to suggest some of the meanings it has accrued for them during its process-performance. Adapting David Wright, this sequence of tasks suggests that:

The conversation with the body [can be] a source of considerable learning (Wright, 1998: 94)

Having made somewhat of a return to the Kosovo theme, the group is now given the opportunity to decide how they want to proceed. Pleased with the quality and intensity of work completed this morning their teacher tries to guide them towards building on this, but there seems to be a consensus among the group to take a different direction, to return to some of the key questions formulated in the initial stages of the RT and use these to
initiate new lines of enquiry [Vid. 1:36:26]. However, as the teacher points out, work
already done is not necessarily finished as such, but can be drawn upon at stages
throughout the RT, either to rework ideas or re-apply forms and styles to different
situations.

One of the interesting ideas that arises from this discussion and its subsequent piece of
work is that of the tension or correlation between feelings of being protected and trapped.
Having a specific yet somewhat abstract idea such as this to work with seems to
encourage experimentation among the groups. The group followed on video provides a
detailed example of experimentation that defies the notion of boundary between
mind/body, performer/audience, subjectivity and space, process/performance etc. [Vid.
1:46:09]. They begin by discussing various options for a figurative or more
expressionistic treatment of this theme, then move on to embodying some of these ideas.
It soon transpires however, that this embodied exercise becomes one of rethinking and re-
exploring rather than a mere transferral of discussion into action, a form of thinking
through the body. Adopting a liminal artist-performer-audience role, what seems to
‘work’ and what does not becomes evident through its embodiment. By carrying out this
physical experimentation the group realise that it is crucial to make a clear distinction
between expressions of protection and those of entrapment. It also becomes apparent that
having one person signify protection and another entrapment, both simultaneously
manipulating or influencing the subject of the piece, creates a confused image because
the subject is unable to react to differently to each. They decide instead to adopt a
progression from one state to another, with two students moving and guiding the third
whose reactions increasingly represent her sense of entrapment. This active investigation within the drama medium constitutes and generates its own contextual knowledge:

Knowledge as a noun is incomplete, unfinished, but, as a verb, continuous, interactive, co-emerging, co-evolving (Fels & Stothers, 1996: 256)

At the intersection of form and content, the piece circumvents notions of subjectivity and space as bounded. Students represent both abstract entities and characters, and the piece itself is suggestive of reciprocity, or a blurring of boundaries between internal states of mind and external influences. Two of the other groups, whose work is recorded, explore similar figurative and symbolic use of 'self' as animate material with which to create drama meanings. This kind of experimentation is encouraged by the syllabus' assessment criteria, which include 'people' as an 'available resource' with which to communicate meanings and atmospheres.

At the end of Day Two the whole group gathers together, the purpose of this is to make some preparation for the external moderation on Day Three [Vid. 2:04:36]. As the teacher explains, much of his time will be taken up with the moderation exercise, focusing on a selected number of students and engaging in discussion with the external moderators, therefore he will not be in a position to set up a succession of tasks. In conjunction with student comments from earlier discussion and in consideration of the moderation requirements, the teacher decides that it would be fitting for the students to use this time to devise a more extended or complex piece of work. He suggests that this could draw on or develop work from earlier in the RT, forming a continuation of their investigation rather than a departure, and being part of the process of 'building'
knowledge. He also reminds the group that they can consider widening the range of drama conventions used, encouraging them to take dramaturgical risks, and not rely merely on habitual patterns of response. In order to broaden investigative possibilities, create a shift in emphasis, and also recalling the success of the work produced at the beginning of Day Two, the teacher suggests that they consider the effects of a traumatic situation on a group of people rather than an individual.

Day Three 06-04-2000 Moderation and assessment: The day of the external moderation has a material bearing on the way in which the work is structured. Teachers are required to provide a moderation plan for visiting moderators, outlining the tasks set or the aims and context of the work that the students will be undertaking, and identifying those candidates who are to be 'tracked'. Despite the collective and collaborative nature of the RT the exigencies of external examination require the atomization of this collectivity. In order to produce and attribute a 'final' grade to students it is necessary that they should be, 'assessed on their individual practical contributions', that 'distinctive and individual contributions' be identified (OCR Drama Syllabus 2000: 34). However, a closer look at the moderation process suggests that although on one level it attempts to isolate individual contribution in order to differentiate between ability and levels, the process by which this is achieved requires the moderators themselves to engage with the work, to enter into a 'tacky' relationality with the creative-expressive processes of the students. The class is working in small groups, developing work intended to build on that of the RT so far. The moderators and teacher move from group to group focusing on and engaging with particular individuals. In order to arrive at an 'agreement', a standardised response, it is stipulated that teachers and moderators must observe the same activity at
the same time. It also suggests in the syllabus that where the Moderation Plan involves candidates working in small groups, ‘tracked candidates should not be spread across too many working groups’ (OCR Drama Syllabus 2000: 43). However, the teacher in this case has nominated one candidate from each of the small working groups, because if individuation and unity of focus are what is required this is very difficult to achieve when ‘tracking’ several students at once. It also means that each group is ‘visited’, each group’s work is engaged with, validating each equally in terms of attention from the moderators.

Intervention is not only permissible, but also a requisite aspect of the moderation process. This allows moderators to seek clarification from students, to ascertain levels of individual involvement and engagement at various stages, and where necessary, to re-orientate tasks in order to promote a more involved response from students, testing whether they are capable of moving their work to a higher level. As with teacher intervention, this can be identified as an example of Vygotsky’s zone of proximal development, in this case the developmental space between the knowledge, experience and abilities of the moderator and those of the student. It is highly significant therefore that part of the moderator’s task is to enter into conversation with students about their work, not merely to attribute a level of achievement based on visual criteria alone. Ross et. al (1996) in their investigation of assessment in arts education, suggest that the ‘spontaneity and freedom’ of conversation is suited to the:

Delicate task of probing and appraising the quality of pupils’ expressive and creative processes
(Ross et. al, 1996: 26)
The moderation exercise is in fact a standardisation procedure carried out within consortia amongst those drama teachers who are operating a RT within their schools. In effect it is the teacher’s marking that is being moderated, but in practical terms reaching parity involves first making an individual assessment of the students’ work and then agreeing a level between the teachers.

The assessment and moderation process of the RT seeks to engage with some of the inherent ambiguities and complexities of creative exploration within dramatic media, not to smooth out or remove the problematic as in other forms of examination in drama. For example, transferral from making, performing and responding within the medium to extrinsic exercises such as essay writing, or the presentation of a rehearsed, ‘polished’ performance that conceals those very ambiguities and complexities under a veneer of objectivity. In such cases student performances are adjudged against externally fixed standards in which they have no personal investment, such standards are arbitrated by what David Cross describes as the figure of the ‘visiting connoisseur’ (Cross, 1993: 130), an ‘expert’ from outside who remains in distanced specular relation to the students and their work. In the case of the RT, the students are also experts in their particular work, and the more deftly they display that expertise the higher their level of attainment. In order for this to be judged fairly, teachers and moderators have to engage with the students, to understand their intent; the ‘standard’ is therefore mitigated through dialogue that involves the students. This approach is influenced by Stenhouse (1975) notion of ‘critical assessment’, where the judgement of the learner is brought into dialogue with the judgement of the critic. Assessment objectives and marking criteria help to identify and label differentiated outcomes, but what constitutes ‘competence’, ‘skilfulness’ or
‘accomplishment’, can only be accurately determined in relation to a contextual understanding and engagement with the work. Ross et. al, (1996) argue, that the assessment conversation ‘begins and ends’ with the work, that it should be ‘conducted on the ‘inside’ in imagination and feeling’ (Ross, et. al, 1996: 36).

In visiting different Centres, moderators encounter a whole range of approaches and forms of outcome, as is the nature of the subject, from the breadth of possible influences on teachers’ styles of working to the cultural and personal influences that students bring to bear. Such heterogeneity finds space to flourish and evolve within more open structures. Rigid and highly schematised systems not only become ‘inappropriate and anachronistic’ over time (Cross, 1993: 159), but also operate their own exclusionary mechanisms. The intrinsic motivation generated by students’ ownership of their work is augmented by the teacher and moderators’ interest and engagement with that work. Students often give the most rigorous accounts of their artistic intent, or demonstrate the keenest investigatory skills when in ‘dialogue’ with teacher-moderators, which in turn is exactly what is required by teacher and moderator in order to connect with the students’ creative process.

The video follows two groups through the stages of their work, showing how the moderation process relates with the work of one of these groups in particular. The first group’s discussion on the notion of isolation, of how different people can feel isolated for different reasons yet might come together for mutual support; considers the possibility of using different conventions to explore the nature of each person’s isolation, their perceived ‘difference’ from other people, and the establishment of their individual
personalities [Vid. 2:10:40]. They also discuss the use of lighting, for example characters entering in darkness with a lighted candle to suggest their isolation and the gradual increase of light as the isolated people come together to form a group. Their enquiry at this stage focuses on discrimination and its effects upon those discriminated, both emotional and behavioural.

The second group is working with the idea of a family splitting up and the separation of twin sisters [Vid. 2:15:29]. They spend some time trying out structural ideas that will emphasise the thematic content, drawing on the doubling of the twins and their separation, experimenting with mirroring the parents and children, and improvising short sections of dialogue intended to compliment this movement work.

The first group draws on the ‘trapped-protected’ work from Day 2 in order to explore the interface between ‘self’ and outside world [Vid. 2:21:00]. Their work at this stage is mostly physical and symbolic, working with the idea that a particular character, in protecting herself from discrimination by others, might be trapping herself in isolation. These ideas are taken further in relation to another of the characters [Vid. 2:25:47], where the symbolisation of ‘external’ threat is made more ambiguous by the central character’s monologue, and comes to represent both the world and her own projected fears. When the moderators arrive at this group the teacher intervenes asking them to go back to a section of work which focuses on the character played by the ‘tracked’ student [Vid. 2:29:47]. In this the group uses monologue but depict the gradual encroachment of others into the central character’s thoughts, rather like the dream sequences worked through on Day One of the RT. They then move into a role-play of a job interview but double the
characters so that their thoughts can be heard in addition to their dialogue, enabling them to express the characters’ increasing sense of paranoia as the interview progresses. Finally she returns to the original position of the monologue, reinforcing her isolation and self-blame with the phrase, ‘It was me’.

The moderators respond with the observation that, further to their earlier discussion with the group in the planning stages of their work, the intention of the piece has changed from a concern with discrimination to an exploration of paranoia, in its realised form [Vid. 2:34:00]. What they want to ascertain is whether the ‘tracked’ student is aware of this, whether she can account for it. At this point an unusual decision is taken to isolate the ‘tracked’ student from the rest of her group in order to glean her response and not the group’s response to these questions [Vid. 2:34:35]. Whilst ensuring focus on the ‘tracked’ student, an understandable manoeuvre in view of limited time and the strictures of the assessment requirements. However, the attempt to reduce ambiguity and complexity in order to provide a clearer point of focus for assessment, also reduces access to the work in the context in which it has evolved, as a collaborative, ‘tactile’ activity of which complexity and ambiguity are a constitutive part. Experiential engagement with the work through its developmental stages would place the moderators in a more involved relationality with the work. However, the moderation conversation that follows does give the ‘tracked’ student opportunities to demonstrate her expertise on the work. This is not to suggest an expectation that all possible questions should have been answered through the process undertaken so far or that the group’s work should have arrived at a point of closure. The moderation conversation feeds into that process as part of its becoming in a way which approaches Vygotsky’s notion of the zone of proximal development, because
it enables the student to formulate questions and decisions about how to move on through the work. This is achieved by enabling her to re-consider the work from two juxtaposed positions, from within the intentionality, planning and experimentation of the group, and from the perspectival position of the moderator-teachers. The first reflects an interface of complex, interesting and challenging material that is still undergoing development and formulation, including: being part of a discriminated minority, isolation, loss of self-worth, psychological effects, possibilities of solidarity with others, use of conventions, lighting, symbolism etc. The second reflects the incisive perception and interpretation of experienced critics, who point out that based on the work observed there seems to be a suggestion that discrimination is all in the mind. Through the moderation conversation the student is not only able to counter this interpretation and clarify the broader intention of the work: 'No... I know what you’re saying but we want to show a bit of both, like how they work together’, but the moderators’ observations about the realised form enable the student to make decisions about how the work might be developed and clarified, by balancing the representation of actual discrimination with its possible psychological consequences.

In many ways the isolation of the ‘tracked’ student from her group creates an artificial situation, and places her under a lot of pressure, however, the moderators seem particularly sensitive to this and congratulate her at the end of the conversation on her performance. The ‘face-to-face’ dialogue has provided an opportunity for the student to participate in the assessment process, however, isolated discussion alone does not convey an adequate impression of the group’s work. Like essay writing, it attempts to transpose the drama medium into another form of communication. Engaging with the group whilst
working through their exploration of these themes would have constituted an encounter with the ‘tracked’ student more in keeping with the organic development of the work and her participation in this. The physical or stylised sections worked on prior to the moderation intervention, are more evocative of the relationality or reciprocity between internal-external, psychological-experiential states that is fundamental to the group’s dramatic enquiry. An other interesting aspect of the work that is not pursued through the moderation process is its ritualistic atmosphere, the use of candlelight and the poetic text compiled by the group to emphasize the relationality of paradoxes explored in the piece.

The presentation of this work towards the end of Day Three, in some ways marks an end-point; that is, to the sixteen hours designated by OCR or the three school days allowed off timetable. But it can also be identified as a specific point in a potentially continuing journey, a demonstration of work-in-progress [Vid. 2:39:39]. It is not part of the remit of the RT that students should work towards a ‘finished’ piece. The first group has attempted to explore a greater number of complex ideas and themes than the second, and to draw together a broader range of drama conventions. Much more time would be needed for this group to achieve a more seamless integration of form and content. The second group has concentrated on one central idea, and has therefore had sufficient time to present a well-executed performance piece with economy of style and meticulous attention to thematic suggestion in staging. It would be impossible to make a fair comparative assessment of these presentations, much less individual performances, without having engaged with the heterogeneity of ideas, the complexity and ambiguity of exploratory and compilatory process-performances that underlie them.
Concluding Remarks:

Her language weaves in and through and around the phallus in a dance that may dazzle, but can never be captured... it disregards – literally disobeys the command, 'Regarde!' – the phallus...

Irigaray is not performing the struggle either to be or the have the phallus: she is speaking beyond the phallus (Winnubst, 1999: 28)

This brief closing section of the thesis addresses issues of legitimation. My reader may be concerned that in an educational climate that favours rationality and demarcation, Irigarayan readings of drama and dance seem to further ghettoize, or marginalize the performing arts as anterior to the more quantifiable, rationally accountable aspects of the curriculum. In a possibly ‘un-Irigarayan’ manoeuvre, these concluding remarks will offer some clarification of my intention in this respect.

The phallus, as a Lacanian reworking, through psychoanalytic discourse, of the Hegelian Concept, mitigates via conflict and opposition the delineation, demarcation and control necessary for language and rationality to operate an individuating and totalizing role:

    The phallus is the privileged signifier of that in which the role of the logos is joined with the advent of desire (Lacan, 1977: 287)

Irigaray identifies this as an economy of desire that excludes or appropriates all possible others, but attempts through a re-materialization of language to exceed this logic of the ‘same’. This is attempted through a kind of enactment or performativity that renders language ‘otherwise’. Irigaray’s philosophical manoeuvres become embodied in her
writings evoking a tactility, a touching of materiality. In their avoidance of the Concept her writings approximate a kind of movement or dancing in which, 'the movements that are choreographed accord to a certain style that do not make up a formal model’ (Irigaray, 1993b: 177):

It is not susceptible of reduction to a grill [or grid] that may be transposed or imposed elsewhere.

A style resists coding, summary, counting, cataloguing, programming into different machines. It cannot be brought down to the level of such oppositions as sense/mind, poetry/ideas...

masculine/feminine, as these dichotomies have been presented to us so far... it may accommodate them... but it escapes them (Irigaray, 1993b: 178, also trans. in Whitford (1991) ed. Pp.148)

This discursive reconfiguration does not dispense with language, concepts or rationality; to replace these would be to instigate yet another totalizing concept. What Irigaray describes is a process by which these are problematized, set into motion through interplay with their structuring possibility; the sensate, materiality, immanence. This strikes me as very similar to the way in which embodied performance is ‘interpretable’ according to symbolic logic but not wholly assimilable to it. Performance exceeds complete transposition into discursive symbolism, but this is not to the detriment of performing arts, as in exceeding the discursive they extend the knowable:

[To] reembody, reinscribe, reconfigure [in performance] acknowledges the pre-existing discursive field, the repetition – and the desire to repeat – within the performative present, while ‘embody’, ‘configure’, ‘inscribe’, ‘signify’ assert the possibility of materializing something that exceeds our language, that alters the shape of sites and imagines other as yet unsuspected modes of being (Diamond, 1996: 2)
Elin Diamond likens Irigaray’s term ‘mimétisme’, a subversion of the Platonic ideal mimesis that ‘makes visible’ a ‘possible operation of the feminine in language’ (Irigaray, 1985b: 76), to the radical potentiality of the body in performance. Acting as a reminder, and remainder, of ‘what is extruded in our conceptualizing... and thus (for Irigaray at least) that which makes our conceptualizing possible... the body is never fully subsumed in performance’ (Diamond, 1997: 173-4, 180). Embodied performance then, can be said to question the exhaustive possibility of the symbolic, the phallic mirroring of pure form.

As detailed within this thesis, Irigaray uses a radicalized female morphology with which to effect relationality between the body and the word. This is because in western cultural discourse the body and the female body have become conflated as tropes of pre-discursive materiality. Irigaray’s attempt to re-embbody discourse is, however, a recuperation of the body for all, not just women. She addresses man’s distancing of himself from corporeality as well as corporeality’s association with women, in her call for the re-vitalization and re-mobilization of thought. As fluidity, flow and plurality are as much a part of male biological embodiment as of women’s, yet subject to cultural dimorphism they become attributable to women; similarly the sensate and the intelligible are held in antitheses through discourse while both are implicated in the possibility of discourse. Irigaray equates the economy that privileges solidity with ‘the triumph of rationality’ (1993b: 113). But a triumph that universalizes one term and negates its other is ultimately reductive and debilitating, an ‘absolute’ that ‘kills’, that ‘saps vitality’ (1993b: 109). The embodied and performative practices of drama education can be seen as a means by which to revitalize thought, through interrelationality between the sensate and the intelligible. As J. McMahon argues, the performing arts, ‘cut through the
immobilizing effects of theory with creative acts’, and do so in such a way that knowledge becomes a ‘self-affirming’ act, as, ‘student’s ‘own’ a text or cultural fact by re-working it through [their] own body and voice’ (McMahon, 1995: 127).

Experimentation, investigation and expression through drama can be regarded as an extension of the rational because:

Unlike the traditional discursive models of dualistic and dialectic thinking, performance art cognition enables a non-discursive complex of ideas to coexist simultaneously (Garoian, 1999: 31)

I would argue then, that drama is neither anterior to rationality, nor should it be limited or confined by being conflated within or modelled upon discursive rationality. At its most innovative drama extends or moves us beyond our immediate conceptualizations, avoiding the closure(s) of absolute and particles, it invites an ‘intense intermingling’

knowledges and the ‘generation – regeneration’ of thought.

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1 Levinas (1990) *Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty*, in Johnson & Smith (Eds.) *Ontology and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty*, reads Merleau-Ponty’s account of vision according to intercorporeality, suggesting that he overlooks the uniqueness of the other (1990: 66)

2 Irigaray (1992: 102) in reference to the sensible-transcendental

3 Irigaray (1993a: 28) in reference to ‘becoming’
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