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Minority control: an analysis of British companies using voting power indices

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Leech, Dennis (1999) Minority control: an analysis of British companies using voting power indices. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.529).

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Abstract

An exercise in the empirical use of voting power indices from cooperative game theory to applied ownership data for large companies, this paper contributes in two areas: (1) the analysis of company control based on shareholding voting power, and (2) the empirical use of power indices and understanding of the comparative properties of different indices. New algorithms for calculating power indices, which quantify voting power in weighted voting bodies like company meetings, are applied to detailed data on beneficial ownership of 444 large UK companies without majority control. The results show that the Banzhaf index is, and the Shapley-Shubik index is not, useful for this analysis and a control classification of the firms is obtained.

Item Type:

Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)

Subjects:

H Social Sciences > HF Commerce

Divisions:

Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics

Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):

Cooperation, Power (Social sciences), Voting research, Game theory, Stock ownership

Series Name:

Warwick economic research papers

Publisher:

University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Place of Publication:

Coventry

Official Date:

March 1999

Dates:

Date	Event
March 1999	Published

Number:

No.529

Number of Pages:

Status:

Not Peer Reviewed

Access rights to Published version:

Open Access

References:

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