Positively Dead: An Examination of the Concept of the Death Drive in Gilles Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*

by

Shaun Stevenson

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In Memory
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Declaration and Inclusion of Material from a Prior Thesis

I, Shaun Stevenson, hereby declare that the following work is entirely my own. The thesis does not contain any material which has been used before or any material which I have had published. The thesis does not contain any collaborative research and contains my contribution only.

The thesis has not been submitted for a degree at another university.
Summary

Death is often characterised within naturalism as being ‘nothing to us’ and we are urged to think of ‘nothing less than of death’. In his lectures on Spinoza, Deleuze says ‘thinking of death is the most base thing’. Thinkers such as Lucretius, Nietzsche and Spinoza (all of whom greatly influence Deleuze’s work), have clear perspectives on the need to avoid thinking about death. They share in the belief that meditation on death only leads to fear and sadness. These affirmationists, that is, philosophers whose writings aim at affirming life, therefore denounce death as unimportant to philosophy. Deleuze also presents a philosophy that seems affirmationist, in keeping with the tradition of those whose ideas he interprets and incorporates into his own philosophy. And yet, death - in the form of the death drive - is a key concept in Deleuze’s work *Difference and Repetition*. This thesis asks the question: Does Deleuze present a concept of death that affirms life?

The concept of death is rarely explored in Deleuze studies, and yet it plays an important role in his philosophy. This thesis seeks to contribute to this research, by delineating and examining Deleuze’s concept of death in *Difference and Repetition*. The description of death provided by Deleuze is compared with the concepts of death in the works of two affirmationists, Lucretius and Spinoza. Hegel’s concept of death is then explored to determine whether Deleuze succeeds in avoiding the use of negation in death’s relation to the subject. The thesis then considers Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s eternal return. The result of his use of the eternal return leads to discussions around kenosis, transpantheism and immanence. It is decided that the naturalist process of demystification is taken by Deleuze to require the demystification of identity, giving primacy to immanence as a singular life.
List of Abbreviations and Editions Used


The words that accompany our experience of and thinking about death are rarely uplifting: grief, loss, mourning, and, of course, fear. Death and everything surrounding it can be terrifying. People fear death. People fear dying. People fear missing out. People fear the loss of others, too. The loss of a loved one is undoubtedly a source of fear for many. The fear and sorrow bound up in the term “death” make it a morbid subject. Often, the topic is avoided in conversation. Death is too melancholic. Death is too miserable. Death is too personal.

Death can be personal, of course. The ways it affects oneself can be intimate and, by virtue of its closeness, it can be a thoroughly private matter. Death is personal when it is one’s own death, perhaps one’s contemplation of or attempt at suicide, or the death of someone known and/or loved. Death has a part to play in our past, our present, and (unavoidably) our future. Death is an omnipresent possibility. Hidden in the wings, death waits for its cue before the final curtain call. All of us await this death and it is the future of us all. The death described here is one that almost everyone will be familiar with: the end of a life. However, there is another death. A second death. An impersonal death. A depersonalised, dispossessed, ungraspable death – that death is the focus of this thesis.

The title’s idiom – “positively dead” – reflects the multiple associations with this second death. Unlike the negative characterisation of death above, the second death is a positive concept. The term “positive” is used in two ways: positive for it is affirming and positive for it is creative. In both these usages of the term positive, there is the proposal that the second death does not feature the negative: it is neither sorrowful nor does it involve lack. In other words, the second death is positive in an idiosyncratic way (i.e., joyful) and as positive creation (i.e., creation without
Both deaths are discussed in this thesis. The first and the second interpretations of death are not mutually exclusive. Personal death is not possible without impersonal death. Personal death is coupled with an individual life; this death is when the individual life ends. However, where the individual dies, there is an impersonal Life that remains. ‘The life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life […]’, writes Deleuze. Deleuze’s work makes use of the second death, which will hereon be referred to as “Death”. The introduction of an impersonal and singular Life should not confuse the idea of an impersonal Death. Rather, impersonal Death is at the boundary between an individual life and an impersonal, immanent Life. An individual’s life is continuously attempting to suppress Death, that is to say a personal life wants to stay personal and not lose its individuality to an immanent Life. Pulling together these ideas: there are two aspects to life and death. The first aspect is the life and death of the individual (so far referred to as personal). The second aspect is Life and Death that exists without individuality (so far referred to as impersonal).

Although there have been several treatments of the notion of ‘life’ as it figures in Deleuze’s corpus, the notion of death has not been explored to the same extent. And yet, Death plays a significant role in Deleuze’s work. Before studying the role of Death for Deleuze, it is worthwhile learning about the origin of his interpretation of Death. Deleuze’s concept of Death is developed in his writing as a curious reading of a death-centric idea introduced by Freud: Todestrieb.

According to Freud, all organisms want to extinguish excitation until they return to an inorganic state. The inorganic state is therefore a regression to a prior state. All living things desire regression to the point of death (the prior state of inanimacy) (BPP 78). The desire to return
to an inanimate state is called the Todestrieb or death drive. The death drive is an innate compulsion to disrupt the harmony of existence. Disharmony is expressed through repeating experiences that are traumatic (BPP 61). These traumas are not just remembered, they are relived (BPP 56). As Freud develops his theory of the death drive, his work takes a materialist tone. Freud begins explaining the drive through embryology, phylogeny, and neurology. For Freud, the death drive becomes the primal drive which the life drive (attempting to preserve the life of the organism) must suppress and struggle against.

Deleuze is not interested in this biological and material concept of the death drive. Deleuze draws upon the concept of repetition found in Freud’s description of the death drive. He states that Freud’s model of the death drive is one of brute repetition (DR 20). By brute repetition, Deleuze is referring to Freud’s material model of the death drive and his focus on the role of opposition in repetition. Deleuze explores a repetition that is only signified, that is a repetition that cannot be represented (DR 21). Deleuze proposes that the death drive is this repetition for itself. However, it is not the repetition of past trauma or the goal of returning to a prior state. Rather, excessive repetition is the eternal return of Nietzsche. All things eternally repeat in the death drive. For Deleuze, this repetition for itself is a belief in the future and affects only the new (DR 117). Repetition for itself is a repetition beyond representation. Deleuze thereby introduces a distinction between representation of repetition and repetition itself.

Eros and Thanatos are distinguished in that Eros must be repeated, can be lived only through repetition, whereas Thanatos (as transcendental principle) is that which gives repetition to Eros, that which submits Eros to repetition (DR 23).

Eros is a term for the life drive (the drive for harmony and stability) and Thanatos is a term for the death drive (disharmony and destabilisation). Eros lives through repetition that is represented. The death drive (Thanatos) is repetition. Deleuze uses this model – his interpretation of Freud’s theory of the death drive – to explain how difference is produced. Difference is not
meant in the conventional concept of the comparative differences between two objects. Difference in the context of Deleuze’s work in *Difference and Repetition* is the concept of difference in itself, without comparison, contrariety, opposition, or distinction: pure difference.

The role of the death drive is fundamental to Deleuze’s concept of difference in itself. The death drive, in Deleuze’s reading, takes place in the unconscious, the unrepresentable, the beyond. The death drive excludes the self. In other words, the death drive is impersonal, ungraspable, and dispossessed. The death drive therefore becomes synonymous with death, if death is understood in the Spinozist sense. For Spinoza, death is the point at which a given body’s proportion of motion and rest has been altered such that it is affected in very few ways (if it can be affected at all) by external bodies (EIV P39). Death is therefore the point at which a body is at “zero intensity”, that is to say it has reached the limits of its affects. By virtue of these characteristics, death or the death drive, as they are treated in Deleuze’s work, comprise the second Death discussed above. Given how Death informs the concept of difference, Death arguably plays a pivotal role in Deleuze’s philosophy. As such, he has been accused of presenting his readership with a “philosophy of death”. Badiou provides this criticism of creating a “philosophy of death”. As a contemporary of Deleuze and having known Deleuze and his work well, this criticism is worth analysing.

In his text *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*, Badiou provides a thorough examination of Deleuze’s philosophical system. Badiou provides a number of criticisms and concerns with Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. One of the areas of Deleuze’s work that Badiou comments on is the necessity for death. Badiou writes the following:

However paradoxical the attribute may seem, applied to someone who claims to draw his inspiration above all from Nietzsche (although there is in Nietzsche himself a profound saintliness), it is necessary to uphold that the condition of thought, for Deleuze, is ascetic. [...] [The crown of “crowned anarchy”] is attributed to beings who have ascetically renounced the “lived experiences”
and “states of affairs” that constituted their sentimental, intellectual, or social actuality and who have had the power to exceed their limits, to go “where they are borne by hubris”.

The result is that this philosophy of life is essentially, just like Stoicism (but not at all like Spinozism, despite the reverence in which Deleuze holds Spinoza), a philosophy of death. Badiou is arguing that Deleuze’s focus on Death and going beyond the personal has left his philosophy too ascetic. By ascetic, we can assume that Badiou is hinting at life-denial, that is to say the refusal to accept life and to instead hope for something more beneficial beyond it. In this case, the condition for thought is Death. Therefore, Badiou suggests that Deleuze’s philosophy has become reliant on the groundlessness of death and depersonalisation and is no longer a philosophy related to life and vitality. However, Badiou’s judgment is inaccurate.

To consider Deleuze’s argument for the condition of thought to be ascetic indicates a misunderstanding of the process of losing oneself in Death. Ascetism is usually undergone to achieve a certain aim, usually spiritual. However, such an aim is unfeasible in the context of Deleuze’s interpretation of Death. The suspension or oblivion of the self in Death is not something one can will. The conscious self does not have control over the unconscious in this way. In other words, one cannot simply will their self away. The moment of transformation that a person undergoes – the moment where the conditions of thought are met, and new thinking can begin – does not include the individual self at all. Badiou’s assertion that Deleuze has produced a philosophy of death makes it clear that he sees Deleuze as preoccupied with how the individual is extinguished. However, Death is a necessary and transformative undertaking that allows immanent Life to be introduced to the individual life of the conscious self. The possibility of transformation lies beyond the self, in the chaos of the unconscious. Chaos is the limit of the cyclical “rhythm” of consciousness. The groundlessness out of which the order of reason originates is chaos. As Smith writes, ‘chaos itself can also be a germ of order or rhythm’, as the ground of rhythm is not possible without its ungrounded nature. Through the link between the conscious self (Eros) and Death
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(Thanatos), new ways of thinking are possible. Nevertheless, Badiou does highlight an important issue. Deleuze’s preoccupation with Death presents some potential difficulties, namely whether there can be harmony between Deleuze’s frequent use of Death and his intention for a philosophy of vitality and Life. The tension between Deleuze’s affirming philosophy and his use of Death is the focus of this thesis. The affirmationist works that inspire Deleuze tend to focus on a philosophy of life and limit their use of the concept of death. Deleuze’s work must maintain the pursuit of a philosophy of life and yet depend on the function of his concept of Death. The reconciliation of the two may provide us with a concept of Death that is not only integral to the life of the individual, but also provides a positive role in the conception of thought.

Deleuze’s use of Death diverges from some of the work of affirmationists whom he admires. In this thesis, the affirmationists who will be examined are Lucretius and Spinoza. Both Lucretius and Spinoza cover two ways of understanding death, similar to Deleuze’s own interpretations (i.e., personal death and impersonal Death). However, there are some fundamental differences between the two historic affirmationists and Deleuze when it comes to developing a concept of death. The divergence centres on Lucretius and Spinoza presenting death as a mechanistic process that results only in the alteration of bodily structures. Lucretius provides reasons not to fear (personal) death, before exploring the atomistic mechanics of an impersonal death. In his work, impersonal death is just the augmentation of a structure. The structure is changed so as to no longer be the same structure as before. The fact(s) of change is the reason Lucretius discusses death in these terms. Lucretius’ account of change explains the process of growth and destruction and reinforces his principle of conservation.

In Spinoza’s work, the fear of death is also addressed. Spinoza explains that a failure to understand death adequately is the cause of the fear of death. The response he has to the fear of death leads him to delineate his own interpretation of it as something impersonal. Death is also linked to structure in Spinoza’s writings. For Spinoza, death is a change in the proportion of
motion and rest in a body. Again, this resembles a depersonalised Death. However, in both cases – Lucretius’ and Spinoza’s – the concept of death is perhaps too materialistic and mechanistic for Deleuze. Nevertheless, their respective concepts of death appear to signify the Death which Deleuze utilises. All three thinkers agree on one aspect of death: the end of the individual is only possible with the existence of a depersonalised Death. Deleuze’s work emphasises the end of the individual in a way that Lucretius and Spinoza do not. At that point where the individual is suspended in Death, novelty is introduced to consciousness. Herein lies Deleuze’s departure from Lucretius and Spinoza.

The loss of the self is not inaccurate in the critique of Badiou. Deleuze does make it clear that his notion of Death occurs during a time when the self is absent. The losing of the self does not mean it is annihilated. However, at the point of Death, the conditions for the self to exist simply are not there. The self is missing because it cannot be present in Death. Death does have an influence over the self, however. Death is intimately linked with the self. Death is what allows for a self to be transformed. In that transformation, there can be new ways of thinking or new images of thought. Deleuze hopes that there can be an era of novel concepts brought about through a change in the limited way people commonly think, what he calls the dogmatic image of thought. In this way, Deleuze’s concept of Death has a positive role. Death is not miserable. Death does not leave us feeling wretched. Death is in fact a crucial element to the ongoing experience of novelty and difference. More importantly, Death is an essential part of the possibility of new images of thought. Death cannot be sought after or willed (contra Badiou). Rather, it is the dispossessed possibility of transformation and thinking through difference.

Death as the possibility for transformation is important to Deleuze’s ethics of experimentation and desire. Deleuze uses the concept of Death to enable experimentation with expressions of the self. That is to say, Deleuze encourages his readers to embrace the fact that they have the capacity to push past their self-imposed limitations. When we become capable of that act,
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we are altered beyond who we were. Indeed, the goal is not to remove the self entirely (which seems to be Badiou’s concern) but to find new fulfilments of desires by experimenting with them. In taking part in these experimentations, the individual can find which desires help them to fulfil their potential and maximise their self-empowerment. For that to happen, Death must provide the means for transformation. Death is therefore a drive for development and augmentation. Death has a positive effect on the life of the individual.

Most work written on Deleuze and death focusses on the circumstances and philosophical significance of Deleuze’s own death, or are commenting on variations of the first, personal death (e.g., suicide). Valuable work that explores the impersonal concept of death in Deleuze includes that written by Leites, Baugh, and Adkins. In particular, Brent Adkins’ work *Death and Desire in Hegel, Heidegger and Deleuze* explores the concept of death in Deleuze in detail. Adkins describes how Heidegger’s explanation of being-towards-death in *Being and Time* could be seen as melancholic, and Hegel’s use of death as part of the development of spirit in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* could be seen as mourning. The problem in both philosophies, Adkins argues, is that neither of them offers an interpretation of death that is not founded on a notion of lack. Deleuze is opposed to the idea that lack can form a sufficient basis for a philosophy, as it uses negation and contradiction, thus keeping it in the realm of representation (DR 62). Through the work of *Anti-Oedipus* and other texts, Adkins concludes that Deleuze and Guattari oppose the Freudian idea of the death instinct as an internalisation of anti-production (which Adkins believes is found in the accounts of death in Hegel and Heidegger, to a certain degree). He suggests that Deleuze and Guattari ‘argue in their positive account of death that there is a model of death, which they identify with the body without organs, and an experience of death, which they identify as the movement from one intensive state to another.’ The model of death Adkins refers to is a state of zero intensity, that is to say the limit of desire-production. Deleuze and Guattari do what Hegel, Heidegger, and Freud do not, namely acknowledge the reality of a model and experience of death that is not purely representational. Adkins suggests that the alternative interpretation of death in
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Deleuze and Guattari is a joyful celebration of life and not a “sad song” about lack or loss. Desire is not interrupted or cut off by death, nor is production arrested by death – rather, the desiring and producing in the model of death is one in which there is no singular or structured aim for desire. Adkins suggests that Deleuze presents death as anti-production itself. Death is not an end to life, but an end to the directedness of desire.

Adkins’ work is insightful and provides a good explanation of how the concept of death is used in the work of Deleuze and Guattari to develop their theory of desire. Death also features in Deleuze’s work prior to his collaborative writing, however. The earlier definitions of death that Deleuze provides are the focus of this thesis. The writings of Deleuze and Guattari are mostly left aside here. Instead, the emphasis of the essay is not on a theory of desire, but the philosophy of difference. The reason for this focus on difference is to explore the necessary conditions for novelty within thought and thinking. The treatment of death in *Difference and Repetition* is not as clearly demarcated as other concepts in the text, such as difference or time. The positive role of death in the philosophy of difference is the priority of this essay. In his collaborative work, Deleuze departs from the solitary focus on difference and develops a theory of desire with Guattari. The theory of desire is used to critique psychoanalysis over its relationship with capitalism. In this work, the development of the alternative to psychoanalysis, schizoanalysis, and emphasis on desire is not pertinent. Therefore, Death in *Difference and Repetition* is analysed separately from later developments of the concept. Works such as *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus* are referred to wherever necessary. However, *Difference and Repetition* remains the dominant source for exploring the concept of Death. The first chapter of the thesis presents a close reading of *Difference and Repetition*.

Chapter One of this thesis explores the definition and usage of death in *Difference and Repetition*. In the second chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, entitled ‘Repetition for Itself’, Deleuze gives the clearest description of the death drive and what role it has in his philosophy of difference.
Death is defined as a limit or boundary between the conscious and unconscious. To make it clear how Deleuze sets up its use in this chapter, each of the three syntheses of time are delineated. The three syntheses of time are how Deleuze explains the structure of consciousness, in particular the identity or image it forms of itself, and how consciousness both represses and is built upon the unconscious. The three syntheses or repetitions are referred to as forms of time (past, present, and future) due to Deleuze interpreting the construction of time as signifying different structures of consciousness. Deleuze makes use of the work of Hume and Kant when defining the first and second syntheses, respectively. The two syntheses related to consciousness (Habit and Memory) are, he suggests, demonstrative of the structure of time in consciousness. The two syntheses of time that Deleuze initially discusses are therefore indicative of the structure of the consciousness that produces these representations of time. The third synthesis refers to time that is not constructed by consciousness. In other words, whereas the first two syntheses of time are represented in conscious experience (a phenomenal time), the third synthesis of time is not represented. The third synthesis lies beyond the conditions for conscious experience and the self.

The first chapter of this thesis treats each of the three syntheses or repetitions discretely. The third repetition features the death drive, or Thanatos. In Freud’s work, the death drive and pleasure principle were connected by a desexualised energy. Freud proposes that the conversion from the love of an object (object-libido) to the love of oneself (narcissistic libido) is the loss of the sexual drive or desexualisation.13 The energy of this desexualisation is preceded by the death drive (given the primacy of the drive). Deleuze interprets desexualisation in a different way. Desexualisation also has a part to play in the philosophy of difference, bridging the order of the consciousness with the groundless chaos of the unconscious.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze is not explicit in what he means by the term desexualisation. However, this concept is important for understanding how Thanatos can influence the other two syntheses of time. A clearer definition of desexualisation is provided in Deleuze’s essay the novel *Friday*, by Michel Tournier’s. In the essay, Deleuze explains how
desexualisation is the process which brings the possibility of change, ingenuity, and novelty to the first two syntheses. Deleuze’s essay also clarifies that the three syntheses, though explored discretely, are not teleological, that is to say that they are not repetitions which lead from one to the other and which culminate in Thanatos. Rather, they occur simultaneously. Indeed, it is easier to see the influence that the death drive has on the repetitions and their dynamic interaction when the three syntheses are explored as a simultaneous occurrence in the process of thinking. The three repetitions are therefore brought together by exploring the theme of timing in drama. Deleuze has an appreciation of dramatic timing in his work, with the dramatic devices featuring in both the conscious and unconscious structures of time. The boundary or limit of the capacity for consciousness to reproduce itself is called the \textit{caesura}, which means cut, break, or pause. It is a technique used in dramatic writing, whereby a character goes from being incapable of an action to becoming capable of it. The change in that character is marked by this severance of their personality: the one who is incapable and the one who is capable. Between these two states (capability and incapability) is the \textit{becoming capable} of the act. The work of Hölderlin has a direct influence on Deleuze’s interpretation and usage of the \textit{caesura}. Deleuze’s intention for the concept of Thanatos in his philosophy of difference is clearer once this dramatic device of the \textit{caesura} is elucidated. Clearer still is the relation between the conscious and the unconscious syntheses.

After emphasising drama and timing, the thesis goes on to explore its association with Deleuze’s triplex structure for repetition (the first, second and third repetitions are synonymous with the first, second and third syntheses of time – repetition is simply an expression of time through the repetition of presents, past and future, respectively). The works of Joachim of Fiore and Giambattista Vico are explored in some detail to reveal why Deleuze values their philosophical systems. An explanation of Deleuze’s critique of Vico and Joachim of Fiore also presents how their philosophies have the same error: the third element of their respective philosophies repeats in the same way that the first two elements do. The third element does not eternally repeat beyond the cyclical repetitions of their first two elements. In identifying this error, it is apparent what
Deleuze’s work provides to remedy their oversight. The aim of this section of the thesis is to take the notions of time and a triplex system, like those presented by Joachim of Fiore and Vico, and demonstrate how they both clarify the interaction between the three syntheses and provide a route to developing new images of thought. With the three repetitions described, Thanatos explored in detail, and the connections between the syntheses illustrated, the reader will have a good understanding of how death is defined and used by Deleuze in his philosophy of difference. Chapter One of this thesis will also have explained why Deleuze is using the concept of death and the importance of its role in his philosophy. An appreciation of the similarities and differences between Deleuze’s concept of death and the concept of death held by other thinkers explored in this thesis will be much clearer once the three syntheses of time have been dissected. One such thinker, whose concept of death will be compared to that of Deleuze and for whom Deleuze holds in high esteem, is Lucretius. The next chapter of the thesis provides an exegesis of his poem *De Rerum Natura* and examines his models of death.

The focus of chapter two is Lucretius’ concept of death. In his poem *De Rerum Natura* (*On the Nature of Things*), Lucretius elaborates on the naturalism and ethics of Epicureanism. A keen student of Epicureanism, he uses the naturalist and empiricist practice of the observation of nature to explain natural events, our capacity to sense the world, and the development and structure of civilisation. Lucretius uses his understanding of the atomic mechanics to arrive at many of his conclusions, taking inspiration from *On Nature*, by Epicurus. Sedley makes a compelling argument for the concordance between these two works – Epicurus’ *On Nature* and Lucretius’ *De Rerum Natura* – and highlighting this connection provides an ideal introduction to Lucretius’ work. Through this introduction, Lucretius’ aims for his work are clear. Revealing the connection between Lucretius and Epicurus also helps to delineate many of the concepts that Lucretius uses in his interpretation of Epicureanism (e.g., clinamen). While there is a great deal of similarity between Lucretius and Epicurus, there are some elements of Lucretius’ work which expand upon the surviving work of Epicurus. Once the connection between Lucretius and Epicurus is
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established, the thesis analyses Lucretius’ treatment of death. Lucretius provides a materialist account of change, growth, and development. To account for change, he offers an intriguing description of death. Death is defined as the moment at which something goes beyond the limits of what it once was (DRN, III:511-20). However, death is also related to the mortality of the soul. Therefore, Lucretius appears to offer two distinct definitions of death. Due to the meaning of death that Lucretius suggests in his elaboration on change and mortality, death goes from being an event in the history of one’s life to a foundational mechanism for the possibility of change and therefore the possibility of life. As it is not possible for atoms to be created or destroyed, according to Lucretius, change must come from the alteration of a structure’s arrangement. A complex structure (made from a combination of atoms) can undergo the addition, subtraction, and substitution of the atoms out of which it is composed. In other words, the material existence of something is only possible through the augmentation of structures as a result of their interaction with other structures in world. The interactions provide the possibility of growth, destruction, or transformation of a given object (structure). What is significant in Lucretius’ account is that the law of the equivalence of matter (integral to his atomism) leads to a distinct process of individuation. The individuation principle in Lucretius’ work is made clear by drawing upon Schopenhauer’s concept of palingenesis.

To maintain the indestructibility of the Will to Live (the essential striving for the continuation of existence that is shared in all things), Schopenhauer explains that the death of something does not mean that the Will is destroyed. Rather, the Will is palingenetic, meaning that it will remain unchanged by the event of death and develop into a new expression instead. I use this example of palingenesis to provide a conceptual framework to understand how Lucretius’ conservation of matter leads to an understanding of death as the limit of identity (which is destroyed) and the limitlessness and indestructibility of matter (which always persists). Using the work of Simondon, I evaluate how effective palingenesis is as an account of change and the development of identity. The latter part of the chapter explores this and the short essay Deleuze
wrote on Lucretius, ‘Lucretius and the Simulacrum’. The role of naturalism in taking apart superstitions through empiricism and the active use of reason is the aim of Deleuze’s essay. The pursuit of joy is the goal of Lucretius’ elaboration on the simulacrum, according to Deleuze, and this same process of demystification is considered in light of the description of death that Lucretius offers. The use of death to introduce the true infinite world of atoms and reveal the false infinite world of identity is a key concept in Lucretius’ work (although it is tenuous, given his reliance on identity elsewhere) and is shared with the work of Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*.

Spinoza is the second of the two affirmationists explored in the context of Deleuze and death. A close reading of Spinoza’s *Ethics* provides a clear delineation of his concept of death. To begin with, important concepts such as passions, substance, and *conatus* are clarified to allow for a good understanding of his notion of death. Spinoza’s naturalism and its aims are explained in brief, before the thesis moves on to the limited descriptions of death that we find in *Ethics*. For Spinoza, death is the point at which a change in the proportion of motion and rest of a given body (that is the ways that the various components of a body interact with one another) and the fall in the number of ways said body can be affected. In short, when something changes so much that it cannot be affected by other things in the same way or as much as it originally was, it is considered to have died. Spinoza’s concept of death does not seem to be too different to that adduced in the work done on Lucretius. However, Spinoza’s work features a concept that is not found in Lucretius: desire. Spinoza’s concept of *conatus* is integral to understanding how change is explored in his work. The *conatus* is the essential desire for existence. The desire to exist is an important aspect of Spinoza’s work. By the nature of desire, it is contradictory to say that something possesses the means for its self-destruction, given that its essence strives for its continued existence. In other words, something cannot both self-destruct and perpetuate itself. The destruction or death of something is always caused by the interaction with something external. Spinoza is clear that under no circumstances can something be considered the source of its own end. The substance (of which an existing thing is a mode) is also not destroyed in the death of a given body. Regarding death,
the fact that it leads to the destruction of a body and therefore a loss in the capacity to be affected that a given body has, makes it a cause for sadness. As it is absurd to say that something carries the will for its own destruction, according to Spinoza, the notion of the death drive seems irreconcilable with his *Ethics*.

The death drive is the fundamental desire for regression to a prior state, namely to a state of inanimacy or death, according to Freud. Freud also argues that the death drive is within all living organisms. For Spinoza, the death drive would be absurd and contradictory. The pursuit of self-destruction cannot coexist with self-preservation. All things have an innate desire for existence and the single substance all things share in (God/Nature) is indestructible. Therefore, the death drive is not only implausible, for Spinoza, the death drive is impossible. In the case of Deleuze’s interpretation of the death drive, there is no contention with any of the rational conclusions that Spinoza has about death. Indeed, Deleuze himself calls death the most base thing in his lectures on Spinoza. Deleuze knew that Spinoza did not support the idea that death is opposed to life. By exploring the interpretation that Deleuze has of the death drive and considering the work already done in the first chapter of the thesis, the compatibility between Deleuze’s concept of death and Spinozism is made clear. In fact, there are some similarities between Deleuze’s Thanatos and Spinoza’s monistic substance. Spinoza’s idea of substance has arguably influenced Deleuze’s definition of the pure order of time and his interpretation of Nietzsche’s eternal return. The thesis then evaluates what the implications might be of Spinoza’s characterisation of death on the anticipation of one’s death and the death of others. I argue that the overreliance that Spinoza has on rationality betrays a neglect of the emotional aspect of death. Of course, Spinoza talks about joy and sadness, and so he is not entirely unappreciative of the effects of emotion on our lives. The approach that Spinoza takes is like that found in Stoicism, whereby one uses their reason to dispel superstition and to calm the mind. However, there is something to be said of the individual’s experiences of death and how this might further motivate the desire to exist and give more credence to the role of identity. The individual has an important role in the acquisition of adequate
knowledge of things to diminish the experience of sadness. Ultimately, the work of both Spinoza and Lucretius sets a precedent: what is primary is the world out of which the individual is produced, not how that individual interacts with the world. This conclusion is returned to later in the thesis, although first I will present the work of a writer who does not see death as something that is to be ignored or pushed away, but something constitutive to the development of identity and even of freedom.

Thus far there has only been talk of affirmationism and a concept of death that is the result of an interaction as opposed to the germ of death being carried by that which dies. In chapter following from the affirmationists, I seek to provide an alternative reading of death. To do this, I will illuminate the concept of death as it is described in the work of Hegel. A dialectical philosopher, Hegel’s work uses the process of contradiction to push concepts to their limits and discover what it is about the understanding of those concepts that is their undoing. In other words, when presented with a concept, Hegel takes that concept to the point of contradiction by a thoroughgoing examination of its meaning. This requires that a given concept has the means to its own contradiction, that is to say that it provides for its own negation. Clearly, this contradicts what Spinoza proposes when he discussed the desire for existence inherent in all things, which prevents them from being the source of their own end. Deleuze also contends that the use of contradiction relies too heavily on representation to be considered a worthwhile foundation for a philosophical system (DR 62-63). Interestingly, Hegel’s notion of death is quite similar to Deleuze’s own concept of death. Death is an important part of the development of self-consciousness. Desire, too, has a role in that process, with death being integral to the fulfilment of that desire and the progression from consciousness to self-consciousness. Death is also indicative of a world beyond singular identity, a world that is much more general and universal and which underpins the individual identities of all things. Therefore, there is the concern that Deleuze’s own concept of death might share in this dialectical model of death and may even introduce negation into the affirmationist system of philosophy that Deleuze wants to establish. I will begin the chapter by introducing how
Hegel's dialectical philosophy is performed in his work. The opening to *Science of Logic* provides a clear example of dialectics at work, the explanation of which lays the foundation for the examination of death to come later. I then go on to introduce the concept of death by providing a close reading of *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

The *Herr/Knecht* dialectic found in *Phenomenology of Spirit* features an important treatment of death, by Hegel. In this dialectic, desire is clearly linked with the development of self-consciousness. Through desiring the negation of other objects by consumption, consciousness achieves self-certainty. The idea of desire is intriguing here, as it also has some significance for Deleuze. However, the focus will remain on Hegel as I then go on to explain how death is involved in the encounter between two self-consciousnesses. The concept of death establishes the relation between the master and the slave and establishes how the slave can later have a means to the freedom that they desired in the initial encounter. The discussion of Hegel's concept of death is then brought together with Deleuze’s own understanding of death. The aim is to expose any shared understanding that the two might have. It is important to know what, if any, similarities there are between Hegel and Deleuze, as these may jeopardise Deleuze’s attempt at being strictly affirmationist in his approach to death. The chapter ends by considering in what ways Hegel provides a concept of death that is rooted in the development of the individual. While this seems to consider personal death and not impersonal Death, the loss of identity and individuality are important to Deleuze’s work. Understanding how individuality (the personal) is lost also demonstrates the movement beyond identity and image. The following chapter elaborates further on what this breaking down of identity means, why it is the approach that Deleuze takes, what the implications may be for his philosophy, and how it relates to other affirmationist philosophies.

An image of thought is established through the implementation of certain rules by the imagination. These rules are habits and are the foundation of our contemplation (what Deleuze calls a question-problem complex). The image is either affirmed or negated due to the rules that
are in place. These rules are implemented to create limits and boundaries around the infinite multiplicity of pure difference. Pure difference has its own rules, in which all things are affirmed. As such, pure difference is affirmation (DR 69-70). The development of these rulesets leads to Deleuze determining that there are two “games” being played: the Human Game and the Divine Game. The Human Game corresponds to the image of thought. While the Divine Game is an explains the nature of pure difference. In this last chapter, it is revealed how Death is the boundary of these two games. The final chapter also explores how Nietzsche is a key inspiration for Deleuze’s concept of these games. To begin with, the Human and Divine Game are explained in some detail. Understanding the idea behind this characterisation of a twofold approach to identity helps to uncover how Nietzsche is the source of these ideas. Two concepts from Nietzsche’s work are delineated: Dionysian spirit and eternal return.

Both the concepts of Dionysian spirit and eternal return influence Deleuze’s treatment of Death. This thesis places the initial development of Nietzsche’s idea of the Dionysian spirit in the work of Birth of Tragedy. In Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche sets Dionysian spirit in opposition to Apollonian spirit. While the Apollonian spirit pursues order and image, the Dionysian spirit is more chaotic, involving intoxication to abandon selfhood. Much is said about how the notion of the sublime influences Nietzsche’s approach to intoxication. The concept of intoxication matures and is distanced from intoxication as escapism. Rather than a resentful intoxication to escape, intoxication is caused by embracing life fully. Moving on from this idea of losing oneself to the fullness of life, the eternal return is explored in some detail. An interpretation of Nietzsche’s use of the eternal return as a thought-experiment is presented, one which is markedly different to the interpretation given by Deleuze. The relationship between the eternal return and Death is then explored. The development of the relation of the two concepts involves a close reading of Difference and Repetition and Nietzsche and Philosophy, alongside Nietzsche’s The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra. This then culminates in an analysis of what Deleuze is attempting to achieve by using the eternal return to arrive at oblivion. Oblivion does not mean extinction or total annihilation in
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this context. Oblivion is a state of having been forgotten, that is to say the self is forgotten in the oblivion of Death in the unconscious.

Towards the end of the final chapter, it is argued that the route to oblivion is intended to enable a radical experimentation with selfhood. The moment of oblivion provides the possibility for pure difference to have a positive effect on the image of thought and allow for the creation of new images of thought and new concepts. However, I also establish that this obliviating of the self is contrary to the aims of those affirmationists explored earlier in the thesis, including Nietzsche. Deleuze succeeds in avoiding negation and contradiction, however in removing the last remaining myth - the myth of identity - he endangers the work of other affirmationists. The endangerment is due to Deleuze shifting focus away from improving the life of the individual. Lucretius, Spinoza and Nietzsche want the reader to practice the cultivation of the self. However, Deleuze sets out to obviate the self to discover new selves, new ways of thinking, and the new concepts. In this regard, Deleuze has taken affirmation too far, when compared to his fellow affirmationists, and is left with a philosophy that only cultivates thought at the expense of the cultivation of the self. Deleuze’s concept of Death does affirm life. However, it does not affirm an individual’s life, but a singular Life, that is to say an immanent life.

In response to Badiou, the philosophy presented by Deleuze is neither ascetic nor a philosophy of death irreconcilable with Spinoza’s philosophy of life. The end to connections with life is not ascetic world-denial, as Badiou perceives it, but the exclusion of the self without volition. The self is not meant to be annihilated or abolished. Rather, the self needs to lose its fixity so it can be experimented with. An individual needs to be open to the possibility of novelty and test the boundaries of the concepts which are recognised. The experimentation occurs as a result of allowing breaks and cracks to form in the image of thought and being transformed by the reassembly of relations. While the self cannot control the type of transformation or make it
manifest, there is the capacity for an openness to difference. This does not require the self to be abandoned, but the possibility of novelty does rely on Death.

Death is a fundamental part of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. Death also plays a pivotal role in the collapse of the structure-Other (also referred to as Other-structure) which supports the dogmatic image of thought. The deconstruction of this structure occurs as desexualisation. However, this process is continuous and not a single moment. The dogmatic image represses Death because it is repeated in the fatigue and forgetting of Eros. In other words, the dogmatic image of thought, which governs conscious experience, limits “making sense” to recognition and, in doing so, reduces novelty and puts thinking into the bondage of the iron collars of representation. Deleuze’s philosophy of difference critiques this way of thinking, this common sense. The aim is not for the self to be abandoned or for convention to be rejected. The aim of Deleuze’s philosophy is for the self to become empowered and active by challenging the common sense that restricts it. The philosophy of difference promotes active thinking by demystifying the transcendental illusion of common sense. As such, Deleuze’s philosophy maintains its affirmationism and stays true to Spinozism.
NOTES

2 Throughout the thesis, Death (capitalised) will specifically indicate this “second death”.
9 Brent Adkins, *Death and Desire in Hegel, Heidegger and Deleuze* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p.188.
10 Brent Adkins, *Death and Desire in Hegel, Heidegger and Deleuze* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p.188.
In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze develops a concept of difference and explores its relationship with repetition. Deleuze’s aim is to show how difference and repetition can force us to think in new and creative ways and develop new structures or images of thought. The second chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, titled ‘Repetition for Itself’, outlines a triplex system of repetition that forms the foundation of consciousness and the development of the self. A necessary component of this system is the third repetition which is the unthought and the unconscious. Constitutive of this third repetition is the death drive, a Freudian concept that Deleuze appropriates and reinterprets for the purposes of his critique of the current, dominant, and dogmatic image of thought.

In Freud, the death drive is a primordial force of self-destabilisation and self-destruction, repressed by the harmony-seeking Ego. For Deleuze, this is interpreted as a vitality attempting to free a singular life from limitations forced upon it. A singular life can be an identity, the representation of individuality. *Difference and Repetition* attempts to demonstrate how the consciousness that helps to form identity also signifies identity’s chaotic and vital source. The reader understands that there are aspects to the structure of the self that lead to its destruction. However, it is not clear if this means identity contains the germ of its own destruction or why there needs to be any self-destabilisation of identity at all. Indeed, it is not readily apparent as to why the third repetition is necessary.

In this chapter, the process and products of the death drive will be elaborated upon. To do this, each of the three repetitions will be discretely explored before they are drawn together under the theme of dramatic timing. The repetitions are worth exploring independent of one
another so that their distinct compositions and operations (including their limitations) are made clear. The three repetitions are described through a careful reading of *Difference and Repetition*. The third repetition, in which the concept of the death drive is introduced, is explored in greater detail to reveal the link between the death drive, vitality, and identity. Deleuze’s essay on Tournier’s novel *Friday* is a key element to this exploration, as it provides some intriguing insights into Deleuze’s understanding of the term “desexualisation”, which he uses to refer to the process which constitutes the death drive. The three repetitions are finally brought together in the context of timing in tragedy, referring to Deleuze’s appreciation of Hölderlin’s commentary on *Oedipus Rex*. The purpose of this is to illustrate the simultaneity of the three repetitions and how the death drive is an ever-present and immanent source of novelty. The work of Joachim of Fiore and Giambattista Vico is discussed in the light of the elaboration on drama and time. These two thinkers provide triplex systems which resonate with Deleuze’s own three repetitions. The missing element to their work — novelty in the third part to their system — is the final piece in the exploration of how the death drive operates in the third repetition.

Before examining Deleuze’s interpretation and use of the death drive through the work of others, the question of what the death drive is and how it appears in Deleuze’s work needs to be dealt with. How does the death drive work within the three repetitions? Why is it necessary for desexualisation to introduce us to the death drive? How does the death drive allow for novelty in the third repetition? Why does Deleuze use the death drive in his critique of the dogmatic image of thought? How does the death drive fit in his philosophy of difference?

**THE THREE REPETITIONS/SYNTHESIS**

Chapter One of *Difference and Repetition* outlines Deleuze’s concept of difference itself. Difference has traditionally been attributed to terms that are identical, similar, analogous, or opposed (DR 182). In this sense, difference is always between concepts and never really explained as a concept itself, that is to say the concept of difference is never absent of any comparison or contrariety.
Death and Time

The first chapter of *Difference and Repetition* is therefore dedicated to what difference is in itself. What is important for the purposes of the first chapter of this thesis is not what difference is (as that will be discussed later) but how difference comes to be made, how we “make the difference”. Deleuze sees repetition as the way we can understand this process of making the difference.

Repetitions are simply a representation that is repeated. However, for there to be multiple repetitions of the same thing, there must also be differences between them, despite their not appearing to be different from one another. Repetition requires difference, although it does not produce difference itself. Rather, the repetition ‘changes something in the mind which contemplates it’, which is to say that ‘something new *in* the mind’ – difference – is introduced when presented with the repetition of something (DR 93). Repetition is characterised not by identicality, similarity, analogy, or opposition but by the change that it causes in the mind of one who observes it, the ‘difference that the mind *draws from* repetition’ (DR 93). Chapter Two of *Difference and Repetition* is therefore the focus of how difference itself finds its way into our experience of the world. Difference itself presents us with another interesting concept: repetition for itself. It is in repetition for itself that we find the discussion of the death drive.

Deleuze’s interpretation of the death drive has its place in the third of three repetitions. In his chapter on repetition for itself, Deleuze elaborates on what he considers to be the three synchronous repetitions which expose how difference is made in the mind. Through the three repetitions, Deleuze aims to reveal how difference enters one’s conscious experience. Of course, this is not merely the difference between objects but the difference that underlies their representation the representation of these objects in the mind. These representations are what is repeated in the mind and it is the difference that leads to the repetition of representations and vice versa that Deleuze refers to when he talks of the mind drawing difference from repetition. The three repetitions are therefore related to representation in their own unique ways. The first
repetition that to be explored is called Habit. This is the habitual synthesis of present moments that have come to pass and their contraction to form a new, coherent present moment.

The work of the first repetition can be characterised by the notion of Habit or Habitus, that is the construction of a mind through numerous habits. Deleuze draws his understanding of habit from Hume. Deleuze writes extensively on habit and subjectivity in his text *Empricism and Subjectivity*. Initially, the mind is an inconsistent collection of ideas, according to Hume. However, there are also connections made between ideas. Hume identifies the imagination as the faculty which provides this relational power. Imagination is not uniform, however, until it is informed by principles that create a tendency or habit. Habit formed through active contemplation makes ease of connecting these ideas together in a coherent way. ‘Habit draws something new from repetition – namely, difference (in the first instance understood as generality). In essence, habit is contraction.’ (DR 97) Imagination provides unity to the mind by associating and contracting ideas. The various relations, associations, contractions are passively generated and develop into habits. Contraction does not occur due to the active contraction of two distinct elements. Contraction of the imagination can also be a passive ‘fusion’, and expectation that ‘one of the two elements will appear after the other’. (DR 98) Contemplation is a passive synthesis ‘of that repetition in a contemplating mind’ (DR 98). Hume suggests that the work of the imagination is passive and Deleuze shares this idea of the initial synthesis as a passive synthesis. Therefore, if the mind is comprised of interconnected ideas, the synthesis of which is provided by the imagination (governed by a series of habits), then the mind is first and foremost a collection of habits. The first synthesis is the satisfaction of already established habits, and so it is largely a body of passive contractions, what Deleuze terms the ‘larval subject’ (DR 103). All these habits are contemplated upon, and it is these contemplations that form the foundation of our unified selfhood, as Deleuze states: ‘We speak of our “self” only in virtue of these thousands of little witnesses which contemplate within us: it is always a third party who says “me”.’ (DR 100)
Deleuze understands contemplation as a question-problem complex. Contemplation poses a question to habit that requires an answer. The question is always whether that habit can be fulfilled. Whenever habit provides a contraction of ideas that affirms the question-problem posed by a contemplation, an image is produced. The image is always of ourselves, with our contemplations wanting the problem of our selfhood responded to with the solution of our image as a unified self. This solution is provided through habitual contractions of ideas. ‘To contemplate is to draw something from’ (DR 99), and what is drawn upon is at first distinct from ourselves, the aim of the contemplation being the affirmation of our self from the contraction of the many instances or “cases” of what is being questioned in the contemplation. ‘Contemplations are questions, while the contractions which occur in them and complete them are so many finite affirmations produced in the same way as presents are produced out of the perpetual present by means of the passive synthesis of time.’ (DR 103) As we can see, Deleuze considers this contraction by contemplation to be the basis for our contraction of a collection of present moments. In contracting presents, habit responds to the question-problem of a self that persists through time in a “present present” or a living present. A present that is informed by the synthesis of all those presents that have been.

In this way we establish the present moment, the living present, the contraction of all previous moments into a unified history of connected ideas via habit. ‘To the first synthesis of time there corresponds a first question-problem complex as this appears in the living present (the urgency of life). This living present, and with it the whole of organic and psychic life, rests upon habit.’ (DR 103) Habit is therefore fundamental to the living present due to it providing the ground for the fulfilment of contemplation. Habit provides contemplation with the unification or contraction of associated ideas in the mind.

Contemplation and contraction form a present present through the synthesis of all past presents into a coherent and united living present. The self is situated in this living present as the
combination of these contemplations and habits. However, the ability to maintain this self has its limits. In contemplating, habits are called upon to contract and relax ideas, providing pleasure in meeting a need that contemplation itself generates. The pursuit of this pleasure leads to self-gratification, the auto-satisfaction of contemplation. Given that we are the collection of our contemplations, Deleuze considers us to be inherently narcissistic. He argues that the affirmation of contemplation being found in the image of our self (as a collection of contemplations) is evidence of this narcissism. It is important to note that we do not contemplate our own self, but the self exists ‘only in contemplating – that is to say, in contracting that from which we come.’ (DR 98)

The desire for pleasure that drives contemplation is satisfied only in contemplation being faced with its reflection, the reflection of many little contemplations being affirmed. Yet, the drive that propels this pursuit of pleasure by contemplation is not unlimited. The perpetual demands of contemplation and the contractions and relaxations of habit can lead to fatigue. ‘Fatigue marks the point at which the soul can no longer contract what it contemplates, the moment at which contemplation and contraction come apart.’ (DR 101)

We are not just comprised of our many habits and their contemplations; we are also comprised of these exhaustions of affirmation. ‘We are made up of fatigues as much as of contemplations.’ (DR 101) Fatigue is not a lack; it is the point at which contraction ceases and contemplation is left unable to be fulfilled, leaving contemplation to begin anew, refreshed. Habit supplies contemplation with affirmation and yet is unable to maintain its contraction beyond certain limits. As Schuster says, ‘For Deleuze the starting point for thinking the drives is a pure affirmation, a pre-reflexive, self-absorbed, impersonal joy, yet one that is at the same time menaced by a lapse, a lag, a drag, the impossibility of going on.’

The pursuit of pleasure or pleasure principle that drives contemplation and habit finds its limitation and reaches fatigue. Beyond the question-complex of contemplation and the tendency imposed by habit there is no “self”, there are no “witnesses” that comprise our selfhood. Rather, we become a dissolved self without uniformity; we become the formless and unregulated association of ideas made by imagination. The self becomes dissolved. These are the two major aspects of the first
synthesis: habit and fatigue. The first synthesis is concerning the present and its repetition is performed by the self that is situated in that living present. Yet all those presents that are synthesised in this first repetition must fall into a past. A past is no less constitutive of conscious experience than a present. Just as the present is associated with Habit, the past is associated with Memory.

Up to now, there has only been an account of how the present is generated in consciousness through the first synthesis, how the contraction of pasts is performed by habit in response to contemplation and how these “past presents” comprise the present present or living present. There remains a problem that Deleuze must respond to, however, and that is how those present presents can become past presents. There must be some way for them to be stored or collected so that they can be contracted and synthesised by Habit, especially if Habit does not have the capacity to retain them but only to bring them together. Otherwise, it would not be coherent to suggest that all present moments must become pasts, allowing for a new present to be formed from those past presents and for our temporal experience to continue in absence of a retentive power contracting those presents into a past. Our present must therefore become the past, this is the work of memory. ‘Habitus is the originary synthesis of time, which constitutes the life of the passing present; Memory is the fundamental synthesis of time which constitutes the being of the past (that which causes the present to pass).’ (DR 105) So how do we understand the past of memory if the present in the first synthesis already has a relation to the past and future? Why have a second synthesis? What function does the second synthesis provide? What is its relation to the first synthesis?

Although the first synthesis already has a relation to the past and future, ‘these pasts and futures are only understood as moments of the present, that is, as habit and anticipation’, making it unclear as to what provides a past into which the present can pass and in which they can be connected and related to one another. To produce a consistent self requires not only the
production of the present in which that individual identity subsists but also the past of that identity, a past which the present identity relates to and from which it is reproduced. The second synthesis produces a ‘horizon of having-been-ness’, the retention of which is the condition of its reproduction. Our memory, which is the faculty of the second synthesis, therefore synthesises our prior apprehension, retaining it and reproducing it (DR 105). The present presents which fall away in the first synthesis can only do so if there is a second synthesis into which those presents can be related and contracted. In other words, the present presents must themselves be synthesised. Therefore, the second synthesis is also the condition for the first, for ‘the first synthesis of time must operate in another’ and that other must assign ‘proper well-determined relations between passing presents’ so they have a continuity and coherence and not disunity or stasis. Deleuze’s characterisation of this second synthesis reflects much of Bergson’s discussion of change and duration in *Creative Evolution*. Bergson compares memory to a series of presents collected up into a continually “swelling” with memory, a pure past into which present presents are recorded. ‘Instead of a flux of fleeting shades merging into each other, it perceives distinct and, so to speak, solid colors, set side by side like the beads of a necklace; it must perforce then suppose a thread, also itself solid, to hold the beads together.’ This initial memory is closely linked with the contraction of presents in Habit, and the continuity this provides comes from this growing collection of past moments.

Memory helps to constitute the ongoing existence of the individual’s identity as relating to a past that the individual believes belongs to them. There are two aspects to this relation: Mnemosyne and Eros. Mnemosyne is the pure past, which is collection of the whole past, wherein ‘we reach a point at which it is completely detached from action and hence, in the state of pure memory, contains a complete record of the past.’ Much of Deleuze’s understanding of the pure past of pure memory is informed by Bergson’s work *Matter and Memory*. The implementation of this can be broken down into three explanations that are successive. The present must contain some element of the past for it to pass away. When a present is accompanied by a past and passes
away, it becomes a past event for any future presents. Finally, the synthesis of past elements of all
the presents is a condition for their passing away.\textsuperscript{13} The synthesis of the past elements of former
presents is a pure past. The pure past is not something that we recall, but what precedes all present
moments. Distinct from Habit, memory of this kind – recovering the past – is an act. ‘In truth it
no longer represents our past to us, it acts it; and if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not
because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into the present
moment.’\textsuperscript{14} The act performed by memory is the organisational retention of those efforts of the
past which serve the movement into the future. The pure past is drawn upon (one remembers
their past) by the activity of Eros. Eros penetrates the pure past and engenders recollection,
remembrance, reminiscence. The action of Eros causes countless memories to be brought forward
into the present. In this movement, the present can then fall into the past at the moment it is
perceived. ‘Your perception, however instantaneous, consists then in an incalculable multitude of
remembered elements; in truth, every perception is already memory. Practically, we perceive only the
past, the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future.’\textsuperscript{15} The
continuity of the present involves the contraction of the past. Memory is the synthesis that enters
into the pure past to create an interpenetrating progression.\textsuperscript{16} Deleuze argues that this generative
power of recognition is drawn from a third synthesis of time. The penetration of the image of a
pure past on the part of Eros is key to the revelation of a third synthesis which generates novelty
within the reproduction of identity. Remembrance and the predictability the third synthesis offers
does not detract from the novelty of an event when it is actualised in experience. What is this third
synthesis? What is synthesised in it? How does it interact with the first and second syntheses?

The third repetition is referred to as the death drive or Thanatos. Deleuze highlights a split
in oneself, a fracture in the I. The fracture is found in the I being aware of itself existing in
conscious experience (that is, in time known to consciousness), while also having to exist in a time
outside of the possibility of experience. The time that exists beyond consciousness, which
consciousness is necessarily a part of, signifies a third repetition. The first and second repetitions
establish a time that allows for consciousness to experience things in the world around it. However, consciousness itself must exist in time that is independent of itself. Therefore, this third time must be a repetition unlike the other two repetitions. In elaborating on how the two repetitions already discussed imply a third repetition, Deleuze turns his attention to Descartes’ thinking subject and Kant’s development of it.

The subject of Descartes’ cogito ergo sum establishes the belief “I am a thinking thing” but leaves the notion “I am” undetermined. There is no account of how it can be known that there is an I, nor that it has being. The lack in demonstration of how this undetermined “I am” can give rise to one’s determination as a thinking thing, in other words how being can lead to consciousness, leaves a lacuna in the relationship between the thinking subject and its material origin. The determining element is absent. The subject is instead determined by something external, namely God, which grants it a temporal existence by simply providing both being and time. Kant is not content with this determination (I think) from an undetermined conclusion (I am), nor its proposed resolution in the utilisation of God as a means. In response to Descartes, Kant presents the self, the passive receptivity of intuition. For Deleuze, this is an important introduction to Descartes’ work because it takes the demands for the creation of being and time away from God. Instead, both are now provided by the self experiencing its own thought and the use of transcendental faculties to interpret the sensible intuitions that affect it. The self must exist for it to be affected by the world and the mind creates a temporal framework to understand it. In this way, Kant arrives at the “determinable” aspect allowing the undetermined to be capable of becoming determined (DR 111-12). Deleuze suggests that Kant had thereby introduced a third logical value (determinable) to the two logical values (undetermined and determined) already presented by Descartes. By moving determination to transcendental activity, and therefore away from God, the conscious mind could take the undetermined world and make it determinable through the application of time. What is the significance of having introduced this third logical value? How does the application of this third value relate to Thanatos?
Death and Time

Once time becomes a necessary condition for the perception of the sensible world, time becomes an internal determining tool superimposed on the external world. For Deleuze, this time is passively formed within the synthesis of imagination. ‘The activity of thought applies to a receptive being, to a passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it.’ (DR 112) The passive subject is the collection of habits which, when they present a present moment in time through the passive synthesis of imagination, provide the determinable for the active subject, the I. The I is how the passive self appears to itself or how it perceives itself as something existing within time. As it is within time, all that can be known about the I is its appearance. An I that is phenomenal is indicative of an I which subsists noumenally, that is to say it exists outside of the conditions for conscious experience, including time.

The consequences of this are extreme: my undetermined existence can be determined only within time as the existence of a phenomenon, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject appearing within time […] Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense […] To “I think” and “I am” must be added the self – that is, the passive position (what Kant calls receptivity of intuition); to the determination and the undetermined must be added the form of the determinable, namely time […] It is though the I were fractured from one end to the other: fractured by the pure and empty form of time. (DR 112-13)

The I that exists outside of phenomenal time, the I that cannot be known to consciousness, is undetermined, noumenal, beyond any synthetic unity like that enjoyed by the larval subject or of memory. In this context, the noumenal is a predetermined state in which innumerable possibilities are awaiting their realisation in the singular phenomenal moment. The two aspects of the I – the phenomenal and the noumenal – are considered to be two sides of a fracture that runs down the middle of the I. The I is split into two halves, one is represented while the other cannot be represented.

Both the subject and the I of appearance have their integral limits (whether fatigue or forgetting). Their limits are symptoms of how they are determined (the individuating unity).
Beyond these limitations, the self reaches fatigue and dissolves due to the exhaustion of habits. Also, the I suffers forgetfulness of the pure past, becoming fractured into phenomenon and noumenon. The I can only subsist in the noumenon as ‘the man without name, without family, without qualities’ (DR 117). Beyond the limitation of these two unities (self and I) there is no requirement for defined spatio-temporal conditions. As a result of the loss of limitations on experience in this third synthesis of time, one’s self cannot be represented in the affirmation of the future. Instead, the lived present and past give way to the empty form of time.

To understand the empty form of time, also referred to as the pure order of time, it is helpful to compare it with phenomenal time. Phenomenal time requires points of reference onto which the mind can attach a sense of duration. However, in the third repetition “time is out of joint” (DR 115). The term for “joint” that Deleuze refers to is cardo. These joints form cardinal points, which reveal a succession of movements whenever an object passes through them. These movements come to symbolise the passage of objects through time as revealed and interpreted by a prior rational structure. The first and second syntheses rely on cardinal time to maintain a self and an I. In the mind, the self moves through the joints of successive present moments in relation to a pure past. The third repetition occurs beyond this cardinal time and is within a pure order of time, what Deleuze calls ordinal time. Deleuze therefore introduces a bifurcation of time into the forms of cardinal and ordinal, the former requiring cardinal points of phenomenal reference and the latter absent of a sequential or cardinal structure. If the first synthesis contracts presents into a living present and the second synthesis contracts past presents into a pure past, what is synthesised in the third synthesis? How does ordinal time relate to synthesis and repetition? What is the relation between the death drive and this synthesis?

The third synthesis is the synthesis of the before and after of the I. Between the past of the I (phenomenal/appearance) and the future into which the I continues to develop (noumenal/unthinkable) is what Deleuze calls the caesura, which is a cut or severance. What is
severed are these two forms of time: past and future. They are the past and future of the I, and the caesura is therefore constitutive of the “fracture of the I”. The I is fractured between the representation of the I as drawn from a pure past in the memory and the I that is not yet present, that is the future of the I. Important to note is that, unlike the first and second syntheses, the third synthesis is static. While the totality of time is drawn together in the third synthesis, there are no joints for it to move through. In the absence of cardinal time, time takes on a formal order or a pure order. Deleuze believes that cardinal time corresponds to an ordinal time. Time, in its pure ordinal form, is the exclusion of the circular time required for the self and the I to be constructed. Why are the self and the I created cyclically? What is engendering their creation?

We know that habit is the passive synthesis acted upon by contemplation. Contemplation makes a demand of habit in the form of the question-problem complex. In its response to contemplation, habit contracts and relaxes. This contraction and relaxation, providing it responds in the affirmative for contemplation, provides pleasure. This desire for pleasure takes the form of a principle of pleasure. The fulfilment of the pleasure principle is what drives confirmation, and the desire is powered by this erotic desire, by Eros. Much of this language is taken from Freud. Deleuze goes one step further into using Freud’s terminology by assigning certain psychoanalytic terms to habit and memory. Habit comes to be referred to as the Freudian Id - the instinctual drives, such as Eros, that drive habit’s synthesis - while memory is the Ego – taking the many presents from the affirmations of contemplation, to construct a pure memory that resists the destructive power of Thanatos. Before moving on, there ought to be an answer to the question of why Deleuze is using Freud in this way. How does Freud become the best candidate for Deleuze to develop his three syntheses? What about the limitations facing Freud’s work? Does Deleuze address and overcome them? And, if Deleuze is attempting to discover the moment at which novel conscious experience arises, why does Deleuze not explore the work of a phenomenologist like Husserl? What does psychoanalysis have to offer Deleuze’s work that phenomenology cannot provide?
Habit comes to be referred to as the Freudian Id, while memory is the Ego. The Ego is driven to continue the synthetic work of unifying contemplations to produce the image of a pure past. The pure past forms an identity – “I am because I was”. The drive to continually reproduce this unified identity maintains the activity of the Ego. The Ego subsists through this narcissistic drive to perpetuate itself. The reproductive drive compels habit and contemplations. Deleuze continues the psychoanalytic terminology by naming this drive Eros, a Freudian concept wherein Eros is the sexual life instinct. Eros is to be understood as the will to continue an existence and engender life. Even when exploring psychoanalytical terminology, Deleuze seems to prefer Hölderlin to Freud when discussing the relevance of Oedipus the King to Thanatos, insisting that Freud’s interpretation is one whose dependence on a fixed identity runs contrary to the story itself. So why use Freud when developing (what seems in part at least) a phenomenological approach when there are others (e.g., Husserl) who provide a phenomenological system already. Especially considering that Freud’s own interpretation of psychoanalysis fails to fully express the pliable identity acknowledged by Hölderlin?

The issue with Husserl is his method and aim for his phenomenological investigation. Husserl is only concerned with that which is present to consciousness – what it can experience through perception. Husserl propounds a horizon to conscious experience. The horizon is that beyond which consciousness cannot focus its attention. Beyond the horizon any possible perception fades into greater degrees of a lack of attention by consciousness until they are not experienced at all. The ability to passively and actively parenthesise elements of one’s experience like this (by focussing, redirecting and ignoring aspects of perception) leads to Husserl proposing that phenomenology attempt to perform a “phenomenological reduction”, whereby all experiences within the horizon of consciousness are parenthesised until all that remains is the initial and primary conscious experience – an experience which is not mediated in any way; an experience that is radical in its immediacy. As such, Husserl was attempting much of the same as Deleuze in trying to locate the source of our consciousness through the genesis of sensible experience. So
why not utilise Husserl’s “eidetic science” when attempting to determine the pre-phenomenological conditions for consciousness?

Deleuze is attempting to demonstrate the constant fluctuation and change inherent in the constitution of consciousness, in the hope of discovering the limitations of our transcendental faculties (for example, imagination) and then exceeding them (DR 188). Husserl still works under several limitations. Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, whereby the judgements made of experience are suspended to reveal the pure, pre-conscious experience, already assumes the existence of the thing which is being sought after. Husserl’s project is concerned solely with conscious experience, its source, nature and what these things can reveal for us about our minds. In his attempt to establish phenomenology as a scientific endeavour, Husserl presents an examination of consciousness. He tries to reduce our conscious perception to expose what constitutes the pre-conscious experience of the world before us. Deleuze, though he is attempting something similar, does not appeal to the same methods as Husserl. Husserl is driven by a single goal: to establish phenomenology as a scientific understanding of consciousness. Whereas Deleuze directs his attention to the conditions of consciousness and how this presents the limitations of the dogmatic image of thought. Husserl’s eidetic science is therefore too narrow in its vision for Deleuze’s consideration. If not Husserl, then why Freud? What does Freud’s psychoanalysis offer that is different to Husserl’s eidetic science?

Deleuze is not attempting to reduce conscious experiences to their moment of constitution to better understand consciousness. Rather, Deleuze is presenting both how such experiences originate (with emphasis on their originating in time) and what processes in their creation allows them to make difference and novelty. The aim is not to simply stamp one’s understanding on the process of producing representation from experience, but to understand the process well enough that its creative power and production of the new can reveal how one might develop a new image of thought. Regarding the process of thinking, Freud’s work often focusses on what instinctual
drives constitute and motivate our thoughts and actions. The approach that Freud takes is methodical, observing the various responses and activities of his patients in order to arrive at empirically evidenced conclusions. Key to understanding Freud’s death drive is the notion of disappearance and return that is untiringly repeated, it is repetition-compulsion wherein the pleasure principle (the drive to seek out and find pleasure) is subverted (BPP 53, 57). The death drive manifests itself in our consciousness through these actions of repetition-compulsion, yet they originate from our unconscious.

Freud’s description of the unconscious, as mental activity which consciousness is not aware of, is intriguing to Deleuze for two reasons. First is the relationship between ‘the speaking subject and the drive-machine’. The drives (for example, Eros) within the unconscious go unnoticed by consciousness and yet become known to it through their appearance to the mind. The divide between that which presents the real to consciousness (the apparatus of the transcendental faculties that structure it) and the latent, chaotic real of the unconscious (which provides consciousness with pure difference and novelty) is a key part of understanding how difference and repetition exist for us, beyond our structured identity. Second, the unconscious is an elemental source of pure difference. Pure difference is taken up in the conscious mind through perception. That difference is then constrained and repressed by Eros (the life drive) to create and sustain a stable identity (representation). The unconscious, where there is no erotic suppression of difference, is therefore absent of the self. Deleuze’s attempt to demonstrate the oblivion of the self in part of the process of thought is a kind of “headless subjectivation” or “subjectivation without subject”. Deleuze is interested in how the unconscious provides the conscious with pure difference and how the conscious can remain apart from and yet a part of the unconscious. These two aspects of Freud’s work are useful to Deleuze and his project to inspire thinking: the division of the unconscious and conscious mind, both of which are reliant upon one another, and the possibility of a flexible identity in this same relation between the conscious and unconscious (due to its lack of erotic structure). Freud readily provides an explanation of the first element of this
(conscious and unconscious mind in collaboration with one another). However, the second element of Freud’s work, the fluidity of identity, is somewhat lacking. The reason for this is Freud’s need to maintain that an identity is fixed. For Deleuze, Hölderlin’s interpretation of Oedipus the King is preferred over Freud’s for this very reason.

Freud focusses on Oedipus’ relationship with his mother and Oedipus’ murder of his father. By contrast, Hölderlin’s interpretation concentrates on Oedipus’ relentless search for the answer to the riddle of why Thebes is plagued. For Hölderlin, this desire to eradicate all impurity from his city is his downfall as it magnifies how terrible his crimes are. Had Oedipus remedied the ailments of the city practically and not pursued a thoroughgoing cleanse of its evil then his downfall would not have been so catastrophic. The tragedy leaves Oedipus transformed from a capable hero to a debased criminal. The impossibility of reconciling these two moments of Oedipus is the incoherence of character that piques Deleuze’s interest and which Freud fails to fully realise in his development of the Oedipus complex. While Deleuze uses Freudian terms, which highlight this incompatibility of the two halves of the individual (conscious and unconscious), he keeps Hölderlin in mind. That is to say that Hölderlin’s interpretation of the incongruence of character in the tragedy is what Deleuze wants to maintain, despite Freud’s insistence on a fixed identity. How are Freud’s terms used by Deleuze? How does Deleuze interpret and use Freud’s terminology when describing the three syntheses? How are we to understand the death drive going forward?

Freud suggested that the basic aim of psychic life is pleasure. Pleasure is found in stability and equilibrium. Freud’s pleasure principle centres on the suppression of excessive excitation of energy. At its simplest, the pleasure principle is a constancy principle (BPP 47). However, Freud found this principle was contradicted in many individuals who repeated unpleasant experiences. Parental abandonment, traumatic stress and self-loathing – all were being repeated by patients or those whom Freud observed (BPP 47-53). According to the pleasure principle, none of these people ought to have repeated these instances, yet they did. Freud was faced with a difficult
challenge: if the pleasure principle is interrupted by a compulsion to repeat painful experiences, then there must be a second principle with greater influence and primacy.

The more primal drive must be suppressed for it to occasionally overwhelm the pleasure principle. Freud attributes this repression to the Ego (BPP 57). The Ego is driven by the pleasure principle to exercise control over pain and unpleasure. As Ansell-Pearson writes, ‘What informs and motivates the repression […] is the pleasure principle: seeking to avoid the unpleasure which would be produced if the repressed content was liberated.’ The Ego is a constant, a coherence that is maintained by the force of the pleasure principle and its solitary aim: stability. The harmony is repeatedly disrupted, however, and so there must be a principle more powerful than that which drives the repression of unpleasure.

Freud suggests that this primal drive must precede the appearance of the pleasure principle for it is always able to circumvent it. The overcoming of the pleasure principle not only explains the frequent fall into displeasure, but also the repetition of unpleasant experiences. To maintain balance and equilibrium, the Ego, driven by the pleasure principle, must suppress pain. The efforts of the Ego are overcome by this drive beyond the pleasure principle: Todestrieb. The Todestrieb or death drive is characterised by repetition compulsion, often a repetition of trauma. “Brutal repetition” subjects the pleasure principle to an unceasing threat of disruption. Herein lies the internalised Empedoclean conflict between the striving for the continued coherency of life and the primal determination for disunity and death. Freud says of the death drive, ‘it must aspire to an old state, a primordial state from which it once departed, and to which via all the circuitous byways of development it strives to return. If we may reasonably suppose […] that every living thing dies – reverts to the inorganic – for intrinsic reasons, then we can only say that the goal of all life is death’ (BPP 78). Freud’s elaboration of this drive to return to a state of torpor relies heavily on his biophilosophical approach to psychoanalysis, that is to say his evidence for his conclusions is taken from biological sciences.
In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud refers to several biological processes and theories. Embryology, phylogeny, and neurology are all used to explain the origins of the death drive. The material explanation for the death drive serves Freud’s dualistic tendencies well. Freud’s discovery of conflict within organic material itself provided an explanation for aggression that went beyond mere guilt. The dualistic theory also lent itself to Freud’s concept of the hostile Superego. The coherence of the Ego is a fundamental part a stable subject, making the death drive ‘an ontological *a priori* condition of the coming into being of human subjectivity.’ The dualistic and conflictual model of the drives formulated by Freud is criticised by Deleuze.

When elaborating on Thanatos, the third repetition, Deleuze suggests that Freud fails to truly discover the death drive (DR 142). Freud proposes that the conversion from object-libido (wherein the id seeks out a love-object) to the narcissistic libido (the ego becomes the love object for the id, having repressed the object-libido) is the loss of the sexual drive or desexualisation. The energy of this desexualisation is preceded by the death drive (given the primacy of the drive). The distinction between the death drive and desexualisation is arguably the point at which Freud fails to adequately capture the death drive. Deleuze writes,

Why […] did Freud thus propose a death instinct existing prior to that desexualised energy, independent of it in principle? Undoubtedly for two reasons – one relating to the persistence of a dualistic and conflictual model which inspired the entire theory of drives; the other to the material model which presided over the theory of repetition. (DR 142)

Deleuze argues that the death drive has nothing to do with oppositions, conflicts, or matter (DR143). The death drive is not part of any personal death, that is the death of the individual, in terms of having ‘an extrinsic, scientific and objective definition.’ (DR 143) The death drive renounces the material and the negative. The death drive is beyond brute repetition. The death drive is ‘the last form of the problematic’, the production of difference through repetition in the pure order of time. (DR 143) By this Deleuze means the death drive is desexualised energy, which
is to say it is the result of the desexualisation of Eros. The struggle between the two drives that Freud discusses in his work is not reflective of the death drive, according to Deleuze. Instead of struggling with one another, Eros and Thanatos occupy a space of problematisation and questioning. The libido which empowers the problematisation as a cyclical and narcissistic process harmonising representation (sustaining the ego) is the same libido beyond that cycle, beyond the pleasure principle. Thanatos is not in opposition to Eros – it is Eros without the narcissistic love of recognition.37

The generative power of Eros is constitutive of Thanatos. In reaching the limit of the content (self) and the agency (I) of the individual, Eros becomes Thanatos. The desexualisation of Eros (the loss of the capability of generation) is the catalyst of this transformation. Unable to reproduce and fulfil the pleasure principle, the generative power of Eros is freed from the constraints of habitual structures of consciousness (for example, cardinal time) set about it by the Id and the Ego. Eros arrives at unbounded productivity as the result of no longer having the libidinal energy (that generative power) to maintain the reproduction of consciousness, thus it falls into unconsciousness. Upon entering the unconscious, Eros, now become Thanatos, is also thrown into the ordinal, pure, empty form of time. ‘Thanatos stands for a synthesis of time quite unlike that of Eros; all the more exclusive because it is drawn from him, constructed upon his remains.’ (DR 145) Before elaborating further on what shape this synthesis takes, it may be helpful to explore how and why Deleuze interprets Eros as being capable of desexualisation and the characterisation of Thanatos as desexualised Eros. Why must Thanatos consist of the remains of Eros and not be something independent of it?

Freud characterises the death drive as indifferent and related to an inanimate matter to which life inevitably returns. The distinction made by Freud between the life-creating Eros and the death drive is a prejudiced one, Deleuze suggests. (DR 142-43) Death is not in opposition to anything, rather it is as necessary as life in providing a means of creativity and growth. ‘It is not a
material state; on the contrary, having renounced all matter, it corresponds to a pure form – the empty form of time.’ (DR 143) Death is not one half of a conflict, but part of the doubling of being, which is performed in the second synthesis; it is the source of one creative power (libido) and at the same time derived from it (exhaustion). ‘Blanchot rightly suggests that death has two aspects. One is personal, concerning the I or the ego […] The other is strangely impersonal, with no relation to ‘me’ […]’. (DR 143) The personal death is associated with the one who dies: “she died”, “they died”, “I will die”. The impersonal Death resides where agency and content cannot extend their reach. Before moving on, it is worthwhile exploring this distinction between personal death and impersonal Death in more detail as it will influence the usage of the terms going forward.

Separating the death drive from Death in the work of Deleuze is not necessary (perhaps even impossible). The two are used interchangeably. Take Anti-Oedipus, for example:

We say, to the contrary, that there is no death instinct because there is both the model and the experience of death in the unconscious. Death then is a part of the desiring-machine, a part that must itself be judged, evaluated in the functioning of the machine and the system of its energetic conversions, and not as an abstract principle. (AO 379)

For Deleuze and Guattari, Freud makes death a transcendental principle, the death drive, because he does not accept that there is a model or experience of death. However, Deleuze and Guattari both insist that there is an experience and model of death, but that this shows that there is no need for a death drive. At first, this appears counter-intuitive; why have the death drive play a pivotal role in *Difference and Repetition*, only to announce its non-existence in *Anti-Oedipus*? Simply put, Deleuze’s death drive is not Freud’s. As has been discussed, Deleuze separates himself from Freud’s material model. However, the death drive is kept as a concept to develop this “beyond death” mentioned in the earlier quote referring to Blanchot. A second death, an impersonal Death, is the source of the “experience” and “model” of death mentioned by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*, though it is not the model or experience itself. ‘Neither Eros nor Thanatos can be
given in experience; all that is given are combinations of both’, writes Deleuze. The Death described here, this depersonalised Death, is the origin and production of novelty. To understand this, we must return to the fracture of the I, the caesura, and explore a little of Blanchot’s *The Space of Literature*, referred to by Deleuze.

The movement of ego to fractured I to Thanatos is captured in *Difference and Repetition* as the following: first is the past and the act incapable, second is the present and the capability of acting, third is the future and the act is pulled from the actor. The “act” can be any number of things, but it is always what will lead to a considerable change in the individual. The first timeframe is the past, before the act is considered a possibility. The act need not wait to be committed, rather the focus is on the transformation that the act causes. For Deleuze, Oedipus has already committed patricide while Hamlet has yet to confront his Uncle. For Blanchot, Kirilov has yet to realise that he can commit suicide. In all cases, the transformation of the act has not occurred as this takes place in the second time.

The second time is the present and this is constituted by becoming capable of the act. We see this Hamlet’s voyage, Oedipus’ enquiry, and Kirilov’s task. At this point, we have the instance where the possibility of change arrives. Deleuze considers this a cut, divide or severance – the caesura. The *caesura* is a dramatic device that Hölderlin emphasises in his Remarks on “Oedipus”. At the point where the rhythm of representations introduces the notion of transition and transport to the sequence, ‘there becomes necessary what in poetic meter is called *caesura*, the pure word, the counter-rhythmic rupture […]’. At the point of the *caesura*, the rhythm that was (the past) is interrupted. The individual is then exposed as fragmented, torn in the present moment between the past and the future. Essentially, the *caesura* is the point at which there is the real possibility of extensive transformation, of traumatic development. In Blanchot’s *The Space of Literature*, this is the realisation that death is possible through suicide.
Blanchot explains that self-mastery can only come when one realises the possibility of death. Not only that, but that one can bring about one’s death through suicide. The significance of this is in the extremity of death. ‘Why death? Because death is the extreme. He who includes death among all that is in his control controls himself extremely.’ Once death is made feasible, Blanchot insists that life gains a certain freedom and is possibility itself. However, death must be achieved, it is ‘a task, one which we take up actively, one which becomes the source of our activity and mastery. Man dies, that is nothing. But man is, starting from his death.’ One must be the bearer and provider of one’s death so that it can be under one’s control. At the realisation of this possibility, one is at the point of the caesura: becoming capable of the act. However, there is an unattainable third time.

The caesura is the moment of capability, of possibility, but there is a “beyond” to that act. For Deleuze, the third time is the crossing of the boundary - the cut - into Death itself. Thanatos or the death drive is this side of the caesura. The amalgamation of Death and Thanatos is not accidental. Death in this context is not Freud’s materialist death; it is not a return to the inanimate. For change to occur in the individual (continuing the discussion in terms of characters), there must be a breakdown of that individual, their definition must be scrambled. Death is the decoding of flows, to use the language of Anti-Oedipus.

The experience of death is the most common of occurrences in the unconscious, precisely because it occurs in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as passage or becoming.

(AO 376)

The model of Death is immobilisation, silencing, stasis – it is the point of desexualisation, of pure, unrestrained desire and production (on which more will be said shortly). ‘Death is not desired, there is only death that desires.’ (AO 375) What results from the return from Death, the resexualisation, is a resurrection of the individual who has been infused with difference and altered by novelty. As Deleuze writes, ‘it is as if the desexualized element were resexualized but
nevertheless retained, in a different form, the original desexualization; the desexualized has become in itself the object of sexualization."\(^{43}\)

In terms of Blanchot, one has no control over this Death. Suicide is the grasping or the death that is represented (perhaps not unlike Freud’s death, death in opposition to life). Death beyond the world and the I is never achievable precisely because it is beyond. ‘We may never encounter Thanatos; its voice is never heard; for life is lived through and through under the sway of the empirical pleasure principle and the combinations that are subject to it […]'.\(^{44}\) The second Death is ‘ungraspable. It is what I cannot grasp, what is not linked to me by any relation of any sort – ‘It is that which never comes and toward which I do not direct myself.'\(^{45}\) As Deleuze writes:

\[\ldots\] the event and the act possess a secret coherence which excludes that of the self; that they may turn back against the self which has become their equal and smash it to pieces, as though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth: what the self has become equal to is the unequal in itself. (DR116-17)

One may (erroneously) believe the act is ‘a relation of sovereign equals',\(^{46}\) yet the reality is that there is no relation, nor is it equal. This is the illusion of suicide, the illusion of the act, and it is the illusion of Freud’s death drive: there can be no transcendental model of death because it is beyond the transcendental. While Death may be modelled and experienced, this is not by way of representation – Death in this third time is beyond representation, it excludes the self, it is dispossession and passivity to the extreme.

However, Deleuze opts to keep this aspect of Freud’s work, despite his divergence from Freud’s dualistic, material, and oppositional model. The reason for continuing to use the death drive is to draw upon Freud’s work on the drives and desire.\(^{47}\) Exploring the drives and desire, Deleuze outlines how our consciousness is composed of a multiplicity of drives, all vying for expression and/or supremacy over one another. Freud’s death drive provides a means for Deleuze to explain how consciousness is exposed to these drives and is influenced by them at a given
moment. The death drive is foundational to this exposure due to its being the source of a multiplicity of drives and limitless desire. This because the desire has been decoded, separated from the bonds of the agent and content of the ego and the id, respectively. As Goodchild writes, ‘Death is a true transcendental, exceeding both the objective and the subjective, while giving meaning to time and all being that is thought in its terms.’\textsuperscript{48} Within the unconscious is the Blanchotian second Death. The Death that is beyond the reach of the one who acts. Hence “death” and “the death drive” are used interchangeably in Deleuze’s work. Both refer to the moment at which the libidinal power of Eros is desexualised, thereby comprising Thanatos. Thanatos excludes the self, it is silent and static. Deleuze’s interpretation of the death drive makes it synonymous with death, where death is the “Blanchotian Death, impersonal Death, the extreme passivity of Death.

On a few occasions it has been mentioned that Thanatos is desexualised Eros. It arises from the incapacity to regenerate through the structure of reproduction, the synthetic unity that provides the Ego with the pleasure of the realisation of its own unified identity, its own reflection staring back at it from the waters of contemplation. Thanatos is repetition by excess. Production at its most unbounded. And yet, it is not clear how this is possible or what occurs through this productivity. What kind of performance does this impersonal Death exhibit? How does the desexualised Eros continue to produce?

LOSING THE TRANSCENDENT OTHER TO DISCOVER THE IMMANENT REALITY

In the transformation from libidinal Eros to the drive of Thanatos, the cycle of contemplation by the Ego is vacant. The Ego seeks to control the drives to fulfil the demands of the pleasure principle. Yet, when the libido which powers and enables this reaches its own fatigue and is no longer vivacious, that energy loosens itself from the Ego and continues to produce, in absence of the Id and Ego’s directives. The Ego provides a definite and limiting structure which enables it to pursue the pleasure principle. As long as this can operate and guide Eros, there is a
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state of continual reproduction of identity. Reproduction satisfies the needs of Habitus, while allowing for Mnemosyne to create the doubling back of the past and present. Beyond the structure of the Id and the Ego (the phenomenal) is the noumenal in which there can be no content or agent; no structure that is cyclical is sustainable here, only the “excentric” circle is possible, for the structure is completely altered. The “straightening out” of this circle of reproduction is the desexualisation of the Eros. When Eros is desexualised, it becomes Thanatos. While it continues to produce, it no longer re-produces. To better understand why a desexualised Eros would produce the new, and not re-produce a fixed identity, we can turn to one of Deleuze’s essays in the Appendix of Logic of Sense, where the notion of desexualisation is discussed in some detail.

In his essay ‘Michel Tournier & The World Without Others’, Deleuze explores Friday, Tournier’s tale of Robinson Crusoe. Tournier’s work is one of experimentation, Deleuze argues, wherein Tournier visualises a world absent of what Deleuze calls the ‘structure-Other’ (LS 316). Utilising Bergson’s own work on the real and the possible, Deleuze creates the concept of the Other not as a subject or object but as a structure which provides consciousness with possibility. Possibility is understood in the Bergsonian sense as that which ‘is only the real with the addition of an act of mind which throws its image back onto the past, once it has been enacted.’ The possible, Bergson considers, is more demanding than the real in that it is at once both presently real and previously possible, causing the mind to cast itself back. It is this doubling back in order to bring the possible into the real that is performed during the second synthesis by Mnemosyne.

The structure-Other, in the work of Tournier, is the proviso for all perception of the possible for consciousness, according to Deleuze. In absence of the Other there is no “margin” that can hold the pre-existence of things to come, denying the apprehension of their possibility of being actualised (LS 314). The loss of the structure-Other thus prevents any doubling back and anticipation of what is to come into reality. As such, no transition between moments can take place, and so every moment is the absolutely present reality. The lack of transition between
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moments of reality, which the possible enables, inevitably puts a stop to the cardinal order of time while the lack of possibility of objects in space inhibits the usual structure of space. ‘Nothing subsists but insuperable depths, absolute distances and differences or, on the contrary, unbearable repetitions, looking like precisely superimposed lengths.’ (LS 315) In the immanently real, transcendence is impossible, as this requires a perceptive duality afforded only by the possibility within the structure-Other. Consciousness is an object without the Other, as it can no longer act transcendentally upon the object via possibility – it is only immanently real. ‘In the Other’s absence, consciousness and its object are one.’ (LS 319) The closing of this distance, between consciousness and that of which it is conscious (object), makes consciousness equal to the objects it perceives.

The non-occurrence of any mediation to provide a structure of spatio-temporal transition causes a ‘straightening out and a generalised erection’, by which is meant a discontinuation of any cyclical process for perception and an absolute repetition of the real (LS 320).

The immanently present unravels without any succession of different moments, consisting of only one solitary moment unveiled from a multiplicity of different and yet equally presentable instants. Time is no longer a movement along a wheel of the possible - unfolding and returning from the real - but is simply the real itself in its most absolute, repeating ad infinitum. The real never moves anywhere, but always changes in its singular and static place, devoid of (pre)destination by any guiding structure, and so it is immediate and immanent. De-sexualisation amounts to the collapse of a libidinal structure. This leads to a new formulation of a structure absent of any movement of perception accessible to consciousness, and so it reverts to becoming grounded in the immediately present real in its most elemental state.

Applying this to the three repetitions, it becomes clear how Deleuze envisages the role of Thanatos as a primordial and integral element for the development of consciousness. One finds the closest rendition of something like Tournier’s structure-Other in the description of our contemplation being described as Acteon, gazing upon Diana. ‘We are always Acteon by virtue of
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what we contemplate, even though we are Narcissus in relation to the pleasure we take from it.’ (DR 99) What Deleuze is expressing here is how the first synthesis, in its pursuit to fulfil habits and in so doing provide the contraction and relaxation indicative of pleasure, must pursue pleasure just as Acteon tries to find the source of the beautiful song of Diana. For the libido to assuage its accumulation of energy it must be discover the affirmative solution to the question-problem. Eros needs a lover, something to become its focus, only then can its desire for pleasure be fulfilled. Contemplation, the provider of the primary structure for habit and Mnemosyne’s going beyond, requires a structure-Other that is at once both something phenomenal and is the condition of the phenomenal. Just as Acteon yearns for what is hidden, so too does consciousness in its first and second syntheses insist upon the possible to satisfy the demands of the libidinal Eros. What Eros desires, in the way that Acteon desires, is itself, as Narcissus desires his self. Contemplation provides pleasure only when what is affirmed in oneself, through the representation provided by Habit. Consider that desire, hunger, sexuality are fatigued and exhausted, what becomes of the structure upholding the cardinal time of the Id and Ego? If these are no longer self-refering and self-affirming through their cyclical pursuit of pleasure, how can they be maintained? Of course, reproduction ceases, the libido is desexualised, Eros goes beyond the pleasure principle and so the structure of Habitus and Mnemosyne is extinguished. Cyclical reproduction is halted, making way for a straightened out, absolute and elemental productivity within a pure form of time, an ordinal time. As there is no sexual structure to direct the libidinal energy, boundless production leads to an unending repetition and as such a ceaseless production of absolute difference. Eros, in becoming its desexualised form, Thanatos, is now the producer of change. The production of change introduces pure difference and novelty to the conscious experience of phenomena. Pure difference is not developed into a phenomenon, but it is shaped by the conditions of representation in the consciousness that turn it into an Idea. Death of the otherness of the phenomenal world is the fundamental and elemental genesis of what is new in the cyclical structure of the Id and the Ego. Thanatos is therefore operating as an entirely different structure to what is
both its origin and its destination, Eros. Thanatos provides novelty to the content and agent by being unbounded by the requirements of their reproduction.

In this section, the aim has been to explain the desexualisation of Eros. The reliance upon a cyclical, self-absorbed, narcissistic structure to provide possibility to the first and second syntheses, was described to clarify how Thanatos is considered to be a “straightening out” of this cycle of reproduction. Eros, upon reaching impotence (through fatigue and forgetting), cannot maintain the cyclical structure of the first and second syntheses, the Id and the Ego, and so both fall away. What is left is just reality, without the “structure-Other”, where the object and consciousness are identical. In other words, the production of Eros turns from a sexual reproduction to a production without anything to reproduce. The desexualised Eros is Thanatos, and so Thanatos is a drive which produces only pure difference and the new, given that the Same is reproduced in the first and second syntheses. What returns is only the new in absence of the structure supporting the Same. In this elaboration of the desexualisation and straightening out, it is easy to think that the three syntheses are both progressive and exclusionary (i.e. first synthesis leads to second synthesis leads to third synthesis and repeat). The differentiation of syntheses does not require that each be passive while the others are operating (for example, the first and second syntheses are dormant during the straightening of the circle). Each is discrete in its operation, but they are always operating in unison with one another. The harmony of the circular reproduction continuously works against the excentric (as in formerly circular and now no longer) chaos of pure difference, and in opposing that chaos it is inherently a part of it and fed novelty and difference by it. To better understand the way that these three syntheses work with one another, it is good to explore the reason for their triplex structure and where Deleuze takes his inspiration.

OF GODS, HEROES AND MEN: THE DRAMATIC TRIPLEX

Deleuze does not consider each repetition discretely in the hopes of demonstrating a teleological consciousness, nor does he consider each repetition to be an improvement on the previous one.
All three are simultaneous. The three syntheses are reliant upon each other to establish an image of thought. Image of thought is the phrase Deleuze uses to portray a specific way of thinking or structure of thought. To think a certain way is to have an image of thought. Deleuze argues that philosophy currently has a ‘dogmatic, moral or orthodox’ image of thought due to its belief in having a monopoly on the truth and in having discovered the best way of thinking (DR 174). He describes all three syntheses to show the reader how a new image of thought is possible through the third synthesis. The third synthesis provides the novelty and creativity to collapse and recreate an image of thought in the process of thinking. In other words, the third synthesis makes thinking possible (DR 145). In his notes on the three repetitions, Deleuze gives an account of where the illustration of a triplex composition of thinking has been attempted in the past. It is here that he discusses Joachim of Fiore and Giambattista Vico, and the influence of their work; here is also a good place to make explicit how the three syntheses all relate to one another and generate a process of thinking and the creation of new images of thought.

Before undertaking an exegesis of these two influences on Deleuze, it is important to ask why he opts to use a tripartite architecture for his structure of repetition. Why not two or four repetitions? Others have written in a three-stage structure, and in his notes on the three repetitions Deleuze makes it clear how many of his sources use this form due to its historical use in drama. There is often a character’s past, the moment at which they become “capable of” or “equal to” the act that they must perform to complete their metamorphosis into the character they become after this moment or “caesura” has passed (DR 115). In just a moment, there will be more said on precisely how this process is demonstrated in the works of Joachim and Vico. For now, let us understand the motivation behind such a structure.

The use of three-part structure in drama is predominantly what leads to Deleuze’s own use of three repetitions, united in the unfolding story of an individual’s identity and the genesis of thinking. The use of drama seems peculiar at first. However, it is the result of a change in the
understanding of what constitutes one’s character. Traditionally one’s character is the unity of one’s actions, for which there is an underlying law, rational structure or judgement. Böhler presents life as an unfolding drama and considers this to be the way that a subjective life is explored in Nietzsche. For Böhler, life understood through drama is what later inspires Deleuze. All of us are constructed by our history (our pure past), and it is this immediacy of repetition of history within our constitution (memory), in which we cannot play an active role, that leads to Böhler insisting that life ought to be seen as a performance, a drama that creates us. ‘A life starts precisely with the performance of an act of repetition.’ The understanding of a life as more than an “entanglement” of actions is further supported by the Hölderlin’s notion of the *caesura*, utilised by Deleuze. The *caesura* is a dramatic device used to provide a temporal framework for the play; there is the past, the metamorphosis (triggered through the *caesura*), and then the ideal self of the future. ‘Clearly this is a dramatic situation, in which the unfolding of time itself reaches a point where it longs for an epochal change: a nadir or zero point (*Nullpunkt*) in time in which the image of the totality of time is ‘torn into two unequal parts’.” The life of the individual has an inherent need for growth, change, development or metamorphosis, and so there is reason enough for Deleuze to agree with his forebears that in life there are two moments, the before and the after, between which lies a third moment.

The third moment is that which divides the two sides of the *caesura* – past and future – and which provides habit and memory with a temporal framework. Therefore, it is not action which determines a character, an identity, but the time in which that action takes place. Why is time the determining factor and not action? We are subject to the demands of time, whether we perform actions or not. Only when we are finally capable of action do we encounter the metamorphosis of our character. The distance between the action in cardinal time and submission to ordinal time through inaction is what makes the character of Hamlet a poignant figure in literature for Deleuze. Somers-Hall describes how the significance of Hamlet is not found in the actions he performs which create a timeframe for the play, but that his ‘actions unfold in a time which is not his own.”
The action is performed in cardinal time by the individual, however it lies ahead of them in the pure order of time when it is not enacted. The action is therefore present in ordinal time before it is performed by the individual, who can only perform the action once they are prepared to do so. For this reason, Deleuze refers to the event, the time in which this third moment comes to be experienced by the self, and the action has a ‘secret coherence which excludes that of the self’ (DR 116). Until the self has an experience of the event by becoming equal to and performing the action, the event and action both demolish the self to allow for the birth of the new self to occur through the performance of action. This is a process necessary for the self to become active and no longer passive amid the totality of time (the third repetition).

The three-part structure of repetition in Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* treats each repetition separately. We now know that this is in part due to the characterisation of the structure of identity. What remains is precisely how these three are related to each other regarding their function. The abstract repetitions and their constituting a narrative are best understood when, having looked at all three discretely, they are drawn back together. The three moments all have an interpenetrative relationship, whereby the first two build a uniformity by restraining the chaos of the third. How these three are related to produce that effect is best described through the work of Joachim of Fiore and Giambattista Vico. Both figures have a triplex structure to their understanding for the development of human civilisation. For Joachim of Fiore, this structure is in the form of the two Christian testaments and the third testament that is the arrival of the Kingdom of God. Vico considers society to follow a regular structure of two ages, that of gods and heroes, followed by a third age of men.

Joachim of Fiore’s interest was in developing a theology of history, whereby history serves as an analogy of the Holy Trinity. All three Godheads are represented by the three testaments which are each revealed to us gradually as history. The Age of the Father, the Old Testament, is the first of the three Testaments, wherein we find the obedience of the Hebrews to God the Father
through the observation of the Torah, itself revealed by God, and their living in fear of Him. In the Age of the Son, there arrives the New Testament consisting of the four gospels, followed by the letters of Paul. The New Testament professes the visible image of God, incarnate in the flesh of man, as Jesus Christ. The human is the Son of God, the hypostatic union, that is the comingling of the substances of divinity and humanity. The Third Testament, revealed to us in Revelations, is the Age of the Holy Spirit. Humankind finally comes into direct contact with the *ousia* or substance of God in an epoch of peace, harmony and the dissolution of the ecclesiastical hierarchy through ‘transformation and spiritualisation’.\(^{57}\)

The first two Testaments are repetitions of one another. The First Testament is analogous to the Second Testament, the latter repeating the former; humanity is *subject to* the divine. ‘Through his innovative principle of concordance, he directly aligned the narrative of events recorded in the time of the Old Testament with the narrative of events in the time of the New Testament.’\(^{58}\) The Third Testament, however, differs in that it begins to present the real possibility for a Kingdom of Heaven which is beyond any institutional and ecclesiastic limitations. The fixed commands of God and the static incarnation of Christ are dissolved in the Kingdom of Heaven. ‘History can have a sense for us if we have the boldness and the courage to think of it as infinitely “open” at every moment towards the imminent outburst of the ultimate truth that will finally be able to transfigure it in its totality – like the sun.’\(^{59}\) The Holy Spirit is perpetual change and novelty as opposed to fixation and repetition of the Testaments Old and New, both of which are limited due to their historical representation of the totality of the Holy Spirit. Without the Third Testament, the future becomes a homogenous and formless time that has little to contribute to the past and present. The introduction of this dynamic Third Testament allows for the past and present to be transfigured. However, transfiguration does not mean the annihilation of the differences found in the first two Testaments. In the ending of the First and Second Testaments, the Third Testament arises as a harmonious unity of the two. ‘The divisions wrought by sin during the passage of time […] would yield to a new unity characterized not by the erasure of difference, but rather spiritual
harmony and concord. The Third Testament, the Age of the Spirit, is the final unfolding of the Holy Trinity and thereby the peak of its development as history, at which epochal stage the triune God in His totality is most immanent. The Third Testament is the eternal repetition of what is expressed and repeated in the First and Second Testaments. While the First and Second Testaments reveal God within history, the Third Testament is God as the totality of history, the totality of time.

Joachim of Fiore is a forebear of Deleuze’s triplex concept of repetition due to this notion of harmonisation, transfiguration, and repetition. Deleuze believes that the addition of the eternal return is required, in which the Third Testament can be the repetition of whatever is repeated in the first two Testaments. However, he still holds that Joachim of Fiore was close to presenting the triplex system of repetition comprised of two cyclical repetitions informed and corrected by a third. Vico also provides this triplex system. Interestingly, his also relates to history and society.

In his work *The New Science (Scienza Nuova)*, Vico argued that a form of social palingenesis – whereby social progression is a repetition of the same three stages, each repetition being a new manifestation of the same trio of instances – is the story of all social developments throughout history. Vico suggested that these three “ages” were recognisable in any social progression and can be perceived throughout history in a variety of civilisations. Focussing on Ancient Greek and Ancient Egyptian civilisations, Vico claims that their origins arrived through the poetry of the divine and the birth of the gods. The numerous gods represented the many facets of human emotions, experiences and ideals. For example, Mercury represents commerce, while Venus is the principle of civic beauty. These ancient peoples found their lived characteristics encapsulated in these divine beings. The age of gods later provides a ground out of which heroes can be brought forward. “Thus it is within the age of gods that the character of the native Greek political heroes gradually begin to take shape […].” Out of these principles heroic characters were developed who possessed the properties originally attributed only to the gods.
Through the tales of bold heroes, the developing Greeks created a narrative which situated the personification of divine attributes as heroic individuals within history. The Ancient Greeks mapped their past with poems of heroic exploits written by the likes of Homer. The heroes would often govern the people, providing them with laws and strictures, and they were celebrated for their accomplishments. Come the age of men, these laws that were once grounded in the age of the gods and later bestowed upon humanity in the form of a penal code during the age of heroes, lose the authority afforded them by the stature of the heroes. With the diminished authority of these laws, new laws are created by the people as new forms of government are established to better coordinate society.

The age of men then began because men reach a form of human government naturally through the development of epistolary languages […] or the vulgar languages of words settled in meaning. In the popular republics these are given the meanings of the words the people use in the common assemblies, where laws are commanded according to natural equity […] and in the monarchies they originate in that necessity of nature whereby, when the people are masters of a language, their rulers are naturally led to want laws that will be welcomed by the common sense of the multitude […] Hence the science of the law fell naturally from the grasp of the heroes […] for aristocratic republics must govern by orders rather than laws.63

Just as the First and Second Testaments of Joachim of Fiore were repetitions of one another, closed in their cyclical form, and the Third Testament was something which transfigured the preceding epochs, so too with Vico’s three ages. The age of gods and age of heroes are repetitions of one another, the heroes embody the principles of the archetypal gods, whose principles are represented in the heroes. The age of men is intimately connected to that past of fixed ideals and authority, but brings an all new, natural autonomy in absence of the fixed gods and heroes. Absent of the restrictive authority of divinity, the law can change, adapt, alter and transform into whatever is required by the body of people governed. The decrees inspired by the gods and enforced by the heroes are absorbed into a society which reinvents them as new laws.
Deleuze’s three repetitions utilise and adapt these triplex systems of Joachim of Fiore and Vico. The first two repetitions, Habitus and Mnemosyne, are analogous to one another, the condition of the first always informs the second. Both are cyclical and closed in nature. Essentially, there is no change or novelty within or integral to either of the first two repetitions; like the three ages or Testaments, all transfiguration, change, and difference is found only in the third age, third Testament or, in the case of Deleuze, third repetition. The palingenetic resuscitation of the inactive is the work of the third element, it is here that what is repeated finds its novel reawakening. Deleuze alludes to this very point when he mentions how the revolutionaries of 1789 are ‘determined to lead their lives as “resuscitated Romans”, before becoming capable of the act which they have begun by repeating in the mode of a proper past, therefore under conditions such that they necessarily identify with a figure from the historical past.’ (DR 117) For Deleuze, the repetitions are distinct in their workings, but united in their production of experience. The first two syntheses produce experience through repetition of the Same, repeating the image of identity. While the third synthesis is repetition itself, production of difference absent of the framework required by the first two syntheses and producing only difference and novelty – both of which are drawn out by and are repeated in the first two syntheses. As such, repetition of the Same is what occurs in the cyclical syntheses. They seek to reproduce, whereas the repetition by excess in the third synthesis is the instance where the infinite multiplicity of difference is repeated, and novelty is produced.

The third repetition provides difference for both the first and second ages to draw out. The third repetition is how “making the difference” is possible for the cyclical structures of the first and second repetitions. Just as the age of gods and heroes, trapped in their continual repetition of one another, find their adaptation in the age of men, which in turn transfigures gods and heroes by introducing a multiplicity of differences to them (different people, cultures, creeds, and so on), so too are the first and second repetitions fixated on their cyclical reproduction and yet imbued with novelty and difference by this third, unbounded repetition by excess. “We see, then, that in this final synthesis of time, the present and past are in turn no more than dimensions of the future:
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the past as condition, the present as agent.’ (DR 121) The first and second repetitions are affected by the third repetition. In all these triplex systems, the third element requires the dissolution of the first and second. Only then are the first and second elements able to make the difference through their reconstitution or resexualisation by their essential genital power (Eros). As Deleuze says, the first two ages return to the third as it is ‘precisely what is needed both to correct the intracyclical hypothesis and to contradict the cyclical hypothesis’ (DR 121).

The exegesis of Joachim of Fiore and Vico ought to present the relationship between the three repetitions or syntheses in Deleuze’s work. However, it does little to locate Death in this relationship. Where does Death come into the unity of the three repetitions? Why does Deleuze use Death as the third part to his triplex of repetition? The answer can be found in what is lost to the third repetition and what the first and second repetitions lose themselves to. The image is lost in the third repetition. Identity is lost in Death. We know this is the case as it has already been discussed how the desexualisation of Eros makes the reproduction of identity impossible. The structures on which identity is built fall apart. There is no self, there is no I. All that subsists is the event and the action. Identity becomes lost in this immanent reality. The self and the I cease to be, having been cast out by their own limitations. Habit is fatigued, memory is forgotten; all that is left is the “plebeian” (DR 117). The pursuit of desire, the pleasure principle or Eros, contains its own exhaustion. However, from this boundary of productivity we find the transfiguration of the self and the I. They are imbued with the new and creative. This novelty and productivity in identity are only possible because of the limitations of cyclical identity. The image exists as it does only because it is driven to its non-existence. In other words, because the genesis of our cyclical consciousness is connected to the ordinal unconscious, we are unable to separate from Death despite consciousness being desperate not to lose its image to Death.

In another sense it involves their reorganisation, since the past is treated in function of a totality of time as the condition by default which characterises the Id, while the present is defined by the
metamorphosis of the agent in the ego ideal. In a third sense, finally, the ultimate synthesis concerns only the future, since it announces in the superego the destruction of the Id and the ego, of the past as well as the present, of the condition and the agent. (DR 147-48)

Death is at once both our continuously destabilising source and that which we distance ourselves from through our reproduction of an identity, an image. Death lies between the condition and the agent and the ‘merciless and straight form’ of the totality of time in its ‘singularly tortuous’ and ‘eternally excentric’ circle (DR 118, 145-46). Of course, by eternally excentric circles Deleuze means the eternal return. It is Nietzsche’s eternal return that Deleuze considers to be the missing element to the works of Joachim of Fiore and Vico. They fail to capture in the first two Testaments or ages the repetition of what is eternally repeated in the third. According to Deleuze, Nietzsche provides us with the eternal return which lies beyond the cyclical repetition of the Same. The interpretation that Deleuze presents in his work, particularly *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, is presented in detail in Chapter 5. For now, suffice it to say that Nietzsche’s eternal return presents the loss of the Ego and discarding of its reactive structure, built to resist the chaos of pure difference and repetition by excess.

At this point we can begin to see how affirmation plays a role in Deleuze’s philosophy of difference and his pursuit of a new image of thought. Thinkers such as Lucretius, Spinoza and Nietzsche inspired Deleuze’s own work, and arguably all of them (Deleuze included) wrote in pursuit of affirmation. They sought the affirmation of life through demystification. Unique to Deleuze is how Death is necessary for demystification. Precisely what it demystifies and the implications of Deleuze’s project of demystification through his critique of representation will be explored in later chapters. For now, the following two chapters will discuss the ideas of two affirmationists, Lucretius and Spinoza, to determine their influences on and differences to Deleuze’s philosophy. The next chapter will examine the work of the Epicureans, Lucretius in particular, and how their demystification was applauded by Deleuze. Of course, this praise came despite the Epicureans’ refusal to accept death as a significant component of philosophy. Whether
this difference is reconciled and the relationship that Deleuze maintains with Lucretius in the light of their conflict over death is the question posed by the next chapter.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to define how the concept of Death is used in Deleuze’s understanding of the structure of consciousness. While the first and second repetitions produce the subject and identity, the third repetition only produces difference. Due to the first and second repetitions “making the difference” and “making sense” of difference, Deleuze suggests that the first and second repetitions point to the third, impersonal repetition. Building on that initial understanding of the three-fold structure of the mind, I focussed on the third repetition and the unconscious. Some aspects of Deleuze’s third repetition are only touched upon in *Difference and Repetition*, and so more detail was given to those concepts that initially seemed obscure. One instance of this was Deleuze’s mention of the moment of the desexualisation of Eros. The desexualisation or loss of libido in Eros is important as it signals the point at which consciousness has reached the limits of its ability to sustain itself. Yet the notion of desexualisation is given very little explanation. To get a better understanding of how Death is the result of the structures of the first and second repetitions, it was important to explain desexualisation in more detail. I also gave a brief explanation of Deleuze’s reasons for drawing upon Freud and avoiding figures like Husserl. The aim was to clarify Deleuze’s choice of Freud when Deleuze’s own philosophy often refers to conscious experience and the pre-phenomenological conditions for consciousness. By exploring these ambiguities in Deleuze’s work, Deleuze’s interpretation of the death drive has been made clear and demonstrates the unique use he has for the concept of Death in *Difference and Repetition*.

The consideration of each repetition discretely can make it appear as though they are abstract and separated from one another, occurring in a temporal sequence (first, then second, then third). However, Deleuze makes it clear that they are in fact occurring simultaneously and are always interacting. To demonstrate this point and to help consider all three repetitions as
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comprising the structure of representation in the mind, Deleuze refers to dramatic timing. The timing of tragedies has an important role in *Difference and Repetition*. This timing helps to illustrate how the three-fold or triplex structure of subjectivity incorporates the past and future of the individual, and how that past and future is severed by a moment of transformation called the *caesura*. The *caesura* is a split or crack in the individual’s fixity of identity, that is, their narrative. Before the *caesura*, the individual is incapable of a certain action. After the *caesura*, they become capable of that action. In this crack, however, we find the limit of that former self, the point at which Death takes over from the production of the subject (performed by Eros).

The crack designates, and this emptiness is, Death – the death Instinct. The instincts may speak out, make noise, or swarm, but they are unable to cover up this more profound silence, or hide that from which they come forth and into which they return: the death instinct, *not merely one instinct among others*, but the crack itself around which all of the instincts congregate. (LS 333)

Death is therefore a primary productivity that gives the possibility of pure difference and novelty. That is then taken up in the production of consciousness by Eros and it is difference and novelty that consciousness tries to make sense of. The timing explored in some detail, the purpose of the death drive was then explained by presenting Deleuze’s evaluation of the triplex structures of social history provided by Joachim of Fiore and Vico.

Only mentioning them briefly in his notes on the three repetitions, Deleuze does not explore the social structures of Joachim of Fiore and Vico in much detail. Yet, understanding what each of these thinkers proposed helps one appreciate what it is that Deleuze is introducing to these systems. I explained how each of the structures features a very similar pattern. The first two testaments or ages are repetitions of each other. The first age sets out the basis for the development of the second age and in turn the second age must rely on the first age for its constitution. The second age is also what keeps much of the first age alive, so to speak. The third age is one in which the first two ages are deconstructed and the ideas that informed them becoming freer and more
livered. In the case of the third testament, the Old and New Testaments no longer point to a foundation that is unseen, that is God’s direct involvement in the world. Nor is it the memory of a time when that fundamental involvement is made clearer and is active in a slightly different way: the incarnation of Christ. The third testament is the coming of the Kingdom of God, where the reliance on strictures imposed on belief are no longer necessary. What follows is the age in which deliverance and judgement are immanent to life in God’s presence and no longer derived from the God.

In Vico’s work, the first age is the age of gods, where human virtues and vices are personified as divine figures. This then moves on to their presentation in heroes. Heroes share in the values of the gods, but also dispense rules and live as examples of those original and divine exemplars of human experience. The age of man is when there is no need to rely on gods or heroes any longer. The laws and regulations are determined by a senate or other governing body, who are the people. The passing of laws is therefore made immanent in the delivery of them through the people themselves. While individuals need God or laws, this need is readily fulfilled in the third ages, but not necessarily met in the first two ages. There is a distance or a transcendence to the dictates of gods and heroes that is founded by the immanent provision for needs by humankind itself. For Deleuze, this is indicative of how the first and second repetitions are providing something (identity) that is already carried in the third repetition, but not in a way that is limited or restricted. However, what Joachim of Fiore and Vico fail to do is find a way to introduce novelty to their systems. Once the cycle has concluded in the third age, it will start again and repeat once more. Deleuze’s response to this is the novelty introduced by the eternal return. The eternal return is explored in greater detail in Chapter Five.

Death has been delineated both as an isolated concept and as an integral part of a larger structure. As an isolated concept, the death drive as Deleuze presents it is not destructive. Indeed, it should now be clear that Deleuze’s interpretation of the death drive is heavily influenced by the
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work of Blanchot. The death drive is referred to as Death, the impersonal and ungraspable death presented in Blanchot. Blanchot’s articulation of this second death is undoubtedly a key inspiration for the dispossessed possibility of difference through repetition that comprises Deleuze’s interpretation of Freud’s death drive. Given Deleuze’s advance over the material model of the death drive, Death does not actively cause the annihilation of the self and the I. Rather, exhaustion is internal to consciousness. Exhaustion occurs within and by the continual cycle of reproduction performed by Eros. Once Eros has reached the limits of its reproductive energy or libido, it becomes the death drive, that is, it becomes Thanatos or Death. Thanatos is the unbounded productivity of pure difference. While it still produces as a drive, it is not cyclical. In this way, Deleuze appears to maintain that Death is not opposed to life, nor does it negate life. The aim is for Death to be a source of positive productivity. As it does not negate anything and produces pure difference, it affirms all things, for difference is affirmation (DR 69-70). Although, this also means that to produce a new image of thought necessitates that the original image is exhausted and succumbs to impersonal Death. While the production of pure difference is indicative of affirmationism in Deleuze’s system, the inclusion of Death seems to call much of that into question. The reason that Deleuze’s use of Death seems problematic is that it creates a tension with other affirmationists. Deleuze believes that the greatest achievement of naturalism is demystification. Demystification is the deconstruction of myths, superstitions, and false beliefs. The purpose of demystification is to remove a cause of sadness. In the work of Lucretius, whom Deleuze praises for his demystification of false infinites, fear of death is a cause of sadness. For Spinoza, too, misunderstanding and fearing death and thinking of death is a cause of sadness. Both affirmationists provide the demystification that Deleuze approves of. Yet they both caution against the use of death in philosophy, lest death become the source of dysphoria or sadness and develop into false belief. A tension seems to develop between Deleuze’s use of Death in his philosophy and the rejection of death in the philosophies of Lucretius and Spinoza. To determine if there is
such a tension in Deleuze’s philosophy and, if so, whether it can be resolved, I will now explore the philosophies of these two affirmationists: Lucretius and Spinoza.
NOTES


6 The discussion of three paradoxes relating to the notion of the present moment passing away to create a space for a new present is an important one, however, for the purposes of this thesis, it is not necessary to explore Bergson’s responses to these in Matter and Memory, nor how Deleuze uses these responses in his own understanding of how this second synthesis relates to the first. To read more about the use Deleuze makes of Bergson when responding to these three paradoxes, see James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), Henry Somers-Hall, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), and Hughes, Joe, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (London: Bloomsbury, 2009).
8 Joe Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), p.108
23 The empiricism employed by Freud is arguably what differs from the far more transcendental approach taken by Husserl.
27 Freud comes to this conclusion in multiple works, including Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895), Interpretation of Dreams (1900) and Civilization and its Discontents (1930).
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32 An exploration of Freud’s use of Weissman to explain the genesis of the death drive can be read in Keith Ansell-Pearson’s Germinal Life.


37 Dorothea Olkowski offers a detailed definition of Deleuze’s concept of death in chapter 7 of Gilles Deleuze and the Rain of Representation (California University Press, California: 1999). Olkowski provides a superb explanation of Deleuze’s divergence from Freud and how the death drive is linked to the notion of becoming, captured in Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal return.


Deleuze considers the work of naturalism to be pivotal to exposing and denouncing false beliefs that are the cause of sadness. Naturalism demystifies these misconceptions through the observation of the effects of nature on the human mind. Two key figures of naturalism who present philosophy in this way are Lucretius and Spinoza. Both philosophers provide Deleuze with appeals to the dynamics within nature, reason in collaboration with observation, and a desire to reveal illusions through the exposing of false infinites. These false infinites are the result of poor reasoning and superstition. The discovery of true infinites is accomplished only by going beyond images and illusions. This is achieved by observing nature. One must understand how it works, how it supports and creates life, and the ways that nature affects us. Lucretius intended for his philosophy to be about life. A philosophy of life does not only include how nature expresses itself as life, but how we can improve our own lives. For Lucretius, we can improve our life by developing and acquiring a detailed understanding of the natural world. The pursuit for a philosophy of life, however, must also acknowledge death.

The treatment of death in these two philosophies is what is of interest here, as it seems to be that both thinkers have an attitude of caution towards the concept of death. For Lucretius, death is nothing to us. Why? Because our focus ought to be on how best to live one’s life. Too much of a focus on death threatens the imperturbability that results from understanding nature. Lucretius offers his understanding of the Epicurean arguments against the fear of death. However, there are some intriguing elaborations on the structure of composite bodies that illuminate much more than the straightforward arguments found in the letters of Epicurus. Lucretius’ work delivers
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an exploration into composition and decomposition that provides what Serres refers to as a ‘fluid
metaphysics’, in which creation and destruction give way to a much more affirmative notion of
movement or transition. Lucretius’ elaboration on these transitions are grounded in his naturalism,
which Deleuze celebrates in his essay *Lucretius and the Simulacrum*. In this essay, Deleuze offers his
interpretation of Lucretius’ work as one of demystification and the eradication of sadness.

Deleuze has a fundamental use for Death in his philosophy of difference. Death is crucial
to understanding how it is that difference can be introduced into what would otherwise be a self-
replicating system of cyclical reproduction in one’s consciousness. Death, requiring the dissolution
of the self and the fractured I, cannot be done away with and is necessary for understanding the
way that sense is involved in the construction of one’s identity and how one’s identity can come
to be unfolded and exposed to novelty and limitlessness. Death is neither insignificant nor
unworthy of our attention. Yet, for Lucretius, death is nothing to us. Death is often the cause of
fear, melancholy, and sadness. How can this difference in the appreciation and characterisation of
death be reconciled between Deleuze and Lucretius?

FROM ON NATURE TO ON THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE

Epicurus developed his understanding of nature through the empirical observation of the
natural world to ascertain its structure and order. Through rational deduction based on these
observations he determined the existence and dynamics of atoms. Epicurean atomism is founded
on Democritean atomism, and it owes much to Democritus. Epicurus didn’t agree with all of
Democritus’ principles, particularly with regards to the concept of necessity and chance, however
there is much shared between them, the use of the atom to understand the construction of matter
is one idea that they both shared.¹ The constitutive components of all matter are atoms. Epicurus
concluded that all things are constructed from atoms within a void, which, when scattered, can no
longer constitute anything. (*Ep. Her. 39-40*)² Atoms are the source of all existing things, including
those things traditionally believed to be incorporeal, like the soul. Atoms are believed to be the
cause of sensation, whether it be the sugar in the mouth, the tongue that tastes it, or the sensation of sweetness itself – all things are material. As all things are material, Epicurus believed that it is possible to discover the causes of all things, and in learning of the causal nature of the cosmos we might learn something about ourselves. In this regard, Epicureanism is systematic in its approach to nature, establishing what is known as the laws of Nature (foedera naturae). The purpose of following the Democritean principle of atomism is to establish a philosophy built on the observation of nature (physis). Developing the understanding of the cosmos through natural science allows Epicurus to confirm the truth about nature and thereby disprove false ideas. Through this natural science, Epicurus built a philosophical system which accounts for political, meteorological, cosmological, geological, and biological facets of life. The pursuit of natural science also served to remove suspicions, myths, and harmful theological ideas. Epicurean naturalism was believed to reveal all this about nature and as a result expose the ethical necessities incumbent upon humanity. For Epicurus, the ethics intrinsic to the natural world is characterised in the relationship animals (including humans) have with pleasure and pain.

Epicureanism is dedicated to the development of imperturbability and mental tranquillity called ataraxia (άταραξία). The state of ataraxia is arrived at through the pursuit of pleasure and a reduction in encounters with those things that are painful and disturbing. The search for pleasure is why Epicureanism is often referred to as hedonistic, from the Greek word for happiness – hedone – and this can be misleading. Epicureanism is not about the pursuit of carnal pleasures or euphoric excess. On the contrary, it is about temperance, restraint, and moderation. Naturally, creatures pursue that which is pleasurable to them and avoid those things which pain them, for ‘every pleasure is a good thing, since it has a nature congenial [to us]’. (Ep. Men. 129) Ultimately, it is the natural inclination of all creatures to embrace those things which are congenial to their nature, as a result of which they experience pleasure, and avoid or abstain from anything which is painful and therefore contrary to that same nature and diminishes that pleasure. The hope for all creatures is to be protected from disturbances, something accomplished upon maintaining a state of ataraxia.
Mental tranquillity is important to Epicureans, as it is what allows for life to be lived happily and without any significant distress and misery. The goal for Epicureans is thus to guard oneself against dysphoria in the form of mental perturbances, through careful modulation of the balance of pleasures. This results in the least pain and allows only for pains which produce the greatest pleasure, thus avoiding unnecessary and harmful pleasures, and pains which are readily avoidable. The relationship between pleasure and its privation (pain) is an understanding which allows the Epicurean to pursue the life which is attuned to their innermost nature: the desire for pleasure. Pain and pleasure are often responses to physical stimuli; however, they can also be caused by emotive responses to beliefs. The most relevant pain of this nature is caused by fear. One who fears something will likely be fearful due to the potential pain it might cause, and that fear is itself a cause of perturbation. Epicurus wanted to use his philosophy of nature to provide a means for addressing issues such as fearful (false) beliefs, in the hope of engendering ataraxia.

Epicurus is most memorable for his work dispelling the fear of death. Epicurus believed that a studious life that was attentive to the laws of nature would assuage any fears of death due to the ready abandonment of false beliefs of an afterlife. ‘It is impossible for someone ignorant about the nature of the universe but still suspicious about the subjects of the myths to dissolve his feelings of fear about the most important matters. So it is impossible to receive unmixed pleasures without knowing natural science.’ (Epicurus, 1994:33) To achieve ataraxia, one must combat ignorance and challenge myths; Epicurus’ atomism is a path to peace of mind. To challenge the fear of death, Epicurus addressed two things: the gods are not interested in the plight of humanity and the soul that gives us out sensation is dispersed when we die. While Epicurus does great work to address these two concerns in what little works of his we have left, Lucretius, a student of Epicureanism, provides us with a more thorough and descriptive explanation of how death is not just the point at which we perish, but something much more fundamental to the mechanics of the cosmos.
Lucretius’ work, *De Rerum Natura* or *On the Nature of the Universe*, appears to be a convincing attempt at recreating Epicurus’ own text, *On Nature.* Lucretius’ comprehensive writings give a rigorous exploration of atomism and are helpful for understanding the nuances of Epicurean naturalism and atomism in response to concerns surrounding natural law, the gods, and the afterlife.

Lucretius joins Epicurus in understanding the world as being comprised of two basic elements: matter and void. The interactions between the atoms within the void leads to the composition of all known existing things. There is nothing which is incorporeal or ethereal, everything is either matter or it is nothing at all. Matter is only sensible due to its capacity for affecting the senses. The senses interpret the information they receive through the emission of atoms from the surface of objects. Smells, colours, heat, and other sensible phenomena are believed to travel over distances when emitted from their source, while those sensations which require touch and taste are experienced in certain ways analogous to the shape of the atoms of which that object is comprised. For example, a bitter drink tastes that way due to the sharp shape of the atoms which make up that particular drink. Their sharpness makes them abrasive against the flesh of the tongue, itself imbued with the soul which then translates the interaction into the sensation of bitter taste. The soul is considered to be the source of sensation. Importantly, the soul is the unity of the mind and spirit (which are one and the same in material construction, though they operate in slightly different ways). The soul is also material and so can interact with the material world and can influence and be influenced by material things. Already, the first concern of the non-Epicurean is being explained away, in that there is no incorporeal spirit which operates the senses or any other such idea around how we experience the world around us. Rather, the world around us can be experienced because it is able to influence the material soul through effects on a material body by another material body. The groundwork to dispelling myths around death is established through the understanding that the soul is a material body. Next is to elaborate on
what material bodies undergo, opening them up to change, alteration and, eventually, decomposition.

Complex bodies are composed of material parts which are constituted by a variety of different atoms. These atoms are not generated *ex nihilo*, as matter simply *is*. The generation of things at a certain time and their dissolution to allow for other things to be formed, including the order of birth and death and the structure Lucretius perceived in nature regarding the special and temporal consistency of life’s creation and destruction, were all he needed to inform him of the pre-existence of all matter and its combination and dispersion as the generative principle. ‘Since there would be no generating particles, then neither/ Would certain things arise from only a certain kind of mother.’ (DRN, I:166-67) All things which originate in the world must originate from something else. Even the word nature comes from the Latin *nasco*, associated with the rebirth of the leaves of the trees each year, with the Greek word Φύσις (*physis*) meaning the same.⁶ Lucretius argues that all things are composed of what they once were, and, in the future, all things will, themselves, be decomposed to allow for the introduction of new complex composites. Much influence for this can be attributed to the Heraclitean law of conservation, whereby all things are thought to be in a state of flux or *panta rei*, with continuous motion accounting for the steady degradation of all things. Heraclitus suggested that all things were in a constant movement between instability and harmony.⁷ All matter undergoes a structural transformation, where the constituent parts to any one thing will eventually breakdown, allowing for the generation of other things. Herein is the key to understanding how a living thing comes to die, for death is fundamentally a part of this transformation intrinsic to nature. Through the collision of atoms compounds are constructed and as constructs they can also be deconstructed, which also means that their constituent parts can be reconstituted as any number of different things. Thus, Lucretius understood mortality as simply the capacity to undergo change that all things have, sometimes a change significant enough to cause said thing to cease to be through its transformation into something wholly distinct from what it was. A body is only living due to various elements
combined within a body. Once the soul is no longer sustained by the body, it scatters and leaves the body, leaving it as a corpse. Before moving onto the wider implication of Lucretius’ conclusions regarding the composition, decomposition and reconstitution of bodies and the notion of transformation, I will briefly explain how this is intended to achieve a chief goal of Epicureanism: to dispel the fear of death, or thanatophobia.

Given that the soul is scattered at death, it follows that the means with which one could sense is no longer available. The soul and body need to be combined for sensation to occur. Upon the death of an individual, when they are changed through the sundering of the body and soul, there can be no sensation.

So when the bond is put asunder between body and soul,

Nothing can befall us, we who shall no longer be,

Nor move our senses, no, not even if the earth and sea

Were confounded with one another, and the sea mixed with the sky.

(DRN, III:838-42)

Lucretius concludes that posthumous sensation is impossible, and so the terror of Tantalus or the tortures of Sisyphus are nonsensical, and all fear of an insufferable afterlife can be cast out of the mind, to the relief of those who believed they would suffer endlessly. An afterlife is therefore not something we can experience, as sensation does not occur after death. But what of the gods and their retribution? According to Lucretius, the gods are wholly indifferent to the plight of individual people. There is no possibility that the gods would involve themselves in either one’s present life or one’s afterlife, as they cannot harm anyone after death and do not take interest in one’s personal affairs. The individual who feared death should, Lucretius believes, come to understand that the gods are not to be feared and death should not worry us at all. One ought not to take this to mean that we should not care about death or should be indifferent to it. Death is a great motivator and provides much impetus for action. A large part of that action should be used to capitalise on
enjoying life, through the abolition of avoidable pain, and the pursuit of happiness in its moderate and necessary forms.\textsuperscript{9} Death is important to the Epicureans not simply because they want it to be less worrisome, but because the proper understanding of death eliminates fear \textit{and} encourages one to live life fully and in greater contentment. Death is not ignored. Rather, death is studied and acknowledged in a positive way.\textsuperscript{10} Now let us examine what the wider implications of Lucretius’ metaphysics are, namely with the way he defines death itself.

\textbf{PALINGENETIC THANATOLOGY}

Lucretius presents two ways that something can die: 1) the point at which the soul scatters from the body and 2) a transformation that takes something beyond its own limits. The first refers to the deceased, while the second is about more than the death of an individual person. Much of what constitutes the first rendition of death has already been discussed. The soul is a material construction that is dispersed throughout and supported by the body, which it controls (through the mind) and provides sensation for (through the spirit). Death can be characterised as the point at which these two physical structures come apart, through the diminution or cessation of one of the components of life that maintains their combination. The soul is therefore mortal, according to Lucretius, as it is susceptible to changes brought about through its interaction with other physical bodies. The mortality of the soul is argued for by Lucretius through the context of one changing one’s mind, whence we see the second, less personal notion of death. Something is mortal if it is capable of change, Lucretius reasons, and so he proposes that for something to have the capacity to be transformed it must be capable of dying. However, there are some instances of this where he suggests what is considered dead still maintains an existence as a transformed thing. What does this mean? How can something that has died continue its existence without being deconstructed?

Lucretius proposes that when we change our mind, we exhibit all the traits of death. While this sounds drastic, it is important to remember that, for Lucretius, death is just a term given to a
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certain effect caused by the movement of atoms within a structure. In the case of the mind, when we change our mind, it is because we have the addition, deletion or substitution of an idea causing the physical structure of the mind to change to accommodate for that alteration. He says:

The living mind is mortal, since whoever wants to change
The mind or any other substance has to rearrange
The organisation of its structure, or add to the sum,
Or else must take away at least some tiny morsel from
The whole. But what’s immortal does not suffer any new
Arrangement of its members, nor can it be added to,
Neither can even one iota of it flow away.
For anything that does, because of this transformation, stray
Beyond the limits of itself \(\text{quodcunque suis mutatum finibus exit}\), then from that moment on
Whatever thing it might have been before is dead and gone \(\text{hoc mors est illius, quod fuit ante}\).

(\text{DRN, III:511-20})

The concept of conservation of materials is evident in this passage, and it leads to a number of developments. First, Lucretius is proposing that the nature of change necessitates that there be the cessation of something (in the case above this is the end of a particular structure of the mind). Second, Nature herself demands that transformation draws on its surroundings to facilitate that change. It is not just that there is an end to the previous structure, but the previous structure provides the ground for the newer structure. Third, this implies that the former structure has a weak survival or continuation in the development of what comes after it. Even though what came before is dead \(\ell mors\), it nonetheless continues in part as a contingent piece of the new structure. How is this important to our project? These assertions perceive death as being not only an event at the end of life, but an integral and fundamental part of living itself. Indeed, it almost takes death to be nothing more than a singular point in the transition from one structure to another. The process is present throughout life and is even what makes life possible. I will elaborate on each of
the three assertions made above before looking into how Lucretius has proposed a change in the notion of death from a singular, personal event to a continual structural alteration.\textsuperscript{12}

The ending of one thing signifying the arrival of newer things is a common concept in Lucretius’ poetry. The contingency of material things, their genesis or subsistence requires the decomposition and/or consumption of other things, relies upon the exceeding of structural limitation as either the provision of the material or the assimilation of it. ‘The funeral wail/Is mixed together with the sound of newborn babies’ cries’, Lucretius writes, conveying how there is a constant back and forth of creation and destruction within Nature (DRN, II:569-80). Lucretius understands all future creations as requiring presently existing things for their creation. As a means of disposing of the fear of death, Lucretius also insists that we owe our life to the deaths of others.

Future generations need material to grow.
And they, when life is through, shall follow you into the grave,
As those that came before, no less than you, wave after wave. Thus one thing rises from another — it will never cease.
No one is given life to own; we all hold but a lease. (DRN, III:967-71)

To have the generation of new things and maintain the conservation of matter in the universe, it is necessary that the constituents of certain things be redistributed in such a way as leads to them “going beyond the limit of themselves,” making them no longer exist in the way that they were, essentially and structurally dead. Only in this way can new things arise, however there is still the existence of what came before that is carried into the new, as a different structure is taken on or some part of what was previous is maintained in the new thing. The continued existence of a thing’s constituents is a law of nature, for Lucretius, as matter cannot be created or destroyed (DRN, III:1001-4), and so even though that which was is no more, some part of it does continue into the generation of newer things – indeed, the thing itself has a history of past things from which it collects its constituent parts.
Throughout his poem, Lucretius talks about how matter is constantly moving. This includes its movement from the structure of one thing into the structure of another as a transference of materials. The importance of conveying how material is conserved within the system is found in his unwavering insistence that the death of any one thing can never be so significant as to lead to the annihilation of any single part of it. Everything that constitutes a being is preserved in death, for death is a term for the transition from one structure to another, different structure. In this way, Lucretius communicates his true intention, which is to demonstrate how the metaphysics that he and other Epicureans draw on is not founded on any formalism – whereby one might consider there to be a particular structure that designates a concept to it – but is much more fluid than this. Lucretius resists presenting atomism as a form of “solid metaphysics”. Metaphysics is “solid” when it considers metaphysical states to be fixed for a given thing, as opposed to a “fluid metaphysics” which allows for metaphysical states to be in flux. The creation of any new thing draws on the necessary end of other things, which leads to the conclusion that all things share in a single source, which we know to be matter, according to Lucretius, and so there is a common genus in all things that is both their foundation for existence, reservoir of resources for growth, and the intrinsic cause of their demise (that is, their deconstruction). I propose that a term which supports and describes this constant fluctuation and transition of materials is palingenesis.

Palingenesis is derived from the Greek *palin*, meaning “again”, and *genesis*, translated as “birth” – it is translated as reborn or recreated. The term has a special place in the lexicon of Arthur Schopenhauer, who (knowingly or not) captures the Epicurean idea of fluid metaphysics in his own attempt at demonstrating how the will-to-live [*Wille zum Leben*] is indestructible. In his essay ‘On the Indestructibility of our Essential Being By Death’ [*Zur Lehre von der Unzerstörbarkeit unsers wahren Wesens durch den Tod*], Schopenhauer elaborates on the way in which the will-to-live, the force that drives all things to continue their existence, is impervious to the effects of death.
Similar to the work of Lucretius explored so far, Schopenhauer explains how the will-to-live that resides in all beings contains that which is necessary for the generation of a new being [Wesen].

Death announces itself frankly as the end of the individual, but in this individual there lies the germ of a new being [der Keim zu einem neuer Wesen]. Thus nothing that dies dies for ever; but nothing that is born receives a fundamentally new existence. That which dies is destroyed; but a germ remains over out of which there proceeds a new being, which then enters into existence without knowing whence it has come nor why it is as it is. This is the mystery of palingenesisis [das Mysterium der Palingenesie]; it reveals to us that all those beings living at the present moment contain within them the actual germ of all which will live in the future, and that these therefore in a certain sense exist already.

Schopenhauer considers the transition of the will-to-live from one being to another as a recreation of that will-to-live. Recreation in this manner implies that all things that will come to exist will have this same will-to-live as their essential being. In anticipation of his readers’ confusion, Schopenhauer is quick to insist that this does not mean there is a transference of one individual’s soul or essence into another being, as is proposed by the doctrine of reincarnation. Nothing of the original being that made it individual continues or is shared once it dies. The term metempsychosis is distinguished from palingenesisis. Metempsychosis is when one’s consciousness, soul or some other personal affect that distinguished the individual, is transposed into a new form or host. The essential being that was in all things before, is in oneself presently, and will be in others, is impersonal; the will-to-live transcends the differentiation of individual identities.

One would do well to make a clear distinction between metempsychosis, which is the transference of the entire so-called soul into another body, and palingenesisis, which is the decomposition and reconstruction of the individual in which will alone persists and, assuming the shape of a new being, receives a new intellect.

The crucial side to this is that the individual is “decomposed” and therefore it is impossible for that same individual to subsist after their death. Lucretius is forced to make a similar distinction in
his own work. Upon declaring the soul’s being scattered upon death and then reworked into the
structure of other beings, he must make it clear that the soul does not remain intact nor possess
any of the characteristics of its former structure. The soul is decomposed and then reconstituted
later on (DRN, III:751-9;777-83) with no trace of the “who” or “what” that it once was.

Of course, Schopenhauer’s will-to-live and Lucretius’ atomistic matter are not the same. The will-to-live, Schopenhauer’s development of the metaphysics of Kant’s thing-in-itself, is
imperfectly understood only through the careful consideration of representations. The
representations we perceive are our attempts to distinguish and interpret the expressions of the
will-to-live. Unlike Schopenhauer, Lucretius believes that matter is something we can know and
understand fully. For Lucretius, there is no illusion interfering with our proper understanding when
our perceptions of the world are meditated upon. While the will-to-live cannot be known fully,
according to Schopenhauer, Lucretius believes that matter and its movements can and must be
known. However, the two thinkers do share the belief that there is a link between temporal
individuality and the atemporal, dispossessed ground out of which it originates.

Thrasymachus: To sum up, what shall I be after my death? Be clear and precise!

Philaletes: Everything and nothing [Alles und nicht].

As an individual, one returns to the primary source out of which one originated, which renders the
individual destroyed (nothing). Simultaneously, that to which one returns is that which is a part of
all things and so, with regards to one’s essential being, one returns to being a part of all things
(everything). Another way to read this is that the primordial ground out of which all things arise is
at once both all things and is also nothing, by virtue of being no determinate thing (literally no-
thing). As we begin to move our attention from Lucretius to Deleuze’s interaction with him, it is
worthwhile beginning by briefly exploring Gilbert Simondon, who had an influence on Deleuze’s
work. Notably, in some of his work Simondon develops the concept of ontogenesis, a concept that
is surprisingly similar to palingenesis. To introduce Simondon, I shall present where problems arise
in the work of Lucretius and how Simondonian ontogenesis can provide a better account of the transformation or transmutation of being.

One of the complications Lucretius’ palingenetic thanatology runs into, is based on two presuppositions: first is that atoms are given as individuals, indeed they have no genesis and are eternal, and yet their existence is not demonstrated as being determined by anything. Therefore, their existence is an assumption, based on which the composite individuals generated by the chance conjoining of these atoms is taken to be the real creation of individuals. Second, we find that Lucretius is still at risk of formalism by presenting the notion of limits. The possibility of something to go “beyond its limits” suggests that such a thing is limited in what form it can take or what structure underlies its presentation as a determined thing. This situates the individual in the awkward position of being in opposition to and resistant to what is around it – namely its subsistence is against its dissolution. Essentially, Lucretius is presenting individuality as a dialectical opposition between the individual and everything which it is not. However, this is not necessarily how Lucretius intended for his work on the individual to be interpreted; it is likely that this conflict between accepting a kind of formalism and avoiding the complication of nature, by introducing distinct individuals determined from it and perceivable as no longer intrinsic to nature, originates from his inner conflict as an author.

Lucretius’ poem is caught between providing a universal and detached view of the cosmos, presenting it as it is sub specie aeternitas, while trying to appeal to the personal problems faced by his readership. Lucretius is addressing the individuals reading his work and, for his message to reach them in a meaningful (hopefully life-changing) way, he must appeal to their subjective natures. But the philosophy he is discussing opposes such an attachment to the idea of oneself as an individual. In her work The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics, Nussbaum highlights this tension in the poems of Lucretius; there is a conflict in what he intends for himself and the reader to accomplish through his teachings and his own practice. Lucretius seems to propose that we
understand nature well enough to be unperturbed by it, just as the gods are not affected by nature. Lucretius writes his work out of his love for his fellow human beings, and he does so with the hope that it will continue to influence people after he is gone. However, his work argues for a life that does not linger on hopes for the future, nor should one attach too much value and importance on the progress and happiness of others.

It is very revealing that when Lucretius speaks of his own poetic vocation he alludes to both of these non-Epicurean motivations: to fellow feeling […] to the desire to leave a mark on human life when, in both Book I and Book IV, he speaks of his longing for appropriate praise […] a creative and other-regarding aim that fits oddly with the Epicurean project of detaching the agent from concern with the human world and its accidents.¹⁸

Lucretius is caught in this awkward position because he is still attached to notions of individuality. Lucretius fails to fulfil what the Epicurean goal demands of him, namely, to avoid an attachment to identity. Through identifying himself as a singular character and appealing to other singular characters – his readership – he betrays a key concept in his work: demystifying the illusion of identity. Lucretius’ “palingenetic thanatology” too closely adheres to the recreation of forms; the genesis within Lucretius’ metaphysics may seem fluid to Serres, but it is not fluid enough to avoid formalism entirely, and certainly fails to avoid identity. Let us look at the ontogenesis of Simondon to provide an example of something closer to what Lucretius was likely hoping for (regarding the palingenetic mechanics of genesis in Nature) but failed to achieve.

Simondon states how the work undertaken by Lucretius is flawed, given that ‘atomism describes the genesis of that which is composed’ and the composition of all complex compounds relies on cohesive forces, the atoms, which are the ‘true individuals.’¹⁹ The “substantialist” principle of individuation is therefore unreliable, given that it is founded on the existence of individuals preceding any individuation, with no account as to the way in which those individuals come into existence. Simondon is interested in determining a principle of individuation through considering
individuation as “ontogenesis” – the ‘character of being, that by which being becomes, insofar as it is, as being.’ To become individuated, one must originate from a preindividuated ground. The living being is one which is going through constant alterations, transitions, and combinations, making them active in growth and development. In a living being, individuation is never completed but is always becoming, for it ‘does not exhaust with one stroke the potentials of preindividual reality.’

Being is always in the process of attempting to fulfil itself and the closest achievement of this is stability and equilibrium, the point with the lowest level of potentiality. The most active processes are found in living beings, for ‘the living resolves problems, not only by adapting itself, that is to say modifying its relation to the environment […] but by modifying itself, by inventing new internal structures and by completely introducing itself into the axiomatic of vital problems.’ That an individual is always attached to the pre-individuated ground is what allows for this continual individuation,

The individual is thus neither substance nor a simple part of the collective: the collective intervenes as a resolution of the individual problematic, which means that the basis of the collective reality is already partially contained in the individual, in the form of the preindividual reality that remains linked to the individuated reality; that which we generally consider to be a relation, because of the mistaken hypothesis of the substantialisation of individual reality, is in fact a dimension of the individuation through which the individual becomes.

The individual is bound up in its own individuation, which is necessary as it is always in communication with the preindividual. The preindividual is not a unity, it must be said, but is beyond unity in its multiplicity. Indeed, it is transindividual, beyond the individual and bound up only in the distillation of activity. Transitioning from the preindividual into the solidifying individual is done through the communicative process of individuation. Lucretius, while betraying his being beholden to certain concepts of the individual and identity, does seem to be proposing something similar to what Simondon refers to as metastability. Metastability describes an individual
existing as a stable unity, but that unity is continuously being contributed to, deducted from, and transformed through its relation to the preindividual.

The living is both agent and theatre of individuation advancing from one metastability to another. While palingenesis in Lucretius is the recreation of the soul or flesh or some other physical entity, this same recreated individual component is always open for regeneration, rejuvenation, or redistribution without being at the cost of an individual, per say. Rather, the individual is the process of change. In other words, Lucretius is more open to the developmental aspect of palingenesis, although his atomism does not allow for the radical metastability that Simondon is suggesting.

Lucretius maintains that there is an individual, and that the individual can sustain changes, however those changes can render the individual decomposed if the process takes them beyond their limitations. Lucretius is working with a definition of individual that is dependent on the formal structure of that individual, a structure that is readily perceptible. Simondon differs by arguing that the individual can maintain their individuality whilst being a field of metastabilities, that is under a constant state of fluctuation and transformation which still maintains the individual as such. For Lucretius, however, there is, quite literally, a limit to how far any given metastability within an individual can go before it is no longer recognisable as the same individual, but something entirely new. This is a significant restriction placed on Lucretius’ appreciation for change. Lucretius has this limitation due to the reliance on the observation, substantialism, and empiricism of Epicurean naturalism. This is important for Lucretius’ work, for without having distinct and perceptible individuals and their identities, there cannot be a subject undergoing a given change whose benefit from that change can be observed. One must remember that Lucretius is interested in educating and helping people and were he to suggest that people are so transient as to be incapable of being individuals with a degree of constancy and existing only as the surface for a host of changes, then it would be difficult to suggest who (or what) his philosophy would apply to. An individual’s
connection to their origins is crucial to what Lucretian physics has to offer, and the insistence on death as being a simple transition is also fundamental to his work against thanatophobia.

Essentially, Lucretius fixes the world of fluctuation within the life of the individual but does so in such a way as to neither render the individual in such a state of flux as they are not capable of being known as a “someone” and yet not so fixed that they seem incapable of change, development, growth, or novelty. The individual can be both permanent and transient simultaneously: they possess an identity, and yet that identity is undergoing a constant and necessary process. One could argue that Simondon would readily concede that, while the reality of existence as a living thing is that we are subject to a range of individuations as a metastable organism, there is still a phenomenal subject that appears to be stable and without a great degree of change. Just because my reality is founded on an ever-shifting landscape of individuation, does not mean that I have no perceptible fixed identity in a world of perceived identities. However, Lucretius’ account of change is in one case a necessary aspect of transient nature, and in another case the defined and limited identities of those individuals undergoing said change. Lucretius does not explore how change might undermine the fixity of a given individual during their lifetime. Metastability provides a good answer to this. Regardless, the capacity for change in both systems does, eventually, lead to the end of that individual. Upon an individual having been altered beyond their own limit, the constituent parts being structured anew, the individual will cease to exist – a process that we now know to be death.

**HEDONIC DEMYSTIFICATION**

Death is therefore only possible in Lucretian thanatopsis if one accepts the absence of genesis in the individuals that are atoms and the presence of palingenesis in the structuring of individuals composed from atoms. Lucretius, upon considering atoms as eternal, rejected the necessity for atoms to be created. Atoms are the foundation on which Lucretius believes he develops a sound and robust philosophy. The notion of individuality is one which could well be a remnant of
Lucretius’ own error of attaching too much value to identity. As has been discussed, Lucretius’ philosophy appears to say one thing (achieve an attitude of \textit{sub specie aeternitas}) while he in practice does another (concerning himself with the success of his teachings). What is important to Deleuze is the practice Lucretius advocates in his teaching. Specifically, Deleuze praises naturalism (such as Lucretius’ Epicureanism) on its promotion and provision of demystification.

In \textit{Logic of Sense}, Deleuze explores Stoic teachings to show how their efforts can challenge our perceptions of representation. Deleuze suggests that many of these developments are crucial to the writings of Lewis Carroll and the non-sensical world he creates. Indeed, Deleuze states that Carroll has a place in the work due to his presentation of the ‘paradoxes of sense’ and ‘chaos-cosmos’, while the Stoics are situated alongside him for their presentation of ‘a new image of the philosopher’ which challenged ‘the pre-Socratics, Socratic philosophy and Platonism.’ (LS xi) The \textit{Logic of Sense} provides the groundwork for many of the concepts that are brought to bear against the “dogmatic Image of Thought” in \textit{Difference and Repetition}. One such notion is that of demystification. The essay ‘Lucretius and the Simulacrum’ performs three tasks: it provides an example of transcendental empiricism; it explores how this method can be utilised in ways that disentangle thought from illusion to create thinking; and it shows a subtle connection between the goals of the Epicureans and those of Spinoza.

Deleuze directs the reader’s attention to Lucretius’ reference to sense as the source of philosophical ideas. The reliance Lucretius has on the senses is important to Deleuze because it is through the limitations inherent in this empiricism that a limitlessness is discovered. The Epicureans consider the natural world to provide the materials for the creation of concepts, even beyond that which is knowable to us – the apprehension of the sensible which can only be sensed provides us with everything we need for the development of new concepts (DR 71). This is achieved by finding the limitations of a n image of thought and then going beyond those limitations. The push beyond the boundaries of the faculties is achieved through demystification,
and this process of demystifying forces us to think in new ways. We are forced into thinking because we must redefine what a faculty is capable of. All of this is facilitated by the discovery of false infinites. Naturalism can expose false infinites (through demystification). For Deleuze, this process is revealed in the example of the *simulacrum*, described by Lucretius.

Simulacra are properties within objects which emanate outwards and travel through the void (space); these can include smells, sounds and colours, among other things. Deleuze argues that the Epicureans reveal how only the image of sensible matter is perceptible, not what the object produces (the simulacrum). This is because the simulacrum is considered to travel faster than the minimum sensible time, otherwise we would perceive the smell of a thing before we smelt it or see things before they are visible. The simulacrum travels faster than we can sense it, which is why we cannot perceive it directly. Deleuze arrives at this conclusion through Epicurus’ and Lucretius’ explanation of the *clinamen*.

The *clinamen* is a very slight swerve in the direction of travel taken by an atom (which would otherwise travel in a straight line, according to Democritean atomism). This minor swerve causes atoms to collide, forming compounds, while allowing them to travel faster than the minimum time required for thought. What he concludes is that the emanations from objects, the *simulacrum*, must, by analogy, travel at least as fast as those atoms undergoing the *clinamen*, not least of all because they, too, are atoms. Ergo, if the atoms swerve within a time smaller than the minimum thinkable time, the atoms of the simulacrum must reach our senses in a time smaller than the minimum sensible time. ‘The simulacrum is thus imperceptible. The image alone is sensible, which conveys quality, and which is made up of this very rapid succession, and the summation of many identical simulacra.’ (LS 282) Deleuze maintains that this concept of atomic movement is the lynchpin of the Epicurean philosophy, providing reasons to refute the false infinite or ‘the principle of the disturbance of the spirit.’ (LS 285)
Death and Sense

What Deleuze is impressed by is the way that Epicurus and Lucretius point beyond the sensible to show how there is a realm from which all our experience originates, beyond the limits of perception. Importantly, that origin of experience lies beyond the image, too, which is the source of perturbance for those who do not adhere to their philosophy. The understanding saving the Epicureans from fearing death is the abandoning of their attachment to the false infinite of the image (infinite capacities for pleasure and pain through an infinite and eternal selfhood) and an embrace of the true infinite that lies beyond the image of thought and which alone stirs the senses into action and interpretation. Deleuze calls this “demystification”. Deleuze admires Epicurus’ and Lucretius’ efforts to demonstrate to their readers the falsity of myths.

One of the most profound constants of Naturalism is to denounce everything that is sadness, everything that is the cause of sadness, and everything that needs sadness to exercise its power. (LS 286)

Deleuze’s mention of sadness is a reference to Spinoza’s sad passions, whereby an individual is saddened by a loss in their power to act (we will say more on that in the next chapter). Deleuze would consider this sadness to be the target of the Epicureans due to their pursuit of pleasure, which he seems to liken to Spinoza’s joyous passion, which results from an increase in one’s power to act. However, it is more nuanced than this we consider that, for Spinoza, the affect of joy is caused when one achieves adequate knowledge of something, which is to cast aside all illusions which confuse an idea. For Deleuze, the example of the Epicureans casting their doubts on these false infinites is a fulfilment of this same task – to denounce illusions and attain adequate knowledge.

Lucretius established for a long time to come the implications of naturalism: the positivity of Nature; Naturalism as the philosophy of affirmation; pluralism linked with multiple affirmation; sensualism connected with the joy of the diverse; and the practical critique of all mystifications. (LS 287)
Death and Sense

The inclusion of the atomists is for this reason: to expose the situation of Deleuze’s own philosophy as one that wishes to continue the work of the affirmationists, the naturalists, and the proponents of positive creation. A clear image of this is found in Lucretius with regards to the going beyond of the senses to find the space beyond the image and illuminate the relevance and impact it has on developing an adequate understanding of the genesis of consciousness out of infinite difference. However, the naturalism of Epicurus and Lucretius is far from ideal as when considering the wider project of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference. Their work requires the limitation of some forms, it suggests substantialist individuation that neglects a principle of individuation, and it still languishes in concepts of divinity and identity. The Epicurean cure for thanatophobia develops a unique and pioneering theory of diversity, but it is a distant cry from the kind of multiplicity that Deleuze is pursuing in his own philosophy.

CONCLUSION

Deleuze’s endorsement of Epicurean naturalism is at the cost (or feigns ignorance over) of much of what they are trying to accomplish. The joy they try to impart through their theory and practice is one of placidity and it is arrived at through a methodical (almost surgical) removal of all sources of disturbance in life. This is, of course, the cause of their philosophical innovation, and yet it is also a cause for concern. As was alluded to earlier in the chapter, the atomists are caught between providing a means for understanding the cosmos in a way that can detach us from it emotionally and developing a therapeutic philosophy that maintains the relevancy and importance of the individual undergoing it. Essentially, it appears impossible to have both; the view from beyond the individual cannot also maintain the individual. Even were the individual to be suspended for a moment, there remains the division of the singular individual and the foundational world of diversity. Death in Epicureanism has demonstrated some understanding of the relation between complex structures and the world with which they interact, to provide a positive account for change and, for Deleuze, to develop a philosophy of affirmation.
Death and Sense

An important part of their work to provide an account for change is their thanatology. The palingenetic unfolding of the story of complex relations. Lucretius provides the narrative and reasoning for one to consider the cosmos in continual fluctuation. New constructs are built. Old constructs fall apart. There is an order, a contract, to the natural transitioning from one structure to another. The movement is life. Between the life of what was and the life of what is to come is the moment of death. Death as the point at which what was before is capable of being transformed, through death, into what is to come. At the point of death, the limits of that structure are reached, the multiple and the individual are one. What is necessary is taken, what is not required is released. The break down and ensuing reassembly of some or all of the structure – that is the loss of one life for the birth of another through the moment of death.

The use of the concept of Death by Deleuze is similar to Lucretius’ concept of death. Deleuze’s concept of Death allows for his philosophy to find affirmationism at the heart of difference, with the provision of a gateway to multiplicity beyond identity. However, the step that Deleuze takes, though it may be found in the doctrine of the clinamen and simulacrum, differs from the characterisation of death found in Epicurean atomism. Death in Epicurean atomism is still firmly rooted in identity and formalism. Epicureanism does not develop a principle of individuation (like the one proposed by Simondon) that can account for the existence of atoms themselves. Therefore, Epicureanism is unable to get beyond a reliance upon the image of the atom. The image was always necessary for Epicureans. It was the one illusion that they could not or would not contend with. Arguably this was due to the fear that demystifying the image of the atom would make their philosophy inaccessible as a means of self-cultivation. The next step in their demystification is surely to abandon the attachment to all identity and to fulfil the movement into a divine viewpoint (sub specie aeternitas) by taking the step away from wanting to be alive and instead become life itself. The dissolution of the self in its entirety seems to be the direction in which Epicureanism heads, but it recoils before the proposing oblivion due to the necessity for a personal connection to remain between the philosopher and his world. A distance must remain between
the two. The appeal for the reader to adopt a divine viewpoint in Epicureanism makes the following error: it judges the divine viewpoint to be transcendent identity, a view from above, and not immanent reality, a view from within, or as a part of, nature. Even then, nature is not to be considered a whole or as the other to the individual – it is to be viewed as the absolute end to all identity, and this is what Deleuze attests to in his philosophy, whereas Epicureanism cannot accept it.
NOTES

1 See Marx's dissertation on the subject, entitled 'Difference between Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature' (1841), for a comparative exposition of Democritus' and Epicurus' philosophies, which also draws conclusions from their respective protagonists and opponents. See also Norman Wentworth DeWitt, Epicurus and his Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), for an explanation of how the two thinkers differed in their understanding of chance and necessity, discussed in the context of teleology in Epicureanism.


3 The theory of Lucretius' poem being founded on the same structure as Epicurus' own work is set out clearly in David Sedley's Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). In it he outlines the correlations between what we know of the books included in On Nature, including how they were ordered, and the content and order of Lucretius' six books. The conclusion Sedley makes is that Lucretius was effectively writing his interpretation of those original texts in as much the same style as Epicurus as was possible. An important assertion, as it goes some way to explaining what might have been the intention for Lucretius' sixth and unfinished poem.

4 While De Rerum Natura does give a more rigorous explanation of atomism, it must be noted that this is Lucretius' interpretation of what Epicurus communicated in On Nature, and so its contribution to Epicureanism ought not to be confused with the ideas of Epicurus himself. As the essay progresses from this point, it is always understood that Epicurus may well have disagreed with some of what Lucretius has to say. As Deleuze wrote on Lucretius and not Epicurus, however, the relevance of Lucretius' work is believed to be more significant than that of Epicurus who inspired him.

5 Lucretius makes it clear that the mind is the source of all reason and direction, while the spirit is the animating entity in the body. 'I tell you the mind and spirit are bound up with one another./ And that together they combine to form a single nature. /But what heads the whole body and reigns over it like a king/ Is Judgement, which we also name the 'mind' or 'understanding' […] The spirit strikes and drives the body forward.' (DRN, III:146-49:160) United, the two comprise the soul.


8 Lucretius provides a categorisation of “life” so that we can be precise when discerning what is living and what is not.

9 For a helpful discussion on the relevance of mortality and change in providing an impetus to action, see Bernard Steigler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, trans Richard Beardsworth and George Collins, eds Werner Hamacher and David E. Wellbery (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, 1998). In it, Steigler explores the origin of technology or craft, by elaborating on the story of Epimetheus. Change is the transformative effect that leads to the perception of mortality. To be mortal is to be prone and open to change. Change is what makes techne possible, and what motivates action to create techne is mortality. Being mortal is what establishes a defined time in which a mortal can make a performance and perfection of a particular action. It is for this reason that the immortals are considered to be wholly indifferent to the lives of humans and produce no art or technology – they simply have no motivation, as they have no urgency, being essentially incorrigible and immortal. Mortality and change are crucial to action.


11 See Michel De Montaigne, ‘One Man’s Profit is Another Man’s Loss,’ The Complete Essays, trans. and ed. M. A. Screech (London: Penguin Books, 2003). Montaigne shares with the reader his reflections on the contingency of natural life and how this often presents itself as a dependency on the loss of one in order for the increase in another.

12 See Charles Segal, Lucretius on Death and Anxiety (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). Segal comes to a similar conclusion, writing ‘Lucretius supplies what is missing in Epicurus, a confrontation with death not merely as the single moment of the separation of soul and body or the division between being and non-being, but as a gradual, terrifyingly concrete physical process.’ (p.32). Segal also elaborates on the complication of how Lucretius' emphasis on the constancy of death's movement can still produce feelings the likes of which the Epicureans want to remove, namely disturbances of the mind, fear, and even depression (p.33).
See Michel Serres, *Genesis*, trans. Geneviève James and James Nielson (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1995). Serres describes Lucretius as one of the first to present us with a “fluid metaphysics,” through which there is much more freedom in creating and applying concepts separated from a formalistic framework of ideas.


The latter interpretation is quite Hegelian and, given the vehemence that Schopenhauer had towards Hegel and Hegelianism, it is unclear whether this was Schopenhauer’s intention.


See Greg Lambert, *The Non-Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze* for an account of philosopher’s artistry in creating concepts. Lambert also provides explores Deleuze’s critique of contemporary philosophy and the potential for creative philosophers.
CHAP TER 3

The Affirmationists: Death and Reason

*Spinoza on the ‘Most Base Thing’*

Spinoza’s bid to avoid valorising death is due to his naturalist endeavour of demystification and affirmation. The human mind is constantly interpreting relations presented through the simulacrum. Spinoza provides a rationalist explanation of the productivity of this creative interpretation. Despite his efforts at insisting on a philosophy focussed on life, death remains a subtle constant in his work. Death is a brief and necessary subject of Spinoza’s work. Spinoza’s characterisation of death is informed by his fundamental ideas. As with the Epicureans, he argues that harbouring misconceptions around death is malefic to living one’s life. Spinoza removes these misunderstandings by delineating how death is a dynamic process in the relations between bodies. The use of reason to dispel superstition can both reinforce a better way of living and diminish misery. Spinoza seeks to find affirmation through opposing the mournfulness of a fear of death. He does this in two ways: understanding Nature through reason and revealing the innate desire for existence that is possessed by all things.

According to Spinoza, we have the capacity to use our reason to develop our understanding of Nature. Our use of reason in turn increases our power to act. An increased power to act results in an increase in our freedom. In pursuing this knowledge, one dissolves misconceptions, misunderstandings, and illusions that may have been held. Our pursuit of knowledge is driven by an innate desire to be free and to increase the potential for existence. The demystification provided by Spinoza is important for Deleuze’s philosophy of difference and transcendental empiricism. Spinoza’s affirmationism is of great consequence to Deleuze. Affirmation is crucial for
understanding pure difference (DR 69). The desire to exist is an important part of this affirmationism.

The desire to increase one’s potential for existence is key to Deleuze’s concept of Death. The notion of desire taken up by Deleuze helps us to understand how the energy of production can be infinite and eternal and how Death allows for infinite novelty. Deleuze wrote two books on Spinoza, *Spinoza et le problème de l’expression* (*Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*) and *Spinoza: Philosophie Practique* (*Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*). *Expressionism* considers Spinoza as a significant thinker of demystification and gives an exploration of his ideas about affects and the univocity of Being. *Practical Philosophy* outlines the interactions of bodies and furthers the discussion of affects in *Expressionism* through his examination of Spinoza’s concept of evil (developed from his correspondence with Blyenbergh) and relating Spinoza’s *Ethics* to the work of Nietzsche. Spinoza’s philosophy also influences Deleuze with regards to Deleuze’s discussion of pure difference in the unconscious and the production of images within consciousness. The ideas of pure difference and image production borrow heavily from Spinozist notions of *substance*, *conatus*, and *desire*. Therefore, this chapter will feature some discussion of how these concepts are interpreted and used by Deleuze. Before beginning the discussion of their interpretation, however, there must be some explanation Spinoza’s basic principles and ideas as presented in *Ethics*.

In this chapter, Spinoza’s text *Ethics* will be explored to outline his concept of death. In addition, Spinoza’s influence on Deleuze’s *Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition* are discussed in brief. Amidst this discussion, a link is made between Deleuze’s use of impersonal Death and Spinoza’s attempt to present a rationalist interpretation of death while avoiding giving death undue significance in his work.
Spinozist Naturalism

The passions result from the affections of external bodies on our mind. To put an end to one’s sad passions (melancholy and pain) is, according to Spinoza, obtainable through the accumulation of adequate ideas and the removal of inadequate ideas. We can gain adequate ideas and disband inadequate ideas through the application of our reason. When an idea passes the mind over to a greater perfection (that is, it increases the possession of adequate knowledge) it brings the affect of joy. In contrast, a sad passion is ‘that passion by which the mind passes to a lesser perfection.’ (EIII P11 Dem.) The effect of sadness is pain and melancholy. Consider the Scholium in EI P11: ‘Perfection, therefore, does not take away the existence of a thing, but on the contrary asserts it. But imperfection takes it away.’ Imperfection must be avoided, for: ‘The mind as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that increase or aid the body’s power of acting.’ The affect of joy comes about as the result of passing into greater perfection and when one’s power to act increases.

What does it mean to have an increase or decrease in the power of acting?

I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is, when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. (EIII D2)

Adequate ideas increase one’s power of acting by decreasing the potential for being acted upon and affected by other bodies and ideas. The mind initially contains an adequate idea of the body (EII P13) and the body expresses itself as the knowing of the body: ‘[…] if the object of the idea constituting a human mind is a body, nothing can happen in that body which is not perceived by the mind.’ (EII P12) The mind is the true knowing of its own body, therefore the mind has an adequate idea of the body. ‘All ideas, insofar as they are related to God, are true, that is, adequate. And so, God is without passions.’ (EV P17 Dem.) The adequate idea is understood through itself and its essence is fundamentally God/Nature, and so the idea of the body is pure, uncomplicated, and wholly adequate. This also means that no one body is entirely independent of other bodies.
The human mind is a complex idea composed of many ideas, just like the body is a complex individual composed of many bodies. Many of the ideas comprising the mind are perceptions of external bodies. The mind’s perception is only possible through the effects external bodies have on the human body. Also, the mind’s perception and idea of the body is only by means of the affections of that body. “The mind knows external bodies, itself, and the human body only by means of its ideas of the affections of the human body. Thus, it has inadequate knowledge or ideas of these things.” An increasing number of inadequate ideas in the mind leads to growing passivity (as one becomes more affected by external bodies) and an increasingly restricted existence.

Adequate ideas about God/Nature are accumulated through developing the use of reason. Reason can be used to understand the ways bodies interact and the results of those interactions. Spinoza argues that these interactions between bodies are determined and not accidental. This is because God/Nature is ‘the efficient cause of all things which can fall under an infinite intellect.’ (EI P16) Understanding these causes develops the knowledge of the laws of nature, which are the acts of God/Nature. Therefore, one can come to know about God/Nature through a rational understanding of the mechanics of nature. In his introduction to the philosophy of Spinoza, Allison writes ‘[…] Spinoza’s God/substance [is] not the source of being about whose existence one can have any doubts, it is, strictly speaking, not a being at all. Nor is it the sum or aggregate of particular things. As already indicated, it is best construed as the universal order of nature.’ One can adequately know God/Nature by understanding God/Nature as the perceptible causal order. One can identify which ideas are inadequate once one understands nature adequately. Inadequate ideas can then be dissolved to prevent sad passions from developing and avoid their affect (passions are to be understood as the result of a body being affected, the result of which can be sadness or joy). Spinoza’s naturalism is therefore a process of demystification. What is the result of applying reason to the notion of death? Quite simply, the fear of death is caused by an inadequate idea of death. Fear of death originates in confusion over the underlying dynamic of nature: the proportion of motion and rest. Our misconceptions about death are the result of
conflating these changes in proportion of motion and rest with the reduction in our power to act and limitation of our freedom.

When an external body interacts with one’s own body, and in doing so leads to a decrease in one’s power to act or even the destruction of the body, the interaction is considered a “bad” relation. Spinoza suggests that those bodies which are not complementary to us should be avoided, as they are not conducive to a development of freedom and the attainment of adequate ideas. Rather, the perception of such bodily affections perpetuates inadequate ideas. To think fearfully of death is to dwell upon a bad relation, an affection leading to inadequate ideas.

A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death. (EIV P67)

A free man has achieved imperturbability through the cultivation of their reason and the acquisition of adequate knowledge; a free man knows nature well enough to resist the passions it arouses. ‘I call him free who is led by reason alone.’ (EIV P68 Dem.) Death is often associated with fear, and fear is the result of a bad relation. Fear leads to despair (EIII P18; P19) and sadness, which is itself characterised by a decrease in freedom and power to act (EIII P11). The symptom of unhappiness is the same here as it is in the Epicurean philosophy: we fear death because we do not understand it adequately; were we to understand it adequately, then we would know that death is nothing to us. Again, the acquisition of adequate knowledge leads to the diminution of passions and the growth of our self-control in the face of events which would otherwise appear as adversities. The free man ‘lives according to the dictate of reason alone’ and is therefore ‘not led by fear’ (EIV P67 Dem). How does Spinoza understand death? Is there an adequate idea of death in Spinoza’s naturalism?
Spinoza’s account of death is described through movement, structure, and limits (it is not dissimilar to Epicurean thanatology in this regard). Death is a change in the proportion of motion and rest between the parts of a body (EIV P39). The change is caused by the body being acted upon by an external body. Death is a change that leads to a loss of power, making it a source of sadness. To quote him at length, Spinoza says this regarding the human body and its destruction:

[…] Next, things which bring it about that the human body’s parts acquire a different proportion of motion and rest to one another bring it about that the human body takes on another form, that is, that the human body is destroyed, and hence rendered completely incapable of being affected in many ways. So, they are evil, q.e.d. […] But here it should be noted that I understand the body to die when its parts are so disposed that they acquire a different proportion of motion and rest to one another. For I dare not deny that – even though the circulation of the blood is maintained, as well as the other [signs] on accounts of which the body is thought to be alive – the human body can nevertheless be changed into another nature entirely different from its own. For no reason compels me to maintain that the body does not die unless it is changed into a corpse. (EIV P39)

Spinoza considers the main interaction between bodies to be this alteration in the proportion of motion and rest. The change in proportion of motion and rest leads to increases and decreases in power (that is the body’s capacity to acquire adequate knowledge). The change is determined by the relation between the bodies that interact. Note that the human body is believed, by Spinoza, to be composed of a multitude of “parts” which form the human body through their combination and interaction with one another (EII L3 Definition). The composition of the human body underpins Spinoza’s argument for the human body being changed into another nature.

Important to this enquiry into the nature of death is Spinoza’s understanding of the composition of the human body and the proportion of motion and rest. Both compose the nature and form of a human being. The proportion of motion and rest is subject to alteration. An
alteration is caused by the interaction of the human body or part(s) of the human body with some other body. Therefore we have three key elements in the characterisation of death: (1) that death is a specific kind of alteration – ‘the human body takes on another form’; (2) the death of the body is not simply the end of life – ‘no reason compels me to maintain that the body does not die unless it is changed into a corpse’; and (3) that it is the result of another body interacting with the human body or part(s) of the human body, and not caused by the human body itself – ‘the human body can nevertheless be changed into another nature’.

At first, Spinoza’s understanding of death seems to be an event that is indistinguishable from any other. Death is just a term that could be attributed to regular and necessary changes exhibited in the natural world. Similar to the fluid metaphysics of Lucretius’ work, Spinoza tells us that much of what occurs in the natural world is indifferent to the passions nature causes. For Spinoza, nature is a series of events which cause some bodies, and composites of bodies, to undergo changes. According to Spinoza, some changes can alter the fundamental proportions of a body’s recognisable form. Spinoza does not conflate death as expressed in EIV P39 with all changes that a body might undergo; death is more specific. Death refers to two synchronous outcomes of a relation between bodies. The first is a change in the proportion of motion and rest; this is what alters the form of the individual. The second is a considerable reduction in capacity to be affected: ‘the human body is destroyed, and hence rendered completely incapable of being affected in many more ways.’ (EIV P39) The death of a human person is an interaction between the human body and another body causing a change in the proportion of motion and rest in the human body and leaving the human body incapable of undergoing many future affections. How do we then go on to understand the case of the Spanish poet suffering from amnesia (EIV P39)? Is death survived by the individual in this case?

Spinoza writes that death does not necessarily lead to a corpse (EIV P39). He makes it clear that the nature of the body is partly determined by the proportion of motion and rest between
its component parts (EII L4). Should a large enough change be made in that proportion of motion and rest, then the human body would be considered to have had its nature changed. As Lucretius would say, it has gone “beyond its limits” (DRN III:519). Spinoza’s account of death seems to be addressing instances such as dementia or amnesia. In either of these cases, one can be considered to have “died” due to the person who one “used to be” no longer being expressed through one’s memories, among other things. In the case of amnesia, Spinoza appears to suggest that death can occur through certain changes to the mind. The amnesia suffered by the Spanish poet in EIV 39S suggest that memory loss is equivalent to death. ‘Memory is a necessary condition of personality’, Maison writes, ‘[…] where there is discontinuity in personal identity, there is death.’ However, as Monaco rightly points out, ‘The connection between memory and individuation is only cursorily addressed in EIV39S and it must be said that nowhere does Spinoza list memory as a requirement for the preservation of individuality.’ Monaco is right to suggest that the importance of memory as a criterion for personal identity is only implicit in Spinoza. Contra Maison, Spinoza’s idea of death (going beyond the limits of one’s form and nature) is no less important than the link between memory and the continuation of life – rather, they appear to be related. If death is the fulfilment of the two conditions mentioned earlier (motion/rest ratio and capacity to be affected), then what does it mean for the poet to be considered dead? What has died and yet requires no corpse?

Spinoza considers the mode of extension (human body) and mode of thinking (mind) to be two modes of one substance (EII P7 Schol). The individual is comprised of both ideas in the mind and the extension of the body, whose form and nature are the motion/rest ratio and the capacity for being affected. For the individual to be considered dead, but not reduced to a corpse, would involve a change in the proportion of motion and rest and a reduction of the body’s potential to be affected. The Scholium in EII P7 would suggest that the mind’s potential to be affected would also be considerably reduced. What Spinoza considers a common-sense response to the Spanish poet (“I should hardly have said he was the same man”) offers little help in understanding how individuals survive being changed to the point of death despite their continued
capacity to be affected (the absence of which, to be clear, would leave them a corpse). Spinoza deliberately leaves this ambiguous as he intends to return to it in Book V, where he will talk of the eternal nature of a form of adequate knowledge (namely the third kind of knowledge, that is knowledge of the essence of things, on which more will be said shortly). Spinoza writes EIV P39 to demonstrate how the mind’s finitude relates to its knowledge of the finite body. Indeed, for Spinoza, the mind is susceptible to change because the ideas from which it is composed are linked with the idea of the body. The extended body and the thinking mind are ‘systematically linked’, that is to say ‘What it takes for an extended world to contain my body is exactly what it takes for a thinking world to contain my mind’\(^\text{10}\) (E II P7; III P2 Schol.), however there are means with which the ideas of the mind can be left insusceptible to the body’s affections. We saw this in Spinoza’s arguments for diminishing the affects through the acquisition of adequate knowledge. Adequate knowledge is eternal and therefore it is not destroyed in the same way that the body might be. Through acquiring adequate knowledge, one can improve the potential for continued existence. Indeed, one increases one’s share in existence through the acquisition of adequate knowledge and thereby increases in perfection, given that adequate knowledge is contained in God/Nature. The existence and essence of anything is granted by God/Nature, and so the concept of the thing rests in the mind of God/Nature and is eternal (EI D8; EV P22 Dem). The adequate idea of the essences of things is knowledge we can attain, and this knowledge is eternal and indestructible by death. The discussion as to the precise character of time, duration and eternity in Spinoza is too elaborate to express clearly in this thesis, so it will have to be left undisclosed for now.

The adequate knowledge that one acquires is knowledge of the essence of God/Nature, that is, they are eternal truths. Spinoza claims that we can have knowledge of the eternal when we attain knowledge of God/Nature through reason. Knowledge of this kind can lessen our fear of death. Tomomi writes: ‘We fear death because our minds are largely occupied with imaginary
representations [...] which are dependent on our bodily existence [...] it is imaginary representations or defective illusions that do not let us truly be ourselves because they are essentially dependent on our bodily endurance, which is inseparable from incessant interaction with other bodies.\textsuperscript{11} Tomomi goes on to say, ‘When our minds become free from imaginary and defective knowledge, we find ourselves to be independent from our bodily endurance in its busy interaction with other bodies.’\textsuperscript{12} Such a demonstration of demystification – the end to false infinites and discovery of true infinites – is of interest to Deleuze. When considering Spinoza’s earlier declaration that the free man thinks of nothing less than of death, it becomes clear that the reason death does not concern the free man is because it is only relevant to the relations of bodies (motion, rest, affects). Whereas adequate knowledge of the essence of things does not rely on the perishable body (which is susceptible to the affects), due to its sharing in the idea of the body contained in God ‘under a species of eternity.’ (EV P22; P23 Schol.)

What does this mean with regards to how Spinoza characterised death in EIV P39? Death pertains to the relation of bodies. In EIV P39, this is the relation of the human body with other bodies. Spinoza argues that the human body and the mind can both be changed by the effects of external bodies (extension) and the ideas of those bodies (thought) respectively (EII P7; EIII P11). However, there is a part of the human mind that is not destroyed with the body. This is the eternal part of the mind, the part of the mind in possession of the idea ‘which expresses the essence of the body under a species of eternity’ (EV P23 Schol.). The impersonal ideas of the essence of things have a continued existence in the mind of God/Nature, and in coming to know such things, we share in that eternal existence. That such things can be known in this life means ‘our eternity is something we don’t have to wait for death to experience – we experience it here and now.’\textsuperscript{13} Thanatophobia is reliant upon the endurance of the physical body and inadequate ideas generated by the imagination. The next necessary concept to explore is the relationship between existence and desire. Spinoza’s philosophy denounces the preoccupation with death as something fearful
and destructive. Instead, Spinoza favours fulfilling our desire to exist (explained through the concepts of conatus and potentia). The desire to exist is essential to all of us (EIII P6).

**DESIRED AND EXISTENCE**

All things want to continue to exist, and everything has a capacity for doing so. The striving for continued existence is known as the conatus. The ability to maintain existence is known as potentia. The conatus is one’s striving to preserve one’s existence. The potentia we have is our power of existing; it is the capacity to try to exist or potential to exist. ‘Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being.’ (E III P6) All things are, in their essence, striving to continue existing and (were it not for the influence of external bodies on them) they would indeed exist eternally, for the striving essential to them is not limited but will go on as long as it can (this is its potential). The potential continuation of human beings has its limits, as there is always an effect that is greater than us which can overwhelm our conatus and potentia, therefore the life of the human body is finite (E IV P3). Desire is part of our essence, which strives to continue existing. We desire those things which increase our joy and resist those things which lead to sadness. Desire is defined by Spinoza as: ‘Appetite together with consciousness of the appetite.’ (E III P9 Schol.) Spinoza considers us to be aware of our appetites (what the mind and body each want for the continuation of their existence) when we desire something. Continuing to exist requires that one does what one can to increase one’s potentia. We desire not just what enables us to be, but what will continue our existence and improve upon our power of existing; we desire those things that will help us fulfil our conatus.

A goal of Spinoza's philosophy is therefore to discover that which helps us increase our potential for existing and fulfil our desire. Spinoza is concerned with diminishing the impact that sad passions have on us, namely the lowering of our potentia and decrease in our power. Spinoza's
philosophy meditates on overcoming or avoiding sad passions, while pursuing life, power, and freedom.

And so we are told that God/Nature prohibited a free man from eating of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and that as soon as he should eat of it, he would immediately fear death, rather than desiring to live […] but that after he believed the lower animals to be like himself, he immediately began to imitate their affects and to lose his freedom […] (E IV P68 Schol.)

Much of what Spinoza considers to be humanity’s goal is captured in the idea of the free man (in this case the first man, Adam). We must try to be as free as Adam was before his Fall from the garden of Eden. Freedom such as this consists in our obtaining adequate knowledge, knowledge which goes beyond good and evil. One must leave behind animalistic fears, for example those developed from inadequate ideas surrounding death. Spinoza considers thanatophobia to be one such animalistic fear. Our focus must be discovering how to live a life which is joyous and free. Indeed, he argues that the fear of death does not occur to one who is free (E IV P67). The inadequate idea of death makes us fearful of it. Fear leads to the diminution of perfection and a loss in our share in existence (leading away from the fulfilment of one’s conatus). The fear of death is a source of sad passions and death is mistakenly considered evil. The free individual pays no heed to either good nor evil. The free person’s understanding has learned to control passions due to the acquisition of adequate knowledge. One who is free can focus solely on improving one’s life through increasing one’s potestia and actively try to fulfil one’s conatus. The striving for understanding helps to achieve these goals. The mind desires to use its reason for this purpose: gaining knowledge to combat the bondage of passions and grow in its freedom and vitality. Life opposes sadness and evil directly, while further development is the removal of even these distinctions – going beyond good and evil – to focus even more on the affirmation of life (fulfilling the conatus).
Spinoza’s philosophy provides the means for developing an understanding of God/Nature so one can lift oneself out of the bondage of inadequate knowledge and advance an understanding in accordance with and in aid of one’s essence. ‘What we strive for from reason is nothing but understanding; nor does the mind, insofar as it uses reason, judge anything else useful to itself except what leads to understanding.’ (E IV P26) Spinoza uses naturalism to obtain adequate knowledge. He continues the demystification of former naturalists, dispelling illusions through reasoned conclusions arrived at by observing the mechanics of the natural world. Spinoza identifies and rationally removes all desires that threaten the joy of an empowered existence. Death does not hold a special place in Spinoza’s philosophy. The mention of death in Ethics is to dispense with any false notions of its inherent evil or that it is worthy of our fearing it. As one who draws upon so much of Spinoza’s work and who, in his lectures on Spinoza, spoke of death as ‘the most base thing’, how does Deleuze reconcile his philosophy of difference (which relies on the concept of death) with Spinoza’s reluctance to give death a positive role in philosophy?  

‘THE MOST BASE THING’: RECONCILING DEATH IN DELEUZE AND SPINOZA

The key concepts looked at thus far have been demystification by naturalism; the inadequate ideas of death as evil and fearful; and the essential striving to exist. These are attempts to diminish the prominence of transcendence (the image) in philosophy and introduce immanence (the real). Deleuze aims to provide a route to reducing the self-limitation of our ability to create new concepts, by elaborating on the immanent world present in our unconsciousness. Deleuze also talks of the limitless opportunity for novel concepts that the mind can generate when it is forced into thinking. Deleuze highlights the dominance of representation as a leading cause of the limitations on thinking. Our conceptual creativity is stifled by the dogma of representation, what Deleuze calls the dogmatic image of thought. The dogmatic image of thought is perpetuated by the reproduction of images by the Ego. In the Ego, we see the work of the conatus misdirected
from an increase in the share of existence to the subsistence and reproduction (recognition) of an image, namely an individual (self/I) (DR 114-15,176). Individual identity seeks to maintain itself and be reassured through its assertion of itself as a subject and an I, in other words as a consciousness. However, that cyclical reproduction directs us to its undoing, its exhaustion (DR 115). The “beyond” of the second synthesis is, of course, Death. Death is this desire to be indistinct; the desire “not to be”, that is to be no singular thing.  

The novelty and difference that it produces are taken up and controlled by the structures in consciousness to produce a singular Idea. The principle of disorder that underlies the ordered world of the self and the I is precisely where Deleuze and Spinoza seem at first to part ways in their philosophies. It appears that Spinoza would never entertain the idea that beneath the rational mind is a wholly irrational and chaotic world of unceasing production. He might also be wary of the notion that thought is a process of limiting and suppressing that chaos. The concept of the mind possessing its own source of finitude (habit leading to fatigue and memory leading to forgetting) is rejected by Spinoza’s concept of the conatus. He might well have argued that it is implausible for the end of consciousness (the unconscious) to be caused by its own construction - nothing can be the source of its own negation. ‘But any thing whatever, whether it is more perfect or less, will always be able to preserve in existing by the same force by which it begins to exist; so they are all equal in this regard.’ (E IV Preface) In other words, not only is the concept of Death (as an integral state of chaos manifest in the unconscious) something that could be considered a source of sad passions, but it may well be absurd. Is there in fact a tension between Deleuze and Spinoza on the concept of Death? How could this tension be resolved? Does Deleuze’s philosophy suggest that a notion of death can be a relevant and important element in a philosophy such as Spinoza’s (i.e., one that meditates on life)?

The phrase ‘thinking of death is the most base thing’ is taken from Deleuze’s lectures on Spinoza. Indeed, it is rather striking that Deleuze makes this conclusion when one considers the
dominance of his interpretation of death and the death drive – that is, the Blanchotian second death – in his own writing. In his lectures, Deleuze says the following about Spinoza’s take on death:

As long as you have a sad affect, a body acts on yours, a soul acts on yours in conditions and in a relation which do not agree with yours. At that point, nothing in sadness can induce you to form the common notion, that is to say the idea of something in common between two bodies and two souls. […] This is why thinking of death is the most base thing. He is opposed to the whole philosophical tradition which is a meditation on death. His formula is that philosophy is a meditation on life and not on death. Obviously, because death is always a bad encounter. 17

As was touched upon earlier, knowledge surrounding and involving death can be inadequate and unhelpful to the pursuit of adequate knowledge, according to Spinoza. Death leaves us unable to fulfil our conatus, the innate desire to increase our share in existence, by significantly diminishing our capacity to be affected and thereby leaving us incapable of acquiring adequate knowledge of the essence of things. What needs to be established is whether Deleuze’s Death, with which Spinoza is to be reconciled, is also leading to the same kinds of bad encounters and impeding the increase in our understanding. Can Death be considered as something evil in the Spinozist sense? Can we realistically accuse Deleuze of committing his philosophy to a meditation on death and not life? Spinoza rejects the idea that death is inherently evil and fearful. However, having a strong focus on death does not advance the fulfilment of our potential for existence. We can still have an adequate understanding of death by observing its causes. For a greater appreciation of this, we can further build on the understanding of EIV P39 by exploring Spinoza’s writings on relations. A deeper comprehension of the nature of relations – good and bad – will help to frame the enquiry into whether Deleuze’s concept of Death can be reconciled with Spinoza’s philosophy.

In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze describes Spinoza’s understanding of evil. He does this by exploring Spinoza’s correspondence with Blyenbergh. The dialogue revolves around the
Death and Reason

story of Adam’s eating of the forbidden fruit in the garden of Eden, expressing the dynamic of bad relations. How is this done? Deleuze interprets Spinoza as not considering the eating of the fruit to be a prohibition, but it is, in fact, just information: ‘the fruit, by virtue of its composition, will decompose Adam’s body’ (SPP 31). In other words, there is nothing bad in the fruit, nor even its composition, what is bad is the affect it gives. The affect is intolerance or intoxication, even “allergy”, according to Deleuze (SPP 31). Relations are what is most significant here. Relations between the components of complex bodies help reveal how something can be good or bad. Therefore, when Adam eats the fruit, what is occurring regarding relations? To quote the text at length:

In these cases, it appears that one of the constitutive relations of the body is destroyed, decomposed. And death occurs when the body’s characteristic or dominant relation is determined to be destroyed: “I understand the body to die when its parts are so disposed that they acquire a different relation of motion and rest.” Spinoza thus makes clear what is meant by a relation being destroyed or decomposed. This occurs when the relation, which is itself an eternal truth, is no longer realised by actual parts. What has been done away with is not the relation, which is eternally true, but rather the parts between which it was established and which have now assumed another relation. For example, the poison has decomposed the blood, i.e., has determined the parts of the blood to come under different relations that characterise other bodies (it is no longer blood…). (SPP 32-33)

The theme of the materialist constitution of complex bodies is returned to here, but with the addition of the relation between those bodies, which go on to establish different relations upon the transformation of the bodies’ determinations. Evil is the situation whereby the adequate understanding of these relations (the eternal truth of them) is no longer possible. ‘We call good, or evil, what is useful to, or harmful to, preserving our being, that is, what increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our power of acting.’ (E IV P8 Dem)
Knowledge of evil is sadness itself, insofar as we are conscious of it. But sadness is a passage to a lesser perfection, which therefore cannot be understood through man’s essence itself, it is a passion, which depends on inadequate ideas. Therefore, knowledge of this, namely knowledge of evil, is inadequate.

From this it follows that if the human mind had only adequate ideas, it would form no notion of evil. (E IV P64 Dem; Cor)

A relation that inhibits the acquisition of adequate knowledge and leads to a diminution of power in the individual is a cause of sadness. The free man thinks of nothing less than of death for this very reason: the fear of death diminishes life and causes sadness. For Spinoza’s philosophy to be adopted coherently by Deleuze, despite his use of death, it must be determined whether Deleuze’s understanding of the depersonalised Death leaves it open to being characterised as evil. Does the notion of Death cause fear? Is the understanding of Death equivalent to a meditation on death? Does Death either lead to or originate from inadequate knowledge?

To answer this question requires an important distinction to be made between image (or idea) – affectio – and feeling – affectus – both of which is expanded on by Deleuze. Images are produced when ‘the affections designate that which happens to the mode, the modifications of the mode, the effects of other modes on it.’ (SPP 48) While the ideas ‘involve both the nature of the affected body and that of the affecting external body.’ (SPP 48) What does this mean? Deleuze is arguing that the image regards only effects on a given body, not the source of the affection, the external body. The idea considers both bodies and their relation to one another. However, neither the image nor the idea involves the transition of the body from one state to another through said affection. ‘Hence there is a difference in nature between the image of affections or ideas and the feeling of affects […]’ (SPP 49) The feeling of affects is quite different from the image and idea, as it concerns the ‘correlative variation of the affecting bodies.’ (SPP 49) In other words, rather than there being a focus on the passive affections endured by bodies through their relations, affectus are
the transitional moments of these interactions, where relations are decomposed, and new relations determined.

Interestingly, we return to the same concerns shown by Deleuze regarding the simulacrum, in which the precedence is taken by the image, the surface, where it should in fact be granted to what lies beneath that surface. In Spinoza’s work, too, the significance is not granted to the image or idea of affection (affectio) but to the feeling of affects (affectus). The feeling of affects is in continual motion (similar to the atom is in Lucretius’ work), and so they reveal the fluidity and dynamism of transition itself. The dynamism is contrasted with the fixed moments of relation between bodies.

The word blessedness should be reserved for these active joys: they appear to conquer and extend themselves within duration, like the passive joys, but in fact they are eternal and are no longer explained by duration; they no longer imply transitions and passages, but express themselves and one another in an eternal mode, together with the adequate ideas from which they issue. (SPP 51)

Beyond the image and idea lies freedom and power, which are the affirmation of life. A clarification of blessedness as “beyond image and idea” is needed if we are to understand its importance to Deleuze.

Spinoza argues for three kinds of knowledge: the first is of the imagination and considers only the affections of the human body (EII P41); the second is of reason, using rationality to understand affects and their causes (EII P40 Schol.2); the third is intuitive knowledge, that is adequate cognition of the essence of finite modes (EII P40 Schol.2). Development in second and third kinds of knowledge is the acquisition of adequate ideas. Growing in adequate understanding of the world leads to a more adequate understanding of oneself as a body and mind in that world. An improved self-understanding enables an individual to have greater understanding of and control over their passions.
We cannot obtain adequate knowledge through the first kind of knowledge. The imaginative route to knowledge cannot possibly interpret the infinite ways that it can affect the world nor the infinite affections it can experience from infinite external bodies. As such, the imagination is not a suitable route to self-understanding. One cannot understand oneself in a world as confused as the common order of Nature. As Sayorslan writes, "To the extent that we perceive the world through the ideas of the affections of our body, we are bound up with the ideas of the appearances of things that our senses present to us from a given perspective at a given moment in time." Spinoza's ambition is for the reader to see the potential to improve this state of affairs by developing an adequate understanding of the world, and this is possible through reason and intuition.

The image affection referred to by Deleuze (SPP 49) is the mind's sensory perception of the world. The mind only understands what it is presented with. Reason is yet to influence imagination (EII P44 Dem). Therefore, the mind passively experiences the world around it – the surface image. The mind is not yet actively reasoning with the experience and adequately understanding its affects. In other words, a mind that only understands the world through the body's interaction with and experience of the external world is a passive bystander. The mind is affected in a number of ways but does not yet begin to control or subdue the effects of these interactions. Let us look a little more at the "beyond" of this passively observed image.

Adequate knowledge can be discovered through the active use of reason and through intuition (EII P41, P40). Common notions are the foundation of reasoning and are universally knowable (EII P40 Schol.1). One does not come to know of it through its affections on the individual, but by the objective, permanent and consistent nature of said body (EII P38). The second kind of knowledge does not view bodies as contingent but as necessary (EII P40). External bodies do not exist only in terms of how they interact with our body. Singular bodies can be understood in a detached and objective way, not personally. Also, the more one understands one's
body, the more one can have ideas of what one’s body has in common with external bodies, and thereby what common notions there are between them (EII P39 Cor.). Through self-understanding one can come to attain adequate knowledge, for the more one understands the body, the better it can determine common notions and make use of reason. Intuition is quite unlike reason.

Intuition is the third kind of knowledge. Knowledge gained through intuition is knowledge of the essence of things (EV P25 Dem.). Essence can be understood as the striving for existence possessed by all bodies (EIII P7). Another term for this striving is conatus and this will be explored in greater detail soon. The fundamental striving to continue to exist is a mode of God’s/Nature’s being. Therefore, knowledge of the essence of something is the knowledge of that body as a mode of God’s/Nature’s being. Of course, if one understands oneself intuitively, one understands oneself as a mode of God/Nature. When an individual can come to know themselves through this intuitive science, they achieve a state of blessedness. They have come to a level of self-understanding that shows them their existence as a necessary, one’s being as a modal expression of God/Nature. One is determined by intellect, not by the perception of senses.

Adequate knowledge gained through reason relies on understanding the existence of finite modes. Common notions are discovered by rationally exploring the sources of affections. The bodies analysed through reason, the finite modes of existence, are durational. Reason can only understand the durational existence of modes; it depends on sense. Whereas intuition is the adequate cognition of the essence of modes (EV P25 Dem.). Reason can stir up a desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge (EV P28). However, the essence of modes is known only through the intellect, not perception. The essence of things is not known through duration, but is viewed from the perspective of eternity, sub specie aeternitatis (EV P29 Dem., P31 Schol.). Intuition is therefore the acquisition of adequate knowledge that goes beyond the image entirely, as it does not rely on sensory perception of a mode existing in duration.
Intuition does not involve any image, nor does it require duration in the acquisition of adequate knowledge. As such, it can be argued that intuitive knowledge is “beyond image” and does not involve the duration of images or ideas. While reason can inspire the desire for intuitive knowledge, only intuitive knowledge can provide blessedness (EIV Appendix IV).\(^2\) The distinction between the joy caused through acquiring adequate knowledge through the second kind of knowledge and joy of the third kind of knowledge is not made by Deleuze. Blessedness is not attributable to active joys alone, but also the accompanying intellectual love of God/Nature (EV P33 Schol., P36 Schol.). The intellectual love of God/Nature is once more not engaged in duration (such as that found in the image and idea) but is eternal (EV P33). Therefore, the eternal mode Deleuze refers to (SPP 51) is of the third kind of knowledge only, though this is not explicit.

What is the significance of the feelings of affects being outside of duration? What connections, if any, can we draw between eternal truth, blessedness and Death?

**SPINOZA AND THANATOS: SPINOZA’S INFLUENCE ON DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION**

If we consider Deleuze’s concept of Death in the context of its relationship to images and ideas, we can already see how it is enmeshed in the Spinozist vitalism (“a meditation on life”). Chapter One elaborated on the ways that the death drive is the signifier for the pure order of time. The point at which the representations can no longer be reproduced through the Ego’s erotic libidinal energies is the moment it becomes the desexualised energy of productivity. The pure order of time, characterised by Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence, is time “out of joint”, it is no longer the cardinal time relied upon by the Ego to fulfil the conditions of conscious experience. The eternal duration of the pure order of time is contrasted to the cardinal (jointed) duration of time in consciousness. Images and ideas rely on this multi-jointed duration, through which they can pass regularly and be synthesised to produce an identity. Just as Spinoza holds that the images formed in the imagination and ideas that represent them are in a relation with previous states of perfection and so rely on a
temporal progression (E General Definition of the Affects), the Ego in Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition* relies on the contraction of past and present and the succession of instants within cardinal time. In other words, the connection that images and ideas in the present have with the state that came before them (moving from greater to lesser perfection and vice versa) situates them in a temporal framework of successive instants, the concept of which is similar between both Spinoza and Deleuze.

Similarly, the feeling of affects in Spinoza is not dissimilar to the eternal return as it is interpreted by Deleuze. Both have a notion of duration beyond passivity (*ressentiment*), that is the content/image and agent/idea are expelled in both cases and replaced with an existence that is more active and affirmative. The point at which the change is taking place and a new constitution is being established is that same state in which, for Deleuze, Death signifies – it is the cut between one identity and another, it is the stage of the development of new relations. The very movement between one identity and another, the interaction of bodies and the resolution of their conflict, is the point at which Deleuze’s concept of Death is in effect. The point of interaction is the *caesura*, where one combination becomes capable of transitioning into another, a proportion ‘distributed unequally on both sides.’ (DR 115) Identity and death are inseparable from one another in the work of both thinkers. Spinoza articulates an idea similar to Deleuze’s concept of Death when discussing the particulars of death in EIV P39. Spinoza’s death as change and transformation is close to the ungraspable, depersonalised Death. The source of fear is not dispossessed Death, but the death of the identity, the death of the image, the inadequate understanding of death. In both, death is a source of change, but it is also here that the two differ slightly. Whereas Death always seems to lead to some form of loss in Spinoza (the destruction of life and a loss of power), in Deleuze this is somewhat inverted. Through Death, one is connected to the pure order of time. Identity is collapsed and the infinite multiplicity from which identity is produced is at its closest proximity. Deleuze’s focus on Death is therefore *not* a meditation on what is lost in an encounter.
with another body, but the point beyond which resides the groundless source of identity: life, affirmation, and *élan vital*.

Spinoza is doing something similar in his elaboration on the interaction of bodies and the results of those interactions. Herein lies what seems to be Deleuze’s inversion of Spinoza’s philosophy, as the notion of life as affirmation in Spinoza becomes Death as affirmation in Deleuze. This does not mean that Deleuze does not affirm life, on the contrary, Deleuze uses Death to rid us of a focus on a singular life (an identity) and to open us to the possibility of life that resides beyond that singularisation, to the life beyond the image of the individual. Beyond the adequate knowledge of things (the second kind of knowledge) is the adequate knowledge of the essences of things (the third kind of knowledge, knowledge of God/Nature). Adequate knowledge of the essence of things is also beyond the conditions of what Deleuze terms cardinal time and is akin to the ordinal time of the third synthesis, as knowledge of the third kind is of the eternal truths contained in God/Nature. Considered in this way, we can begin to find a link between impersonal, eternal, and infinite adequate knowledge and impersonal, eternal, and infinite pure difference. The connection between the two helps us understand how Death can be reconciled with Spinoza’s reluctance to utilise thanatological ideas, and the ways they are linked by the notions of both substance and eternity.

Spinoza’s understanding of death comes very near to the concept of Death (that is to say, death that is no longer personal) when it is described as the point at which what constitutes the individual (a certain ratio of motion and rest) is deconstructed to such a degree as the individual can no longer be said to exist (because they have such a small share in existence) (EIV P39). In the Deleuzian understanding, this would be the point at which the structure of the content and agent are taken to their limit (fatigue and forgetting) and can no longer subsist. The remains of the individual are still part of the mind, the unconscious, but it is not constrained by the limitations of consciousness. The mind contains the idea of the body (susceptible to change) and yet can also
possess adequate knowledge of the essence of things (which is impervious to the passions caused by the interaction of the body with other bodies). Similarly, Deleuze’s description of consciousness in *Difference and Repetition* portrays consciousness as restricted by the conditions of conscious experience and simultaneously rooted in the unconscious. Both thinkers argue that the mind is comprised of the personal and impersonal, the singular and the multiple, and the temporal and the atemporal. The correlation is evident in the distinction Spinoza makes between the temporality of inadequate knowledge (caused by the fixation of the mind to the affections of the body) and the atemporality of adequate knowledge of the essence of things (which are contained in God/Nature), which exist outside of time (but not necessarily outside of duration). As Wolfson writes:

Thus eternity, like duration and time, refers only to things which exist, or, as Spinoza would call them, real beings. But inasmuch as real beings are divided, according to Spinoza into those “whose essence involves existence,” i.e., God or Substance, and those “whose essence involves only possible existence,” eternity, says Spinoza, applies only to the first kind of real being. […] In the eternal God there are both essence and existence, though the two are identical. In eternal truths there is only essence; there is no existence in them.24

Ideas which are eternal are atemporal due to their having no share in existence. God/Nature is eternal within a duration which is beyond the perceptible, measurable time that is generated by the imagination.25

Death as it is defined by Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition* does not inhibit or prevent one’s attainment of adequate knowledge and does not diminish the capability of being affected in such a way as would allow for common notions to be formed. In this way, Death subverts the usual expectations of traditional, personal death. For Deleuze, Death is the breaking away from imagination. Rather than Death being an aspect of illusory life, it is at the limit of illusory life and is an indicator of the reality beyond the defective knowledge cultivated by the imagination. Death
is where the imagination can no longer create illusion. Whereas death in Spinoza’s work is the end of the individual and does not serve the eternal vitality of God/Nature which is inherent in the essence of things, Death exceeds the boundary limit of the individual and is therefore the removal of the limits placed on chaotic reality by the imagination. Death – the point at which this limit is reached – is a means for expressing how we can access an increase in power. The induction of thinking and creation of new images of thought this possibility being realised. Through Death – the point of access to impersonal death and the possibility of the loss of individuality – the conscious mind is linked to an infinite and eternal wealth of novelty. The connection with this multiplicity and novelty enables the mind to not only affirm its existence, but experiment with new ways of thinking that can break away from the confines of dogmatic images of thought and introduce new, freer thinking (DR 377). The pure, unfettered desire of the desexualised libido provides the means for this. As Goodchild writes, ‘Thought becomes production instead of representation. There is no need here to overthrow representations, but merely to begin producing instead of representing. For this, thought needs to add something, to construct a synthesis – it begins to operate through desire.’

The concept of desire in Deleuze’s writing is different to that used by Spinoza, though it is doubtless derived from Spinoza’s work. Desire through the Ego is the erotic desire of representation. Desire through the unconscious is Eros without libido, and so it continues to produce, but not to reproduce. Desire is the production of production itself, desiring for the sake of desiring.

C O N C L U S I O N

Despite him writing a philosophy of life, it seems that there is a lot to be said for Spinoza’s concept of death. Spinoza’s description of death was always to demonstrate how its being misunderstood is a cause of sadness. The attention given to the wrong conception of death distracts us from developing a philosophy of life. For these reasons, it seemed there was potentially a tension between Deleuze and Spinoza. Spinoza urges us to focus on life, whereas Deleuze regularly utilises
Death. Death is a crucial element in his philosophy of difference. In this Chapter, the aim was twofold: to provide an account of death on Spinoza’s terms and to determine whether Deleuze’s notion of Death could be reconciled with Spinoza’s philosophy of life.

Spinoza’s thanatopsis, his views on death, are closely related to his notion of the affects. Bodies are affected by other bodies that they interact with. Through these interactions they can either increase their power to act or find that their power to act decreases. As a result of the interaction’s effect, the body will experience joyous or sad passions. In addition to this, a body is most likely to gain adequate knowledge the more it is affected by external bodies. Adequate knowledge is arrived at through the rational assessment of common notions, that is, what is common to all thinking. It can also be acquired through intuition, or the affirmation of the necessary eternity of God/Nature’s attributes as being the singular things that God/Nature expresses of itself. When a body is not capable of being affected in a wide variety of ways, the opportunity to attain adequate knowledge diminishes, leading to a decrease in one’s power to act and the feeling of sadness. I described Spinoza’s interpretation of death as the change in the proportion of motion and rest in a body that leads to a catastrophic reduction in the ways that that body can be affected. This of course means that death, especially the fear of death, is always a source of sadness. Spinoza’s understanding of death is notably impersonal in EIV P39 and comes close to the Death used in Deleuze’s work. However, the characterisation of death that Spinoza provides us with is not identical to Deleuze’s.

If Deleuze’s concept of Death did not cause sadness, then it would not be necessary to avoid it in his work. To reconcile Deleuze and Spinoza over the concept of Death peculiar to Deleuze, I focussed on the idea of affects (affectio) and the feeling of affects (affectus). Death is at the limit of the representation of identity (a singular life). Beyond representation is the unlimited multiplicity of pure difference. Pure difference contains all possible relations of difference. Due to this limitless possibility, pure difference can be taken up in consciousness to provide new images
of thought (as long as the dogmatic image of thought its deconstructed first) (DR 368-69). The
distinction of the idea of affects and the feeling of affects can correspond to this definition of
Death. Identity is similar to the idea of affects. The idea of effects is a static image of an affect.
The idea of affection can be known, but what it reveals to us is limited. Just like identity, the image
is constrained by the limits of our capacity to experience the affection. In contrast, the feeling of
affects involves the dynamic relations that produce the idea of the affection. Pure difference is not
unlike this, as the innumerable relations affirmed in pure difference are what lies beyond the
representation of them. Interestingly, those affects which are “active joys” – specifically those
which bring blessedness - are not within perceptible time (SPP 51). In fact, the active joys are
considered to be beyond time and in the atemporal duration of God/Nature. This is a shared
characteristic between the feeling of blessedness (to be precise) and dispossession by Death.
Pursuit of blessedness is an attempt to discover adequate knowledge of the third kind, which is
knowledge of the essence of things contained in God/Nature. The attempt to understand Death
has a similar aim. Through Death is the discovery of pure difference beyond representation. Pure
difference is in the empty order of time and not cardinal time – that is, not time that we require
for conscious experience. Death presents us with the demystification of the fixity of a given
identity. As Death both breaks down the image and its falsity and provides a route to the
knowledge of the essence of representation (pure difference), it can be argued that both Spinoza
and Deleuze have a shared goal: to denounce sadness.

Death is therefore not about the negation of the individual, but exposing how the
individual, the living person, exists in the presence of the inevitable and impersonal Death. For
Deleuze, the atemporal duration of Spinoza is where Death resides and from which Death
influences and interjects in life. In the following chapter, Hegel provides us with a different way
of interpreting the role of death. Hegel, too, believes that death can be beneficial to us and allow
us to gain freedom. However, a different tension arises amidst this comparison of notions of death.
While Hegel’s understanding of death resounds with Deleuze in a number of ways, it is not the
Death and Reason

site of positive creation, but internalised negation. Does Deleuze’s understanding of Death, closely aligned with Hegel’s own interpretation, avoid the use of negation? Can Deleuze provide an explanation as to how Death is impersonal, casting aside content and agency, without there being a necessary negation of the individual?
NOTES

1 When referring to Spinoza’s *Ethics* (E), I will use the following notation: the first roman numeral identifies the part of *Ethics*, with the following letter indicating definition (D), axiom (A), lemma (L), proposition (P) or postulate (Post), followed by an Arabic numeral. Demonstrations (Dem), scholia (Schol) and corollaries (C) are indicated (where present) after the Arabic numeral. All translations are by Curley (London: Penguin Books, 1994).


4 Davide Monaco expresses this concern in his paper ‘Individuation and death in Spinoza’s *Ethics*’. The Spanish poet case reconsidered’, in *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* (2018). In it, he explains how the concept of the altered individual case considered as “dead” in EV P93 Schol. Needs to be distinguished from the transition from infancy to adulthood, otherwise ‘the destruction of our nature and the alteration of our ratio of motion and rest is something that almost everybody would undergo throughout his life.’ (p.7)

5 Note here that Spinoza and Lucretius both share this basic understanding of the nature of an impersonal death.


9 Wallace Maison, ‘Death and Destruction in Spinoza’s *Ethics*’, *Inquiry*, Vol. 20, Issues 1-4, (1997) [pp.403-417], p.405. Maison states that memory as the centre of personal identity is more important than his “eccentric notion of death”, however I think that it is important to remember the significance of death as a movement, a kind of transition as opposed to a static and singular event.


15 See Aaron Schuster, *The Trouble with Pleasure: Deluze and Psychoanalysis* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2016). Schuster makes a similar point when he writes: “But to be “not-Hamlet” does not exactly mean “not to be.” For to be the Hamlet who has chosen not to be does not mean “not to be,” but to be “not-Hamlet.”” (pp.180-81) Schuster talks of the exclusion of the subject as a symptom of disorder (chaos) once an “ordered” way of thinking has been disbanded or discarded.


23 See Daniel W. Smith, “‘A Life of Pure Immanence’: Deleuze’s “Critique et Clinique” Project’, in Essays on Deleuze (Edinburgh, EUP: 2012) for an insightful exploration of the importance of the concept of Life and vitalism in Deleuze’s interpretation of literature and his incorporation of the concepts into his philosophy.

See Bruce Baugh, ‘Time, Duration and Eternity in Spinoza’, *Comparative and Continental Philosophy*, (London: Equinox Publishing, 2011). Baugh presents a Deleuzian reading of Spinoza which provides an argument against atemporality of existence (though not necessarily the atemporality of the truth of essence) and an argument for duration in existence beyond that conjured by the imagination. Much of what Baugh says is similar to the discussion on atemporality and omnitemporality in R. J. Delahunty, *Spinoza* (London: Routledge, 1985). Though Delahunty reserves a great deal of judgement on book V of the *Ethics*, his critique and comparison of other scholars on the subject of time, eternity, and duration is illuminating.


This is the origin of one’s fear of dying – too much investment of significance to the finite and constructed representation of one’s existence. The individualising of one’s existence is the determination of oneself (not the distinction of oneself) and so it introduces negation (all determination is negation), and in turn the negation of the self in death through the decomposition of relations. The affects from this breakdown of relations between bodies leads to sad passions which are instances of passivity – the kind of passivity Spinoza (and Deleuze) wants us to avoid.
In the previous chapters the discussion centred on the role that death plays in the philosophy of affirmationists. The affirmationists Lucretius and Spinoza are significant for Deleuze’s work in that they appear as philosophical forebears for the development of his understanding of multiplicity, difference, and dynamism. Death, though featured in their philosophies, is worthy only of reproach for the negative effects it has on our reasoning (through fear or passions). Deleuze’s interpretation of death as the impersonal and dispossessed Death of Blanchot and Freud marks something of a departure from Lucretius and Spinoza, both of whom identify a similar concept but do not go on to develop their philosophies with it. Given that Deleuze thinks differently about the significance of death to philosophy, it is worthwhile finding a philosopher whose work also considers death as a substantial part of their own philosophical system contra the affirmationists Lucretius and Spinoza.

In this chapter, several works of Hegel’s will be explored to determine the role that death plays in his philosophy, with a particular focus on death and desire in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Death is an important concept in Hegel’s work. Death features in the origin of life, the possibility of self-consciousness, and the necessary paradox of the Incarnation. Hegel even offers a description of death which would not be entirely out of place in Deleuze’s own work. Yet, Hegel’s work is reproached by Deleuze as ‘the final and most powerful homage rendered to the old principle’, the old principle being the dogma of representation (DR 63). Hegel uses the apparatus of representation to deliver up the “infinitely big” of pure being (DR 57). Where Deleuze wishes to go beyond representation to the origin of the image, Hegel’s dialectics are reliant upon
Death and Negation

representation. Despite Deleuze’s rejection of Hegel, there is an acute similarity between the work of the two with regards to the significance that death plays and even how it is described. As this chapter will show, Hegel’s acceptance of death as an important element of philosophy is indicative of his philosophical method, namely dialectics. The antagonism between these two thinkers centres mainly on this: the dialectics necessitate the negative, whereas Deleuze’s concern is with affirmation and dismisses the negative. Deleuze repudiates Hegel’s work and yet they share a great deal in terms of their characterisation and use of death. This chapter will explore how Hegel’s concept of death operates in his work and thereby present a philosophy which uses death and yet is not affirmationist. The similarities and differences between the two concepts of death will be acknowledged, though the intention is to show how the concept of death lends itself to dialectical philosophy in a way that it does not for affirmationist philosophy, thus revealing how Deleuze’s use of the concept of Death endangers the affirmationism in his work.

Hegel’s writes on topics ranging from metaphysics to phenomenology to natural science to ethics. As such, determining a single concept of death is quite difficult. Indeed, it is not clear that there is such a singular idea for Hegel, given that death features in his work in several different ways. The use of death in his ontological work (e.g., *Philosophy of Nature*) and phenomenological work (e.g., *Phenomenology of Spirit*) is fairly similar in that they both involve determination and transformation. In both texts, death and desire are integral to the determination of individual entities. Death and desire in *Nature* denote the death that leads to a being’s return to the general (i.e., indeterminacy) and the desire for an independent existence from the general. Meanwhile, in *Phenomenology*, death and desire denote the death that threatens the desire for an individual’s affirmation. However, this perceived connection between Hegel’s ontology and his phenomenology is an extensive and recondite subject for which there is neither the time nor necessity for exploration in this chapter. However, it is worth considering that there may well be further similarities between the work of Deleuze and Hegel if this focus on phenomenology (the representation produced in consciousness) and the reality of the natural world (which may well
correlate with and reflect those activities which develop self-consciousness) can be successfully drawn together. For now, it is sufficient that this work focusses solely on the notion of death and how Hegel’s conception of it draws several links between his dialectical philosophy and Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, while also establishing how the two differ.

**HEGEL, DIALECTICS AND THE NEGATIVE**

The dialectical method of philosophy has its roots in Plato’s dialogues. Plato’s dialogical form of writing usually featured Socrates and one or several other characters, all of whom would contest Socrates over some concept formerly believed to have been known to and understood by all parties. Socrates would feign ignorance (aporia) and urge those around him to provide him with an precise definition of the concept. The ensuing conversation would lead to those involved realising their own ignorance of the real understanding of the concept. The collective, led by Socrates, would then work to recollect (anamnesis) the true understanding of the concept under discussion.

The process of determining this understanding took the form of thorough questioning performed by Socrates. Plato’s dialogues therefore use the process of challenging the understanding of a given concept through the introduction of contradiction (achieved by Socrates’ questions) and the result of the attempts to resolve said contradiction. In his own work, Hegel attempts to go beyond the simple beginning from ignorance utilised by Socrates.

The aim is to establish knowledge through a scientific form of the dialectic, that is a dialectic which is much more rigorous and disciplined. Hegel argues that Plato’s work is problematic because it only advances Notions (Begriffe), that is to say thoughts which wholly abandon the fixity (or assuredness) of the ‘pure concrete’ understanding (PS §33). The abandonment of the concept at the point of ignorance overemphasises the negation of the Notion and therefore fails to recognise that both the Notion and its contradiction offer something more exact than a simple reintroduction of the Notion itself. Too often the negative is all that is upheld in Plato’s system, a process which ‘on the one hand, aims only at abolishing and refuting limited
assertions through themselves, and, on the other hand, has for result simply nothingness.’ (SL 55-6). Hegel is working to develop on the ‘free scientific […] form’ (EL §81 Remark 1) of dialectics constructed by Plato, so that the outcome will be more than just nothingness, it will be an advancement beyond a “Science of Notions”.

Hegel’s dialectical philosophy is founded on contradiction. Two contradictory concepts are considered through their opposition to one another. The contradiction is then taken to its logical conclusion, a process from which, Hegel argues, a more resolute definition of the concept is revealed, brought from the struggle between the two former, less sophisticated ones. The dialectic has three components: the Abstract (understanding), the dialectical (negative reasoning), and the Speculative (positive reason) (EL §79). Understanding [Verständige] is the primary facet of the logic and relates to the fixity of characters and their distinctiveness from one another (EL §80), meaning it is fixed, reliable and certain. The dialectical [negative-vernünftige] refers to the inherent instability of this same understanding. The Speculative, or positive reason [positiv-vernünftige], is the outcome of the conflict between the understanding and negative reasoning and their coming to their logical conclusion. The relationship between these three components to the dialectic will now be defined.

Understanding ‘is not an ultimate, but on the contrary finite, and so constituted that when carried to extremes it veers round to its opposite’ (EL §80). Therefore, the perceived fixity of understanding is undermined by the possession of its own opposition. The opposition to the understanding of the concept is revealed at the extreme limit of the concept’s definition. The understanding can have a period of fixity, but it must eventually give itself over to its opposite, and this is due to its being finite. The finite fixity of understanding is exposed when one considers what that understanding is not when taken to its end – fixed understanding is known through itself as well as its opposite. All understanding contains within itself its own undoing, its own contradiction. Without self-contradiction, it is impossible to have a comprehensive understanding.
of something. Hegel states ‘the true view of the matter is that life as life, involves the germ of
death, and that the finite, being radically self-contradictory, involves its own self-suppression.’ (EL §81 Remark 1). Unlike the affirmationists discussed earlier, Hegel holds that all understanding
contains within it the means for its own contradiction and thereby also contains the means for its
own deconstruction. Negative reasoning, the dialectical, is precisely this moment of contradiction.
The fixity and determinacy of understanding necessitate instability and indeterminacy. Thus,
understanding undermines itself. It is here that the important movement to positive reasoning
takes place.

The positive development of understanding arrives through the movement between the
two conflicting terms (understanding & negative reasoning). By their contradiction, the two terms
each provide the undoing of the other, while each also requires that the other subsist, lest one be
dissolved in the other and the definition of both terms becomes impossible (how can we know
what it is without also knowing what it is not). The dialectic therefore involves the understanding
being taken to the limit of its definition, whereby the negative is established as the finitude of the
understanding. The two terms of the contradiction then come into conflict [Kampf] with one
another and, in the ensuing movement between them, a new concept is established through
positive reasoning. The opening to Science of Logic provides a clear example of this process at work.

Science of Logic is a sceptical work that tries to suspend all beliefs and understanding to
establish a radical logical foundation for a presuppositionless philosophy. At the beginning of
thought there needs to be an absolute ground, Hegel argues. The absolute ground must be, for
Hegel, what is most immediate. The most immediate beginning of logic, through which the
foundation of all else can be determined, is ‘thought that is free and for itself’ (SL 68). In other
words, pure knowing is the ground on which all thought is determined. Pure knowing is
understood as “truth”, for it has no object that is over against it and defining it, it necessarily
defines itself and is its own object, its own self. Pure knowing is therefore self-defined and
immediate. To begin with pure knowing, and nothing else, requires that pure knowing is not mediated by anything. Pure knowing is the ground of thought and so no single thought can determine it, that is to say pure knowing contains all of thought and no single distinguishable or distinct thought. To reiterate, pure knowing is not any one thing in particular, rather it is everything and therefore not containable as a concept in any one thought – it is pure immediacy (not mediated) and indeterminate (not determined). Pure knowing is therefore determined through its immediate indeterminacy. Pure knowing cannot be “knowledge of”, lest it be determined (that is mediated through thinking) and therefore no longer immediate. However, its immediate indeterminacy is the way in which pure knowing determines itself as pure knowing. The immediacy of pure knowing leads to the indeterminacy which undoes its own self-determination – pure knowing is determined by its indeterminacy and its indeterminacy is what determines it as pure knowing. Negative reasoning is thereby introduced as part of a dialectic between pure knowing and nothingness (as in no thing that is determinable as any thing). Pure knowing determines itself as object but is also the annihilation of the object that it determines itself as, meaning it can no longer be itself, but is ‘at one with its self-alienation [selbstEntfremdung].’ (SL 69) Hegel puts it thus:

> Pure knowing as concentrated into this unity has sublated all reference to an other and to mediation; it is without any distinction and as thus distinctionless, ceases itself to be knowledge; what is present is only simple immediacy. (SL 69)

The simple immediacy is precisely what Hegel intends to begin with, and so herein lies the beginning of logic, the “true expression” of which is pure being. However, there is a contradiction which must be resolved, namely that pure being is at once both itself and nothingness. How is pure being, in its determination of itself as an object, equal to nothingness?

Hegel wants to begin the Science of Logic without recourse to mediation. To do this, he focusses on pure being. Pure being is immediate and indeterminate being. The whole process of
Hegel’s scepticism suspends the quasi-transcendental philosophy of mediation and tends to what remains, namely the immediate and indeterminate.

The foregoing shows quite clearly the reason why the beginning cannot be made with anything concrete, anything containing a relation within itself. For such presupposes an internal process of mediation and transition of which the concrete, now become simple, would be the result. […] that which constitutes the beginning, the beginning itself, is to be taken as something unanalysable, taken in its simple, unfilled immediacy, and therefore as being, as the completely empty being. (SL, 74)

According to Hegel, at the beginning of a presuppositionless philosophy there must be pure and empty being. A mediated being consists in a relationship consisting of said mediated being and that through which it is mediated. What would be presented in this case is not the beginning itself but merely a beginning. Hegel is concerned with the immediate beginning, and not one beginning amongst many. Pure being - which has no relation to anything, nor any determinacy - is pure indeterminateness and emptiness (SL, 82). As such, it is the same as nothing. Equally so, pure nothing, the ‘absence of all determination and content – undifferentiatedness in itself’, is within thought itself. Therefore, pure nothing can be said to be the same as pure being (SL, 82). That which determines pure being is the same thing making it no longer be anything at all.

Hegel argues that pure being is immediate and indeterminate. Indeed, it is so immediate and indeterminate that it is wholly empty of any content, making it equal to nothing. Pure being is immediate because it is not mediated by anything. It is also indeterminate because it is not determined by anything. However, pure being is not wholly indeterminate. Through its characteristic of immediacy, pure being determines itself. It is also not wholly immediate, as it is mediated by the relation it has to nothingness. Ergo, the indeterminacy and immediacy intrinsic to pure being, determine and mediate it as something.¹
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The transition from pure being into nothing and nothing into pure being is what Hegel refers to as becoming. Becoming is the outcome of the dialectic of pure being and nothing; it is the element of positive reasoning that is the basis of what is determined.

Since the unity of being and nothing as the primary truth now forms once and for all the basis and element of all that follows, besides becoming itself, all further logical determinations: determinate being, quality, and generally all philosophical Notions, are examples of this unity. (SL 85)

The movement of being into nothing and back, called becoming, makes pure being and nothingness inseparable. All things contain both being and nothing, they are at once what they are and what they are not, containing within them their own most limit. All things therefore contain their own end, and they will necessarily end as the determinacy (that is the fixity) of the understanding is finite.

Hegel’s sceptical and foundational philosophy is built on this formula of understanding, negative reason, and positive reason – thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Dialectics provide Hegel with a means for establishing concepts and an account for their change and development. Positive reason carries within it the two terms that define it (e.g., becoming is always the result of the contradiction between being and nothingness). Hegel can trace a line from concepts to their origin, and throughout the synthesis there is always the echo of what came before. The echo resonates in whatever arises from the conflict of contradiction. The active use of the negative as a philosophical device is not exclusive to Hegel, but it is an element of his philosophy that differentiates him from the affirmationists we previously looked at. In Hegel’s philosophy, the use of the negative means that death is a crucial part of Hegel’s philosophy as it is a form of negation. Death also plays a role in the development of one’s self-consciousness through the Herr/Knecht dialectic. To understand the way death is involved in this process of self-consciousness, we need to elaborate on this particular dialectic.
HEGEL’S CONCEPT OF DEATH

The *Herr/Knecht* dialectic will be the primary source for deliberating how Hegel describes death, though it must be acknowledged that his discussion of death is not limited to this part of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Death is discussed in a few key places in Hegel’s work, most notably in *Philosophy of Nature*, *Phenomenology of Spirit* and his lectures on *Philosophy of Religion*. In each of these works, death is described in a different context. Although it is varied in Hegel’s presentation of it, the broad application of the concept of death is useful for providing a comprehensive picture of the way death operates in Hegel’s dialectical philosophy and how it is integral to Hegel’s use of negation.

Hegel’s *Phenomenology* is a thoroughgoing exploration of the generation and development of consciousness. Therefore, the characterisation of death that he constructs here is related to consciousness, in particular how consciousness becomes self-consciousness. In the transition from the origins of consciousness to self-consciousness, Hegel introduces the concept of desire. An interpretation is offered as to how Hegel defines desire, as this will have some bearing on the way we can understand its connection to death. For Hegel, it is desire that leads to the need for recognition. Recognition concerns social interaction and relations, in this case with another self-conscious subject. Through these relations between self-consciousnesses we are presented with the concept of death. The discussion of death and how it plays a role in self-consciousness is important to the aims of the thesis, as it is here that many of the differences and similarities between Deleuze and Hegel are identifiable. Death will be discussed in two different ways. The first form will be the concept of death as a resistance to or loss of life or existence, the kind that is encountered in the initial struggle (*Kampf*) between the two conscious subjects. The second form will be the fear of death and its relation to work, which is a means for the slave (*Knecht*) to discover his freedom. Prior to any discussion of either of the two forms of death is Hegel’s notion of desire, and so let us begin by looking at how desire features in Hegel’s understanding of consciousness.
Consciousness is aware of objects that surround it, due to their providing it with a focus for perception, understanding, and sense-certainty. Consciousness is also aware of itself as something which perceives a world comprised of external objects. In this sense, consciousness is already aware of itself as a self and is therefore self-conscious. However, in this double knowledge (knowledge of others and knowledge of itself), there is initially no difference between the being of the external object and the being of the consciousness that perceives said object. Both are comprised of their own being in themselves and their being an other for whatever is perceiving them (PS §166/104). Hegel writes: ‘[…] if we call Notion what the object is in itself, but call the object what it is qua object or for an other, then it is clear that being-in-itself and being-for-an-other are one and the same.’ (PS §166/104) Consciousness is not, therefore, fully aware of itself, rather it is only aware of itself in relation to others. In other words, there is no difference between the two (itself and others) and therefore it knows itself no better than it knows others. Consciousness must come into conflict with the other, negate the other, and then return to itself to know itself fully and be pure self-consciousness.

Desire (Begierde) is the impulse by which self-consciousness becomes certain of itself by negating an object that is other to it. The word Begierde contains the German word for “greed” (Gier), which, when combined with the prefix “be-”, can be understood as a greed which is for something or someone. Desire is a longing after something, the internal greed reaching outwards to consume. The notion of reaching outward suggests that desire is a kind of movement. Houlgate suggests that desire is not ‘a feeling of wanting something I lack’ but is ‘more akin to greedy consumption’. As Pippin also points out, Hegel himself refers to desire as a movement (Bewegung) (PS §167) and a process (Prozess) (PS §178). Desire is the projection of the want for a sense of self that takes the form of the destruction of what lies outside of the self. Self-consciousness desires the consumption or negation of ‘this other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life’ and, by negating the other, self-consciousness ‘thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty’ (PS §174). However, the process always relies upon the relation of the
self-conscious consciousness and the other that is negated. Not only that, but the negation of the
other can never be complete, meaning there will always be something left for desire to negate,
leaving the need for self-certainty of self-consciousness unfulfilled. Self-consciousness therefore
needs an object that is not entirely removed by its negation. In other words, it needs another self.

Consciousness does not negate itself when it negates the being-for-another in the object
that is over against it. Despite consciousness also possessing this being-for-another, it returns to
itself upon negating the other. Consciousness saves itself from the same desire that consumed the
other when it was negated. The capability of surviving the negation of being-for-another makes
self-consciousness ideal as a means for fulfilling the desire of another self-consciousness. Self-
consciousness is an ongoing and reusable resource in this regard (although it is not inexhaustive).
Self-consciousness therefore makes the move from desire as the simple consumption of objects
to discovering the recognition of another self-consciousness. All of this is intended to fulfil the
desire for self-certainty. Desire is still self-serving. Self-consciousness is still searching for its own
self-certainty, and it is a movement that is no less consumptive, no less destructive. Therefore,
both self-conscious consciousnesses attempt to fully negate the other through a struggle (Kampf)
which is referred to as the master-slave (Herr-Knecht) relation. The aftermath of this relation will
tell us of the fear of death and its uses, but the first mention of death is as the ending of one’s life,
and that is what will now be expanded upon.

In the initial encounter between the two self-conscious consciousnesses, there is a
mutuality of recognition. Both consciousnesses recognise each other as an object, a being-for-
another, and as a desiring consciousness, a being-for-self. ‘Self-consciousness exists in and for
itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being
acknowledged.’ (PS §178) However, the desire to negate objects, to discover self-certainty, is not
overcome. The self-consciousness is confronted with its own otherness when it is recognised by
another self-consciousness. Each self-consciousness must therefore overcome the otherness in
itself to assert itself as truly independent, that is to say it is not reliant on another to know itself (PS §180). In their desire to overcome the internal otherness of being an object for another (being-for-another), each self-consciousness must demonstrate to the other (and to themselves) that they are not attached to the immediacy of objects (not reliant on the existence of others to achieve self-certainty), indeed that they are not attached to any existence. Consciousness requires the presentation of consciousness as the abstract truth of self-consciousness, consciousness that is sure of itself and itself alone. To present itself as that truth, it must present itself ‘as the pure negation of its objective mode’ and therefore it must show ‘that it is not attached to life.’ (PS §187) Both self-conscious consciousnesses are undertaking this process through their recognition of each other, and so they are both presenting themselves as not attached to life, intending to recapture their being-for-self in the supersession of the other. ‘In so far as it is the action of the other, each seeks the death of the other. But in doing so, the second kind of action, action on its own part, is also involved; for the former involves the staking of its own life.’ (PS §187) In showing itself as not attached to life, self-consciousness attempts to assert itself and cause the death of the other – negating the other entirely – and each self-consciousness therefore risks its own existence in the process. At this stage, each self-consciousness establishes that the acquisition of that pure abstract truth of self-consciousness for itself is more important than life.

Each self-consciousness tries to kill the other and, in doing so, prove itself to be truly free. The proof of freedom is in the killing of the other, because once that self-consciousness is extinguished, the attachment to life is believed to be overcome and the victorious self-consciousness no longer relies upon the other for its self-certainty, it can be sure of its own freedom as the pure truth of an abstract I. Each self-consciousness knows that they are risking their own life during the confrontation – this is not a struggle to stay alive, but a contest between two selves to demonstrate how little life actually means to them. The one that achieves this is the “master” (Herr), securing freedom from the defeat of the other. The self-consciousness who fails in the struggle and retreats to preserve itself is regarded as the slave (Knecht). The master will
continue to consume and attempt to satiate his desire, while the slave exists to provide for their
master’s insatiable appetite. It is in the work of the slave that they will uncover a means to an even
greater freedom than that experienced by the master. But before discussing that route to freedom,
it will help our understanding of Hegel’s concept of death if we first elaborate some more on what
form death takes in the struggle between the two selves.

Death is simply the loss of life as an individual. Life is the resistance to death. For Hegel,
life is universality, and universality takes the form of a whole that is broken down into its members
and which is then collapsed into a unity once more. To quote Hegel:

Thus the simple substance of Life is the splitting-up of itself into shapes and at the same time the
dissolution of these existent differences; and the dissolution of the splitting-up is just as much a
splitting-up and a forming of members. [...] Life consists rather in being the self-developing whole
which dissolves its development and in this movement simply preserves itself. (PS §171)

Life consists of all these members which are at once both a disunity (with each individual
expressing itself as such) and a unity (in which all individuals are subsumed as objects into an
otherness). In this regard, Life is universality; a collection of differentials that are undifferentiated
in their unity. As self-consciousness resists its assimilation into objecthood, it creates a scenario in
which it may lose its distinctiveness and therefore it “dies” by returning to Life. While this sounds
contradictory, it is important to remember that the existence of the individual as free is precisely
because it is free from Life, having stated as much in its conflict with another. Self-consciousness
does not want to die, it wants to exist, but it wants to survive as a pure abstract I and rid itself of
its being-for-another. Therefore, life is different to Life, in that life is attributable to a pure self-
consciousness (master) that is distanced from the nothingness inherent in Life, existing only for
itself. Life is the thinghood to which a self-consciousness that exists for another (slave) remains
attached. Death is therefore the return to Life, the return from individuality to universality – the
loss of individuality and assimilation into nothingness. As Hegel writes:
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For just as life is the natural setting of consciousness, independence without absolute negativity, so death is the natural negation of consciousness, negation without independence, which thus remains without the required significance of recognition. (PS §188)

Death is the point at which one’s consciousness can no longer fulfil its desire to negate and affirm itself, even left unable to be recognised and provide itself with self-certainty (consider the necessity of being affected and the reduction in ways of being affected that we see in Spinoza’s definition of death). To die is to render the consciousness equal to nothing. Initially, the master no longer has death as a concern; indeed, in the very achievement of pure self-consciousness the master succeeds in demonstrating that the truth of one’s abstract I is more important than life or death – “better to die standing on your feet than to live on one’s knees” is the master’s shibboleth. However, for the slave who continues to exist as being-for-another and is regarded as an object by the master, the risk of a return to thinghood is still prevalent. Indeed, the slave is fearful of their assimilation into nothingness and a total loss of their individuality. The angst over this potential fate is expressed as the fear of death.

During the struggle between the two selves, each held their life as without value compared to the necessity of knowing oneself as pure self-consciousness. In this regard, they were both fearless when faced with the possibility of losing one’s life, fearless in the face of death. However, the slave retreats from the conflict, preserving their life only by acknowledging their reliance on things to sustain their individuality. While the master succeeded in creating a sense of being that is separated from everything else – being-for-self – the slave, in submitting to the other, makes clear the attachment to and need for life to define their existence. As such, the loss of life is a significant drawback to the slave. The transformation in the slave’s attitude towards life, having undergone and survived the struggle with another self only through submission to it, is manifested in a fear of death (§194). What is significant about this fear of death is how, through labour, it allows for the slave to gain a freedom that is not readily available to the master – a thought that is worth
expanding on in preparation for the comparison to be made between the thanatopsis of Hegel and that of the affirmationists. So, how does the fear of death create a space for the development of freedom?

When the slave labours, they create something – for example, baking bread, carving a chair, tailoring a shirt, and so on. In the creating of an object, they impart something of their independence as “one who works” into their work. ‘Work […] is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing.’ (PS §195) Already this is something not available to the master, for the master only negates; the master is still self-consciousness qua desire. In contrast to the negating power of the master, the slave establishes a kind of permanence through their work. ‘The negative relation to the object becomes its form and something permanent, because it is precisely for the worker that the object has independence.’ (PS §195) Through work, the slave can discover a means of reconfiguring the attainment of independence. The slave finds independence in the expression of their being-for-self in the object that they make as they work (PS §196). However, freedom is not found only in the exercise of work – fear of death is an integral part of the discovery of the freedom unique to the slave.

The fear of death, perpetuated by the presence of the master (PS §194), is a ‘negative significance’ that complements the ‘positive significance’ of the shape of the object that stands before the slave. In creating this being-for-self, the slave comes to recognise its own being-for-self and that this subsists in the face of the fear of death. Hegel writes: ‘in fear, the being-for-self is present in the bondsman [Knecht] himself; in fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him, that he himself exists essentially and actually in his own right.’ (PS §196) The slave reconfigures the nature of recognition by “rediscovering” itself in the being-for-self encapsulated in the thing that it creates through work. Through the work forced upon the slave by their submission to the master, the slave discovers a means to face their alienation, that is to say their existing as a self that is not recognised as a self (the slave is perceived as an object by the
master), in the shape of the thing created by the slave creates through their work. The slave’s creation provides a permanent expression of the slave’s own being-for-self. This expression is only for the slave, providing a means to face the fear of death, the potential for assimilation into nothingness, without losing its being-for-self. In this way, the slave can discover its freedom, ‘the two moments of fear and service as such, as also that of formative activity,’ Hegel says, ‘are necessary’, and their combination is what allows the slave to be a pure self (PS §196).

In the Phenomenology, there is a clear definition of desire, death, and the fear that originates from the encounter with the possibility of death (for the slave, at least). The movement of desire is a consciousness’ self-affirmation (being-for-self) through its consumption or negation of the universal Life of objecthood (being-for-other). Desire leads to a self-conscious consciousness needing the recognition of another self-conscious consciousness. The ensuing struggle brings both consciousnesses into the reality of the possibility of death. Death is characterised as the loss of individuality, the assimilation of the self into nothingness. Life is the sustained self-producing existence of the individual. The master continues to consume (I am not that, I am not this), having successfully asserted itself as a pure self (being-for-self), while the slave is bound to life, having receded from death and submitted to the self-certainty of the master. Unlike the master, the slave has come to realise the possibility of its annihilation in death, and so lives with a fear of death. The fear of death is not conquerable but provides a means for the discovery of the slave’s being-for-self and the freedom inherent in that discovery through the products that it obediently creates for the master through the slave’s work.

We have therefore seen in Hegel’s work how death is a crucial element for the establishment of a self-consciousness as a pure self and how the fear of death, far from only being a symbol of a lack of freedom, can in fact allow for a great deal of freedom in the case of the slave. Desire and death are therefore integral to (though not the sole reason for) consciousness to develop into self-consciousness. How does Deleuze’s use of death compare to that of Hegel in his

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development of consciousness and self-consciousness? Where are there similarities and differences between the two? What are the reasons for these instances of congruence and divergence? What are the challenges and consequences, if any, faced by Deleuze in using death when developing a theory of consciousness while attempting to avoid using the negative?

**DELEUZE AND HEGEL ON DEATH**

The similarities between Hegel and Deleuze are few, and on the concept of death they often appear to be on different ends of a spectrum. In *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel is interested in understanding the way that death leads to one obtaining being-for-self in the master-slave relation. Deleuze understands death as the point at which one’s selfhood is expunged (hitherto referred to as Death), providing a space for novelty and difference to be introduced into life. On the one hand, Hegel’s idea of death is that it is something which gives rise to self-consciousness and provides the self with freedom. While on the other hand, for Deleuze, Death is freedom itself: creative freedom, transformative freedom. How are these determinations of death so different? Are there any moments between the two conceptions where there is some commonality?

In Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, death is part of the process that consciousness undertakes to become self-consciousness. Death enables the discovery of a pure, abstract self-certainty that leads to the freedom of self-consciousness. Death is consciousness’ loss of life, that is to say it is the point at which the distinctive self dissolves into the universal realm of objects that is Life in general. Hegel and Deleuze both share a similar idea when it comes to understanding the relationship between death and consciousness. The basic idea they share is that death is the loss of individuality. In Hegel, this is the loss of self-certainty. In Deleuze, this comes in the form of the unconscious. Each of these is worth expanding on, as it is through a closer examination of each that the different understandings of death as the loss of individuality becomes clearer.
As has been discussed, Hegel’s understanding is that death is a state in which the individual is dissolved into the generality of Life. Being a part of Life in general is equivalent to being an object. Desire is the movement essential to consciousness that keeps it separated from this world of objects. The performance of desire is always for separation – the distancing of consciousness from that which seeks to assimilate it, the Universal. As we know, the reason for this is that Life leaves consciousness dependent and indefinite. However, consciousness desires its self-certainty, expressed through the negation of all being-for-other. The resistance to being-for-other is what leads to the slave’s fear, the fear of becoming part of the negative. The fear of death is the fear of absolute negativity. Death is the loss of all individuality and we can now say with confidence that this is the negation of being-for-itself, that is to say the end of any capability of affirming self-certainty. Hegel’s *Philosophy of Nature* is an interesting place to find instances of the same dialectic of resistance to the negative and collapse into it that also occurs in nature itself. Indeed, it is useful to see how this logic of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* feeds into his examination of the ontology within nature.

Briefly, the individual animal strives to distinguish itself from its source: nature. The animal’s resistance to its source is what gives it some individuality. The fulfilment of its individuality as a living being is found in the harmony of its parts. Each part is distinct, that is to say it is singular and independent. Therefore, the animal is a complex collection of parts. However, in being a conglomeration of these parts, it is a unity as an animal, which is to say that it is a single animal. It is this harmony of the one animal and its many distinct parts that makes the animal a living one. This is because in existing as several parts and returning to its unity as one (and vice versa) the animal is ‘a self-reproducing entity’ (PN §274). In any case, the animal organism resists its essential attachment to nature, as it is nature that causes its singularity to be indeterminate. Nature is general and, as such, may contain singularities which ultimately remain general. Only in resisting their essential generality do animal organisms become individual. Yet, they cannot overcome what is essential to their being, namely that their centre of being is in nature. Therefore,
all living beings are overcome by their essential generality and die, causing their individuality, their unity, to be disassembled.

Its subjectivity is only the concept in itself but not itself for itself and exists only as an immediate individuality. The inner generality is thus opposed to its actuality as a negative power, from which the animal suffers violence and perishes, because its existence does not itself contain this generality within itself. (PN, §296)

To bring this back to the *Phenomenology*, we can see how Hegel’s logic regarding the resistance of consciousness to the being-for-other that threatens its self-certainty is markedly similar to that which he employs in *Philosophy of Nature*. In summary, the individual resists the negative and it is in this resistance that they are at once distinct from the other and still remain indebted to it. Why indebted? Because only otherness allows for the individual to arise. Otherness also continues to threaten individuality because individuality will, inevitably, succumb to otherness. Without going any further into Hegel’s philosophy of nature, we can already draw some comparison with Spinoza’s naturalism.

Hegel is not utilising naturalism in the *Phenomenology*, yet there is a similarity between the way that Hegel frames consciousness, self-certainty, and death and the way in which Spinoza characterises death. Earlier, in Chapter 3, the definition of death that Spinoza provided was taken to be the point at which the proportion of motion and rest in the body and mind was altered such that the body and mind had their ability to be affected reduced by a significant degree (E III P39). Arguably, this is death’s most significant repercussion: that the body becomes so altered as to no longer be capable of undergoing a number of affections. The body’s incapacity to be affectedmultitudinously means that there can be no real progression towards freedom, which is to say that the body can no longer increase its power. This is because power is increased or decreased depending upon the ways a given body is affected. Too few affections leave the body unable to increase in power. Hence why Spinoza determines death as evil, for it makes possible only a loss
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in one’s power. Considering this, Hegel’s own discussion of death in *Phenomenology* as the negation of consciousness (PS §188). There is a similar result to that described by Spinoza. Just as Spinoza saw death as the inhibition of self-determination and empowerment, Hegel considers death to be a similar privation of selfhood and self-expression. By Hegel’s understanding of the concept, the slave is under the control of the master due to his freedom being lost. One’s freedom is lost (at least initially) in becoming the slave, due to their submission to the master and ensuing subservience to them (a constant reinforcement of the authority of the master and a reminder to them of the reality of death). The character that this lost freedom takes is not just thraldom, but the inability of the slave to alienate themselves from their own being an object, their being-for-another. The slave can no longer achieve self-certainty through the attempt to fulfil their desire, whereby they negate objects. The slave’s capacity to assert itself and grow in its freedom is therefore hindered, due to the fear of death. Herein lies the difference between Hegel and Spinoza, for whom the fear of death is used or overcome, respectively.

Spinoza holds that the source of freedom is through the continued acquisition of second and third kinds of knowledge – the adequate knowledge of things and adequate knowledge of the essence of things. The increase in these kinds of knowledge renders such things as the fear of death as non-sensical, given that it is not capable of reducing one’s power once it is understood adequately. In other words, once death is understood through adequate knowledge, one comes to realise that death is not worth thinking about, given that it does nothing to increase one’s power. Spinoza rationalises away the fear of death, in a way not dissimilar to that attempted by the Epicureans. Once death is known by its motions, one considers it unworthy of attention, preferring instead to meditate on life. However, for Hegel, the slave cannot afford the luxury of anaesthetising or dispelling the fear of death. The slave is perpetually presented with the real possibility of their death, in the form of the master’s presence. The master threatened the slave with death in their initial confrontation (or struggle) for independence as a pure abstract self. The slave is under the thraldom of the master because they, being craven, cherished life more than their independence.
and, as such, forfeited independence and declared themselves attached to life. The exposure to the reality of their death in that moment before their submission does not leave them. The master embodies that moment in their existing as an independent self-consciousness. The master, in their superior self-certainty, perceives the slave to be yet another object that simply affirms the master’s status as independent. Juxtaposed to this is the slave, for whom the master is a symbol of the slave’s dependence on life and the threat of death. Therefore, death is a reality, it is an experience, which the slave knows they cannot endure. Hegel does not propose that the fear of death be something which is removed, therefore, but argues that the slave can use that fear, along with their labour, to find freedom. Death is not nothing to us, nor is it unthought of, nor is it overcome – death is utilised. While Spinoza and the Epicureans find ways to reduce the significance of death, Hegel determines that it is something which leads to a positive outcome: the slave’s freedom. Indeed, whether self-consciousness is determined by the gluttonous master or the industrious slave, the outcome is always a freedom that is enjoyed by self-consciousness, albeit via different routes. Before discussing Deleuze, it is important to emphasise this point: that Hegel’s understanding of phenomenology is teleological.

*Phenomenology* is a text that shows us the progression of consciousness. Consciousness’ development from sense-certainty has a definitive end, which is reason. Indeed, just as consciousness has a linear progression that eventually culminates in reason, Hegel maintains that history, among other things, progresses in this way too. There is a finalism present in Hegel’s work that is alien to Deleuze. Deleuze’s philosophy of difference sets the goal of taking what are believed to be the confines of thought and discovering a means to break those limitations down. He wants us to establish new ways of thinking and develop new concepts, all of which is only possible if the boundaries of representation are overcome. As has been discussed, Deleuze wants for the dogmatic image of thought (that image of thought which is believed to govern all thought, and which restricts and delimits thinking) to be transformed so that new images of thought can be developed. Deleuze does not consider our consciousness to be one which ought to follow a line
of development that will come to an end, like Hegel proposes in *Phenomenology*. Deleuze believes that our conscious mind can engage in an infinite number of lines of thought, all of which are pursuable due to something which provides all the materials required for novel ways of thinking: Death.

As was discussed in Chapter One, Deleuze’s accepts that there is a conscious and an unconscious part to the consciousness. Consciousness has a source of habits and memories, which are synthesised by the Id and Ego respectively. The syntheses provide one with a sense of self, a unified and consistent identity. The Id and Ego are concepts developed by Freud. Deleuze appropriates these concepts for his own work. The Ego, in synthesising memory and habit, creates an image or representation of the self. In so doing, the Ego also determines the way in which one thinks, that is to say it provides one with an image of thought. This image of thought is continually regenerated and reasserted by the synthesis of the Ego. This synthesis is made possible by a libidinal drive, that is a drive capable of reproducing the image provided by the Ego. The libidinal drive in question is called Eros, by Deleuze. Eros is understood as the psychoanalytic idea developed by Freud. Freud held that Eros was the instinctual drive for self-preservation and the sexual desire for reproduction. Therefore, the conscious mind is a combination of two syntheses which produce a sense of self and the history (through the synthesis of memories). The reproduction of the image of the self and the I is performed through this drive, Eros. Because the image is always reproduced, the synthesis is cyclical. The same image of the self is reproduced repeatedly. However, Deleuze points at instances where habits are not performed, when one becomes fatigued, or memories fade away, when one forgets. Therefore, there are instances occurring all the time, wherein Eros is unable to maintain its reproductive powers. At this point, Deleuze proposes we have the introduction of the unconscious.

The unconscious is a part of the mind that is inaccessible to the Id and Ego. It is also the point at which Eros becomes “desexualised”, that is to say it loses its libidinal power. Deleuze calls
this the death drive or Thanatos. Again, this is a term taken from Freud, for whom the death drive is juxtaposed with Eros, or the life drive. Freud discussed the death drive at length in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, where the death drive is believed to be one’s innate desire to return to the inanimate and elemental state prior to one’s existence. In other words, it is the desire to die. In Deleuze’s work, however, the death drive (Thanatos) is not opposed to the life drive (Eros), but it is the desexualised Eros. Eros, in instances of fatigue and forgetfulness, demonstrates the limit of its libido. As well as these two instances, there is the matter of our experience of time. Time as we experience it within consciousness is governed by certain “rules”. These rules are the requirements for our conscious experience. In the case of the conscious mind, this takes the form of past and present, which are provided for by the respective syntheses of the Id and Ego. However, the present is always moving into a future. As Eros is only capable of reproducing the self that is comprised of the Id and Ego, it is unable to generate a future for them. At this point, Eros, unable to produce, is desexualised. The desexualised Eros, now called Thanatos, can continue to produce, however it does not produce within the requirements of conscious experience. Instead, it becomes a highly creative and unrestricted productivity. At the point of the desexualisation of Eros, wherein its libido is no longer unable to reinvigorate an identity, the productive power of Eros transitions from production of an identity, a self, to the production of production itself. We have referred to this dispossessed and depersonalised loss of selfhood as Death. The significance of this is clear when we consider what Deleuze is attempting to do via a look at the pre-phenomenological, metaphysical conditions of consciousness. How does this tie in with the discussion of phenomenology that underpins Hegel’s use of death in his *Herr/Knecht* dialectic? Why is the unconscious significant to the discussion of Deleuze and Hegel?

Deleuze’s project in *Difference and Repetition* is referred to as a “genetic phenomenology” by Hughes. Hughes suggests that Deleuze’s interest in sense is based on the need to find the source of our consciousness. Deleuze wants to find this source as he is resolved to discover the way in which our current way of thinking, the dogmatic image of thought, is created and thereby discover
how we might move beyond it. Deleuze therefore explores the pre-conscious conditions necessary for the genesis of consciousness to demonstrate how new images of thought are a real possibility. Thanatos, the synthesis within the unconscious, is evidence of this. Thanatos produces novelty for us and presents us with a source of consciousness that is itself not restricted by the necessary restrictions on perception that are in place for our conscious experience. In the way that consciousness is constructed, with its fatigue, forgetfulness and uncertainty over the future, there is a connection to an unlimited realm of possibility, a continual and constantly novel creativity. Deleuze undertakes his search for the conditions of consciousness in a similar way to Hegel, trying to begin at the source of consciousness, but it is not with the aim of determining where consciousness ends. Rather, Deleuze uncovers the conditions for consciousness (through his interpretation of Freud’s psychoanalysis) with the aim of discovering where it can take us next. The pre-phenomenological, metaphysical examination of the conditions of consciousness that Deleuze presents is one in which he is attempting to demonstrate “horizontal” thinking. Hegel’s teleological phenomenology is too “vertical”. The best way to describe the difference between these two images of thought – vertical and horizontal – is through the notions of root and rhizome thinking discussed in Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus*. However, before undergoing an explanation of what those are, it would be useful to defend the choice to use one of Deleuze’s collaborative texts here, all of which have so far been left aside.

*A Thousand Plateaus* is not a work that is solely focussed on images of thought. Complex and highly technical, *A Thousand Plateaus* is a means for Deleuze and Guattari to express their concept of new images of thought, multiplicity, and a host of other intricate ideas, such as the body without organs and schizoanalysis. The work is one of Deleuze’s later writings, a stage in Deleuze’s writing which this thesis originally intended to avoid in the hopes of not “cross-contaminating” the two eras of work. However, there are some concepts which bridge the divide that some may believe occurs between Deleuze’s early work and his later collaborative work with Guattari. I would argue that one such “bridge-concept” is what Deleuze develops as early as *Logic*
of Sense. “Flattening” is a concept where Deleuze, in his fascinating interpretation of Carroll, begins to state his belief that there is a skin or surface on which profound and novel ways of thinking can occur and a multiplicity of images of thought can share a space. When one jumps to *A Thousand Plateaus*, this “flattening” is closely related to what Deleuze refers to as the “plane of consistency”, a concept developed from his discussion of “root thinking” and “rhizome thinking”. Therefore, it is through these two concepts – the root-tree and the rhizome – that Deleuze most clearly articulates what flattening is.

Root thinking or tree logic is progressive; it moves from one stage to the next, always growing by building on what came before. Just like a tree begins at its roots and grows in a single direction, so too does this way of thinking have a singular direction of development. In tree logic and root thinking there are leaves, tracings, root tips, endings which are the culmination of that process. We can see this happening in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, which Deleuze would call a “root-book” (ATP 3). Hegel develops from one concept to the next. Sense certainty causes consciousness causes self-consciousness causes reason. It is here, at reason, that the root becomes a tip and ends abruptly, or the branch ends in a leaf, which traces a unity or codified strata over the multiplicity of sense. This root thinking or tree logic ‘plots a point, fixes an order’ that allows the idea (in this case a phenomenology) to grow in its singularity (ATP 5-6).

Root thinking is also restricted by the necessity to reside only in the present. What this means is that root thinking is the growth of a thought based on successive instants. The succession of instants, joints or presents gives the work its chronological order. Sense certainty is one instance occurring in and discussed during the present, before it is built upon by a new present, consciousness, and so on. Just as a tree has successive rings from its growth, so too does Hegel’s work have rings in the form of sections, with each section building on the last and, upon building on it, leaving that previous section in the past. ‘There is always something genealogical about a tree.’ (ATP 6) In Hegel’s phenomenology, it is easy to trace a line of development due to his work
taking this chronological, genealogical, and teleological approach. Hegel’s work has an aim, and it is written with that singular aim in mind. In asking the question of how we transition from sense to reason, Hegel immediately sets the parameters of his work. Therefore, *Phenomenology* can only go in one direction: deeper. The root of Hegel’s work digs deeper into its subject until the root is spent, that is to say until Hegel has found his answer. Indeed, in finding his answer, Hegel has only succeeded in finding the “blockage” or “impasse” in his root’s direction of travel. For Deleuze, this is a way of thinking, writing, and speaking which can be too restrictive and is harmful to a richer way of thinking: thinking through multiplicity. ‘The tree and root inspire a sad image of thought that is forever imitating the multiple on the basis of a centered or segmented higher unity.’ (ATP 16) Deleuze introduces the rhizome as an illustration of thinking through multiplicity.

A rhizome is a plant whose growth is shallow and broad. The subterranean stem of the rhizome spreads out across a large area and can be covered in root tubercles which can sprout new stems. The plant is an interconnected web of offshoots. Instead of developing along a singular and restricted direction, ‘the principal root has aborted, or its tip has been destroyed; an immediate, indefinite multiplicity of secondary roots grafts onto it and undergoes a flourishing development.’ (ATP 4) Deleuze makes a point of there being other forms of rhizome, for example the complex and varied social structure of a swarm of rats, or the intricate system of burrows that subterranean creatures build. However, the idea is always the same: rhizomes signify multiplicity.

The multiple must be made, not by always adding a higher dimension, but rather in the simplest of ways […] with the number of dimensions one already has available – always \( n-1 \) (the only way the one belongs to the multiple: always subtracted). (ATP 5)

Rhizome thinking is not simply building upon a singular idea, but making the far-reaching connections between infinite determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions. Deleuze suggests that this amounts to thinking in terms of “becoming -”, that is to say there are no distinct elements to the world of multiplicities, rather there are a series of relations which are being made. Importantly,
this means that there is no means for rhizome thinking to reproduce what occurred. In other words, because the rhizome is incapable of reproducing a present it is an “antigenealogy” (it is opposed to successive generation) and can never be any singular thing insofar as it is at once becoming something else. Due to this continual shifting of relations, inability to reproduce and inhibition of singularity, the rhizome does not develop any depth like that exhibited by the tree-root structure of thought. Instead, the rhizome remains flat.

All multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they fill or occupy all of their dimensions: we will therefore speak of a plane of consistency of multiplicities, even though the dimensions of this “plane” increase with the number of connections that are made on it. […] Flat multiplicities of n dimensions are asignifying and asubjective. They are designated by indefinite articles, or rather by partitives (some couchgrass, some of a rhizome…). (ATP 8)

We might recall how Deleuze had described the significant development of the Stoics as their flattening of thinking. The notion of chaos or the Aion that Deleuze developed in *The Logic of Sense* has a significant role to play in the ways that we might develop images of thought based on multiplicity and novelty (LS 167-73). Relations and connections are continually being made, but only on the broad and flat surface. Indeed, he writes in the “Second Paradox of Paradoxes of Surface Effects” that being flat is considered the more noble of states in Carroll’s work:

One could say that the old depth having been spread out became width. The becoming unlimited is maintained entirely within this inverted width. “Depth” is no longer a complement. Only animals are deep, and they are not the noblest for that; the noblest are the flat animals. (LS 6)

The flat multiplicities that constitute the rhizome are noble because their width allows for a host of connections to form in creative and novel ways. The plethora of connections find their expression as new images of thought, continually renewing and restructuring. Deleuze considers the noblest animals to be the flattest ones because these animals are what demonstrate the limitlessness of rhizome thinking. Were there to be a lateral movement from the past to the future
and back again, then time can be in its purest form (pure order of time), not rigid and jointed, and so too would all of the moments that occur in time be capable of connecting with and communicating with one another.

Hegel’s work is therefore comprised of tree logic, of root thinking. In other words, Hegel’s *Phenomenology* is an example of restricted thinking, limited by a chronological and genealogical image of thought. For Deleuze, this is to Hegel’s detriment. Deleuze believes rhizomatic thinking provides novel images of thought. New and creative images of thought allow for genuine thinking to happen, and the need for this is expressed in his work *Difference and Repetition*. While Hegel works with representation, Deleuze critiques representation. Representation has its drawbacks, the most damaging of which is its adherence to a dogmatic image of thought. Rhizome thinking breaks down that dogmatic image of thought and allows for new images of thought to arise. Hegel’s work does not allow for that to happen. Hegel’s work tells us, as a matter of fact, what the representation of sense certainty, consciousness, and reason are and how each one leads to the other in sequence. These different ways of thinking that appear to be exhibited by the two thinkers (or attempts at thinking) has an influence on their respective concepts of death.

The way that this translates into their differing appreciations of death has everything to do with the aims that they have for its use. For Hegel, death is a moment in a developing narrative. Death must be a part of the development of self-consciousness which can be left in the past or, if its presence continues (for example as the nothingness in the image created by the slave’s labour), then it exists only to be done away with at some point. In *Phenomenology*, death is a means to an end. Whereas for Deleuze, Death is the instance when the narrative itself falls apart and is renewed.

Death in Deleuze’s work dissolves the self and fractures the I because it is only through this cracking-up of that narrative that the cycle of selfhood and consciousness can begin to be flattened out. Death is a kind of window or cipher to a world of flat multiplicities and tremulous surfaces. Through the connection that consciousness has with this rhizome of connectivity beyond
it – that is, in the unconscious – the conscious mind is introduced to novelty and creativity. Once we understand that the rigidity of representation, the dogmatic image of thought, is not integral to our way of thinking, we can begin to develop more rhizomatic ways of thinking, developing new lines of flight for our thinking to take.\textsuperscript{6} Death is therefore linked to Deleuze’s intention for a change in our way of thinking, or rather the means by which we can begin to think,\textsuperscript{7} by opening the way for novelty, creativity, and multiplicity. Where the two thinkers differ in their aims, their use of death reflects what they want to achieve: for Hegel, death is a single moment; for Deleuze, Death is many beginnings.

Hegel’s idea of death is also characterised as the loss of the individual self into the anonymity of nothingness. Death’s sole purpose is to therefore provide a way for self-certainty to be expressed (through the master-slave relation) and to pose as a fearful potentiality for the slave, again to allow for self-certainty and the freedom that it provides. Whereas for Deleuze, Death may well share the notion of anonymity that Hegel has, its purpose is for something quite different. Deleuze’s purpose for Death captures the essence of possibility Blanchot celebrates in \textit{The Space of Literature}. Death provides a means for the self to access the multiplicity of a limitless world of pure difference. Deleuze wants us to understand that, in losing our image of our self, we have the capacity for new images of thought, that is to say we can develop new ways of thinking and new concepts through the access we have to immanent multiplicity. Hegel wants to show how death leads to our selfhood being established, while Deleuze wants us to see how Death takes our selfhood away.

\textbf{HEGEL ON THANATOPHOBIA}

Let us consider what has been discussed so far regarding the notion of death as something which can enable us to affirm our distinct individuality and even grant us a good deal of freedom. Despite Hegel’s concept of death being a case of root-thinking or tree-logic, according to Deleuze, it is worth our looking at how Hegel’s interpretation of death in his philosophy influences the attitude
toward death. Considering what has been said regarding Lucretius and Spinoza’s reactions to the
topic of death, it seems as though Hegel’s contrasting take on the subject warrants an examination
to find the potential benefits or pitfalls it may have on ethics of self-cultivation. However, the
response had by the affirmationists to death, namely that it is nothing to us or not worth thinking
of, is not exclusive to Lucretius and Spinoza. In Ancient Greek philosophy, there is a theme around
death and how it ought to be dealt with. A common notion of that time seems to have been that
it is best to anaesthetise oneself to the fear of death. The search for happiness, tranquillity, and a
flourishing (eudaimonia) life led to the oft proposed approach to the fear of death or thanatophobia:
one must learn to remove thanatophobia altogether. Given what has been said about the way the
fear of death is used by the slave in Hegel’s Herr/Knecht dialectic, one could argue that these beliefs
surrounding the need to remove the fear of death may complicate the pursuit for the “good life”.

The question this section will address is: what are the implications of Hegel’s concept of death
when compared to those of the affirmationists?

In Chapter Two, the approach to death had by Epicurus was explored in brief. Epicurus
considered death to be problematic for the development of psychic calm. However, this was only
the case if one held erroneous beliefs about the afterlife. Death itself was only the source of fear
when one considered it to be the beginning of a life of perdition and not the cessation of one’s
existence. Therefore, it was the fear of death born of false belief that had to be nullified. For
Epicurus, to end the false beliefs or superstitions which caused the fear to manifest was to remove
the fear of death. Eradicating those false beliefs was achieved through undertaking a careful and
scientific study of the mechanics of nature. Once one understood the process of death in a natural
context, it would become clear that there is nothing fearful about death, as superstition cannot
withstand the evidence presented through a rational observation of the natural world. Reasoned
truth will succeed against falsehood, and death will no longer be fearful. Epicurus was not alone
in finding ways of removing the fear of death, however. Many Stoics also considered ways in which
the fear of death could be quashed.
In his letters, Seneca writes extensively on the fear of death and does so in the hopes of demonstrating how it is not to be feared and, in not fearing it, very little (if anything) in life is worthy of our being fearful over it. In a letter to Lucilius, he writes: “Trust me, Lucilius, death is so far not to be feared that, thanks to it, nothing is to be feared.” The suggestion made by Seneca on a number of occasions is that death has no power over us given that we can bring it upon ourselves (therefore we can control it to some degree) and learn to diminish its power through our imagining our future death and thereby become accustomed to its inevitability.

Beginning with the notion of bringing death upon ourselves, Seneca entertains the thought of suicide as a viable route out of hardship and suffering. Writing to Lucilius, Seneca speaks of Pompeian praetor Cato who, due the failure of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus to defeat Julius Caesar, was at a point in his life where he had lost all hope in ever living in a world where Caesar would not rule. Therefore, with ‘the will to die and the means to die’, Cato decided to take his own life. At the point of hopelessness, it is not unreasonable to find a way to bring that situation to an end through taking one’s life, according to Seneca. In his work De Ira (On Anger), Seneca writes about stanching the flow of suffering as he talks of those who are hopeless in the face of tyranny or slavery. For him, suicide is an escape from these hardships.

Wherever you turn your eyes you may see an end to your woes. Do you see that precipice? Down that lies the road to liberty; do you see that sea? that river? that well? Liberty sits at the bottom of them. Do you see that tree? stunted, blighted, dried up though it be, yet liberty hangs from its branches. Do you see your own throat, your own neck, your own heart? they are so many ways of escape from slavery. Are these modes which I point out too laborious, and needing much strength and courage? do you ask what path leads to liberty? I answer, any vein in your body.”

Far from being a deplorable act, Seneca suggests that suicide is a reasonable response to pain and suffering that have become unbearable. The idea of suicide is one of freedom from pain, insignificance, or bondage. This notion is not restricted to Seneca. Indeed, many Stoics saw death
as an escape. In his meditations, Marcus Aurelius writes: ‘But if you feel yourself falling away and
losing control, retire in good heart to some corner where you will regain control – or else make a
complete exit from life, not in anger, but simply, freely, with integrity, making this leaving of it at
least one achievement in your life.’ When one cannot get a hold of oneself and regain mastery
over one’s life then their next and last resort ought to be to end life so as to escape the torment
they are undergoing. However, death is not just escape and freedom. The purpose of making
suicide a reasonable end to a life is predominantly to show that it is not something to fear.

Suicide is a demonstration of one’s lack of fear of death. An individual who can take one’s
own life in confidence and with a sound mind is an example of one who has conquered the fear
of death and is ready to meet it. Such figures appear as heroic to some Stoics, and we get an idea
of how they are revered by the Stoics through Cicero’s mention of Theramenes and Socrates. Both
men were ordered to drink poison while they were imprisoned, and it is their countenance in the
face of death that is important to Cicero in his dialogue “Against the Fear of Death”. Theramenes,
apparently jovial in the face of death, and Socrates, who was resolute upon carrying out his
sentence, both exhibited how one can remain peaceful when death arrives if they do not believe
death to be bad or evil. ‘Could we praise the equanimity of the greatest soul of all if we considered
death and evil? […] Let us recognise that if death is an evil, then evil is eternal. For death is the
end of the misery of life, but if death itself is miserable, then there can be no end.’

Death, a state
absent of sensation according to many of the Stoics (a point of commonality between them and
the Epicureans), need not lead us to believe that there is anything to fear in an afterlife. If there is
nothing to fear in an afterlife, then death itself begins to seem a less terrifying a prospect. Yet there
remains a more general fear of the cessation of one’s living, that life comes to an end is itself a
source of fear for many people. Many people would that they can continue to live, and this is also
perfectly reasonable. However, for many of the Stoics, there must be a rational acceptance of the
finitude of life. The mental exercise which can help this irrational attachment to life is meditating
on one’s death.
In his essay ‘To philosophise is to learn how to die’, Montaigne describes how one might overcome the fear of death by imagining our death on a regular basis. The aim is to take away the uncertainty and strangeness of finality that makes death so worrisome. Were one to imagine one’s death frequently, the arrival of death would be well expected and not peculiar or uncomfortable, therefore it would not alter or diminish one’s composure and one would maintain one’s mental tranquillity.

To begin depriving death of its greatest advantage over us, let us adopt a way clean contrary to that common one; let us deprive death of its strangeness; let us frequent it, let us get used to it; let us have nothing more often in mind than death. […] We do not know where death awaits us: so let us wait for it everywhere. To practise death is to practise freedom. Montaigne is influenced by the Stoic approach to thanatophobia. In his continued correspondence with Lucilius, Seneca expresses the need to train oneself to ‘welcome death’, and that the mind ‘must be toughened by constant practice so as to endure the sight of it and its nearer approach.’

The regularity of one’s thinking upon death is intended to make death seem mundane. The meditation has one purpose: to anaesthetise one from thanatophobia. One becomes (or is believed to become) desensitised to the fear of death, given that it is so often thought upon and, importantly, rehearsed. Preparation is the greatest cure for fear. The Stoics practiced reflecting on one’s death to establish this: to be prepared for and therefore no longer fearful of death.

In Chapter Three, Spinoza’s work was explored, in which the fear of death is to be least thought of by one who is free. This is a strong opposition to Hegel’s thoughts, as Hegel insists that there can be no freedom without the experience of the fear of death. Freedom, for Spinoza, is achieved through the gradual demystification of illusion and inadequate knowledge through the acquisition of adequate knowledge. Freedom is when one is not under the control of passions, affects from our relation to bodies in the external world. While we cannot be entirely free from passions, given that we are ourselves a body and are therefore destined to interact with other
bodies, we can minimise their effect on us through the active use of reason. We become freer the more we actively rationalise and understand the world around us. It is our increasing in freedom that brings us a great deal of joy. However, death and the fear of it are hinderances to this freedom. This is because morbid contemplation of death is believed by Spinoza to always rouse sad passions, given that death itself is a significant cause of sad passions. Ergo, Spinoza considers the fear of death as counteractive to our progress towards a freer, joyful, and more rational life. The idea that the fear of death could make us free is, for Spinoza, counterintuitive and contrary to our essential nature, which is to focus on what can increase our potential to exist.

However, one could argue that, on a more basic and instinctive level, the fear of death is significant for our sense of self-preservation and developing an air of urgency and significance around what we do in life. To no longer fear death may have dangerous implications for the way we live our life, calling into question if fearlessness over death is truly beneficial to us. Whether we look at Epicureanism, Stoicism or Spinozism, the view of thanatophobia is the same: one must be anaesthetised to it. From what has been discussed, we can see how becoming numb to death can take the form of demystification, familiarisation or rationalisation. However, these different means for coping with the fear of death are all transfixed on how we can turn away from death to focus on life. The implicit suggestion is that fear of death is inherently bad, that the fear of death is necessary to avoid at all costs. For Hegel, the fear of death is crucial to the development of consciousness itself. The slave is able to find freedom in their bondage only through the use of the fear of death. Is an Epicurean, Stoic or Spinozist outlook on death detrimental to the opportunity for freedom presented to the slave in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*?

In *Phenomenology*, the fear of death is the thought of being nothing. Thanatophobia is, for Hegel, the experience of all stability being threatened with dismantlement and the potential for the ‘melting-away of everything stable’ by death (PS §194). What is fearful, then, is not that death will occur or that it will cut life short, but that it leads to one being nothing at all, a pure negativity.
Being nothing is only fearful to the slave, however, and not the master. This is because the master has embodied pure negativity by continuing to satiate their desire (*Begierde*) and negate things (i.e., consume). Indeed, this pure negativity or being nothing is the aim for desire. The fear of death had by the slave is due to the slave’s dependency on life. The dependency is what the slave demonstrated in the initial encounter with another self-consciousness, wherein the one tried to put the other to death in their relation. The slave, in experiencing this being nothing through the prospect of death (a prospect that the slave recoiled from), still has knowledge and experience of being nothing.\(^{15}\) The difference between the master and the slave is in the master’s performance of that same pure negativity in their consumption, while the slave’s experience is manifest in a quiet, inward fear of death. The slave takes this fear of death and manifests being nothing as a created thing, made through the slave’s labour. The creation of a thing becomes an expression of that pure negativity, and it is in this creative labour that the slave can face their fear of death. Hegel writes, ‘in fashioning the thing, the [slave’s] own negativity, his being-for-self, becomes an object for him only through his setting at nought the existing *shape* confronting him. […] in fear, the being-for-self is present in the bondsman himself; in fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to *him*, that he himself exists essentially and actually in his own right.’ (PS §196) The fear of death is what provides this initial experience of being-for-self as being nothing and pure negativity. In creating something through their labour, the slave comes to know themselves as the being-for-self that they sought after in another consciousness. Otherwise, the being-for-self remains locked away inside the slave and is unknown to them. The fear of death is therefore crucial to this experience of being-for-self. Does the slave overcome this fear of death, then? What effect does the fear of death have on the slave?

Were the slave to find a means to numb the dread they felt in experiencing the reality of their death, they would have no way to know that they could be free. Contrary to what the Stoics, Epicureans, and Spinoza believe, the fear of death is instrumental in the development of the slave’s consciousness. That is why the fear of death is not overcome or desensitised for the slave, they
Death and Negation

will still be under the threat of death posed by the master and their dependency on life. The slave cannot do away with the fear of death, as it is in this fear that they come to know themselves to be what the master is, namely pure negativity. Also, through their near-death experience, as it were, they also encounter a way to maintain the kind of recognition of being-for-self that gives them a further developed freedom than even that enjoyed by the master. This is because the master depends upon the slave to provide for his insatiable greed and enable him to negate and preserve his pure negativity, while the slave depends only upon themselves to provide freedom through labour that draws on their fear of death. The master relies upon the slave, the slave is liberated through labour and thanatophobia. Take away the fear of death and you take away the slave’s possibility and capability of freedom. Epicurean, Stoic and Spinozist indifference towards death stunts the progression of an individual’s capacity for a pure self. Instead, they would leave the slave to work for no other purpose than to be a pawn for the master and deny the slave the reality of their own experience in the conflict between themselves and the other in the struggle at the beginning of the master-slave relation.

CONCLUSION

Hegel’s position on the concept of death has been covered as a juxtaposition to Deleuze’s. However, the intention behind this juxtaposition has been subtler than first impressions ought to suggest. The purpose of this chapter has not been to simply turn to a thinker who is not an affirmationist for the sake of providing an alternative perspective. The purpose of the chapter has not been to present a dialectician because he utilises negation, contrary to the affirmationists. Neither is the aim of the chapter is to try and catch Deleuze out, by implying that he brings negation into his philosophy of difference. “Death and Negation” establishes that Hegel’s conception of death is not just a departure from that of the affirmationists, it is a way to utilise death within a philosophical system. Hegel makes for such an interesting counterpart in this
examination of the concept of death in Deleuze’s work because Hegel’s use of a concept of death is (tenuously) shared with Deleuze, despite a marked difference in their philosophies.

Deleuze does not share with Lucretius and Spinoza what he shares with Hegel, namely a high regard for the place of the concept of death in philosophy. Such a comparison should not suggest that Deleuze has made an error, that is to say he has incorporated the negative in his philosophy. Of course, the need to avoid integrating negation has been considered by Deleuze and he has written his work accordingly. What this chapter has done is show how a philosophy that uses death as an important part of its system is divergent to both the affirmationists and Deleuze alike, while still having some connections with Deleuze’s work. The chapter presents Deleuze’s concept of Death as having its own space, a kind of middle ground, in which he is dissimilar to the affirmationists and yet also maintains a distance from a philosophy utilising the negative. The differences between Hegel and Deleuze’s philosophy are brought to the attention of the reader with the aim of deepening, even further, the understanding of Deleuze’s concept of Death. It is too easy to suggest that, if death is disregarded amid the positive and embraced amid the negative, Deleuze, having embraced the concept of Death, must be in league with those who maintain the negative. The discussion here is how Deleuze can distance himself from both past affirmationists and dialecticians, and establish a philosophical space of his own.

To bring attention to these differences, the chapter established how Hegel’s philosophy follows a dialectical logic. The dialectic’s use of negation does make it distinct from Deleuze’s philosophy, but it is a method that Hegel believes is demanded by a presuppositionless philosophy. The way that it is used was presented through the example Hegel provides in the beginning of The Science of Logic. We clearly see the way that Hegel’s philosophy is contrary to affirmationism. The affirmationists rarely, though not always, disavow the negative as having relevance in philosophical discourse. The negative does not play a role in the world beyond representation, and so it is of no concern to philosophers whose interests go beyond representation (think adequate knowledge,
which is representational, and adequate knowledge of the essence of things, which is essential, intuitive, and not represented). Having established that Hegel thinks differently to our Lucretius and Spinoza, it was pertinent to look at how this way of thinking affected his concept of death.

Death is discussed in several ways and across different texts in the body of Hegel’s work, however the most poignant and relevant elaboration of death (as far as this work is concerned) is found in *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The master-slave relation presents us with a notion of death which relates to consciousness. The discussion of death relating to consciousness is of course important due to Deleuze’s own elaboration of consciousness and Death, as discussed in Chapter One. Having elucidated the master-slave relation, a comparison between the two thinkers, Hegel and Deleuze, was had over this concept of death. The divergence between the two was revealed as constituted by different approaches to thinking. Deleuze’s intention with his work is to make thinking “flat”, that is to say thought must not dwell on any one moment without considering the connections of that moment of thought with a host of other lines of thought. Whereas Hegel is set on developing a self with a manifest progression, Deleuze is intent on taking a look at the self once it has reached the limits of its agency and content. Their views on death are dissimilar not only because of their philosophical foundation, but also due to the different aims of their philosophies.

Having elaborated on the relationship between Hegel and Deleuze, the discussion turned to the way Hegel’s notion of death compares with that of Lucretius and Spinoza, both of whom have already undergone some scrutiny over the implications of their views on death. A deeper insight into the notion of anaesthetising oneself from the fear of death was offered by the Stoics. Anaesthetisation is an idea shared between the Stoics and the two affirmationists. The reason for this discussion was to show how it is problematic for the affirmationists to be presented with the idea that the fear of death ought to be useful and not merely overcome. The proposal for the fear of death seems at least more hopeful and realistic than that held by Lucretius, the Stoics and
Spinoza. However, Hegel’s notion of the fear of death as providing a means to freedom for the slave still requires a key philosophical element: the individual. It is perhaps here that Hegel shares a great deal with Lucretius and Stoics (and, to some degree, Spinoza), in that his philosophy keeps the individual in mind.

The progression of consciousness is bound up in experience and a lived reality that, although it lends to Hegel’s “root-thinking” and “tree logic”, maintains a relevance to the individual and the life of that individual. Of the figures we have looked at, no matter their opinion on death, the self is always the sole beneficiary of their endeavours to understand death – is this reflect in Deleuze’s work? For Deleuze, the individual seems to be a problem that ought to be overcome. Deleuze’s idea of flattening out leaves the individual with no reference as to who they are. Deleuze is eager for us to discover the plebeian, one who has no name, one without content and agency. All of this relates back to the idea of Death as a window to the infinite, immediate pure difference. Pure difference is found in the pure order of time, and it is the connection of the pure order of time, pure difference, fracturing of the I and the dissolution of the self that we turn to next.
NOTES

1 As being is necessarily empty, it cannot be said to contain anything, and so it must be an indeterminate nothing. Nothing is, Hegel says, often attributed to the opposition of something. Ergo, nothing is determined as the absence of a particular something. The relationship between nothing and the something to which it is opposed is a factor which serves to determine that nothing, and so we have a determinate nothing.


6 “[…] the rhizome is made only of lines: lines of segmentarity and stratification as its dimensions, and the line of flight or deterritorialization as the maximum dimension after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis, changes in nature.” Gilles Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Bloomsbury, 1987), p.22. As the rhizome is comprised of flat multiplicities it does not require a structure like that of the root-tree model of thought. Therefore, it is not a structure that comprises it but a series of lines which cross and intersect at an host of ever-increasing connections.


CHAPTER 5

Death and Oblivion: The Divine Game, Transpantheism and Kenosis

In the previous chapter, the notion of rhizomatic thinking was discussed, along with the idea of “flattening out” thought. Deleuze’s aim is for an understanding of pure difference to inform our creation of new concepts and new ways of thinking. For Deleuze, Hegel is still caught up in thinking through representation. He does not escape the fetters of the dogmatic image of thought. Hegel’s use of death is solely for the benefit of understanding the development of self-consciousness. The thinking Hegel employs is too deep, it is tree-logic par excellence. Deleuze wants to use Death to break away from the vertical work of Hegel and force us into horizontal thinking, a more rhizomatic image of thought.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze is attempting to create a new image of thought by proposing a change in the way we think. In other words, the limits of our existing image of thought must be reached to force the reader into thinking. Thought is currently under the restrictions placed upon it by representation. These constraints on our thought lead to our repeating the same way of thinking, the same image of thought. Revisiting the same way of thinking, or recognition, keeps us stuck in a loop of thought. We only think via recognition and are never mindful of the pure difference that lies in-between our recognitions (as opposed to the difference between the recognitions themselves). As such we are unable to “think difference”. Instead, ‘only that which is identical, similar, analogous or opposed can be considered different.’ (DR 182) To think difference we need to dissolve the dogmatic image of thought; we need to go beyond what Deleuze considers to be the limitations of our cognitive faculties (DR 188).
For Deleuze, going beyond these faculties means first finding their limit. To force these faculties beyond their limit and force them to metamorphose and meet the demands of exceeding their limitations requires us to reconfigure ourselves. Death is the boundary of the self. In Death, the self is excluded and then transformed upon its return. Deleuze therefore requires our identity to be obliterated for these new parameters of thought to be laid down and continually transformed. Identity is attached to the dogmatic image of thought. As such, it tethers us to the dogmatic image of thought.

In this chapter, I will explore the reason behind Deleuze suggesting the need for the oblivion of the self and the way in which it occurs in the unconscious by discussing both in detail. The notion of self oblivion is rooted in Deleuze’s interpretations of Nietzsche. Deleuze’s interpretation of the Dionysian spirit and the idea of the eternal return are key concepts which inform this notion of losing the self. Nietzsche’s own iterations of these ideas will be delineated, and this will help to better understand Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche. Also considered here is how the death drive (as a compulsion to fatigue, forgetting and the dissolution of the self) is the necessary condition for what Deleuze refers to as “active forces”, that is to say pure affirmation, another idea derived from the work of Nietzsche which will be touched upon. The death drive, eternal recurrence, and Dionysian intoxication all lead to the same conclusion in Deleuze’s work: the self as a fixed identity needs to be overcome for new ways of thinking to be made possible. However, the self is of real significance to Nietzsche, from whom Deleuze has developed many ideas. Indeed, much if not all of Nietzsche’s work is built around the same goal – to encourage the reader to find and experiment with their own means for improving themselves, that is to truly discover and nurture one’s authentic identity. Nietzsche aspires for his readership to increase their “will to power”, which is their own, personal development towards a kind of Spinozist perfection, wherein they are living a life that is purely and fully their own, one which they can affirm in its entirety. Without the self, Nietzsche’s work is no longer a project of self-cultivation but something far more abstract and detached from life.
Unravelling Identity in the Chaosmos of the Divine Game

To begin “thinking difference”, we must first grasp a concept of difference itself. Deleuze does this in his opening chapter of *Difference and Repetition*. Pure difference, he says, is not restricted to contrariety or even similarity. What he suggests is that the concept of difference is not difference *between* things. Difference itself is not the kind of difference we associate with comparing two or many things with one another. Difference in that respect is just the delimitation of objects in space, “this is p because it is different to q”. Even in the repetition of the same we find differences. The repeating ticks of a clock, for example, are different from one another due to their existing in a different time to the ticks that rang out before and that may ring out after. Deleuze is not interested in the way that difference is manifest through the notion of the identical, similar, analogous, or opposed. Deleuze wants to discover difference in itself, a concept of pure difference. ‘We tend to subordinate difference to identity in order to think it […]. In other words, we do not think difference itself.’ (DR xii-xiii) Deleuze wants to establish a concept of difference to begin changing the dogmatic image of thought. The dogmatic image of thought is an image of thought that has
been ‘borrowed from the pure element of common sense’ and in which thought is considered to have ‘an affinity with the true; it formally possesses the true and materially wants the true.’ (DR 174) However, to understand the concept of difference is to step beyond the confines of the present dogmatic image of thought. This is because, although the dogmatic image of thought is content with how it determines representations as truth, pure difference is not determinable in the way a representation is. Indeed, pure difference cannot be determined at all. Pure difference must be considered as a concept that has different terms, conditions, or rules to representation.

Difference is not singular in the way that representation is, which is why it has not yet been thought of in its own right, that is to say it has not been thought of as pure difference. Part of the reason for this, is that difference is an unlimited multiplicity. While representation requires ‘a single centre’, difference has the capability of being its own source of creativity, a ‘profound genetic element’ which allows it to have an unlimited number of multiple centres – representation presents ‘a false depth’ compared to the ‘affirmed world of difference’ that it attempts to capture in its presentation of difference (Deleuze describes this presentation as possible only through the identical, similar, analogous, and opposed) (DR 70). The reason this is the case, according to Deleuze, is because representation is too restrictive. Representation is fettered by the dogmatic image of thought; it relies too heavily on identity. The rigid process of conceptualisation by representation follows the same rules in which ‘the form of the concept’ is presented as ‘a form of identity’ (DR 70). The world of difference, on the contrary, is ‘a complicated, properly chaotic world without identity.’ (DR 72) Identity is the unique and singular centre of representation; it is required for there to be a conceptual fixity that will provide the aforementioned truth that the dogmatic image of thought has an affinity for. Deleuze distinguishes these two worlds as two games: the Human Game and the Divine Game.

In the conclusion of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze describes the Divine Game, a concept he alludes to throughout the text. On providing a concept of difference, Deleuze must
demonstrate how and why pure difference is outside of the requirements and limitations of representation and the dogmatic image of thought. Difference and representation are not compatible with one another, as difference cannot be confined to a singular centre. The affirmed world of difference is well beyond the small world of representation.

Difference is not and cannot be thought in itself, so long as it is subject to the requirements of representation. [...] it appears that pure disparates formed either the celestial beyond of a divine understanding inaccessible to our representative thought, or the infernal and unfathomable for us below of an Ocean of dissemblance. (DR 345)

Deleuze wants to expand our horizon beyond the world of representation and look further afield to where the image of thought originates. The Divine Game is the term Deleuze gives to this origin of thought, the ‘celestial beyond of a divine understanding’ (DR 345). As it is beyond the representation that forms our experience of the world, it is not confined to the conditions of experience that the dogmatic image of thought imposes on our understanding. The rules that are required for the formation of concepts and their identity are referred to as the Human Game.

The Human Game consists of rules. These rules are the requirements of representation. The rules give rise to a number of conceptual apparatuses, such as ‘pre-existing categorical rules’, rules to ‘determine probabilities’ and rules which ‘fragment’ chance and ‘subtract or remove the consequences of the throw from chance’. The rules follow a ‘sedentary distribution’, whereby the results of “dice throws” (a term for the fortuitous multiplicity inherent in the ‘deployment and explication’ of difference (DR 147)) in the game are distributed ‘according to their consequences following a hypothetical necessity’ (DR 369). The problem with the Human Game is that it begins with an expectation or hypothesis that is poised to capture difference and subject it to the requirements of said hypothesis. The dogmatic image of thought applies these rules and thereby restricts the unlimited multiplicity of pure difference. The dogmatic image of thought tries to subsume difference under its conditions for representation. Even when we are presented with
difference, when we are ‘given a situation of chance or multiplicity’, we can only affirm it insofar as we can ‘impose limits upon it’ and ‘ward off its effects’, all to ‘bring about the return of the same, given a winning hypothesis’, which we understand to be representation (DR 147-8). We affirm only what we are willing to affirm. We are only willing to accept what the dogmatic image of thought offers us. The dogmatic image of thought only deals in present moments. Just as Hegel’s root-tree thinking can only consider each moment of the progression of consciousness, the Human Game is only capable of considering what is present to it, hence why, in returning to the same, it re-presents it and re-cognises it. However, Deleuze tells us that the Divine Game is a ‘system of the future.’ (DR 148)

In contrast to the Human Game, the Divine Game has no pre-existing rule, affirms all chance, and regards all of time. The Divine Game does not need rules for an outcome. The conditions of representation do not apply to the Divine Game. For this reason, the Divine Game is played without pre-existing rules and is always successful. Success is guaranteed by the absence of these conditions because there is no hypothesis to contradict. By affirming all chance, the Divine Game ‘wins by embracing all possible combinations and rules in the system of its own return.’ (DR 148) The Divine Game affirms the whole of chance ‘in a necessarily winning throw.’ (DR 148) Deleuze means that difference and repetition are affirmative because they do not have any blockage in the form of a solution, a concept, or an identity. Instead, the ‘game of difference and repetition has replaced that of the Same and representation’. (DR 371) The hypothesis/solution narrative necessitated by the dogmatic image of thought gives way to an image of thought that discovers connection and problematisation. The ocean of differences are interwoven and interconnected through the relations that we draw between them. We make these connections when our thinking becomes rhizomatic or flattened out. We can begin to see and interpret the relations between things as opposed to simply focussing on their singular identities (the product of root thinking). Unlike the Human Game, the Divine Game does not, therefore, require successive present moments. The Divine Game operates outside of jointed or cardinal time. The
pure order of time is what enables this thoroughgoing connectivity and unlimited multiplicity of connections to be possible. However, singular identities cannot subsist without the cardinal order of time that representation requires. Therefore, by virtue of there being no pre-existing rules, no restriction of chance based upon a hypothesis, and no jointed time to organise a singular identity, no identity can exist. The loss of identities is an important element of the Divine Game. Unless identity becomes something capable of being abandoned, there can be no progress in thinking that would deconstruct the dogmatic image of thought. Identities do not endure in the unconscious; Death abjures the self. Death is the moment at which the Human Game gives way to the Divine Game. Death is the unravelling of the identity.

The point at which the image of the self reaches its limit is fatigue and forgetting. When Habit can no longer provide a contracted present and Memory can no longer provide a subject’s past, their energies have been spent. The energy that they have is libidinal, that is to say it is a sexual energy. As the energy is sexual, it is reproductive. The reproductive drive is Eros. Eros draws on the libido and uses the cyclical syntheses of Habit and Memory to reproduce the image of the self. Once the libidinal energy is exhausted, Eros becomes Thanatos. Where Habit can no longer maintain its contraction of the present, the self recedes, and where Memory can no longer synthesise the past, the I is fractured between the time it experiences and the time that exists outside experience, the time ahead of the I (future). The time outside of experience is the pure order of time, the time in which the Divine Game is played. The absence of the self is the loss of identity, which occurs at the beginning of the Divine Game. The lost self and fractured I, both correspond to the pure order of time – both are left empty by fatigue and forgetting respectively, and both are left behind (at least, temporarily) by Death. ‘Beyond memory, the evident paradox of the death instinct lay in the fact that, despite its name, it seemed to us from the outset to be endowed with a double role: to include all the force of the different in repetition, and at the same time to provide the most positive and most excessive account of repetition.’ (DR 377) What does Deleuze mean when he says the death drive is the ‘most positive and most excessive account of repetition’?
Death and Oblivion

Here he is referring to his interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought experiment of the eternal return, which, as Deleuze interprets it, casts out identity and causes only the positive or affirmative to remain. More will be said on the eternal return shortly. Before that, the notion of transcending identity as a key expectation of Deleuze for the stimulus of a new image of thought is worth exploring in more detail. What is the background for this idea of a loss of identity, that is the abandonment of the Human Game, and opening up to the Divine Game and pure difference? Where does the notion of an unravelled self begin to surface and what are its origins?

SUBLIME OBLIVION IN THE DIONYSIAN SPIRIT

In the process of discovering a new image of thought, Deleuze has made it clear that identity is an enemy to the progression of cognitive novelty. While the source of our subjectivity is pure difference, that difference is sifted through ‘successive levels of division’, that is levels of rules and conditions, that leave it modified and, in that modification, cancelled (DR 103, 300). To maintain pure difference in its original state of multiplicity, these prerequisites imposed by the first synthesis of habit must be peeled away, they must be unravelled. Also, the second synthesis of memory requires amnesia to rid it of the imposition of a cyclical reproduction of the image of the self. Both habit and memory (content and agent) need to reach their limit and then transcend it. Their limit is the caesura. The caesura is ‘the point at which the fracture appears’ in the I, it is where the pure order of time enters as the third synthesis or third repetition (DR 116). The caesura is the term Deleuze uses for the border between representation and pure difference. By connecting consciousness and cognition to the unlimited world of the elemental and pure difference, Deleuze presents the means with which we routinely transcend the self-imposed limitation of identity. The opportunity is presented to us for endless novelty of thought, not just recurring images. To think is to go beyond, and so that beyond is made present in Deleuze’s Divine Game, which provides a route to all new rules and products (DR 188). It is not unlike Nietzsche’s Dionysian spirit in this sense. While Apollo provides rules, order, and regulation of the image so that it can be interpreted,
Dionysus is the intoxicated creation and production of musical notes. Representation is formed through the rules imposed on difference, while the elemental itself is only the presentation of immanent and immediate reality; one refines, subdues, and determines, the other produces, without an aim or any limitation. Death also bears a similarity to the Dionysian spirit in the way it excludes the self. The Dionysian spirit is capable of leading to the loss of the self through intoxication – just as Death omits the self. Before continuing to discuss the eternal return and Deleuze’s interpretation of it, we shall look at the Dionysian spirit and how this could be considered a dominant factor in Deleuze’s hope for the origin of novel, creative, and productive thinking.

Before Nietzsche begins talking generally about the Dionysian spirit in his writing, he is already concerned with the importance of ingenuity, novelty, and creativity in his Untimely Meditations. In ‘Of the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’, Nietzsche makes it clear that the future must not allow for a past that is dwelled upon, as taking refuge in the past comes at the cost of our capacity for adaptation. Hence, Nietzsche writes: ‘the unhistorical and the suprahistorical are the natural antidotes to the stifling of life by the historical, by the malady of history.’ The unhistorical is the ‘art and power of forgetting’ while the suprahistorical is the capacity to steer clear of stability and eternity. What he appeals to is the youthful need for something meaningful and essential to them to best define them, to find within themselves ‘the existence within … of an active power that fights, excludes and divides and of an ever more intense feeling of life.’ Nietzsche’s interest in this vital force or élan vital is also found in The Birth of Tragedy, where we are introduced to the concept of the Dionysian spirit.

In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche’s Dionysus is characterised by intoxication, ‘either under the influence of the narcotic drink of which all original men and peoples sing in hymns, or in the approach of spring which forcefully and pleasurably courses through the whole of nature, those Dionysian impulses awaken, which in their heightened forms cause the subjective to dwindle to
complete self-oblivion [...] intoxicated reality, which again pays no heed to the individual, and even seeks to annihilate the individual and to redeem him through a mystical feeling of unity.\textsuperscript{6}\footnote{Losing oneself in this rapturous or euphoric embrace of life is like losing oneself in the sublime.\textsuperscript{7}} Interestingly, the idea of the Dionysian spirit – as the feverish and impulsive, the untethered and unconstrained – relates closely to the descriptions of the unlimited creativity and novelty of chaotic pure difference. Regarding the expulsion of selfhood and image, the Dionysian appears to signify the same instance of suspension, denial, or rejection of the self that Deleuze characterises as part of Death. However, Nietzsche reimagines the character of the Dionysian when writing \textit{Dawn}.

The work Nietzsche writes on the Dionysian usually includes references to drunkenness and intoxication. While this intoxication is likely intended to be one’s loss of oneself in the sublime, he believes the mention of intoxication is injurious to the purpose of the Dionysian spirit. Nietzsche appears concerned that the term intoxication may become synonymous with anaesthetisation. The reason this would be problematic for Nietzsche is that the Dionysian is not intended to be an escape from the harsh realities of life. Rather, the Dionysian spirit is the embrace of life in its most pure and unrestricted form. Anaesthetisation is the negation of sorrow. The Dionysian is the affirmation of everything – including suffering. Nietzsche appears to suggest that self-medication through intoxication is one way pessimism managed to gain a foothold in Europe: “The Middle Ages meant the alcohol poisoning of Europe.”\textsuperscript{8} In \textit{Dawn} §50, Nietzsche writes that those who seek out intoxication are ‘insatiable sowers of the weeds of […] disdain for this world and this time, and especially of world-weariness’ and declares that ‘people who live for sublime and enraptured moments are usually wretched and disconsolate’.\textsuperscript{9} He considers intoxication to be indicative of a desire to escape from reality, a means through which one can keep from suffering from the outside world. This escapism is world-denying – it is the belief that the world is an insufferable place to live, and intoxication is an attempt to get away from the pain of living, to discover a route to self-annihilation as a solution to suffering. Nietzsche condemns this as the wretched pursuit of Schopenhauer and other pessimists, and the antithesis of the Dionysian
spirit.\(^{10}\) The shift in the characterisation of the Dionysian in Nietzsche’s writing goes from an sublime and obliterating intoxication to losing oneself in enveloping vitality and recapturing oneself as renewed upon returning. Much of the rhetoric sounds like the abandonment and unravelling of the self in the Divine Game from Deleuze’s own work. If the Dionysian is in the interest of affirming life and pure difference is affirmation, then the similarities grow even stronger. The difference is in the aims of their means for affirmation. Pure difference challenges representation and the dogmatic image of thought. Dionysus develops into the counterpart of Pauline Christianity, arguing for the relevance and importance of worldly experiences. Nietzsche considers it necessary to destroy the nay-saying values of Pauline Christianity, as “Paul’s intoxication” hinders Nietzsche’s goal of self-cultivation through experimentation with values.\(^{11}\) To develop new values, beyond good and evil, we must first ‘be a destroyer and break values’ and only then will we ‘at last seek new springs of the future and new origins.’\(^{12}\) According to Nietzsche, Christian morality teaches one to forego any attachment to a self in the hopes of freeing oneself from the world and, therefore, freeing oneself from suffering.

What is incontrovertible is that it has been taught only décadence values as the highest values. The morality of unselfing oneself is the morality of decline par excellence, the fact that ‘I am destroyed’ – and not only into the imperative!... The sole morality that has hitherto been taught, the morality of unselfing oneself, betrays a will to the end; at the most fundamental level it denies life.\(^{13}\)

‘Dionysus against the crucified one...’ is how Nietzsche summarises his intention for the idea of Dionysian spirit, namely that Christian morality has been a catastrophe and the Dionysian spirit is the only thing that can destroy these harmful, world-denying Christian moral values.\(^{14}\) The notion of obliterating or annihilating the self is deemed a harmful and decadent notion, promoting the diminishing of one’s own self-importance. Humbling oneself before the Immortal Christ steals away one’s importance, relevance, and significance. Abasement such as this leaves the believer divested of all power and joy. Nietzsche is interested in the development of oneself, and a good portion of his work is an attempt to overcome the shadow of world-denial inherent in Christian
morality. Christianity denies the productivity and creativity offered up by the Dionysian spirit. It is therefore harmful to the progression of the individual in their pursuit to fulfil their own potential to be the best version of themselves, to ‘become the person you are.’

Therefore, there is a link in Nietzsche’s work between self-cultivation and creative production.

Deleuze characterises the distinction between the Christian longing for an end to an insufferable, worldly life and the Dionysian affirmation of suffering in the following way:

“Those who suffer from the superabundance of life” make suffering an affirmation in the same way as they make intoxication an activity; in the laceration of Dionysus they recognise the extreme form of affirmation, with no possibility of subtraction, exception or choice. “Those who suffer, on the contrary, from an impoverishment of life” make intoxication a convulsion, a numbness; they make suffering a means of accusing life, of contradicting it and also a means of justifying life, of resolving the contradiction. (NP 16)

The two responses presented here are of either the affirmation of suffering or its avoidance. The Dionysian affirms suffering, Deleuze says, because it does not offer up choices, options, contradictions, or any opportunity for resolution of what simply is. Christianity, on the other hand, does offer this reparation of suffering by providing a means through which the contradiction, namely that life is suffering and unjust and yet justice must be available through life, can be resolved through the martyrdom of Christ. ‘Even when Christianity sings the praise of love and life what curses there are in these songs, what hatred beneath this love!’ (NP 15) Echoes of the Divine Game can be heard in this proclamation about the Dionysian. The freedom from subtraction, exception, and choice is one afforded to the unconscious, what we might refer to as the “unselfed” self or the plebeian. Without any subtraction, exception, or choice there is no possibility for the negative. In the Divine Game, everything is affirmed because nothing is denied, rejected, or divided. Dionysian intoxication results in only affirmation. For Deleuze, intoxication is active – ‘they make intoxication an activity’ – and not the search for a passive numbness. Through
intoxication, we have two routes to self-omission or self-oblivion: active and reactive. The active route to self-oblivion is through assuming a Dionysian spirit. In so doing, one affirms all of life which allows for a great deal of productivity to flow freely and promotes transvaluation of values. The reactive pursuit of self-oblivion, however, is a means of escaping the incongruence between life’s importance and the experience of suffering. Deleuze makes this distinction because there needs to be a means through which the self can be intoxicated without the motivation being one of world-denial through escapism, anaesthetisation, or self-destruction. How does the process of self-oblivion take place as something active? How does Deleuze demonstrate Nietzsche’s intention for the loss of self in a way that is not reminiscent of or equal to that of the Christians and pessimists? In other words, how do we die to ourselves in a way that is not merely escapism, but a means to affirming life? The answer may be found in a thought experiment Nietzsche describes as “Das Größte Schwergewicht” (The Greatest Heavyweight).

THE TORTUOUS UNWINDING OF THE ETERNAL RETURN

“The Greatest Heavyweight” is the title of Gay Science §341 and is one iteration of Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal return. The eternal return is intended to be a difficult idea for the reader to wrestle with. However, if one could find it in oneself to affirm the idea of the eternal return, then one will have been able to affirm all of life. The notion of an all-affirming principle is what is of interest to Deleuze. For this reason, the eternal return features frequently in Deleuze’s work. The eternal return also provides a good deal of background for the development of Deleuze’s ideas of repetition to excess and pure difference as means for the active affirmation of life and the capacity for transcending one’s identity, that is to say the unravelling and ensuing abandonment of identity by self-obliviating. The idea of the eternal return warrants describing and explaining before elaborating on Deleuze’s interpretation of it. Once Deleuze’s interpretation of the eternal return is made explicit, it will be much clearer as to how Deleuze expects affirmation to be active in the absence of any active self.
The eternal return has three common interpretations: as a cosmology, as an ethical imperative, and as a thought experiment. The cosmological and ethical interpretations are not as relevant to our discussion as the eternal return qua experiment. However, each of the former is worth explaining in brief as it is easier to understand the basic premise of the eternal return and the uniqueness of each interpretation once they are treated discretely.

The eternal return is arguably portrayed clearest as a cosmology in *The Will to Power*. The basic idea is that the cosmos must have a finite number of possible combinations which eternally recur. Nietzsche believes this must be the case because the cosmos is a ‘certain definite quantity of force’ and must therefore ‘pass through a calculable number of combinations.’ As the cosmos has not reached some equilibrium or final state of completion, it must be considered, according to Nietzsche, that the same events must be infinitely repeating. ‘In infinite time, every possible combination would at some time or another be realised; more: it would be realised an infinite number of times.’ The cosmological rendition of the eternal return is one in which the cosmos is finite yet eternal, and is therefore restricted to a finite number of combinations which are destined to recur endlessly throughout eternity. The intention behind this description is to cause anxiety, but also assurance – at least it is reassuring to those who accept it – as it means that one has to find a way of affirming life in all its imperfections, for this life will return when ‘the sea will cast it up again.’ Far from being a merely mechanistic idea, the eternal return has ethical implications: what ought we to do with the knowledge that this world eternally returns?

The cosmological idea of a finite number of combinations in this cosmos leads to the conclusion, for Nietzsche, that the world will eternally return to this present state an infinite number of times. The cycle poses a striking and difficult question to the one who considers it: how will you respond to the proposition that your entire life as you have lived it thus far will happen again and innumerable times more, completely the same, with not a single joy or pain altered, removed, exceeded, or lessened? One who believes this to be the case can either cower from the
consequences or embrace them. In this presentation of the eternal return, one’s actions would from then onwards be prefaced by this question: ‘Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?’ Nietzsche believed that such a demand would be difficult to respond to, but that an affirmative response would seal one’s actions with eternal approval. The eternal return develops into an adaptation of Kant’s categorical imperative.

Kant proposed a universal ethic that ought to be considered by all people. Kant surmised that one ought to: ‘Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.’ Kant’s categorical imperative asks that one considers if one’s actions were to be permissible or advisable if it was an action that anyone could and should take. A simple example is that it would not be appropriate for suicide to be made a universal law. The reason is because self-love is what leads to the desire to commit suicide. One wants to die because one loves oneself too much to allow for the continued suffering of a life that one can no longer endure or that has nothing left to offer one. However, self-love and self-destruction are contradictory. Kant concludes that this makes the act of suicide impossible as a system of nature, which holds no contradictions, and cannot therefore be made a universal law. As such, suicide, not being universally applicable as a consistent law, is opposed to one’s duty to only act according to universal laws.

Nietzsche’s idea of the eternal return seems to be of a similar vein to Kant’s categorical imperative. However, whereas Kant believes his imperative ought to be adopted by all people, Nietzsche does not prescribe his idea for everyone to uphold. Nietzsche’s eternal return is not something everyone can accept, and so he considers it something which will only be taken up by the courageous and experimental. Thus, we have the third and most relevant interpretation of the eternal return, that it is a thought experiment.

The eternal return makes a demand of whoever thinks on it. One must respond and can do so, according to Nietzsche, in one of two ways. One can break down in fear of it and refuse to
affirm one’s life or one can be joyous at the opportunity to live their life as it is innumerable times. Nietzsche poses this question through the eternal return in response to pessimism. Pessimism promotes world-denial, according to Nietzsche. The notion of world-denial is encapsulated in Schopenhauer’s work. Schopenhauer promotes the denial of the Will to Live. The Will to Live is a force that compels us to continually desire happiness and yet never find fulfilment and therefore leaves us suffering with the feeling of want. To end the suffering brought on by the will to live one must deny the will to live and eradicate desires. Nietzsche sees this pessimistic worldview as one which is highly restrictive and promotes self-loathing, a hatred of life, and the development of ressentiment or resentment. Ressentiment is ‘a purely reactive mode of feeling which simply negates the active and spontaneous affirmation of values on the part of nobility.’26 “The whole pose of “man against the world,” of man as a “world-negating” principle, of man as the measure of the value of things, as judge of the world who in the end places existence itself upon his scales and finds it wanting – the monstrous insipidity of this pose has finally come home to us and we are sick of it.”27 Nietzsche wants to bring an end to the discontent sowed by the pessimists of his age and those who are more ancient (especially Christians and Buddhists) and find a means to affirming life and the world. The question remains as to how the eternal return works to oppose pessimism and world-denial in general?

The eternal return challenges us to discover how to affirm our life in full and in a way particular to each of us. Nietzsche believes most people exposed to the eternal return will find it horrifying only because there is likely a great deal of ressentiment that one carries with them. Due to this ressentiment, one may wish for some events in life (those which inspire ressentiment and their effects) to never recur. One who feels this way about their life would, Nietzsche says, throw oneself down, gnash their teeth and curse whomever posed the question of the eternal return.28 The challenge for individuals such as these is that they have a negative outlook on their life and will want resist its repetition, as they are unable to affirm their life in its entirety. In posing this question, Nietzsche’s intention is for the reader to wrestle with this heavyweight subject until one can
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(indeed, if one can) learn to affirm one’s entire life. For Nietzsche, this comes in the form of being able to declare that the life one lived, is living, and will go on to live, is the life that they wanted to live, the life they willed for themselves.

One who wishes to repair one’s past will struggle with the promise of the eternal return. What Nietzsche is hoping for is that those who struggle will discover within themselves the means to not only reconcile them with their past and where it has led them, but even declare that they would not have it any other way and, were they to live it again, they would not change a thing. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* there is a helpful exposition of this sentiment on the part of Nietzsche, when he writes:

“To redeem the past and to transform every ‘It was’ into an ‘I wanted it thus!’ – that alone do I call redemption! [...] ‘It was’: that is what the will’s teeth-gnashing and most lonely affliction is called. Powerless against that which has been done, the will is an angry spectator of all things past. [...] All ‘It was’ is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful chance – until the creative will says to it: ‘But I willed it thus!’

Until the creative will says to it: ‘But I will it thus! Thus shall I will it!”

The eternal return has the power to teach us to will backwards by presenting us with our past as a future possibility. This is made possible by the eternal return contracting all of time into the single moment. This means, from the standpoint of the single moment, the eternity that stretches ahead of oneself is no less than the eternity that stretches out behind oneself. In that scenario, where the finite combinations will infinitely recur, the same moment has been lived countless times already and the past as much as the future is ahead of oneself, prepared to be relived countless times again. In this sense, all of time is contained in every moment, due to future and past being one and the same in the eternal return. Zarathustra’s interaction with the Spirit of Gravity portrays the eternal return in this way, with Zarathustra confronting the Spirit of Gravity under the gateway entitled “Moment”.

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“Behold this moment!” I went on. ‘From this gateway Moment a long, eternal lane runs back: an eternity lies behind us.

‘Must not all things that can run have already run along this lane? Must not all things that can happen have already happened, been done, run past? […] ‘— and must we not return and run down that other lane out before us, down that long, terrible lane – must we not return eternally?’

We have a picture developing now of an eternal return that challenges pessimism by forcing us to confront the possibility that in every moment we must relive everything that we resent. Therefore, it is clamant to find a means of not living in a cycle of perpetual vengeance and resentment. Rather, one should find a way to affirm life and learn to love what has passed and what will come to pass. World-denial leads to the continuation of the suffering of existence as a plight that we are opposed to and need to escape. Nietzsche warns those who are world-deniers and nay-sayers that they cannot escape their reality, and their only hope at redeeming this life is by affirming it and willing it.

In the eternal return, Nietzsche challenges pessimism, which he believes is damaging the outlooks of modern Europeans. To encourage his readers to be more affirmative, to imbue them with more of a Dionysian spirit, Nietzsche declares that the will is creative enough to allow them to affirm all that has been and will be. Not only that, but the eternal return threatens them with a horrifying prospect if they refuse to try and find a way to affirm life. The eternal return should evoke an urgency to undertake the difficult task of affirming one’s life, which has thus far been suppressed by resentment and a spirit of revenge. The courage to undertake this process of affirmation and to confront the eternal return is not understated by Nietzsche, who writes: ‘Courage, however, is the best destroyer, courage that attacks: it destroys even death, for it says: ‘Was that life? Well then! Once more!”

Nietzsche’s eternal return encourages us to learn a way that one might be emboldened against the temptation to harbour regret, revenge, and resentment. We are urged to find a way to
affirm life and thereby affirm every instance of life. The ambitious goal is founded on the notion that we have a creative will, one that can will backwards. When this will is emancipated from reactivity – our reactive *ressentiment* having been cast out by the eternal return – one is left with only affirmation and active forces. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and elsewhere, Nietzsche’s challenging thought experiment is interpreted and developed upon by Deleuze.

**REPETITION BY EXCESS: DELEUZE ON THE ETERNAL RETURN**

When faced with the eternal return (when considered as a thought experiment), one ought to find a response which proffers the most affirmative action. In other words, the thought experiment should make you want to affirm what you have done, what you are doing, and what you are going to do – one should learn to affirm one’s life. In so doing, one avoids ever being struck with horror at the suggestion of reliving one’s life countless times. In other words, life will no longer seem a horrible affliction, but will be a joyous experience. This conception of the eternal return as a thought experiment seems to be the most relevant to Deleuze’s own aims for his philosophy of difference. The question is, what makes the eternal return relevant to Deleuze’s work at all? How does Deleuze characterise the eternal return to serve his philosophy of difference? Also, how does the eternal return relate back to the relation, in Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, between the Dionysian and Death?

Deleuze interprets the eternal return in relation to active and reactive forces. In a modification of Spinoza’s internalised bodily ratios of motion and rest, Deleuze introduces the notion of a relationship of different forces within a body (a body in the Spinozist sense). A body is a part of the quantity of force which already exists and which comprises reality. ‘There are nothing but quantities of force in mutual “relations of tension”.’ (NP 40) Some forces making a body are dominant, exerting their superior power over other forces, while some forces are
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dominated, that is to say they are under the dominion of those forces that are superior. The
dominant forces are known as active, while the dominated forces are called reactive (NP 40). Every
body is constituted by this hierarchy of forces: active and reactive. Reactive forces have definite
ends, they exist to provide some conclusion required by the body they compose. Meanwhile, active
forces are what make the body a self. What is important to note, however, is that this active self
is not a conscious self.

Deleuze considers the ego to be a reaction to the active forces at work in a body. It is a
way to adapt that active force in such a way as will allow consciousness to understand what is
affecting it. This means that active forces – which avoid reactivity – cannot be a part of
consciousness, given the reactive forces at work in it. ‘What makes the body superior to all
reactions, particularly that reaction of the ego that is called consciousness, is the activity of
necessarily unconscious forces […] The only true science is that of activity, but the science of
activity is also the science of what is necessarily unconscious.’ (NP 41-42) The signification of
Death and the third repetition are therefore already present in this idea of the interplay of forces
within a body, of which the active forces constitute an unconscious self. As the unconscious is
constituted by active forces, the appeal of the eternal return relates to the possibility of distancing
from the ego and discarding reactivity. Creating such a distance would allow for greater dominance
of active forces and the affirmation they bring.

Thinking back to the beginning of this chapter, the discussion of the Divine Game
mentioned how all of chance was affirmed in the Divine Game, compared to the Human Game,
which can only affirm some chance due to the limitations it imposes on itself. We necessarily
impose limits by repeating an image, and this in turn is what is defined as reactive or, in Freudian
terms, repressive. The repetition of an image that is undesirable is suppressed by a reactive force.
Recall the discussion earlier about the self-censorship of suffering and world-denial. ‘We do not
repeat because we repress, we repress because we repeat.’ (DR 135) In the repetition by excess,
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that is the eternal return, all of chance is affirmed, so there can be no repression or reactivity which limits chance, only the superior, active forces. The eternal return is therefore a means to understanding how affirmation resides in the unconscious. In the Divine Game, we ‘affirm the relation of all forces’ and so ‘we affirm all of chance all at once’, which takes place in ‘the thought of the eternal return.’ (NP 44) Deleuze even goes so far as to say that those encounters of chance are the ‘limbs of Dionysus’, suggesting that this relation of forces is already known to us as Dionysian creativity (NP 44). This creativity requires something which seems inconsistent with the eternal return: difference. How does Deleuze understand the creative power of the all-affirming Divine Game of the eternal return if he considers it amenable to a philosophy of difference? How can novelty exist through the eternal return of the same?

Deleuze believes that one misunderstands the eternal return if one interprets it as the eternal return of the same (NP 48). The eternal return can only be understood as the eternal return of the same if one looks at it mechanistically. If one applies the cosmological mechanics to the eternal return, then of course it is conceivable that this life will return and be lived once more. However, Deleuze believes this is not Nietzsche’s intention for the eternal return. Indeed, he reads Nietzsche as refuting this interpretation in The Will to Power §634, where Nietzsche warns his reader that a mechanistic theory is ‘a theory of motion’ that is ‘already a translation into the sense language of man’, that is to say one takes what is limitless and a chance encounter and restricts it through one’s obedience to necessity and law (reactivity). Just as Deleuze’s Divine Game is drawn upon by the pale comparison that is the Human Game, the limitlessness of the eternal return is bridled if it is thought in terms of the eternal return of the same. For this reason, Deleuze is not concerned with the lack of identity that he believes is not important to the eternal return. ‘In other words, identity in the eternal return does not describe the nature of that which returns but, on the contrary, the fact of returning for that which differs.’ (NP 48) Identity only provides an expression of differences caused by returning, it is not what returning is dependent upon. Deleuze sees the eternal return as a synthesis, the third synthesis of time, in which ‘time and its dimensions’ and
‘diversity and its reproduction’ are synthesised in a ‘double affirmation’ which does not depend on
the ‘principle of identity’ (NP 48-49). We see the third synthesis in *Difference and Repetition*, where
the eternal return is the synthesis of the pure order of time, that is time that does not require the
movement of successive moments, rather it contains the entirety of time.

The eternal return provides Deleuze with a connection between the pure order of time and
affirmation. The eternal return supports the notion of the formless pure difference, where identity
is not only unnecessary, but also unsustainable. The only identity sustainable in the eternal return
is returning itself, but even this identity is a ‘secondary power’ as what is superior is the ‘identity
of difference’ on which the returning of the “same” is based. In other words, no identity subsists
because the only identity maintainable is the difference that returns and the returning of the
difference – ‘conceiving the same on the basis of the different.’ (DR 52) Therefore, the only
“thing” that can return is whatever is determined by difference. This means that nothing that is
the same can return, what returns is only difference and thus only the production of the continually
new. ‘Only the extreme forms return – those which […] extend to the limit of their power,
transforming themselves and changing one into another.’ (DR 53) Difference always returns, is
always metamorphosing, and is always novel. Deleuze talks briefly and clearly about the eternal
recurrence and the individual in *Difference and Repetition*:

Eternal return alone effects the true selection, because it eliminates the average forms and uncovers
“the superior form of everything that is”. […] Eternal return “makes” the difference because it
creates the superior form. […] If eternal return is a wheel, then it must be endowed with a violent
centrifugal movement which expels everything which “can” be denied, everything which cannot
pass the test. (DR 69)

When Deleuze writes about the superior form he is referring to what we identified as active forces
in his *Nietzsche and Philosophy* text. Through a ‘violent centrifugal force’, the eternal return removes
the restrictions and limitations placed on pure difference by the ego and its consciousness. This
occurs, of course, because the reactive forces of the ego and its Human Game cannot enter nor perceive the unconscious. In the unconscious resides active forces and the unconscious self, away from the reactive forces of representation, identity, ego, and consciousness. The superior form is therefore the self that is the unconscious and active, the Dionysian, which affirms all chance and is therefore difference itself — ‘affirmation is itself difference.’ However, the issue of interpreting the eternal return as the production of the new and different still needs addressing. How is it possible that the eternal return is always the return of something new and not the eternal return of the same? Does Nietzsche not make it clear that it is, indeed, the eternal return of the same, the identical?

‘This life as you now live it and have lived it,’ declares the demon, ‘you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it [...] your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence’, and so, having presented the challenge of the eternal return, it would appear that the heaviness attributed to it is based on the understanding that nothing changes, nothing alters, nothing is new, rather everything returns precisely as it was. The difficulty in this, as has been spoken of, resides in the dislike of life as it has been and the effort to change one’s perception of life and the events in it so that one can affirm it entirely. Should the demon sit beside us and tell us that this life will be lived repeatedly but that each time it will be different, transformed, and altogether new, then any affirmation of this version of the eternal return would surely be a joy at not having to live the same life and therefore be joy at leaving this life? Surely this caveat of life being different in every occurrence would show regret, vengefulness, and resentment towards the life being currently lived – no? For Deleuze, this is not only the case, but rightly so. The eternal return of the same does not concern identity and ego. Therefore, the opportunity for change and metamorphosis that allows for active forces to serve our unconscious self is what ought to be pursued. Were this not the case, as has been believed in the past, then the dogmatic image of thought cannot be made anew because the ego that learns it and perpetuates it cannot be let go. Without losing ourselves to the unconscious and allowing for
the thought of the eternal return to cast out the content and agency that informs and engenders our identity, we cannot begin to experiment with novel concepts, innovative ideas, and even new identities. We cannot discover who we are, be what we are, if we cannot also allow ourselves to change the narrative of who we have been – this change (or metamorphosis) is facilitated by the eternal return. As Deleuze writes in *Difference and Repetition*:

> Eternal return affects only the new, what is produced under the condition of default and by the intermediary of metamorphosis. However, it causes neither the *condition* nor the *agent* to return: on the contrary, it repudiates these and expels them with all its centrifugal force. [...] As Klossowski says, it is the secret coherence which establishes itself only by excluding my own coherence, my own identity, the identity of the self, the world and God. (DR 117-8)

Deleuze’s interpretation of the eternal recurrence relies on viewing one’s life *sub specie aeternitas*. One must waylay identity to allow for the novel and different and to usher in transformation and metamorphosis. Identity is put aside in this synthesis due to the formlessness of the eternal return, which makes it impossible to reconcile the form of identity with the ground out of which it originates. The formless unconscious cannot accommodate the form of consciousness. Deleuze uses the eternal return in this way to demonstrate how a new image of thought requires the suspension of the syntheses that generate the role and restrictions involved in identity. In demonstrating this, Deleuze shows how there is an opportunity for a route into breaking down the dogmatic image of thought and promoting the limitlessness that is the ground of our transcendental faculties. In proposing that we plumb the depths of these limitations and surpass them, Deleuze hopes that new ways of thinking, new lines of flight, may present themselves in the process of adjusting to these new limits. To develop new images of thought requires the violence of the eternal return and its denial of identity.

> The thought of the eternal return ought to be difficult to wrestle with and require a great deal of courage. Courage is needed to affirm those events in life which seem impossible to accept.
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Not only that, but to affirm them such that one would be joyous at the thought of reliving them countless times. The eternal return, however, left questions as to how it would work and who it would work for. How do we understand eternity? Mechanistically? Dynamically? Circular or straight? Who undergoes the eternal return? The individual or their underlying, unconscious self? For Deleuze, the eternal return is the straight path on which Zarathustra converses with the Spirit of Gravity. The eternal return only allows for the self that stands behind feelings and thoughts, the unconscious self. The eternal return casts out identity and ego, allowing the free reign of the creative Dionysian spirit. The eternal return is repetition by excess, which demands an outpouring of difference for each repetition to be distinct. Lastly, the eternal return is brought about at the point of Death. Death is the severing of a life, “my” life, and the return to life itself, that is elemental and immanent life. Death is the point at which the Human Game meets the Divine Game, where the limited and rules laden world of the ego meets with limitless and untethered chaos. Growth and development are only possible at the point at which identity is thrown from the game. In its essence, Deleuze presents Death as comprising a kenotic ethic, that is to say his means for the initiation of thinking relies on the emptying of the self.

DELEUZE AND THE KENOTIC ETHIC

Kenosis is not a term exclusive to Christians. However, the verb κενόω (to empty) is used in Christian scripture to describe the emptying of the self that is performed by Christ. In his letter to the Philippians, St Paul wrote that ‘though he was God’, Christ emptied himself of his ‘divine privileges’ and adopted a humbler position (Phil. 2:7, NLT). For many, the self-emptying subject became an ethic to live by, promoting humility and servility among believers, like that taken on by Christ when divested of his selfhood. The kenotic ethic is based on this concept of kenosis (κένωσις). Kenosis is a goal common to many Christians: the emptying out of all subjective will and to allow for the will of God to enter into oneself. Kenosis is an act of obedience to God,
humbling oneself before Him. Meister Eckhart is a proponent of kenosis and his writing on the subject is fascinating, challenging, and useful in this discussion.

Eckhart’s understanding of kenosis is: the means by which one is completely divested of all individuality and independence so that all that remains is God. When considering the way to pray, for example, Eckhart proposes the following attitude be adopted by the adherents of Christ: ‘When I pray for aught, my prayer goes for naught; when I pray for naught, I pray as I ought.’ What Eckhart means by this is when saying a prayer which is directed towards something (a prayer for a person or an event) a distance is established, ‘it is to set up something beside God.’ What a follower of Christ should do is pray to God alone and, in so doing, pray for all things as all things are in God. ‘When I am united with That wherein all things are existent whether past, present or future, they are all equally near and equally one; they are all in God and all in me.’ One must be obliviated, once that occurs there is no longer any distance between one and the entirety of existence. It is not only that one has God reside within them, but that one fully becomes part of God. In his study on kenosis and immanence, Dubilet does great work delineating Eckhart’s position on the matter. Dubilet writes:

A dual movement constitutes the general outline of this ethics: Undergo kenosis – empty yourself, become nothing, be dispossessed, annihilate yourself, become detached and released, want nothing, know nothing, possess nothing – but at the same time, in that very gesture, live immanently, live without asking why, live out of what is common, anonymous, impersonal […] to live without a self, to live as nothing, is also to live without the other in relation to which that self is constituted, but rather to live out of the dispossessed namelessness of life itself.

Without the reliance on any scaffold on which to construct and maintain the self, one lives an immanent life absent of identity. All the structures of identity are removed in self-annihilation, including relations to all other things. Consider the desexualisation of Eros covered in Chapter One, whereby the Other-structure is dissolved and all that remains is the immanent reality which
has no more depth to it, only what immediately appears to us from the surface, the simulacra. Losing oneself is necessary for one to begin living in the immanence of life. As Dubilet writes, ‘[human life] is not simply annihilated, but rather in that annihilation it lives as annihilated, and therefore univocally and immanently.’\(^{40}\) The route to immanence is through the annihilation of one’s life to allow for a life. Stripping oneself of the distinction between self and other, human, and divine. Does Deleuze really have a kenotic ethic? Would the use of the kenotic ethic be problematic for him? And is an annihilated self a truly dead self?

In Meister Eckhart’s work, some may argue that the line between transcendence and immanence is not so distinct as it is for Deleuze. Indeed, Dubilet’s entire book is arguing this point, that the two – transcendence and immanence or theology and philosophy – need not be exclusive. However, for Deleuze, there are no uncertain terms when it comes to the hinderance on thought caused by transcendence, as transcendence is grounded in image and representation. Deleuze is adamant, therefore, that God is dead in the unconscious. ‘Nietzsche seems to have been the first to see that the death of God becomes effective only with the dissolution of the Self.’ (DR 73) Once the self is dissolved in the oblivion of the unconscious, when it is lost in Death, the recourse to representation (to the image of the I) is no longer present nor is it able to fetter the creativity and novelty of pure difference.

God survives as long as the I enjoys a subsistence, a simplicity and an identity which express the entirety of its resemblance to the divine. Conversely, the death of God does not leave the identity of the I intact, but installs and interiorises within it an essential dissimilarity, a “demarcation” in place of the mark or the seal of God. (DR 113)

Deleuze cannot be said to adopt a kenotic ethic, because he does not consider there to be a concordance between transcendence and immanence. Transcendence does not influence immanence, nor does immanence make any alteration to transcendence – the two are at odds with one another. While immanence offers us limitlessness and transformation, transcendence is
dogmatic and produces regular mystifications, representations, identities, and illusions that hinder our ability to think. The need to move away from thinking in terms of transcendence, through representation, is the purpose of Deleuze’s critique: he wants to create this new way of thinking by critiquing our current, dogmatic image of thought. To do this, to move from transcendence, he needs must move to a more immanent way of thinking. He achieves this by taking thinking immanence to the extreme of eradicating transcendence altogether.

Deleuze’s extirpation of the need for transcendence in his philosophy of difference makes the notion of a Deleuzian kenotic ethic incongruent with his intention. Kenosis is the removal of oneself to allow God to enter life fully, so one may live a holy and righteous life. Annihilation of the self is for the purpose of living correctly or righteously, humbling oneself before the eternal oneness of God, and thereby becoming one and the same with God. While it may appear as though this is what Deleuze is proposing – the intoxicating oblivion of the self to allow for pure difference to be poured into thought – the assertion that this amounts to a kenotic ethic turns pure difference into an identity, a divinity, and does not allow for the freedom from representation. What Deleuze is attempting to do with pure difference is avoid its categorisation as One and present a multiplicity of difference that is not distinguishable or identifiable, as anything at all – it simply is and encompasses all that there is.

Badiou is not convinced by this assertion on the part of Deleuze and considers his notion of pure difference a failure to ‘liberate the multiple’ and goes on to say that Deleuze’s configuration of the multiple submits ‘thinking to a renewed concept of the One’. The reason Badiou believes Deleuze fails to reconfigure multiplicity and difference to provide a “liberation”, is that his expression of the “clamour of being” describes ‘a single and same Ocean for all the drops’. From this expression, Badiou argues that Deleuze has simply subsumed multiplicity under a collective identity: a singular One. However, this assessment on the part of Badiou seems to underestimate Deleuze’s commitment to Spinozist monism.
Pure difference is the source of its own differentiation (DR 37). Pure difference is not bound by any necessity to obtain its difference through its differentiation from another thing. Pure difference is indeterminate in this sense; pure difference does not require something else to present the difference between two things through their determination from one another. This is not to say that pure difference, or difference in itself, is a singular difference that is applied in the relationship of two already distinct things. What this would suggest is that the determination of these things is independent of the difference between them, and that difference is applied between the two. Determination presupposes difference, and so difference exists not as merely difference in general, but also difference that allows for distinct identities to form between things and within the things themselves. In other words, pure difference is what makes something what it is as well as establishing what it is not. Pure difference provides a single path to determination, prior to any differentiation.

There are not two “paths”, as Parmenides’ poem suggests, but a single “voice” of Being which includes all its modes, including the most diverse, the most varied, the most differenciated. Being is said in a single and same sense of everything of which it is said, but that of which it is said differs: it is said of difference itself. (DR 46)

The singular path contains all differences within it. Although it is not intended to be a monistic difference – pure difference is comprised of all differences, in an infinite and inexhaustive multiplicity, that provides the signs that the mind can interpret for its process of determination. Difference contains all the differences that are and are not yet. Pure difference is being and non-being, providing a question, a problem, which is interpreted in the conscious mind so that it might respond with an image, a representation, an identity, a determination. ‘Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the being of the negative; rather, it is the being of the problematic, the being of problem and question.’ (DR 80) Deleuze insists that the negative is ‘the illusion projected by the problem’ or ‘the shadow of a question’ and so he does not see any reason to consider it as a significant or operating principle in his philosophical system; the negative is relegated to the work
of the mind in the genesis of representation – it is a tool to sculpt identities (already differentiated) and nothing more.

The work of Deleuze is inherently Spinozist, insisting that for the single “substance” of pure difference there are a multiplicity of “attributes” or differences. If pure difference was what constituted the real and was therefore considered pantheistic (much in the same way as Spinoza appears to be pantheistic in *Ethics* I:16), then there would certainly be a case for Badiou’s challenge to Deleuze’s liberation of multiplicity. However, Badiou’s interpretation does not seem to take into account the attempt Deleuze is making at what Faber calls “transpantheism”.

Deleuze uses a concept of difference which does not rely on the comparison of concepts. In the process of developing upon this concept of difference and the repetition that is its companion, Deleuze discovers a means for a new image of thought to be brought forward. The new image of thought relies on the suspension of identity. Deleuze must find a way for the reader to go beyond identity, including their own self, and does this through exploring the unconscious. The unconscious is an elemental state wherein difference has free reign. However, Deleuze must also make it clear that this difference is not a *thing*. The multiplicity of difference is not identifiable. Only once difference becomes conceptualised and made a representation are they known as something. At this point, however, they have lost their nature as a true multiplicity and pure difference.

Faber recognises that there is a need and an attempt on the part of Deleuze to avoid a “divine identity” being attributed to difference. This is not intended to be a theistic divinity – Deleuze is not in danger of making difference transcendent – but it is divinity in terms of the identity of a Whole, One, or God, much like that which Badiou accuses Deleuze of providing us with. The “Divine Game” of the pure Idea of multiplicity insists in/on/as multiplicity before its “identification” as “multiplicity.”42 Deleuze is attempting to present multiplicity prior to its being identified as multiplicity. Badiou may not be aware of this, hence his criticism. Difference as a
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multiplicity that has its origins prior to its identification as difference or multiplicity ‘is a creative process of *un-naming* the divine.’\(^{43}\) The only possible way of having this “un-naming” is through the death of God in the thought of the eternal return. Only then can the last transcendent “name” or identity be removed, and the unconscious Self truly be free to the immanent chaos of difference. Deleuze is not pantheist, therefore, as he does not ascribe an overarching singularity or an identity to the multiplicity of difference – indeed he cannot do this because the multiplicity of the Divine Game precedes specificity and determination. Instead, Deleuze commits to transpantheism. Transpanthesim avoids “*identifying* the divine by association with “immanence,” “creativity” or any “*All-One,”* that is, a pantheistic “identification,” without falling back into theistic “identifications.”\(^{44}\) By presenting only the pure multiplicity of becoming, the creativity of pure difference, Deleuze succeeds in maintaining the pantheistic monism of Spinoza without succumbing to either pantheism (relying on a transcendent identity) or monism (a singular identity that encompasses multiplicity). All of this is accomplished through the continual ‘*un-naming the divine*’ that we find in the appeal to intoxication, the thought of the eternal return, and self-oblivion in Death, which all relinquish identity and remove any ‘frame for identification’.\(^{45}\) A new problem arises, however, as self oblivion appears to neither be kenotic nor is the self recaptured from its dissolution. How does Deleuze’s philosophy rest in relation to his predecessors and those whom he regularly venerates (especially Spinoza)?\(^{46}\) The question builds upon what has been said previously regarding Nietzsche’s philosophical intention. It also highlights another criticism from Badiou, who accuses Deleuze’s philosophy of life as being more of a ‘philosophy of death’. Does Deleuze’s peculiar take on the unconscious and self-oblivion leave him at odds with his forebears? Has Deleuze sacrificed too much of his philosophical heritage, in his attempt to incorporate death in his philosophy, to be considered an heir to their affirmationist work?
CULTIVATING THOUGHT/OBLIVIATING THE “I”

The crux of the problem with Deleuze’s interpretation of the affirmationists’ philosophy is this: given that the inspiration for the philosophy of difference tends to the idea of self-cultivation, how is it that the philosophy of difference insists upon the abandonment of the self? To phrase it differently, if the goal of Deleuze’s predecessors is self-cultivation and self-development and in Deleuze’s work that self is not permitted within the unconscious source of that cultivation and development, whence is the self that benefits from the process? The answer is a simple one: Deleuze is not concerned with ethics of self-cultivation.

The confusion on the part of this work in trying to understand how death can act as an affirmation of one’s life is due to the mistake of attempting to discover Deleuze in these historical philosophies and not explore how Deleuze departs from them. How can we be sure of this lack of interest in self-cultivation and development, given that this is the goal of many thinkers whom Deleuze draws upon? Does Deleuze not talk extensively about the works of the Stoics in Logic of Sense and does he not also use the Nietzschean doctrine of the eternal return in Difference and Repetition – both prime examples of philosophers of self-cultivation?

Deleuze’s use of these thinkers has always been in the context of their processes of demystification. Demystification, not self-cultivation, is the key endeavour of Deleuze. We see this in his call for the flattening out of thinking in Logic of Sense and his critique of representation in Difference and Repetition. Later, in his collaborative works with Guattari, we see this expand into the demystification of the Oedipus complex in Anti-Oedipus and demystification through the process of deterritorialization in A Thousand Plateaus. Deleuze takes this approach because his intention is not to discover a way of affirming a life through an ascetic practice. Deleuze wants to combat stupidity (the failure to begin thinking) by breaking down the barriers to thinking. Deleuze does not wish to affirm a life, but to affirm life itself through itself.
The unconscious provides us with the access to this immanent life. Necessarily, however, we as individuals – with habits, memories, desires, contemplations and more – cannot be privy to that unconscious chaosmos of pure difference and multiplicity. However, the unconscious is not an escape. The unconscious as escape would be world-denying. Yet the unconscious is annihilation of the self to delve further, indeed fully, into the world in its most immanent reality. As this is inherently affirmative – the Divine Game affirming all chance – self-oblivion cannot be said to be an attempt at escaping the world by negating it. Rather, self-oblivion is absorption into the world by affirming it. Hence, Badiou is wrong to think that ‘the condition of thought, for Deleuze, is ascetic’, because Deleuze’s intoxication is not a pessimistic European alcohol-poisoning. Instead, it is Dionysian intoxication; the Dionysian spirit into which we lose ourselves and affirm life itself. Indeed, one might go even further to state that far from being ‘not at all like Spinozism’, Deleuze’s philosophy is more Spinozist than it is Nietzschean, precisely because he does not consider the self as an integral part of his philosophy.

If there is, for Whitehead and Deleuze, a “place” in the history of philosophy from which they wrestle with “God,” it is not Nietzsche’s “death of God” (which remains part of the logic of the One), but Spinoza’s natura naturans as the affirmation of creativeness in the chaosmos.

In the search for ingenuity, novelty and creativity, the loss of the self is so integral to Deleuze and his transpantheism that he, more so than Spinoza, makes the cultivation of thought his primary goal of the philosophy of difference. The novelty inherent in Thanatos and the eternal return make possible the creation of a new image of thought. In this way, Deleuze avoids the charge of presenting us with a philosophy of death.

While Death is a necessary component to Deleuze’s philosophy, it is only present as a result of a life, the “I”, being distinguished from the elemental unconscious. Death is a process that is necessary for novelty to be introduced to consciousness. Death is our tether to our pre-conscious source of identity. Life is not the death of the individual, but the absorption of all “lives”,...
all singular identities, into an immanent multiplicity called \textit{Life}. Delueuze provides us with a philosophy of death only if the I takes precedence over the life out of which it originates. Self-cultivation makes the identity of a self the significant component of philosophy. However, for Deleuze, fixed identity appears to be simply another superstition for philosophy to demystify. What is more significant and relevant than the self and the “I” is the dissolved self and fractured “I”. Herein lies the self that is behind thought, ‘the man without name, without family, without qualities, without self or I, the “plebeian” guardian of a secret, the already-Overman whose scattered members gravitate around the sublime image.’ (DR 117)

**CONCLUSION**

Nietzsche’s concepts of Dionysian spirit and the eternal return have had a notable influence on Deleuze’s understanding of how identity can be oblminated. Nietzsche was wary of proposing that we should obliterate the self to escape reality. The purpose of oblivion is to discover the creativity and ingenuity that resides beyond what we understand and to embrace more of the creative power within us. The result should be a self that is cultivated to achieve its full potential. Deleuze shares a similar vision for his own philosophy of difference. Influenced by Nietzsche’s concepts of Dionysian intoxication and the eternal return, Deleuze incorporated them into his demonstration of the limits of the self. The philosophy of difference incorporates Death as a means to go beyond the life of the individual and provide us with limitless novelty and creativity that affirms life. However, it is not \textit{our} life that is affirmed. Deleuze’s philosophy, his critique of representation, does not provide us with a means to live a life in the shadow of death and use death to affirm our life. Deleuze is interested in the immanence provided by Death. Immanence beyond death is the singular Life. Immanent Life is pure difference. In pure difference, there is only affirmation. The introduction of the consciousness creates the divide between the immanent and the transcendental, what Deleuze defined as the Divine and Human Games respectively. As pure difference is immanent, it does not depend on anything. ‘Absolute immanence is in itself: it is not in something,
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to something; it does not depend on an object or belong to a subject. The subject therefore stands in the way of immanence. Deleuze believes that the end of the subject can allow for the introduction of the pure difference that is in immanence.

The significance of depersonalisation should now be clear, having explored the concepts of kenosis and transpantheism. The practice of kenosis appears to be very similar to what Deleuze is attempting to demonstrate in his desexualisation of Eros and the oblivion of the self in the eternal return. However, there are clear differences between Deleuze’s intention and that of Eckhart. The major difference is that Eckhart insists that the self-emptying subject still retains an identity, and their loss of subjectivity is only replaced by another subjectivity, namely God. The persistence of the subject means kenosis still includes the transcendent, which in this case is God. To move beyond the transcendent, Deleuze appears to commit to transpantheism, according to Faber. This involves giving primacy to pure difference without making it an identifiable object. Deleuze accomplishes this while maintaining that pure difference is in immanence, that is to say it is found on a plane of immanence.

The primacy of immanence (and with it, pure difference) leads to Deleuze’s philosophy viewing the life of the individual as something which needs to be made flexible, deconstructed, and surpassed.

Between his life and his death, there is a moment that is only that of a life playing with death. The life of the individual gives way to the impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens […] The life of such individuality fades away in favour of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other. A singular essence, a life…

Only in the plane of immanence do we find affirmation and the potential for new images of thought. As Deleuze wants for new images of thought to be discovered by pushing beyond the
boundary of identity, the transcendental. While the work of Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Lucretius all aimed for a philosophy of affirmation, they remained indebted to identity for the outcome of that philosophy. In other words, the philosophies of affirmationists prior to Deleuze all want to benefit the subject. While they try to improve life for the subject, they do so with reference to what is beyond that subjectivity. However, the purpose of their work is to help others with self-cultivation. This therefore maintains the importance of the subject, despite pointing to the affirmation which lies beyond them. For Deleuze, there is no need to return to the historical subject, the subject whose life is the cyclical representation fuelled by Eros (i.e., Freud’s historical Oedipus as opposed to Hölderlin’s transformed Oedipus). That is not to say that Deleuze considers subjectivity so transient as to not be necessary. The image of thought is always returned to, as the limit of thought is internal to thought itself. ‘Overcoming the Image of thought makes this image no less inevitable, it just means that an other set of values becomes possible.’ Also, desexualisation and oblivion all presuppose a self. The self is always returned to after the moment of change has passed. While Deleuze does not want to improve the life of the individual, he wants for new subjectivities to be produced through a change in the image of thought. By cultivating thinking, the world can be open to innumerable new concepts and ways of making sense of reality. To do that, however, Deleuze must make it clear that transcendence can be overcome, and the immanent reality takes precedence in our approach to philosophy.

In the wake of this development, however, are the remains of affirmationist works that intended for their philosophies to develop a praxis that would help people achieve happiness, joy, and fulfilment in life. Deleuze sees affirmation coming from a world that lies outside of representation and the images it produces (including that of the subject). Deleuze states that the dogmatic image of thought limits us, whereas immanent Life is affirming and creative.
Deleuze’s philosophy is therefore a duality: at one and the same time it is a philosophy of death and a philosophy of life. A philosophy of death in that it treats the loss of individual life positively and a philosophy of life in that it gives primacy to a singular, immanent Life.
NOTES


7. Nietzsche arguably understands sublime in the Kantian sense, namely that to experience the sublime is to experience something so large that it overwhelms our imagination (Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, §25) or when we are fearful in the face of nature, while knowing ourselves to be safe enough to view it (§28). Schopenhauer takes the feeling of the sublime to be the moment at which our intellect is free from the Will to Live, the striving to continue our existence (Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, §38).


16. ‘… the I which is fractured according to the order of time and the Self which is divided according to the temporal series correspond and find a common descendant in the man without a name, without family, without qualities, without self or I, the “plebeian” guardian of a secret, the already-Overman whose scattered members gravitate around the sublime image.’ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p.117.

17. The word *Schwer*gwicht means heavyweight and is the term used for the heaviest class of boxers, while the word *Schwer* interestingly means not only “heavy” but also “difficult”, leading one to consider Nietzsche’s use of the word *Schwer*gwicht to demonstrate how the idea of the eternal return is a difficult, combative and crushing idea with which one must wrestle in order to affirm it. See Walter Kaufmann’s section on Eternal Recurrence in his translator’s introduction to *The Gay Science* (New York, NY: Random House Inc., 1974).


24. ‘[…] Among them is one idea that really requires “millennia to become something. From where am I to take the courage to pronounce it!”’ This is an excerpt from a letter by Nietzsche to Gast. Regarding experimentation, see §319: ‘We ourselves wish to be our experiments and guinea pigs.’ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, NY: Random House Inc., 1974), pp.18-19, 253.

25. See Levi Bryant, *Difference and Givenness* (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2008). Bryant presents a case for Deleuze’s denunciation of the Image of thought to be explicitly moral (DR 131-23) (p.221). Indeed, Deleuze is working with a moral framework, though the arguments he provides are weak. Unfortunately, this thesis cannot follow this


49 See Daniel W. Smith, “‘A Life of Pure Immanence’: Deleuze’s ‘Critique et Clinique’ Project’ in Essays on Deleuze (2012) for a thoroughgoing exploration of the concept of Life in Deleuze’s work.


Conclusion

The aim of this thesis has been to answer the following question: Does Deleuze’s treatment of death affirm life? The thesis began with Badiou’s critique of Deleuze, namely that Deleuze had provided a philosophy of death. The philosophy of death, Badiou suggested, was in opposition to the life affirming philosophy of Spinoza, whom Deleuze admires. The accusation from Badiou was the catalyst for an exploration in this thesis of Deleuze’s appreciation of Death. The death drive features in *Difference and Repetition*, and it is here that Deleuze presents most clearly his philosophy of difference. The death drive in *Difference and Repetition* is not the same as Freud’s articulation of the concept in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. In *Difference and Repetition*, the death drive is within the unconscious as a condition for the creation of novelty in thought. Using the death drive, Deleuze develops his philosophy of difference. Does Deleuze really present us with a philosophy of death? Does Badiou’s critique withstand this different interpretation of the death drive provided by Deleuze? Does Deleuze diverge too far from Spinoza’s philosophy of life and affirmation? Is it possible to have a concept of death that enhances life? Or must death always be characterised as mournful or fearful? As Deleuze proposed a concept of death that seemed quite distant from the affirmationist philosophers whom he draws upon, it was important to determine if he remained an affirmationist despite his use of death.

To understand how death is used in Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, one must first understand how difference and repetition work. The second chapter of *Difference and Repetition*, ‘Repetition for Itself’, provides an overview of the nature of repetition in the mind. The mind features three different types of repetition. The three repetitions – Habit, Memory, and Death – are treated discretely in this thesis. Deleuze uses the terms death drive, death, and Thanatos to refer to the third repetition. To avoid confusion, these terms, which all describe the dispossession
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and exclusion of the self from the unconscious, were referred to collectively as Death. The aim of treating these repetitions discretely was to develop a deep understanding of each of them. The aspects of the death drive that Deleuze kept and those he deviates from were described in relation to Freud. Freud’s characterisation of the death drive provided a model of repetition for Deleuze to develop from.

Deleuze’s interpretation of Death as an unstructured repetition distinct from the cyclical repetitions of consciousness was made clearer in the elaboration on the similarities and differences between Deleuzian Death and Freudian death drive. Freud’s “brute repetition” in his material model was replaced with Deleuze’s repetition for itself as part of a model for the conditions of thinking. Death is presented in *Difference and Repetition* as the groundlessness on which the ordered self is formed. Death also provides novelty to thought. The chapter ‘Repetition for Itself’ lays down the structure of the mind, providing the reader with an explanation for how the self comes to be and what maintains its experience of novelty and difference (i.e., Death). The role of Death in Deleuze’s philosophy of difference relates to time. Indeed, each of the three repetitions are expressed through time. Time is divided into perceptible time we are conscious of (i.e., past, present), labelled cardinal time, and time we cannot experience (i.e., future), labelled ordinal time. Deleuze’s interpretation of these variations of time – past, present, and future – are referred to as three syntheses of time, in *Difference and Repetition*. To appreciate the position of Death in this system, the three repetitions had to be brought together in an exploration of Deleuze’s use of dramatic timing. Hölderlin’s interpretation of tragedy is pivotal to understanding the interaction between cardinal and ordinal time, as this is a source of inspiration for Deleuze’s structuring of time in this way.

Hölderlin, in a marked difference to Freud, did not interpret Oedipus as an unfolding character who remained the same before and after his experience. Rather, Oedipus went through a transformation as a character, such that he was a different Oedipus to the one prior to the
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revelation of his forbidden relationship with Jocasta and patricidal history. Hölderlin refers to the point at which this change occurs as the *caesura*. For Deleuze, the *caesura* is the boundary between thought and Death. The bifurcation of time—cardinal and ordinal—is understood through the dramatic timing proposed by Hölderlin. Deleuze uses Hölderlin instead of Freud because Hölderlin does not see character as static and unchanging, in the way Freud arguably does. Deleuze also discusses the work of Joachim of Fiore and Giambattista Vico in relation to a triplex system.

The triplex structure to the philosophies of these thinkers is compared to that of Deleuze’s triplex structure of time. For Deleuze, there is a problem that is unresolved in the systems of Joachim of Fiore and Vico. The three elements of their respective philosophies are all cyclical and lack the possibility of novelty. To explain how novelty is introduced to the system, Deleuze turns to the work of Nietzsche and his concept of the eternal return. The eternal return is missing from the work of Joachim of Fiore and Vico, and that is why their systems are limited. The eternal return is closely associated with Death, in Deleuze’s work. The eternal return is repetition itself, without direction and entirely static. To understand this distinctive interpretation of time—ordinal time—the process by which the self is forced out of the unconscious must be elucidated. The moment at which the *caesura* occurs is at the instant when the regenerative power of cardinal time, the libido of Eros, becomes desexualised. Eros is the life drive, which, Freud argues, represses the death drive (referred to as Thanatos by Deleuze, though Freud does not use the term). The libido energising the productivity of Eros can become desexualised, that is to say it no longer produces with direction or purpose. The desexualised Eros is Thanatos. Thanatos is this unrestrained productivity that repeats infinitely within ordinal time, or the pure order of time. Thanatos is the ungraspable, dispossessed, and groundless absolute of Death. Therefore, to grasp how Death pervades the Erotic reproduction of the self, one must consider how Deleuze interprets desexualisation.
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The notion of desexualisation was explored through a close reading of an essay Deleuze wrote on Tournier’s novel, *Friday*. According to Deleuze, Tournier’s work explores the effect of living in an immanent reality, the notion of possibility being removed by the absence of a structure-Other. The structure-Other is provided by the existence of another’s perspective on reality. The structure creates a double movement (what could be and what is) that is crucial for conscious experience. Without the structure-Other, only immanence remains. The self cannot exist in this immanent reality. Desexualisation is the moment at which the structure-Other ceases to provide the double movement and so only the immanent reality remains. The immanent reality was taken to be the groundlessness of Death.

The first chapter concluded that Deleuze’s concept of Death is essential to the creation of a new image of thought. An image of thought is a structure of thought, whose rules govern representation and provide structure to conscious experience. Deleuze provides a critique of representation throughout *Difference and Repetition*. The representational structure Deleuze challenges is the dogmatic image of thought. The dogmatic image of thought is Deleuze’s term for the structure of thought that is currently dominant and is believed to be a truthful representation of the way thinking must work: using recognition (this is Deleuze’s definition of common sense). The dogmatic image of thought is problematic, as it is firmly rooted in restrictive boundaries of representation. The thesis discusses how the possibility for change in the dogmatic image of thought is thinkable through the connection between the conditions for thought and the unconscious. Death is Deleuze’s demonstration that pure difference is a prevalent feature of our thought processes, and so it can introduce change to the dogmatic image of thought (and the image of identity) and transform it entirely. While these concepts all seem pertinent to Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, the question of whether this remains an affirmationist philosophy is still unanswered. Does Deleuze’s model of Death fit with that of other affirmationists? Deleuze’s attitude towards Death appears to be one of experimentation and development – is this shared
with other affirmationists? Or is Deleuze presenting a philosophy of death that deviates too much from affirmationism? The answers to these questions were found by exploring the works of affirmationists whom Deleuze admired and was inspired by.

One such affirmationist is Lucretius, whose poem *De Rerum Natura* was examined. The aim of Lucretius’ philosophy is to reduce psychic disturbance. A large part of Lucretius’ task involves his understanding of death. Lucretius’ work is one of self-cultivation, whereby the reader can learn to eradicate fears which are caused by superstition. By practicing the philosophy of Epicureanism, of which Lucretius was a learned student, one can reveal how superstitions surrounding death are erroneous. The deeper appreciation for the operations of nature helps to dismiss superstition, reduce fear, and alleviate psychic disturbance. Disturbances (such as fear) threaten the achievement of the desired tranquil mental state. The process for discovering and ending superstition is demystification. The goal of demystification is to end sadness. The concept of death in Lucretius’ work gave an account of mortality (there is no afterlife due to the dispersion of the material soul at the point of death) and an account of change. Change requires that something must die to whatever it was before it underwent said change. In this thesis, change is determined as a form of palingenesis, in which living things die after undergoing sufficient change, but their constituent parts are then reconstituted. These impersonal constituents demonstrated how the identity of the individual was lost in their death, but the source of their identity remained. Lucretius’ individuation through palingenesis was critiqued using Simondon’s argument for individuation through ontogenesis. While Lucretius did offer an account of the creation of identity, the source of that creation (atoms) already required identity to begin with. Despite Lucretius’ philosophy remaining beholden to representation, Deleuze is clearly influenced by the way Lucretius uses naturalism to remove sadness by demystifying false infinites. The demystification that is performed with naturalism is taken up in Deleuze’s work. Lucretius’ reliance on identity in his philosophy is a problem that he does not overcome, and so this may present Deleuze with a
new myth that needs to be disproven through naturalistic demystification. Fixity of identity is another false infinite, a transcendental illusion of representation.

The essay that Deleuze wrote on Lucretius’ work focussed on the concept of the simulacrum. Simulacra are the emanations from an object that we perceive through the senses. For example, a rose exudes particles which are the cause of the smell one senses. Deleuze concludes that the simulacrum is the reality that produces an image of something. He insists that beyond our minimal thinkable time is the reality of the simulacrum, while we only experience the surface image of this reality (the image within thinkable time). Deleuze approves of Lucretius’ account of the simulacrum and the demystification it achieves. What Deleuze finds praiseworthy is the creation of an image (a false infinite) through the reasoning of atomism (a true infinite). In other words, Deleuze appreciates how Lucretius demonstrates the limits of the image and how it is generated from a true infinite, that is, it is generated from the infinite multiplicity and variety of both atoms and atomic collisions. The deconstruction of something by death and its reconstitution as something different is an example of this same transitionary and “false” infinite, the infinite of identity. Underlying the false infinite of identity is the true infinite of atomic metastability. The experience of death (personal death) is this false infinite, while the model of death (impersonal Death) is present in the multiplicity of metastability. Lucretius’ use of death is not, therefore, dissimilar to Deleuze’s own use of death in Difference and Repetition. Both relate to the loss of identity, and both are used to present an affirmationist characterisation of change. Deleuze’s notion of Death is closely related to the metastability of Lucretius’ atomism. Deleuze does not veer too far from Lucretius’ affirmationist philosophy, especially regarding the denunciation of sadness by demystification. Deleuze intends not only to emulate this but to develop it. Lucretius provides a material model for understanding metastability, palingenesis, and even thought. Deleuze wants to use these methods of revealing false infinites to provide an explanation of the pre-conscious conditions of thought and how novelty is introduced to thinking. Just as Deleuze moves away
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from a material model of the death drive to a model of repetition as the production of difference, Deleuze leaves the material model of metastability to a model of infinite multiplicity of pure difference.

Badiou’s criticism was specifically focussed on how Deleuze’s admiration of Spinoza is undercut by the presence of a conception of death underpinning much of his philosophy. Deleuze maintains affirmationism as he develops on the work of Lucretius. However, is there a discontinuity between Spinoza’s affirmationism and Deleuze’s advancement of affirmationism?

When it comes to death, Spinoza is cautious to explore it in too much depth. An inadequate understanding of death is easy to arrive at. The fear of death is both difficult to remove and harmful to one’s freedom to act. Spinoza states that a free man thinks of nothing less than of death (E IV P67) and death can be a cause of sadness. At one point, the effects of death are characterised as evil (E IV P41). Spinoza’s philosophy focusses on life and how to enhance life through the increase in one’s adequate knowledge, power to act, and freedom. The focus on life involves minimising fear. The notion of demystification is revisited in this context of rationalism and the denunciation of sadness. The fear of death inhibits life enhancing pursuits, which is why it is a cause of sadness, that is to say the fear of death causes sad passions. Sad passions are the result of an interaction between a body and external bodies which causes a decrease in one’s power to act. An example would be poison, which upon drinking it would reduce one’s power to act (due to sickness or death). As the fear of death causes sad passions, according to Spinoza, the subject does not need to be revisited once it has been adequately understood. To provide an adequate understanding of death, Spinoza offers a definition of the concept of death. This is important, for while it does not mean that Spinoza thinks differently about death (the fear of it can still be a cause of sadness), it does mean that we can make a comparison between the concept of death in Spinoza’s work and the concept of Death in Deleuze’s work. In doing so, it can be established whether Deleuze’s concept of Death is adequate, in the Spinozist sense.
During one of his lectures on Spinoza, Deleuze remarks how death is ‘the most base thing’ due to it being a cause of sadness. Deleuze acknowledges Spinoza’s reluctance to use the concept of death as an integral part of a philosophical system. In the comparison made between Deleuze and Spinoza, there were many shared characteristics between their concepts of death. Death is an element in a process of change or alteration (as it had been in Lucretius). In Spinoza’s definition, death has two aspects: it is a change in proportion of the motion and rest of a body and this change in the proportion of motion and rest must lead to a critical reduction of that body’s capacity to be affected in a variety of different ways. For example, when an individual dies from the intake of poison, they go from being able to experience many affects to being without the capacity to be affected in many ways. They may be affected as a cadaver, but this does nothing to improve their acquisition of adequate knowledge. Therefore, the loss of the power to act can cause the fear of death. Spinoza also suggests that there are instances where something can be considered dead without becoming a corpse, for example as the result of amnesia. The question that needed answering was whether Deleuze’s concept of death led to sad passions or if it produced the opposite effect. If Deleuze’s concept of Death could increase one’s power to act, then it would lead to joyous passions. Were this the case, then perhaps Deleuze’s concept of Death could be reconciled with Spinoza’s philosophy of life.

Reason eliminates fear and facilitates the discovery of adequate knowledge, according to Spinoza (EIII P1 Cor; EIV P63). Adequate knowledge of the essence of things is the highest order of knowledge an individual can acquire (EV P25). This is because adequate knowledge of the essence of things is knowledge of the essence of God/Nature for itself (EV P30). To acquire knowledge of this kind, one must understand the feeling of affects (affectus) and not just the idea of those affects (affectio) (SPP 48-49). The idea of affects are the images of those affects. The image is a static and limited representation of an affect. The image fails to show the dynamism of relations between bodies. Knowledge of the feeling of affects is knowledge of these relations and of the
dynamic plurality of relations that are possible. The image of affects occurs in a perceptible time, whereas the feeling of affects is beyond perceptible time, existing in the eternal duration of God/Nature.

Intuition gives access to knowledge of the essences of things. The essence of things are eternal truths, found in the eternal duration of God/Nature. This form of knowledge, though it is known to the individual, is not uniquely known. That is to say, knowledge of the third kind (intuition) is eternal, unchanging and perfect, and when it is conceived under a species of eternity is knowledge of the essence of God/Nature (EV P30). Knowledge of this kind is possible because part of the mind does not subsist in a duration that can be defined as time (EV P23 Dem). In other words, the mind exists in the time as far as it is bodily, yet the essence of the mind exists in an eternal duration that is not defined by time (EV P23 Dem). The notion of a bodily mind and the essence of the mind as having two distinct ways of existing in time is the closest Spinoza and Deleuze come to sharing an idea of time as divided.

For Spinoza, the individual can know this form of duration that is not defined as time. The mind must be able to conceive of the essence of things through a species of eternity to attain this third kind of knowledge and achieve blessedness. Blessedness is the satisfaction of the mind brought about by the intuitive knowledge of God/Nature (EIV Appendix IV). Deleuze does not accept that the individual can perceive duration under a species of eternity. At the point of Death, where perceptible time and eternal duration are divided, only the ‘man without name, without family, without qualities, without self or I’ can subsist as a ‘common descendant’ between the fractured I and the Self (DR 117). Spinozist demystification does not require that the individual be unable to access knowledge. All knowledge is possible to attain, with adequate knowledge of the essences of things being the most sought after (EV P25). Deleuze allows for this, given that there is infinite multiplicity in pure difference which makes possible new images of thought. The unconscious mind is what encounters this pure difference as it is ‘inaccessible to representative
thought’ (DR 345), with the conscious mind constructing an understanding by subjecting difference to the ‘fourfold root of identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance.’ (DR 39) Deleuze is augmenting Spinoza’s separation of time and duration by including an explanation of how the mind can access eternal and infinite difference – namely, through Death. However, the question is whether Deleuze’s deviation (or adaption) from Spinoza’s philosophy, using the concept of Death, is what Spinoza would consider to be a cause of sadness. Does Death cause a loss in the individual’s power to act?

Badiou accuses Deleuze of magnifying the role of death, contra Spinoza. Insofar as Deleuze promotes his concept of Death, the only way this could negatively impact the relation between Deleuze and Spinoza would be if Death were to cause the individual to pass to a lesser state of perfection (EIII P11 Schol). Deleuze’s critique of representation is his project of demystification. Deleuze is challenging representation, specifically the dogmatic image of thought, to instigate a growth in ingenuity, creativity, and thinking. Deleuze presents the dogmatic image of thought as a transcendental illusion (DR 349). The illusion leaves thought constrained by the demands of common sense and recognition. Only the new (difference) can overturn the image of thought (DR 179-80). Difference can only be introduced to thought by the connection of the self with the unconscious, that is to say they are connected by Death. Deleuze also maintains that his is an adequate understanding of death in contrast to death as understood through representation (DR 146). By presenting the means for the overturning of the dogmatic image of thought and the freedom of thinking not yet afforded by representation, Deleuze demonstrates how difference and repetition can increase our power to act. Our power to act is increased when we can think in freer ways that are detached from common sense. The adequate understanding of death that Deleuze uses to achieve this end – groundless, dispossessed, depersonalised, ungraspable Death – therefore makes an increase in perfection possible and could be defined as a cause for joy in the Spinozist sense. Chapter 3 ends with the conclusion that Deleuze presents a notion of Death that, while
depersonalised, is quite different to the death Spinoza discusses. Nevertheless, the understanding of Death is an adequate one, as death should not be feared (Death is absolute and continuously present) and knowledge of the essences of things is made possible through it (in giving the mind exposure to infinite multiplicity in the eternal duration of the pure order of time). Given that Deleuze’s concept of Death furthers the aims of demystification, it can be said with confidence that Deleuze’s work does not become so distant from a Spinozist philosophy of life that it becomes a philosophy of death irreconcilable with Spinoza’s work. The boundary between the self and pure difference raises another question, however. Is Death the negation of the self? If Death is boundless and directionless productivity, does it produce out of the lack of something? What other philosophies use death as an integral part of a developing consciousness? What do they share with Deleuze regarding the characterisation and use of death? Does a mutual appreciation of death with a philosopher who is not an affirmationist endanger Deleuze’s affirmationism?

Desire and Death are concepts Deleuze uses to explore production. Death is an integral part of the production of identity. Without Death, there could not be the introduction of pure difference and novelty to the triplex structure of the self. Both desire and death also feature in Hegel’s philosophy. For Hegel, desire is not production, but consumption. Consumption is a form of negation. A consciousness will negate something for it to be certain of its being a self. The presence of objects creates doubt as to whether consciousness is being for itself or being for an other (the object before it). Negation is the removal of doubt and a self-certainty that consciousness is for none other than itself. Desire seeks to separate the singular consciousness from the universal world of objects. For Hegel, death simply means the loss of life. The individual falls away into the general and universal. Death is when something becomes nothingness. Death is also a form of negation. When two self-conscious consciousnesses try to consume one another, that is, try to negate one another, each holds its life as worth less than the need for self-certainty. In this struggle, the one who retreats from death (the slave) is not consumed but must provide the
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means for the successful self-consciousness (the master) to continue to consume and fulfil its desire for self-certainty. Through the production of consumables for the master, the slave can find freedom and self-certainty. Freedom and self-certainty are discovered in the objects they produce through their work and the fear that they have of death. The fourth chapter gave some details of Hegel’s understanding of negation and the process of the master-slave dialectic in *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Death is a key component for the development of selfhood and is integral to Hegel’s philosophy. The attitude toward death in Hegel’s work contrasts with the perception of death held by Lucretius and Spinoza.

Although Deleuze and Hegel appear to share some ideas regarding death as an important part of the creation of selfhood, their philosophies remain incompatible. The concept of negation is too grounded in the dogmatic image of thought, for Deleuze. In proposing contradiction as a basis for his philosophy, Hegel’s work becomes too limited by representation. Hegel relies on the contrariety of images and therefore depends on images. Desire should be about productivity only, for Deleuze, and it is the focus on productivity that maintains Deleuze’s affirmationism and positive account of life, despite his use of death. However, Hegel does explain death’s contribution to self-cultivation. Spinoza considers the fear of death to be a source of sadness as it is not established through reason but by inadequate ideas of death (EIV P63, P64, P67). Hegel proposes that the fear of death does not inhibit one’s development. On the contrary, the fear of death and the creation of objects through labour can help the slave to discover their freedom, a freedom acquired through the realisation of self-certainty. As Hegel writes: ‘in fashioning the thing, the [slave’s] own negativity, his being-for-self, becomes an object for him only through his setting at nought the existing shape confronting him. […] in fear, the being-for-self is present in the bondsman himself; in fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him, that he himself exists essentially and actually in his own right.’ (PS §196) The slave can use their labour and knowledge of the fear of death to realise the route to freedom, that is to exist in their own right, without the need to continually consume (as the master does). Upon accepting the fear
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of non-existence (which they experienced in their struggle against another consciousness) and their labour, the slave can find freedom. This freedom would not be possible were they desensitised to the fear of death in the way that Lucretius and Spinoza would argue should be the aim for all people.

Hegel's dialectical approach to the concept of death proffers some positive outcomes – namely the use of the fear of death to discover freedom – and the similarities between Deleuze and Hegel's concept of death do not undermine Deleuze's affirmationism. Indeed, Hegel's concept of death further illuminates Deleuze's intention for Death to be the limit of identity. The fifth and final chapter details the eternal return. The aim is to delineate how identity is absent from Death without the use of negation.

The Human and Divine Games are important concepts in both *Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition*. They are how Deleuze divides the two worlds of image and pure difference. Image is on the plane of transcendence, (representation and idea). Pure difference is on the plane of immanence (reality). Each of these two games has rules. In the Human Game, the rules involve chance, where the response to a question can be affirmative or negative. In this regard, the Human Game includes limitations. These limitations are the limits of thought as constructed within consciousness. The Divine Game also has rules, but these rules affirm all of chance. This is in reference to the infinite multiplicity of pure difference, where difference is affirmation. At the meeting of these two games, the Divine Game provides affirmation on the plane of immanence while the Human Game applies its rules to the difference that it inherits from the Divine Game. The rules constrain and limit the multiplicity of difference, that is to say the Human Game makes sense of the Divine Game. In the Divine Game, identity has no fixity. As identity cannot be fixed, no one identity can be said to exist in the Divine Game. Therefore, the individual self is cast out by the Divine Game. Deleuze explains the affirmation of all chance and the loss of the self through
his interpretation of the eternal return. To understand the connection between the exiled self and eternal return, it is necessary to first attend to the Dionysian spirit.

The Dionysian spirit involves the loss of the self through intoxication. However, this is not alcoholic intoxication. The use of alcohol to obliterate the self is indicative of life-denial and resentment; it is drinking to escape reality. Whereas Dionysian intoxication is to lose oneself in life itself. Both the eternal return and the Divine Game involve going beyond the limits of a transcendental faculty (namely imagination in the case of the sublime and Dionysian spirit) and this leads to the loss of the self. For Nietzsche, the Dionysian spirit makes possible the introduction of novel and creative ways of thinking. It also makes possible the transvaluation of values and experimentation with values. All of this is found in Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return.

There are three different characterisations of the eternal return: cosmological, ethical, and as a thought experiment. While there are descriptions given for all three, the third presentation of the eternal return – as a thought experiment – was given the most attention. The reason for this is that the eternal return as a thought experiment focusses more on affirmation than former two depictions. Affirmation has been a key aspect of the philosophies discussed in this work. Deleuze considers affirmation to be an important part of the Divine Game, and in the eternal return. All that can survive the test of the eternal return are active forces. There is a hierarchy of forces that comprise a body. The dominant forces are known as active and the dominated forces are called reactive (NP 40). Reactive forces have definite ends, whereas active forces are what make the body a self. What is important to note, however, is that this active self is not conscious. Consciousness is a reaction to the active forces which comprise the body. Reactive adaptations are applied to active forces so that consciousness can understand what is affecting it. This means that active forces cannot be a part of consciousness as they overcome the reactive forces which form consciousness. When Deleuze suggests that the eternal return casts out everything that is not affirming or active, this is what he means. The eternal return excludes reactivity and therefore excludes consciousness. This is because the eternal return refers to the pure form of time, that is,
it takes place in the empty order of time. Deleuze’s interpretation of the eternal return therefore explains why identity cannot subsist beyond the *caesura*, in Death. Also made clear is how identity comes to be established through the interpretation of active forces that is performed by consciousness (so that it might understand the effects of the active forces). A brief evaluation of how successfully Deleuze avoids the transcendent and gives primacy to immanence through the eternal return and the affirmation of the “chaosmos” brings this chapter to a close. The conclusion is that the primacy of immanence left Deleuze affirming a singular Life as opposed to an individual life. The demystification of identity leaves the cultivation of thought an endeavour that can never affect oneself personally.

The notion of the personal and impersonal is revisited several times in this thesis. The two oppositional aspects of the mind – the personal and impersonal – are reflected upon because it is here that there is an ambiguity. The individual’s death is different to Death that occurs beyond any individual. In different terms, one might say that the personal death is an experience of death, while the impersonal death is a model of death. Death appears to overwhelm a life that is continuously trying (and failing) to suppress Death. In Deleuze, an ambiguity arises as to how Death is repressed by Eros (when consciousness “makes sense” of difference) and yet Eros is constitutive of Death (via desexualisation). How can the self resist something that it is not present for?

Of course, there is no resistance. There is only the appearance of resistance. The libidinal power of Eros is always limited. The limitation is intrinsic to Eros due to the primacy of Death. The cyclical reproduction of the libido is limited; the self forgets and grows fatigued. Eventually, the primary productivity that is linear – Death/Thanatos – prevails. Death does not appear and disappear, it is not formed and dissolved, it does not come and go. Every moment of cardinal time is only possible because a pure order of time provides consciousness with the possibility of novelty. The novelty we experience signifies a point beyond which Eros cannot reproduce. At this point,
representation is no longer possible, and recognition gives way to the new. The new brings with it opportunity, that is opportunity for new concepts. Deleuze encourages this discovery and implementation of the new to break free from the iron collars of representation (DR 345). Through making use of difference and the new, common sense can give way to novel ways of thinking. In these novel ways of thinking, we may begin to experiment with new concepts and find the means for thought that is affirming and not restrictive, positive and not negative. Consciousness relies heavily on representation to provide a sense of self, uniformity, and identity. However, these restrictions are caused by transcendental illusion. Recognition is stunting thought by creating a false fixity of character. Deleuze’s use of the concept of Death undoes this bondage of representation.

At the beginning of the thesis, Badiou accused Deleuze of constructing an ascetic philosophy of death. This thesis has shown that Badiou’s allegations are unfounded and false. Far from ascetic, the loss of the self is not intended to be life-denying but a form of Dionysian oblivion. The oblivion of the self is not self-imposed, but caused by the centrifugal force of the eternal return (DR 69). Deleuze does not propose that one ought to cast aside ‘sentimental, intellectual, or social actuality’. The occurrence of oblivion is structural and persistent. In other words, the unconscious – from which the self is excluded – is what makes sentimentality, intellectualism, and social relations a possibility. These are possible due to the novelty and difference that are introduced through the common descendant shared between the self and fractured I. The connection is at the caesura, linking the individual life to the model of Death. The illusion of representation is readily cast off, then, not by dissociation from one’s connections, but by a reinvention of some part of oneself. Such a transformation is possible only when one can accept that there is a fluidity to one’s developing self (e.g., Hölderlin’s Oedipus). Important to acknowledge, however, is that this metamorphosis is brought about by Death. As such, it is not something one can reach for or attain. One does not make the change happen. As Fitzgerald writes:
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Of course all life is a process of breaking down, but the blows that do the dramatic side of the work [...] the ones you remember and blame things on [...] don't show their effect all at once. There is another sort of blow that comes from within—that you don't feel until it's too late to do anything about it, until you realize with finality that in some regard you will never be as good a man again. The first sort of breakage seems to happen quick—the second kind happens almost without your knowing it but is realized suddenly indeed.⁶

Deleuze urges for an openness in the reader. One must discover the excess of the faculty (DR 188). One should allow for the Other-structure to be broken down (DR 369). Deleuze insists upon this discovery and overcoming of limitations not to escape life, but to experiment with thought. Beyond the limit of the self is not nothingness, but a place in which thinking must be forced into action to reconfigure the relations that compose the subject or object. Thought goes from passive recognition, bound by the illusion of common sense, to active thinking. The change is not caused by lack, but by positive creation. The positive creation is made possible by going beyond the limits to find the Void (LS 331). Beyond the limits of representation and the self that reinforces it, is Death. In his essay on Zola, Deleuze writes: ‘It is as if the crack runs through and alienates thought only in order also to be the possibility of thought, the vantage point from which thought is developed and recovered.’ (LS 339) Deleuze does not write a philosophy of death that is opposed to active life. Deleuze upholds the Spinozist pursuit of increasing the power to act. He gives a clear indication of where the limit of representation lies and how our intimate link with that space beyond representation allows us to grow active in our reinvention, experimentation, and active thinking. That limit is Death, the point beyond which lies the affirming Divine Game. Out of the Divine Game comes a wealth of possibility for the development of new images of thought, new concepts, new selves. None of which is at the expense of a philosophy of life.
NOTES


Bibliography


**J O U R N A L S**


OTHER


