Distributive politics and the benefits of decentralisation
Lockwood, Ben (1998) Distributive politics and the benefits of decentralisation. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers).
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This paper integrates the distributive politics literature with the literature on decentralization by incorporating inter-regional project externalities into a standard model of distributive policy. A key finding is that the degree of uniformity (or “universalism”) of the provision of regional projects is endogenous, and depends on the strength of the externality. The welfare benefits of decentralization, and the performance of “constitutional rules” (such as majority voting) which may be used to choose between decentralization and centralization, are then discussed in this framework.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Distribution (Economic theory) -- Political aspects, Distributive justice, Welfare economics, Externalities (Economics)|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Number of Pages:||27|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Description:||First version, November 1997; this version, August 1998|
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