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Moral understanding, affect, and the imagination

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Vanello, Daniel (2022) Moral understanding, affect, and the imagination. Inquiry . doi:10.1080/0020174x.2022.2077431 (In Press)

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2022.2077431

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to defend the view that we need to conceive our moral understanding as in part constituted by our affective and imaginative abilities suitably related. The core argument is that in order to be able to understand and explain the truth of a given moral proposition, we need to understand what the relevant moral concepts refer to, that is, we need to understand the semantic value of the relevant moral concepts. In the moral domain, I argue, this involves appealing to our affective and imaginative abilities suitably related. My account provides a genuinely new alternative to current accounts of moral understanding because it brings in both affect and the imagination central stage. Moreover, my account is a defense of the view that our moral understanding is a distinctive kind of understanding not reducible to non-moral kinds of understanding. The upshot of my argument is a new position in questions about the nature of moral understanding that focuses on the peculiarities of understanding in the moral domain.

Item Type: Journal Article
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
SWORD Depositor: Library Publications Router
Journal or Publication Title: Inquiry
Publisher: Routledge
ISSN: 0020-174X
Official Date: 19 May 2022
Dates:
DateEvent
19 May 2022Available
10 May 2022Accepted
DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2022.2077431
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: In Press
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access

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