BEING AND INTERPRETATION
Kant, Heidegger, and Fundamental Ontology

by
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DECLARATION

This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. This work is the result of original research undertaken solely by me. None of this work has been published prior to submission, nor has it been submitted for any previous degree, except for portions of my exposition of Kant’s Copernican Revolution in Chapter 3, section 2; exegesis of the Schematism in Chapter 5, section 2; and Heidegger’s account of death in Chapter 5, section 3, which were previously submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Philosophy at the University of Warwick in July 2018. However, these interpretations have been expanded upon and rewritten for this thesis.
ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to provide a systematic interpretation of the influence of Kant's theoretical philosophy on Heidegger's early project of 'fundamental ontology'. Beginning from Heidegger's early neo-Kantianism, I trace the development of his engagement with Kant through to his post-transcendental thinking of the 1930s. However, my particular focus concerns *Being and Time*. Here, I argue that there is a structural analogy between Kant's conception of the imagination and Heidegger's conception of disclosedness, both of which define their respective ontological approaches. Moreover, I argue that making such an analogy allows us to draw out a single, clear line of argument in *Being and Time* that should guide our interpretation of the text. Through this, I argue that the question of *transcendence* is the key explanandum for Heidegger's early project, and that a rethinking of Kantian *schematism* is Heidegger's answer for this. Consequently, a further strategic aim is to critically examine Heidegger's conception of schematism: to what extent can we defend and develop further the notion of schematism in considering the grounds of ontology?

The thesis is divided into three parts. The first traces the development of Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology and attempts to locate Kant's place within it. I argue that Heidegger's conception of phenomenology as method develops from his critical engagements with his contemporaries (in particular, Rickert, Husserl, and Dilthey), whereas the terms of his project as defined by the *Seinsfrage* derives from his interpretation of the history of philosophy (in particular, Aristotle and the Scholastics). My claim is that Heidegger consequently develops an ontological interpretation of Kant to connect the two: the Copernican Revolution provides a way to think a phenomenological ontology that does not reduce to anthropology, whilst Kant's notion of the imagination provides a formal structure through which to think Dasein's ontologically disclosing abilities. The second part provides an extended comparative analysis of the first *Critique* with *Being and Time*, aiming to show how Heidegger's concept of worldhood is a phenomenological reconsideration of the key themes of the Transcendental Deduction, and that Heidegger's notoriously difficult account of ecstatic temporality becomes comprehensible when read alongside the Schematicism. Through this, I aim to demonstrate the imagination/disclosedness analogy in practice, whilst also clarifying the problematic of transcendence that underlies their respective accounts. The final part then takes up the notion of transcendence as an explicit theme, firstly attempting to retrieve a positive signification for transcendence despite the later Heidegger's retrospective criticisms. Then I return to the question of the relationship between transcendence and schematicism in the final chapter, providing an interpretation and defence of Heidegger's concept of 'praesens' as a proof of concept for further inquiry into this rich philosophical field.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Heidegger Texts:

Heidegger’s works are cited with the German *Gesamtausgabe* pagination, followed by the below cited English translation (except for *SZ*, which in the German follows the standard Max Niemeyer edition). Generally, my quotations follow the English translation, with modifications or my own translations noted in the corresponding footnote. For terminological consistency, however, I always translate *Sein* as being (not Being), *Seiend* as entity (not ‘a’ being), and *Seyn* as beyng (not be-ing) in all instances.

*Ga3*  

*Ga9*  

*Ga14*  


\textbf{Kant Texts:}

Kant’s works are cited using the standard \textit{Akademie} numbers, except for \textit{KrV}, which uses the standard A/B pagination.


INTRODUCTION

1. Preliminary Aims
During the winter semester of 1925/6, in Heidegger’s Logic lectures, we see a fundamental shift in his thought occur. Having spent the main bulk of the lectures (and indeed, most of the early 1920s) primarily concerned with the ontological underpinnings of Aristotle’s philosophy, Heidegger suddenly refocuses his inquiry onto Kant, and particularly the chapter on Schematism in the Critique of Pure Reason. Following this, until at least 1929, Kant becomes Heidegger’s primary concern from the history of philosophy. In Being and Time, Heidegger freely adopts Kant’s transcendental language, and furthermore claims that Kant was “the first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of temporality”, that is, the foundational element in Heidegger’s ontology. Immediately after this, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology lectures begin with an extended discussion of Kant’s claim that existence is not a predicate, and end with an extension of the account of temporality offered in Being and Time, couched in terms of the Schematism. But it is Heidegger’s next set of lectures, entirely devoted to interpreting the Critique, that make the true extent of Kant’s influence abundantly clear. For Heidegger concludes the lectures by saying:

“When some years ago I studied the Critique of Pure Reason anew and read it, as it were, against the background of Husserl’s phenomenology, it opened my eyes; and Kant became for me a crucial confirmation of the accuracy of the path which I took in my search”.

1 Ga21, 269ff/224ff.
2 SZ, 23/45.
3 Ga25, 431/292.
In 1929, the infamous Davos disputation between Heidegger and Cassirer occurred, setting out in stark terms the fundamental divide between Heidegger’s ontological and phenomenological interpretation of Kant against the previously hegemonic neo-Kantian epistemological approach. Soon after this, Heidegger’s book on Kant appeared. By the publication of its fourth edition, however, Heidegger was claiming that the work was an “overinterpretation”, perhaps itself already reflected in Heidegger’s shift away from transcendental thinking as the 1920s made way for the 1930s. After this, Heidegger’s work becomes less systematic in ambition, with his interests instead broadening out to subjects as diverse as poetry, Nietzsche, and the pre-Socratics. Yet there is nevertheless a crucial historical moment in which the philosophical consideration of Kant is centrally enmeshed both in Heidegger’s historical and original work. And with that in mind, the opening question this thesis begins from is how we ought to understand the influence of Kant upon Heidegger during this period.

Of course, merely recognizing the influence of Kant on Heidegger’s work is no new revelation, as it is similarly erroneous to claim that Kant ceases to be of any concern to the later Heidegger. Quite the opposite. Indeed, an important subsidiary aim of this thesis will be to establish what exactly motivates Heidegger’s shift away from transcendental thinking and the place of Kant therein. But still, the Kantian thread in Heidegger’s early work is already well documented in the literature, from Kisiel’s genetic account of Heidegger’s philosophical development in the 1920s, to commentaries on Heidegger’s works on Kant, and attempts such as Carman’s to make parallels between the philosophical and textual structures of Being and Time and the Critique of Pure Reason. What

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4 For a summary of this debate, see: Ga3, 274-296/193-207
5 Ibid., xiv/xviii.
6 Although Heidegger’s activity on Kant greatly diminishes after 1930, he is still devoting entire essays to him as late as 1961, see Ga9, 445/337.
else is there to contribute? The fundamental missing link, however, is that which brings those inquiries together, namely, providing a systematic account of the multitude of philosophical roles that Kant inhabits within the work of the early Heidegger. I want to start from Heidegger’s Rickertian beginnings, go through the development of fundamental ontology, and progress towards assessing what Heidegger saw as the supposed ‘failure’ of that project and the consequences of his move away from transcendental thinking. For Heidegger is fundamentally a problematic philosopher, firstly in the sense that his work blurs the traditional disciplinary divisions between the history of philosophy and his own original concerns, but also inasmuch as Heidegger’s career as a whole can be said to be in a continuous state of development and revision. Whilst *Being and Time* might be the most ‘important’ Heidegger text, it is by no means his final word in the way that, e.g., the first *Critique* defines who Kant philosophically ‘is’ after his silent decade. We cannot understand ‘Heidegger’ by focusing on merely one text insofar as the chronological progression of each always bears a relation to what preceded and succeeded it: there is no fixed point where Heidegger, so to speak, ‘stops’. Accordingly, the centrality of Kant in the late 1920s as a particular moment in Heidegger’s broader trajectory cannot be sufficiently captured in an entirely descriptive, genetic account, just as a traditional commentary on *Being and Time*, or the *Kantbook*, or any given lecture course would not account for the broader story that we see developing as we read through each. Insofar as I aim to bring such inquiries together, therefore, I aim to both tell the historical story of Heidegger’s developing relationship to Kant whilst at the same time mobilizing the exegetical resources of the history of philosophy across a broader range of texts from the 1920s than a singular commentary would do, in order to achieve a fuller philosophical picture.

However, in attempting to provide this systematic account, my aim is not merely to consolidate what has already been established. For where I aim to go beyond previous inquiries is in claiming that Heidegger’s central period of activity on Kant tracks the later stages of the development of what is perhaps his most enduring original project: fundamental ontology, where I contend that Kant’s influence significantly shapes the direction of that project down to its foundations. Accordingly, a central motivation for telling this historical story is to prepare the groundwork for a resolutely ‘Kantian’ reading of fundamental
ontology at its core. My aim is not just to establish that Kant was a greater influence on Heidegger than the literature supposes, but moreover express the way in which there is a fundamental unity between the thought of Kant and the early Heidegger. Heidegger claims in the *Kantbook* that “transcendental philosophy=ontology”. My aim, however, is to argue not only that Heidegger believes this of Kant, but further that it is a presupposition to which he had already committed himself. Consequently, there is a single, consistent Kantian thread in *Being and Time* which ought to guide our interpretation of the text.

But I think we can go further than that: *Being and Time* is (infamously) an incomplete work, such that Heidegger never fully fleshes out his account of how “the interpretation of time [could be] the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being”. And I do take it to be the case that any purportedly ‘accurate’ reconstruction of Heidegger’s intentions for the final Division is to all intents and purposes unattainable, since there is simply insufficient extant material. However, by thinking through this Kant-Heidegger relationship in an original philosophical way, I contend that Heidegger’s reflections on schematism will allow us to make a further advance into this problematic. My aim in the final chapter, therefore, is to set out the schematism for *readiness-to-hand*, as an initial ‘proof of concept’ for further inquiry into the problematic of Division III. Therefore, the historical inquiry which comprises the bulk of this thesis is ultimately there to motivate further original philosophical research into fundamental ontology, i.e., as an *open* philosophical programme. At root, therefore, I am concerned with the Kant-Heidegger relationship in order to think both with and beyond them. Insofar as Heidegger locates a fundamental common ground between his own work and Kant’s, and places it at the heart of *Being and Time*’s structure, my strategic aim is to extend that thinking towards ‘answering’ the Seinsfrage. The essential aim, therefore, is to *retrieve* the problematic which Heidegger set aside, in and through a synthesis of Kant and Heidegger’s systematics. In short, I want to lay the initial ground which would allow us to see that *schematism* opens up the horizon for being, as the general condition for the possibility of Dasein’s ontological interpretation.

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10 *Ga3*, 88/62.
11 *SZ*, 1/19.
2. Context and Method

Insofar as my strategic aim is to understand the foundations of fundamental ontology, in one sense, the central question of this thesis is, purely and simply, the question of the meaning of being. And whilst I aim to make a contribution to the interpretation of both Kant and Heidegger in this thesis, the historical story is told to motivate what I take to be the intimate relationship between the transcendental, phenomenological, and ontological. My aim is to understand the interconnectedness of these three concepts, through a comparative analysis of Kant’s and Heidegger’s thinking. A central motivation for this begins, in a key sense, with the essential open-endedness of *Being and Time*. For Division II effectively ends on a cliffhanger: a paragraph of rhetorical questions which suggest where Division III would have led but are equally too inexact on their own to provide concrete specifics. Consequently, I want to shed light on the foundational, systematic presuppositions which lead Heidegger to that point. And insofar as I want to centre the unique influence of Kant therein, the question arises of how to push this tendency further. Where Heidegger focuses on the unique ontological possibilities of schematism, to what extent does that allow us an inroad into the problematic of Division III?

Beginning on this journey is a something of an omission within the literature, traceable back to a partial consensus that even if there is much in the specifics of *Being and Time* to be defended, the project as a whole was something of a failure. For example, the most prominent monograph on Division II, Blattner’s *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*, ultimately hinges on the conclusion that, “if [Heidegger’s] philosophy of time is a failure, as I argued it is, then the entire effort of *Being and Time* is called into question”. Similarly, Vallega-Neu’s commentary on the *Contributions* contextualizes that later work as motivated precisely by the supposed failure of Heidegger’s attempt at systematicity in *Being and Time*. And whilst there is one essay collection which explicitly treats Division

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III,\textsuperscript{15} it is not primarily focused upon reconstructing or further developing it. Indeed, the notion that Heidegger’s assessment of the failure of fundamental ontology could be wrong seldom (if ever) becomes a theme. It should be clarified that my intention in opening up this problematic is not to mount a hypothetical inquiry: some superficial ‘alternate history’ or theoretical exercise. Rather, my aim is to show that, on a high-level, Heidegger was on the right track when \textit{Being and Time} cuts out. Consequently, my intention is to extract a defensible interpretation of Heidegger’s ontology from the basis of the Kantian thread which I argue guides the extant text. For if we are to make even a small inroad into the problematic of Division III, we first have to affirm the general presuppositions for Heidegger’s project as such, i.e., to come to an interpretation of fundamental ontology which demonstrates how Heidegger’s closing questions were not a fading out into obscurity.

Thus my particular focus on Kant, who takes on three key roles during the inquiry. Firstly, considered by himself, I want to show that his theoretical philosophy was essentially ontology in the relevant sense, and that this is demonstrable from a close reading of the first \textit{Critique}. Secondly, by putting the first \textit{Critique} and \textit{Being and Time} directly into dialogue, we see the historical development of a shared approach to ontology, with Heidegger building upon an essentially Kantian ground. In particular, I want to claim there is an essential structural analogy to be made between Kantian imagination and Heideggerian disclosedness, both of which frame the question of being as the question of transcendence. My claim is that, for Heidegger, if we can explain Dasein’s transcendence – a concept he initially finds productive in Kant\textsuperscript{16} – then we can come to an interpretation of being.\textsuperscript{17} So finally, my original contribution follows from this synthesis of Kant and Heidegger, and claim that where the systematic innovations Heidegger appends to the transcendental project with phenomenology and hermeneutics ought to be preserved, Kant was nevertheless right to emphasize the importance of \textit{schematism} within his own systematics.\textsuperscript{18} Consequently, the

\textsuperscript{15} Lee Braver (ed), \textit{Division III of Heidegger’s \textit{Being and Time}: The Unanswered Question of Being} (Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 2015).

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ga3}, 16/10-1.

\textsuperscript{17} This will be treated in further detail below.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{NF}, 18:685-6.
final argument this thesis is leading to is a recasting of schematism in a Heideggerian context. My foundational claim is that through schematism, we are able to elucidate the formal structures for the interpretation of being, such that at root, I argue the meaning of being for Heidegger is essentially a question of *transcendental hermeneutics*. In particular, the meaning of being is expressed in terms of a hermeneutic of becoming, the philosophical residuum being, in short, that schematism functions as an essential mediator between Dasein’s necessarily contingent, finite mode of being and its ontologically interpretative potentiality. *Time*, therefore, is ultimately the ontological expression of this essential becoming, but it is also the structure for ontological determination. That is, in focusing on readiness-to-hand, I will argue that my interpretation of the schemata provides the formal structures for the ontological interpretation of world that Heidegger provides. Where Heidegger’s concern with ontology is motivated by a desire to displace the static being which, in his view, has defined the substance ontology of traditional metaphysics, Kant’s schematism already, at least regarding its formal structures, provides the conceptual tools to overcome this reification. The question of being is equally, therefore, the question of finding a phenomenologically permissible understanding of schematism. But perhaps this sketch of my final argument presumes too much: we need a better sense of the journey which takes us there. Therefore, I will provide a summary of the broader argumentative structure of the whole work, but with this problematic of finding a fundamental-ontological schematism as the overriding aim in view.

3. Structure of the Thesis
Starting from the historical problematic, the thesis does not begin within the interpretation of *Being and Time*, but rather traces the development of fundamental ontology leading up to 1927. My aim is to disambiguate the various strands of Heidegger’s thinking which are in a sense already presupposed once we get to *Being and Time*, and to locate the place of Kant within it. Accordingly, the first two chapters treat the key themes which Heidegger develops prior to the emergence of Kant in 1925/6. This is more properly a re-emergence: given that Heidegger’s earliest work is supervised by the neo-Kantian Rickert, our first question is how to understand Kant as the tentpole at each end, whilst Heidegger’s intellectual context radically shifts from epistemology to ontology.
This equally cuts through both contemporary and historical concerns: firstly, Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenological method develops from his encounters with Rickert, Husserl, and Dilthey (the subject-matter of the first chapter). However, the project of fundamental ontology – as defined by the Seinsfrage – arises from Heidegger’s critical engagement with Aristotle and the codification of Aristotelian metaphysics by the Scholastics (the subject-matter of the second).

Beyond the necessary historical context these two chapters provide, the philosophical aim is ultimately to show in Chapter Three that Kant re-emerges in Heidegger’s thought to solve the tension that arises between the respective method and project. How can phenomenology be relevant in treating the Seinsfrage, in such a way that it is not a mere contingent anthropology? I argue that Kant provides the way out – and thus the grounds for fundamental ontology – insofar as the Copernican Revolution reorients the priority in ontological constitution. This is to say: the transcendental turn reorients the relationship of objectivity to cognition (or in Heidegger’s terminology, entity to existentiality). Through the Copernican Revolution, it is Kant who first opens up the thematic possibility of an ontology grounded in (what Heidegger will call) Dasein, of an ontology centred around interpretation and projection. I then use this to set out what I take to be the unifying factor between the critical project and fundamental ontology, namely, the aforementioned analogy between Kantian imagination and Heideggerian disclosedness. This is the interpretative lens through which I read both thinkers’ work. In particular, I emphasize Heidegger’s claim that “phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis”. Insofar as Heidegger’s transcendental turn centres ontology on the question of Dasein’s disclosedness within the context of its concern, and insofar as in Kant the imagination ‘discloses’ world through its synthetic function, both point to a quasi-creative potentiality of the subject/Dasein that constitutes its world. What the transcendental turn involves is recognizing the interpretative ability to determine world, expressed first in Kant through his account of the categories and phenomenologically developed by Heidegger through the existentialia.

And where Kantian ontology locates the formative ontological structures in through its treatment of the categories and schematism, the question of

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19 SZ, 38/62.
the formation of Dasein’s disclosedness, that is, its transcendent ability to determine world, is one question still left open at the end of Division II. From this preliminary analogy, the structure of the rest of the thesis becomes clear: to plot a course to an explanation of Dasein’s disclosedness in and through the Kantian thread of Being and Time, and ultimately through a modulation of schematism (insofar as it “forms transcendence a priori”), into fundamental-ontological terms.

The second part of the thesis – Chapters Four and Five – explicitly traces the Kantian thread of Being and Time through a comparative analysis with Kant’s Transcendental Analytic. In particular, the fourth chapter argues that Heidegger’s concept of worldhood is a phenomenological reconsideration of the key themes of the Deduction, whilst the fifth chapter argues that Heidegger’s notoriously difficult conception of ecstatic temporality becomes understandable when read in light of the Schematism. The fourth chapter, therefore, treats the question of ontological constitution for Kant and Heidegger, whereas the fifth begins the argument for the foundationalism of time within that context. As Kant-interpretation, the aim is to show that the success of the Deduction and Schematism – at least under Kant’s own terms – can only be affirmed if we understand Kant’s aims as ontological. At the same time, Heidegger’s interjection is to mount the external critique that Kantian faculties ought to be replaced by a phenomenological derivation of the basic structures. Taken together, what I want to say is that focusing on Kant’s influence in Being and Time allows us to disambiguate a clear, single line of argument in Heidegger’s thinking, one which ultimately clarifies that an explanation of Dasein’s transcendence is the way into the meaning of being. For Heidegger, the importance of transcendence is affirmed in §69(c), where he argues its possibility is explained by schematizing ecstatic temporality.²¹ At the essential juncture, then, the Kantian subtext becomes text. The issue is that Heidegger’s attempt here is somewhat underdeveloped. So, our question then is: can we take this argument to its conclusion, or does it reflect some broader insecurity in our purported transcendental foundations? Can we come to a defensible account of transcendence, particularly given the incompleteness

²⁰ Ga³, 105/74.
²¹ SZ, 365/416.
of *Being and Time* and the post-transcendental transition in Heidegger’s later thinking?

In the third and final part, transcendence is explicitly taken up as a theme. Chapter Six deals with the fallout of *Being and Time* and the transition to the later Heidegger as his relationship to Kant becomes increasingly ambiguous. In particular, I argue that a central problem which motivates the eventual move away from fundamental ontology is that Heidegger began to see its procedure as latently metaphysical. I focus on two key points: (1) Heidegger’s ambiguous relationship to transcendental idealism, and (2) his flirtation with the concept of ‘metontology’, the only time in Heidegger’s work where he seems to treat metaphysics positively. These points, I suggest, are two aspects of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant that we can critique: (1) fundamental ontology can overcome the Kantian idealism whilst thinking transcendentally, where (2) I take metontology to misunderstand the aims of Kant’s Dialectic. Altogether, the aim is to show that these issues are local to the texts in which they appear, and do not globally affect the veracity of the project of fundamental ontology or its centring of transcendence. The question going into the final chapter, then, is how to substantively understand transcendence within a Heideggerian account, given my attempt to defend it.

The final chapter takes up this problematic by developing further Heidegger’s own treatment of schematism, particularly its relationship to readiness-to-hand, as he sets it out in *Basic Problems*. The aim is to clarify how the Seinsfrage ought to be directed towards the hermeneutic constitution of world and Dasein’s interpretative stance towards being. In setting out that schematism, I begin by tracing the existentialia of Dasein as they first appear as existentiality, facticity, and falling – and then through their ecstatic temporal interpretation regarding Dasein’s self-understanding – such that we can broaden out that analysis to the constitution of world as such. Insofar as Dasein’s transcendence designates its projecting of an interpretation which determines world, the question of schematism asks what those root structures are which determine the nature of ontological interpretation as such.

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22 I should note that by ‘fundamental ontology’, I refer exclusively throughout the thesis to Heidegger’s early transcendental project.
And whilst setting out the schemata themselves is beyond the scope of this introduction, the systematic point is that world is formed through the *synthetic unity of the schemata* gathering together the relevant hermeneutic materials, which sits behind any given Dasein’s particular interpretation and determines *a priori* its formal structure. Whilst Dasein is radically finite and contingent, schematism and the function of time therein are the necessary structures which make its ontological interpretation possible. In the flux of Dasein’s life and its attendant phenomenology, the transcendental structuring of time is the sole necessity which determines ontological interpretation as such: schematism constitutes the relevant horizon insofar as it sets out the framework for interpretation. Thus why I equally want to push further the idea that the meaning of being is ultimately a hermeneutic of *becoming*: being is unified through transcendental interpretation, but in the essential instability of time and the contingency of any given Dasein, the meaning of being is never a fixed constant. Rather, transcendence and *history* are ultimately seen to intersect: there is a history to the concept of being even whilst its meaning is transcendently constituted in any given case. The point is not to locate and fix an atemporal *koinon*, which abstracts being from its correct ‘place’. Rather, being is rooted in life and its hermeneutic implications. For Heidegger, being is disclosed in terms of time, but this shows how the meaning of being as such is intrinsically unsettled due to the constitutive function of time and the hermeneutic implications of schematism. And what I foundationally want to contend is that such an account follows from a synthesizing of Kant and Heidegger’s systematics.

4. Transition

Bringing this all together, the central claim this thesis aims to justify is a reappraisal of fundamental ontology when it is understood from its Kantian ground: it aims both to shed light on the Kant-Heidegger relationship and make a further advance in understanding the role of schematism in the constitution of world. In terms of an overriding argument, then: beginning from an ontological reading of the Copernican Revolution, we shift to an analogy between the imagination and disclosedness. Systematically expounding this analogy through the *Critique*

and *Being and Time* clarifies the *Seinsfrage* as essentially about the question of transcendence. Schematism, then, finally appears in a new form in the final chapter in relation to the formation of transcendence, and regarding the constitution of world, we find a fundamental becoming expressed in terms of time. And although this would not suffice to ‘complete’ all there is to say about the relationship between being and time, what I hope to show by providing this ‘proof of concept’ is that the question of transcendence and schematism is still an open problematic for us.

From my own perspective, this inquiry began from a reading of the *Critique* which understood Kant’s procedure as far more ontological in character than I otherwise found, and in turn a reading of *Being and Time* which I could not see as anything but entirely enmeshed in Kantian ways of thinking. To think these together was perhaps the natural – if daunting – next step, not least because one runs the risk of doing interpretative ‘violence’ to both thinkers. Consequently, exegesis is emphasized, particularly in the exposition of the Kantian thread, in aiming to overcome that present risk. The central question now, then, is where to begin? How do we enter into the systematics of two absolutely central thinkers when the final aim is to understand them in tandem? Given the aim is ultimately to begin on the path to Division III, I propose that we begin from Heidegger and consequently locate the place of Kant therein. However, as the early part of the thesis will aim to make transparent, quite how the project of fundamental ontology came together is far from clear-cut.
PART ONE

The Development of Fundamental Ontology
PROLOGUE

Where Does Heidegger Begin?

One question which arises throughout the literature on Heidegger is where exactly we should consider his thought to ‘begin’. Kisiel labours over this point regarding Heidegger’s breakthrough to his topic in Being and Time;¹ where Sallis asks, “where does Being and Time begin?”;² with reference to how we – as readers of Heidegger – should enter into the conceptual scheme of such a complex text. Even Heidegger himself was acutely aware of the difficulty of locating a clear-cut starting point.³ For Heidegger as philosopher and Sallis as interpreter, this is a question of providing access to a philosophical system, whereas for Kisiel there is a further historical signification, that is, when does Heidegger become Heidegger? What was the initial insight (or set of insights) out of which Heidegger – the Heidegger we know – began to develop? As Kisiel recognizes, “there is something abrupt and arbitrary about any beginning, and a great beginning involves an especially violent burst of creativity”.⁴ And yet, it is nevertheless a pertinent question, and as interpreters, we are obligated to make that decision. In our context, then, we have to ask: where does the early Heidegger’s engagement with Kant begin? And from where does the notion of a transcendental and phenomenological ontology take root?

One intuitive ‘beginning’ for Heidegger on Kant might be the Logic lectures, where, for the first time, the Schematism is expressly incorporated into Heidegger’s developing account of temporality. As I claimed in the introduction, this marks a turning point in Heidegger’s thought, where for the next half-

decade, Kant is front and centre. But the Logic lectures arrive in the midst of a project still developing but nevertheless already underway: in one sense, the incorporation of Kant into Heidegger’s systematics is the final piece of the puzzle in putting together fundamental ontology. Accordingly, to understand the relevance of the Schematism to that context requires us to first understand how that context developed.

Furthermore, the emergence of Kant in 1925/6 is, as stated, a re-emergence: Heidegger’s supervisor for much of the early stages of his career was the neo-Kantian Rickert, and Heidegger the graduate student operated broadly within that philosophical paradigm. By contrast, the Heidegger of the late 1920s can to a great degree be characterized as providing a critical response to the neo-Kantian hegemony of the German academy in the immediately prior decades. Indeed, the stark dividing lines between Heidegger and neo-Kantianism by 1929 is exactly what makes the Davos disputation so potent. Consequently, before 1925/6, Heidegger already has a history with Kant, a trajectory which involves:

(1) A rejection of neo-Kantianism;
(2) The moves towards phenomenology and the early developments of fundamental ontology; and then…
(3) A return to Kant within this new, competing philosophical paradigm.

To the extent that, by the publication of Being and Time, the Kantian thread is fully integrated into the project of fundamental ontology, the place of Kant in Heidegger’s thought and the development of fundamental ontology are ultimately seen to interweave with one another from the late 1910s to mid 1920s. Regarding the question of beginnings, there is a story we need to tell prior to the 1925/6 breakthrough. We firstly need to ask: how should we understand the intellectual context of Heidegger’s time and the place of Kant within it? What were the factors which turned Heidegger away from neo-Kantianism? And how should we understand the development of the key strands of fundamental ontology as they appeared prior to Kant’s re-emergence?

The aim of this first part is to elucidate those key strands as a prelude to explicating the Kantian thread of fundamental ontology as it appears in *Being and Time*. Within that context, I argue that we can identify two key (interrelated) strands in Heidegger’s thought prior to the Kantian re-emergence: firstly, Heidegger’s critical engagements with his contemporaries (in particular: Rickert, Husserl, and Dilthey) lead Heidegger to forge a new method for philosophy. He terms this ‘phenomenology’, justifiably I will argue. But he radicalizes the possibilities of phenomenological inquiry beyond Husserl. Secondly, Heidegger’s critical engagements with the history of Western metaphysics allow him to define the terms of his project. That is, through his engagement with the tradition, Heidegger identifies an aporia which in turn leads to his unique formulation of ‘the question of the meaning of being’. But it is the conjunction of the method and the project which leads to a tension: how do they connect? The re-emergence of Kant, I will argue, is deployed to resolve this: in Kant, Heidegger finds a ground, not just for his project, but for the substance of fundamental ontology itself. Each chapter in this part will concern one element of the above schematic, before we see each of those elements come together in Part Two.
CHAPTER ONE
Rickert, Husserl, Dilthey

1. Heidegger the Student, Neo-Kantianism, and Phenomenology

Our story with Heidegger begins with neo-Kantianism. More precisely, Heidegger’s story begins with the clash of neo-Kantianism and phenomenology. For Heidegger enters the academy as a student at the University of Freiburg, where Rickert and then Husserl were consecutive members of the faculty.1 Since the 1860s, neo-Kantianism had been the dominant philosophical school in Germany, at least until Husserl published his Logical Investigations in 1900-01, where in the sixth and final investigation, Husserl elucidates the phenomenological method for the first time. Heidegger later wrote that even before Husserl arrived at Freiburg he was “captivated by the never-ceasing spell of the Logical Investigations”.2 And he was not alone: before Heidegger, Max Scheler and Edith Stein were already making their own developments within phenomenology, and Heidegger notes that “we – friends and pupils – begged the master again and again to republish the sixth investigation which was then difficult to obtain”.3 So, even before Heidegger had met Husserl, phenomenology was playing a key role in his philosophical development.

However, the acquaintance with Rickert is equally significant for Heidegger’s earliest engagements with philosophy, even if the result is ultimately negative. Heidegger set out on his own path by defining his philosophy against neo-Kantianism, and we can see (beginning from his lectures of 1919) how he is stepping away from the neo-Kantian orthodoxy. By late 1920 and into 1921, with the Phenomenology of Religious Life lectures, he has resolutely set out on this

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2 Ga14, 97/78.
3 Ibid., 98/78.
new path. But what is also notable in these early lecture courses, given our context, is the degree to which Kant’s philosophy itself takes a back seat in Heidegger’s positive account. Insofar as his phenomenological interests centre around the hermeneutics of factual life,⁴ Heidegger’s primary focus almost un-waveringly centres the matter of phenomenological description itself. If Heidegger is thinking systematically at this point (at least prior to 1922), he does not make it apparent to his students.

But what Heidegger does do in these early courses is to begin to develop a number of key themes that ultimately interweave with his interpretation of Kant once we get to Being and Time. In particular, Heidegger begins to develop his critique of ‘the theoretical’, which I will later argue sets the stage for his replacement of Kant’s derivation of the categories in the Metaphysical Deduction with an alternative, phenomenological derivation of ‘world’.⁵ And at the same time, he begins to conceive of his own phenomenological method as explicitly hermeneutic, due to some key problems he perceives in Husserl’s early account. Consequently, before we can begin to understand Heidegger’s mature account of Kant, there are a set of historical questions we need to answer first, as scene-setting for interpreting Being and Time itself: most prominently, (1) why is it that Heidegger moves away from neo-Kantianism, and (2) how and why does Heidegger begin to reconceive phenomenology as well, notably in light of his critique of Husserl? With this, we ought to gain a sense of Heidegger’s method as it developed prior to the Kantian re-emergence (to be treated in Chapter 3). What was the conflict that arose between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology? And how did Heidegger first put his own stake in the ground?

2. Heidegger and Rickert: Erkenntnis vs. Sein

Let’s firstly find our way into Heidegger’s thinking through his engagement with Rickert and neo-Kantianism. And despite its name, the focus of neo-Kantianism did not primarily concern the textual interpretation of Kant in and for itself, as we might generally characterize today’s approach to the history of philosophy. However, that is not to say the neo-Kantians were entirely averse to exegesis.

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⁴ cf., e.g., Ga59, 36-8/26-7; Ga61, 39-40/30-1; Ga63, 14-5/11.
⁵ cf. Chapter Four.
Instead, bearing in mind Liebmann’s rallying cry of “back to Kant”, the neo-Kantians were more interested in returning to Kant to think within what they saw as his general presuppositions and taking them some step further. So, the Marburg neo-Kantians, for example – Cohen and Natorp in particular – essentially wanted to ‘update’ the critical system given the decades of developments in the natural sciences that separated them from the first Critique. As Natorp put it, they aimed to provide “necessary corrections of Kant’s teachings”. Consequently, the Marburg School aimed to remain within what they perceived as the spirit of Kant’s project, whilst being unafraid to radically depart from him where they saw science suggest they ought to. However Rickert, as a Southwest neo-Kantian, saw the problematic from the other side, which is to say, Rickert’s primary focus was on history (and the Kulturwissenschaften more generally), in order to remove what he saw as the bias inherent in the first Critique of the priority of the natural sciences above all else. For whilst Rickert agreed with Kant’s aim to provide a transcendental-logical underpinning for human knowledge, he also argued that Kant’s system of categories therein privileged the concept of nature to the detriment of the cultural or historical:

“Kant moved too quickly, so to speak, from the concept of the given or perceived, to the concept of nature […] Empirical knowledge is identified by [Kant] with knowledge of nature, and thus the concept of ‘experience’ is conceived too narrowly”.

In turn, the aim of Rickert’s own Erkenntnistheorie was to correct what he saw as this central mistake, and thus to broaden out Kant’s account of the categories. To account for this, Rickert firstly makes a distinction vis-à-vis our categorial understanding, of which he claims there are firstly a set of ‘constitutive forms’ necessary for the possibility of any experience. But he also added to that the idea

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9 Quoted in Ibid., 216.
there are sets of ‘methodological’ forms which determine what is requisite for the possibility of some particular science. In distinguishing the natural vs. historical sciences, Rickert emphasized the “individualizing concept formation [of the historical sciences], which stands in logical opposition to the generalizing concept formation of natural science”. And moreover, he claimed that “individualizing concept formation […] takes place only through a theoretical ‘relationship’ of historical objects to values”. Where Kant, in the Metaphysical Deduction, essentially puts his faith in the logic contemporary to him, and takes the twelve categories pre-given and wholesale, Rickert wanted to return to the ground of the categories’ function. By doing this, Rickert believed that he was able to account for more diverse modes of knowledge.

With this claim in mind, we can in essence understand Rickert’s central contributions along two axes. The first is to introduce the concept of ‘value’ not within the context of ethics or aesthetics, but Kantian theoretical philosophy. For Rickert, what determines an historical object as a properly historical object is its ‘value-relevance’ – that is, within the context of some broader Weltanschauung – because “not all individual realities are the object of history”. Rather, “the historian has to discriminate some objects or other from the infinite manifold in order to represent them historically. His real scientific work would begin only after the selection was made”. And it is precisely this cultural dimension to theoretical work that Rickert believed Kant neglected in the first Critique, that is, at least insofar as history-as-individualizing is concerned with explaining specific notable events, as opposed to the general laws of natural science.

Rickert’s other key contribution is to reorient the focus of transcendental philosophy onto the concept of givenness. That is, Rickert does not characterize his project as an ‘Erkenntnistheorie’ because he is concerned with some sceptical threat, nor with concepts like justification or reliability, as we find in

11 Rickert, ‘Concept Formation in History’, 332.
12 Ibid., 332.
13 Compare the respective tables in KrV, §§9 and §10, e.g.
14 Rickert, ‘Concept Formation in History’, 331.
15 Ibid., 357.
contemporary epistemology. Instead, Rickert is concerned with the higher-order question of what it means for some region of objects to be ‘given’ for a particular science.\(^\text{17}\) Where biologists are concerned with living matter and historians with relevant sources, what are the categories that are implicit for that givenness? So, just as intuitions in Kant are immediately given as the ‘matter’ for sensibility, and space and time are elucidated as its pure forms – that is, as “the condition[s] of the possibility of appearances”\(^\text{18}\) – in turn, Rickert wanted to probe the givenness of the divisions between academic disciplines and explain their possibility. In short, Rickert’s aim is to provide a systematic account of the sum of Erkenntnis as such, elucidating its interconnections and justified from transcendental grounds.

Shifting back to Heidegger, we can already make a superficial parallel insofar as his mature work also begins from an anti-naturalist perspective. However, as we will see, Heidegger in the 1920s pushed this tendency much further than the conceptual resources of neo-Kantianism would allow. After all, as commonly understood, what marks out the originality of Heidegger’s work develops from his move away from neo-Kantianism. As Frede says of Heidegger’s thesis and habilitation, “his early work, if not actually dull, is at least rather conventional and must look at first blush as of historical interest at best […] Had Heidegger done no more, he would rightly have vanished without a trace in the archives”.\(^\text{19}\) There are dissenting views: Lyne argues, e.g., not only that Rickert was an important influence on the development of fundamental ontology, but that fundamental ontology furthermore builds upon Rickert’s Erkenntnistheorie. For Lyne, Rickert’s concern with the structure of givenness tracks Heidegger’s later concern with the question of the meaning of being.\(^\text{20}\) Ultimately, I do believe that Rickert’s influence on Heidegger ends up being somewhat marginal at best. But it is nevertheless instructive to see why Heidegger was compelled to move away from neo-Kantianism, because what we also begin to see is a key

\(^{17}\) *Ibid.*, 211.

\(^{18}\) *KrV*, A24/B39.


theme that often resurfaces whenever Heidegger criticizes prior philosophers. That is, a repeated criticism of Heidegger’s is to object that the conceptual resources available are simply insufficient for the task at hand. We will see that Heidegger also mounts this objection regarding both Husserl and Dilthey, but it is first directed towards Rickert. And what this allows the young Heidegger to do, in short, is to extract the positive from the negative, i.e., to specify what he wants to philosophically establish as a result of what he disposes of.

To show this, let’s start in dialogue with Lyne’s position that Rickert may have been an essential influence. Bearing in mind that his aim is to draw substantial parallels between Rickert’s conception of givenness and Heidegger’s 1920s conception of being, a typical example of his approach can be seen here:

“[For Rickert,] the epistemologist does not focus on any particular type of given thing – that is the job of the different empirical sciences – but on how such givenness is understood. The epistemologist is thus not concerned with any particular object, but the meaning of the very objectivity of objects within empirical science, and thus ultimately not with any particular being or entity, but rather with the meaning of the being of beings as implicitly understood in the broad context of the subject’s cognitive sensitivity to what is […] For Rickert, the Being of what is given, is not some hidden causal ground of appearances, but refers rather to what it means for an object to be given in experience, such that it constitutes a standard for how the subject ought to judge”.\(^{21}\)

Lyne’s reading thus depends upon drawing an analogy between Rickert’s *Erkenntnistheorie* and Heidegger’s mature conception of fundamental ontology. On the one hand, Rickert’s account of givenness is expounded in terms of a transcendental account of scientific knowledge. On the other (and as we will see), Heidegger in *Being and Time* also explains ontological priority in transcendental terms. Given this purported parallelism, Lyne’s claim is that Rickert and Heidegger were involved in much the same project. Or alternatively, insofar as Rickert searched for the transcendental conditions on the basis of which

scientific objects are given to scientists, Lyne claims that this in turn corresponds to the meaning of the *being* of scientific objects. He wants to dispute the standard story that Heidegger moved away from the epistemology of neo-Kantianism by claiming instead that Rickert’s project *was always covertly ontological*;²² and in such a way that one can make key parallels with Heidegger’s account by 1927. Indeed, Lyne attributes the discovery of the ontological difference to Rickert, i.e., the claim there is a distinction to be made between the meaning of being on the one hand and entities themselves on the other.²³ This is a foundational distinction that Heidegger introduces in the opening pages of *Being and Time* and is essential to getting the project off the ground.²⁴ Insofar as Lyne attempts to apply Heidegger’s terminology to Rickert, sciences are concerned with the ‘ontic’, where the *Erkenntnistheorie* itself is Rickert’s ontology. Therefore, at least considering the broad terms of Heidegger’s project, fundamental ontology for Lyne is intended to be read as less of a departure from neo-Kantianism than we have been led to suppose.

But in this passage, we get a sense of the speed at which Lyne shifts from a standard interpretation of Rickert to incorporating more radically ontological language. And we might question the extent to which this move is warranted. Is there a substantive connection between Rickert’s conception of ‘givenness’ and claims about the ‘objectivity of objects’ (a term Heidegger deploys in the *Kantbook* to explain the ontological underpinnings of Kant)?²⁵ Is it fair to claim that Rickert’s *Erkenntnistheorie* can tell us anything about ‘the meaning of the being of entities’ in the sense that Heidegger in 1927 would intend that phrase to be used? And if Rickert is doing ontology, why did he instead consider it a theory of knowledge?

To assess those questions, we firstly need to introduce Heidegger’s conception of ontology and consider the extent to which it coheres with Rickert’s philosophy. Although the question of ontology will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapter, for now, we can begin with Heidegger’s claim in *Being

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²² Although it goes without saying that Lyne also recognizes the additional influence of Husserl (cf. *Ibid.*, 204).
²⁵ *Ga3*, 74/52.
that ontology concerns “that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood”. Insofar as Rickert is concerned with transcendental conditions, understood ontologically, we might take it that ‘that on the basis of which’ refers to the synthetic a priori, i.e., the underlying conditions necessary for the possibility of entities. And given we have already seen Heidegger claim that transcendental philosophy = ontology, can we read this as claiming necessarily that transcendental conditions = ontological conditions? And if that is so, can we further take it that Rickert consequently was engaging with ontology, at least regarding the objects of empirical sciences, even if only in a limited sense?

The central issue is this: Rickert and Heidegger (by the late 1920s) have fundamentally different readings of Kant, and even if Heidegger is right to think that transcendental philosophy = ontology, this does not consequently mean that such a thought applies to Rickert. For on the one hand, transcendental conditions do ground Heidegger’s ontology. But on the other, as Lyne recognizes, fundamental ontology is not only about the ‘objectivity of objects’ (even whilst Heidegger would only use such terminology when discussing Kant), but furthermore its relationship to the concept of meaning. And for Heidegger, ‘meaning’ is a technical term. As he puts it in Being and Time:

“When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the being of Dasein – that is, when they have come to be understood – we say that they have meaning. But that which is understood, taken strictly is not the meaning but the entity, or alternatively, being. Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself. That which can be articulated in a disclosure which we understand, we call ‘meaning’. The concept of meaning embraces the formal existential framework of what necessarily belongs to that which an understanding interpretation articulates”.

There are numerous elements we ought to highlight here: firstly, meaning for Heidegger is a transcendental structure. For if we have the Copernican Revolution in mind, alongside the fact that ‘disclosure’ for Heidegger refers to Dasein’s

\begin{footnotes}
\item[26] SZ, 6/25-6.
\item[27] Ibid., 151/192-3.
\end{footnotes}
ability-to-be the entity on the basis of which meaning is possible, the basic idea seems to be that the individuation of meaning is that which makes possible an understanding of entities. Secondly, Heidegger’s claim that meaning is a ‘formal existential framework’ connotes Kant’s use of ‘form’ in the first *Critique*. For example, Kant claims the form of appearance is “that which allows the manifold of appearance to be ordered in certain relations”. That is, a ‘form’ for Kant refers to whatever condition sits behind or structures some particular ‘matter’ so that it can be given. Analogously, meaning for Heidegger is a foundational ontological structure of Dasein which is the transcendental product of its interpretation of world. Therefore, understood in those terms, the ‘meaning of the objectivity of objects’ (or otherwise, ‘the meaning of the being of entities’) bears an essential relation to the conditions for the interpretation of entities by Dasein on the formal-ontological level, where its (so to speak) ‘matter’ is provided through phenomenological encounter.

But even shorn of Heidegger’s terminology, is it fair to say that Rickert is concerned with the meaning of the objectivity of scientific objects (in Heidegger’s sense) insofar as they are ‘given’ to the scientist? I argue not, because where Heidegger’s ontological reading of Kant takes it that the conditions for our intentionality coincide with the ontological conditions for the world, the reason Rickert’s *Erkenntnistheorie* is meaningfully a theory of knowledge is because he remains within the interpretation that Kant does not provide a grounding for the world in its most fundamental sense. Instead, for Rickert, Kant provides a theory of cognition that grounds only the sciences. Rickert’s issue with naturalism (whether Kantian or otherwise) is not, as Heidegger later argues, that there is a more fundamental level of meaning given synthetically a priori by Dasein that makes regional ontologies possible. Rather, Rickert’s concern is only that there is ‘more’ to science than Kant allows. Even if Rickert can escape the charge of naturalism, he still remains within the realm of a scientism that is anathema to Heidegger’s mature work. At root, Heidegger’s conception of meaning only gets off the ground if there is some aspect to human experience which comes prior to theorizing, where this concern does not enter into Rickert’s conceptual

28 Ibid., 132-3/171.
29 *KrV*, A20/B34.
30 See Chapter Three for my full account of this claim.
scheme. Moreover, to posit such a close relationship between ontology and intentionality equally supposes a key \textit{phenomenological} influence. In both cases, then, Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant is defined against how Rickert conceives of Kant’s project.

But this is all in 1927: what took place in the prior decade that not only led to Heidegger’s break from neo-Kantianism, but led to Heidegger ending up in an almost incommensurable philosophical context? In short, Heidegger could not square the limitations of the conceptual resources of neo-Kantianism with his increasingly wide-ranging philosophical ambitions, such that the search for a new method became almost inevitable. Because this underlying concern with \textit{being} is present even in Heidegger’s work supervised by Rickert. Heidegger’s habilitation concerns Duns Scotus’s doctrine of the categories, e.g., which is a further development of Aristotle’s account. And Heidegger cites Aristotelian metaphysics as precisely that which first sparked his interest in ontology. For both Aristotle and Duns Scotus, the question of being begins from the thought that “there are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’”, and whilst Aristotle’s \textit{Categories} sets out what he considers to be those fundamental ‘senses’, it is altogether less clear how he ended up with that particular set of categories and why. Duns Scotus, by contrast, not only expands out the fundamental categories but furthermore argues for their veracity by incorporating them into a broader account of meaning and intentionality. So, where Aristotle’s categories are often couched in linguistic terms – for example, substance is defined as “that which is neither \textit{said} of a subject nor in a subject” – this relation of ontology to language and the subject is never explored. For Duns Scotus, by contrast, it is exactly those relations he aims to establish. As Frede reads Duns Scotus, “the categories of reality cannot simply be \textit{read off} nature, as they were for Aristotle, but they are obviously also read \textit{into} nature by us”.

\begin{thebibliography}{1}
\bibitem{31} Ga14, 93/74.
\bibitem{32} Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, 1003a33.
\bibitem{33} We will deal with Aristotle in much greater detail in the following chapter.
\bibitem{34} Consequently, one could consider Duns Scotus an essential predecessor not only of Heidegger, but of Kant too (even if only indirectly).
\end{thebibliography}
distinguishes the *ratio significandi* (the meanings of the categories themselves) as conditioning the *ratio intelligendi* (how they are cognitively understood), such that both of those constitute the *ratio essendi* (the mode of the being of the entity itself). According to Duns Scotus, not Rickert, we find the first inkling of the idea that ontological relations are to be established by means of intentionality; that entities have to be understood as *intentional objects* such that their being depends upon the structure of our understanding.

All of which is to say: whilst Duns Scotus is still tied to formal logic in a way the mature Heidegger is resolutely not, we can see in his account of intentionality a jumping off point for Heidegger’s account of meaning above. Moreover, Duns Scotus signposts a way of dealing with the question of the categories (that he, Heidegger, Kant, and the neo-Kantians share) which not only has an ontological character, but also a proto-transcendental one. Rickert and Duns Scotus’s treatments of the categories conflict with one another, along the axis of epistemology vs. ontology. And as Heidegger begins to grapple with Aristotle’s question of the equivocity of being – and thus the *ontological* meaning of the categories – his philosophical concerns effectively outgrow neo-Kantianism. Where Rickert sees Kant as dealing with only natural science, and he diligently expands the structure of the categories to further account for the historical, Heidegger (through Aristotle and Duns Scotus) returns to the root of the categories’ function from a different perspective: the *question of ontological constitution*. For taking over two centuries of Kant interpretation as a whole, there is little consensus as to whether Kant himself meant for his categories to be understood as epistemological or ontological concepts. And where for Rickert they are simply (and only) the *a priori* contributions for cognition, at the same time, Heidegger’s own interests expose the fundamental limitations of neo-Kantianism. That is, where an aim of neo-Kantianism was to account for the sciences without being subservient to them, this *post hoc* treatment of the sciences ultimately leaves neo-Kantianism with an inability to account for what Heidegger was beginning to see was the fundamental question of philosophy: what is the meaning of being?

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37 Ibid., 48.
38 Ibid., 50.
3. Heidegger and Husserl: Breaking the Primacy of the Theoretical

“The primacy of the theoretical must be broken, but not in order to proclaim the primacy of the practical, and not in order to introduce something that shows the problems from a new side, but because the theoretical itself and as such refers back to something pre-theoretical”

Martin Heidegger

Three years separate Heidegger’s habilitation and his earliest extant lectures, and in the passage above, we can not only see a more confident Heidegger, but perhaps the first breakthrough to the key phenomenological theme of fundamental ontology. But this outward confidence belies the central problematic that Heidegger has to confront: without the neo-Kantian guide, and with the question of the meaning of being gaining prominence in the background, what is the direction of Heidegger’s thought going into the 1920s? Going through the 1920s, one sees the gradual refinement of his project, but here in 1919, we find the first insight which guides Heidegger’s methodological approach: the critique of the primacy of the theoretical to philosophy.

It is difficult to overstate quite how important this move is for the early Heidegger. This critique is not only mobilized against his previous neo-Kantianism, but also against the two thinkers who have a positive influence on his method going forward: Husserl and Dilthey. Heidegger terms his new method ‘phenomenology’, but it ought to be noted how critical Heidegger can be of Husserl himself, and all because of this latent commitment to the theoretical.

Similarly, much of what Heidegger replaces in Husserl’s methodology develops from Dilthey’s Lebensphilosophie, but that too is criticized along similar lines. In short: the critique of the theoretical is used to specify how projects Heidegger is sympathetic to nevertheless fall short of their own aims, i.e., the primacy of the

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39 Ga56/57, 59/50.
40 Ibid., 111-2/93-4.
41 Ga63, 45/35-6.
theoretical individuates a categorial structure insufficient for the task at hand. Consequently, breaking this primacy is the key move which inaugurates Heidegger’s unique contribution to phenomenology, insofar as both his negative and positive projects end up defined in relation to it.

But since Heidegger’s first original contributions to phenomenology involve a rejection of key aspects of Husserl’s method, we firstly need to understand Husserl’s project. Husserl begins with a dictum clearly appropriated from neo-Kantianism: “we must go back to the things themselves”. This firstly displays Husserlian phenomenology’s always ambiguous relationship to Kant. Indeed, Husserl later characterized phenomenology as a form of transcendental idealism. But here, his initial conception of phenomenology was set up in opposition to neo-Kantianism (the ‘going back to…’), and concurrently claimed (or at least aimed for) access to things themselves. Superficially, however, we can see how this dictum would appeal to a Heidegger dissatisfied with the limitations of neo-Kantianism. For Husserl’s basic aim was to suspend our traditional philosophical assumptions, i.e., to work through the phenomena directly in order to work back to and access directly the fundamental structures of human intentionality. Consequently, the guiding dictum of phenomenology signalled a return to philosophical foundations just at the moment Heidegger was searching for new grounds.

Moreover, where neo-Kantianism remained within the relative safety Kant’s pre-existing system, phenomenology begins with greater ambitions. Husserl’s project begins in earnest with a critique of the dominant methods of philosophy, and furthermore claimed that in order to establish “philosophy as

44 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second Book, trans. Richard Rojcewicz & André Schuwer (Dordrecht, Boston & London: Kluwer, 1989), 417. [Quite how Husserlian phenomenology is such an idealism is still a question with intense debate, beyond the scope of this thesis, and indeed, Heidegger describes the disappointment many of Husserl’s followers felt following the claim of this idealism in Ga14, 53/44.]
rigorous science’, Husserl termed the sum of our pre-existing assumptions our ‘natural attitude’. But how do we access the ‘things themselves’? In short, we utilize a description of experience in principle shorn of those everyday assumptions as our new method in order to investigate the real ‘essence’ of things. Indeed, Husserl termed phenomenology the “science of essences”, the idea being that what is philosophically enlightening is not the imposition ‘from above’ of a given schematic in which we (for Husserl, artificially) force order onto things. For example, we cannot assume the veracity of the Cartesian dualistic language that we use when we colloquially speak about our states of mind. Rather, we begin ‘from below’, from the specificities of the experiences themselves, through which essences are revealed as such insofar as they are “directly given to us in intuition”. In effect, then, just as Descartes and then Kant after him had attempted, Husserl wanted to provide philosophy with entirely new grounds.

With this suspension of our philosophical assumptions (or as Husserl termed it, bracketing), phenomenology essentially begins with a process of reduction. Where Descartes had suspended all possibly doubtable beliefs in the first Meditation in order to establish the fundamental, indubitable ground of all knowledge, Husserl in turn believed he could ground philosophy as that ‘rigorous science’ on an analogous suspension. As he argues, even if I am deceived regarding the truth of what I experience, what cannot be denied is that I experience. Consequently, a description and analysis of the nature of human intentionality as it is experienced is intended to circumvent not only the problem of radical scepticism, but moreover to demarcate the limits of possible knowledge, and as such, our ‘world’.

So, we can see the superficial sense in which the ex-Rickertian Heidegger might be drawn to phenomenology: in this search for a new method, Husserl’s

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48 Ibid., 33.
49 Ibid., 33.
50 Ibid., 59.
51 Ibid., 60-2.
aims demand a return to the foundations of philosophical practice just as Heidegger’s ambitions appear to be constrained by the neo-Kantian paradigm. And we can see Heidegger latching onto the intellectual freedom that phenomenology provides. He describes phenomenology on multiple occasions as a possibility, with all its allusions of entering into the unknown, alongside the idea of suspending all theoretical assumptions as latching onto the notion of “that which is ontically closest and well known, is ontologically farthest and not known at all”. Or in simpler terms: whilst our immediate intentionality is what we are most intimately acquainted with, two millennia of philosophical baggage has, in its own way, alienated us from the nature of the phenomena themselves. For Heidegger, the possibility of phenomenology – of returning to the ‘primordial’ structures of our engagement with the world – latches onto a fundamental ambiguity in the nature of our experience not captured by theorizing methods. Phenomenological reflection ought to demonstrate that we are more than mere ‘subjects’ amongst ‘objects’; that we are more than homo sapiens; that we are more than an agglomeration of drives, or desires, or dispositions. Rather, to understand ourselves, we must exonerate all theoretical assumptions and return to the basic phenomenality on the basis of which all consequent thought and theorizing finds its fundamental ground. And for Heidegger, this means that we must return to the phenomenology of human life. As he says, phenomenology ought to be directed towards “the primordial intention of genuine life, the primordial bearing of life-experience and life as such, the absolute sympathy with life that is identical with life-experience”. If through Duns Scotus, Heidegger first sees the connection between intentionality and ontology, the possibility of phenomenology in turn secures the root of intentionality itself: the nature of lived experience.

In these earliest texts, Heidegger’s critique of the theoretical begins to develop in earnest once he makes this connection of the primordiality of life to our phenomenological engagement with the world. And it should be noted that this concern with the theoretical is initially found in Husserl, who claimed, “in these investigations, we keep theories – here the word designates preconceived

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52 See Ga20, 184/135-6; SZ, 38/63; Ga56/57, 219/187.
53 SZ, 43/69.
54 Ga60, 13-4/10.
55 Ga56/57, 110/92.
opinions of any sort – strictly at a distance”.

We can see how far removed this is from Rickert’s starting point. Where Rickert’s lasting contribution was, in effect, to provide a transcendental logic of history, Husserl’s aim is to avoid the relative safety of the pre-existing Kantian system – indeed, of any ‘system’ – to follow the phenomena where they lead. The lecture notes of one of Heidegger’s students, Franz-Joseph Brecht, are telling in this regard, setting out the stark dividing lines that neo-Kantianism and phenomenology inhabited at this time for Heidegger:

“Phenomenological philosophy and worldview are opposed to one another.

Worldview: this is bringing to a standstill […] Life, as the history of the spirit in its transcendental expression, is objectivized and frozen in a definite moment […]

But philosophy can progress only through an absolute sinking into life as such, for phenomenology is never concluded, only preliminary, it always sinks itself into the preliminary”.

What is telling here is how Heidegger sets up the opposition. Insofar as Rickert’s neo-Kantianism is concerned with the logical space of historical thought, and consequently with uncovering the Weltanschauung of an age, Heidegger identifies this as the antithesis of life. Rather than taking up the phenomenon of life with all its messy, enigmatic connotations, neo-Kantianism is ‘frozen’ into its own dogmatic conceptual scheme. Worse than that, Rickert objectivizes, which is to say: treating history as if it has a formal logic transforms the activity of life into an object, as if it is something to be studied from afar as opposed to participated in. Phenomenology, by contrast, is explicated dynamically: where the rigid structures of an Erkenntnislehre act against the intrinsically temporal and transitory nature of life, phenomenology ‘sinks into life’. It is this taking up of life in its very ambiguity which allows philosophy to progress, such that Heidegger at this moment seems to think that what philosophy is about is life. And it is furthermore

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56 Husserl, Ideas I, 56.

in that sense whereby, in the final sentence, Heidegger identifies phenomenology with philosophy itself.

But in turn, a central element of Heidegger’s engagement with Husserl is the extent to which he is disappointed by the fact Husserl does not make good on his promises. Ultimately, for Heidegger, Husserl ends up enmeshed within a theoretical system which was supposed to be the antithesis of the phenomenological project. Even in these early stages, Heidegger claims that the possibility of phenomenology is liable to its own subversion in the form of “a forced orthodox dogmatics with its apologetic principles, a ‘perversion’ for which a desire has recently begun to stir in phenomenology”.

And in his 1919/20 lecture course, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger opens the lectures with the claim, “*Basic Problems of Phenomenology* – the most burning and inextinguishable, the most original and ultimate basic problem of phenomenology – is phenomenology *itself* for itself”.

These allusions to dogmatism and the ‘problem’ of phenomenology are thinly veiled references to the fact that Husserl ultimately overlaid the basic phenomenological project with a highly formalized structure of human intentionality such that, for Heidegger, he ultimately did not take up phenomenology’s ‘possibility’. Heidegger develops this thought across his lectures in the early 1920s, reaching its zenith in the 1925 *History of the Concept of Time*, where he claims, “even phenomenological research stands under the constraints of an old tradition […] In the basic task of determining its ownmost field, therefore, phenomenology is unphenomenological!”.

However, we ought to be careful here. Although I agree with Heidegger that there is an overreliance on quasi-Cartesian concepts in Husserl’s early work, at the same time, Husserl’s conception of his own project is far from static. For whilst in earlier texts like the *Ideas*, we do find the sorts of puzzling juxtapositions Heidegger has in mind, by the time we get to the *Crisis of the European Sciences* in 1936, many of these have been replaced. To provide some examples: in the *Ideas*, after Husserl introduces the phenomenological reduction, he immediately follows that up with the question of how “‘pure’ consciousness, and subsequently the whole

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58 Ga9, 36/31.

59 Ga58, 1/2 (my translation).

60 Ga20, 178/128.
phenomenological region, [is] accessible to us?61 It is unclear from where, phenomenologically speaking, Husserl arrived at this notion of ‘pure consciousness’. Consequently, Heidegger’s charge of dogmatism does hold some weight. But by the Crisis, Husserl is alternatively situating consciousness within a Lebenswelt that is the necessarily intersubjective horizon for our activities.62 This concept distinct from, but also not entirely alien to, Heidegger’s own concept of being-in-the-world. The question of the degree to which this career-long shift in Husserl’s work is down to Heidegger goes far beyond the aims of this thesis, but there are two related points we ought to make.

Firstly, we can’t take Heidegger’s criticisms of Husserl simply at face value. At the very least, we have to be careful to restrict them to the relevant (early) texts Heidegger presumably has in mind. And secondly, what these criticisms nevertheless show is how resolutely Heidegger’s own thinking is focused on reaching the relevant phenomena ‘primordially’, which is to say, what Heidegger sees in the ‘possibility’ of phenomenology is not just that we must return to intuition as our starting point. As we will see when Heidegger returns to Kant, the key focus is not on the Aesthetic. Instead, even before the idea of a ‘fundamental ontology’ is present in Heidegger’s thinking with any great clarity, he is already asking the question of how to understand our factical life as that from which philosophy begins. This question “is not philosophy at all, but […] something preliminary that runs ahead of it and has its own reason for being”.63 Heidegger sees in the possibility of phenomenology something absolutely basic; he is already concerned with that originary datum in 1919. As Scharff says, “what is remarkable is that […] Heidegger’s answer is already a non-Husserlian – not a post-Husserlian – answer. He brings something from Dilthey to Husserl’s work, to further a promising tendency he finds in it”.64 We will treat Dilthey’s influence in the following section. Suffice it to say for now, what Heidegger will do with

61 Husserl, Ideas I, 66.
63 Gatz, 20/16.
this concern to understand life pre-theoretically is to connect it up to a hermeneutic as the methodology for understanding this phenomenon primordially.

But what, in the end, does Heidegger take from Husserl? Because on the face of it, he does dispense with much of what is in the contemporary texts, even if the later Husserl eventually gets closer to the early Heidegger. In short: where I believe Heidegger stands is that Husserl’s philosophical instincts are right, but the ‘letter’ of Husserl’s account does not always cohere with its intended ‘spirit’. So, where Husserl begins from the natural attitude and uses this to justify the requirement for a reduction, Heidegger argues instead that the natural attitude is not our starting point, phenomenologically speaking. Perhaps, if we are asked to reflect on what we are, because we were taught biology in school, we might say homo sapiens or ‘we’re really just intelligent apes’. But that is already a reflective act, and so for Heidegger, that claim itself does not locate our pre-theoretical comportment. In our activity, as opposed to our thought, we do not inhabit the natural attitude. What Heidegger wants to do is to make that phenomenon transparent. In the activity of living, we do not act in accordance with some consequent theoretical definition: we simply live. Life should be our point of focus. As stated in the passage which began this section: “the theoretical itself and as such refers back to something pre-theoretical”. Pre-theoretical, factual life comes before the natural attitude or the requirement for a reduction. But we could still argue that thought is Husserlian in spirit, if not in letter: what Husserl recognizes is that philosophy has gone wrong somewhere along the way. For Heidegger, Husserl diagnoses the problem, even if his remedy is not entirely successful. What Husserl does do, then, is open up the problematic field that Heidegger will be concerned with for at least the next decade, perhaps even longer. But in the end, the way to that for Heidegger is not through the phenomenological reduction, but instead a hermeneutic of factual life.

4. Heidegger and Dilthey: A Phenomenology of Life-Experience?

Let’s take stock: to the extent that the German academy of Heidegger’s time is defined by the debate between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, Heidegger finds himself from his habilitation through his earliest lectures traversing that

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65 Ga56/57, 59/50.
dichotomy. Firstly, he rejects the limitations inherent to Rickert’s project once his own has greater ambitions, whilst also criticizing Husserl for not achieving the fullest expression that the fundamental principles of phenomenology purport to establish. In both cases, Heidegger becomes dissatisfied with their commitment to the theoretical, because what he sees phenomenology indicate is a more fundamental level to experience that Rickert never considers and the early Husserl misses the mark in locating. So far, so negative. But it is nevertheless a thought that persists, with one of Heidegger’s successors, Merleau-Ponty, characterizing phenomenology along these lines: “if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression”.66 For Heidegger, at least around 1920, that ‘basic experience’ we have seen identified as life, insofar as it can ambiguously be both banal and enigmatic; life as that which precedes theorizing, with its own phenomenology in our most ordinary comportments that the tradition has in turn overlooked. This is in opposition to the philosophies of mind that construct complex taxonomies about how mental acts relate to propositions or how minds relate to bodies, which, in effect, treat humans as objects of inquiry rather than living entities. Instead, Heidegger wants to tap into how we experience in the moment of the experience itself, which he contends is passed over in the inherent abstractedness of theorizing.67 Contra Husserl, Heidegger claims, “it must be asked how human Dasein is given in specifically personal experience”.68 And given Heidegger relates phenomenology to life, it is perhaps unsurprising that he further claims that “Dilthey was the first to understand the aims of phenomenology”.69

Dilthey was, of course, not a phenomenologist. Indeed, he was a generation older than Husserl. But as is often the case with Heidegger’s claims about his predecessors, they can be more revealing about his own thought at the time

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68 *Ga20*, 162/117.
and various thinkers’ places within it than anything else. A generation later, Husserl sets out the aims of phenomenology, and yet before that Dilthey — with his *Lebensphilosophie* — has supposedly understood them. So, given the above: is the key to understanding the origins of Heidegger’s concrete phenomenological method instead to be found in Dilthey?

In what is definitely on its way to becoming a running in-joke for Heidegger, Dilthey too is ultimately assessed to have latched onto something exactly right about human experience, but is nevertheless constrained by the conceptual resources of the theoretical attitude. Therefore, again, Heidegger cannot be characterized as an orthodox Diltheyan just as he is not an orthodox Husserlian. That is: insofar as Dilthey comes to see life as ‘irrational’, Heidegger runs the argument that, again, this supposed irrationality is only ‘revealed’ insofar as Dilthey does not think beyond the strictures of the theoretical attitude. Life only *appears* ‘irrational’ to the extent that the theoretical attitude is incommensurate with the phenomenology of life.

But what we ought to see here are the foundations of Heidegger’s phenomenological method as they develop through his predecessors. Heidegger’s phenomenological method is ultimately a synthesis of what he finds compelling in Husserl and Dilthey, but expressed through a conceptual taxonomy that is sensitive to the primordiality of the pre-theoretical. That is, for Heidegger, the conceptual limitations of the theoretical will suggest the requirement for a new philosophical terminology. We have to think beyond the way terms such as subject and object, *logos* and rationality, force us into phenomenologically unsatisfactory modes of thought. Not only does the canonical terminology locate the wrong phenomena; it obscures the right ones entirely. In other words, Heidegger’s thought takes the direction that it is not just about modifying, e.g., what was passed down from Husserl and Dilthey, but that we have to completely reinvent the conceptual space we have unthinkingly assumed to be self-evident.

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72 *Ga63*, 45/35-6.
73 We see this throughout *SZ*: traditional philosophical vocabulary is almost always presented with scare quotes.
And once those elements are in place, we ought to be able to see a Heidegger who is assuredly working within his own, original way, such that, in 1922, we will see the first clear statement of what will become the project of fundamental ontology.\textsuperscript{74}

But firstly, regarding Dilthey: his hermeneutic approach to human life – that is, interpreting human life as the primary question of philosophy – had as profound an effect on Heidegger’s thinking as the more famous influence of Husserl. Indeed, I had to presuppose much of it in the previous section, which already demonstrates the extent to which the Husserlian and Diltheyan influences become inextricable in Heidegger’s mature work. That is to say, the possibility of phenomenology motivates the requirement for an interpretation of human life. Where Heidegger rejects the phenomenological reduction because he posits a more foundational level of engagement, the question of life enters philosophical field of vision precisely because it is the nature of a specifically lived experience that the early Husserl avoids (along with the rest of the tradition).\textsuperscript{75}

If phenomenology is a return to foundations, or if phenomenology is to access ‘things themselves’ in their primordiality, then what must be considered first is life, the interpretation of our comportment when living, because it is the way we access the world immediately and non-abstractedly. And this is a thought that follows through to \textit{Being and Time}, where Heidegger claims that a “‘philosophy of life’ […] says about as much as ‘the botany of plants’”.\textsuperscript{76}

The key point we find in Dilthey, however, that really affects the methodological distinctiveness of Heidegger’s phenomenology,\textsuperscript{77} is that what life requires (philosophically speaking) is a hermeneutic. On this point, Dilthey was significantly influenced by Schleiermacher, who developed a hermeneutic method not concerned with highly formalized procedures of interpretation, of strict rules to be applied to any text. Rather, he claimed that interpretations should aim for

\textsuperscript{74} That is: \textit{Ga62}, 346ff/358ff.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Ga20}, 207-8/154-5. [Of course, Husserl does eventually introduce the aforementioned concept of the \textit{Lebenswelt}, but not before the early 1920s].

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{SZ}, 46/72.

\textsuperscript{77} That is, beyond the critique of the theoretical and the turn to life.
“the art of understanding”. Schleiermacher saw the interpretation of a text as a discourse between the reader and the text; mediating between what the text says and what the writer intended, that is, what they actually thought.

On this point, we can see this general approach both mimicked and then radicalized in Heidegger’s engagements with the history of philosophy. For example, he says of interpreting an historical text, “what must be decisive is what [the text] sets before our eyes as still unsaid, in and through what has been said”. This will become a particularly pertinent question regarding Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant as we reach his re-emergence. Many of Heidegger’s claims are controversial, e.g., the notion that the imagination is the ‘common root’ of intuition and understanding, as the grounds of Kant’s transcendental ontology. Kant never makes that claim, but Heidegger contends it is nevertheless present yet ‘unsaid’ in the first Critique. Unpacking this claim and the objections will come into view in Chapter 3, but suffice it to say about Heidegger’s hermeneutic presuppositions for now: in this and many other instances, we can see Heidegger not only partaking in Schleiermacher’s claim that we have to mediate between text and intention, but going beyond it. In many instances, Heidegger pushes the thought of a philosopher to its ultimate limit. But whether or not one thinks this is a legitimate move, what I believe makes Heidegger’s interpretations of the history of philosophy compelling is how he treats whoever his subject is as if they are interlocutors in the same room. Through this, Heidegger brings life to texts that might otherwise be treated as antiquarian artefacts, and demonstrates their relevance to our contemporary concerns.

But beyond the literal interpretations of texts, Heidegger – through Dilthey – brings a hermeneutic approach to phenomenology as well. Where, for Husserl, phenomenology supposedly concerns providing a description of experience (a term he always left suspiciously nebulous), for Heidegger this is insufficient, because any such description will not just require but in turn presuppose an interpretation of it. As Guignon writes: “human existence [for Heidegger] is

79 Ibid., 2-3.
80 Ga3, 201/140.
81 Ibid., 138-41/97-9; 160/112.
regarded as like a meaningful text”, and he, “[portrays] our life-world as a holistic field of ‘internal relations’ in which we find ourselves most originally as place-holders in a wider field of significance relations”.  

Or as Heidegger puts it in Being and Time, “the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation […] ‘hermeneutic’, as an interpretation of Dasein’s being, has the […] sense of an analytic of the existentiality of existence”.  


84 Ibid., 148-9/188-90.
Whilst his concerns with the pre-theoretical, the primordiality of life, and the hermeneutic possibilities of phenomenology all appear earlier, these lectures are a significant breakthrough insofar as Heidegger applies all of them in interconnection to the case of Christian life-experience as a paradigmatic mode of living. And one can see why it is a classic example. Since Christian life comes into being through conversion or confirmation as a Christian, Christian life has a temporal structure, with death as a moment of judgement and more broadly, with the imminent eschaton. Similarly, Christian life-experience also intrinsically involves an awareness of life. Heidegger terms this awareness the phenomenon of ‘having-become’. That is, in having-become(-a-Christian), factual life is able to be disclosed in such a way that life as a phenomenon is accessible, and significantly (given what comes later for Heidegger), Christian life is disclosed as intrinsically temporal. Christian life “is not only in time but it is time. It focuses on and centres around its having become”. What makes life life in Christian experience precisely is its finitude; in the transformation from an atheistic to religious state, to its future-directedness towards God’s judgement.

And whilst Heidegger is not explicit about this, this intrinsic temporality is paradigmatic for any kind of life. As Féher contends, what is unique about Christian life is the awareness of this fact. Consequently, what it means to live, on a structural level for Heidegger, is to be conditioned by temporality. And as we may be able to anticipate, this recognition of the primordiality of temporality for ontological interpretation is going to constitute the heart of Being and Time.

Again, however, here it first appears in its embryonic form, as a structural presupposition for uniquely Christian life. And yet with this, we can see how far Heidegger has moved on from Rickert. We have moved from Heidegger’s ambitions outgrowing neo-Kantianism, through clarifying his hermeneutic phenomenological methods, and to his earliest tentative steps into recognizing the ontological relevance of human life. And Heidegger has not stopped yet: we have not even arrived at the question of the meaning of being.

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85 That’s not to say there aren’t relevant points to be made in Ga58 and Ga59, e.g., but the interjection of temporality in Ga60 is, I think, transformational.

86 Ga60, 93-8/65-7.


88 Ibid., 118-20.
(nor the rereading of Kant) yet. Nevertheless, the formative methodological presuppositions that will guide the growing project of fundamental ontology have now largely been put into place.

5. Conclusion

As we can see, then, Heidegger’s earliest steps into philosophy already involve a considerable breaking of new ground: Heidegger aims to undercut not only the neo-Kantianism that his ambitions led him to reject, but he furthermore radicalizes the possibilities of phenomenology and hermeneutics. For Heidegger at this point, factual life is seen as a text to be interpreted, and more precisely, a hermeneutic of life is seen as a way to overcome the theoretical. That explains, at least as an introduction, the function of phenomenology as methodology in the early Heidegger. But what about ontology? For we have seen that one crucial moment in Heidegger’s intellectual development arises from this concern with categories that Rickert understands epistemologically, where Heidegger in turn becomes interested in its ontological roots. There is another thread of Heidegger’s thought before the re-emergence of Kant that we need to consider. Accordingly, in the next chapter, I will ask: how and why for Heidegger is the possibility of phenomenology taken up in an explicitly ontological sense?
CHAPTER TWO
Aristotle and the Development of the *Seinsfrage*

1. Aristotle and Fundamental Ontology
Where we are now headed to, we all know. For many of us, the opening pages of *Being and Time* will have been the first Heidegger we ever read. We know the touchstones: the quote from the *Sophist*, the diagnosis of the rot that has slowly set in throughout the history of metaphysics, the relentlessly Heideggerian way of introducing phenomenology by means of its etymology, the suggestions of where Division III would have led. The passages are so familiar, Heidegger’s style so confident, that we conceal the decade of labour that led to it. Because despite its assertive style, Heidegger’s critique of the history of metaphysics is in fact the product of a decade’s frustration with a fundamental category mistake that Heidegger sees repeating itself, a category mistake that he is determined to locate the root of.

And although this thesis argues that fundamental ontology ends up being Kantian to its core, its *question* instead begins from Heidegger’s engagement with Ancient thought. For before 1925, Heidegger’s primary historical interest was not Kant, but Aristotle. Between 1921 and 1926, nearly every lecture course Heidegger gives includes considerable discussion of Aristotle’s philosophy. And like Husserl and Dilthey, Aristotle is another figure where Heidegger’s relationship to him is ambiguous. As we will see, Heidegger identifies Aristotle’s philosophy of time in the *Physics* Δ as the turning point after which metaphysics set off on the wrong course. But at the same time, key elements of Heidegger’s reformulation of the phenomenological method are themselves rooted in his engagement with what he saw as an essentially *Greek* conception of truth. We have

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already seen that it was first Aristotle who set off Heidegger’s interest in ontology, from his famous claim in the *Metaphysics* that “there are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’”. And even as a student, Heidegger developed a preliminary formulation of what will become the question of the meaning of being: “if being is predicated in manifold meanings, then what is its leading fundamental meaning? What does being mean?” Through Aristotle, Heidegger is able to clarify the terms of his project, to situate himself within and yet beyond a tradition he is aiming to overturn. Furthermore, this situation is going to lead to something of a tension: insofar as this project is developing in tandem with Heidegger’s reformulation of phenomenology, in what way can the project meet with the methodology? How can phenomenology – a phenomenology rooted in the hermeneutics of human life – come into contact with a fundamental concern about the unified meaning of being? It will take until 1925 (and the incorporation of a certain philosopher from Königsberg) for Heidegger to resolutely establish that. For now, we need to trace the early development of fundamental ontology in its historical signification, whilst it crystallizes into the defining project of Heidegger’s early career.

2. Where Does Fundamental Ontology Begin?

There are, in essence, two ‘beginnings’ to fundamental ontology. The first develops from the aforementioned quote from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. Here, Heidegger begins from the equivocity of being and consequently frames the *Seinsfrage* in terms of the unity of being as such. The second is how *Being and Time* literally begins, with a quote from Plato’s *Sophist*: “what do you want to signify when you say *being*? Obviously you’ve known for a long time. We thought we did, but now we’re confused”. Each of these beginnings, whilst referring to the same problematic, provides a distinct emphasis. In searching for unity over equivocity, the Aristotle-beginning more clearly specifies the substantive direction of Heidegger’s research. But in focusing on a fundamental *confusion* about being, the Plato-beginning clarifies the philosophical *situation* Heidegger takes us

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4 *Ga14*, 93/74.
to be in. For the Seinsfrage effectively consists of two parts: firstly, we need to consider the precise wording of the question itself, “the question of the meaning of being”\(^6\), which we will discuss shortly. Before that, we need to understand how Heidegger contextualizes his question within a broader critique of the history of metaphysics. Because for Heidegger, the motivation for the Seinsfrage arises not just from a confusion, but a mistake about the nature of being that is raised and then codified in Plato and Aristotle’s work.\(^7\)

We can see the significance of this in the opening pages of Being and Time. Heidegger’s concern about the unity of being does not just arise from a dissatisfaction about a particular moment in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, rather, it is about the influence of Ancient thought in dogmatizing how being is interpreted. There is an historical story that Heidegger wants to tell about the institution of “a dogma […] which not only declares the question about the meaning of being to be superfluous, but sanctions its complete neglect”.\(^8\) And it is moreover telling how the introduction to Being and Time appears almost in draft form in Heidegger’s Plato’s Sophist lectures: Heidegger’s own dissatisfaction with the path the history of metaphysics has taken becomes expressed in terms of the ‘confusion’ of the Eleatic Stranger.\(^9\) The intended analogy is apposite: where the Stranger is frustrated by Theaetetus’s unthinking acceptance of Parmenides’ account of being,\(^10\) for Heidegger, the dogmatic interpretation of being that has guided the history of metaphysics equally generates an aporia about the basic terms of ontology itself. After all, throughout the first introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger is compelled not just to recapitulate but fundamentally reorient the terms of the fundamental question of ontology. Accordingly, the Plato-beginning is something of a rhetorical tool, a way into a question that “we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of”.\(^11\)

But the more philosophically pertinent beginning lies in Aristotle; in particular, once his thought becomes codified by the Scholastics. With this

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\(^6\) SZ, 1/19.
\(^7\) Ibid., 2/21.
\(^8\) Ibid., 2/21.
\(^11\) SZ, 1/19.
connection to Scholasticism, one can perhaps already anticipate one part of the story Heidegger is going to tell. That is, insofar as Aristotle is quite literally for the Scholastics the philosopher, the deficiencies in Aristotle’s account have been passed down and mutated throughout the history of traditional metaphysics such that it is formative on the state of metaphysics contemporary to Heidegger.\(^\text{12}\) In that sense, we might think the key moment for Heidegger actually happens after Aristotle, which would be to say that metaphysics only becomes dogmatic once Aristotle’s philosophy is codified as what philosophy ‘is’. Indeed, Heidegger claims nearly as much: “in the Middle Ages, this uprooted Greek ontology became a fixed body of doctrine”, and whilst “its systematics […] are] by no means a mere joining together of traditional pieces into a single edifice […] its basic conceptions of being have been taken over dogmatically from the Greeks”.\(^\text{13}\) However, this is not the entire story since, at the very least, the seeds of the fundamental mistakes of metaphysics are to be found in Aristotle. At the outset, then, we have a threefold problematic to unpack:

(1) How should we understand Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle and the purported category mistake(s) in Aristotelian metaphysics?

(2) How does Scholasticism set the stage for the persistence of a dogmatic metaphysics?

(3) How does Heidegger bring these historical engagements together into a critique of metaphysics that is not only the motivation for the Seinsfrage, but moreover defines Heidegger’s historical thinking about being for almost his entire career?

Our first question, therefore, is essentially one of origins: is there a particular identifiable moment in Aristotle where metaphysics went awry? Not quite – at least not one moment in one text – but the nexus point for all these issues does boil down to one Aristotelian concept: *ousia.*

\(^\text{12}\) Ibid., 21-2/43-4.

\(^\text{13}\) Ibid., 22/43.
3. Introducing *Ousia*

We will deal with the specific issues concerning *ousia* momentarily, but first, let’s set the stage for how it figures in Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle. “*Ousia*”, Heidegger claims, “is the expression for the basic concept of Aristotelian philosophy”.\(^{14}\) Moreover, “on the basis of *ousia*, we will […] acquire a ground on which to place other basic concepts”.\(^{15}\) *Ousia*, however understood, is taken to be the foundational element of Aristotle’s metaphysics, and indeed, it appears as such across his metaphysical treatises. In the *Categories*, for example, *ousia* is defined as “that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject”.\(^{16}\) And we can see why Heidegger might consider it a ‘ground’, since it is on the basis of *ousia* that Aristotle establishes a metaphysical hierarchy. Namely, Aristotle distinguishes *protai* from *deuterai ousiai*, which designate increasing levels of generality in our categorical predications. For example, the *prote ousia* of “the individual man belongs in a species, man, and animal is a genus of the species; so these – both man and animal – are called *deuterai ousia*”.\(^{17}\) Here, then, the function of *ousia* is to establish relations of priority between distinct metaphysical types.

*Ousia* also appears in Aristotle’s later work. In the *Metaphysics*, after Aristotle recognizes the equivocity of being, he immediately expounds a long list concerning how entities can be understood as modal variations on *ousia*.\(^{18}\) To quote a part: “some things are said to be because they are *ousiai*, others because they are affections of *ousia*, others because they are a process towards *ousia*”, and so on.\(^{19}\) In both cases, *ousia* almost seems to be equated with being, and indeed, Heidegger’s gloss on this is that Aristotle takes *ousia* to designate “the ‘being’ of entities or as ‘beingness’”.\(^{20}\)

However, immediately after this, Heidegger recognizes the fundamental ambiguity in the meaning of *ousia*, and it is precisely because of this that I have, so far, not translated the term. As Derrida says, the translations of *ousia* are

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\(^{14}\) *Ga18*, 22/17.


\(^{16}\) Aristotle, ‘*Categories*’, 2a14. [It ought to be noted that in Chapter One, for simplicity, I translated *ousia* as substance as if it was unproblematic. Now we’re going to see it is not so simple].

\(^{17}\) *Ibid.*, 2a17-19.

\(^{18}\) Aristotle, ‘*Metaphysics*’, 1003b5-23.

\(^{19}\) *Ibid.*, 1003b6-8.

\(^{20}\) *Ga18*, 21/17.
“charged with history”\(^{21}\), not because of the truism that it is a word from an ancient language, but because there is a cross-linguistic development between what each translation designates over two millennia, and those translations track important philosophical changes in the signification of what is, prima facie, designating the same root concept. To explain: the most common translation of ousia into English is ‘substance’ – from the Latin substantia as used by both Roman philosophers and the Scholastics – and yet it is not immediately clear that what we would mean by ‘substance’ is what Aristotle meant by ‘ousia’. Accordingly, this is where the threefold problematic that I set out above begins to intersect: to sufficiently understand the idea that ousia is going to generate almost a domino effect of problems across the history of philosophy, and to understand Heidegger’s critique therein, we cannot simply take Aristotle in isolation. Rather, it almost makes more sense to work backwards: to reverse through the history of ousia in order to specify its initial meaning. Indeed, this is one of Heidegger’s own tactics: he reads Plato’s Sophist through Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, and the 1927 Basic Problems of Phenomenology lectures work back from Kant to Aristotle. To understand ousia, I propose that we make a similar hermeneutic move.

Within that in mind, I argue we can divide Heidegger’s critique of ousia into two key historical stages. Firstly, there is the Scholastic interpretation of ousia as substance, a translation which Heidegger claims “gets peddled round absurdly in the history of philosophy”\(^{22}\). For Heidegger, understanding being as substantiality overwhelmingly avoids the Seinsfrage, and consequently renders traditional metaphysics not properly ‘ontological’. And secondly, we need to treat Heidegger’s own interpretation that ousia in Aristotle is implicitly temporal. But Heidegger also argues that Aristotle’s account of time involves an analogous category mistake. Namely, Heidegger sees Aristotle prioritizing presence (Anwesenheit, Gegenwart) in both its ontological and temporal connotations.\(^{23}\)

In sum, Heidegger’s critical stance towards the history of traditional metaphysics arises from a rejection of the thought that being can merely be reduced to an account of either substance or presence. Indeed, each account is argued to

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\(^{22}\) Ga21, 193/163.

\(^{23}\) SZ, 25/46-7.
involve fundamental category mistakes about how we ought to understand being and how we conceptualize ontology. In both the Plato’s Sophist lectures and then the opening pages of Being and Time, this is what Heidegger implicitly packs into his analogy with the Eleatic Stranger. And that is the thought we now need to motivate: how does Heidegger’s dual critique of ousia lead him to the question of the meaning of being?

4. Heidegger’s Critique of Ousia (I): Substance

Let’s begin from what we know, because Heidegger’s intellectual developments in ontology did not exist in a vacuum separate from his developments in phenomenology that we saw in the previous chapter. We have already seen that the problem of the categories is an ongoing concern for Heidegger: firstly, we saw it in Rickert, where the categories are framed epistemologically in terms of what is requisite a priori for understanding a given science. But we also saw Heidegger turn to its ontological roots in Duns Scotus, where the categories are taken to be formative on an understanding of being (where Duns Scotus is also drawing heavily on Aristotle). Paired with Heidegger’s further ‘Aristotelian’ concern of finding the unity of being within its equivocity, it is perhaps unsurprising that the question of understanding ousia enters Heidegger’s philosophical field of vision. But it is also the case that Heidegger is critical of what the dogmatizing of ousia entails from a very early stage. Already in 1922, Heidegger is claiming that “the research of the Middle Ages, in its leading respects, is constrained within […] the framework of a neo-Scholastically moulded Aristotelianism”.

He also claims that objects ought to “no longer [be] approached as ‘substances’ in a crude sense (an approach, by the way, from which Aristotle was far removed, contrary to what is often taught)”. Moreover, the return to Aristotle is already present here, when he claims that “the philosophy of today’s situation moves inauthentically within the Greek conceptuality”. For Heidegger, this means that we are required to uncover the historical origins of Western metaphysics insofar as they are found in Aristotle.

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24 Ga62, 370/372.
25 Ibid., 367/370.
26 Ibid., 367/370.
27 Ibid., 371-2/373.
But beginning from Scholasticism and working back: why is it that, for Heidegger, an ontology grounded in substantiality cannot be considered properly ‘ontological’? Let’s start with a definition of substance that Heidegger would most likely have been aware of. Duns Scotus claimed that “every substance is independent; it lacks the sort of dependence an accident has on its subject”. It can further be noted that substance designating ontological independence persists throughout the history of Western philosophy: for example, Descartes later says that substance “can exist by itself, that is without the aid of any other substance”. And even in contemporary analytic philosophy, Lowe claims, “x is a substance if and only if there is nothing y such that y is not identical with x and, necessarily, x exists only if y exists”. The idea, then, of independent substances within which properties inhere is a paradigmatic metaphysical concept which recurs throughout its history. However, it first appears in the context of Scholastic Aristotelianism. Now, as the above suggests, Heidegger’s critique of substance operates on two levels: he firstly rejects the idea that substance is what Aristotle meant by *ousia*, but he equally rejects the very idea that we ought to ground an ontology in substance. I will leave the first criticism to the later section where Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle is discussed. For now, our focus will be on his specific critique of the notion of substance.

And the opening question is this: if the guiding question of ontology is the question of the meaning of being, then what does that question actually consist in? We have seen that Heidegger has been concerned with that question since his student days, nebulous as it initially may have been. But what does an emphasis on the meaning of being imply about Heidegger’s conception of the direction of ontological research? Carman rightly denies that what Heidegger intends is mere linguistic meaning. That is to say, Heidegger’s conception of ontology should not be understood as a semantics of the term ‘being’. Rather,

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Carman suggests, ‘meaning’ designates “intelligibility more broadly construed”, such that what ontology ought to aim for are the “hermeneutic conditions” for being. This may appear to be a quick move, but it nevertheless chimes with the hermeneutic phenomenology we saw Heidegger developing in the previous chapter. In short, the Seinsfrage directs ontological inquiry towards uncovering the structures through which we interpret entities insofar as Heidegger takes ontological inquiry to require a transcendental and phenomenological account. And whilst we aren’t at Heidegger’s return to Kant yet, earlier in 1925 Heidegger is already conceiving ontology in terms of meaning. As he says, ontology involves “the elaboration of the ground upon which the interrogation of entities as to their being is at all possible”. So, whilst Heidegger’s earlier ontological thought is not (yet) explicitly transcendental, his conception of the Seinsfrage already has considerable hermeneutic connotations.

However, this is a point Heidegger needs to argue for, because it is not immediately clear that a hermeneutic of being is what traditional metaphysicians have taken ontological questioning to concern. Moreover, since Heidegger’s critique of substance aims to undercut such reasoning by denying its true ontological stature, he will also need to mount a higher-order argument than simply, ‘being cannot be equated with substance, because being is actually x instead’. Heidegger’s intentions thus shift the terms of the debate not just to what being ‘means’, but moreover what ontology as a discipline is about.

With that in place, we can now introduce Heidegger’s higher-order critique of a metaphysics of substance:

“If we are to understand the problem of being, our first philosophical step consists [...] in not ‘telling a story’ – that is to say, in not defining entities as entities by tracing them back in their origin to some other entities, as if being had the character of some possible entity. Hence being, as that which is asked about, must be exhibited in a way of its own, essentially different from the way in which entities are discovered”.

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32 Ibid., 85.
33 Ibid., 86.
34 Ga19, 448/310.
35 SZ, 6/26.
To understand this, one needs to consider the broad structure of traditional accounts of ontology and the placement of substance within them. And so once again, we are back within the question of the role of the categories insofar as perhaps the defining characteristic of traditional metaphysics is its aim to categorize entities. Within that context, substance (as designating ontologically independent entities) becomes almost a shorthand for the basic datum of a given ontology. If one considers the most prominent early-modern accounts, e.g., one finds Descartes’ dualism of thinking and extended substances, or Spinoza’s monism of the unity of all substance, amongst others. And even considering Hume’s empiricist critique of substance from its unobservability, his generalized anti-metaphysics means that he does not think beyond substance, rather only against it. Moreover, whilst ‘substance’ might be considered something of an antiquated term in contemporary analytic metaphysics, its effects are still felt insofar as the structure of general properties inhering in independent particulars is not widely questioned. In short, what it is for some $x$ to be (under traditional metaphysics) is for $x$ to be a substance.

However, this claim overlooks the conceptual distinction in ontology which Heidegger takes to be fundamental. In the above passage, Heidegger states that being ‘must be exhibited in a way of its own’ to be a properly ontological inquiry. The consequence of this is that we have to grasp the intrinsic contradistinction of being from entities, since for Heidegger, what is unique about being is that it applies to the diversity of entities (as a unity) whilst itself not being an entity. In other words, whilst “being is always the being of an entity”, $^{36}$ it is nevertheless the case that “the being of entities ‘is’ not itself an entity”. $^{37}$ Heidegger terms this distinction the ‘ontological difference’, of which he claims it “is not arbitrary; rather, it is the one by which the theme of ontology and thus of philosophy itself is first attained”. $^{38}$

To elide that difference, therefore, would be to equate an inquiry into being with one concerning entities, and certainly some instances of this appear more egregious than others. Heidegger references, e.g., Thales’ claim that being

$^{36}$ Ibid., 9/29
$^{37}$ Ibid., 6/26.
$^{38}$ Ga24, 22/17.
is water, where an entity is literally picked out to stand in for being. 39 But immediately after this, he makes the point that his contemporary situation regarding the primacy of substance is a repetition of the same basic mistake; it is simply on another level of abstraction. That is, the general structure of traditional metaphysics invokes substantiality (however so understood) to designate the fundamental type of entity, upon which is built however baroque a categorization of entities you wish. But this ignores the fact that, given the ontological difference, a properly ‘ontological’ inquiry must have a distinct subject-matter than simply the categorization of entities. For even if a categorization of entities can tell us certain structures about certain entities, 40 this focus on entities tells us next to nothing about being as a principle of unity under which all entities stand. The ‘most basic entity’, after all, is still an entity. And with substance at the foundation of one’s ‘ontology’, for Heidegger, one always remains on the level of entities: justice is not done to the meaning of being under traditional metaphysics because we are precisely ‘told the story’ that substantiality is the fundamental attribute of an entity. And that is, to borrow a phrase from Aristotle, not to consider ‘being qua being’, but ‘entities qua entities’.

Furthermore, one can see the limitations of this when we consider perhaps Scholasticism’s most famous contribution to Aristotelianism: the idea that what unifies the equivocity of being is an analogical relation between the differing modes of substance. And yet that is simply a restatement of the problem that being poses. To say that all modalities of entities bear some relation to being tells us nothing about what being ‘is’. 41 And so, even with an ‘ontology’ grounded in substance, traditional metaphysics repeats Thales’ category mistake: by eliding the ontological difference, by refocusing supposedly ontological inquiries away from being and onto entities, by replacing the question of being with the question of substance, an explanatory gap is opened up in the history of metaphysics. And if we continue to follow this trajectory – as we can see Heidegger’s argument run – if we don’t fundamentally reconsider the basic terms of ontology, we will not get any closer to answering its basic question. As Heidegger ultimately

40 Indeed, it may even tell us even what is the ‘most basic type of entity’ insofar as it is purportedly substantial.
41 SZ, 3/22.
diagnoses the problem, not only does “the question of being [lack] an answer, but […] the question itself is obscure and without direction”.42

5. Interposed Considerations

(a) Being and Truth

There is, however, a further phenomenological dimension to this account that perhaps better reveals Heidegger’s methodological motivations. As we saw in the previous chapter, starting from his earliest extant lectures Heidegger is engaged in a thoroughgoing critique of the primacy of the theoretical. For Heidegger, phenomenological inquiry ought to aim to uncover the pre-theoretical structures of experience, from which the theoretical is effectively an abstraction. Within this, we saw that his hermeneutic rendering of phenomenology re-focuses philosophical methodology onto the interpretation of the activity of life; that is, life as it is lived in the moment of living. And the continuous aspect of the verb is a helpful expression in English insofar as it is precisely this dynamic aspect to life which Heidegger wants to emphasize, against the way the metaphysics of substance freezes signification in an atemporal abstraction. And this has ontological implications: for example, Levinas recognizes this verbal aspect to Heidegger’s account of being. In his interpretation of the ontological difference, Levinas claims that “being is the verb itself”,43 which would be to suggest that being is something that unfolds in the midst of a phenomenology rather than merely ‘being’ statically and atemporally. Since Heidegger wants to understand being as the essential background context to our activity – i.e., as that through which signification becomes accessible – the structure of the Seinsfrage consequently shifts. The aim is to capture the phenomenology of the unfolding of being as opposed to reifying its essence into a single proposition of the form ‘being is x’. That is to say, Heidegger intends to situate the unfolding of being within the activity of life, i.e., to recognize the context within which being is encountered.

Consequently, on another level, even where a substantialist ‘ontology’ may bring up ‘a’ question of being (misconceived as it is), it cannot access the

42 Ibid., 4/24.

question of being because its theoretical orientation *ipso facto* abstracts the question from its pre-theoretical ground. But it is important to note how this objection, directed towards Scholasticism, has Greek roots for Heidegger. That is because this move towards the pre-theoretical is grounded in a rejection of a correspondence theory of truth, which Heidegger also claims is phenomenologically unsatisfactory. For we can see in the structure of a substantialist ontology how framing the question in terms of essence leads one to expressing that essence propositionally, and how the truth of that proposition is taken to correspond on with how things fundamentally *are* (even whilst a substantialist ‘ontology’ remains only on the level of entities). It is, we might think, not just the standard way of dealing with being, but the traditional method of philosophy more generally considered. But this is not, Heidegger argues, how the Greeks thought about truth.

For whilst *aletheia* is typically translated as ‘truth’, with all its traditional connotations, a more precise translation would be ‘unconcealment’. And for Heidegger, “unconcealment does not apply to things insofar as they are, but insofar as they are encountered, insofar as they are objects of concern […] unconcealment is a specific accomplishment of Dasein”.  

This is derived from what Wrathall identifies as our “openness to the world and comportment toward things in the world [in a way] that is more fundamental than thinking and speaking about them”.  

We have an implicit grasp of our environment that allows us to engage with it purposively, and that purposiveness is not captured (or at least not emphasized) in the ‘knowing’ of a proposition. In other words, for something to be *un*-concealed presupposes not only an unconcealer, but also a wider meaningful context within which what is unconcealed is encountered.

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44 *Ga19*, 24/17 (translation modified).


46 This becomes a much more prominent theme in Heidegger’s later work: see, e.g., *Ga54*, and in particular the analysis of Zeus giving ‘signs’ in Homer (p. 45-8/31-3). The idea of a ‘sign’ implies that it requires interpretation – these examples from myths we might equally think have phenomenological implications about how we are implicitly attuned to our environment and the ways we engage with it. That is to say: we have certain presuppositions about entities based on
Therefore, on the phenomenological level, what is to be interpreted is not (for Heidegger) some fundamental essence that we could reduce to a single proposition. Instead, the concept of *meaning* is in turn related to the broader activity of unconcealing, insofar as it is *by virtue of the disclosure of meaning* that the concealed can be *un*-concealed.

On the ontological level, therefore, another reason that Heidegger emphasizes that we ought to seek the *meaning* of being is because he also seeks to reorient our understanding of ‘truth’. For an alethic conception of truth suggests a much closer relationship between the concept of being and Dasein’s encountering activity than the mere apprehension of a proposition ‘about’ being. That is to say, insofar as unconcealing entails there is always an interpretative aspect to encounter, the interpretation *of being* itself becomes an essential background presupposition for any encountered phenomenon. Indeed, insofar as for Heidegger being is “that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood”, the unfolding of being is that in terms of which particular significations (of entities) are made generally possible.

Now, some interpreters have overstated Heidegger’s concern with unconcealment. For example, Sheehan has claimed that Heidegger ought not to have used the term ‘being’ at all because the term itself is too traditional-metaphysical. Instead, what Heidegger was ultimately concerned with was the unconcealment of meaning. But whilst Heidegger was concerned with the unconcealment of meaning, specifically within the context of a hermeneutic of human life, what I argue the broader account detailed above ought to show is that Heidegger was nevertheless concerned with the concept of being in and for itself, even whilst he emphasized its phenomenological manifestation. Much of his positive account, I contend, ultimately depends upon the interjection of Kant, such that it cannot be entirely set out at this moment. Nevertheless, a crucial point is going to be that Dasein is ‘transcendent’ precisely insofar as it is *ontologically*...
**determinative**, i.e., insofar as its projection in a meaningful sense sets out the structure of world. *Aletheia*, therefore, is not a replacement for the concept of being with instead the dual problematic of truth and meaning, rather, it is the expression of the phenomenological side of a problematic which we cannot yet see to its completion. With this partial retrieval of Greek thought, Heidegger does want to argue that it is simply too easy to reduce the problem of being to a metaphysics of substance, since this suppresses the dynamic unfolding of being that Dasein unconceals in its encounter. But we will see that Heidegger’s point is that through *aletheia*, we can locate being’s correct ‘place’, i.e., *within the activity of life*, and not that being gets superseded by a different concept.\(^{50}\)

\[(b)\] **The Meaning of Heidegger’s Critique of Metaphysics**

Let’s take stock. From 1922 to 1927, we have seen Heidegger begin to set out a plan to recover the roots of ontology from its Scholastic limitations, but the terms of that retrieval become increasingly ambitious. For in 1922, the aim simply seems to be to recover the essence of Aristotle’s thought from its codification by the Scholastics, to demonstrate the *phenomenological* (and thus immediate) significance of Aristotle’s thinking beyond the customary interpretation that he sets out a metaphysics of substance. However, we can see that this move ends up requiring significant legwork: once Heidegger begins to formulate the ontological difference and reinterpret the concept of *aletheia*, Heidegger arguably goes beyond simply commentating on Aristotle. Instead, he begins to develop, his own original account. Consequently, as historians of philosophy, we may ask whether there was a shift in ambitions that took place between 1922 and 1927. Did Heidegger begin with a more self-contained project of ‘saving’ Aristotle from Scholasticism, and only later aimed to completely reconceptualize ontology as a discipline? Or was that always the essential aim?

It is difficult to say, even with hindsight, whether the more radical project was what Heidegger always had in mind. Was the point of the ‘Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation’ in 1922 – a text which, it should be noted, was effectively a summary plan for Heidegger’s future work\(^ {51}\) – a springboard from

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\(^{50}\) cf. Chapter 7, for a fuller treatment of Sheehan’s account.

which the broader critique of traditional metaphysics was always implicit, or did it come together in the intervening years? Certainly there is a trajectory one can surmise that broadening out Heidegger's hostility to those aspects of Scholasticism in 1922 might have led to him identifying the purported recurrent pattern. However, the issue is that the necessarily terse and programmatic ambitions of the ‘Indication’ leave us with an ambiguity regarding that chronological point. Nevertheless, *Being and Time* not only presupposes but is motivated by that broader critique, and so the more pertinent question is whether Heidegger is justified in mounting it. *How*, the critic might contest, can two and a half thousand years of metaphysical inquiry be reduced to what is, in effect, a single concept?

To respond, let’s begin on the most superficial level and build up in complexity. Even a cursory glance at the list of titles in the *Gesamtausgabe*, from the *Parmenides* lectures to Heidegger’s response to his French existentialist contemporaries in the ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, indicates that the critique does not arise from nowhere. Rather, Heidegger engages in more close textual analysis with a wider range of Western philosophers across its history than perhaps anyone else. Furthermore, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger sets out a plan for understanding this history in a more focused sense: his famous ‘Destruktion’ of the history of ontology. Heidegger tells us this would involve tracing back through the tradition from Kant to Aristotle to show that “when tradition […] becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible […] that it rather becomes concealed”.52 But he furthermore denies that this must be a negative project: “we must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition”, whilst “this always means keeping it within its limits”.53 So firstly, we can stipulate that Heidegger’s critique of traditional metaphysics is not a blanket rejection of that history. Instead, the terms of Heidegger’s critique are directed towards a particular orientation of ontological inquiry that became dogmatic – i.e., the primacy of substance – and to overcome that orientation itself presupposes that we must understand that history. The critique of substance is not where our engagement with traditional metaphysics ought to stop. On the contrary, whilst it is the summation of Heidegger’s results

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52 SZ, 21/43.
53 Ibid., 22/44.
in his historical inquiries, it is concurrently, from a pedagogical perspective, our starting point for understanding the history of philosophy within the context of providing ontology with new grounds. Therefore, Heidegger is as much trying to convince us to engage with the history of philosophy as he is concerned with criticizing it.

The key question, therefore, is whether traditional metaphysics has the conceptual resources to think beyond substantiality as the ontological ground. And that is not, at this point, even to claim that being is not substance; rather, does traditional metaphysics allow the possibility of meaningfully conceptualizing being in some other way? And on this point, I argue Heidegger is right to highlight that traditional metaphysics operates within a fundamental limitation. Analytic metaphysics, for example, particularly the naturalistic, Quinean consensus, claims only that “the single sense of being or existence is adequately captured by the existential quantifier of formal logic”.54 We are told this “ought to be uncontroversial”.55 But all this effectively claims is that ‘being is unified by analogy’ in a newer technical language; still all it would conceptually give us is an enumeration of types of entities. Again, it does not appear to allow us to reach the concept of being.

Now, one might claim that was never Quine et al.’s aim. Quinean ‘ontology’, we might say, needs to be contextualized as a reaction against logical positivism. Perhaps it was the first step towards a more wholehearted revival of metaphysics. But on the other side, that implies that it too cannot think outside the ‘Aristotelian’ paradigm. The Heideggerian critique still holds since being is not available as a possibility to contemporary analytic metaphysics. And so one has to ask: from where does this arise? In short: because the ontological difference goes unrecognized, it cannot be seen that nothing is said about being by making it equivalent with substantiality or existential quantification. In such accounts, the domain of entities could perhaps be clarified, and whilst that is the domain to which being applies, being is not equivalent to it. Accordingly, what we are required to seek, beyond the categorization of entities, is the fundamental determining ground in terms of which entities are. Traditional metaphysics thus operates with a fundamental deficiency here insofar as that level is missed out.

55 Ibid., 237.
And insofar as that level is being, that itself suggests a foundational categorial error in terms of how traditional metaphysics has proceeded, persisting into the analytic metaphysics of today.

So, the equation of being with substance is rejected by Heidegger because it presupposes a fundamental category error. This error historically develops from the Scholastic translation and interpretation of ousia. It engenders not a consideration of being, but a categorization of entities, and whilst defining the domain of entities may include such a categorization, insofar as ontology is about being, we cannot simply stop there. This thus sets out the first element of Heidegger’s critique of ousia, but we still have its Aristotelian origins to consider. That is, if ‘substance’ is an insufficient translation for ousia, then what does Heidegger take Aristotle to have meant by the term? To what extent does that too set the stage for the Seinsfrage? And how is it that being comes to be signified in terms of time?


Following this reverse history, how should we understand the Aristotelian side, as opposed to the Scholastic? After rejecting the translation of ousia as substance in the Logic lectures, Heidegger claims, “ousia […] means nothing other than ‘presence’ (Anwesenheit) […] To understand being as presence […] is to understand being in terms of time”.56 This is crucial: after all, the “provisional aim” of Being and Time is “the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being”.57 Being, then, whether in its Aristotelian or fundamental-ontological significations for Heidegger, bears some essential relation to time. But Heidegger also cites Aristotle’s essay on time in the Physics as itself operating with a fundamental deficiency, whilst also claiming that “every subsequent account of time […] has been essentially determined by it”.58 So, Sadler is right to claim that for Heidegger, “the essence of Aristotelian ontology can be found in the analysis of time in [the] Physics”.59 Our aim, in turn, is to

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56 Ga21, 193/163.
57 SZ, 1/19.
58 Ibid., 26/49.
specify this relationship of time to presence that Heidegger is opposed to. And the broad structures of Heidegger’s analysis are paradigmatically captured in this passage from Being and Time’s introduction:

“The meaning of being [understood] as παροσία or οὐσία [...] signifies, in ontologico-temporal terms, ‘presence’ [Anwesenheit]. Entities are grasped in their being as ‘presence’; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time – the ‘present’ [Gegenwart].”

There are a few shifts we ought to note here: firstly, from οὐσία to παροσία; secondly, from Anwesenheit to Gegenwart. These are inextricable for Heidegger: in the Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy lectures, he significantly claims, “οὐσία is the abbreviation for παροσία, ‘being-present’” [Gegenwärtigsein]. And yet παροσία is an alien term in Aristotle, and these shifts in the respective Greek and German terminologies trade heavily on the varying ontological and temporal connotations of presence. Despite this, we can see a number of essential themes emerge:

1. Being, for Heidegger, is conceived in terms of temporality (however this relationship is ultimately understood).
2. For Heidegger, Aristotle privileges temporality in terms of presence, in distinction from past or future.
3. Heidegger relates this sense of presence in Aristotle to (para)ousia.
4. For Heidegger, the tradition has not substantively questioned Aristotle’s account of time.
5. Consequently, beyond mere substantiality, under traditional metaphysics: being = presence.

We can perhaps anticipate that another central element of Heidegger’s critique of traditional metaphysics will involve a critique of the priority of presence. But

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60 SZ, 25/47.
61 Ga18, 33/25.
62 Which we ought to be particularly careful about, as it is even easier to elide the two in English, given there is no terminological distinction.
let’s firstly begin by distinguishing *ousia* from *parousia*, for as Sadler recognizes, “the Greeks did not have a universal ontological concept of presence”, rather only a distinction between “the mere *parousia* of changeable things, by virtue of the contrast with unchangeable *ousia*”.\(^{63}\) *Parousia*, in that sense, designates an arrival, a becoming, as opposed to the static being of *ousia*. We might think that *parousia* designates the dynamism to being that we saw Heidegger argue for when considering the phenomenological unfolding of being. But significantly, *parousia* first appears in the *Gesamtausgabe* in the *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, from its use in the New Testament to designate Jesus’s Second Coming.\(^{64}\) *Parousia* thus equally designates an event, a single moment, and so there is an ambiguity concerning its phenomenological status. Nevertheless, the New Testament origins of *parousia* brings up the question of how Heidegger can charge Aristotle with privileging presence when its ontological connotation was foreign to it: for Heidegger, presence is “the unitary but hidden determinant of Greek ontology”,\(^{65}\) in terms of which the problems with Greek ontology must be understood.

Hermeneutically, we find ourselves back in Heidegger’s radicalization of Schleiermacher. It is another instance of uncovering the ‘unsaid’ that is the subtextual motivation for the text. Is a metaphysics of presence what Aristotle’s ontology is ‘really’ about? We will have to see the letter of Heidegger’s account to assess whether this is legitimate or not. In short, Heidegger will argue that the privileging of presence will lead to the phenomenon of ‘levelling-off’, i.e., that what is ontologically pertinent regarding temporality is abstracted and removed from the problematic such that – again – the question of the meaning of being is avoided.\(^{66}\) But let’s firstly return to Aristotle, this time the *Physics*, to understand his account before we consider Heidegger’s critique in greater detail.

On the face of it, at least insofar as it has filtered down through millennia of philosophical thought, Aristotle’s account of time can look relatively unremarkable. Naturally, in a text over two thousand years old called the *Physics*, it might not have much to say scientifically in the age of quantum theory, but neither are there any huge diversions from what we might consider the intuitive

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\(^{63}\) Sadler, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being*, 44.

\(^{64}\) Galo, 98/67-9.

\(^{65}\) Sadler, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being*, 44.

\(^{66}\) SZ, 424/476.
conception of time: a linear succession from future to past mediated by what Aristotle terms the ‘now’.

For Aristotle, the ‘now’ is absolutely central, claiming, “the ‘now’ is the link of time […] (for it connects past and future time), and it is a limit of time (for it is the beginning of the one and the end of the other)”.

Here, Aristotle recognizes the unique status of present time: firstly, it is a connecting link insofar as it designates the particular moment in the succession. But more interestingly, the ‘now’ is furthermore a limit because its second unique element is that it is a temporal point – that is, analogously to a spatial point, it has no extension – such that any putative isolated ‘now’ will always give way to another ‘now’, and yet we are always within a ‘now’. The ‘now’, for Aristotle, consequently has a privileged place in his account as that in terms of which the relations to other temporal modes are established. But isn’t this natural, even phenomenological? When considering our experience, our immediate access to time is through the present, even whilst we can remember the past and look towards the future – the centrality of the present appears to be transparent to us – so why does Heidegger become concerned with this? And how can the temporal present connect with anything Aristotle has claimed ontologically?

In this, Heidegger trades heavily on the concepts of aletheia and the pre-theoretical we saw him previously set up. Insofar as ‘truth’ refers to an ‘unconcealing’, not correspondence, Heidegger sees in the implications of Aristotle’s privileging the ‘now’ that he precludes access to the phenomenological explication of encounter. In this, being is displaced from our initial mode of contact with entities. Aristotelian ‘ontology’, for Heidegger, is an abstraction grounded in a category mistake concerning the nature of time. For where the ‘now’ implies a conception of time as a linear quantum, where all temporal relations are essentially relative to the ‘now’, the issue is that “world-time and accordingly temporality in general have been levelled off and covered up by such an interpretation”.

To view time as entirely quantitative, to think that it has no prior phenomenal character as an essential component of our contact with the world, that it bears no meaningful relation to the peaks and troughs of our experiencing, is to cover up the

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68 Ibid, 222a10-12.
69 SZ, 424/476 (my emphasis).
temporality of life, i.e., the pre-theoretical modes through which we encounter time both immediately and qualitatively.\textsuperscript{70}

Phenomenologically, therefore, an essential component is missed out, but this has ontological effects. Because this concept of a timeline, of ‘real’ existence being contained within the ‘now’, itself presupposes its own structure within which entities are. That is, entities are taken to be merely present to us as dateable ‘objects’, qualitatively separate from us, about which we form propositions. And again, once we reach \textit{Being and Time}, we will see Heidegger argue this is itself only a ‘derivative’ mode of our contact with entities, and fundamentally a limited one.\textsuperscript{71} With the implication that all entities ‘are’ are ‘objects’ for theoretical assertions, we remove all contingent signification intrinsic to any encounter, we limit our ontological scope to the ‘now’ as quantum, such that against the qualitative significations of time, we presuppose that all there is to truth and being are correspondence and objective presence. What gets ‘levelled-off’ is any possibility of access to the pre-theoretical as pre-theoretical, to the modes of un-concealing, and all we are left with is the “presence-now of something present; [where] presence is what characterizes entities insofar as they are”.\textsuperscript{72}

The \textit{parousia} of the ‘now’ reifies the \textit{ousia} of entities to be its only ontological attribute, and whilst we might think this terminology is an instance of Heideggerian ‘interpretation’, we can see the underlying point being made. That is, Aristotle does not entirely reduce being to substantiality, but the temporal limitations he imposes by virtue of the privileging of the ‘now’ does leave us with a deficiency ontologically. That is, insofar as the temporal signification of \textit{ousia} gets bound up with presence, the uncovering encounter that is ontologically essential is itself suppressed by virtue of the abstraction that the privileging of presence presupposes.

Nevertheless, this has a significant effect, for even if Aristotle goes about it the wrong way – and even if Aristotle was unaware of it – this connection of \textit{ousia} to presence makes him the first philosopher to make the connection of being to time. Now, clearly there is much more to say about Heidegger and time, and the particular difficulty of dealing with presence at this early stage is that we cannot presume the conceptual schematic Heidegger builds throughout \textit{Being and}

\textsuperscript{70} Miguel de Beistegui, \textit{The New Heidegger} (London & New York: Bloomsbury, 2005), 67.

\textsuperscript{71} SZ, 157-8/200-1.

\textsuperscript{72} Ga21, 193/163 (my emphasis).
Time. Consequently, I accept the limited nature of my exposition above. However, as a prolegomenon to a broader discussion when we get to Division II, I argue what we have established so far is sufficient to set up the relationship between Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Seinsfrage in its early development.

For considering Heidegger’s chronology, he accumulates throughout his student years and early career a flurry of ontological concerns – the categories, ousia, and temporality in particular – all of which originate from Aristotle, and each of which drive the aporia that Heidegger first expresses in the Plato’s Sophist lectures. As an attempt at reconstruction, one might think about it this way: beginning from his rejection of the limitations inherent to an epistemologically oriented neo-Kantianism, Heidegger is led to Duns Scotus, where the categories are not only addressed from their ontological roots, but are moreover developed in terms of their meaning or signification. That is, Duns Scotus asks how the categories are to be incorporated into a ‘human’ understanding of ontology (an orientation which, in its broadest sense, Heidegger is sympathetic to). But concurrently, Scholasticism presupposes interpreting ousia in substantial terms, and substantiality as furthermore ontologically foundational. Heidegger ultimately assess such a move contravening the ontological difference, however. At the same time, Heidegger engages with the roots of ousia and the categories in Aristotle and sees in Aristotle’s account of time an alternative signification for ousia. For Aristotle, ousia ought to be understood in terms of presence, with the ‘now’ as the location in which entities are. But the priority of presence in its own way avoids specifying the meaning of being by means of its inherent abstractedness. Consequently, the way both time and being are dealt with – whether directly in Aristotle or mediated through his influence across the history of philosophy – leaves us in a situation which Heidegger reasonably assesses as not only incorrectly identifying what being is, but furthermore, that there is a fundamental confusion concerning the ability to locate being at all, whatever its meaning. The desideratum, in other words, is unable to cohere with the method presupposed; the theoretical orientation of traditional philosophical inquiry divorces what being signifies in place of the categorization of entities. In short, traditional metaphysics abstracts being from its own inquiry.

Within that context, the quote from the Sophist which opens Being and Time is charged with a considerable subtext that one might not be aware of
without considering this history: the ‘confusion’ is not only a pedagogical tool Heidegger utilizes to immediately orient us within his problematic. Moreover, the confusion represents Heidegger’s own confusion, because he sees an almost complete lack of resources in the history of philosophy for sufficiently treating the question of the meaning of being. By means of both substance and presence, one gets close to approaching being before being taken along the wrong track. So, what can Heidegger’s alternative method be? What can allow us to access this so far inscrutable whilst indispensable notion? Perhaps the answer is natural: phenomenology. Which would be to say: we have seen Heidegger develop this dynamic conception of being, of being as that which is foundationally presupposed for our experience. So, if phenomenology is to have a hermeneutic orientation towards pre-theoretical, engaged life, is there a means by which these dual concerns can be unified? Can phenomenology, in short, provide us with a more subtle account of the relationship between human life, time, and being? Is it able to move beyond the inherent abstractedness which has plagued ontology since at least Aristotle?

But at the same time, might phenomenology not again reduce ontology, but this time to human understanding? That is: if we do begin from factical life to provide access to being, how do we ensure that we do not reduce ontology to an anthropology? This is why, in the Introduction, I emphasized the Logic lectures, because it is here that we can see the first shift away from this tension between phenomenology and ontology to fundamental ontology having a clearer and more unified direction. For immediately after Heidegger expresses his dissatisfaction with Aristotelian *ousia*, he claims that “Kant is the only philosopher who even suspected that the understanding of being and its characteristics is connected with time”.73 A new direction has been signalled: a transcendental relationship between being, Dasein, and time. Think of it in this way: if phenomenology is conceived not only to be hermeneutic but also transcendental – i.e., we situate phenomenological structures within the transcendental turn of the Copernican Revolution – is this a more methodologically robust starting point than only description and interpretation? Can the transcendental turn itself institute the shift from the anthropological to the ontological? To anticipate the following

chapter: I will argue that it is precisely Heidegger’s turn to a transcendental and hermeneutic phenomenology, underpinned by a resolutely ontological interpretation of Kant, that is going to be able to unify the diverse strands of Heidegger’s thought we have seen so far into a single, coherent project. Kant takes centre stage from the second half of the Logic lectures onwards precisely because the transcendental project signals a way to unify phenomenology with ontology.

Evidently the Kantian turn requires cashing out. In particular, how is the Copernican Revolution to be incorporated into Heidegger’s philosophical schematic, and how does it allow us to think beyond *ousia? And how precisely can the method of phenomenology meet with the project of fundamental ontology through a shift to the transcendental? These are the foundational questions for Heideggerian ontology, since their answers enable Heidegger to set out fundamental ontology as a unified programme. For whilst many of the elements of fundamental ontology are already present in our existing considerations, the essential ground is still yet to be laid. For beyond phenomenology and beyond a preliminary casting of the *Seinsfrage, through Kant, Heidegger is now going to be able to specify what fundamental ontology really is.
CHAPTER THREE
Heidegger’s Kantian Turn

“This sort of investigation will always remain difficult, for it includes the metaphysics of metaphysics”.

Immanuel Kant¹

“Being is the transcendens pure and simple […] Every disclosure of being as the transcendens is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis”.

Martin Heidegger²

1. Introducing Heidegger’s Kantianism
For how long has Heidegger been (implicitly) a Kantian, and to what extent was fundamental ontology always transcendental in orientation? What would it mean to term Heidegger a ‘Kantian’? For even after his move away from neo-Kantianism, Kant never entirely leaves Heidegger’s purview: although the instances are nowhere near as numerous as in the late 1920s, the Kantian language of ‘conditions of possibility’ does appear in the 1925 History of the Concept of Time,³ which is generally considered an early draft of Being and Time.⁴ Furthermore, given Husserl’s stated commitment to transcendental idealism and the concurrent popularity of neo-Kantianism, the influence of Kant on the German academy in Heidegger’s time can perhaps not be overstated. But in Heidegger’s work, a clear shift is made explicit in the Logic lectures: Kant is no longer one philosopher amongst many because Heidegger identifies the Schematism as the

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¹ C, 10:269.
² SZ, 38/62.
³ See, e.g., Ga20, 283/207; Ibid., 314/228; Ibid., 328/238.
historical core of his temporal ontology.\textsuperscript{5} To be sure, Heidegger also claims that we “need an understanding of time that breaks radically with the traditional understanding”, whilst Kant “held firm to the traditional concept of time”.\textsuperscript{6} Heidegger’s ‘Kantianism’ is by no means orthodox, and the precise lines between direct textual interpretation and taking a Kantian idea to its limits can often appear ambiguous. Nevertheless, at the height of Heidegger’s activity on fundamental ontology, I will contend that he is never anything less than resolutely Kantian in spirit.

The aim of this chapter is to motivate the basic insights which led Heidegger down the transcendental path, and to set out the broad structures of my interpretation of the relationship between Kant and Heidegger that will be exposited in greater detail in Part Two. I begin from the tension between phenomenology and ontology, aiming to demonstrate how Heidegger’s thought undergoes its own ‘Copernican Revolution’ in response to it. This will lead us to Heidegger’s interpretation of the imagination and its ontological centrality when given a phenomenological basis. I will argue for a parallelism between the imagination in Kant and disclosedness in Heidegger as grounding their systematic unity with one another. At the end, I will consider the question of Heidegger’s purported idealism, and conclude that whilst the early Heidegger is a transcendental thinker, he was not a transcendental idealist.

2. Kant and Heidegger: Two Revolutions

\textit{(a) The Possibility of a Phenomenological Ontology and the Spectre of Anthropology}

Heidegger’s aim in 1922 – to return to the roots of Western ontology to specify the meaning of being – turns out to be something of a dead end. Whether one takes the Aristotelian or Scholastic interpretation of \textit{ousia}, both not only commit themselves to a theorizing that Heidegger is already hostile to, but in the course of doing so, restrict their own access to being itself. Heidegger instead – drawing on an alternative Greek notion of truth-as-unconcealment and Dilthey’s hermeneutics – wants to interrogate being as it appears in the context of phenomenological encounter. Put simply, Heidegger’s aim is to specify how being is

\textsuperscript{5} Ga21, 194-5/163-4.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., 194/163.
essentially related to and incorporated into our understanding of the world. As he claims in the opening pages of *Being and Time*:

“Our is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that [...] being is an issue for it [...] Understanding of being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein’s being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological”.

There is a phenomenological basis to this. For Heidegger’s treatment of being so far has centred two key claims: firstly, ontologies derived from *ousia* are deficient because they suppress being over against entities. Secondly, as we saw in *Plato’s Sophist*, being has instead been designated the ‘ground’ of the ‘possibility’ of entities. Consequently, these two claims open up an explanatory gap: how are we to conceptualize the meaning of being in such a way that the term ‘being’ does not stand in for ‘the categorization of entities’, and instead asks about the nature of the aforementioned ‘ground’ and how it is constituted. Heidegger comes to see the *Seinsfrage* as essentially related to Dasein firstly because meaning cannot appear outside the sphere of Dasein. But crucially, being only appears as a problem because our understanding relies on it as an essential presupposition, as the most fundamental level in terms of which entities are intelligibly structured. Foundationally, the problem of being is essentially a phenomenological problem because being is an essential component of any phenomenon. Any encounter with an entity presupposes an understanding of being.

So, there is a developing orientation in Heidegger’s work wherein the methodology of phenomenology and the project of fundamental ontology are beginning to cohere. Where Heidegger’s critique of the primacy of the theoretical led him to a hermeneutic of pre-theoretical life, Dasein’s facticity is taken up in the introduction to *Being and Time* as the essential way into the question of the meaning of being. Moreover, insofar as the theoretical attitude divides the world into subjects and objects – independent forms of substance with diametrically opposed essential properties – providing an alternative account of intentionality for Heidegger shares motivation with fundamental ontology for a new kind of

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7 *SZ*, 12/32.
8 *Ge19*, 448/310.
categorial understanding. This conception recognizes that understanding all entities as primarily present-at-hand is “ontologically inappropriate”; there are both more diverse modes of encounter in tandem with more diverse modes of being. But to what extent is Heidegger playing a risky game here? As I asked in the previous chapter, how can a phenomenological ontology guard against becoming a mere anthropology of being, given the contingency and/or relativism that phenomenological description might imply? How can a turn to Dasein provide us with something more robust than simply staying on the level of the empiricist or the descriptive? Taminiaux, e.g., critically describes fundamental ontology as “the culmination of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity”, the implication being that the seeds of fundamental ontology’s downfall have already been sown.

Furthermore, Heidegger was aware of the possible charge of ‘anthropology’, devoting a section of Being and Time’s first chapter to it. There, Heidegger recognizes the limitations of Dilthey’s Lebensphilosophie ontologically, given its anthropological orientation. In short, he recapitulates his critique of Dilthey’s conceptual resources that we saw in Chapter One. Moreover, Heidegger contends that anthropology is one sphere in which the Seinsfrage has been avoided, both through Aristotle’s understanding of the human as a ‘rational animal’ and the Biblical account of Imago Dei. These are both, he claims, present-at-hand understandings of the human, they rely on interpretations of the human which are both phenomenologically and ontologically unsatisfactory. But even if that is the case, why couldn’t so-called ‘fundamental ontology’ simply be a ‘new’ anthropology? How can phenomenology provide us with something more than its Husserlian beginnings might suggest?

This is a serious tension that Heidegger has to confront. For phenomenology and ontology (at least before Being and Time) are not obvious bedfellows. Although by 1936, in The Crisis of the European Sciences, Husserl is arguably turning

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9 SZ, 59/86.


11 SZ, 46-49/72-75.
to the ontological, in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl claims phenomenology “[aspires] solely to such freedom from metaphysical, scientific, and psychological presuppositions”. From the early Husserl’s perspective, the turn to intentionality is intended to discursively free us from metaphysical conjecture, to hone in on the immediacy of the moment of encounter. How, then, given the intellectual context within which *Being and Time* appears, can phenomenology and ontology be accordingly unified? However, I would argue that elevating ontology beyond anthropology (with a turn to the human) is an aim Heidegger shares with Kant. For whilst many interpreters contend the first *Critique* is primarily a work of epistemology, in both editions, its opening questions are instead directed towards metaphysics and its establishment as a *Wissenschaft*, in place of the methodological deficiencies presupposed by the dogmatics of Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics or Hume’s scepticism. Where for Heidegger, the dogmatism of *onsia* precludes access to being, for Kant, there is a general methodological concern that the methods of Enlightenment metaphysics cannot secure the claims it purports to establish. Kant describes metaphysics as a “battlefield”, on which “no combatant has ever gained the least bit of ground”. Its methods have been diffuse, so much so that Kant’s theoretical philosophy begins precisely from the contention that “the procedure of metaphysics has been a mere groping, and what is the worst, a groping among mere concepts”.

**Kant’s Copernican Revolution**

Kant’s solution to this problem represents perhaps the only true paradigm shift in the history of Western philosophy. To explain: metaphysics, for Kant, is

12 See, for example, an account of the apparent inconsistency between Husserl’s earlier and later accounts of ontology in T. A. McCarthy, ‘Logic, Mathematics, and Ontology in Husserl’, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 3 (1972), 158-160.
15 KrV*, Aix-Axi.
understood to establish synthetic \textit{a priori} claims about the world.\footnote{Ibid., B18.} These are non-trivial, \textit{a priori} propositions, where the content of such propositions goes beyond merely unpacking a given concept. If this is the case, then the core methodological question for metaphysics concerns the nature of metaphysical truth to the extent it can be accessed by us. For unlike the analytic \textit{a priori}, where a reflection on the meaning of the relevant terms is sufficient to establish truth or falsity, and unlike the synthetic \textit{a posteriori}, where experience is evidently accessible, the synthetic \textit{a priori} is peculiar since it is \textit{a priori} knowledge which makes \textit{structural} claims about the world. How can such claims be assured as legitimate if that structure would be entirely independent of our cognition?\footnote{Ibid., Bxvi; A6-A7/B10-B11; B18.} Consequently, Kant’s preliminary conjecture – his ‘Copernican’ move – is to reverse the relationship of subject to world that has been presumed throughout the history of philosophy up to this point:

“Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find something out about them \emph{a priori} through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an \emph{a priori} cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us”.\footnote{Ibid., Bxvi.}

It is worth reflecting on the ontological consequences of the Copernican Revolution, particularly given the epistemological consensus. For although there is something undeniably epistemological in the way Kant frames the question in terms of legitimacy, I argue that what actually \textit{legitimates} metaphysical knowledge for Kant is a claim about the relationship between intentionality and ontology. What the Copernican Revolution is there to establish, consequently, is a higher-order consideration about what metaphysics is, about the ways metaphysics is incorporated into and essentially related to subjectivity. That is to say, the
Copernican Revolution is neither solely nor primarily directed towards the question of knowledge; rather, I contend that the epistemological question is only involved insofar as it is our way into establishing the grounds of ontology in ‘the subject’. For consider what Kant’s claim, ‘objects must conform to our cognition’ actually states: it is not ‘objects must be like our cognition’, it is even stronger than a relation of correspondence. Instead, the conformity of the structure of objects to the structure of cognition means that Kant posits an active role for the subject, which is to say, the subject transcends itself insofar as it plays a role in constituting its world.21 For if the relationship between cognition and object is not one of correspondence, but instead conformity, then the relationship is unequal: cognition has a determinative priority. But if cognition is determinative upon the structure of the world, then there is a crucial ontological subtext to Kant’s assertion here. To put it another way: what it means to be an object, for Kant, depends upon a structural projection from the subject such that intentional conditions coincide with ontological conditions. It is not just that metaphysical knowledge can be legitimized, because what that legitimation presupposes is the prior ontological point that the constitution of the world requires a subject-relation to impart its formal structure. It is consequently the coincidence of intentionality and ontology that I contend is Kant’s manifesto for the Critique going forward: as he paradigmatically states, “the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience”.22 This claim also allows us to see how Kant intends to move beyond anthropology: Kant’s ‘revolution’ is to recognize that intentionality-ontology is a unified complex a priori.

Accordingly, my interpretation entails a radically distinct conceptual schematic for Kant than one finds in, e.g., Allison. For Allison, the transcendental in Kant establishes ‘epistemic conditions’, which he characterizes as “a

21 This component of my reading of Kant is mediated through Heidegger. Indeed, ‘the problem of transcendence’ is the key hermeneutic lens through which Heidegger reads the first Critique. We will consider the problem of transcendence throughout the thesis, particularly in the final two chapters. Here, I intend to introduce the concept and show one argument for where it has textual support.

22 KrV*, A158/B197.
necessary condition for the *representation of objects*”.23 Under that rubric, we move from Kant’s stated concern – objectivity – and instead focus upon its subset of ‘representation’. Now, since I argue that intentionality and ontology cohere in Kant, one essential point will be that the conditions for representation and the conditions for objectivity themselves cohere. But I would dispute Allison’s emphasis: Kant, after all, often frames his foundational questions in terms of ‘objective validity’, and given the difficulty of parsing that phrase, the focus is drawn to ‘validity’ insofar as it connotes some form of epistemic assent. Let’s use as an example Kant’s conclusion in the B-Deduction: “the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are thus also valid *a priori* of all objects of experience”.24 Allison here understands the problem Kant is responding to as “that the deliverances of sensibility might not correspond to the *a priori* rules of thought”.25 And whilst Allison argues the B-Deduction is ultimately unsuccessful (at least taken alone),26 it is clear that he takes Kant’s attempt to be to respond to a form of mitigated scepticism regarding the faculties, rather than treating some more foundational ontological question about the constitution of objects.

In a similar fashion, Allison’s focus on ‘epistemic conditions’ leads him to understand Kant’s transcendental idealism as an epistemic distinction “between two ways of considering things (as they appear and as they are in themselves) rather than as […] two ontologically distinct sets of entities”.27 This ties back to the notion of objective validity being viewed solely in terms of epistemic assent: if the transcendental distinction operates simply on the level of how we view things, such that Kant’s question becomes entirely directed towards the structure of knowledge, then perhaps we can do away with the messy question of ontology. But although Ockham might want us to go in that direction, I argue that move does not do justice to the Copernican Revolution, because Kant’s starting point is not only about the structure of the representation of objects, but more broadly about the structure of *objectivity itself*. That is to say, we can only ‘get

23 Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, 11 (my emphasis).

24 *KrV*, B161.

25 Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, 160.


farther with the problems of metaphysics’ if objective structures themselves – not just the conditions for their representation – are a contribution of subjectivity. If we consider Kant’s idealism in light of the ontological implications of the Copernican Revolution, I argue that we have to subtly modify Allison’s account: Kantian idealism is neither about modes of thinking, nor about distinct sets of objects, but rather distinct modes of being. This is because what Kant implies we establish transcendentally are not just epistemic conditions so that representation is possible. Rather, because intentionality and ontology cohere, transcendental conditions must be ontological in nature because they denote the conditions of the possibility for what it means for there to be objects, the structural conditions for objectivity itself.

(c) Heidegger’s Interpretation of the Copernican Revolution

But with that in mind, we can also see why Kant returned front and centre in Heidegger’s thought once fundamental ontology began to develop with progressively greater clarity. Insofar as Heidegger finds the locus of meaning in Dasein as a possible way to overcome the category mistakes of traditional metaphysics, Heidegger’s thought undergoes its own transcendental revolution. Because the unity of intentionality and ontology is precisely what Heidegger has been searching for: where Husserlian phenomenology is limited (ontologically) by mere description, and where traditional metaphysics is unable to specify anything beyond ontic categorization, those problems fade away once one recognizes that the meaning of being operates within Dasein’s intentionality (as the projection of an interpretation of the world). When being is understood in a post-Copernican context, the structures of being are themselves structures of Dasein. Indeed, the ontological difference is itself a transcendental distinction, for when ‘objects must conform to our cognition’ (or in Heidegger’s terminology, entities must

28 To clarify: my point is not to say that there isn’t any ‘epistemological’ problematic in Kant at all. Clearly there is, in the sense of establishing the extent and limits of metaphysical ‘knowledge’, thus the interplay of the Analytic and Dialectic. Here I agree with Karin De Boer & Stephen Howard’s assessment that Heidegger unwarrantedly underplays this (cf. ‘A Ground Completely Overgrown: Heidegger, Kant, and the Problem of Metaphysics’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (2019), 374). The point is that the ‘ontological’ question has the priority: the extent and limits of possible ‘knowledge’ is itself determined by the scope of metaphysics (cf. my exposition of the Deduction in the following chapter).
conform to our existentiality), it is not just that being is an ‘issue’ for Dasein because being happens to be a component of our phenomenology. Instead, being is an ‘issue’ because it is the structural presupposition we bring to entities, it is that in terms of which entities are most fundamentally understood. For Heidegger, a hermeneutic phenomenology requires as its ground a transcendental ontology.

And evidence for this connecting of phenomenology and ontology through the transcendental can be found both in Being and Time and in Heidegger’s historical work on Kant. In the Kantbook, e.g., Heidegger claims, “the inner possibility of ontological knowledge is exhibited from the specific totality of the constitution of transcendence”,29 which is to recapitulate the unity of intentionality and ontology conjectured above. Moreover, the book begins (as we have) from Aristotle and Scholasticism, with Heidegger recognizing that metaphysics as a field has a strange genealogy in that it begins simply denoting Aristotle’s treatise which comes ‘after the Physics’, but that the questions of that treatise set the stage for the development of an independent discipline. Following this, Heidegger notes that the Scholastics impose a taxonomy on metaphysics which implicitly operates throughout the Critique.30 That is, the question of being in general is designated by the Scholastics as metaphysica generalis, whereas the specific questions of God, freedom, and immortality are metaphysica specialis.31 The subjects of metaphysica specialis Kant famously designates as the “unavoidable problems of pure reason”,32 and arguing for their unknowability either way is the central concern of the Transcendental Dialectic.33 However, given that even in Kant’s time metaphysics was more diverse than those three issues, the question arises as to why he focuses on those three in particular. For Heidegger, the reason for this determines the textual structure of the Critique: the possibility of metaphysica specialis is established by doing ontology first. If we are to make claims about these specific questions insofar as they apply to certain entities – and since

29 Ga3, 88/62.
30 Ibid., 5-6/3-4.
31 Ibid., 8-9/5-6.
33 That is, at least on the grounds of pure reason. Given the explicitly ontological aims of this thesis, the Critique of Practical Reason is not treated here.
they are undoubtedly metaphysical questions – then the question of their possibility requires a consideration of being first. As Heidegger says, “the quest for a laying of the ground for metaphysica specialis is in itself forced back to the question concerning the essence of metaphysica generalis”.

In this context, Heidegger reads the Critique thus: firstly, the Aesthetic and Analytic constitute Kant’s ‘ontology’. There, Kant develops (in essence) a three stage narrative. Firstly, he dissects the sources of cognition and locates their synthetic a priori ground. Within that context, space, time, and the categories are conjectured as the basic (synthetic a priori) conditions for the possibility of experience. And finally, the imagination is located as the principle of their unity, i.e., as that which brings together our diverse cognitive resources to construct a cognizable world. For Heidegger, it is the constituting role of the imagination which affirms the veracity of the Copernican Revolution as an ontological postulate. Following this, it is from the results of the ontological inquiry that the Dialectic is possible. And the reason Heidegger reads the Critique this way follows from what he takes the message of the Copernican Revolution to be: “not ‘all knowledge’ is ontic, and where there is such knowledge, it is only possible through ontological knowledge”. Ontology must come first insofar as the meaning of being regulates any consequent understanding of entities. And in terms of Heidegger’s own work, he makes an analogous claim in Being and Time:

“The question of being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type […] such that all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of being”.

34 Ga3, 11/7-8. (Some more recent literature has also recognized this in Kant, cf. Karin de Boer, *Kant’s Reform of Metaphysics: The Critique of Pure Reason Reconsidered* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 77-8).
35 Ga3, 127/90.
36 Ibid., 13/8.
37 SZ, 11/31.
The first parallel arises in terms of the formal structure of the disciplines: in *Being and Time*, Heidegger contends that ontology is the ground on the basis of which other disciplines are built, just as the ontology of the Aesthetic and Analytic in the *Critique* constitute the ground for the *metaphysica specialis* of the Dialectic. But on the same page of *Being and Time*, Heidegger first introduces the notion that it is through *Dasein* that ontology must proceed. That is, Heidegger recapitulates the opening of the *Critique* in the opening of *Being and Time*, such that by the end of the introductions, the relations of the formal structure of fundamental ontology can be expressed: “*phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis*”. 38 For Heidegger, the phenomenological, the ontological, and the transcendental are themselves a unified complex.

But beyond recognizing the ontological import of the Copernican Revolution, its relation to Heidegger is still very much on a higher-order level. What further needs to be argued for is precisely this unified complex insofar as it sets the stage for fundamental ontology in general and *Being and Time* in particular. To achieve that, we need to enter into the systematics of fundamental ontology, to specify the transformation that Heidegger’s thought undergoes from 1925/6 onwards. In short: what is the *meaning* of Heidegger’s transcendental revolution?

3. Hermeneutic Phenomenology as Method for Transcendental Ontology

(a) The Formal Structure of Fundamental Ontology

“*Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis*” is an extremely dense sentence. Every word in it, even the specific placement of the words, is contributing something significant to our understanding of Heidegger’s ontology. Generally speaking, Heidegger is setting up a series of equivalence relations: whatever ‘phenomenological truth’ is, is equivalent to the ‘disclosedness of being’, and it is equally so for *veritas transcendentalis*. But how are these *prima facie* diffuse concepts to be connected?

Firstly, regarding the meanings of some of the individual terms, we have seen their conceptual development in Heidegger’s thought in the previous chapters. ‘Phenomenological truth’, for example, for Heidegger begins from Husserlian description, which is then modified (through Dilthey’s influence) to have an

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expressly hermeneutic orientation. Similarly, ‘truth’ here refers to the alethic notion of an unconcealing encounter. The ‘truth’ that Heideggerian phenomenology aims for, consequently, is to uncover the nature of our interpretation of the world in the context of pre-theoretical factual life.

Or is it? More precisely, fundamental ontology is not about ‘life’ in any personalistic sense, because whilst “the phenomenological interpretation of personality is in principle more radical and more transparent [than Dilthey’s Lebensphilosophie...]; the question of the being of Dasein has a dimension which this too fails to enter”.39 Instead, Heidegger intends to interrogate Dasein’s life from the specific position of its “average everydayness”.40 What does this mean? Firstly, Heidegger is deepening his critique of the ‘anthropological’ tendencies in Dilthey. Where Dilthey aimed to interpret “life as a whole”,41 for Heidegger this is too ill-defined. Given that Heidegger has already distinguished pre-theoretical and theoretical modes of engagement, and argued that the theoretical is derivative of the pre-theoretical, ‘average everydayness’ specifically designates the intentional stance of the pre-theoretical. The point is not just that, pre-theoretically, we do not think in terms of some rarefied set of technical categories; instead, the intentional distinction entails an ontological one. In everydayness, it is not just that the mode of encounter is distinct, moreover, the mode of encounter exhibits such entities under distinct modes of being. Entities are not ‘present-at-hand’, they are ‘ready-to-hand’; they are available for use within a complex of significance relations which we will see constitute the core of the first stage of Heidegger’s ontology.42 So, rather than moving from a present-at-hand understanding of Dasein to some nebulous concept of ‘life’, Heidegger instead specifies the primary mode of encounter as ‘everydayness’. Heidegger’s aim is not just to locate the level to experience which traditional metaphysics has been unable to capture; moreover, he aims to provide a more nuanced picture of human intentionality than phenomenology has provided so far. ‘Phenomenological truth’, as Heidegger conceives it, is to deepen our account of categorial understanding not only beyond traditional metaphysics, but beyond Husserl and Dilthey too.

39 Ibid., 47/73.
40 Ibid., 43/69
41 Ibid., 46/72.
42 Ibid., 69/98.
‘Veritas transcendentalis’, in turn, designates the Kantian element of the complex, even if its precise meaning is not yet transparent. But given what we have already set out, we can minimally stipulate that the results of the phenomenological inquiry will provide us with some set of transcendental conditions that are themselves ontological in nature.

And so the difficulty, insofar as it connects the other two, is understanding what Heidegger means by ‘the disclosedness of being’. We know that, for Heidegger, ‘being’ will not designate a substance ontology, but how does ‘disclosedness’ modify the phrase? Considering its later appearances in Being and Time, Heidegger emphasizes that “Dasein is its disclosedness”, and that “the unconcealment of entities within-the-world is grounded in the world’s disclosedness”. So, whatever ‘disclosedness’ signifies, it bears some relation to both Dasein and entities. Regarding Dasein, the copula ‘is its’ suggests another equivalence: what it means to be Dasein is to be in some way disclosive. Regarding entities and their unconcealment, disclosedness therefore appears within the encounter itself: entities are unconcealed within the context of the disclosure of the world. So, through disclosedness, there must be some relation that Heidegger wants to establish between Dasein and world. More precisely, if Dasein is its disclosedness, Heidegger’s aim must be to claim that the world is to be disclosed in some (as yet undefined) way through Dasein. And given the ontological difference, this relationship of Dasein to the unconcealment of entities must in turn be related to the disclosure of being.

(b) Disclosedness and Understanding

So, suggestions of the nature of the relationship between the phenomenological, ontological, and transcendental iteratively appear. Beginning from the notion of a phenomenological encounter in general, this appears in tandem with the claim of an essential relationship between Dasein and being, and that is expressed through a relationship of ‘ground’ one might take to be transcendental. But are we getting any closer to specifying the nature of that relationship? Partially, yes, because we can use the central notion of disclosedness to anchor the other relationships.

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43 Ibid., 133/171.
44 Ibid., 220/263 (translation modified).
Firstly, considering the ontological results of the Copernican Revolution, disclosedness is the essential attribute of Dasein which expresses its unique ontological possibility. Because for Heidegger, disclosedness is essentially related to interpretation. This is to say: given that Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology presupposes firstly (and trivially) that any encounter presupposes a comportment towards entities, furthermore, any such encounter presupposes interpretation as the mode of understanding the nature of that encounter. In the simplest terms, Dasein is able to ‘disclose’ world insofar as it is able to understand and interpret it. Now, given Heidegger’s aversion to the theoretizing conceptual resources of the tradition, ‘understanding’ here does not primarily designate the site of propositional knowledge, as it does in Kant. Instead, Heidegger wants to reconceive the notion of ‘understanding’ and indeed, in the German, this is terminologically marked. Understanding in Heidegger is not the understanding – he does not use Kant’s ‘der Verstand’ – which designates a particular faculty. Rather, Heideggerian understanding is verstehen, the verb itself. And as with Heidegger’s verbal emphasis on being, this suggests an analogous dynamic unfolding to disclosive understanding, as well as its immediate accessibility (i.e., as an active component of encounter). As Schalow reads this subtle, but crucial, terminological difference, “Heidegger revisits the Kantian faculty (i.e., Verstand) with respect to its origin (Ursprung), that is, its root capability (Vermögen) [...] in such a way as to establish a new platform to recast its employment in a more primordial form”. The point appears not to be to eschew Verstand as a productive philosophical concept entirely, but to recognize its pre-theoretical, phenomenological ground in verstehen.

Indeed, Heidegger’s exposition of verstehen reflects this search for a more fundamental ground. For the central claim is that “as understanding, Dasein projects its being upon possibilities”. The focus is thus shifted from propositions to ‘possibilities’, that is, possibilities for Dasein’s being, ways of being, living, and interpreting the world. In line with the prior critique of the theoretical, what we ‘first’ understand are not the judgements of a disinterested observer, but

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47 SZ, 148/188.
instead a *purposive* complex of signification that is inherent to the pre-theoretical, everyday stance.\(^{48}\) *Verstehen* concerns our ‘possibilities’ in that pre-theoretically, we are primarily comported towards action, not ‘thought’ in any grandiose sense. But to take up such a possibility presupposes that entities are *already* ‘understood’ in a way that is conducive to a given action; entities are therefore always already *interpreted* under a particular mode in relation to such a possibility.\(^{49}\) In line with the Copernican Revolution, we can consequently see how intentionality and ontology will cohere for Heidegger: ontological interpretation is an essential component of our intentionality concretely in relation to purposive action, and indeed, *prior to* any theoretical thought.\(^{50}\) But I argue that Heidegger pushes the transcendental aspects of disclosedness even further than just rethinking the concept of understanding.

(c) *Disclosedness and the Imagination*

We can set it out thus: for Dasein to be disclosive means that Dasein is involved in the interpretation of entities *a priori*, but Dasein’s disclosedness further involves the intentional-ontological mode of *facticity*. This term designates the way Dasein not only projects an interpretation onto entities, but is also *determined by* the entities themselves insofar as (to use Heidegger’s terminology) Dasein is *thrown into* the world.\(^{51}\) Signification and interpretation are always individuated in relation to the phenomenon of world and Dasein’s *being-in-the-world*. Interpretation is always mediated through facticity; Dasein’s ability to disclose meaning in turn comes up against its limits since facticity sets the boundaries of possibility.\(^{52}\) Dasein, consequently, is both determinative and determining, the being of Dasein involves a “thrown projection”,\(^{53}\) a unified complex of facticity and interpretation. Therefore, beyond the initial analogies we have treated so far, I argue that the key aspect Heidegger takes from Kant is that he repurposes his

\(^{48}\) There will be much more to say about what this involves in the next chapter.


\(^{50}\) We will deal with the question of priority in Chapter Four.


\(^{53}\) *Ibid.*, 148/188.
interpretation of Kantian imagination in setting out Dasein’s disclosedness. For as Kant claims:

“Imagination is the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition. Now since all of our intuition is sensible, the imagination [...] belongs to sensibility; but insofar as its synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity [...] the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility a priori”.⁵⁴

To explain, in Kant’s picture, the Copernican Revolution sets up a trade-off: the turn towards the subject allows Kant the possibility of ontology, but the consequence of this is that one is forced to commit to transcendental idealism. For Kant, ontology has a limit, demarcated by the bounds of the synthetic a priori. But the site of ontological ‘truth’ also changes in this shift, and in the course of doing so, Kant is able to recognize the unique ambiguity at the heart of human subjectivity. That is, the unity of subjectivity demands the unity of receptivity with spontaneity, or givenness with thought. We are given objects in intuition, structured synthetically a priori by space and time, but they are thought through the categories, which provide the “pure concept of the transcendental object [...] that in which all of our empirical concepts in general can provide relation to an object, i.e., objective reality”.⁵⁵ So, whilst objects are given, objective structure in general is subjectively imposed, and whilst this “may well sound quite contradictory and strange”,⁵⁶ its possibility is established through the imagination as the faculty of synthesis.⁵⁷ Or as Gibbons puts it more prosaically, the imagination is the mediating faculty: it is “the capacity of a finite, discursive intelligence to work up the material of experience from its diverse elements into something which can be known or judged”.⁵⁸

⁵⁴ Krv, B151-B152.
⁵⁵ Ibid., A109.
⁵⁶ Ibid., A114.
⁵⁷ Ibid., A78/B103.
For many interpreters of Kant not invested in the ontological core of the critical project, the imagination has been treated as something of an unfortunate aberration stemming from Kant’s commitment to architectonic. Strawson, most famously, complains that many of Kant’s claims about human cognition “belong neither to empirical (including physiological) psychology nor to an analytical philosophy of mind […] They belong to the imaginary subject of transcendental psychology”. But I argue there are grounds to dispute this: on a purely textual level, this claim ignores the fact that the possibility of imaginative synthesis – and giving an explanation of it – is precisely what drives the argumentative structure of the Transcendental Analytic. For Kant wants to overcome the dogmatics of both empiricist and rationalist psychology, and does so firstly by distinguishing human intentionality in terms of its content: whilst we may first be given sensible content, to take such content as objective in turn requires discursivity. Consequently, Kant does not set up a false dichotomy with the imagination as a post hoc addition; rather, the point always was that the puzzle human subjectivity provides is how diametrically opposed types of content can come together to provide us with our picture of the world. How is it that, as Kant puts it in the opening lines of the Schematism, “the application of the category to appearances is possible”, when taken alone no content is shared between the two? How can we have a world when its constituent elements seem prima facie to be incommensurable?

Kant’s answer, in short, is that we bring them together, we combine the given with thought, we construct the world from its constitutive elements. I agree, for where else could the unity be found? For once it is stipulated that we do have some coherent view of the world, and once we recognize the essential type-distinctions in intentional content, to reach the unity of human intentionality requires the stipulation of a mediating faculty. Or as Heidegger corroborates, what brings the sources of cognition together is a “receptive spontaneity” that

\[\text{60 KrV, A50-A51/B74-B75.}\]
\[\text{61 Ibid., A137/B177.}\]
\[\text{62 After all, Kant is rarely concerned with the question of radical scepticism.}\]
“projects, forming in advance the totality of possibilities in terms of which [...] the horizon within which the knowing self, but not just the knowing self, acts”. 63

And so Heidegger re-enters the picture insofar as he emphasizes the formative power of the transcendental imagination. Indeed, in the Kantbook, he goes even further, claiming that the imagination is the ‘common root’ of intuition and understanding. 64 This is a reference to Kant’s claim that the “two stems of human cognition [...] may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root”. 65 This claim did receive some consternation from Heidegger’s neo-Kantian colleagues: Cassirer, e.g., argued that in making this point Heidegger “no longer speaks as commentator but as usurper”. 66 Of course, Heidegger does go beyond Kant here, but he is aware of this, the point being that “Kant shrank back from this unknown root”. 67 Furthermore, we have seen that Heidegger’s hermeneutic approach was never to simply put the thoughts of a philosopher into his own words. Following on from Schleiermacher, the fundamental principle of Heidegger’s historical interpretations is that “it is of no use to repeat Kantian concepts and statements or to reformulate them. We must get so far that we speak these concepts and statements with Kant, from within and out of the same perspective”. 68 The conceptual centre of Heideggerian hermeneutics is this question of authorial perspective, of locating the subtextual motivation for a text. By doing so, by finding the fundamental insight (or set of insights) that lead to the genesis of the text, we must then follow that argument where it leads. Or, in other words: “what must be decisive [in interpreting a text] is what it sets before our eyes as still unsaid, in and through what has been said”. 69

From the perspective of tracing the transcendental thread which underlies fundamental ontology, this is something of a diversion. The relevant point for our purposes is more that Heidegger saw such a possibility in the imagination,

63 Ga3, 154-5/108 (my emphasis).
64 Ibid., 160/112.
65 KrV, A15/B29.
67 Ga3, 160/112.
69 Ga3, 201/140.
because the structure of ambiguity which underlies it repeats itself in Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of disclosedness in *Being and Time*. Indeed, although it allows Heidegger to provocatively set his interpretation of Kant apart from neo-Kantianism, the language of the ‘root’ is somewhat inappropriate, because it suggests the imagination is somehow ‘before’ intuition and understanding. And I argue we can dispute this. Since Kant’s account, as Heidegger affirms, begins from the primacy of *intuition* (given its immediacy), the imagination is not meaningfully a ‘root’, but a principle of unity: it is the *centre* of the Kantian schematic, not its origin. The imagination has a formative power in the constitution of the world, but it does not ‘precede’ intuition. Unity in Kant is earned through synthesis, not given as a root.

Nevertheless, regarding both the imagination and disclosedness, I argue that the dual mediating and projective functions occur in each case. On the Kantian side, the imagination mediates between intuition and understanding, whereas for Heidegger, disclosedness mediates between facticity and existentiality. The transcendental ‘product’ in each case is either a cognition or ontological interpretation. As if to signal this, Heidegger mirrors his terminology when we put *Being and Time* and the *Kantbook* side-by-side: we have seen, e.g., that the existential constitution of Dasein is designated as a ‘thrown projection’, where the unifying function of the imagination is characterized as a ‘receptive spontaneity’. What both these composite terms emphasize is not just the unity consequently produced, but the ambiguity that precedes the unity: how are intuition and understanding to be unified? How is Dasein’s facticity to be reconciled with interpretation? Moreover, this allows us to clarify the ontological problematic which I argue both the *Critique* and *Being and Time* speak to. That is, in a post-Copernican context, we need to account for that ambiguity between what determines Dasein/the subject on the one hand and how it is determinative. Within that context, the imagination in Kant and disclosedness in Heidegger are both designated as projective; the effect of the proposed unity is the projection of an ontological interpretation.

Considering projection in imagination first, Heidegger specifies that what projection means is that the imagination “forms transcendence *a priori*”,

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70 Ibid., 21-2/15-6.
71 Ibid., 105/74.
which is to recapitulate the ontic-ontological distinction in Kantian terms. To have empirical knowledge of objects presupposes that they first be structurally constituted through the synthetic \textit{a priori}.

Conversely, we have seen that projection is related to possibilities in \textit{Being and Time} – that is, concrete possibilities for action – but again, such possibilities can only be individuated insofar as they themselves are constituted in relation to an underlying complex of significance which contextualizes such possibilities. Moreover, signification itself is formed through the synthesis of facticity as given and interpretation as, whilst not strictly speaking discursive, with an analogously discursive function since it sets out how the world is pre-theoretically understood. Under the terms of fundamental ontology, therefore, imagination in Kant and interpretation in Heidegger are two sides of the same coin; they represent the unity of the intentional-ontological complex which I contend underlies each of their respective systematics. With that in mind, being is an ‘issue’ for Dasein because our existential situation presupposes this mediation of thrownness and projection; Dasein \textit{is} disclosive because the synthetic unity of both constitutes ontological interpretation. In turn, when Heidegger claims that \textit{“phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis”}, a substantive unity that is the methodological foundation for fundamental ontology is conjectured. That is: we are given a phenomenology that is the starting point for ontological inquiry, \textit{through which} being is disclosed insofar as Dasein bears a unique relationship to being, that \textit{is itself} constituted by a transcendental structure. Heidegger’s Kantian turn arises, therefore, because he begins to see that the formal basis of the critical project addresses effectively the same problematic that motivates fundamental ontology.

4. Realism, Idealism, and the Transcendental Import of Fundamental Ontology

Clearly there is much more to be said about this. I have set out only the most general points of my interpretation, and we will have to follow the argumentative thread of \textit{Being and Time} in detail to fully assess its success. But one further topic that needs addressing is the broader literature on Heidegger. I have argued above how the primarily epistemological orientation of contemporary Kant scholarship

\footnote{72} Foundationally, through Schematism. See Chapter Five.

\footnote{73} \textit{SZ}, 38/62.
means it has a tendency to misread certain Kantian concepts. But analogously, reading Heidegger as so resolutely a Kantian is hardly a consensus view. Indeed, even those who have previously centred Kant in their interpretation of *Being and Time* tend to hold off from drawing such an explicit relation between disclosedness and the imagination. Instead, the most prominent debate has concerned the question of Heidegger’s purported idealism, most prominently forwarded by Blattner. Under Blattner’s interpretation, “being, but not entities, depends on Dasein […] Heidegger is a transcendental idealist about being, but not about entities”.\(^74\) This account contrasts with more realist interpretations, such as Dreyfus’s, who contends that Heidegger instead “simply *means* by ‘the being of an entity’ something like an entity’s intelligibility to Dasein”.\(^75\) Indeed, for Dreyfus, Heidegger can arguably be described as something of a scientific realist, at least in the minimal sense that “reality can be revealed in many ways and none is metaphysically basic”.\(^76\) Other Heideggerian realists have somewhat tempered this position, e.g., Carman primarily focuses on what he terms Heidegger’s *ontic* realism, which we will consider in more detail shortly.

In this debate, there are thus two problematics at play: firstly, there remains the question of the influence of Kant upon Heidegger, focusing here on his idealism rather than the functions of the imagination. But moreover, there is the question of how to understand the ontological difference. For given the ontological difference inaugurates a foundational type-distinction between entities and their being, and given that the disclosure of being is intimately related to Dasein’s unique ontological status, does that entail that *being as such* is dependent upon Dasein? How does *Dasein* relate to the ontological difference? And does that relationship imply that Heidegger was an idealist about being, whether Kantian or otherwise?

Firstly, since Heidegger is clear that “entities are, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed”,\(^77\) we can stipulate that Heidegger was not a wholly ‘subjective’ or Berkeleyan idealist. Similarly, Blattner clarifies

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\(^75\) Blattner, *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*, 242.


\(^77\) *SZ*, 183/228.
that his account of Heidegger’s idealism does not entail a relatively ‘weak’ claim such as ‘if there were no Daseins, then there would be no understanding of being, because there would be no one to understand it’. As he recognizes, this would suggest that Heidegger’s purported idealism is somewhat ‘trivial’, whereas the claim that being is dependent on Dasein appears to be substantive. Instead, Heidegger’s key claim is that “only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of being is ontically possible), ‘is there’ being”. This chimes with what we have established about Heidegger’s ‘Copernican’ turn: since intentional conditions coincide with ontological conditions, this would appear to entail that the context within which being obtains must coincide with that of Dasein’s. That context, of course, is phenomenology, and Blattner’s account aims to deepen this apparent theme by giving a structural account of how this ontological dependency is supposed to work. In short:

“[Heidegger] does not just claim that being is intelligibility, and that intelligibility (trivially) depends upon the one to whom things are intelligible. Rather, he argues that the structures in terms of which Dasein understands being are temporal structures, and that those structures – and not just the understanding of them – depend on Dasein”.

There are two key claims here. The first is that the ideality of being follows from the ideality of time: Heidegger is an ontological idealist, for Blattner, insofar as he is a temporal idealist. Insofar as time is a constitutive structure of Dasein, and being is to be exhibited in terms of time, being must (by extension) also depend upon Dasein.

But Blattner also identifies an explicitly Kantian move here. If we consider Kant’s paradigmatic statement of transcendental idealism in the Aesthetic, the empirical reality vs. transcendental ideality of space and time is far from a triviality or some contingent attribute of the subject. Instead, a wedge is driven between the empirical, human standpoint under which the reality of space and

79 Ibid., 241.
80 SZ, 212/255.
81 Blattner, *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism*, 246.
time obtains, and the *transcendental* standpoint, where we ‘abandon’ those conditions.\(^\text{82}\) As Blattner suggests, in a Kantian context, we can ask questions from these differing standpoints: empirically, we can “[accept] the conditions of human sensibility as governing our answers and, thereby, [endorse] the independent existence of tables, chairs, Newtonian matter, and especially time and space”.\(^\text{83}\) But transcendently, we can also “[want] to know what things are like independently of those conditions”.\(^\text{84}\) And even whilst the answers we will find in transcendental questioning are, at best, negative – e.g., things in themselves are *not* spatiotemporal – the transcendental standpoint has a crucial pedagogical function in Kant. It demarcates the bounds of cognition, beyond which (at least pure) reason must remain silent. The results of the Dialectic are already anticipated in the Aesthetic; they are inherent to Kantian idealism.

And whilst Heidegger shifts the context from the ontic to the ontological, Blattner argues that the two standpoints still obtain under Heidegger’s idealism. The empirical standpoint is now *phenomenological*, and “puts into words the sense and ground of all phenomena, their ontological framework”.\(^\text{85}\) In turn, the Heideggerian transcendental standpoint suspends those conditions, but we get a different result. The point is not that we can demarcate appearance from thing in itself in Heidegger, for he is not an ontic idealist. Instead, we clarify that the domain being applies to is thoroughly phenomenological, and thus dependent upon Dasein. Blattner’s argument for this hinges on what should be a (relatively) simple question: “are there entities independent of Dasein?”.\(^\text{86}\) From the phenomenological standpoint, we can answer straightforwardly ‘yes’, “we can say that entities will continue to be, even if Dasein does not”.\(^\text{87}\) But suppose we remove our phenomenological presuppositions and take on the transcendental standpoint. Heidegger’s claim is striking: “if Dasein does not exist, then ‘independence’ ‘is’ not either, nor ‘is’ the ‘in itself’ [...] it can be said neither that

\(^{82}\) Ibid., 234.
\(^{83}\) Ibid., 236.
\(^{84}\) Ibid., 236.
\(^{85}\) Ibid., 247.
\(^{86}\) Ibid., 238.
\(^{87}\) Ibid., 238.
entities are, nor that they are not”.\textsuperscript{88} He appears to think the question is unanswerable. But why?

Firstly, for Blattner, the transcendental question is argued to be “senseless, because one of its presuppositions is false”\textsuperscript{89}. Then he claims that “Heidegger connects the senselessness of [this] question with being’s dependence upon Dasein”.\textsuperscript{90} We can understand this move if we firstly suppose that Heidegger was a realist. If that was the case, then it would presumably be transparent that entities would continue to ‘be’, even if Dasein did not, for they would be wholly independent of Dasein’s existential conditions. Similarly, if Heidegger’s idealism entailed that entities were wholly dependent on Dasein, it would be clear that they would not continue to be. But Heidegger’s use of scare quotes in the above passage is telling. The problematic concept is not the continued persistence of entities in the absence of Dasein,\textsuperscript{91} but saying that they ‘are’. From the phenomenological standpoint, we can say that entities would continue to persist, but transcendentally, \textit{we cannot say that they would continue to ‘be’}. And for Blattner, we cannot say that – such that the question is ‘senseless’ – because the framework under which being obtains is dependent upon Dasein. And “if being depends on Dasein, then when Dasein does not exist, neither does the question’s framework”.\textsuperscript{92} Thus the linkage of Dasein to time to being: because those structures in terms of which being is interpreted \textit{are} argued to be dependent upon Dasein, when we remove those structures, questions about ‘being’ cease to make sense. Therefore, as Blattner argues, Heidegger is a \textit{transcendental} idealist about being.

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There has been some pushback on this point, particularly regarding the apparent ‘senselessness’ of the transcendental standpoint. As Carman says, “surely, the

\begin{flushleft}
88 SZ, 212/255.
89 Blattner, \textit{Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism}, 243.
90 \textit{Ibid.}, 244.
91 I intend ‘persistence’ to be a neutral term here, given ‘being’ and ‘existence’ have important technical senses in Heidegger.
92 \textit{Ibid.}, 244.
\end{flushleft}
‘human standpoint’ is the only one it makes sense for an existential phenomenologist like Heidegger to entertain. Besides, of what philosophical use is a transcendental perspective, if all it does is generate senseless questions?”.

Transcendental idealism has a crucial function to play in Kant because it shows why we cannot access things in themselves, but an analogous role does not seem to persist in Blattner’s interpretation of Heidegger.

There is a real tension here. On the one hand, we have seen many of Heidegger’s claims have evident idealist subtexts, and these claims appear to be further evidenced by his consistent usage of Kant’s technical language. But at the same time, I argue Carman is right to question the relevance of the transcendental perspective: what appears to be ontologically productive is (rightly) limited to the phenomenological. And whilst Dasein’s disclosedness is explicated in terms of its transcendental conditions, does that require Heidegger to incorporate every tenet of Kantian idealism wholesale?

Carman argues not, and his aforementioned account of hermeneutic conditions informs his response. Heidegger “is interested not in our particular practices and understandings, but in the conditions of the possibility of interpretation”.

And although Heidegger is a transcendental thinker, “constructing arguments for or against realism or idealism […] was clearly not [his] chief concern”. For Carman, Heidegger was concerned instead with the transcendental underpinnings of hermeneutics, i.e., those structures which make our interpretation of the world possible. I agree: one of Heidegger’s key innovations in transcendental philosophy was to reorient it towards hermeneutics. Dasein is disclosive insofar as it is interpretative. And Heidegger does express some reticence regarding the metaphysical implications of allying himself too readily with either realism or idealism.

But if that is the case, how can we account for the unanswerability of the transcendental question?

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94 Carman, Heidegger’s Analytic, 12 (my emphasis).
95 Ibid., 4.
96 Sometimes, Heidegger goes further than this, claiming that the debate around realism and idealism reflects an “inappropriate formulation of the question” (SZ, 207/251). This is to say: the framework under which realism/idealism obtains is ‘inappropriate’ insofar as we presuppose a metaphysics of subject and object that he is also trying to overturn. We will consider Heidegger’s critique of subject-object in more detail in the next chapter. But for Carman, this means that
Carman’s response is to remind us of the ontological difference: being is not an entity, nor is it a property of entities. “Being is what it means to be.”\(^97\) Therefore, being is not an ‘existent’ in the way entities are. It is neither real nor ideal, and assigning it predicates is little more than a linguistic convention.\(^98\) Being ‘depends’ on Dasein by virtue of its hermeneutic abilities, but that is only to say that “being is the transcendental condition of entities making sense as entities.”\(^99\) Therefore, whilst the early Heidegger is a transcendental thinker, he is not a transcendental idealist. A key function of the ontological difference is to deflate that possibility. He assents to the Copernican Revolution insofar as ontological structures are structures ‘of’ Dasein. But ontological structures are hermeneutic: entities ‘conform to’ our existentiality insofar as our existentialia render the world encounterable and meaningful. Heidegger thinks the temporal structure which underlies these hermeneutic abilities is complex; indeed, he mobilizes the Kantian sense of schematism to explicate it. But being is neither a real nor ideal entity: it is the hermeneutic itself, akin to existence being our way of being-in-the-world.

I argue that Carman’s account is subtle and defensible. Through his interpretation of the ontological difference, we are able to make sense of Heidegger’s prima facie conflicting statements about realism and idealism, without a reliance on a ‘senseless’ perspective. Moreover, Carman’s account is sensitive to both the transcendental and hermeneutic aspects of Heidegger’s early thought. Indeed, I would tentatively contend that we can connect Carman’s analysis to the structural analogy I have posited between disclosedness and the imagination. For where Kantian synthesis ‘produces’ Erkenntnis, Heidegger too presupposes a ‘synthesis’ of entity and existentiality that has as its product ontological interpretation. Dasein transcends – it organizes entities under an interpretation – but the ontological difference itself entails there can be no further ‘standpoint’. Heidegger remains a Kantian insofar as ontological conditions are

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\(^{97}\) Carman, *Heidegger’s Analytic*, 201.

\(^{98}\) Ibid., 202.

\(^{99}\) Ibid., 202.
transcendental conditions, but such conditions indicate Dasein’s disclosive abilities, not a Heideggerian commitment to Kantian idealism. In this way, we have another glimpse into how Heidegger thinks both with and beyond Kant: the formal apparatus of transcendental philosophy remains in and informs the argumentative structure of Being and Time, but Heidegger is ultimately in dialogue with Kant. And here, we see that Heidegger’s mobilizes the ontological difference to overcome Kant’s ontic idealism.

With this, we have now set out – at least in general terms – my interpretation of the relationship between Kant and the early Heidegger. Kant’s transcendental thinking provides a unifying ground for Heidegger’s dual concerns in phenomenology and ontology, and in Being and Time, this is expressed through a structural analogy between disclosedness and the imagination. But Heidegger does not simply ‘translate’ Kant into his own terminology: as the debate around realism/idealism suggests, Heidegger also wants to think beyond Kant, to push Kant’s insights further.

But what are the consequences of this general interpretation? Now, we need to turn to a more in-depth, comparative analysis of Being and Time with the first Critique, i.e., to see how the Kantian thread plays out in Heidegger’s ontology.

5. Conclusion
In this first part, we have traced the early stages of Heidegger’s career as the project of fundamental ontology develops, culminating in his return to Kant in 1925. I have suggested that the key lens through which we should understand the Kantian thread in Being and Time is with a structural analogy between disclosedness and the imagination. Our next question is how this works in practice. In Part Two, we will focus on the two key moments in each respective Division of Being and Time where I argue Heidegger is expressly discoursing with Kant. Firstly, in the account of worldhood, Heidegger reconceives the Deduction along phenomenological lines, and furthermore sets out the hermeneutic core of his ontology. Secondly, I will focus on the relationship between Heidegger’s account of ecstatic temporality and the Schematism, and how the interrelated concerns of finitude and time appear as the foundational conditions for both Kantian and Heideggerian ontology. These, finally, will be used as the materials
from which to build my defence of the early Heidegger’s account of transcendence in Part Three.
PART TWO

The Kantian Thread of *Being and Time*
CHAPTER FOUR
Worldhood and Ontological Constitution

1. The Procedure of Fundamental Ontology

We now have in place the broadest structures of my account. The Copernican Revolution ties ontology to intentionality, and it is by virtue of Dasein’s disclosive interpretation of being – where Heidegger is drawing heavily on the dual functions of the imagination – which provides the first point of contact with Kant. But this is very general. We need to see Heidegger’s dialogue with Kant in action, to set out the Kantian thread in *Being and Time* itself.

And it begins at the start of Division I: we have seen that Heidegger’s basic procedure is to interrogate Dasein within its everydayness, and that his aim with this method is to provide a more nuanced ontological picture than simply a reductionism to presence-at-hand. But beyond that, the way everydayness is set out involves a twofold account where the phenomenological and transcendental immediately dovetail one another. For everydayness is not a property of Dasein as if it were present-at-hand, nor is it a disposition or a mood; instead, it is constituted as an existential structure *a priori*. And where everydayness firstly signifies a generalizable phenomenological comportment (indeed, that comportment which Dasein is oriented towards “proximally and for the most part”),¹ there is a transcendental relationship between the ontic and the ontological that Heidegger wants to tease out. As he says, “anything which, taken ontically, *is* in an average way, can be very well grasped ontologically in pregnant structures which may be structurally indistinguishable from certain ontological characteristics […] of Dasein”.² The procedure of fundamental ontology, therefore, is twofold: beginning from average everydayness, phenomenology is utilized to clarify

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¹ *SZ*, 43/69.
the nature of encounter, i.e., the contingent ways we deal with entities. But the second point, and Heidegger’s aim, is to demonstrate the *a priori* structural presuppositions which regulate the nature of encounter – i.e., the conditions of possibility *for* encounter – which must be presupposed so that entities can be taken as entities. From the outset, Heidegger renders the phenomenological transcendental and the transcendental phenomenological. From the Kantian side, the point cannot be exactly like the Critique, where a set of faculties are presupposed and the broadest structural question is *their* unification, because that presupposition may not cohere with the phenomena. Rather, one begins from the phenomena, and it is on Heidegger’s onus to demonstrate their transcendental ground.

With that in mind, the thematic core of Division I is primarily devoted to developing the conception of Dasein’s being which Heidegger argues satisfies the phenomenology. Namely, Dasein’s being is to be analysed as ‘being-in-the-world’, and whilst it is “a compound expression […] it stands for a unitary phenomenon”. Heidegger’s choice of words gives us an intuitive sense that what we are aiming for is a conception of ‘the self’ situated within a meaningful life, not abstracted from it. But in specifying the term more precisely, we will see that the concept of ‘being-in-the-world’ brings together a multitude of concerns that we have seen Heidegger develop.

Firstly, where Heidegger’s rejection of the primacy of the theoretical has already given a formal justification for redrawing intentional relationships so they are not dependent on the traditional distinctions of subject from object, in turn, the concept of being-in-the-world will show how this is *phenomenologically* unsatisfactory. Within this context, the problem of the categories will also broaden out and be replaced by a diversity within the modes of being, which Heidegger terminologically marks by distinguishing existentialia (the ontological structures of Dasein) from the categories themselves (the ontological structures of presence-at-hand). But what this will further indicate is a more general claim concerning what one might call ‘first philosophy’, that is, where (since at least Descartes) *the* fundamental problem of philosophy has been the nature of human knowledge, conceiving Dasein as being-in-the-world will reveal that “the

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theory of knowledge is itself shot through with dogmatic metaphysical assumptions”. For Heidegger, epistemological ‘problems’ only appear as such because one’s ontology is deficient, grounded in the fact our mode of being has not been understood phenomenologically.

But if, systematically, ‘being-in-the-world’ stands in for these multifarious concerns, what this depends upon is the elucidation of the idea that Dasein’s ‘world’ designates a holistic complex which overcomes the oppositional divisions of the subject-object distinction. Heidegger firstly characterizes being-in-the-world as a ‘dwelling’ in-the-world. Dasein’s primary mode of being-(in-the-world) involves an engaged comportment: there is a purposive structure to everyday encounter which cannot be captured via propositional intentionality. Dasein’s world is the world of its concern, and we are always oriented within-the-world in relation to concern, i.e., “having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something”, and so on. In the broadest sense, this is the phenomenology Heidegger wants to develop to overcome traditional accounts of human experience.

But ontologically – and transcendentally – the phenomenology of world is taken to entail “the ontologico-existential concept of worldhood”, i.e., the conditions of possibility for Dasein having a world, the conditions of possibility for entities showing up within the concern of the ontologically interpretative entity. Worldhood, consequently, is the first existentiale Heidegger attends to. The first step in his ontology is to explain this transcendental relationship between Dasein and world, i.e., to explain how the individuation of entities is possible within this new context of taking intentionality-ontology to be a unity. It is also the first substantive element of the Kantian thread. Because what Heidegger takes from Kant, I argue, is not just a rethinking of ‘the transcendental’ in terms of ontico-onto-ontological priority. Moreover, what is left unsaid in Being and Time is the degree to which Heidegger is directly reworking whole sections of the Critique phenomenologically. Considering worldhood, I argue Heidegger is in dialogue with the Deduction. Firstly, they share the same question: the aim of both chapters is

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5 Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, 13.
6 SZ, 54/79-80.
7 Ibid., 56/83.
8 Ibid., 65/93.
to give an account of ontological constitution within a transcendental context. That is, given the conceptual reversal of the Copernican Revolution, how can we now account for entities, for the world we find ourselves in? Heidegger treads the same ground as Kant, just now phenomenologically.

There are already hints of this interpretation in the literature, e.g., Okrent argues there are substantial parallels between Kant’s ‘I-think’ and Heidegger’s ‘for-the-sake-of-which’:

“Kant argues that the possibility of the ‘I think’ accompanying every act of cognition is a necessary condition on acts of conceptual cognition […]. In an exactly parallel manner, Heidegger argues that if an agent is capable of being in the world, of intending entities as tools that are to be used according to some equipmental type, then that agent also, thereby, intends herself as that for the sake of which her world […] is organized”.

But there is not only a single parallel: I argue the relationship between the aims of the Deduction and the aims of Worldhood go far deeper. Firstly, both chapters exposit substantively the nature of the relationship between the intentional and ontological beyond the merely programmatic ambitions of the Copernican Revolution. Both chapters provide a structural account of the way Dasein/apperception is ontologically formative, either by providing synthetic unity so the categories can be applied, or insofar as Dasein is the “ontical condition for the possibility

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10 By ‘ontologically formative’, I mean to refer to Dasein/apperception’s capacity to actively constitute its world. As I will read the Deduction (and in the next chapter, the Schematism), the categories and their schemata are not ‘simply’ concepts through which the world is understood. Moreover, they are structures which affect the way the world is presented to the subject that the subject itself contributes a priori. By virtue of this, they are therefore not merely epistemic, but moreover ontological. I describe this as ‘formative’ insofar as (for Kant) the categories are formative upon the presentation of world, i.e., they precede and determine it. Similarly in Heidegger, my analysis of significance, the for-the-sake-of-which, and (later) temporality will entail them having the same function.

11 KrV, B132-B133.
of discovering entities which are encountered in a world”. The Deduction is a radical break with what came before it by recognizing the ontologically formative status of apperception even whilst Kant held firm to a traditional account of faculties. Heidegger’s account of worldhood, with phenomenology as his guide, also breaks with the tradition in that way, but also goes one step further. Dasein is ontologically formative, but the phenomenology demands that we think both with and beyond the categories: there are modes of being of entities other than Dasein that also cannot just be interpreted in terms of the categories. Furthermore, whilst taken alone each chapter may seem self-sufficient, both are radically incomplete. The argument started in the Deduction requires the Schematism for its completion: to be incorporated into human experience, the categories require a temporal interpretation. Similarly, ‘worldhood’ alone is not Heidegger’s ontology; furthermore, we require an understanding of care and its temporal structure. Accordingly, my central claim in this chapter is that there are not only parallels to be drawn regarding a restricted set of Kantian and Heideggerian moves; moreover, I argue there is a systematic unity between the procedure of Kant’s critical philosophy and Heidegger’s fundamental ontology.

Under my interpretation, therefore, one cannot understand the force of Heidegger’s arguments concerning worldhood without first grasping the ontological meaning of the Transcendental Deduction. But that reading of the Deduction is itself controversial; consequently, my argument will begin aiming to justify that interpretation before we return to the analysis of Being and Time itself.

2. The Ontological Meaning of the Transcendental Deduction

(a) Ontology vs. Epistemology

What is the point of the Transcendental Deduction? Counterintuitively, it makes more sense to begin from Kant’s conclusions and work back. Firstly: the “synthetic unity of perceptions is precisely what constitutes the form of experience, and it is nothing other than the synthetic unity of the appearances in accordance with concepts”. Furthermore, Kant reiterates his guiding ontological principle that “the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience”, wherein

12 Sz, 87/120.
13 Krü”, A110.
the categories are identified as “nothing other than the **conditions of thinking in a possible experience**”.\(^{14}\) And for all the other putative differences between the two editions of the *Critique*, Kant comes to the same conclusion in B.\(^{15}\) But what does this flurry of Kant jargon actually mean? Kant makes three key points here, which will lead me to make a broader claim about Kant’s conception of ontology.

Firstly, Kant recognizes the importance of *synthesis* in constituting the ‘form of experience’. Kant defines synthesis as a “**combination** [...] of a manifold in general”,\(^ {16}\) which is “an act of [the subject’s] *self-activity*”.\(^ {17}\) In turn, ‘experience’ is a technical term for Kant, specifically designating “a synthesis of perceptions, which is not itself contained in perception but contains the synthetic unity of the manifold of perception in one consciousness”.\(^ {18}\) Consequently, in connecting the constitution of experience to synthesis, Kant claims that the constitution of experience is self-actualized: experience is something we construct from its constituent elements, by adding each perception to the succession. But beyond that, Kant is not just making a contingent claim about human psychology because what is self-constituted first is the *form* of experience. That is, apart from any particular perceptual content, the formal structures of experience (the temporal succession of perceptions with a continuity attributable to one consciousness taken as such) are *themselves* individuated by means of a synthetic act. Kant’s first claim, therefore, is that the overarching *structure* of human intentionality is synthetically constituted *a priori*.

So, the ‘form of experience’ designates the transcendental structure underlying human intentionality; that is, the fundamental conditions in terms of which human intentionality is constituted *as such*. In turn, Kant’s second move is to assert the *ontological* relevance of the form of experience. Which is to say, since the form of experience is the structural foundation underlying the intelligibility of the world, this ‘form’ is itself covertly ontological because the conditions for the possibility of experience themselves constitute the structure of the

\(^{14}\) *Ibid.*, A111.


\(^{16}\) *Ibid.*, B129.

\(^{17}\) *Ibid.*, B130 (my emphasis).

entities within experience. That is, because the structure within which entities appear is self-constituted, the structure of the entities themselves must be self-constituted too. Kant’s final move is to then identify the categories as those specific conditions in terms of which entities are synthetically structured as objective.

Bringing those points together: to say the Deduction has an ontological meaning is to claim that ontological constitution is only possible through a priori synthesis. To achieve this, I contend that the argument of the Deduction aims to justify that objectivity is only possible by virtue of the projection of the categories onto a manifold of intuition. In other words, the Deduction demonstrates how ontological constitution must be subjectively projected insofar as (objective) ontological structures are grounded as a priori structures of the subject. Now, clearly my interpretation of the Deduction has Kant making a far stronger claim than the ‘epistemological Kant’ reading would affirm. I have already made reference, e.g., to Allison’s interpretation, who contends that the Deduction is instead responding to a putative sceptical objection regarding the coherence of the faculties. By contrast, Guyer initially appears to advocate something closer to my position in claiming that Kant’s categories “are supposed to be shown to be the formal conceptual conditions of all experience, just as space and time are supposed to be the formal conditions of all the intuitions that are the matter of experience”. However, he too argues that the categories “are to be understood epistemically rather than ontologically”. And even a generation before Heidegger, Cohen was arguing that Kant’s ‘genius’ was in wrenching Aristotelian logic from its supposedly ‘metaphysical’ presuppositions and refocusing the categories onto “judgements as the cognitive unities”.

In taking any such position on the Deduction, therefore, there is far more philosophically at stake than the interpretation of one chapter: since it

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20 Ibid., 128.
constitutes “the very heart of the *Critique of Pure Reason*”, the Deduction is (along with the Schematism) the litmus test on which one’s more general stance on the *Critique* stands or falls. This is not helped by the fact one of Kant’s few statements about the purpose of the Analytic more generally is somewhat ambiguous. Namely, Kant claims that “the proud name of an ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic *a priori* cognitions of things in general in a systematic doctrine (e.g., the principle of causality), must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding”. *Prima facie*, this suggests Kant believes that ontology must give way to epistemology. But given that Kant provides a proof for causality in the Second Analogy, might the distinction instead be between the *systematics* of dogmatic metaphysics over against Kant’s critical stance? In other words, is the distinction methodological as opposed to disciplinary? For in any case, the ‘mere analytic’ takes on the functions of the ‘proud name of an ontology’, even if Kant restricts the use of that particular word to his rationalist predecessors. To break the impasse, we will have to turn to the letter of the Deduction itself, to see within Kant’s argument its essentially ontological orientation.

(b) *Synthesis and Apperception*

In turning to the Deduction’s argument itself, Kant begins in both editions with the introduction of synthesis. To be sure, Kant spends substantially more time in *A* unpacking the inner workings of synthesis, but §15 makes the same basic point in *B*. That is: we are firstly provided with a ‘manifold’ by intuition, which is to say, any such appearance will be composed of manifold properties. But in order for any manifold to be taken as such – that is, for the subject to take any given manifold as a manifold as opposed to a disparate collection – a synthesis of the elements of the manifold must take place. This is because “we can represent nothing as combined in the object without having previously combined it

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23 *KrV*, A247/B303.


ourselves”, or as Kant says in A, “in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold […] it is necessary first to run through and then take together this manifoldness”. For Kant, combination is “the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold”, which is required because of the essentially ‘receptive’ nature of intuition, i.e., intuition is composed of sensible content that we are merely given as opposed to that which is actively (‘spontaneously’) thought. Consequently, if given manifold properties are to be taken as a unity, that must occur by means of our own mental activity. That is, the subject synthesizes each element so that, beyond a temporal succession of otherwise unconnected sense-data in inner sense, the elements are instead represented as pertaining to one and the same entity.

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Now, for Heidegger, the more involved account of synthesis in A is taken to be absolutely crucial because he argues it includes an implicit temporal subtext. In A, Kant exposits synthesis as a threefold process in which the elements of the manifold must be:

(1) ‘Apprehended’ as a manifold, but this is only possible insofar as…
(2) Each successive element of the manifold can be ‘reproduced’. That is, for each element to be synthesized with the next, the prior elements must be held in place so they can be synthesized by the subject. But this itself would not be possible if…
(3) Each element of the manifold could not possibly be ascribed to the same consciousness and by virtue of which concepts can possibly be applied.

Given that (2) and (3) only make sense as conditions upon (1), I furthermore contend that this whole process must be implicit in B even whilst only (1)

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26 Ibid., B130.
27 Ibid., A99 (my emphasis).
28 Ibid., B130-B131.
29 Ibid., A50/B74.
30 Here, I must thank Stephen Houlgate for some discussions we had back in 2016 for helping me clarify this aspect of Kant’s argument in the A-Deduction.
31 KrV’, A101-A102.
32 Ibid., A103.
appears explicitly in §15. But making this explicit is important for Heidegger because:

“The three modes of the transcendental synthesis each relates to a mode of time: the synthesis called apprehension is related to the now, the one called reproduction is related to the no-longer-now, and the synthesis called precognition” is related to the not-yet-now”.

For Heidegger, each element of transcendental synthesis designates a temporal directionality, which he will also argue in Being and Time is that which unifies Dasein’s being. Regarding the Critique, for Heidegger, each element of synthesis exhibiting one of three temporal modes is precisely what provides unity to synthesis as a singular-but-complex mental act insofar as:

(1) Apprehension designates what occurs in the present moment of intending, whilst...
(2) Reproduction designates the holding in place of that which came before, whilst...
(3) Precognition is a futural projecting of the fully synthesized object.

This unity of synthesis provided by temporality is then taken by Heidegger to represent “the originally unified articulation of the primal activity of the ‘I’ as ‘I think’”. Then he claims it is through the “unity of this primal activity, the subject is itself something that in reaching out essentially emerges out of itself without simply leaving itself behind”. This almost certainly appears obscure to us now, but it is worth foreshadowing that within a year of Being and Time’s publication, Heidegger is making an explicit parallel between what he takes to be the ontological meaning of the Deduction and what he designates in Being and Time as the ontological meaning of Dasein’s being. Consequently, the relevance of the

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33 This is Heidegger’s revision of the terminology.
34 Ga25, 389/264 (my emphasis).
36 Ga25, 390/264.
37 Ibid., 390/264.
Deduction to fundamental ontology is not only limited to Heidegger’s analysis of worldhood but spans the whole work. The question that will have to be asked when Division II is analysed, then, is the extent to which Kant and Heidegger’s conceptions of time coincide. For that is the unorthodox moment in Heidegger’s interpretation; in terms of tracing the premise-by-premise structure of Kant’s argument, I want to show that Heidegger is otherwise relatively uncontroversial here.\(^{38}\)

Because Kant’s next move is to connect the unity of synthesis to the unity of self-consciousness. If we follow the A-edition, it is because the synthesis of recognition requires the unity of consciousness which further allows Kant to claim that applying any concept must involve “the consciousness of the unity of this synthesis”.\(^{39}\) That is, it is only by recognizing that each element of the manifold is part of the same synthetic act which makes possible the recognition that the manifold is unified in the same consciousness. And conversely, since the unity of synthesis requires the unity of consciousness – i.e., each element of the manifold be ascribable to the same consciousness for it to be taken as a unity – self-ascription by the cognizer must in turn be possible. As Kant says, “every necessity has a transcendental condition as its ground. A transcendental ground must therefore be found for the unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions”.\(^{40}\) The ‘all’ is crucial here because it indicates a modal shift on Kant’s part: strictly speaking, the scope of the Deduction pertains only to the cognition of a single object, but now Kant seems to be talking about the ground of the unity of experience as a whole. Which is to say, what underlies all unity of synthesis, what makes possible the synthetic unity of all synthesizes themselves, is the I-think, the unity of self-consciousness, or as Kant begins §16 in B:

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\(^{38}\) At this point, it ought to be noted that Kant does (at least on one occasion) assert the temporality of the threefold synthesis, in the *Metaphysik Mrongovius*. He says, “the sensible faculty of cognition can be classified (A) with respect to time, since it is (α) the faculty of intuition of the present or the senses, sensation <sensatio>, (B) of the past or reproduction, and (C) of the future or anticipation <praevision>”, cf. LM, 29:881. Whilst a single passage isn’t sufficient to establish whether it was Kant’s considered view, this does suggest Heidegger’s reading isn’t as off the mark as it’s commonly taken to be.

\(^{39}\) *KrV*, A103 (my emphasis).

\(^{40}\) Ibid., A106.
“The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or at least would be nothing for me”.41

The next key move in making the application of the categories possible in both versions, therefore, is this possibility of self-ascription, which does not entail, as Allison notes, that we are constantly thinking ‘I think’ in propositional intentionality. Rather, transcendental apperception only designates “the necessity of a possibility”.42 Nevertheless, self-consciousness over mere consciousness is essential, because without the possibility of self-ascription, the move could never be made from the cognition of a singular object to the awareness of one’s “one experience, in which all perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike connection”.43 That is, the unity of experience is only possible through the synthetic unity of apperception insofar as experience is the synthesis of perceptions.

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But let’s try and simplify the multiple levels of synthesis Kant has now set out. In the first instance, taking a manifold of intuition as a unity requires a synthesis of its elements, because the bare givenness of the faculty of sensibility, in which sense-data is only given a minimal structure by space and time, requires that the unity be projected by the subject. But that alone is not sufficient for cognition of an object, because as Kant claims, “an object […] is that in the concept of which a manifold of intuition is united”.44 Therefore, there is a condition on the operation of the synthesis of a manifold of intuition: what provides the unity for the manifold, what regulates which sensible contents we take as pertaining to a particular manifold unity, is dictated by our conceptual resources. For example, the concept ‘cat’ can only be applied – thus at the same time a cat be cognized

41 Ibid., B131-B132 (my emphasis).
43 *KrV*, A110.
44 Ibid., B137.
– if the relevant sensible content is there, but at the same time, we will not cognize the manifold as the object-‘cat’ without applying its relevant concept. Consequently, for Kant, the possibility of objective cognition requires the possibility of concept application.

And as we have seen, concept application in general for Kant requires the unity of consciousness across every element of the manifold because the unity of consciousness is precisely what holds all the elements of the manifold in place. But at the same time, this apperception itself is a synthetic unity insofar as one’s self-identity is inferred through the unity of synthetic activity, i.e., through the continuity instituted by synthesis. Beyond this, there is a third level of synthesis in which fully cognized perceptions are themselves synthesized for the constitution of experience, but clearly there’s a gap. How do we move from the dual conditions of (1) the necessity of concept application for objectivity and (2) the necessity of apperception for concept application, to the introduction of the categories as pure concepts of the understanding in particular? And how is it that Kant expresses the ontological meaning of the Deduction in its argument?

(c) Objecthood, Judgement, and the Imagination

My claim is that those two questions point to the same move: the categories are ontological conditions for Kant insofar as they set out the basic conditions for objectivity. But how does Kant actually get to the categories? It is here that the prima facie major distinction between the two editions appears, and in turn one area where one might locate the point of disagreement in the ontological vs. epistemological debate. For where in the A-edition, Kant focuses on the nature of objectivity and its possibility in the context of human cognition, in B, Kant instead provides an analysis of the nature of judgement. That is, where A seems to relate the function of the categories to a basically ontological concern viz. objectivity, B seems to alternatively focus on the categories as concepts able to be incorporated into propositions, and thus expound them in relation to human knowledge. But I argue that these are only two ways of approaching the same basic concern, and that akin to the threefold synthesis being implicit in §15, to make judgements themselves presupposes an ontology which underlies them.

45 Of course, the assumption is made that the sense-data is veridical.

46 Ibid., B133-B134.
i. The A-Edition

Let’s take each edition in turn. In A, we have the two conditions above in place: objectivity requires concept application and concept application requires apperception. From this, Kant reiterates three essential claims about his account of intentionality. Firstly, he claims that all representations must “have their object”,\(^\text{47}\) where the ‘object’ designates what is being represented. Secondly, he claims that appearances are objects “given to us immediately”,\(^\text{48}\) with their origin in intuition. And finally, he claims that appearances “are not things in themselves, but themselves only representations”.\(^\text{49}\) Kant then uses the interconnectedness of these three claims to make a striking ontological point, but firstly we have to recognize that since appearances are representations, appearances must in turn have their object. However, we are unable to intuit that for Kant because the ‘object’ of an appearance would be a thing in itself. So, how can appearances therefore appear as objective? Through what Kant terms the “pure concept of [the] transcendental object”,\(^\text{50}\) which has no determinate object insofar as it is entirely separate from intuition. Instead, it designates formally, “that unity which must be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as it stands in relation to an object”.\(^\text{51}\)

This may appear obscure, but the basic idea seems to be that since the objective structures of things in themselves are inaccessible to us, what provides objective structure for the appearances must in turn be subjectively imposed, even for the possibility of representation. This is because representation itself (regardless of how minimal or deficient any mode of representation is) must have an object. For example, even hallucinations exhibit the formal structures of objectivity, it is simply that the object is not actually there. Indeed, hallucination is an interesting case because it seems to presuppose that we do know how to structure an object a priori. Under hallucination, objective structure is preserved even where there is no empirical correlate, which in turn seems to imply precisely what the

\(^{47}\) Ibid., A108.
\(^{48}\) Ibid., A109.
\(^{49}\) Ibid., A109.
\(^{50}\) Ibid., A109.
\(^{51}\) Ibid., A109.
pure concept of the transcendental object designates: the formal conditions for subjectively imposed objectivity.

With this concept in place, it is now a matter of connecting everything else. Where the pure concept of a transcendental object relates the manifold to objectivity as such and sets out its formal constitution, that which does the relating is the transcendental unity of apperception, by providing unity to synthesis. Synthesis is the mental activity which makes the representation of appearances possible.\textsuperscript{52} What must be contained in the pure concept of the transcendental object given that account, therefore, are the “\textit{a priori} rules of […] synthetic unity, in accordance with which […] relation to empirical intuition is alone possible”\textsuperscript{53}, which is to say, the \textit{categories}. In other words, the conceptual transcendental conditions for human intentionality coincide with the pure concept of the transcendental object. Consequently, intentional conditions coincide with ontological conditions for Kant insofar as the categories designate the fundamental conceptual conditions for objecthood itself.

That, at least, is Kant’s account in the A-edition: the categories are afforded objective validity insofar as it is shown that they \textit{constitute} objectivity (within the context of transcendental idealism). Substantiality, causality, reality, etc., are not just the conditions in terms of which we understand objects, moreover, they are those conditions which determine objectivity as such. The categories are the conditions for what it means to be an object in general.

\textbf{ii. The B-Edition}

But the A-edition version is equally not Kant’s final word on the matter, given the rewrite in B. And Kant’s argument there is \textit{prima facie} more transparent. In B, Kant simply recognizes that bringing a manifold of intuition to apperception is “the logical function of judgements”,\textsuperscript{54} and that “the \textit{categories} are nothing other than these very functions for judging, insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined with regard to them”.\textsuperscript{55} On the surface, this is a much easier way to get to the categories: \textit{judgements} are identified as the discursive

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}, A109.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Ibid.}, A110.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}, B143.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}, B143.
product of cognition, from which it is argued that judgement itself is only possible insofar as the categories set out the base conceptual conditions for unifying a manifold, on the basis of which judgements are in turn formed. This is more straightforward. There’s no reliance on transcendental idealism, there’s a clearly demarcated transcendental argument, and we can sidestep the discussion of objecthood that Kant included in A. Can we therefore conclude Kant was an epistemologist?

No, because that’s not the whole story. That argument appears only halfway through the B-Deduction, and whilst the categories have been introduced, Kant is not claiming their objective validity yet. As Henrich argues, the B-Deduction has two key stages, where the second half centres around an analysis of the imagination as that which facilitates synthetic activity, due to its ability to mediate between the empirical and sensible manifold against the conceptuality and aprioricity of the categories. In one sense, this appears epistemological; indeed, it seems to corroborate Allison’s interpretation that Kant is responding to a mitigated scepticism regarding the unity of the faculties, with the imagination conjectured as the principle of unity. But conversely, if it is only epistemological, it does seem to render the imagination a kind of ‘God of the gaps’ response, if not entirely question-begging, because without understanding the imagination as a unique faculty which is both mediating and formative, it seems that all the imagination is there for is to make sure intuition can connect up with the categories. But doesn’t that just render the imagination a placeholder? As Allison asks, “the main question is why the imaginative synthesis […] must conform to the categorial requirements of the understanding”, and in the following paragraph admits, “Kant’s treatment of this issue is extremely perfunctory”. On the contrary, I think we can show that Kant’s treatment of the imagination does provide us with the tools to answer Allison’s question.

Of course, Kant has far more to say about the imagination than what appears in the B-Deduction, and I argue it can be usefully mobilized for our purposes. In turn, it will mean we have to read even the B-Deduction ontologically, with the projective function of the imagination in place.

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57 Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, 191.
The first point to note is that Kant has already claimed that “synthesis in general is […] the mere effect of the imagination”.\(^{58}\) This is because, as we have seen for Kant, the imagination has a dual receptive-spontaneous function since it “[represents] an object even without its presence in intuition”.\(^{59}\) Thus why, in A, Kant assigned reproduction to the imagination: it is characteristically able to hold in place all the elements of the manifold throughout the synthetic process. But the question in B is why Kant focuses specifically on the imagination in the stage of the argument which he takes to demonstrate the objective validity of the categories. In that case, we need to think about how the imagination actually functions. And Kant is explicit here: in applying the categories, the transcendental function of the imagination is:

“\textbf{Productive} […] and thereby [distinguished] from the \textbf{reproductive} imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, namely those of association, that therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition \textit{a priori}, and on that account belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology”.\(^{60}\)

On the empirical level, therefore, the imagination is not particularly notable; indeed, the reference to ‘association’ is almost Humean. But insofar as the Deduction is concerned with transcendental synthesis through its ability to build up experience, Kant’s reference to the \textit{productive} possibility of the imagination signifies its \textit{constructive} function.\(^{61}\) That is, because all intuition does is provide a manifold, and all understanding does is provide concepts, synthesis is necessary for the representation of a complex that is nevertheless unified. Therefore, the transcendental imagination must be more than a mere mediator that connects the gaps because the constitution of an object itself involves more than ‘empirical manifold + empirical concept’. Instead, again, the categories are necessary as the

\(^{58}\) \textit{KrV}, A78/B103.

\(^{59}\) \textit{Ibid.}, B151.

\(^{60}\) \textit{Ibid.}, B152.

\(^{61}\) In my interpretation, this follows from the aforementioned notion of Heidegger’s that the imagination is a receptive \textit{spontaneity}, i.e., the imagination does not just mediate, it is moreover involved in the active constitution of objective cognition.
“laws of […] combination” themselves,⁶² which is to reiterate as in A that the function of the categories is to provide the fundamental conditions for objecthood. In that sense, the ontology that is explicit in A must be at the very least implicit in B insofar as Kant is arguing the imagination constitutes the objects of experience as the *product* of its mediating function. And beyond that, what B thus makes clear is that what is unique about the imagination is that as a receptive spontaneity, ontological constitution is an essential part of the functions of the imagination.

*(d) From ‘Kantian’ to ‘Fundamental’ Ontology*

Whichever edition of the *Critique* one focuses on, therefore, I have tried to independently show that the arguments in the Transcendental Deduction ultimately lead to ontological conclusions. That is, the ‘objective validity’ of the categories is ultimately established due to their ontologically constitutive role: there could not ‘be objects’ without category application. Of course, there may be some points in Kant’s argumentation which might concern us, e.g., the A-Deduction does seem to rely heavily on a commitment to transcendental idealism. However, one might expect Kant to reply that one wouldn’t need to deduce the categories if transcendental realism was true, given access to things in themselves would (presumably, counterfactually) be transparent. Nevertheless, this still suggests that a commitment to the broader critical project is requisite for the success of the A-Deduction.

Furthermore, as Longuenesse notes, one of the few points of consensus amongst the radically disparate approaches to Kant scholarship, from Heidegger to Strawson and many in between, is a scepticism concerning the success of the *Metaphysical* Deduction. That is, they “all agree that the relation Kant aims to establish between the categories and the logical forms of judgement is, at best, not especially enlightening and, at worst, downright wrong”.⁶³ So, whilst the success of the Transcendental Deduction could provide us with a general argument for the necessity of category application that is indiscriminate concerning which categories there are, in the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant has been read to

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assume that ontology will map onto logic, such that it is not clear that the Transcendental Deduction must refer and only refer to the twelve in the ostensibly ‘derived’ table of categories.

Of course, within the context of fundamental ontology, the question of the relationship between logic and ontology does not appear at the same moment because the derivation of the basic ontological concepts (and/or its analogues) follows a different methodology. As Heidegger says of the Metaphysical Deduction, “a critique of the Table of Judgements, as supposed critique of the source of the origin of the categories, has already fundamentally missed the decisive problem”. For Heidegger, the Metaphysical Deduction does not constitute Kant’s argument for determining which categories there are. Rather, it only sets out the elements of pure knowledge, and shows “the more radically one seeks to isolate the pure elements of a finite knowledge”, as the Metaphysical Deduction attempts to, “the more compelling becomes the impossibility of such an isolation and the more obtrusive is the dependency of pure thinking on intuition”. Insofar as the Analytic is part of a transcendental logic, its categories therefore “[have] a manifold of sensibility that [lie] a priori […] in order to provide the pure concepts of the understanding with a matter”. Consequently, categorial understanding is always already oriented towards the possibility of experience. And for Heidegger, this means we ought to shift our focus onto the question of the unity of intuition with understanding, which is to say, to the transcendental function of the imagination and its ontologically formative status.

With this, Heidegger attempts to mitigate the phenomenological inadmissibility of Kant’s dependency on formal logic: whatever formal logic sets out forces us back to the primacy of intuition, which suggests in phenomenological terms the ontological importance of encounter. In this way, Heidegger uses Kantian notions to think beyond Kant: the Metaphysical Deduction, at least on one reading, seems to be a rare moment where Kant falls prey to a kind of dogmatism, but we can find a way out for Heidegger through the opening principle of the Aesthetic and the functions of the imagination. We can find a way to our

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64 *KrV*, A79/A80/B105-B106.
65 *Ga3*, 56/40.
67 *KrV*, A76-A77/B102.
basic ontological precepts without assuming the kind of theorizing that is intrinsic to pure logic.\textsuperscript{68}

And this, I argue, is the first point of contact between the Deduction and Heidegger’s concept of worldhood. Where the aim of that chapter is to translate the ontological meaning of the Deduction into phenomenological terms – to preserve the transcendental relationship between Dasein and world – it also attempts to wrench away the dependency on and relative safety of pure logic. Ontological conditions will still fundamentally be understood as projective, and made possible through those attributes of Dasein which coincide with the transcendental imagination. But Heidegger also attempts to overcome the subject-object distinction and accounts of faculties along with it. In that way, it will be shown that explicating the concept of world involves a careful balancing act between the phenomenological and the transcendental in establishing the ontological. But still, we will see that the basic direction of Kant’s thought is maintained, even if he did not have all the conceptual tools to successfully express its fulfilment.

### 3. The Phenomenology of World

(a) Equipmentality and Readiness-to-Hand

Our aim is to express the systematic unity of the ontological meaning of the Deduction with Heidegger’s concept of worldhood. The point of contact is on the transcendental level, but we need the phenomenology in place to get there.\textsuperscript{69} Indeed, as I previously claimed, the procedure of fundamental ontology in general and worldhood in particular uses phenomenology to reveal its underlying transcendental conditions. But this already brings up a methodological question: how does one determine which phenomena are relevant? Heidegger has already

\textsuperscript{68} If we want to think about in terms more charitable to Kant, we might alternatively emphasize the fact the Metaphysical Deduction is subtitled: “The Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding”, cf. KrV, A66/B91 (my emphasis). Perhaps it’s only a clue. And given Kant also provides justification for each individual category in the Analytic of Principles, there’s a compelling argument to be made that the Metaphysical Deduction is only a starting point from what Kant would take us to already know, and it shouldn’t be treated in isolation.

\textsuperscript{69} ‘The transcendental level’, I should clarify, is not equivalent to what Blättner identifies as the ‘transcendental standpoint’. Instead, it refers to the transcendental conditions, as opposed to the phenomenology those conditions determine.
provided one general dictate: we begin from the comportment we are ‘proximally’ oriented in, i.e., the pre-theoretical stance of average everydayness. And beyond the critique of the primacy of the theoretical that we previously saw Heidegger mount, he will now run a further argument for how the ontology of presence-at-hand is derivative of average everydayness and readiness-to-hand. But to run that argument, one presumably already needs the essential characteristics of readiness-to-hand in place. So, will any ‘everyday’ phenomenon do? Or do we need to delve a little deeper? In fact, the crucial phenomenon for Heidegger is found in its breakdown. It is when, as Dreyfus puts it, the ordinary flow of engaged activity is ‘disturbed’,\(^{70}\) that what was essential for everyday comportment comes to the fore, alongside the thematization (which is to say, the theorization) of what was once pre-theoretical. The basic idea, then, which drives Heideggerian phenomenology, is that through absence can the necessary structures thereby be revealed.

Furthermore, we have also already established that our concernful comportment is characteristic of everydayness, such that our primary engagement with entities is firstly argued to not have the structure of “bare perceptual cognition”.\(^{71}\) Instead, those entities which we are primarily oriented towards are “those which show themselves in our concern with the environment”\(^{72}\). ‘Environment’, in Heidegger’s German, is \textit{Umwelt}, which is to say literally, ‘around-world’. There is already a phenomenological dimension to the term: those entities which Dasein ‘proximally’ encounters are located within Dasein’s situatedness, “that ‘wherein’ a factual Dasein as such can be said to ‘live’.”\(^{73}\) Within the environment, entities ‘become accessible’ not through their conceptualization, but by our putting them to use: they are the tools of the workshop, the computers in the office, the knives and chopping boards of the kitchen.\(^{74}\)

Moreover, it is the intentional distinctiveness of environmental entities which entails for Heidegger an ontological distinction. Given the pre-theoretical context of environmentality, we cannot assume that environmental entities take on

\(^{70}\) Dreyfus, \textit{Being-in-the-World}, 70.
\(^{71}\) \textit{SZ}, 67/95.
\(^{72}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 67/95 (my emphasis).
\(^{73}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 65/93.
\(^{74}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 67/96.
the same ontological characteristics as present-at-hand objects. Instead, Heidegger claims that environmental entities have the ontological character of equipment, of which he says, “taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment”. That is, within the enworking world of our concern, within the going-about of our business, entities are always encountered within a broader relational totality irreducible to its individual components. For example, there is a monitor, mouse, keyboard, lamp, open copy of Being and Time, and cup of coffee before me on my desk. We could take these ‘things’ individually. I could pick up the coffee cup and examine it like an alien who has never encountered one before. But if we think about the phenomenological structure of the actual everyday activities which constitute our lives – e.g., if I’m comported towards ‘getting my work done’ – each of those individualities fade away into a unified meaningful nexus, an equipmental whole, which indicates to me the possibility of particular activities.

Equipment are not ‘objects’, but the stuff of life. And the further ontological point Heidegger will need to justify is that this purposive structure is not simply a ‘subjective’ addition atop the structure of objectivity, as one finds in Husserl, but establishes that readiness-to-hand is a distinct mode of being.

But Heidegger goes one step further. For when one is actually acting, Heidegger argues that the standard philosophical resources are unable to accurately characterize it. For example, if I scroll up to proof-read the previous paragraph whilst taking a sip of coffee, we could say I am interacting with any number of ‘objects’. But still, talk of me thinking a set of propositions and having to take the effort to conceptualize my immediate surroundings to interact with it doesn’t capture the ease with which such actions are actually performed. “The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand,

75 Ibid., 68/97.
76 Ibid., 68-9/97-8.
77 cf. Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations: Volume 2, trans. J. N. Findlay (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 167. He says, “This world is there for me not only as a world of mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world. I simply find the physical things in front of me furnished not only with merely material determinations but also with value-characteristics”. The term ‘value-characteristics’ suggests that whilst Husserl does allow for more diverse intentionalities than simply theoretical cognition, he is still fundamentally thinking in terms of subject-object.
it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically”.

When acting, our focus is not on the particular objects and their minutiae cognized as such, instead, our focus is drawn to whatever we’re getting on with, whatever it is we’re trying to do. In our pre-theoretical, equipmental dealings, the objectivity of entities never gets the chance to appear because the referent of concern is not some individual entity, but an in-order-to, which is to say, the intention in terms of which the action is performed. Or as Heidegger puts it, in the famous example of an artisan using a hammer:

“In dealings such as this, where something is put to use, our concern subordinates itself to the ‘in-order-to’ which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time; the less we just stare at the hammer-thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is – as equipment”.

To take a short step back: the point Heidegger is making here is that the basic condition for equipmental dealings is what he terms our ‘familiarity’ with the world. Colloquially, we get a sense of what Heidegger means: we are sufficiently well-acquainted with our world such that we do not need any special kind of ‘knowledge’ to interact with it. Entities already relate to one another in such a way that, in the ordinary course of my concern, I do not need to ‘think’ in any rarefied sense about what I’m doing: opening doors, brushing my teeth, riding a bicycle, and so on. There will have been a point when I was a young child that I learnt how to do those things, but that is secondary to the point that in the actual doing of them, the structure of the engagement is not manifested as a set of propositional knowledge that I am drawing on and must think about to institute the action. Instead, the action is simply done. Which is to say: the world and its structure is always already ‘there’ for me, I already ‘know’ how to engage such that the world does not in and of itself present a ‘problem’ for me.

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78 SZ, 69/99.
79 Ibid., 69/98.
80 Ibid., 76/107.
But that ‘already’ itself implies Heidegger’s transcendental point: our phenomenological familiarity with the world will be shown to be constituted by the transcendental structure of disclosedness, such that the structure of world itself is a synthetic a priori projection.\(^{81}\) As with Kant’s final relating of the categories to apperception and objecthood in the Deduction, Heidegger will draw an analogous relationship between worldhood, Dasein, and ontological constitution in Being and Time. But the point he is firstly making phenomenologically is this institution of an entirely distinct intentional structure: not just objecthood, but entities fade away in equipmental dealings because our focus is on the task, and not with the nature of the entities with which it is achieved. In the hammer example, the point is that Dasein and hammer become part of a wider holistic complex insofar as the artisan’s familiarity with her tools breaks down its objective structure and is replaced by a purposive structure. She does not ‘think’ about the hammer, she hammers. As Haugeland explains it formally, “equipment does not have properties (relational or otherwise) […]. Instead of properties, equipment has […] appropriateness and proper roles […] where to] be appropriate is to be appropriate for (in, with, amidst, etc.) something”.\(^{82}\)

So, when Heidegger claims that equipmental dealings institute the structure of readiness-to-hand, the ontological point is that readiness-to-hand is not simply another way of thinking about entities. Instead, the phenomenology itself is supposed to indicate entities are manifested under a distinct mode of being.\(^{83}\) As Haugeland intimated, readiness-to-hand has its own ontological structure in contradistinction from Dasein and presence-at-hand: where Dasein is ontologically characterized by its existentialia, and presence-at-hand by categories, readiness-to-hand is ontologically distinctive by means of its appropriateness to a relational whole of Dasein’s concern. Readiness-to-hand is encountered in relation to practical activity, but as Heidegger clarifies, “‘practical’ behaviour is not ‘atheoretical’ in the sense of ‘sightlessness’”.\(^{84}\) For Heidegger, there is something more to our equipmental dealings than simply a distinction of thought from action.

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\(^{81}\) Ibid., 87/120.


\(^{83}\) SZ, 69/98-9.

\(^{84}\) Ibid., 69/99.
Instead, “action has its own kind of sight”, which Heidegger terms *circumspection*. To explain this, consider an entity taken present-at-hand. If I simply look at a hammer as an object, I can enumerate its properties: its length, that it is made of metal and wood, that it’s heavy, and so on. But in looking at it theoretically, this tells me nothing about its use: to actually pick it up and use it to drive in nails already indicates that my intentional stance has shifted. But so has my relationship to it as an entity: suddenly, it is not a mass of metal and wood, nor defined by any categorial structure it might have. Instead, it is appropriate-for the task of driving in nails. It is not just one ‘thing’ amongst other ‘things’, but is *purposively* related to the workshop, to me, to the nails, to the timber that the nails are being driven into, etc. And it is that appropriateness which shifts its ontological relationships: taken as equipment, the hammer is not an independent substance defined by its property-structure, but an *interdependent* element of an equipmental whole, defined by its appropriateness-for-x.

(b) The Ontological Priority of Readiness-to-Hand

But does the phenomenology support that ontological point? Does the hammer’s mode of being shift, or is it not only our comportment towards it? After all, pragmatist claims such as “experience is not a matter of knowledge, but rather of practical know-how”, are more minimal than Heidegger’s ontology. But *prima facie*, ‘know-how’ seems to be able to support the spirit of Heidegger’s point without also committing us to this increasingly complex ontological account. As Blattner comments, “the failure of existential phenomenology and American pragmatism to engage each other in a healthy dialogue is one of the great missed opportunities of twentieth-century philosophy”. I agree, but there is a key distinction – furthermore a distinction I think Blattner would agree with – which means that we cannot simply reduce readiness-to-hand as a mode of being to know-how as an intentional comportment. Indeed, it is the point that has been driving Heidegger’s whole argument so far. For readiness-to-hand “is not to be understood as merely a way of taking [entities…] as if some world-

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85 Ibid., 69/99.
88 Ibid., 47.
stuff which is proximally present-at-hand in itself were ‘given subjective colouring’ in this way”. 89 This would suggest that what is designated as ready-to-hand is somehow secondary to what is theorized by presence. But Heidegger’s aim is to show that “readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-categorically”. 90 That is to say, readiness-to-hand does not just designate a more practical kind of ‘knowledge’; moreover, because of its abstraction from circumspection, it is presence-at-hand that is ontologically secondary. Presence-at-hand does not ground readiness-to-hand, it is the other way around: the first ontological point that the phenomenology is there to support is that presence itself is ultimately dependent upon readiness-to-hand.

This claim goes further than Heidegger’s initial critique of the primacy of the theoretical from 1919. There, we saw Heidegger’s dissatisfaction with the early Husserl not living up to the ‘possibility’ of phenomenology by presupposing key tenets of traditional accounts of experience, and Rickert’s inability to break out of scientism, even if he could go beyond naturalism. But at the same time, Heidegger’s argument was neither explicitly nor systematically ontological. But here, we see the intended effect of this line of argument: pre-theoretical comportment is supposed to indicate a distinct ontological type. Which may well follow, and if it can be shown that readiness-to-hand is primary, then certainly it would have the status of a distinct mode of being. But how?

This is where the phenomenology of breakdown comes in, through the recognition that even if circumspective comportment guides average everydayness, this is not to deny that in certain cases we do take on a theorizing stance. Because what Heidegger has supposed so far is that our concern, circumspection, and the relevant equipmental totality are all working in unison: the requisite tools are available, they work properly, and so on. But clearly this is not always the case, and the phenomenology of these edge cases is utilized to explain the relationship of readiness-to-hand to presence-at-hand. Heidegger focuses on three key instances: entities become (1) conspicuous when they are unusable, (2) obtrusive when they are missing, and (3) obstinate when they prevent the fulfilment of an intention. 91 To provide some examples: suppose, when the artisan is

89 SZ, 71/101.
90 Ibid., 71/101.
91 Ibid., 73-4/102-4.
hammering with the hammer, the metal becomes loose and flies off the handle, or she has lost the hammer and can’t find it, or the door to the workshop is locked and she doesn’t have the key. How does the phenomenology change when such obstacles are introduced? The broken hammer, e.g., is conspicuous insofar as it is that which has caused the breakdown of the unity. But crucially, it is identified as the thing, the object that stands in the way. As Heidegger says, “conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to-hand”, and moreover that “pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment”.

We should clarify that Heidegger’s point here is that pure presence-at-hand is ‘announced’, and not that in cases of equipmental breakdown entities are experienced as merely present. The point is subtler, because to fully take an entity as present-at-hand requires considerable abstraction. Which is to say: in conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy, the un-readiness-to-hand of the entity reflects its failure to properly function as equipment. In the equipmental totality, it is inappropriate-for-\( \ast \) whilst in theory it ought to be appropriate. The entity stands out as inappropriate, and it becomes objectified insofar as it reorients our action. If the hammer is lost, it needs to be found, and until it is found, it cannot be incorporated into the holistic complex for which it is appropriate. In the searching, Dasein is looking for that object, that thing which is to be used. But at the same time, it would not be ‘announced’ as such if the equipmental totality had not broken down, which for Heidegger implies that objective structure only becomes phenomenologically relevant if the relational whole does not properly function. Consequently, Heidegger’s ontological point is that presence-at-hand only arises on the basis of readiness-to-hand.

I argue that we need to understand this claim transcendentally, that is, under the terms of the Copernican Revolution. Because this priority could be understood genetically, which would be to claim that Heidegger is simply making the empirical point that we experience readiness-to-hand ‘first’. But even if that is true, that does not itself establish that readiness-to-hand is ontologically primary, only that it is phenomenologically proximal. It could still be that entities are ‘really’ present-at-hand underneath all this. But that would be to suppose

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92 Ibid., 73/102-3.

93 Ibid., 73/103.
firstly that Heidegger’s critique of substantialist ontology was in vain; that we could somehow understand being without its dependency upon Dasein, even whilst we know that possibility to be semantically empty. It would be, in effect, to suppose that ontological structures could in some way be divorced from the structures of Dasein. But the next step in Heidegger’s argument is to attempt to show conclusively that this is not possible, because what it means to have a world at all relies on the *a priori* projection of worldhood from Dasein. Consequently, whilst the phenomenology of breakdown indicates how presence-at-hand is ‘derivative’, what underlies even that, and consequently establishes the relationship of the modes of being, is the transcendental point that it is only in terms of Dasein that entities take on their requisite ontological character.

### (c) The Relationality of World

The argument from breakdown, therefore, is effectively a promissory note that we will see Heidegger cash out, and specifically along Kantian lines. In the text, however, Heidegger pauses this discussion to explain in greater detail the referential/relational structure of readiness-to-hand. And it is worth considering this since it completes the initial phenomenology of world as a prologue to the transcendental-ontological structure of worldhood.

Again, the phenomenology of breakdown makes the relational structure explicit. If we continue with our example of the hammer being lost, what is also the case is that I become *aware* that I need the hammer in-order-to-drive-in-nails.\(^\text{94}\) Indeed, alongside the consequent frustration concerning it being lost, the relational structure that *ought* to obtain is often brought to the forefront of our awareness. All one can think about is what one ought to be doing but is unable to. Consequently, by means of the disturbance, “the context of equipment is lit up […] as a totality constantly sighted before in circumspection. With this totality, however, *the world announces itself*”.\(^\text{95}\)

There are two sides to this: on the one hand, with the breakdown of the equipmental totality, presence-at-hand is ‘announced’ in the un-readiness-to-hand of the entity. Through this, the normative relational totality becomes explicit. But at the same time, even that minimal thematization of our surroundings

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\(^94\) *Ibid.*, 74/105

\(^95\) *Ibid.*, 75/105 (my emphasis).
provides the tools for explicating how the world is disclosed.\textsuperscript{96} Heidegger’s use of that terminology is crucial here: given ‘disclosedness’ designates Dasein’s abilities to ontologically interpret the world – that is, it is through Dasein’s disclosive possibility that being is consequently disclosed\textsuperscript{97} – here, we find that relationship specified for the first time.

Firstly, because world as such only becomes explicit through breakdown (that is, through its relational structure becoming explicit), the world must be “something ‘wherein’ Dasein as an entity already \textit{was}”\textsuperscript{98}. This may seem phenomenologically trivial – of course Dasein is in-the-world – but it is relevant transcendentally. As we have seen, ‘already’ is a modal signifier for Heidegger (namely, for synthetic \textit{a priori} necessity), such that he is covertly introducing the idea that world is transcendentally constituted, that \textit{worldhood} is individuated by Dasein. But, as always, the phenomenology must be in place to make the transcendental claim, and it is here we find the first conclusion of the phenomenological thread concerning world.

That is, what the prior argumentation leads to, for Heidegger, is that being-in-the-world “amounts to a non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment”.\textsuperscript{99} Heidegger is bringing together everything established thus far, which is to say: when beginning from average everydayness, and by attending to the phenomenology of the entities proximal to us, we do not find the subject-object relation that the tradition has supposed. Nor do we find that we are primarily oriented towards entities in terms of forming propositions about them. Instead, we are amidst entities within-the-world that we have an \textit{engaged comportment} towards, our \textit{concern} with entities means that we engage with them purposively, from the background of a prior \textit{familiarity} which makes possible such engagement. Within that context, we find that world is not structured in terms of subjects and objects because our purposive engagement presupposes a \textit{holistic} structure, grounded in our concern, which is to indicate the \textit{interdependence} of entities within-the-world and Dasein as being-in-the-world. The representing

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 75-6/106-7.
\textsuperscript{97} See my discussion of disclosedness in the previous chapter, but also SZ, 132-3/172.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 76/106.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 76/107.
structure of presence-at-hand does not arise when we engage with equipment; rather, the being of readiness-to-hand presupposes that equipment itself fades away, both artisan and hammer fade away, e.g., in place of the in-order-to-drive-in-nails. That is, representation is replaced by the referential structure in terms of which equipment is assigned its appropriateness-for-x.

Moreover, our ‘everyday’ understanding cannot be propositional. Firstly, this is because the structure of propositions presupposes subject and object. But further, because readiness-to-hand is constituted by its appropriateness, and not by categories, its ontological status resists propositional encapsulation. As Golob summarizes it, “whilst Dasein’s primary intentionality is conceptual, it is nevertheless non-propositional”. So, where categorial accounts – such as one finds in Aristotle, Duns Scotus, or Kant – are for Heidegger proper only to presence-at-hand as a mode of being, there is an analogous conceptuality concerning readiness-to-hand that dictates a given equipment’s appropriateness-for-x. If we take conceptuality, as Kant does, to have a rule-based structure, where for Kant the understanding is explicitly “the faculty of rules”, we also find a normative element in the appropriateness-relations of the ready-to-hand. Where the categories are rules for synthesizing a manifold, the appropriateness of equipment has an analogously normative function concerning its usefulness for fulfilment of a given equipmental task. In turn, we find not judgements – thus not propositions – but instead a non-cognitive discernment concerning such appropriateness to a relational whole.

And once again, the particulars of this normative structure indicate how the ready-to-hand does not exhibit the structures of objectivity. Instead, Dasein utilizes x-equipment (let’s stay with the hammer) in-order-to-drive-in-nails, towards-which a chair is produced, in the context of the equipment of the workshop. In both Dasein’s circumspection and its action, this interrelatedness entails that the independence characteristic of substance is unable to enter the picture. Dasein is always part of some broader relational whole; the world is not something Dasein theorizes, because the world is something Dasein is always already

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101 *KrV*, A126.
interacting with. In short, the world is something Dasein is intimately involved with.

4. The Transcendental Structure of Worldhood

That, in essence, constitutes Heidegger’s basic phenomenology of world, and although we have seen key strides towards and suggestions of where this will be leading ontologically, the account thus far has nevertheless primarily focused on the ontical. Even readiness-to-hand, whilst designating a distinct mode of being, has so far been understood primarily ontically. Indeed, the uncharitable reader might think Heidegger is simply making another addition to the categorization of entities that he found so uninformative under traditional metaphysics. But in following this ontic-to-ontological/phenomenological-to-transcendental set of relationships that is threaded throughout Being and Time, correspondingly, the question of the phenomenology of world must make way for that of its underlying transcendental constitution. We now need to move explicitly from world to worldhood.

(a) The Transcendental Unity of the For-the-Sake-of-Which

It is here that we find Kant substantively entering the picture, as opposed to what we have seen above, where Heidegger is simply drawing on the general resources of a transcendental project. To be sure, we have already seen Kantian influences in Heidegger’s relating intentional comportment to the modes of being: there is an order of priority which ipso facto involves commitment to the Copernican Revolution. Nevertheless, that is still on a far more general level than the specific, systematic unity between the Deduction and Worldhood that I promised to demonstrate. However, the phenomenology of world as explicated prior to its transcendental underpinning can be understood as taking on the functions of the Metaphysical Deduction phenomenologically. It secures the fundamental elements of Heidegger’s ontology – namely, Dasein, readiness-to-hand, and presence-at-hand – in what is instead a methodologically satisfactory way. Indeed, Heidegger not only makes a development beyond Kant here, but also rethinks some key tenets of the early Husserl.

That is: where we saw Husserl set up the possibility of phenomenology but immediately shifted to the reduction and pure consciousness, Heidegger
instead returns to the roots of human experience and how ontological structures are manifested therein. It is not entirely presuppositionless since any phenomenology will already have a definite character, but nevertheless, it does not rely on an immediate abstraction in the way Kant is dependent on pure logic or Husserl revives the *cogito*. For it is this rejection of abstraction that Heidegger finds fruitful in phenomenology: what the phenomenology of world is able to demonstrate is that ontology does not have its site in ‘theory’ but is instead always presupposed even within our most *mundane* tasks. What ontology is *first* are the conditions for the possibility of any such interaction with entities. Independently of anything else, this is a significant advance itself. But we still have the fundamental question of ontological constitution unanswered, because we have not yet considered the *ground* of this new account of intentionality. To assess Heidegger’s account of worldhood here would be like attempting to assess the Deduction only on the basis of the threefold synthesis, i.e., prior to the explicit introduction of the categories. And as in the Deduction itself, where Kant takes time to eventually introduce the categories, we are similarly still awaiting Heidegger’s systematic exposition of worldhood.

And this is why, here in the final stage of Heidegger’s argument, we find the core of his ontological approach, even if it is by no means his final word. So far, we have seen that average everydayness is primarily constituted through an engagement with entities ready-to-hand, and that readiness-to-hand itself presupposes a holistic complex of Dasein and world. Further, Dasein’s engagement therein is governed by its familiarity and concern, such that what it means to be ready-to-hand is for equipment to be involved in a relational totality. But if we are to move from the ontic to the ontological, then we have to ask what institutes such relationships. How is not just readiness-to-hand, but world itself *constituted*? Consequently, the relational structure Heidegger is now searching for is not just the internal structure of a single equipmental totality, but the underlying *conditions for the possibility of the world* insofar as the phenomenology has demonstrated the world to have that structure. In this way, the ontic is slowly making way for the ontological, as the phenomenological shifts to the transcendental.

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102 SZ, 84/115-6.
More concretely: for Heidegger, the purposiveness of any such relational totality is always going to refer back to something more fundamental. If Dasein is hammering, where the hammering is part of some single, local totality, then there must be something on the basis of which Dasein is so engaged. At the same time, one can work back to ever greater generalities. This particular hammering may be taking place towards—which Dasein is constructing a chair, but Dasein’s hammering-in-general may be taking place because that Dasein is engaged in the project of being-an-artisan. The point being: what underlies all relational totalities, what constitutes Dasein’s concern and consequently orients them within-the-world in both the transcendental and situational senses is that for-the-sake-of Dasein’s being. In the end, what regulates all equipmental relationships is that for-the-sake-of which Dasein is.

If one takes Heidegger to be an existentialist, a lot can be made from this. For if one follows the broad Sartrean line that ‘existence precedes essence’ and we therefore have the moral responsibility to define that essence, then one equally could pack into the for-the-sake-of which some complementary moral psychology. We could read it such that the for-the-sake-of which is our staking our claim on our essence and build on from there. But I would suggest that’s an overinterpretation, at least considering the function of the concept for our purposes. Instead, Heidegger’s point seems to be neutral regarding the ethic of any particular Dasein’s for-the-sake-of, because strictly speaking, the for-the-sake-of which is a formal mode of the existentiale of worldhood, which expresses the conditions for the possibility of the involvement of equipment. Indeed, it is here that we see the situational-phenomenological vs. formal-transcendental explicitly interact for the first time, and in a way where we can substantively draw some conclusions concerning their interaction.

That is to say: Heidegger claims that ontically, letting-something-be-involved designates the availability of the ready-to-hand, or as he puts it, the entity

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105 Obviously ‘psychology’ itself is an inappropriate term, strictly speaking.
106 I think Sartre does with his conception of the fundamental project, but that is not immediately relevant here.
is ‘freed’ for involvement in an equipmental totality. But nevertheless, ontologically, there is an “a priori letting-something-be-involved [that] is the condition for the possibility of encountering anything ready-to-hand”. One can see the Kantian move Heidegger is attempting to make: in the Deduction, the particularity of a given manifold of intuition was our starting point, but the aim was to reach the general and formal conditions for its constitution as such. Similarly, in the Worldhood chapter, the singular phenomenon stands in for its general ontological conditions. And where the manifold is unified by the transcendental unity of apperception, so too here are the involvement relations of the ready-to-hand ultimately unified by the for-the-sake-of-which. Consequently, our focus should not concern existentialism or any other ethical conclusion one might be able to draw, but instead where this chapter began with Okrent, and his explicit connecting of the for-the-sake-of-which with Kant’s I-think.

Okrent draws the analogy first, so what would that mean in practice? In the Deduction, we saw that the I-think was a principle of unity precisely because the possible applicability of ‘I think’ to a mental act provides unity to self-consciousness, and in turn, that unity makes possible the unity of synthetic activity. Therefore, if that relationship is applicable to the for-the-sake-of-which, then the for-the-sake-of-which would be the condition for the possibility of involvement, because it is precisely that foundational intention which ‘organizes’ – provides synthetic unity for – one’s world. So, our context has shifted from ‘the manifold of intuition’ to ‘the equipmental totality’ – for warranted phenomenological reasons – but the formal structure nevertheless holds. That is, the a priori for-the-sake-of-which in general, which refers to that on the basis of which any Dasein’s concernful encounter will be so manifested, is that which institutes the structures in terms of which entities are so encountered. Consequently, the for-the-sake-of-which takes on the unifying functions in terms of which any Dasein’s world has its particular character.

To explain: the for-the-sake-of-which arises from the confluence of three key notions. Firstly, what grounds ontological constitution in fundamental

107 SZ, 84-5/117.
108 Ibid., 85/117 (my emphasis).
110 Ibid., 165.
ontology cannot be the theoretical postulate of a subject (which would be to incorporate the I-think tout court into the account of worldhood), when it is both phenomenologically unsupported, and when Kant’s exposition of the I-think itself is radically unclear concerning how robust the conception of subjectivity therein is supposed to be.\footnote{Heidegger, for his part, sees Kant as unproblematically a Cartesian here (cf. SZ, 318-20/366-7). This perhaps goes too far, but there is nevertheless the question of what exactly transcendental apperception precisely involves, given Kant’s rejection of our knowledge of the substantiability of the subject in the Dialectic (cf. KrV’, A349-A350).} Secondly, where the phenomenology sets out the involvement of the ready-to-hand in equipmental totalities, we are in turn led to the question of what grounds such involvement. And finally, Heidegger’s rejection of substance ontology and its ordering of ontological priority has already led him to assent to the Copernican Revolution. The introductions to Being and Time have already argued for the point that ontological structures must be structures of Dasein, and so the question that the for-the-sake-of-which answers is how to conceptualize the functions contained within the I-think without any reliance on traditional notions of subjectivity. Consequently, the for-the-sake-of-which as a principle of unity is not oriented towards a logical conception of the subject, nor towards an existentialist interpretation, but instead towards the formal-constitutive structures of Dasein’s concernful encounter with entities. Which is to say, Dasein can only have concern if it has some underlying for-the-sake-of-which that structures its comportment. But moreover, that comportment itself is only possible on the basis of entities being structured so that they are accordingly available. The basic spirit of Kant’s point that one finds in the Deduction is still present – i.e., of the projective ontological possibility of ‘the human’ – but the projection is now instead the for-the-sake-of-which onto the totality of equipment. This provides entities with their requisite ontological character, as an analogous replacement for the phenomenological inadmissibility of an ontology of only categories and objects.

In that way, Okrent is right to draw this analogy between the I-think and the for-the-sake-of-which. The only issue is that he stops there. For just as transcendental apperception is the crucial connecting point between the manifold of intuition and the categories in the Deduction, so too is the for-the-sake-of-which the connector between the phenomenology of world and the transcendental
structure of worldhood. However, just as transcendental apperception is not alone that which establishes the objective validity of the categories, neither is it the case that for Heidegger the for-the-sake-of-which is identical to worldhood. Rather, in the A-Deduction, transcendental apperception makes way for a discussion of the conditions for objecthood, where in B this is explicitly cashed out in terms of the imagination. And as I have claimed, what I intend to show makes my interpretation of the Kant-Heidegger relationship original is to provide a systematic account of the relationship between Kantian imagination and Heideggerian disclosedness as that which underlies the Kantian thread in Being and Time. And consequently, insofar as we have already seen Heidegger make suggestions concerning worldhood being understood as the disclosure of world, what in turn needs to be shown is how apperception/imagination has its analogues in the for-the-sake-of-which and Dasein’s disclosedness.

(b) The Worldhood of the World

Because the for-the-sake-of-which by itself does not constitute the worldhood of the world. Rather:

“The ‘wherein’ of an act of understanding which assigns or refers itself, is that on the basis of which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of being that belongs to involvements; and this ‘wherein’ is the phenomenon of world. And the structure which is that on the basis of which Dasein accordingly assigns itself is what makes up the worldhood of the world”.

We can think of this claim as analogous to Kant’s oft-repeated ‘supreme principle of all synthetic judgements’. We have already seen this is a crucial element of his conclusions in the A-Deduction, i.e., “the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience”. It is the core of Kant’s ontological approach, and here, we can see it is also essential for Heidegger. And although Heidegger’s rejection of substantialist ontology leads him to reconceive its specifics, he holds firm to its formal principle. That is, in the passage from Being and Time above,

112 SZ, 86/119 (translation modified).
113 Kant terms this claim as such in KrV, A158/B197.
Kant’s talk of objects has made way for Heidegger’s incorporation of the involvements in an equipmental totality. But still, just as Kant’s ‘supreme principle’ involves the shift in reference from the possibility of experience to its objects, so does Heidegger’s passage include the shift from world to worldhood. That by itself would be sufficient to contend there is some deeper relationship between the Deduction and Worldhood, but furthermore, Heidegger associates the formation of world with an ‘act of understanding’. What does this mean?

The first sentence makes two clarifications: firstly, the ‘wherein’, the context, within which involvement relations take place is ‘the phenomenon of world’. Secondly, the assignment of those relations is ‘an act of understanding’, i.e., undertaken by Dasein. But Heidegger introduces a new point in the second sentence. The ‘act’ of assigning itself – and in particular, the process of self-assignment insofar as it orients Dasein towards entities – is associated with worldhood itself. World is constituted, therefore, through the structure of assignment, i.e., world is formed through the assignments Dasein makes.

But the puzzle is that the phrase ‘an act of understanding’ is one we would ordinarily take to be characteristically Kantian and uncharacteristic of Heidegger. In particular, the notion of a mental act is a term taken from the tradition, and specifically the central part of it that Heidegger is trying to overturn. So, whilst I contend the unity between Kant and Heidegger becomes increasingly explicit here – and whilst I do argue that Heidegger’s claim above expresses the conceptual core around which the systematic unity of the Deduction and Worldhood can be expressed – how can we understand this foundational relation without implicating Heidegger in what might be taken as a recapitulation of the deficiencies of traditional metaphysics?

What firstly needs to be taken into account are the formal analogical relations with the Deduction that we can see Heidegger set up as the Worldhood chapter develops. We have already seen Okrent rightly connect the for-the-sake-of-which to the I-think. But the more fundamental departure that Heidegger makes from traditional metaphysics is facilitated through the introduction of the ready-to-hand, i.e., its holistic structure as opposed to the independent structure of substance, and its priority over presence-at-hand. Taken merely as phenomenology and shorn of its transcendental underpinning, this may at first blush look like Heidegger is simply complicating the ontic categorization of traditional
metaphysics, but this is not the case. Because when this account of intentionality is incorporated into the transcendental ontology which grounds the projects of both Kant and Heidegger, we can see it is not just about saying ‘intentional-ality is more complex’. Even Husserl in *Ideas I* can make that claim. Moreover, the structural relationship of readiness-to-hand to presence-at-hand brings us back to the problem of the categories that has concerned Heidegger since his student days. Specifically, he is now reconceptualizing that problematic in relation to the *question of ontological constitution*.

We have seen these interrelated problematics iterated and reiterated in Heidegger’s work over the decade and a half leading to *Being and Time* with Aristotle and the problem of *ousia*, with Duns Scotus’s deepening of Aristotle’s account; and with Rickert and neo-Kantianism’s epistemologizing the categories. The interpretation of the categories, across Heidegger’s early career, is the battleground where the priority of ontology over epistemology plays out. Consequently, when Heidegger introduces the ready-to-hand and demonstrates that philosophers have been looking in the wrong place all along, the Deduction and its treatment of the categories also comes to the fore. Because the academic debate concerning Kant’s account of the categories in turn reiterates the ontology vs. epistemology debate in microcosm, but it also includes the basic *transcendental* insight which Heidegger takes to be utterly ontological and completely correct. That is, in moving from the categoriality of presence-at-hand to the equipmentality of readiness-to-hand, there is a dual function. Firstly: ontic categorization must be more complex, but more crucially, the question of ontological constitution also appears with a new clarity. That is, where the ontological meaning of the Deduction is that ontological constitution is only possible through *a priori* synthesis, the ontological meaning of Worldhood is instead to claim that ontological constitution is only possible on the basis of the structure of *signification* that is the condition for the possibility of the ready-to-hand. It is consequently by means of signification that the world is disclosed.\footnote{SZ, 87/120-1.}

With that in mind, we can now see why the question that worldhood is there to answer more broadly is: *what does ontological constitution mean within the context of a transcendental ontology?* If fundamental ontology in general shifts the
Seinsfrage to the meaning of being explicitly, then how do we understand the formal structures that are formative upon that meaning? Couched in that way, what we saw Heidegger actually identify as constituting worldhood – namely, signification – might seem frustratingly analytic at first, but it is precisely by virtue of the Kantian thread we can fill out ‘signification’ more concretely.

Firstly, bearing in mind we have already seen Heidegger make the formal point that worldhood is structured in accordance with Kant’s supreme synthetic principle, we need to relate this claim to Heidegger’s use of the phrase ‘act of understanding’ and its relation to significance and disclosedness. Of course, we have seen that ‘understanding’ can involve some translational ambiguities: Verstehen is not a faculty, but rather the mode of disclosedness which involves Dasein projecting upon possibilities. Insofar as Verstehen is projective, it has a transcendental function, but if anything, understanding in Heidegger is actually closer to the functions of the imagination in Kant. Where, for Kant, the imagination is a receptive spontaneity, with a mediating and formative function which ‘projects’ transcendental structures onto the manifold of intuition, thus making objectivity possible, understanding in Heidegger has an analogously projective function, but in terms of interpretation and its relationship to being.

This is to say: ontically, understanding means that we are sufficiently familiar with the world, so that we are able to purposively engage with entities. But ontologically, “to Dasein’s being, an understanding of being belongs”, and it is only through “the previous disclosure of that on the basis of which what we encounter in the world is subsequently freed, [which] amounts to nothing else than understanding the world”. Consider Heidegger’s language here: concernful dealings are only possible on the basis of a previous disclosure. World-disclosure, for Heidegger, is a priori. Our concernful dealings are only possible on the basis of familiarity, but familiarity itself presupposes the disclosedness of the structure of world, that Dasein already has an understanding of the relations contained in an involvement, and moreover that “all these [relations] must be disclosed beforehand with a certain intelligibility”.

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115 Ibid., 85/118 (my emphasis).
116 Ibid., 86/118 (translation modified).
117 Ibid., 86/119 (my emphasis).
To explain in greater detail: when Heidegger claims that the conditions for the possibility of the phenomenon of world involve an ‘act of understanding’, this is not in relation to any purported faculty. Instead, it is an indication towards a claim Heidegger makes later in the book:

“In the for-the-sake-of-which, existing being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this disclosedness we have called ‘understanding’. In the understanding of the for-the-sake-of-which, the significance that is grounded therein, is disclosed along with it […] Significance is that on the basis of which the world is disclosed as such”\(^\text{118}\)

So, if we trace back the relevant transcendental conditions, Dasein’s being is disclosed through its for-the-sake-of-which, because the for-the-sake-of-which is the overarching, synthetic a priori operative principle for its concern as such.\(^\text{119}\) That is to say: any Dasein has the ability-to-be-x-entity, to take up any such possibility, on the basis of a for-the-sake-of that orients its concern a priori. Perhaps some Dasein might ontically interpret that as its ‘purpose in life’, perhaps it never

\(^{118}\) Ibid., 143/182 (my emphasis).

\(^{119}\) Does this mean that all equipment is encountered directly in relation to the for-the-sake-of-which, even those that are insignificant at a given moment? Perhaps not. As I sit here writing, there are all sorts of things that are not ‘on my radar’: an unlit candle on my desk, a plant on the windowsill, a bookcase across the room. I still encounter those things, they might even ‘indicate’ alternate possibilities if I briefly glance at them, even whilst they are not a component of my immediate concern. The for-the-sake-of-which is therefore a higher-order condition: it ‘determines’ concern in the sense that it determines what I choose to pursue, how I invest things with meaning – not moment to moment or in every single activity – but instead overall.

Similarly, this is not to say that every activity we undertake must (or does) conform to the for-the-sake-of-which. We all have responsibilities that we might not want to fulfil. We ‘waste time’. Nevertheless, if I see some activity as pointless or diverting, it does not seem wholly implausible to claim that, in some cases, a negative, indirect relationship to one’s for-the-sake-of-which is instituted.

Indeed, such a recognition coheres with the aforementioned analogy with the ‘I-think’. As we saw, for Kant, transcendental apperception does not mean that the transcendental subject is always thinking ‘I think’. Instead, it needs to only be possible for the subject to have the possibility of self-ascription. Similarly here, the for-the-sake-of-which regulates Dasein’s general orientation, as opposed to the perception of each and every possible affordance.
explicitly appears, but nevertheless, ontologically, the for-the-sake-of-which is
the ultimate condition for the possibility which determines how entities will show
up as invested with meaning (or insignificance). But just as for Kant in the De-
duction, the account of transcendental apperception makes way for the specific
argument for grounding the categories, there is too a transcendental principle
even underlying the for-the-sake-of-which. For it is the for-the-sake-of-which
itself that is only possible on the basis of the underlying structure of significance,
because any such purposive structure exhibited by Dasein is going to be depen-
dent on the structure of meaning which makes possible the specific equipmental
relations.

How, then, does the for-the-sake-of-which interact with the account of
meaning we have seen Heidegger develop? In Chapter 2, I agreed with Carman
that ‘meaning’ in Heidegger designates the hermeneutic conditions that underlie
the interpretation of world. Now that we have reached the question of the mean-
ing ‘of’ significance, it is worth considering this in more detail. For one way of
reading the phrase ‘hermeneutic conditions’ is simply to identify them as those
conditions which regulate intelligibility, and whilst this is the case, I argue
Heidegger’s account has to involve one further clarification. That is, if herme-
neutic conditions are only related to intelligibility, we run the risk of painting
Heidegger as more of an epistemologist than he was. Alternatively, the meaning
of ‘significance’ ought to be understood through another explicit analogy with
the Deduction: where, in A, Kant mobilizes the argument about objecthood to
show how objective structure can be maintained through the projective onto-
logical possibility of the categories, here Heidegger introduces ‘significance’ be-
cause he is concerned with showing the ontological constitution of the mean-
ingful structure that is presupposed in the purposiveness of average everyday-
ness. Consequently, ‘significance’ (thus Dasein’s hermeneutic conditions) is not
just there to say, ‘entities are intelligible to Dasein’. Rather, the transcendental-
onlogical point is that any such for-the-sake-of-which already presupposes
that Dasein has interpreted entities under some definite mode. Some interpretation
of being is already operative, however ‘pre-ontological’ it is. The role of ‘signifi-
cance’, then, is to signal this: the meaningful structure which underlies world –
i.e., worldhood itself – is a setting out of the transcendental conditions by means of
which it is possible for entities within-the-world to show up in a meaningful
Both meaning and relationality are essential: the claim is not only about intelligibility but is firstly radically structural. It is only by means of the transcendental structure of significance that Dasein is able to ‘construct’ its world.

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The worldhood of the world, then, is both transcendental and hermeneutic. Ontological constitution must be a priori in constituting Dasein’s familiarity with the world, but equally, the logical structure of the categories is replaced by the meaningful structure of significance in establishing the relationality of entities, in order to do justice to average everydayness. Where Heidegger is less clear at this moment, however, is in filling out ‘significance’ in greater detail. Where in Kant we can simply look to the categories as making up the formal concepts in his account of ontological constitution, Heidegger has not explicated the internal structure of significance. Instead, he has only postulated it as the transcendental conditions necessary for the interpretation of being by Dasein. This is why, as I claimed at the beginning of this chapter, I.3 is insufficient by itself: it sets out the formal structures of Heidegger’s account of ontology, but there is still a lot more to be said.

So let’s say it, at least in summary, rather than leaving it as a cliffhanger: Heidegger will ontologically characterize being as a ‘clearing’, and significance will be constituted through a temporal interpretation as the principle of unity for ontological interpretation. That is: temporality will be postulated to indicate an “horizontal schema” which operates as a principle of unity, as that which constitutes significance, and the question that the incompleteness of Division III leaves us with is how to specifically move from Dasein and temporality to being and temporality. Every avenue of fundamental ontology leads us to time, schematizing, and the clearing, i.e., as the culmination of how one can think through the systematic unity of Kant and the early Heidegger. But before we can move

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120 SZ, 133/171.
121 Ibid., 364/6/415-7.
122 Ibid., 365/416.
deeper into that argument, let’s summarize where we are so far, in explaining the first point of unity specifically between the Deduction and Worldhood.

5. Conclusion

If the core of Kant’s ontological approach is his supreme synthetic principle, then Heidegger’s, couched here in terms of the *transcendental* relationship between the ontic and the ontological, is to claim that ontological constitution is the projection of an *interpretation* of being by Dasein. Where, for Kant, the conditions for the possibility of experience coincide with the conditions for its objects, for Heidegger, “significance […] makes up the structure of the world”,¹²³ by means of a projection which constitutes the relationality of readiness-to-hand. The conditions for the possibility of concernful dealings are manifested as the conditions for the possibility of world. And whilst those formal relations are not the categories themselves, they have an analogous function in being normatively and structurally constitutive. The *distinction*, fundamentally, is that Heidegger’s approach is expressly hermeneutic where Kant’s is only implicitly so. For Heidegger, the *a priori* relational structure of worldhood is expressly related to significance because its formative status on familiarity means that it *is* the synthetic *a priori* relational structure of world which allows entities within it show up as meaningful. The bounds of possible meaning, the bounds of ontological constitution and interpretation, are dictated *a priori*. Similarly, in Kant, whilst he would not use the terminology, a manifold of intuition under transcendental idealism must in its own way be ‘interpreted’ in terms of the categories because the ontological constitution of an object in Kant presupposes subjective projection. So, in contending that there is a systematic unity between the Deduction and Worldhood, my point is not that worldhood is a direct steal from Kant; on the contrary, we can see that even implicitly Heidegger’s other interests in Aristotle, Husserl, and so on are still present. Instead, the specific systematic unity between Kant and Heidegger precisely follows from their coherence on this point of ontological constitution. Which is to say, the formal structure of the Deduction is preserved even whilst logic is superseded by phenomenology, and the subject by being-in-the-world. The Kantian insight still fundamentally holds

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 87/120.
in Heidegger, not merely as some nebulous influence, but it instead sets out the argumentative structure in the very exposition of the text.

This is equally why I claimed previously that Kant has a unique role in fundamental ontology, even whilst I hope to not suppress Heidegger’s other influences. That is, Kantian systematics are so closely tied to the very structure of Being and Time that the first Critique is recalled even when Heidegger is not explicit about it. Husserl and Dilthey are clearly influences on the hermeneutic and phenomenological moments, as Aristotle and the Scholastics are regarding the Seinsfrage, but the argumentative structure of Being and Time presupposes transcendental argumentation just as Dasein’s ontological possibility in turn cannot be extricated from the analogy of imagination to disclosedness. And that is the systematicity in fundamental ontology that is unique to Kant’s influence above all else. For whilst there are singular instances one can point to where ‘Kant believes x, whilst Heidegger believes y’, Heidegger nevertheless stays true to the spirit of the critical project like no other philosopher. As the relationship above between the Deduction and Worldhood demonstrates, he intimately understands the texture and subtlety of Kant’s argumentation, even whilst his independent reflections on phenomenology and ontology entail that the account can never be a simple translation. The Metaphysical Deduction makes way for the phenomenology of world, just as the categorial structure makes way for the a priori relational structure of significance. But still, every step of the way, Heidegger’s claims cannot be extricated from their fundamentally Kantian grounding.

So, what does this mean more generally in approaching Being and Time as a text? Here, I have focused in particular on worldhood as a demonstration of the systematic unity between Kant and Heidegger, and I have also indicated that the foundational role for Kant continues throughout. We furthermore have the formal structures of fundamental ontology in place. However, thus far, we have neither the relationship of being to time, nor a more detailed filling out Dasein’s ontological interpreting. And similarly, Kant’s ontology based on the Deduction alone is incomplete: furthermore, we need to consider the question of schematism in relation to Kant and Heidegger. But the path has nevertheless been set: the Deduction and Worldhood provide our formal basis, now we need to think
through (1) time and schematism in relation to Dasein, on the way to (2) providing an interpretation of *transcendence* as the key concept in Kant and Heidegger.
CHAPTER FIVE
Temporality as the Foundational Element of Ontology

“It is typical of Kant that whenever he reaches a crucial problem-set in his Critique of Pure Reason, he is forced to go back to the issue of time. Time occupies a privileged place right from the start.”

Martin Heidegger

“People assume that time is a strict progression from cause to effect, but actually, from a non-linear, non-subjective viewpoint, it’s more like a big ball of wibbly-wobbly, timey-wimey stuff.”

Steven Moffat

1. Introduction
Kant opens the Schematism with a puzzle about category application. We have seen, in the Deduction, that the categories are argued to be objectively valid, but now Kant explicitly recognizes that since the categories are pure concepts, they “can never be encountered in any intuition”. And so a question arises: “how is the subsumption of the latter under the former, thus the application of the category to appearances possible, since no one would say that the category [...] could also be intuited through the senses and is contained in the appearance?”.

There is a shift in focus between the Deduction and the Schematism: where the Deduction asks whether the categories apply to experience, the Schematism asks

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1 *Ga21*, 270/224.
3 *KrV*, A137/B176.
how they accordingly apply. At base, this is a question about the unity of the faculties: if the categories are a priori and conceptual, whilst intuitions are empirical and sensible, then how can these oppositional kinds of content interact, as the Deduction ought to have shown they must? But for Heidegger, this is only the “superficial form” of the question.5 Because Kant’s answer – where the imagination is synthetically linked to time – suggests for Heidegger something far more radical. For Heidegger, what Kant actually establishes here is the “ground for the inner possibility of ontological knowledge”.6 That is, the Schematism demonstrates how time is revealed to be “[the] single and pure ontological horizon”, insofar as it is “the condition for the possibility that the entity given within it can have this or that particular, revealed, indeed ontic horizon”.7 For Heidegger, the Schematism constitutes the heart of the Critique of Pure Reason,8 and indeed, it is during his discussion of the Schematism in the Kantbook that he makes the foundational claim that this thesis is treating, i.e., “transcendental philosophy=ontology”.9

The Schematism, therefore, is at the very least a key text in understanding the relationship between temporality and ontology. But in Being and Time, Heidegger goes further than this. Not only does he claim that “the ontological constitution of the world – must […] be grounded in temporality”,10 but he moreover characterizes the relevant conception of time in that context as an “horizonal schema”.11 In effect, the Kantian thread at the defining moment in Division II again becomes explicit with the introduction of temporality: here, the grounds of ontological disclosure are structurally connected to Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant. In addition, one may recall that it is precisely the Schematism which breaks through in the Logic lectures once Heidegger has exhausted his resources in Ancient philosophy,12 implicitly setting up an opposition between Aristotle’s prioritization of presence and the process of schematizing. And

5 Ga3, 89/63.
6 Ibid., 108/76.
7 Ibid., 108/76.
8 Ga21, 357-8/294.
9 Ga3, 88/62.
10 SZ, 365/416.
11 Ibid., 365/416.
if we go back even further, we can see that Heidegger’s concern with time precedes his Kantian breakthrough, since in the *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, Heidegger’s “point of departure [is] from factual life, from which the meaning of time is won”.

Now, since our primary concern so far has been with the formal structures of fundamental ontology, the problem of the categories in Heidegger’s work has largely taken priority over the question of time. However, what Division II makes clear is that these two problematics are interconnected because what fills out the formal structure of significance is a schematic interpretation of temporality. Division II, through the lens of Heidegger’s intellectual development, is consequently there to show that the two central concerns that Heidegger repeatedly returns to in the 1920s can, in fact, be jointly reconciled, where the Schematism is the point of connection and the inspiration from the history of philosophy. What the Schematism thus signals, for Heidegger, is a way to *structurally* understand time both phenomenologically and within the context of a transcendental ontology. Dasein’s disclosedness is argued to be constituted by temporality as the foundational transcendental structure that makes the understanding of being intelligible.

All of which is to say: if the formal structures of the Kantian thread in *Being and Time* ought to be understood in terms of the relationship between the Deduction and the concept of worldhood, then to deepen our ontological account – to fill out the structure of significance more concretely – itself requires an understanding of the relationship between the Schematism and Heidegger’s ‘ecstatic’ conception of temporality. But it ought to be noted that hermeneutically, this leaves us in a difficult position, because both schematizing and ecstatic temporality are respectively some of the most contentious aspects in Kant’s and Heidegger’s work. Many Kant scholars have not even seen the point of the question of the Schematism, let alone been convinced by its answer. Kemp Smith, for example, refers to it as an “artificial aspect of Kant’s argument”, and claims that “Kant’s method of stating the problem of schematism is [...] so completely misleading, that [...] the various strands in his highly artificial argument must be further disentangled”. Bennett similarly claims that “the incoherence of Kant’s

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13 *Ga60*, 65/45.

problem about category application is matched by the vacuity of its supposed solution”.15 Correspondingly, considering Heidegger, Blattner ultimately concludes that Division II must be considered a failure, and even suggests that “perhaps the failure of Division III ever to appear […] is the product of Heidegger’s] having seen the insuperable difficulties with which the theory of Being and Time is plagued”.16

Consequently, since my position is that there is much that is philosophically defensible both in the Schematism and ecstatic temporality, there is a lot of legwork to be done. Firstly, just as with the Deduction, I need to demonstrate the ontological basis of the Schematism, to overcome the traditional objection that it is an extraneous addition to Kant’s argument. Drawing on Heidegger’s own interpretation, I argue that what Kant in fact achieves in the Schematism is to establish the foundation of his ontology. As Sherover puts it, for Kant, “to be = to-be-in-time”.17 Moreover, we also need to consider why Heidegger was drawn to a specifically schematic interpretation of temporality and how this relates to his own concept of ecstatic in specifying the qualitative conception of time that underlies Dasein’s being. The difficulty of Heidegger’s prose here, whilst understandably following from the complexity of his account, I aim to overcome with an analogy to the Schematism. That is, the very notion of a ‘schema’ can be utilized to bring out the transcendental structure of time which underlies both the Kantian and Heideggerian accounts. Schematizing brings out the modality and directionality of time, in terms of which ontological interpretation is argued to be organized in both cases. And finally, I will relate this conception of time back to the concept of worldhood, so that we can consider the problematic of Division III in the final chapter.

But in charting this course to Division III (and, in tandem, the later Heidegger), we will find another concept also comes to the forefront in relation to time: transcendence. This concept is essential to understanding the systematic distinctions between the early and later Heidegger. In this chapter, I want to show how providing an explanation of transcendence – i.e., how Dasein goes beyond itself in constituting its world – is the key ontological explanandum for the

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16 Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism, 232-3.
17 Sherover, Heidegger, Kant, and Time, 115.
early Heidegger. He also locates the origin of this tendency in Kant. But by the 1930s, it is a key concept that Heidegger wants to think beyond: in effect, Heidegger concludes that fundamental ontology was not fundamental enough because staying on the level of transcendence suggested he was still committed to some latent metaphysical concepts. My intention, in Chapter Six, is to suggest this is something of an overcorrection, because transcendence does signal a key ontological problematic. Indeed, showing this is how I intend to open up the conceptual space to reconsider Heidegger’s suggestions concerning Division III. But to reach this, we need to understand Division II first. How can we understand Kant’s Schematism ontologically? What does Heidegger take from Kant in Division II? And how does the problematic of transcendence relate both to the question of ontology and the question of time?

2. Schematism and Fundamental Ontology

(a) What’s at Stake?

Time first appeared as a theme in this thesis during the discussion of Aristotle in Chapter Two, with Heidegger’s opposition to the concept of *ousia* constituting the grounds of ontology. There, we saw Heidegger interpret *ousia* as implicitly temporal, whilst setting out an understanding of time which underlies the history of traditional metaphysics. For Aristotle paradigmatically prioritizes “the ‘now’ [as] the link of time […] (for it connects past and future time), and it is a limit of time (for it is the beginning of the one and the end of the other)”. This prioritization of presence we saw Heidegger reject as a matter of principle on the grounds of its reductionism: it abstracts the being of entities from their involvement in our concern and objectifies them, it ‘levels-off’ the richness of the phenomenology of their encounter. We consequently saw Heidegger exposit the formal structures of that phenomenology in the ‘Worldhood’ chapter. But in Division I, time does not appear as a theme; rather, the particular focus of the phenomenology of world concerned (1) rejecting the substantiability of entities within-the-world, and (2) developing the transcendental structure of Dasein’s ontological interpretation. In Division II, however, its ontological core is a

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18 *Ga3*, 16-8/10-2.

section called, “The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World”. Time, the transcendental, and worldhood are explicitly connected here, but as I noted in the previous chapter, the account of worldhood in Division I is incomplete. ‘Significance’ is posited as the transcendental structure that constitutes world, but there is nevertheless little explication of its internal structure. Significance-as-worldhood with no qualifications is only a formal structure, so the immediate question is: what is the substantive structure of significance which constitutes Dasein’s own structures for its interpretation of being? And given this answer will be time: how should we understand time such that we do not fall into Aristotle’s category mistakes? Overall, this is the question that Division II poses: how can we come to a new understanding of temporality as the underlying structure which constitutes both the being of Dasein and the structure of world?

Kant’s Schematism breaks through in the Logic lectures and reappears in Division II, then, precisely because his temporal ontology signals a way of breaking free from the Aristotelian mould. Corroborating that point is the aim of this section, because from Heidegger’s perspective, the ontological relevance of the Schematism is encapsulated in his claim that the process of schematizing “forms transcendence a priori”. To understand this, we need to distinguish the term ‘transcendence’ from ‘the transcendental’, which is a key distinction in the Kantbook. That is, where the transcendental refers unproblematically to constitutive-ontological conditions whether one is reading the first Critique or Being and Time, for Heidegger, transcendence is specifically used in the Kantbook to explain the structural relationship between the subject and being in Kantian ontology. As Dahlstrom summarizes: “only an explanation of the possibility of transcendence (empirical knowledge of objects) can provide the grounds (the fundamental ontology) for any future metaphysics”. Under this terminology, therefore, the Copernican Revolution would be read as reorienting ontological inquiry away from ousia and towards ‘the possibility of transcendence’, just as ontic categorization is superseded by transcendental structuring. Consequently, in claiming it

20 SZ, 364/415.
21 Ga3, 105/74.
is schematizing which ‘forms transcendence’, Heidegger’s use of the term ‘formation’ implies an ontologically foundational role for this process. That is, schematizing, however understood, provides the ultimate ground for the interpretation of being insofar as it provides the structural context that renders ontological interpretation possible. Compound with this Kant’s characterization of a schema as a “transcendental time-determination”, and we can see just by the words Kant chose why this might have appealed to Heidegger. For even without probing into the specifics, the very terminology of ‘transcendental determination’ suggests that the way time functions for Kant is as the final ‘condition for the possibility’ that underlies all else.

But whilst a transcendental structure for time is clearly not Aristotle’s position, that does not ipso facto entail that the Schematism might not still broadly function within the Aristotelian paradigm. For if Kant continues to prioritize presence above the other modes of time, then he still falls prey to the foundational category mistake of traditional metaphysics. As, for example, Derrida claimed, “the Kantian revolution did not displace what Aristotle had set down but, on the contrary, settled down there itself, changing its locale and then refurbishing it”. Which is to say: where the Aristotelian concept of time for Heidegger sets out an overarching linear structure within which the ousia of entities is rendered entirely ‘objective’ and presentational, for Derrida, Kant modifies the context within which presence is prioritized, but presence is still prioritized. Under this reading, time is only marginally rethought as transcendental and not ‘in the objects’. Which, at least regarding its emphasis, I would argue does a disservice to Kant, because even if he never entirely breaks free from the prioritization of presence, the Schematism nevertheless rethinks the structure of time so radically that it can still provide the basis for a more resolutely fundamental-ontological understanding of time. For Heidegger, Kant will always be an ambiguous figure traversing the boundaries between traditional metaphysics and fundamental ontology. But there is a reason that despite Kant’s incidental commitment to presence, we have already seen Heidegger repeatedly make claims about Kant being the only philosopher to have substantially considered the concept of time. For

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23 KrV, A138/B177 (my emphasis).
24 Derrida, ‘Ousia and Grammē: Note on a Note from Being and Time’, 44 (my emphasis).
25 See, e.g.: SZ, 23/45; Ga21, 194/163; Ga25, 431/292-3.
as Heidegger emphasizes: “categories cannot be taken as isolated concepts of the understanding; they are essentially related to time”,26 where this relationship is first posited by Kant in the Schematism. But once it is given an explicitly phenomenological rendering, it becomes a foundational presupposition of Division II. Consequently, even if the precise letter of the Schematism does not overcome traditional metaphysics, undoubtedly Kant signals a way out for Heidegger, where the problem of the categories becomes so enmeshed with the transcendental structuring of time that it can be used to explain the substantive constitution of worldhood.

(b) Interpreting Kant’s Question
Indeed, understanding the transcendental structure of time and its relationship to the categories is precisely where the Schematism begins. From Kant’s perspective, the purpose of the Schematism is signalled with what Heidegger considered the ‘superficial’ question of the applicability of the categories to the appearances. But I would counter that the question serves a philosophical purpose, at least to the extent it can overcome Kemp Smith’s charge of artificiality. That is, for Kemp Smith, the Schematism is unnecessary because:

“The heterogeneity [between category and appearance] which Kant here asserts is merely that difference of nature which follows from the diversity of their functions. The category is formal and determines structure; intuition yields the content which is thereby organized”.27

Kemp Smith argues the Schematism is extraneous because if the Deduction has established the necessity of the categories, then it simply does not make sense to ask any further about the nature of their applicability. The issue, however, is that Kemp Smith provides an analytic solution to a synthetic problem: firstly, because the Schematism does not recapitulate the question of the Deduction. Rather, by moving from the question of ‘whether the categories necessarily apply’ to ‘how they so apply’, we see a meaningful development in Kant’s line of interrogation, a development which is incidentally not unphenomenological. Secondly, in

26 Ga25, 429/291.
27 Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’, 334.
Kantian terms, simply referring to the ‘diversity of their functions’ is unwarranted: what the Schematism is about is explaining the unified interaction of diverse faculties. Under the terms of a critical philosophy, this cannot be taken for granted. And finally, there is a modal shift at the centre of Kant’s investigation in the Schematism which is only hinted at in the Deduction: where the Deduction, strictly speaking, concerns only the cognition of a single object and the constitution of objecthood in an abstract sense, the Schematism shifts explicitly to the constitution of the subject’s one experience and the general structures for the ontological constitution of experience. Which, under the terms of a transcendental philosophy, is surely its ontological centre.

So, contained within Kant’s concern about the applicability of the categories to appearances is far more than he lets on. In this way, Heidegger is right to consider it a ‘superficial’ question, but it is not ‘artificial’. Regarding the systematics of the Critique, the opening question of the Schematism has a central function in explaining the ultimate principle of its unity. Because even if one holds that the Deduction has established the necessity of the categories for the constitution of experience, the fact that the categories are pure, a priori, and in some way ‘determine’ sensible appearances at the very least brings up a puzzle. How can we explain oppositional kinds of content coming together, especially when we already have an argument which shows that they must necessarily?

(c) Kant’s Schematism

The key element in Kant’s answer is, of course, time. Time is a “third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter”.28 This is the formal side of Kant’s argument, and links back to the first appearance of time in the Critique, in the Transcendental Aesthetic. In that chapter, time is argued to be a form of intuition, which is to say, along with space, it constitutes the a priori transcendental structure that enables the receptivity of empirical intuitions.29 But this itself means, for Kant, that time has crucial connecting attributes: on the one hand, its transcendental status by definition renders it a priori, but concurrently, its status as a form of intuition equally relates it

28 KrV, A138/B177 (my emphasis).
29 Ibid., A38-A39/B55-B56.
to sensibility. Moreover, Kant argues that time has a priority over space. For Kant, “space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances of outer sense”, but in contrast, “time is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general”. Which is to say: whilst spatiality is undoubtedly necessary for the representation of outer objects, all representations – whether they are of other objects or internal mental states – must be temporally ordered. Time, then, for Kant, is “the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, thus of the connection of all representations”. Consequently, Kant foundationally understands time as the overarching structure within which everything else in his account of intentionality is able to occur.

Formally, then, Kant posits time as the ‘third thing’ able to cross the bridge between category and appearance insofar as it shares content with each. Insofar as time is pure and a priori, it is able to connect to the categories, whilst its sensible status connects it to the appearances. As Kant stipulates, such a representation “must be pure […] and yet intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other”, because homogeneity can only be achieved on the basis of such shared content. But then, rather than simply recognizing that time as the prior form of intuition has this ability, and that is all we need to say, instead, Kant makes what seems to be the further claim that “such a representation is the transcendental schema”.

Accordingly, the argument of the Schematism is more than a mere formal addition which plugs a gap in the Deduction. Beyond this, the implied account of time – now that it is understood as schematic – suggests Kant is doing something more fundamental. Indeed, the full argument of the Schematism will take us to the position where we can see that Kant’s ontology is foundationally grounded by time. So, what would it mean to understand time specifically as a ‘transcendental schema’? The first point to note is the role that schemata are supposed to perform: beyond the ‘superficial’ question of applicability, Kant

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30 Ibid., A26/B42.
31 Ibid., A34/B50 (my emphasis).
32 Ibid., A34/B50.
33 Ibid., A138/B177 (my emphasis).
34 Ibid., A138/B177.
explicitly reorients the question instead to unity insofar as the transcendental schema is intended to act as a mediator between the faculties of intuition and understanding. Indeed, insofar as the Deduction posits the necessity of category application to appearances, whereas now the Schematism is shifting to explaining the unity in their respective functions, in one sense, the Schematism is Kant’s attempt to explain the fundamental unity which underlies his entire theoretical system. Where, in the Deduction, the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition is provided by the categories in order to determine the manifold as an object, now Kant seems to be asserting that the possibility of that unity in practice implies a deeper unity that facilitates the homogeneity of the content of each. So, insofar as the question of applicability is extended into the question of unity, the question of what the transcendental schema would be – which is to say, how time is foundationally understood by Kant – is the question of what could facilitate that deeper unity. And in line with this, Kant claims:

“A transcendental time-determination is homogeneous with the category (which constitutes its unity) insofar as it is universal and rests on a rule a priori. But it is on the other hand homogeneous with the appearance insofar as time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Hence an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental time-determination which, as the schema of the concept of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former”.\(^{36}\)

So, we already have in place the formal argument for why time in general can assume this dual role, but what does Kant mean in claiming that a ‘schematized’ category is equivalent to a ‘transcendental time-determination’? To explain this, we firstly need to recall the general principles of Kant’s account of intentionality, and in particular, the role of the imagination and synthesis in the constitution of experience. For whilst Kant is never quite explicit about this element of his method, what his ‘critical’ attitude towards philosophy in practice presupposes is a breaking down of all the elements of experience into their basic parts. Firstly,

\(^{36}\)Ibid., A138-A139/B177-B178 (my italics).
the distinction of intuition from understanding separates out the sensible and discursive elements of intentionality. In turn, they are subdivided by the pure/empirical distinction, wherein the pure elements (the forms of intuition and the categories) have a constitutive role to play as the structural elements underlying human experience. At the same time, however, what even the Deduction has shown is that we cannot have cognition of an object or experience across time without the connection of all the elements of intentionality. Which is to say: the ‘analytic’ way Kant deals with the structures of intentionality entails synthesis as the principle of their connection.

And as we furthermore saw Kant make explicit in the Deduction, the synthetic constitution of experience is a function of the productive possibility of the imagination. That is, as a receptive spontaneity, the imagination is fundamentally projective, insofar as its synthetic function constitutes experience from its base elements. Now, to explain this relationship between the categories, their schemata, and Kant’s characterization of this as a transcendental time-determination, it is therefore significant that Kant claims, “the schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination”.37 The status of time, therefore, as a form of intuition, signals a formal possibility for Kant regarding its content. But in further asserting a relationship between time and the imagination, Kant indicates the synthetic function of the transcendental schema. Which is to say: the categories are only able to apply to appearances if they are subject to a synthesis with time. As Heidegger interprets Kant, “the horizon of transcendence can be formed only in a making-sensible”,38 which is to contrast the formal possibility time has to act as a mediator with the non-sensibility of the unschematized categories. Insofar as time constitutes the form of experience – i.e., it sets out the transcendental structure of experience – the Schematism asserts that categories can only be sensibilized by imaginative synthesis insofar as the categories themselves are temporalized.

Consequently, the temporalization of the categories is understood as schematic because the product of the synthesis is to set out the general forms for temporal-categorial representation. That is, insofar as we have seen that for Kant the categories function as rules for synthesis, his enumeration of the schemata

37 Ibid., A140/B179.
38 Ga3, 91/64 (my emphasis).
is precisely an enumeration of the *rules* by means of which the categories are to be incorporated into temporal experience. For example, whilst substance, for Kant, as an unschematized category, denotes "something that could exist as a subject but never as a mere predicate", its schema is "the persistence of the real in time". Schematizing, therefore, takes the basic idea expressed in the category – with substance, ontological independence – and sets out the rule for its temporal interpretation. That is, to be identified as 'substance', the object requires independent existence across time. The schemata are transcendental time-determinations, therefore, insofar as they are intended to exhaust all the modal variations in the possible representation of time.

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The *ontological* import of the Schematism, therefore, is to demonstrate the foundationalism of time in the synthetic constitution of human intentionality. For Kant, the categories can only apply to appearances – or in more Heideggerian terms, the categories can only function as ontological conditions – *if* they are subject to the synthesis with time. The categories can only function *within* experience – as Heidegger would put it, the categories can only be ontologically constitutive – insofar as their schematism sets out the modal variations in the representation of time. Where the Deduction showed that the categories are the necessary foundational conditions for objecthood, in the Schematism it is argued that their possibility is only secured on the basis of a temporal interpretation of them. Therefore, what it means to be, in Kant, is "to-be-in-time".

Consequently, there is a complex modality at play between the Deduction and the Schematism. How can it be that the Deduction is intended to demonstrate the *necessity* of the categories whilst the Schematism claims they can only be *possible* on the basis of their temporal interpretation? Contained within this is, in effect, the key move in Kantian ontology which I argue elevates Kant’s thought beyond the latent Aristotelianism that Derrida conjectured, because what that modality has to admit of is that the *schema* is ontologically prior to its category.

39 *KrV*, B149.
For we saw, in the previous chapter, that Heidegger argued the issue with the Metaphysical Deduction was that its abstractedness only leads us further to seeing “the dependency of pure thinking on intuition”, but here in the Schematism, that seems to be precisely what Kant claims. This follows as a result of the Copernican Revolution. For once the synthetic constitution of experience coincides with the ontological conditions for the world, the very abstractedness intrinsic to the Metaphysical Deduction entails that it is only possible as an abstraction from the constituted world of the transcendental subject. Consequently, in claiming that the categories are only possible on the basis of their temporal interpretation, the conceptual space that Kant opens up – at least for Heidegger – is to reorient ontological inquiry away from its logical grounding in the categories, and instead towards an ontology situated in time.

But specifically, it is a conception of time structurally tied to the situatedness of the subject. For whilst there are other issues Heidegger has with Aristotle’s prioritization of presence, the primary objection is its abstractedness. As Heidegger put it, the primacy of presence entails we are “guided by an understanding of being that – [conceals] itself”. By contrast, Heidegger alternatively claims that “metaphysics is not something which was just created by human beings in systems and doctrines”, as the abstraction presents it, “rather, the understanding of being, its projection and its rejection, happens in Dasein as such”. What has been driving Heidegger phenomenologically is this dynamic aspect to being. As a corollary, I would suggest that Kant implicitly expresses this transcendentally in the Schematism. Kantian ontology situates time foundationally within the intentional structures of the subject.

(d) Clarifying Heidegger’s Problematic

Time, therefore, is the foundational ground of Kantian ontology because it is the rock bottom structure of human intentionality. Time does not only order our appearances, moreover, it is in terms of time that objective structure is constituted. So, whilst Kant does not reconceive the structure of time within its schematism, and whilst Kant does not think beyond objectivity, his centring of time and the

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42 Gal 3, 57/40.
43 Ibid., 241/169 (my emphasis).
44 Ibid., 242/170.
imagination nevertheless goes a long way towards thinking beyond the metaphysics of presence. And indeed, its impetus does follow from imaginative synthesis: my exposition of the Kantian thread opened with a structural analogy between the imagination in Kant and disclosedness in Heidegger. Now, we can see one result of this in practice. For insofar as being is a happening for Heidegger, in Kant, the constitution of the world happens in the subject through its projection of temporality. The imagination, in effect, sets out the ontological contexture that constitutes a cognizable world, where the foundational ontological contexture is time. Or as Heidegger puts it, the basic fundamental-ontological insight in the Critique follows from this assertion:

“The understanding of being must be projected upon time from out of the ground of the finitude of Dasein […] that time, in essential unity with the transcendental power of the imagination, attained the central metaphysical function in the Critique of Pure Reason”.

It is perhaps surprising that Heidegger refers to the central ‘metaphysical’ and not ‘ontological’ function here. This reflects a difficult shift in Heidegger’s thought in 1929 that will be a primary focus of the next chapter. Otherwise, this passage expresses the central unity in Kant’s and Heidegger’s treatments of temporal ontology, firstly, the projectedness of the imagination reflects its quasi-creative function, its transcendent function, in setting out the structure of world. World is fundamentally disclosed or interpreted through the projection of time. But there is another element at play here, for Heidegger makes reference to the ‘ground of the finitude of Dasein’ as that on the basis of which the projection is necessary. In the Kantbook, Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant begins from a reflection on the nature of human finitude, where he claims that we require a faculty of understanding and a conception of ontology for Kant because we are not an entirely creative intuition as God would be. It is because we are essentially limited, because we cannot take in the totality of being in one fell swoop, that

46 Here, we are focusing on the Kantbook. In what follows, we will read this account back into Being and Time.
we require the imagination to ‘construct’ our world, where time constitutes that basic structure.

And if this reads like Kant and Heidegger are merging here, it is precisely because, in *Being and Time*, finitude (and its phenomenology as death) is the pivot around which the two Divisions turn. As Haugeland says, “death […] is not merely relevant but [is] in fact the fulcrum of [Heidegger’s] entire ontology”. 48 Division II opens by recognizing the structural limits of (Heideggerian) understanding. And where *Being and Time* so far has been aiming to examine Dasein’s being primordially, the necessary but entirely singular focus on everyday comportment has missed out that Dasein’s finitude “limits and determines in every case whatever totality is possible for Dasein”. 49 Because disclosedness and ontological interpretation, as they are explained in Division I, might seem to be almost boundless. And although Heidegger recognizes that “existentiality is essentially determined by facticity”, 50 reference is not made to limits within existential-ontological interpretation itself. Heidegger uses the metaphor of a clearing to explain Dasein’s disclosedness, i.e., the spatial metaphor of an expanse within which being unfolds. 51 Or as the German *Lichtung* further suggests, an ‘enlightening’ of entities: it is essentially a positive metaphor. But as White recognizes:

“The clearing is the realm of possibilities which are revealed to Dasein by being, just as a forest clearing highlights things in it by setting them off against the dark background of the surrounding forest. Beyond the clearing lie impossibilities in the realm of being’s concealment”. 52

To be uniquely ‘Dasein’ refers not only to the fact that being is an ‘issue’ for us, moreover, that ‘issue’ is mediated through our essential, radical finitude. Where for Kant, the imagination and understanding are necessary on the basis of our


49 SZ, H.234.


essential finitude, for Heidegger, our ability-to-be any x, our ability to understand
being, always comes up against certain limits. Beyond its systematic placement
in Kant or Heidegger, then, time moreover bears an essential relation to our
finitude. Time is the necessary structure of our finite existence in that it gives
structure to existence. Time designates the directionality that our intentionality is
always intending within. Consequently, beyond the Aristotelian paradigm, the
process of schematism – of relating time to our foundational categories, and in
setting out the modal variations of all the possible representations of time – sets
out the strictures of an analogous concept to the clearing in Kant, for all it is not
his terminology. As a mere form of intuition, as one way (alongside space) em-
pirical intuitions are ‘given’, time may never entirely break free from the Aristo-
etelian paradigm in Kant. But as schematic, time is the essential structure of human
finitude, and furthermore signals a way to explain the relationships between
finitude, time, and disclosedness that is the central focus of Division II.

For as Heidegger introduces Division II: “the primordial ontological ba-
sis for Dasein’s existentiality is temporality. In terms of temporality, the articulated
structural totality of Dasein’s being as care first becomes existentially intelli-
gible”.53 Akin to worldhood, there is a phenomenology contained within this that
is not explicit in Kant, but nevertheless, the structural triptych of time-finitude-
disclosedness (or in Kant, imagination) is essential in both cases. In Kant, this
constitutes the ground of his ontology. In Heidegger, this triptych is the culmina-
tion of the extant Being and Time. And just as the formal argument of the Deduc-
tion led Kant to exposit his ontology more concretely in the Schematism, we are
equally required to move beyond the formal exposition of worldhood and to-
wards its temporal grounding.

So how, in Heidegger, is the formal account of world filled out by his
analysis of time? How does it relate back to Kant, and yet also towards “the
interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever
of being”?54

53 SZ, 234/277.
54 Ibid., 1/19.
3. Finitude, Ecstatic Temporality, and the Unity of ‘Care’

(a) Death and Finitude

Division II opens with the recognition of the ontological centrality of finitude, and in turn, the inherent limitations to Dasein’s being and its ontological interpretation. But Heidegger also expresses this more systematically, because Division I ends with the characterization of Dasein’s being as care, which designates the unified complex of existentiality, facticity, and falleness as the ‘primordial’ existentialia of Dasein.55 ‘Care’, therefore, designates the essential transcendental structures for Dasein’s interpretation of being, where:

(1) Existentiality refers to the projective character of the interpretation of being itself, whilst…

(2) Facticity involves the recognition that any such interpretation will be determined by the nature of the entities themselves, and…

(3) Falleness designates Dasein’s absorption within its own particular world.56

But as Heidegger’s formal characterization of the care structure makes clear, even though the aim of Division I was to understand Dasein’s being-in-the-world in its primordial unity,57 here ‘care’ is acting more like a placeholder term for this phenomenon. For the formal characterization of care is the rather unwieldy claim that “the being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-being-already-in-(the-world) as being-amidst (entities encountered in the world)”.58 Where Division I had promised to express this foundational unity as our way into the Seinsfrage, what we find instead is Heidegger bolting together the formal structures of the relevant existentialia. Division II opens within the context of this lack: whilst an analysis of everydayness can tell us about the transcendental structure of ontological interpretation, taken alone, the focus on everydayness has not allowed Heidegger to articulate Dasein’s being in its primordiality. Heidegger has

57 Ibid., 41/65.
58 Ibid., 192/237 (translation modified).
elucidated the various structures necessary for ontological interpretation, but he has not expressed their unity yet.

The concept of finitude breaks this impasse. In Division II, Heidegger is concerned not only with the immediacy of encounter within everydayness, but shifts to the higher-order question about the structural context within which we are ‘everyday’. It is one thing to say that we have certain abilities-to-be regulated by our for-the-sake-of-which; it is another entirely to recognize that these abilities are in fact potentialities never entirely fulfillable because death stands before us. The notion of a ‘limit’, of an ‘end’ to intending, brings the overarching structure of Dasein’s being into the picture – ontically, the structure of life – just as it has motivated Heidegger’s work since his earliest engagements with Dilthey. Accordingly, Division II opens with a discussion concerning the “ontologically adequate conception of death”, which Heidegger characterizes as “the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein”.

Now, there is a longstanding debate about what precisely Heidegger means by ‘death’ and the prima facie contradiction of an ‘impossible possibility’. Mulhall argues that Heidegger means ‘death’ literally, and that as a phenomenon death brings our life to the fore as “something for which [Dasein] is responsible”. Phenomenologically, Mulhall argues we access ‘death’ indirectly: death “stands before us as a possibility throughout our existence”. And whilst we cannot literally ‘experience’ death, we can imagine ourselves, e.g., as a corpse. It’s a phenomenon that “repel[s] us”, but in those moments we feel ourselves ‘outside ourselves’. He accepts this is a contradictory phenomenon, but that is not to say it is incomprehensible. Rather, the phenomenology is the phenomenology of a contradiction: it feels subjectively ‘wrong’ to have awareness of our eventual non-being. But it is precisely through that ‘contradiction’ that the meaningful

60 Ibid., 234/277 (my emphasis).
61 Ibid., 250/294.
63 Ibid., 303.
64 Ibid., 300.
65 Ibid., 300.
structures of our life are brought to the fore, and for Mulhall, the ontological significance of this indirect access to death is that it reveals Dasein’s being to itself. We see how being is the ‘issue’ of our life, our life matters because our finite existence requires that we determine what is important for us, what it is we find meaningful.66

Blattner, by contrast, argues death is a metaphor for the possibility of world-collapse. That is, insofar as our being is at ‘issue’, its inherently underdetermined nature means that our structure of significance is always at risk of unravelling, and along with that, our sense of ‘self’.67 ‘Death’ is thus not our literal death – which Blattner contends Heidegger alternately designates as ‘demise’68 – but instead pertains to our for-the-sake-of-which. Given our for-the-sake-of-which is only ever one possibility amongst a multitude of others, it can be destabilized; significance always has the possibility of being lost. This is not to say Dasein loses its practical abilities or, e.g., chairs stop showing up as ‘to-sit-on’. Rather, Dasein ‘dies’ by losing all sense of purposiveness; entities and abilities are ultimately manifested as not mattering.69 In existential death, Dasein loses its identity through the loss of the meaningful structure which constituted its world: one is not ‘oneself’ anymore.70 Accordingly, Blattner relates death to Heidegger’s complementary conception of anxiety, wherein “death is the self-understanding that belongs to this experience, anxiety is its mood”.7172 Where anxiety – as mood – designates the immediate phenomenal manifestation of insignificance, ‘death’ designates how that is projected within-the-world. In death, Dasein

66 Ibid., 305-6.
68 Ibid., 53.
69 SZ, 186-7/230-1.
71 Blattner, Heidegger’s Being and Time, 149.
72 ‘The Heideggerian concept of ‘mood’ is another interpretatively contentious debate. At the very least, moods are not equivalent to emotional states. As Ratcliffe puts it, “unlike an act of perceiving, believing, desiring, emoting, or remembering, a mood is not an intentional state directed at something within-the-world. Instead, it is a condition of possibility for such states” (‘Why Mood Matters’, in Cambridge Companion to Heidegger’s Being and Time, ed. Mark A. Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 159). Mood, then, is prior to the emotional state itself: I have a particular emotional reaction to x, e.g., insofar as I am already inhabiting some mood.
reaches its hermeneutic limit, and comes to an interpretation of world mediated through its loss of identity and significance.\textsuperscript{73}

In this, both Mulhall and Blattner develop key themes we have seen Heidegger introduce. Mulhall emphasizes life as the basic datum of phenomenological ontology, and moreover – through the notion of responsibility – locates an ethical subtext to Heidegger’s thinking that is present, even whilst Heidegger does de-emphasize it.\textsuperscript{74} Blattner, by contrast, recognizes the relative instability to the meanings we assign through our for-the-sake-of-which, and their interrelatedness to Dasein’s sense of ‘self’. But given death is, as Haugeland put it, the ‘fulcrum’ around which the two Divisions turn, why does Heidegger introduce death at this moment? It is because Heidegger sees death as our way into understanding Dasein as a whole: “if we are to have a fore-sight of being, we must see it in such a way as not to miss the unity of those structural items which belong to it”.\textsuperscript{75} Again, both Mulhall and Blattner can explain this: if death is understood literally, then it is the limit which demarcates the ‘whole’ of Dasein’s life, i.e., over a finite temporal span. If death is ‘existential’, we find instead the limits of Dasein’s ‘possibilities’, the limits of significance, beyond which – in


\textsuperscript{74} As Golob corroborates, “essentially [Heidegger’s] view is that, before one can address ethics, construed as the question of how we ought to live, one needs to get clear on ontology, on the question of what we are. However […] the relationship between Heideggerian ontology and ethics is more complex than that simple gloss suggests” (‘Heidegger’, in The Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy, eds. Sacha Golob & Jens Timmermann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 623).

I agree. Heidegger never sets out ‘an ethics’ or a ‘system’ of morals in the traditional sense. But there are certainly ethical implications or tendencies in what Heidegger sets out ontologically. In Being and Time, the clearest examples of this are Heidegger’s treatments of death and authenticity. As Golob interprets authenticity, it appears to be a higher-order ethical ideal, even whilst it neither (necessarily) permits nor prohibits any first-order action we might undertake (Ibid, 626-7). Similarly, whilst Heidegger does not explicitly relate his discussion of death to the question of moral responsibility, I find Mulhall’s claim to be phenomenologically plausible. If we think about the possibility of our death, we are immediately confronted with the question of our life, i.e., ‘have I spent my time in a worthwhile/meaningful way? What is it that I value?’.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{75} SZ, 232/275.
anxiety and death – we “annihilate the possibility of the possible”. Dasein’s ‘wholeness’ may instead be revealed as potentially unstable.

But what sense of ‘death’ does Heidegger intend, and how does this link to the rest of Being and Time? I believe we can answer that by more precisely specifying Dasein’s ‘being-a-whole’. Does Heidegger mean by ‘wholeness’ the ‘whole life’ of Dasein? Perhaps not. As White recognizes, Heidegger provides a different characterization, focusing instead on understanding Dasein “in the depths of its being”. This is not “an image of horizontal extension in time”, but instead:

“…one of vertical depth. The issue is not, have we got all the parts of Dasein present at once, but rather have we reached the rock bottom condition for the possibility of having an understanding of being?”.

Consequently, there is a formal point underlying Heidegger’s treatment of death: do we have an understanding of Dasein’s being regarding its most fundamental conditions? The ‘preparatory’ conjecture of Division I was that care is this ‘rock bottom’ condition: existentiality, facticity, and falling constitute Dasein as being-in-the-world. Division II, by contrast, affirms that care is constitutive of Dasein, but taken alone, says it is incomplete. So, if being-in-the-world is a “unitary phenomenon”, and ‘care’ signifies that unity, what enables the constituent elements to unity?

For White, the unity is provided by finitude itself, phenomenologically explicated through existential death. As Heidegger corroborates, Dasein “does not have an end at which it just stops […] it exists finitely”. What it means to be Dasein is to be finite. As White reads this claim, “Dasein cannot be just any way. Our finitude is precisely what lets us be as this understanding of being”. Insofar as we ‘are’ finite, we must inhabit some understanding of being. Death,

76 Ibid., 261/305.
77 SZ, 317/365 (my emphasis); also cited in White, Time and Death, 66.
78 White, Time and Death, 66.
79 SZ, 53/78.
80 Ibid., 232/275.
81 White, Time and Death, 75.
82 SZ, 329/378.
83 White, Time and Death, 75.
consequently, represents the limit case: a structure of signification – an understanding of being – collapsing. But formally, given our finitude, we require a structure to understand being within, a structure which unifies and directs the existentialia of care.

The finite structure that Heidegger posits is time. Consequently, death is the ‘fulcrum’ between care and temporality, between the ‘analytic of Dasein’ and its temporal grounding. As with unreadiness-to-hand, it is the possible breakdown of significance that reveals to Heidegger our essential finitude. This breakdown is not literally our ‘demise’; instead, existentiality itself breaks down. In existential death, Dasein inhabits an ability-to-be which has the phenomenal character of an inability-to-be. Dasein still persists, but its possibilities feel unavailable. Its understanding of being ‘dies’, and along with it, its structure of signification that Division I had presumed to be secure.

But since this chapter is concerned with temporal ontology, our primary focus is on the formal point, i.e., the shift from care to finitude to temporality itself. If Dasein is essentially finite, such that Heidegger will argue Dasein always understands being through time, then what is Heidegger’s conception of time? How will he substantively think beyond the metaphysics of presence? And how does Heidegger’s analysis of time in Division II get us closer to understanding time as the horizon for being?

(b) Estatic Temporality and the Threefold Synthesis

i) Preparatory Remarks

Since Heidegger’s conception of time is notoriously difficult, I want to make some preparatory remarks about how I am going to tackle it, in line with how I see Kant’s Analytic sitting behind Heidegger’s account. There are two key moves Heidegger makes: firstly, his introduction to his conception of time involves developing further the explicitly temporal rendering of the threefold synthesis that I noted in the previous chapter. Secondly, when Heidegger moves to explicitly relating this conception of time to worldhood, schemata enter the picture as horizontal. These moves themselves indicate the systematic interrelation

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84 SZ, 327/375.
86 SZ, 365/416.
between Kant and Heidegger, where the shift from the formal to the concrete that one finds from the Deduction to the Schematism is recapitulated between Division I and Division II. But furthermore, within Division II this shift is internally recapitulated insofar as what Heidegger terms the ‘ecstases’ of temporality are themselves only possible on the basis of their attendant schemata. These structural points lead to what I contend is the central original claim of this thesis: whilst the being of Dasein in Heidegger is unified through the ecstases, and whilst time as a form of intuition is introduced first in Kant, what is nevertheless ontologically foundational about temporality for both Kant and Heidegger is its schematic rendering. The Kantbook makes it clear that Heidegger believes this of Kant, but the incompleteness of Being and Time means I will need to mount my own argument regarding Heidegger’s original thought.

To explain: whilst the primary focus of Division II concerns ecstatic temporality, insofar as it allows us to understand Dasein’s being ‘primordially’, it is not Heidegger’s final word on time, even in Division II. Rather, the aforementioned §69(c) introduces the language of the Schematism to prefigure Division III, to prefigure what should have been the explanation of the ultimate relationship between time and being. In what follows, what I will argue is striking about §69(c) is how Heidegger seems to come to conclusions that may well follow, but he hasn’t yet argued for. What I suggest Heidegger is doing here is introducing a set of promissory notes about the schematism of ecstatic temporality that may have been taken up had Division III been completed. By the end of this chapter, therefore, one ought to be able to see that the ground of the Kantian thread in Being and Time follows from the ontology of time in Kant’s Schematism. But with this structural plan in place, how does temporality first enter into the analysis of fundamental ontology?

ii) Introducing Temporality
Heidegger’s introduction to temporality begins from Dasein’s finitude, and the aforementioned claim that Dasein ‘exists finitely’. Existence is a technical term for Heidegger, designating the projectedness of existentiality, and projection is similarly how Heidegger characterizes ontological interpretation. Consequently, ontological interpretation itself is determined by Dasein’s finite situation. In considering Dasein, we have seen that its own being is regulated by its for-the-sake-
of-which, through which Dasein has certain abilities-to-be available. Dasein’s projectedness is a projectedness upon these possibilities, which is to say, meaning shows up such that a given set of possibilities are intelligible. And for Heidegger, for Dasein to be Dasein ‘authentically’ means to understand itself as open to such possibilities. In everydayness, I may understand myself in terms of my job, social status, or some other cultural signifier; to understand myself authentically would be to understand myself as always existing within the context of possibilities. However, these possibilities are always bounded by existential finitude, for whilst I am always projecting into the future, “the ecstatical character of the primordial future lies precisely in the fact that the future closes one’s own ability-to-be”. But what does Heidegger mean by ‘future’ here?

As he clarifies, “we must hold ourselves aloof from all those significations of ‘future’, ‘past’, and ‘present’ which thrust themselves upon us from the ordinary conception of time”, by which he means the Aristotelian conception. Instead, this ‘ordinary time’ is derived from the ‘primordial time’ of Dasein. So, the formal claim is that the structures of care, bearing some relation to Dasein’s finitude, are unified by this so-called ‘primordial’ time, the nature of which is yet to be clarified.

This is where the threefold synthesis becomes relevant. In the previous chapter, I noted that for Heidegger each element of the synthesis corresponds to a mode of time, which itself unifies the transcendental subject in Kant as “something that in reaching out essentially emerges out of itself without simply leaving itself behind”. Heidegger terms this emergence, “the ecstasis of the subject”. Firstly, we can note the repetition of ecstasis here in the Kant-lectures. However, the essential structural point is that where the unity of the subject in Heidegger’s Kant-interpretation is derived from the unity of time, this claim also appears in Being and Time. Heidegger says, “the primordial unity of the structure of care

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88 Ibid., 330/379 (translation modified).
89 Ibid., 326/374.
90 Ibid., 328-9/377.
91 Ga25, 390/264.
92 Ibid., 390/264.
lies in temporality”.

Consequently, the key move in both cases is to argue for the ontological relevance of temporality, because it constitutes the principle of unity underlying the being of the ontologically interpretative entity.

There are a multitude of connections interweaving these claims: firstly, the care structure was initially presented as unifying Dasein’s being as being-in-the-world, but the first move of Division II is to claim this is insufficient alone because finitude is posited as a limit. However, concurrently, we have seen that finitude is also the starting point for Heidegger’s Kant-interpretation, wherein this essential relationship between the unity of the ‘self’ and the unity of time is also found. So, undoubtedly Heidegger is aiming to draw some analogy by linking the essentiality of human finitude to the unifying function of time. But with this in mind: how can the threefold synthesis be used as a rubric through which to disambiguate the numerous claims about temporality and the care structure that Heidegger introduces in *Being and Time?*

The first and clearest point about the temporal interpretation of the threefold synthesis is that their unification by time follows, for Heidegger, from the directionality of each element of the synthesis. Firstly, Heidegger relates apprehension to the present, not as an Aristotelian now-point, but instead by claiming that in apprehension, “there is already present to us an interrelation of entities”.

Moreover, reproduction is connected to the past insofar as “this synthesis allows us to remember what is brought forth again as the same”, and recognition to the future as a ‘Vorweghaben’, that is, having the concept of objecthood in advance of its unification. Here, Heidegger seems to be developing further Kant’s ‘general remark’ at the start of the A-Deduction: “all of our cognitions are in the end subjected to the formal condition of inner sense, namely time, as that in which they must all be ordered, connected, and brought into relations”.

As Käufer recognizes, however, it is synthesis itself which carries out this ordering: the elements of synthesis “are therefore not ‘in’ time in the same sense

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93 *SZ*, 327/375.
94 *Ga25*, 363/246 (my emphasis).
97 *KrV*, A98 (my emphasis).
in which representations must be in time”. Rather, it is through synthesis that the temporal order is instituted in the first place. So, when Heidegger claims, e.g., in apprehension there is an ‘already-present’, he is referring to the a priori constitutive function of time therein. That is, for objects to be presented within a given temporal order – within the ‘ordinary’ succession of present-at-hand experience – the fact time is synthetically constituted demands that this structure must already be constituted a priori. As Heidegger puts it: “pure apprehending synthesis does not first take place within the horizon of time, but instead it first forms precisely the like of the now and the sequence of nows”. But if the now-sequence itself must be ‘formed’ from a prior, ‘horizonal’ time, Heidegger’s claim appears to be that the now-sequence must first be constructed by the imagination through pure synthesis. However, given any synthetic act requires experientially applicable material, the fact we have to construct the now-sequence means that, for Heidegger, this sequentialism itself cannot be “time in its primordiality”. Time must already ‘be there’ for the constitution of present-at-hand time. Consequently, the constitution of the empirical syntheses themselves entail that there must be some underlying, a priori directionality which constitutes the now-sequence first.

But setting aside for one moment whether Heidegger is correct about Kant, what precisely is he claiming? The first point is clear: the ordinary conception of time obtains within present-at-hand experience. The more difficult idea is seeing what inaugurates this, for Heidegger. Because his further claim is that the now-sequence of ordinary time has to first be constituted itself, which means that ordinary time must be grounded in a more ‘primordial’, ‘horizonal’ temporality which is its origin. To account for this, Heidegger claims, “the transcendental power of imagination allows time as a sequence of nows to spring forth, and as this letting-spring-forth it is therefore primordial time”.

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99 GA3, 180/126.

100 Ibid., 175/123 (translation modified).

101 Ibid., 175-6/123 (translation modified).
I have described this ‘letting-spring-forth’ as a kind of ‘directionality’, because it picks out that time always functions within the context of intentionality, without presupposing what is proper only to the derivativeness of the ordinary conception of time. Since, for Kant, the time of inner sense is represented through the distinctions “in the succession of impressions on one another”, what is being produced by the pure synthesis of time must be this successive character, without which the flow of experience would not have its order. And this is similarly true of how Heidegger characterizes primordial time in *Being and Time*, where he claims, “temporalizing does not signify that ecstases come in a ‘succession’”. So, primordial time is directional, but non-successive. In Heidegger’s Kant, pure synthesis first constitutes succession ‘as such’; in *Being and Time*, ‘ecstasis’ amounts to the same move regarding the elements of the care structure. But even if the synthetic constitution of ordinary time does suggest that there is something more fundamental underlying it, nevertheless, why does Heidegger end up with such a *prima facie* unintuitive conception of time?

(c) Despatializing Time

This arises from Heidegger’s reorientation of the *Seinsfrage*, in particular, from the aforementioned critique of the static nature of *ousia* and his desire instead to understand being as dynamic, as unfolding within our encounter. In this context, Heidegger understands time as a “pure becoming”. For as he claims, “temporality ‘is’ not an entity at all. It is not, but it *temporalizes* itself”. The first point to note is that despite the linguistic conventions which mean we come up with constructions such as ‘time is...’ – which imply that time has the character of a static noun – instead, time is rendered as a verbal activity, an *a priori* activity of *Dasein* in its primordiality. Heidegger wants to pinpoint time in its own character, in contradistinction from the ordinary conception, which (despite its familiarity to us) actually relies on *spatial* metaphors, such that we do not express what time *is* from its primordial basis, or more correctly, its *temporalizing*.

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102 *KrV*, A99.
103 *SZ*, 350/401.
105 *SZ*, 238/377.
For time, under the ordinary conception, can be understood as a line with an infinite stretch of ‘now’-points, with ‘regions’ that can be divided up. In turn, presence is at its centre: presence is that from which the in principle infinite line expands. But in this spatializing, time is reified: it is quite literally abstracted from what it is and conceptualized in terms of its opposite. So, when Heidegger claims that in the “pure sequence of ‘nows’, without beginning and without end […] the ecstatical character of primordial temporality has been levelled-off”\(^\text{107}\), this ‘levelling-off’ is specifically the abstraction of (1) the dynamism of the phenomenology of time, even in only its ontical signification. But moreover, we abstract (2) the transcendental structure of temporalizing which is the condition for the possibility of phenomenological ‘time’. Because ordinary time cannot even account for the average everyday: phenomenologically, time is sensitive to our situation. Time speeds up when we are enjoying ourselves, or if we are rushing; it slows down when we are bored, or we want to ‘savour the moment’. Phenomenologically, time does flow in a linear fashion, but it has a texture, a set of qualitative peaks and troughs that the ‘objectivity’ of a timeline cannot account for. But these ‘peaks and troughs’ are themselves covertly spatial metaphors. So, how does one distil the timeliness of time in its own signification?

The crucial point is Heidegger’s characterization of temporalizing as ‘ecstatic’, which I have held back from specifying because its meaning is clearest in contradistinction from the spatializing of ordinary time. Ordinarily, we might refer to the modes of time as ‘dimensions’, which is once again a spatializing move. So, what is Heidegger trying to capture in characterizing these modes as ‘ecstases’? Etymologically, Heidegger notes that ‘ecstatic’ designates, “outside-of-itself”,\(^\text{108}\) which itself should recall the Kantian term ‘transcendence’. In Heidegger’s Kant, we have seen that ‘transcendence’ designates what is ontologically requisite for empirical knowledge of objects. Analogously, in Heidegger’s original work, the outside-of-itself of ecstasis suggests the way in which Dasein goes beyond itself in interpreting the world: the character of primordial time is to infect the structure of Dasein’s encounter within-the-world transcendentally. Heidegger describes Dasein’s temporality as ‘ecstatic’ in the sense that it emanates from Dasein. That is to say, when we consider the structure of any one Dasein’s

\(^{107}\) SZ, 329/377.

\(^{108}\) Ibid., 329/377.
experience, how it is comported towards the world and how it understands itself follows from the intentional ‘directives’ of time. Dasein’s own world is always coloured by the past-determinations of facticity, its being-amidst the present, and its futural projection towards its for-the-sake-of-itself. And whilst these comportments originate within Dasein, they go outside-of-itself in determining the world of its experience. And just as, in Heidegger’s Kant, the unity of time establishes the unity of synthesis, which itself leads to the unity of the I-think, so too does the unity of time in Heidegger bear an essential relationship to this for-the-sake-of-itself, thus Dasein’s own unity.

To set out the temporal relationships of the care structure more explicitly: as Dasein’s self-understanding is ultimately a projection upon possibilities, Dasein’s being is ultimately grounded in the ecstatic future.109 This is not in the sense of some ‘objective’ timeline in which we can ‘place’ Dasein’s ontical life. Instead, ontologically, what orients Dasein’s existentionality a priori – i.e., insofar as its intentional structure is directed towards possibility – is a futural directionality that structures Dasein’s for-the-sake-of-which. Where Dasein is oriented by such abilities-to-be – and where entities within-the-world are cleared (‘light-up’) in relation to its for-the-sake-of-which – it is because our intentionality is constituted in terms of what is not yet actualized, that the activity of world-formation is always future-directed.110 Indeed, Dasein’s finitude entails these possibilities can never be fully actualized.

But that future-directedness is not in itself separable from Dasein. Rather, the constitution of temporalizing is intimately related to Dasein’s situatedness in-the-world and its transcendence in interpreting the world. Indeed, this is not only a close relation: temporalizing is the constitutive structure in terms of which meaning and situatedness are first made possible.

The other elements of care also each align with a temporal ecstatic. The ‘being-already-in-(the-world)’ of facticity – that is, Dasein’s thrownness into the world – is past-directed because what Dasein is determined by follows from what Dasein has already been.111 Whereas the ‘being-amidst’ of fallenness is present-directed: indeed, Heidegger uses terminology here we have already seen him

109 Ibid., 327/375-6.
110 Ibid., 365-6/416-7.
111 Ibid., 328/376.
redeploy in his interpretation of the Schematism. That is, the present-directedness of fallenness is a “making-present”. Whether Dasein’s encounter is ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, the absorption in-the-world that one finds in falling directs Dasein to what is currently ‘there’. But the crucial point that Heidegger is making overall is that it is ultimately this temporalizing which provides unity to Dasein’s being, by giving a unifying principle to the elements of care.

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To bring this all together, the basic argument of Being and Time up to this point is as follows: the Division I phenomenology of world led Heidegger to argue that worldhood itself was a transcendental structure of significance. Worldhood thus amounted to the conditions for the possibility within which the world could show up as interpretable and meaningful. From this, Heidegger gleaned that the necessary transcendental structures for ontological interpretation were existentially, facticity, and fallenness, and he termed the principle of their unity ‘care’. But in Division I, significance and the possibility of the unity of care were posited only as formal structures and not substantially cashed out. Moreover, the focus in Division I on the mode of average everydayness exclusively meant that we could not get to Dasein’s being-a-whole.

Therefore, the purpose of Division II has been to find this principle of unity that underlies Dasein’s being. Firstly, Heidegger located the principle of unity for the care structure, and from that, attempted to fill out substantively the structure of significance that constitutes world. In considering Dasein-as-a-whole transcendentally, Heidegger is led to Dasein’s essential finitude. What sits behind both everydayness and authenticity is not just our demise at the end of a timeline. Instead, Dasein’s understanding is structurally restricted a priori in its interpretation of being. What motivates ontology, what makes being an ‘issue’ for Dasein, are our existential limitations. Insofar as Dasein is finite, Dasein requires a structure to understand being within, a structure which sets out the strictures of the clearing, a structure in terms of which Dasein is able to disclose being. And for Heidegger, ecstatic temporality is this foundational structure insofar as

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112 Ibid., 328/376.
it unifies and directs the existentialia of care. What it means to ‘be Dasein’ is to
finitely exist in terms of some for-the-sake-of-which, but Dasein is always or-
iented within and consequently understands itself in terms of some possibility it
is futurally projecting towards. In turn, its determination and situation are struc-
turally constituted by (respectively) the past and present.

But as we ought to see by now, the temporality of Dasein is radically
distinct from Aristotle’s conception of time. Firstly, ontology is not primarily
directed towards the present, but instead the future. Moreover, time in its pri-
mordiality is not tied to succession or objectivity. Rather, temporalizing is an a
priori activity of Dasein centred around its pure becoming, because temporalizing is
the foundational meaningful activity which institutes the intelligibility of
Dasein’s ‘self’-understanding. Therefore, where the unity of care is found in the
temporal unity of the ectases, Dasein’s being – as an essential possibility, as always
in some state of becoming – is transcendentally grounded by a pure becoming that
structures its attendant interpretation. So, when Heidegger claims, “the primordial
unity of the structure of care lies in temporality”,\(^{113}\) what he is aiming to set out is that
what unifies Dasein itself is this temporal ectasis. So, where ecstatic temporality
unifies Dasein’s own being, the question going forward concerns the transcendence
of that structure insofar as Heidegger contends Dasein projects an interpretation
that constitutes the foundational meaningful structure of the world.

Therefore, just as Heidegger finds an implicit temporality in Kant’s
threefold synthesis, the first move in Division II regarding time is to recognize
that the existentialia are themselves implicitly temporal. Moreover, both the
functions of the threefold synthesis in Kant and ecstatic temporality in
Heidegger speak to the same underlying problematic: the unity of the sub-
ject/Dasein. So, where in Kant, empirical synthesis constitutes representations
in ‘ordinary’ present-at-hand time, this is only possible on the basis of a pure
synthesis which sets out the primordial structure of time. Equivalently in
Heidegger, care and significance express the meaningful complex of Dasein’s
existential situation, but “these are made possible by the temporal ectases that
first constitute [Dasein] as a discloser in such a way that the possibilities can be
yours”.\(^{114}\) So, if we take this back to the initial exposition of a transcendental

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\(^{114}\) Käufer, ‘Temporality as the Ontological Sense of Care’, 352 (my emphasis).
ontology in the Copernican Revolution, ‘objects’ must conform to our cognition – or entities must conform to our existentiality – *foundationally* in terms of time. However, for Heidegger, we must stipulate this is *not* a time that has been ‘levelled-off’ from the phenomenology of world. Instead, the point Heidegger is moving towards is being able to claim that worldhood itself is constituted by *Dasein’s* temporality. To say that the world shows up in terms of time is to connect the meaningful disclosure of entities to the directionality of Dasein’s intentionality. In turn, such a role for time implies that meaning will be transcendentally constituted in relation to the ability-to-be that Dasein is projecting *towards*.

There is a temptation, given what has now been established, to simply stop there. For once Dasein’s being has been unified by the ecstases regulating its interpretation of being, what more is there to say? All we would need to do is assess Heidegger’s argument therein. But even putting aside answering the *Seinsfrage*, there is still a lack in Heidegger’s conception of time. For whilst we have considered the temporality of *Dasein’s* being specifically, what we have still not established is “how anything like the *world* in its unity with Dasein is ontologically possible”.¹¹⁵ Which is to say, in the following chapter of *Being and Time*, Heidegger recapitulates the question of the Schematism in fundamental-ontological terms. For where Kant’s Schematism moved from the question of whether the categories apply to *how* they so apply, here, Heidegger is asking the same of ecstatic temporality. How does Dasein’s temporality measure up to its world? And even if ecstatic temporality does constitute the foundational temporalizing of Dasein, we nevertheless need to understand the temporal structure of *significance itself*, given the implication is that Dasein’s temporalizing constitutes worldhood. So how, then, *can* Dasein’s own temporality transcend itself insofar as it is formative on the structure of world?

4. The Temporality of Worldhood and the Possibility of Transcendence

How can we connect ecstatic temporality to the constitution of world? Given a central aim of the ‘Worldhood’ chapter was to posit a *holistic* relationship between Dasein and world, it might *prima facie* look like we can simply say that significance is constituted by ecstatic temporality. And to a certain degree, that

¹¹⁵ *SZ*, 364/415 (my emphasis).
is true. However, the issue that significance presented us with in the previous chapter was that its internal structure was not explicated. For Heidegger claimed only that “significance is that on the basis of which the world is disclosed as such”. So, to recapitulate the analogy with the question of the Schematism: our question now is not whether significance is constituted by temporality, but instead how it is so constituted. Because if Heidegger has been successful in establishing an essential relationship between ecstatic temporality and the care structure, then he would have established that Dasein’s being is unified through its temporalizing. But since the Kantian thread sets out that Dasein’s existentialia transcendentally constitute the structure of world, how do we move from the specific temporality of Dasein to the temporal constitution of entities within-the-world, and in turn, the temporality of the structure of significance itself? How do we move from expositing the temporality of Dasein’s ‘self’-understanding to making our first, tentative steps into interpreting the temporality of world?

Much of Heidegger’s argument relies on a claim that was implicit in the ‘Worldhood’ chapter, but which also seems to be much stronger than anything we have seen him explicitly state so far. That is, “Dasein is its world existingly”. Even the strongest defender of Heidegger’s idealism would not claim that Heidegger is positing that Dasein is equivalent to the world. Dasein and world are holistically constituted through the projection – the transcendence – of Dasein’s existentialia and the ontological structure of the ready-to-hand, but it is a step too far to suggest that Heidegger’s holism is instead a kind of monism. So, in what way ‘is’ Dasein ‘its world’? Dasein is its world because its purposive structures organize the structure of world. Entities within-the-world, as we have seen, are encountered ready-to-hand on the basis of a certain appropriateness-for-x, such that the world is proximally encountered by Dasein in relation to the meaningful structure underlying its activity. But if those constitutive structures of Dasein have been revealed to be temporally constituted, then “the unity of significance – that is, the ontological constitution of the world – must then likewise be grounded in temporality”. Moreover, Heidegger claims: “the existential-

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116 Ibid., 143/182.
117 Ibid., 364/416.
118 Ibid., 365/416.
temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon”.\(^{119}\)

In my exposition of the Schematism, we saw that Heidegger ties schematizing to horizonality, and indeed, here in §69(c) Heidegger conceptually joins them in claiming that the temporality of worldhood is constituted by horizontal schemata.\(^{120}\) So, just as the Schematism deepened Kant’s account of time beyond its merely being a pure form of intuition, Heidegger’s terminology suggests that a similar move is being made here. In the Schematism, this was achieved through the synthesis of the categories with time by the imagination, such that the ontologically relevant sense of time for Kant is instituted through the active formation of the basic temporal structures. The temporal schemata, in turn, constitute the “horizon for the possible encountering of all objects”.\(^{121}\)

The concept of a ‘horizon’, we should note, is not a Kantian term: it is original to phenomenology, first appearing in Husserl’s Ideas. There, ‘horizon’ is introduced in relation to Husserl’s phenomenology of our field of perception;\(^{122}\) that is, insofar as the term suggests the limit to our field of perception, the ‘horizon’ is a structural metaphor for “the general framework, within which phenomena obtain their meaning”.\(^{123}\) We can see why Heidegger might apply this, with an explicitly transcedental-ontological signification, to Kant’s schemata: the schemata are horizontal insofar as they provide the general framework within which the objecthood of objects obtains. And just as we cannot see beyond the horizon, it does not make sense ontologically to go ‘beyond’ time for Kant insofar as it is the basic constitutive structure.

But this notion of horizonality also enlightens the relationship between the threefold synthesis and the process of schematizing, in a way that is instructive for understanding the relationship between the ecstatic temporality of Dasein and the schematized temporality of worldhood. For in the discussion of the temporality of the threefold synthesis, we saw Heidegger claim that “pure

\(^{119}\) Ibid., 365/416.
\(^{120}\) Ibid., 365/416.
\(^{121}\) Ga3, 103/73 (my emphasis).
\(^{122}\) Husserl, Ideas I, 51-2.
apprehending synthesis does not first take place within the horizon of time, but instead it first forms precisely the like of the now and the sequence of nows”.

So, the Schematism claims that time as the ontological horizon is ‘formed’ by the imagination by means of the pure synthesis of the categories with time, whilst Heidegger’s interpretation of the Deduction contends that pure synthesis ‘forms’ the horizon of time. I have also claimed that the Deduction is, in effect, a formal argument, whilst the Schematism has a priority given it substantially exposits the foundations of Kantian ontology. My point is that Heidegger is at pains to emphasize in his interpretation of Kant that the horizon of time is itself formed by pure synthesis in the pure imagination. Therefore, the threefold synthesis itself already presupposes schematism. And accordingly, just as for Heidegger’s Kant, the horizon of time is formed through schematizing, the central move of §69(c) is to claim that the horizon of time is formed through the schematizing of the ecstases in constituting the structure of worldhood.

But what is the purpose of this? What would it mean to ‘schematize’ the ecstases? The basic issue Heidegger is dealing with – and indeed, we saw it in the Schematism itself – is explaining the possibility of transcendence insofar as it is the foundational question for a post-Copernican ontology. For if Dasein is transcendent, how do we structurally understand the relationship between Dasein and world? Heidegger has formally stipulated that there is a complex of ‘significance’ that is accordingly constitutive, but how do we expand upon that formal stipulation? The first relevant point is found in the opening sentence of §69, where Heidegger affirms that “the ecstatical unity of temporality […] is the condition for the possibility that there can be an entity which exists as its ‘there’”, where by its ‘there’ Heidegger means Dasein. Dasein is ‘there’ – is Da – insofar as it is uniquely the entity whose transcendental structures ‘enlighten’ entities within a meaningful relationality. Indeed, the initial exposition of the ‘there’ in I.5 makes it explicit that the ‘there’ is equivalent with Dasein constituting the clearing of being, and in turn equivalent with saying that “Dasein is its disclosedness”.

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124 Ga3, 180/126.
125 Sz, 365/416.
126 Ibid., 350/401.
127 Ibid., 132-3/171.
128 Ibid., 133/171.
So, when at the outset of §69, ecstatic temporality is related to the ‘there’ as its condition of possibility, Heidegger is claiming that, more than only constituting *Dasein’s* temporality, there is a relationship between ecstatic temporality and the clearing. That is, being itself is ‘cleared’ insofar as the temporal ecstases constitute the horizon within which being is understood.

However, when Heidegger moves onto the temporality of worldhood in particular, the missing structural link precisely is the explanation of the possibility of transcendence itself. How are Dasein’s constitutive structures able to go ‘outside-itself’, i.e., project out and constitute world? In my analysis of Kant’s Schematism, I argued that the schemata set out, at least in principle, all the modal variations in the possible representation of time. What Kant thus achieved in principle was to demonstrate the foundationalism of time to ontology in crossing the bridge between subject and world. In Kantian terms, the gulf between subject and object, and also between intuition and understanding, was able to be unified through the productive possibility of the transcendental imagination. And whilst Heidegger in *Being and Time* does not have such a stark conceptual bridge to cross, given he collapses the subject-object distinction in his holism, the possibility of this transcendence still needs to be explained since ontological structures are supposed to be structures of Dasein. The question, in short, is how the holism between Dasein and world itself is possible.

And so, in attempting to establish this foundational relation, ecstatic temporality is equivalently argued to be schematized in establishing the transcendence of Dasein just as the subject’s transcendence in Kant is ultimately achieved through schematizing. As Heidegger clarifies: “ecstases are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away. Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a ‘whither’ to which one is carried away. This ‘whither’ of the ecstasis we call the horizontal schema”.129 And as he then asserts in the following paragraph: “the horizontal unity of the schemata of these ecstases makes possible the primordial way in which the relationships of the ‘in-order-to’ are connected with the ‘for-the-sake-of’”.130 The clear implication is that the relationality of entities within-the-world is ontologically established through their temporal constitution by the schematized ecstases. The difficulty, however, is how terse Heidegger’s

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exposition is in this section: the only clear indication of what a schematized ecstatic unity would be is Heidegger’s characterization of it as the ‘whither’ of the ecstasis. This makes thematic sense since we have seen that the pure becoming of ecstasis is cashed out as a pure directionality. But concurrently, a schematism would seem to presuppose some explicitly synthetic, formative function: in Kant, the Schematism is precisely where the pure imagination is revealed to be ontologically central. So, if Heidegger is going to draw an explicit analogy with the Schematism, this function of the pure imagination, we might think, should analogously reveal the foundational structure of Dasein’s disclosedness. Similarly, Heidegger claims that the schema of the ecstatic future is the for-the-sake-of-which, where the present is the in-order-to, and the past Dasein’s thrownness. However, this is merely stated.\footnote{Ibid., 365/416-7.} In the end, although these connections make conceptual sense, §69(c) does not explain the possibility of transcendence.

What is telling, given the empty space §69(c) opens up, is a line of argument Heidegger mounts in his next lecture course – The Basic Problems of Phenomenology – which is more explicit about the relationship between ecstasis and schematism.\footnote{See Chapter Seven for a more in-depth exegesis of this point. Here, I am simply introducing the thematic field in more general terms.} There, Heidegger terminologically distinguishes the Zeitlichkeit of ecstatic temporality from the Temporalität of its schematism, such that “Zeitlichkeit is the condition of the possibility of all understanding of being; being is understood and conceptually comprehended by means of time”.\footnote{Ga24, 389/274.} However, “when Zeitlichkeit functions as such a condition we call it Temporalität”.\footnote{Ibid., 389/274.} With this distinction, the Zeitlichkeit proper only to Dasein’s temporal ‘self’-understanding is posited to be founded on a more foundational sense of time: a foundational schematizing that sets out the horizon of time. Heidegger’s basic argument, then, is that Dasein is transcendent insofar as it is disclosive of being, because disclosedness itself is constituted in accordance with the schematized horizon.\footnote{Ibid., 423-426/298-300.} The implication, therefore, would again be that the schemata constitute the structure of the clearing. And Heidegger accordingly claims, “we understand being from the original
Temporalität is Zeitlichkeit with regard to the unity of the horizontal schemata belonging to it. Temporalität, therefore, is still a structure of Dasein – it is a transcendental structure – however, the further claim seems to be that Temporalität is nevertheless conceptually distinct from Zeitlichkeit insofar as it is the process of schematizing itself that makes transcendence possible. This is helpful in the sense that it affirms Heidegger’s aim in 1927 was to posit schematizing as foundational, and so, insofar as we are historians of philosophy, we can accordingly affirm that Heidegger’s intention was to mirror the structure of Deduction-to-Schematism in Zeitlichkeit-to-Temporalität. However, the issue again is that the text cuts out: where the aim of Basic Problems was to firstly motivate fundamental ontology through Heidegger’s Destruktion of the history of metaphysics – from which the relationship of time to being would consequently be expounded – Heidegger does not, in the end, cover all the intended material. Explaining the temporal constitution of the possibility of transcendence is clearly an issue that Heidegger is deeply invested in. Indeed, it is an issue that he takes to be foundational. And yet, in both Being and Time and Basic Problems, the argument does not appear to be fully completed.

But within the context of fundamental ontology, it is completely essential: in moving from Dasein’s temporality to the possibility of its transcendence, we are setting off on the road to the temporality of being. If fundamental ontology was intended to be a transcendental ontology down to its foundations, Dasein’s transcendence is an essential explanandum, because transcendence establishes the relationship between Dasein and its a priori constituting of world. It is known that Heidegger went some way to completing a draft of Division III, which he later destroyed after considering it untenable. So, an issue we will have to consider in the next chapter is why Heidegger moves away from transcendentalism in the 1930s. For now, let me summarize the position we find Heidegger in, and provide an indication of where I intend to take this material.

136 Ibid., 436/307.
137 Ibid., 30-3/22-4.
5. Conclusion

Having spent the previous five chapters tracing Heidegger’s early intellectual development, and then the Kantian thread in *Being and Time*, now we have to deal with the consequences of his early project and his turn away from Kant. There are, in effect, two problematics before us. Firstly, we need to understand *why* Heidegger’s infatuation with Kant ends after 1929: what is it that leads to the incompleteness of Division III and the shift in Heidegger’s thinking? Consequently, the following chapter will return to the foundations of Heidegger’s ‘Kantianism’, but from the other side. To what extent does Heidegger in the 1930s break with the Kantian aspects of *Being and Time*, and what does that mean for the foundations of his ontological project? We will develop further the conception of transcendence introduced, and my interjection will be to affirm that it *is* a productive concept, despite Heidegger’s retrospective criticisms.

But with a defence of transcendence in place, the question of an ontological schematism comes back into view. In §69(c), we have seen Heidegger introduce a set of promissory notes to explain the shift from *Zeitlichkeit* to *Temporalität*. In considering *Basic Problems* in more detail, we will see Heidegger fill out this account further, particularly in relation to readiness-to-hand and the concept of worldhood. But it remains incomplete. Therefore, in the final chapter, my intention is to provide an interpretation of *Temporalität* to plug this gap. Taking the directives from Kant and Heidegger that I have been setting out, I want to provide a ‘proof of concept’ for ontological schematism, in relation to worldhood, to show that the themes of Heidegger’s early project are still open to us.

And although such an account would not wholly complete the *Being and Time* project, what I do hope to show is that the paragraph of open questions that close *Being and Time* – and the ontological ‘Kantianism’ that is implicit in them – do not represent something of a false start on Heidegger’s part. On the contrary, the relationship he attempts to establish between transcendence, schematism, and being remains philosophically productive for us today.

Our final path has therefore been set: to think through, respectively, transcendence and schematism in coming to systematically understand the ontological foundationalism of time for the early Heidegger.
PART THREE

Transcendence and the Temporality of Being
CHAPTER SIX
Heidegger and the Problem of Metaphysics

1. From the Early to the Later Heidegger
Our investigation is at a crossroads. *Being and Time* leads us to see that the foundations of ontology reside in an explanation of the possibility of transcendence and its relationship to time, and yet, in Heidegger’s writing, this account remains only partially complete. In turn, there is a process of transition in Heidegger’s thinking, with key dimensions of his work in the 1930s being recognition and then reorientation: a recognition that there are limitations to the philosophical path he has aimed to traverse, and reorientation towards an eventual new paradigm for dealing with the question of being. Ultimately, this is a severe reorientation: in the *Contributions*, e.g., Heidegger almost seems to go as far as to reject the ontological difference, that is, he seems to reject the very insight which was supposed to distinguish fundamental ontology from traditional metaphysics. As he characterizes this new approach:

“The task is not to surpass entities (transcendence) but, instead, to leap over this distinction [that is, the ontological difference] and consequently over transcendence and to question inceptually out of beyng and truth”.¹

In this, the link between Dasein and being – now *beyng* – is not quite broken, but shifts.² Heidegger no longer conceives the transcendental structures of Dasein as the site of the unfolding of being. Rather, Dasein is firstly thrown into the throes of beyng and has to grapple with beyng as omnipresent and yet

¹ *Ga65*, 250-1/197.
² Considering Heidegger’s critique of the tradition, but also his aim to access the ancient primordiality of (the truth of) being, his use of the archaic *Seyn* to signal this is perhaps appropriate.
conceptually separable from Dasein. As Vallega-Neu puts it, in the *Contributions*, the experience of the truth of beyng “is like awakening in the midst of an event, in the midst of a thinking which we experience as coming to us as we think”.

The clearing, as the ‘site’ of being, is no longer conceived as a structural component of Dasein. In turn, Heidegger’s focus is “not so much on the temporal horizon of one’s projections as the structuring of one’s own existence but rather on the *where* wherein one’s being-there is thrown – the opening of the there as the very site of unconcealment”.

The essential ontological relationship is reversed: Dasein’s transcendental structures do not constitute the clearing, rather, Dasein is thrown into the midst of it. From our perspective, Heidegger’s account in the *Contributions* can feel like a distorted mirror of *Being and Time*: much of the old terminology remains, but now in new significations, and with the transcendental relationships between them all in tatters.

Where Heidegger is headed appears to take on a very different form than his early project. There is a sense in which Heidegger’s questioning going into the 1930s and onwards remains the same: his primary concern is still *being*, even whilst there is a shift from its ‘meaning’ to its ‘truth’. However, Heidegger’s later thought does involve an essential reversal through which the conceptual apparatus that has supported *Being and Time* – in particular, its relationship to the transcendental – is eventually dismantled. One finds this even in Heidegger’s writing style: insofar as the rejection of the transcendental ends up entailing for Heidegger a rejection of systematic philosophy *tout court*, this stylistically leads to a greater experimentation with forms of expression. Heidegger never again writes another obviously intended *magnum opus* in the style of *Being and Time*: his later output is almost entirely shorter essays, or, as with the *Contributions*, longer pieces which defy easy categorization. The *Contributions* is partially a text of fugal repetitions and cursory notes, but also of traditional philosophical argumentation being replaced by a much more obscure but altogether more suggestive, literary writing. In *Being and Time*, the doctrines of traditional philosophy were a problem. In the *Contributions*, *philosophical form itself* is problematized.

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3 *Ga65*, 233-4/184.


From our vantage point, what the later Heidegger leaves us with is a whole new set of interpretative questions. Firstly, the breakdown of a systematized project leaves a greater space for ambiguity: it is my contention, at any rate, that there is no single ‘later Heidegger’. Rather, Heidegger’s later work is a continual process of experimentation that falls sharply in relief from the self-conscious system-building we find in Being and Time. But moreover, the very question of a ‘later Heidegger’ highlights the absence of Division III: its problem-set hangs over Heidegger’s later work as the path not taken. In our context, what we foundationally have to reckon with, therefore, is this problem of transcendence. Firstly, why does Heidegger begin to doubt what we have seen is the foundational ground of his early conception of ontology? And secondly, insofar as I contend that transcendence remains a productive ontological concept for us, how can we work through this fundamental rift between Heidegger’s early and later thinking?

In this chapter – by setting out and critically examining the historical background leading to Heidegger’s shift – I will consider two key puzzles for fundamental ontology and its Kantian foundation. Firstly, I want to consider the problem of transcendence in relation to Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics and the scope of fundamental ontology. We have already seen that whilst the early Heidegger is a transcendental philosopher, he is not a transcendental idealist. As Carman showed us, this follows as a result of the ontological difference. But to what extent does Heidegger begin to see a latent metaphysics in his commitment to transcendentalism which ought to have been expunged? Was the ‘fundamental ontology’ of Being and Time fundamental enough, or does the existence of a Kantian thread itself suggest there is still more work to be done?

Secondly, I want to consider a momentary but somewhat perplexing phase in Heidegger’s philosophical development: namely, the short 1928–29 period where metaphysics appears to take on a positive signification for Heidegger. As he claims in the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic:

“We need a special problematic which has for its proper theme entities as a whole. This new investigation resides in the essence of ontology itself

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6 See Chapter Three.
and is the result of its overturning [...] I designate this set of questions metontology”.

Where the extant Being and Time covers the key themes of the Transcendental Analytic, Crowell argues that Heidegger is also “motivated by a desire to find a successor discipline [...] to the dogmatic metaphysics ruled out by Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic”. The oddity, as we will see, is that Heidegger does not (on the face of it) seem to share Kant’s reservations about the possibility of metaphysica specialis. Rather, as the above quote suggests, he follows a train of thought whereby ontology ought to be ‘overturned’ and either replaced by or complemented by some conception of ‘metaphysics’.

Another example would be the opening sentence of the Kantbook, which sets out that Heidegger is “interpreting Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason as a laying of the ground for metaphysics and thus of placing the problem of metaphysics before us as a fundamental ontology”. Again, the formulation seems out of character. Given the treatment of Kant we have seen Heidegger exposit so far, one might have thought that the relationship Heidegger would want to emphasize between Kant, metaphysics, and ontology is that Kant lays the ground for a critique of metaphysics and shows how the problems with metaphysics motivate the requirement for its replacement by fundamental ontology. That would then explicitly render the first Critique and Being and Time complementary texts. But that is not what Heidegger’s thesis statement means. Instead, where Heidegger sees Kant ‘laying this ground’ for metaphysics, the phrase ‘the problem of metaphysics’ does not seem to imply that metaphysics is ‘a problem’. Rather, it signals metaphysics as an open problem-set that bears some positive relationship to fundamental ontology. But how can that be the case?

In these two puzzles, I will argue we find Heidegger’s central philosophical motivations for abandoning the transcendentalism of the Being and Time project. In short: as we have seen, from Heidegger’s perspective, the ambiguity in Kant’s philosophy arises from its traversal of the boundary between traditional

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7 Ga26, 199/157 (my emphasis).
9 Ga3, 1/1.
metaphysics and fundamental ontology. At the same time, however, Heidegger appropriates Kant’s central (if formal) ontological discovery – that is, transcendental constitution – and includes it in the essential systematics of *Being and Time*. But as Heidegger begins to see it, this has adverse effects: he begins to see his own account as tainted by this metaphysical hangover. As he reflects with hindsight on *Being and Time*, “we grasp the ‘ontological’, even when grasped as a condition of the ‘ontic’ […] only as something supplementary to the ontic.”¹⁰ In short, Heidegger eventually comes to the assessment that the systematic underpinnings of fundamental ontology did not allow him to access its essential desideratum; that a supposedly ontological thinking centred around transcendence nevertheless preserves a latent metaphysical thinking that was supposed to have been avoided.

If that is the case, then we can see why Heidegger was dissuaded: it is precisely the transcendentalism of fundamental ontology which rendered it ambiguously straddling the distinction of metaphysics from ontology proper. But I think we can dispute this assessment: firstly, because I do not read Kant’s transcendentalism as intrinsically ‘metaphysical’. Instead, the Copernican Revolution is Kant’s key move *beyond traditional metaphysics*. And secondly, the problem with ‘metontology’ is its inconsistency with both the early and later Heidegger: the oddity about metontology, after all, is that it seems to render Heidegger’s position more metaphysical than Kant’s. Taking those points together: where Heidegger comes to believe the problems surrounding transcendence and metontology suggest a global insecurity in the foundations of the *Being and Time* project, I argue these issues are only local and effectively self-contained. This chapter, therefore, is aimed to be both critical and methodological: to reappraise the notion of transcendence as a prologue to considering transcendence positively in the final chapter.

### 2. Transcendence and Metaphysics

So, *Being and Time* ‘ends’ with transcendence still an open question. But at the same time, this questioning, opening into the projected Division III, does not exist in a vacuum: the question of transcendence becomes an increasing

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¹⁰ *Ga*65, 450/355 (my emphasis).
preoccupation of Heidegger’s in his work from 1927-30. Similarly, where Heidegger so far has largely dealt with Kant implicitly (but foundationally) operating within the argumentative structure of *Being and Time*, across these late-1920s lectures (and the *Kantbook*), we also find an increasing codification of Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant. Around this time, Heidegger not only draws on Kant in his own thinking; the first *Critique* becomes a central object of study for its own sake. This is not accidental: for Heidegger, the problem of transcendence is essentially Kant’s problematic. Or rather, Heidegger sees Kant in the first *Critique* reaching towards a fundamental ontological understanding of transcendence, but never quite sufficiently capturing it. “The whole of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*”, Heidegger says in 1928, “is a circling around the problem of transcendence [...] without Kant’s having secured this transcendence phenomenon radically from the ground up”.\(^{11}\) And so he emphasizes, in that classic Heideggerian way, that Kant instead “must be read [...] for what he wanted to say”.\(^{12}\)

However, I do not think this is unfair: although Heidegger inevitably latches onto Kant’s claim that we can understand an author better than they understood themselves,\(^{13}\) Heidegger also takes seriously Kant’s self-professed ‘revolutionary’ aims. In the opening of the *Critique*, Kant is to some degree aware that he is not just breaking new ground but setting out a new paradigm for philosophy. Heidegger’s concern is thus that, despite this, “Kant is kept from [fully] recognizing the significance of what he is doing because of methodological limitations”.\(^{14}\) Heidegger never pretends that his interpretation of Kant is supposed to be an entirely faithful reconstruction. We have already seen that Heidegger does not regard this sort of ‘repetition’, as he puts it, to have a useful function when engaging with the history of philosophy.\(^{15}\) Rather, Heidegger sees in Kant

\(^{11}\) *Ga26*, 210/164-5.


\(^{13}\) *Ga25*, 3/2.

\(^{14}\) David Carr, ‘Heidegger on Kant on Transcendence’, 40.

\(^{15}\) *Ga25*, 5/4.
a deeper problematic, and whilst Kant “vacillates between psychology and logic”,¹⁶ his “actual procedure is far better than his own knowledge of it”.¹⁷

But what also needs to be considered is why Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant moves beyond subtext and becomes text at this juncture. As I argued in Chapter 3, Kant re-enters Heidegger’s sphere of influence during the development of Being and Time because he sees in transcendental philosophy a way to methodologically connect the otherwise disparate strands of phenomenology and the Seinsfrage. Heidegger begins to understand the structure of Dasein’s ontological interpretation explicitly in terms of transcendent conditions because they suggest a way to ensure that a phenomenology of being does not remain an anthropology. The question of transcendence, therefore, is as much Heidegger’s question as it is Kant’s: in Heideggerian terms, it is the question of how the structures of disclosedness are able to disclose the meaning of being. Structurally, then, insofar as Dasein’s disclosedness is constituted by ecstatic temporality, the Heideggerian question of transcendence is in turn the question of the schematism of the ecstases, of the schematized constitution of the clearing insofar as this is identified with the horizon of time. Heidegger returns to the letter of the Critique itself because whilst Division II sets this out in principle, it does not wholly explain this transcendence. But given Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant, we might think that the possibility of transcendence should be discoverable within the Critique. Heidegger delves deeper into Kant, therefore, precisely because he is searching for the grounds of transcendence.

(a) Transcendence and the Quid Juris

So, in place of Kant’s ‘vacillation’, Heidegger sees the problem of transcendence, just as in place of epistemology, Heidegger sees ontology. But firstly: let’s get clearer on how Heidegger specifically understands transcendence in Kant. As he says in the Kantbook:

“Transcendental knowledge does not investigate the entity itself, but rather the possibility of the preliminary understanding of being, i.e., at one and the same time: the constitution of the being of the entity. It concerns

¹⁶ Ibid., 323-4/219.
¹⁷ Ibid., 324/220.
the stepping-over (transcendence) of pure reason to the entity, so that it can first and foremost be adequate to its possible object”.

Or, as Heidegger says in the *Phenomenological Interpretation*, “these *a priori* representations [of transcendence] constitute the objectness of something as an object”.

In a Kantian context, Heidegger understands transcendence explicitly in relation to *objectivity*, such that the problem of transcendence ought to find its clearest exposition in the Deduction, with (as in A) its extended discussion of the ‘pure concept of the transcendental object’. But Heidegger does not think it is that simple. Instead, he is explicit that transcendence *is a problem* for Kant. He charges the Deduction with…

“A fundamental lack of clarity with regard to method [which] also corresponds to a fundamental lack of clarity with regard to the subject matter, that is, with regard to the theme of such a fundamental ontology […] Kant failed to see the fundamental constitution of Dasein, i.e., transcendence. Hence the notion of the transcendental and of the transcendental method – and thereby the notion of transcendental philosophy and transcendental ontology – remains in confusion”.

In this moment, Heidegger is as critical of Kant as we have ever seen him. Indeed, the uncharitable reader might wonder why Heidegger is pursuing the Kantian thread at all, given the shopping list of unclarities and confusions above. If even the transcendental method is ‘in confusion’ – that is, the method Kant continually uses throughout the *Critique* – how instructive really is Kant for fundamental ontology? But what is the substance of Heidegger’s objection here? At base, Heidegger sees a disconnect between how Kant frames transcendental philosophy over against what he sees as its true function. That is, Heidegger’s basic dispute is with the *quid juris*. The *quid juris* is how Kant famously opens the

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18 *Ga3*, 16/10 (translation modified).
20 *KrV*, A107-A110.
Deduction chapter in the Transcendental Analytic, where he attempts to clarify the scope of his concern with the categories with an analogy to legal practice. For Kant, the question of the Deduction is not a *quid facti*, i.e., it is not about whether we *happen* to use the categories only insofar as they are a feature of our experience. That would only amount to an empirical deduction. Instead, are we *entitled* in our use of the categories, which is to say, do the categories track true features of objects (i.e., have ‘objective validity’)? Heidegger thinks this misses the point entirely: “viewed as a *quaestio juris*, the Transcendental Deduction is the most disastrous segment of teaching in Kantian philosophy to which one can refer [...and] is almost without exception untenable”.

So again, Heidegger doesn’t hold back. But to what extent should we be surprised by this? Firstly, there is a sense in which the argument of the Deduction – regardless of what one might think Kant’s question ought to be – does not provide a convincing answer to the *quid juris*. *Prima facie*, the *quid juris* seems to frame the question that Kant is supposed to be answering as anti-sceptical, or that it is at least a normative question concerning the correct use of the categories. Indeed, in B, Kant explicitly sets up his supposed ability to answer the *quid juris* as a challenge to Humean empiricism and its consequent scepticism concerning the possibility of (what Kant would call) the synthetic *a priori*. But still, putting to one side momentarily any other merits in the Deduction’s argument, the fact Kant decides to launch into his account of synthesis and then link it to the *ontological* question of objecthood does not seem to actually answer the sceptical empiricist. Kant *says* that he is going to answer empiricism and then does some ontology instead. But our question, then, is what about the Deduction’s argument actually responds to Hume’s famous charge at the end of the *Enquiry* that metaphysical claims should be “[committed] to the flames: for [they] can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion”? Heidegger does touch on this,
noting that Kant “realized that a discussion of these faculties and thus this manner of investigating the mind and the human being is not an empirical discussion. As opposite, he knew only the rational discussion. But rational discussion is a logical one”. And then, as we might have expected: “Kant did not yet see the essential task of a purely phenomenological interpretation of Dasein in the sense of a fundamental ontological explication of its basic structures”. But to what extent does this phenomenological interjection on Heidegger’s part clarify what the Deduction is actually supposed to be about?

Firstly, as a matter of Kant-interpretation, we might dispute the ‘normative’ reading of the quid juris. As Callanan argues instead, “the primary task is not to show how we might lawfully think certain contents (i.e., […] with epistemic ‘right’) but rather how we might think lawful contents (i.e., how we might think contents whose purport expresses how things must be)”. Callanan therefore focuses on how the categories are identified with the form of experience, such that Kant’s supposed procedure can effectively be reversed. In short, the point is not to say that we can bank experience first and then ask whether the categories measure up to it a priori. If that is the frame of the question, then it would seem to be impossible to provide a satisfactory answer, given ‘experience’ in Kant’s technical sense presupposes the categories. But maybe that is not what Kant is doing, and maybe that is not what the quid juris is trying to uncover. Instead, Callanan argues, Kant’s point is that it is only because the categories constitute the form of experience in the first place – i.e., are transcendentally a priori – “that we are capable of possessing those [empirical] contents at all”. Therefore Kant, under this interpretation, responds to Hume by undercutting him: Kant is not reading the a priori back into experience. Rather, he claims first that experience is only possible on the basis of the a priori. Or, in other words, experience itself is only possible on the basis of the transcendence of apperception. Insofar as the categories constitute the form of experience, therefore, experience would be impossible without their synthetic contribution.

28 Ga25, 318/216.
29 Ibid., 318/216.
30 Callanan, ‘Normativity and the Acquisition of the Categories’, 16.
31 Ibid., 17.
In Callanan’s argument, we see how Heidegger does not treat one way of reading the *quid juris*: there is a sense in which Kant does seem to be able to provide an answer to a question of right. But concurrently, there is another sense in which the *quid juris* does not seem to fully capture the significance of what Kant is doing in the Deduction’s argument. For even whilst the Deduction is able to undercut sceptical empiricism, framing the chapter only in those terms does seem to undersell Kant’s achievement therein. And this is perhaps where Heidegger and I somewhat diverge: where Heidegger sees a vacillation between psychology and logic in the Deduction insofar as the *quid juris* represents a worrisome framing of its basic question, I would argue instead that what is striking about the Deduction is how far Kant is able to go ontologically nevertheless. At least on its own terms, the Deduction *does* provide an explanation of the possibility of transcendence, and it sets out a fundamental ontology of *presence-at-hand* insofar as presence-at-hand is characterized by categoriality and objectivity.

The issue for a Heideggerian, however, is that Kant’s explanation of the possibility of transcendence in the A-Deduction intrinsically relies on Kant’s *ontic* idealism. Because firstly, the *quid juris* is not Kant’s only characterization of his basic question. As he also says of the understanding: “a difficulty is revealed here that we did not encounter in the field of sensibility, namely how subjective conditions of thinking should have objective validity”.32 But in Kantian language, that is the question of transcendence: it sets up the Deduction, to repeat Heidegger, as about “the stepping-over (transcendence) of pure reason to the entity, so that it can first and foremost be adequate to its possible object”.33 ‘Subjective conditions of thinking’ are objectively valid – the categories are ‘adequate to its possible object’ – because those categories, as the *a priori* rules for synthetic unity, institute the formal rules for the constitution of objecthood. That is to say, the possibility of experience relies first on ontology and the transcendence of those structures from the side of the subject. However, the categories can only be regarded as objectively ‘valid’ because the ontological structure of things in themselves is inaccessible, because what the Deduction establishes is that subjective projection is necessary not just for objective cognition, but

32 *KrV*, A89/B122.
33 *Ga3*, 16/10 (translation modified).
even for the possibility of representation in the first place. In Kantian terms, transcendence and transcendental idealism are inextricable because Kantian ontology presupposes a central restriction on its scope: space, time, and the categories are able to ‘transcend’ the subject precisely because they constitute the ontology of appearances. For Kant himself, this is not problematic because despite contention that ontological structures are transcendentally ideal, the appearances to which they apply are nevertheless empirically real. But it is clear why Heidegger might be concerned: transcendental idealism means that Kantian ‘ontology’ is ultimately founded on the ontic distinction of phenomena from noumena.

(b) Transcendence and the Later Heidegger

Consequently, the question the early Heidegger would need to answer is how the transcendental structures of Dasein can accordingly transcend without (1) a commitment to this ontic idealism, and (2) without reducing phenomenology to anthropology? One intuitive response, we might think, is to point to the holism of Dasein and world. That is, where Kantian idealism presupposes a foundational distinction between subject and object which Heidegger is emphatically opposed to, his account of the formation of world is a direct response to this problem. Where the categorical distinction of subject from object motivates Kant’s distinction of appearance from thing in itself, Heideggerian holism could in turn be read as setting out the co-constitution of Dasein and world.

That is, if “being-in-the-world is itself in every case its ‘there’”, then the dual disclosure of Dasein and its world cannot be extricated from one another. Indeed, as Heidegger says of the structure of the Da of Dasein, “[the] ‘here’ of an ‘I-here’ is always understood in relation to a ‘yonder’ ready-to-hand”. The claim is that Dasein’s Existenz is only possible within the context of a meaningful relational totality, just as the totality itself is only able to have significance on the basis of Dasein’s interpreting. Ecstatic temporality, then, could be read into this account as the structure which makes Dasein’s Existenz intelligible, where the question of the schematism of the ecstases in turn refers to the higher-order

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34 cf. Chapter Four.
35 SZ, 132/171.
36 Ibid., 132/171.
question of the general constitution of the clearing itself, as the foundational condition for transcendence itself. Indeed, what this seems to suggest is that in shifting from (1) the co-dependent constitution of world, to (2) the constitution of Dasein by ecstatic temporality, to (3) the constitution of being by a temporally schematized horizon, is that every consequent ontic element is relationally dependent upon the initial schematic formation. But isn’t this precisely what Heidegger has been looking for? We still need to explain that foundational schematism, but nevertheless, structurally we can say that Dasein transcends not in the sense of a ‘subject’ determining an ‘object’, but that Dasein only transcends insofar as it institutes an interpretation, insofar as “existentiality is essentially determined by facticity”, and vice versa. The interpretative puzzle, however, is why Heidegger turns away from this account in the 1930s.

The key issue is that Heidegger begins to see even this account as too ‘subjectivist’, as still latently metaphysical. Indeed, he begins to contend that centering transcendence within ontology entails at least an implicit commitment to a problematic idealism. For consider what the concept of transcendence consists in. As Vallega-Neu puts it, transcendence involves “[the representation] in our mind [of] a motion which departs from a being […] and leads to some other being”. The issue appears to be, for the later Heidegger, that fundamental ontology (despite its holism) locates the structures for ontological interpretation within Dasein itself. Heidegger as self-critic appears to begin to recognize that fundamental ontology foundationally relies on this ontic relation. As the later Heidegger might put it, it appears as if the interpretation of being were simply a ‘representation’ of Dasein’s. Or, to put it another way: is the early Heidegger’s purported holism meaningfully a holism? Does the account of worldhood substantively overcome these metaphysical implications when Dasein appears to have a determinative priority? The structure of ontological interpretation, after all, is projection, which the critic might contend reinforces the notion that ontological interpretation is the institution of a relation between two entities, despite the fact that this was supposed to be our way to access being. As Heidegger says in the ‘Letter on Humanism’, the structure of projection is that of a

37 Ibid., 192/236.
“representational positing”, when what he was looking for was a “thinking which 
abandons subjectivity”.40

Moreover, at certain moments in *Being and Time*, Heidegger does appear to explicitly assent to a minimal transcendental idealism. For example, he does say:

“If what the term ‘idealism’ says amounts to the understanding that being can never be explained by entities but is already that which is ‘transcendental’ for every entity, then idealism affords the only correct possibility for a philosophical problematic”.41

As is often the case with Heidegger, we should be careful when he includes scare quotes. I do not take him to be committing himself to any ‘thick’ conception of idealism here.42 As we saw Carman corroborate, being is not an ‘existent’. The early Heidegger is a realist about entities and a hermeneuticist about being. But in his later work, a different theme begins to surface: Heidegger begins to reread *Being and Time* from a different perspective. And where, in Division II, Heidegger clarifies that the central problematic for fundamental ontology is the question of transcendence, in the later work, he assesses this point as still containing an implicit metaphysical thinking which was supposed to have been overturned. Reading the early Heidegger from the later Heidegger’s perspective, the aim was to articulate a holism, with the intention of fully breaking from Cartesianism. But insofar as his account relies on a transcendental relationship between Dasein and world, the later Heidegger sees his early project as still tied to the language of metaphysics, and therefore to the thinking of metaphysics.43

Let’s consider this point in more detail. One passage which seems to bring together all these key themes is found in *The Event*:

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40 *Ga*9, 327/249 (my emphasis).
41 *SZ*, 208/251-2.
42 See Chapter Three, section four, for my corroboration of Carman’s claim that whilst the early Heidegger is a transcendental thinker, he is not a transcendental idealist.
43 *Ga*9, 328/250.
“At first, what was available, simply out of metaphysics, was [...] the schema of the transcendental, such that this itself was immediately conceived, according to the basic position of Being and Time, in its own truth (‘Temporalität’). Yet thereby also resulted by necessity the fatal delivery of the step to metaphysics; it seemed that everything was only a modification of Kant’s laying a foundation for metaphysics”.

Here, Heidegger explicitly situates the doubts that began to creep in within the context of Division II and Basic Problems. To briefly recapitulate, there, Heidegger tied the process of schematizing to the formation of transcendence, where Temporalität was a placeholder term for the schematized ecstases. The implication, therefore, was that Temporalität = the temporal horizon. The key difference is that Heidegger now views this close relationship to Kant negatively: that is, by grounding fundamental ontology in schematizing, Heidegger now thinks that fundamental ontology was in turn grounded in an essentially metaphysical conceptual space. As we see, Heidegger repeats his thesis statement from the Kantbook of laying the ground for metaphysics. Heidegger now sees himself as not thinking beyond metaphysics in Being and Time, but only ‘modifying’ it.

But I think we can dispute this. Firstly, I have already noted the oddity of Heidegger opening the Kantbook with that claim insofar as it seems to run against how Heidegger deals with the transcendental in Being and Time. Moreover, in contradistinction from the late 1920s, the later Heidegger appears to de-emphasize the ontological possibilities that are already present within Kant’s philosophy. For although the early Heidegger sees Kant ‘vacillate’ between psychology and logic, he does nevertheless locate the question of transcendence in Kant, even if it is not fully developed. And as my interpretations of the Deduction and Schematism reflect, I think the early Heidegger is right to recognize this. For although Kant does not explicitly think ‘the question of being’ in the Heideggerian sense – it is, after all, an innovation of Heidegger’s – the problematic of transcendence that underlies the Transcendental Analytic nevertheless represents a true break with what came before it. It is the ‘unsaid’ of Kant’s thinking; the problem of transcendence elevates Kant’s theoretical philosophy

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44 Ga71, 141/120.
beyond the primacy of epistemology and allows it to be an essential precursor to fundamental ontology. So, when the later Heidegger says that his earlier project only ‘modified’ Kant’s ground-laying, I contend that we can respond in two ways. Firstly, this undersells Kant’s own (if implicit) ontological innovations, such that if Being and Time was only a modification of Kant, the implied negative subtext would appear to overstate the issue. But secondly, Being and Time does not only modify Kant. Kant’s influence is a foundational component of the systematics, but Heidegger’s innovations in phenomenology and hermeneutics mean that he departs from Kant in similarly foundational ways. The Kantian thread allows us to understand the structure of Being and Time, but Heidegger is in dialogue with Kant, and not simply ‘modifying’ his thought.

For the ostensible ‘modifications’ that Heidegger made are what allowed him to move beyond the latent metaphysical aspects of Kant’s thinking. Firstly, his holism allowed him to think beyond the subject-object relation such that he could circumvent Kant’s ontic idealism. Moreover, insofar as the ontological difference asserts that the meaning of being is distinct from the entities to which being applies, Heidegger opens a hermeneutic space that distinguishes him from perhaps all his predecessors. Where we have seen that traditional metaphysics is defined by the search for a categorization of entities, this is far from the early Heidegger’s project. And more than just innovating beyond a metaphysics of presence or substance, the early Heidegger rethinks the entire framework within which being is to be understood. Dasein’s transcendent and hermeneutic abilities are contextualized within the holistic complex of itself and world, within the structures of interpretation, towards understanding Dasein’s essential disclosedness. Consequently, although Heidegger is a meaningful successor to Kant, and draws on him heavily, he is far from a dogmatic follower of him. As we have seen, he reworks Kant quite significantly, and pushes further the ontological insights that are implicit in the first Critique. But even with this Kantian debt to pay, does that mean what Heidegger was doing in Being and Time was to continue ‘laying a foundation for metaphysics’? I think the later Heidegger undersells his earlier achievements.
(c) Preliminary Conclusions

Let’s summarize where we are. What this transitional period from *Being and Time* to the *Contributions* effectively reveals about Heidegger’s treatment of the question of transcendence is his *ambivalence* surrounding the concept. Firstly, in his increasing codification of his interpretation of Kant, we begin to see Heidegger reassessing the degree to which Kant lives up to the purported standards of fundamental ontology. However, this argument begins to function almost as a proxy for his own self-criticism. But what I have tried to show is that, at least on his own terms, Kant *can* explain transcendence. The problem, from Heidegger’s perspective, is that this explanation is dependent upon transcendental idealism, which Heidegger perceives as egregiously metaphysical.

Beyond this, however, I argue that Heidegger’s holism in *Being and Time* allows him to think the transcendence of Dasein without this necessary commitment to transcendental idealism. For when the concept of transcendence was introduced in §69(c), the ‘problem’ there treated transcendence as a positive concept in need of explanation. It is only in the ensuing decade that transcendence begins to be treated negatively, as *problematic*. By the *Contributions*, the concept of transcendence is emblematic of a representational, metaphysical thinking which reflects how *Being and Time* did not go far enough into its subject matter: it is held up as a justification for an even more radical shift away from traditional philosophizing. I have tried to show that we can reasonably dispute this, instead, Kant’s ‘unsaid’ problem of transcendence can be understood as a moment where ontology breaks free from the trappings of traditional metaphysics. More minimally, I would contend that despite the later Heidegger’s critique, the problem of transcendence remains a meaningful problem, for the question of an explanation of Dasein’s disclosedness still holds its own independent weight. We are interpretative entities: what are the structures that *enable* those interpretative abilities?

But perhaps the greatest question we now have is how Heidegger came to the assessment that *Being and Time* was, at its core, too metaphysical, despite the fact its very possibility was predicated on Heidegger’s *critique* of metaphysics. From where did this renewed concern with metaphysics arise? What first instituted the doubts surrounding the latent metaphysics of fundamental ontology, and how does it fit into the larger transitions in Heidegger’s thinking? Now, we
need to consider the second puzzle of Heidegger’s transitional period, that is, metontology and its reappraisal of *metaphysica specialis*.

3. Metaphysics and Metontology

Metontology: an uncharacteristic suggestion of Heidegger’s, found in an appendix to a lecture course during the largest transition in Heidegger’s thinking. How much philosophical weight should we place on this? As a component of Heidegger’s project, it is only momentary, antithetical as it is to both his earlier and later treatments of being. Nor does it seem to have an immediate relevance to the question of Division III: the term *metontology* suggests its place comes ‘after’ or ‘transcends’ ontology, which might imply we could circumvent its problematic entirely.\(^{45}\) However, it is relevant. Heidegger’s assent to a concept like metontology represents a limit case: it is the only instance in his philosophy where his basic position does seem to be categorically, undeniably metaphysical. Where else in his career would Heidegger claim that “ontology itself expressly runs back into the metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains”?\(^ {46}\) For the Heidegger of *Being and Time*, this contravenes the ontological difference: phenomenologically, ontic encounter is only possible on the basis of *a priori* ontological structures of interpretation. For the later Heidegger, a thinking that remains ontic is charged with psychologism, with staying in the realm of ‘correctness’ *vis-à-vis* truth rather than recognizing the possibility of *aletheia*. What the later Heidegger means by this is that whilst you might be able to understand some true facts in the ontic, you cannot establish their *ground*.\(^ {47}\) In both cases, the ontic can tell us about objects, but not about bei(y)ng.

And although the later Heidegger’s criticizes *Being and Time* insofar as the ontological was supposedly presented as only “something supplementary to the ontic”,\(^ {48}\) that would still be a more minimalist position than the concept of metontology implies. The later Heidegger sees the early Heidegger as too reliant on metaphysical language and conceptuality in his attempt to access the

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\(^{45}\) Heidegger trades on this etymology of ‘metaphysics’ quite often in 1928-9, see, e.g., *Ga*3, 6-7/4.

\(^{46}\) *Ga*26, 201/158.

\(^{47}\) *Ga*65, 198-200/155-7.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., 450/355.
ontological. But this is distinct from the claim in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* that ontology is *always* ‘implicitly’ metaphysical. Indeed, Heidegger goes further than this, claiming that “fundamental ontology and metontology constitute the concept of metaphysics”.49 There is perhaps a sense in which this is something of a diversion when we consider Heidegger’s career overall: it is, after all, only a fleeting moment. But why is it that at this moment, Heidegger seems to reappraise metaphysics?

In the above quotation, despite its counterintuitiveness, there is a suggestion about where Heidegger’s systematic thinking might be heading at this point. For whilst much of *Being and Time* relies on an implicit structural analogy with Kant’s Analytic, the Analytic alone is not the whole of the *Critique*. The Analytic is supplemented by and contrasted with the Dialectic, which is concerned with the “logic of illusion”;50 specifically, with identifying “the origin of certain cognitions from pure reason and inferred concepts, whose object cannot be given empirically at all, and so lies wholly outside the faculty of pure understanding”.51 The positive project is mirrored with its negative; the Dialectic consequently seeks to identify those metaphysical questions to which the categories cannot apply. To recapitulate how Heidegger reads this in the *Kantbook*: the Analytic establishes the possibility, extent, and limits of what the Scholastics called *metaphysica generalis* (ontology). It is from this that the possibility of *metaphysica specialis* is to be considered.52 And given the Dialectic’s concern with transcendental illusion, it is undeniable that Kant is sceptical of this possibility since the categories have no object to apply to: God, freedom, and immortality are consequently out of the reach of our possible knowledge.

But if Heidegger in his own work has been mounting this structural analogy with the *Critique*, to what extent does his ‘analytic of Dasein’ require an attendant Dialectic? Certainly the introduction to *Being and Time* suggests so, with the assertion that following Division III, there will be a second part concerned with the *Destruktion* of the history of ontology. Heidegger intends to “destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial

49 Ga26, 202/158.
50 KrV”, A131/B170.
51 Ibid., A333/B390.
52 Ga3, 9-11/6-8.
experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of being”. So, like Kant, Heidegger is concerned with uncovering an illusion of a certain sort which follows from the positive project. But equally, in both cases, the intent of these respective ‘Dialectics’ is not entirely negative. For Kant, the impossibility of establishing *metaphysica specialis* on the basis of pure reason opens the door for the possibility of *practical reason* and the second *Critique*. Similarly, for Heidegger, *Destruktion* is not only about “shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its limits”.

But with the introduction of metontology, Heidegger seems to be suggesting something else. For the purported Dialectic of *Destruktion* latches onto the question of illusion, of thinking through the history of being in light of what fundamental ontology has been able to establish. With metontology, by contrast, Heidegger’s focus instead seems to shift to a positive reappraisal of *metaphysica specialis*. For the aim is to establish a deeper relationship between being and entities, since “within the horizon of the problem of being [...] it appears that all this is visible and can be understood as being, only if a possible totality of entities is already there”.

Metontology, therefore, is another way of thinking through the themes of the Dialectic. The question is why Heidegger changes tactic. What is the function of “a special problematic which has for its proper theme entities as a whole”, when *Being and Time* was explicit that the thematization of given regions of entities is the function of the sciences? Concurrently, the precise nature of the thematization of the totality of entities as ‘metontology’ is not entirely clear: what would such a problematic involve that does not simply reduce to either ontic science or traditional metaphysics? Heidegger appears to think this is possible. For example, at the end of the *Kantbook*, he asks rhetorically: if the *metaphysica generalis* of the Analytic can be modified into a fundamental ontology, then what are we to do with “the rejection of the traditional *metaphysica specialis* [...] is there

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53 *SZ*, 22/44.
54 *Ibid.*, 22/44.
55 *Ga26*, 199/156-7.
57 *SZ*, 10-1/30-1.
not also a positive problematic to be found in this characterization of the Transcendental Dialectic, which appears to be only negative?" Heidegger seems to contrast ‘traditional’ *metaphysica specialis* (God, freedom, immortality) with whatever is the subject-matter of metontology. But as Crowell recognizes, “the whole problem is that it is not at all clear what status an *inquiry* into beings as a whole could have within the framework of *Being and Time*”. It is difficult to see what such an inquiry would contribute when the Division I account of worldhood seems to already categorize the modalities of the being of entities, and Division II reveals their ontological ground in temporality. Excepting the literal questions of traditional *metaphysica specialis*, what else could be asked?

Perhaps, insofar as Heidegger identifies this new problematic as “in the domain of metontological-existentiell questioning”, there is a more ‘applied’ question about Dasein’s phenomenology that fundamental ontology leaves unanswered. That is to say, where fundamental ontology abstracts from the specificities of a given phenomenological description to reveal its general, transcendental presuppositions – its *existentialia* – there are still anthropological or psychological questions that we could ask, despite the fact fundamental ontology itself consciously tries to avoid them. But that cannot be what Heidegger has in mind, even if fundamental ontology might be supplemented with separate anthropologies or psychologies: why would Heidegger associate such contingent questions with *metaphysics*? Moreover, that contingency and specificity contravenes Heidegger’s clear directive that the ‘proper theme’ of metontology is ‘entities as a whole’: it is still a necessary and general endeavour. In short, it seems difficult to conceive, at least with the material available, what metontology would involve that does not simply amount to doing some traditional metaphysics. But even Kant rejected the possibility of *metaphysica specialis* from the grounds of pure reason: why should that change when considering Dasein’s existentiality?

However, that does not explain why Heidegger – even if only for a fleeting moment – thought this. Perhaps he was simply trying something out: it does arise in the midst of his transition away from the *Being and Time* project, when he is grappling with the question of completing Division III. Was it an experiment

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58 Ga3, 245/172.


60 Ga26, 199/157 (my emphasis).
with *metaphysica specialis* that he rightly came to reject? But any such explanation is going to remain conjectural: Heidegger never writes the companion ‘Dialectic’ to the ‘Analytic’ of the *Kantbook*. In the extant texts, metontology simply fades from view. Heidegger’s focus shifts: in his 1930s lecture courses, he begins to work through Kant’s 19th Century inheritors – particularly Hölderlin and Nietzsche – and in his original work, the transcendental itself begins to fade away.

But if we can only conjecture as to the ‘why’, what might metontology instead represent in some higher-order sense for Heidegger? I would suggest, if only tentatively, that what metontology represents in considering Heidegger’s career more broadly is the wider difficulty he is having in entering into the problematic of Division III itself. As I suggested in the previous section, Dasein’s holism does provide a way to think through transcendence, such that the problematic remains open to us. Counterintuitively, Heidegger’s more explicit focus on Kant after *Being and Time* does not necessarily clarify the transcendental ground that he sought. But should we read this as calling into question the veracity of the Kantian thread in *Being and Time*? I think not: these are local problems, not global ones for the project as such. Regarding transcendence, Heidegger’s reluctance to recognize the full signification of the *quid juris* conceals the ontological ground from which Kant was already thinking. Similarly, I think we can sidestep the question of metontology, firstly because it contravenes the critique of metaphysics in *Being and Time*, but also because the principle of *Destruktion* coheres better with Kant’s conception of the Dialectic. There are issues with Heidegger’s later treatments of transcendence and metontology, but I do not think they dislodge the foundations of the *Being and Time* project.

Nor are Heidegger’s claims here subject to, e.g., Cassirer’s central objection that Heidegger “no longer speaks as commentator but as usurper”, in suggesting this close interrelation between the *Critique* and *Being and Time*. Instead, transcendence and metontology represent the difficulty of the problematic that Heidegger would have to treat in Division III. But a positive possibility is signalled: if transcendence is still an open question, can we correspondingly return to the question of schematism? Can we take up Heidegger’s promissory notes about the schematism of ecstatic temporality and flesh them out further? Can

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61 Cassirer, ‘Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics: Remarks on Martin Heidegger’s Interpretation of Kant’, 149.
we specify Temporalität? In the next and final chapter, I will attempt to provide an initial ‘proof of concept’ for such an interpretation.

4. A Return to Temporalität?
Ultimately, therefore, these late-1920s forays into Kant do not entirely enlighten the problematic of Division III. That is not to say they are without value: on the contrary, the Kantbook in particular is still underread, Heidegger’s general contention that Kant’s central problematic is the question of transcendence is a position that we share, and Heidegger’s interpretation of the Schematism therein is the nexus point around which Kant’s critical philosophy and Heidegger’s fundamental ontology intersect. But these are problematic texts: they reflect the difficult questions Heidegger was still grappling with, even after the publication of the extant Being and Time. But at the same time, they also show Heidegger’s continued commitment (at least until 1929) to answering the question of transcendence. In this chapter, I have attempted to show that this question is still open: where the later Heidegger ‘leaps over’ transcendence, I now want to confront it. What did Heidegger want to say about Temporalität? Is schematism a defensible way to reach the horizon for being? Whilst my account in the next chapter cannot claim to be comprehensive, I want to begin on that journey, to find a way into concluding the Kantian thread of Being and Time.

Notoriously, Heidegger claims in the Kantbook that “what must be decisive”, in interpreting an historical text “is what it sets before our eyes as still unsaid, in and through what has been said”. It was precisely from this basis that Cassirer disputed Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant. And indeed, many Kant interpreters ever since have concluded that that Heidegger’s hermeneutic methods were ultimately too violent to be of any productive use. But I would counter that the ‘unsaid’ is the subtextual motivation – the philosophical basis for the text, the ground of the problematic itself – which reasonably demands thinking beyond what is literally on the printed page. And in Heidegger, Division III is the omnipresent ‘unsaid’. In the early work, it is what Heidegger is centrally working towards; in the later work, its very possibility is defined by the absence of Division III. But if Heidegger’s holism provides a workable ground for the

62 Ga3, 201/140.
question of transcendence – one that is not idealist, one that is not metaphysical – then at the very least, there is a way to begin to think the suggestions of §69(c) and Basic Problems. How, then, might the holism of Dasein link to the temporal problem of the transcendence of world? How do we substantively cash out the analogous relationship that Heidegger suggests between synthetic activity and temporalizing? And finally: how do we understand the relation between schematism and the early Heidegger’s conception of being?
1. Introduction

The extant *Being and Time* ends – compellingly, frustratingly – with a barrage of questions:

“And where does this investigation stand?

[…] Being has been disclosed in a preliminary way, though non-conceptually […]. The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein’s totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the ecstatical projection of being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ecstatical temporality temporizes. How is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time manifest itself as the horizon of being”.

And so the language of the ‘preliminary’ reappears, just as it did in the transition between the first two Divisions. There, what was preliminary in Division I was its central thesis – that the unity of Dasein’s being is ‘care’ – and preliminary in the sense that its unity could not be expressed solely in terms of everydayness. Rather, the everyday analysis of care prepared the way for the exposition of the foundational ontological structuring of care in terms of ecstatic temporality. However, to reach that, we firstly needed to analyse Dasein’s radical finitude to clarify its existential situation. Finitude constituted the structural link between care and time. But if Division II is, in its own way, preliminary, then our first

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question must be: what is the structural link that leads us from Dasein’s temporality to the temporality of being as such? Heidegger’s questioning already hints at a method; the distinction of Zeitlichkeit from Temporalität is already anticipated. This is similarly mirrored in Heidegger’s terminological shift from the ‘ecstatic projection’ of temporalizing to discovering this in its ‘primordiality’. The question is: what makes ecstatic temporality (insofar as Division II establishes it as the foundational structure for self-understanding) in the first instance possible? What is the transcendental-ontological ground for ecstatic temporality itself? But moreover – insofar as Heidegger characterizes this condition as a temporalizing – what is the structure of the foundational activity which constitutes the clearing (as the ‘site’ of the unfolding of being)? But if Heidegger’s intimations seem obscure here, they need not be, because Heidegger has already told us what it is: the structural link between time and being is schematizing. Schematizing is at the foundation of ontology.

We have already seen Heidegger introduce this thought: both §69(c) and Basic Problems refer to schematizing in instituting the shift from Dasein’s temporality to the temporality of being as such. In §69(c), Heidegger associates the schematizing of the ecstases with the formation of the horizon of time. So, given Heidegger opens Being and Time with the aim to interpret “time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being”, this implies that Heidegger had worked out the formal/structural interconnections of fundamental ontology. What we don’t find in the extant texts is a fully complete exposition of this fundamental-ontological schematism. Basic Problems goes further than Being and Time in developing this: firstly by systematically distinguishing Zeitlichkeit from Temporalität, but moreover by attempting to explain ontological schematization regarding readiness-to-hand and the formation of world. However, after this – as we saw in the previous chapter – Heidegger becomes increasingly concerned with the concept of transcendence which underlies this account, such that the possibilities these two texts suggest are never fully taken up. But my analysis, by contrast, depends upon two essential interpretative postulates: firstly, as already exposited, that Heidegger’s later treatment of transcendence

\[\text{Ibid.}, 365/416.\]
\[\text{Ibid.}, 1/19.\]
\[\text{Ga24}, 434-6/306-7.\]
understates both his and Kant’s considerable ontological achievements. And secondly, because of this, the question of a positive relationship between transcendence, schematism, and the meaning of being is still open to us. Consequently, the aim of this final chapter is to begin along this path: to mobilize the Kantian and Heideggerian resources that we have been developing, and use them to find a way into thinking the temporality of being. Evidently one chapter alone will not be sufficient to complete this task. But what I do aim to provide is an initial ‘proof of concept’ that could constitute the ground for further research.

Let’s begin with the requisite context: in the previous chapter, my aim was to affirm the Kantian foundations of Heidegger’s early project, even given the manifold transitions in his own thinking. In particular, I wanted to show that transcendence is still a productive philosophical concept for us. Transcendence is not to be ‘leapt over’: it is to be confronted, because the term expresses the unique ontological attribute of Dasein. It expresses the way that Dasein is ontologically oriented towards world, i.e., how we are essentially related to world. For the essential conjecture that Being and Time sets out to establish is that we are the ontologically interpretative entity, and in such a way that our hermeneutic abilities (in a key sense) extend ‘beyond’ ourselves and are constitutive upon the very structure of world. But at the same time, Dasein is not a ‘subject’ in the sense of being substantially separable from a world of ‘objects’. Instead, as being-in-the-world, Dasein is in an essential unity with world. Consequently, if we are to explain Dasein’s transcendence on the most fundamental level, then we need to explain how this Dasein-to-world relationship is inaugurated. This is the question that both §69(c) and the final sections of Basic Problems introduce. They return to the problematic of I.3, and given the account of ecstatic temporality, begin to set out the temporal grounding of transcendence vis-à-vis the ready-to-hand. With this in mind, if the previous chapter had a certain air of negativity, now I want to deal with the positive consequences. My aim is to defend and expand upon the schematism of readiness-to-hand that Heidegger introduces, as perhaps the key expression of the unity we can effect between Kant’s and Heidegger’s thinking.

To achieve this, this chapter has two key aspects: firstly, I want to consider Heidegger’s account of schematism in Basic Problems in greater detail, and
use the Kantian and Heideggerian resources that I have been developing to push this account one step further. Here, I focus on what I identify as the two key advances Heidegger makes. Firstly, he clarifies that the problem of transcendence is to be understood in terms of providing an explanation of familiarity, which both recontextualizes the Kantian question of transcendence and also establishes an essential link to the account of worldhood in I.3. Secondly, although Basic Problems cuts out before we are given the full account, Heidegger’s designation of schematic time as a ‘retentive-expectant enpresenting’ provides a rubric through which to develop his account. Consequently, my own contribution in Section 3 will be to offer an account of this ‘retentive-expectant enpresenting’, given the directions Heidegger has provided. In particular, by bringing in my central thesis that there is a structural analogy between Kantian imagination and Heideggerian disclosedness, I want to show how there is a threefold movement from existentiale to ecstasis to schema. That is to say, just as the imagination in Kant inaugurates the shift from the category of substantiality to its schema as ‘the persistence of the real in time’, Dasein’s disclosive abilities similarly permit the shift in context from, e.g., the factical, ecstatic past to its schema as ‘retention’. In this way, I aim to corroborate that this essential analogy is a component of the foundations of the Being and Time project.

Having set this out, the second key aspect of the chapter is to link the account offered to a set of foundational interpretative issues within fundamental ontology. Firstly: how does the problematic of schematism link back to (and possibly affect) our understanding of ‘the question of the meaning of being’? Secondly, insofar as I will argue that the theme of becoming that is crucial to Dasein’s temporality also applies to the schematism of readiness-to-hand, what does this notion of becoming contribute to Heidegger’s conception of being more broadly? And finally, how does the notion of becoming intersect with Heidegger’s conception of time? Insofar as Sections 2 and 3 develop the initial ‘proof of concept’ I am offering, in this final section my aim is to link this to the broader question of how we approach Heidegger’s early project.

In short, I will argue that what schematism allows us to explain is why the question of being is ultimately a question of transcendental hermeneutics. After all, being cannot be captured propositionally since the proposition is the expressive vehicle for presence-at-hand, and there is a sense in which the desire
for such an ‘easy’ answer misses the point. Fundamental ontology is in a central sense about the close relationship of the question of meaning to the question of being: the ‘moral of the story’ is to motivate how they are deeply interconnected. And the base ontological structure is a *temporalizing* because interpretation – i.e., *disclosure* – is an itinerant, fluid, fundamentally *phenomenological* orientation. In other words, *Temporalität* is the transcendental background which makes possible even familiarity itself. Time is the singular necessity which regulates the contingency and particularity of interpretation; it is the transcendental structure of pure becoming which determines *a priori* the extent and limits of possible ontological interpretation.

Admittedly this introduction is very assertoric. And yet in finding our way into the systematic foundations of the early Heidegger, this has a helpful pedagogical function. I have needed to set out the structural interconnections that will be justified in the following sections; to set out firstly and in the most general terms the deep interrelationship between the transcendental, the hermeneutic, and the temporal that we find at the foundation of being. In doing so, we need to begin where Heidegger begins, i.e., with a return to readiness-hand. How do we come to a conception of schematization which wrenches it from its unique systematic placement in the first *Critique*, and understand it in relation to Heidegger’s account of world? From this point, we can begin to develop Heidegger’s basic theses further, towards providing an account of the hermeneutic foundation of the *Seinsfrage*.

2. The *Praesens*-Analysis

(a) Transcendence and Familiarity

We begin from the recognition that, from every direction we attempt to think through the question of being, Heidegger leads us to schematizing. It is beyond doubt that Heidegger saw a possibility here. So perhaps that is what we need to consider first: what is it about schematizing that primes it to be the foundation of ontology? Certainly in a Kantian context, it functions as the ultimate principle of unity for his system. It is only by means of schematizing that every level of Kantian ontology, from a mere element of a manifold up to the categories themselves, can be unified in the formation of a cognizable world. But this also places the imagination at the centre of Kant’s systematics, such that the structure of
Kantian ontology is effectively that of interpretative projection. At the same time, I have contended that the imagination in Kant and disclosedness in Heidegger are structurally analogical concepts: where the imagination is the faculty which facilitates the formation of transcendence, disclosedness is equally an *a priori* formative ability to project an interpretation of world. In parallel with this, schematizing as an activity – in relating the foundational sense of time to the categories, not to an Aristotelian now-point – signals a way of thinking *beyond presence*, just as ecstatic temporality takes up this possibility in a preliminary sense in relating Dasein’s temporality to its existentialia. Consequently, insofar as Heidegger has associated the meaning of being with the possibility of the transcendence of Dasein, on both the systematic and hermeneutic sides, schematizing seems to have the possibility to function as such a structural connector. The concept of a ‘schema’ itself – just the word, let alone its Kantian particularities – suggests the possibility of a formal elucidation of fundamental structures, where both Kant and Heidegger afford that foundational role to time. Perhaps, then, it is through the schematization of the ecstases, in setting out those formal structures for interpretation, which permits access to that structure which forms the horizon of being.

Providing such an account of ontological schematism, I have contended, is the key systematic question still open at the end of Division II. And in the final sections of *Basic Problems*, we see Heidegger begin to treat this problematic. He introduces the concept of *praesens*, which is his term for how *readiness-to-hand* is to be schematized. This undoubtedly constitutes something of a missing link: where Kant’s Schematism provides a temporal ontology of presence-at-hand, and Heidegger’s account of ecstatic temporality demonstrates Dasein’s own temporal grounding, it is notable that we have not yet considered the temporal grounding of the phenomenological/ontological stance that Dasein inhabits ‘proximally and for the most part’. To be sure, Heidegger introduces this question in §69(c) of *Being and Time*, but as we saw in Chapter 5, this appeared to have constituted a set of promissory notes yet to be cashed out. Consequently, the *praesens*-analysis picks up where §69(c) left off. However, this analysis alone (in treating only readiness-to-hand) will not provide a complete account of the

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5 *SZ*, 43/69.
temporality of being, since there are still other modes of being to be accounted for. How are nature, number, or art to be schematized, for example? And how can we understand the unity underlying the temporality of being? Still, given the centrality of readiness-to-hand to the account in Being and Time, such an account would be a significant development towards providing an account of transcendence.

Within this context, the first question to ask is how we should understand the role of a ‘schematism’ within the context of fundamental ontology specifically. What should a set of schemata contribute that is not already captured by existentialia or the ecstases themselves? In Kant, what motivated his Schematism was the question of applicability and unity: given the results of the Deduction, how can the categories constitute experience, despite their heterogeneity with intuition?6 And where, as I argued in the previous chapter, the quid juris sets out the (Kantian) question of transcendence, the Schematism completes the answer: the imagination has a constructive role to play in synthesizing and unifying disparate contents, and it is the projecting of that synthetic activity that constitutes the ‘world’ of the transcendental subject. But from the vantage point of the ready-to-hand, the heterogeneity of content does not appear to underlie Heidegger’s question of transcendence. Instead, the open question is precisely what §69(c) asks: “how is anything like the world in its unity with Dasein […] ontologically possible? In what way must the world be, if Dasein is to be able to exist as being-in-the-world?”7

Basic Problems also takes up this question, but Heidegger recontextualizes it. That is: if we are to explain the ‘ontological possibility’ of the unity of Dasein with its equipmental world – and Dasein’s transcendence upon that complex – then what is it that we are required to explain? Insofar the Worldhood chapter set out the relationality that constituted world and the significance that characterized it, in Basic Problems Heidegger clarifies that the relevant question of transcendence is to be specifically answered by providing an explanation of familiarity.8 We can see why this is the case: if we think back to I.3, the key phenomenological attribute of Dasein’s engagement with the world – indeed, that from

6 KrV A137-8/B176-7.
7 SZ, 364/415.
8 Ga24, 428/301.
which the analysis of worldhood began – was Dasein’s necessary *familiarity* with its world. *Prima facie*, we might think this is phenomenologically transparent: when going about my business, the world simply *is* familiar to me. I implicitly ‘know’ how to engage with it. But by virtue of its very familiarity, Heidegger had presupposed much in that one word, including all of the means by which world is *able* to be encountered as familiar. So, given that familiarity designates the transcendental background that makes purposiveness, understanding, and interpretation in the first place possible, to provide an explanation of familiarity *is* to provide an explanation of transcendence *vis-à-vis* the ready-to-hand. Where world itself is constituted by its significance – by an *interpretation* of world that Dasein projects – that interpretation is only possible by means of Dasein’s initial familiarity. Or as Heidegger ties together all these issues in *Basic Problems*:

“Transcendence is not instituted by an object coming together with a subject [...] instead, Dasein itself, as ‘being-a-subject’, transcends. Dasein as such is being-toward-itself, being-with-others, and being-amidst entities ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. In the structural moments of *toward-itself*, *with-others*, and *amidst-entities* there is implicit throughout the *character of overstepping*, of transcendence. We call the unity of these relations Dasein’s being-in, with the sense that Dasein possesses an original familiarity with itself, with others, and with entities [...] This familiarity is as such *familiarity in a world*.10

Consequently, significance, familiarity, and transcendence are intimately connected concepts in Heidegger. Where transcendence refers to the determinative relationship that Dasein’s interpretation of being has upon world, familiarity characterizes Dasein’s primary ontological relationship to world. In turn, significance itself is related to familiarity: as Heidegger says in I.3, “*Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their kind of being*.”11 Dasein can only engage with the world insofar as we are familiar with it, insofar

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9 *SZ*, 76/107.
10 *Ga24*, 428/301 (translation modified).
11 *Ibid.*, 87/120.
as we are already acquainted with its structural characteristics. In other words, there is a synthetic *a priori* relationship conjectured, and if we are to explain how Dasein is transcendent, we must first explain what makes its phenomenal ‘familiarity’ possible. This is the ‘original’ familiarity that Heidegger refers to.

But what can such familiarity consist in? As Golob stipulates, “familiarity cannot, on pain of regress, be a familiarity with any entity: instead, it must be a piece of ontological knowledge”. This follows in line with the ontological difference: familiarity is not a ‘cause’ bringing entities ‘into being’, instead, it “exemplifies the properties in terms of which we make sense of entities”. It is what we *a priori* presuppose so that significance is possible. And as we might expect, this is where schematism enters the picture: Dasein is ‘originally’ familiar with entities due to a familiarity with time. Consequently, the key aim of the praesens-analysis is to set out the interpretation of time that underlies ready-to-hand encounter, to explain how *Zeitlichkeit* is schematized into *Temporalität*, which is to say, to explain Dasein’s transcendence.

*(b) Praesens and Schema*

So, Heidegger’s first key claim regarding schematizing and the ready-to-hand is to clarify that what is to be explained is familiarity insofar as it makes ready-to-hand encounter possible. That familiarity is an *a priori* familiarity with time. Immediately, we can see the development beyond §69(c). When we treated that section, we noted that Heidegger to some extent appeared to simply recapitulate the directionality of the ecstases. But here, the aim instead appears to be to involve the process of schematizing explicitly within the account of equipmental relations that constitute world. If one wants to push the structural analogy between the first *Critique* and fundamental ontology further, this would appear to be a solid strategy. For where the general line of thought one finds in the Deduction is both modified and deepened by the Schematism – and Heidegger’s Division I account of worldhood stands in for the Deduction – claiming that

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15 cf. Chapter Four.
familiarity is only possible on the basis of horizontal-temporal schemata seems to almost be a direct translation of Kant.

However, despite this thematic congruity, Heidegger’s argument here is not without controversy. For although the promise of the analysis is to begin to treat the schematism of arguably the key mode of being in Heidegger, Golob ultimately describes the *praesens*-analysis as “from a philosophical perspective […] colossally disappointing”. I think we can show this assessment to be somewhat unfair: in this passage, we see Heidegger moving as far into the problematic of Division III as he ever goes. And although the account remains incomplete, Heidegger makes a number of essential clarifications. Moreover, I think we can make some defensible indications of our own to further develop the account, which will be the focus of the following section.

Nevertheless, the basic framework of the argument is as follows. Beginning from this notion that the central ontological question for worldhood is to provide an explanation of familiarity, Heidegger argues that the way entities are encountered as either ready-to-hand or unready-to-hand (and therefore as familiar or unfamiliar) is grounded in the ‘basic phenomenon’ of presence and absence. That is to say, an entity is ‘familiar’ insofar as it is available for purposive use. Within this context, Heidegger goes on to claim that presence-absence bears a relation to the ecstatic present, wherein the schema of this ‘basic phenomenon’ is *praesens*. Heidegger then clarifies that *praesens* is distinct from both the Aristotelian now-point and the ecstatic present itself. Instead, *praesens*-schema designates the horizon for the ecstatic present. And then Heidegger concludes, on the assumption that we can motivate analogous schematics for

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18 *Ibid.*, 434-5/306. (We should clarify that whilst Heidegger’s primary focus in the *praesens*-analysis concerns the ecstatic present, the two notions are not identical. As Heidegger says on the same page, “corresponding remarks [will also] apply to the other two ecstases, future and past”, but in the context of his lecture, “in order not to confuse unduly our vision of the phenomena of temporality, which moreover are themselves so hard to grasp, we shall restrict ourselves to the explication of the present and its ecstatic horizon, *praesens*”. In fact, we will see that Heidegger does also provide some convincing suggestions of how past and future will figure in his account).
the past and future: “accordingly, we understand being from the original horizontal schema of the ecstases of temporality”.

How should we understand this basic argument? If that were all Heidegger said, we could see why Golob might argue it is ‘disappointing’: “‘praesens’ is left so unspecified as to be more a label for the gap in Heidegger’s argument than the completion of it”. At first blush, præsens appears to simply be the name for our explanandum, not the exposition of a schematism that we were promised. Moreover, we might question Heidegger’s claim that readiness-to-hand is grounded in presence/absence, particularly given his use of the German term ‘Anwesenheit’, which is a key attribute of presence-at-hand. Thinking back again to I.3, what was ontologically characteristic of readiness-to-hand was that equipmental relations were instituted on the basis of a given entity’s appropriateness-for-x, i.e., in contradistinction to the categorial structure of presence-at-hand. So, if an entity is a Zuhandene, should this not imply that it cannot be anwesende? For the Anwesenheit of an entity was precisely the nature of its encounter when one takes a theorizing stance, i.e., when its ‘handiness’ has been levelled-off and the entity is considered as substance. But now that Heidegger is treating the schematism of readiness-to-hand, this essential ontological distinction appears to have been contravened. Given how essential this distinction is, I believe we can rule out this being some oversight on Heidegger’s part. So, what is Heidegger saying about ‘presence’ in this context?

Firstly, we should remember that terminological distinctions in Heidegger are almost always significant. Despite the use of Anwesenheit, the parallel designation of ‘praesens’ indicates that Heidegger wants to provide a differing sense of ‘presence’ within the context of readiness-to-hand. As he says, “‘praesens is a more original phenomenon than the now”, and we see Heidegger we see Heidegger latch onto this systematically with the claim that praesens is the horizon for the ecstatic present. Consequently, praesens (as schematic) is similarly distinct from ecstasis. And in the ecstatic present, where Dasein is amidst entities, we are already thinking beyond Anwesenheit or the Aristotelian now-point. Rather than determinate locatability on an ‘objective’ timeline, the ‘being-amidst’ that

20 Ibid., 436/307.
22 Ga24 435/306.
characterizes the ecstatic present designates the *continuing* character of the particular activity, the *absorption* within the given task, the *focus* (or lack thereof) that qualitatively infects one’s intentionality. But as Heidegger says in §69(c), “ecstasies are not simply raptures in which one gets carried away. Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a ‘whither’ to which one is carried away. This ‘whither’ of the ecstasis we call the ‘horizonal schema’”.

Consequently, if a ‘continuing absorption’ characterizes how Dasein gets phenomenally ‘carried away’ in the ecstatic present, then *praesens* refers to its ‘whither’. Which requires us to ask: insofar as *praesens* constitutes such an horizon, what is presupposed *a priori* that would suffice to inaugurate Dasein’s presential absorption as such?

What is still left open, therefore, is the precise nature of this ‘whither’. Instead, Heidegger begins the argument by setting out the formal, systematic relationships between the varying senses of ‘presence’ he now has at play. *Anwesenheit*, the now-point, the ecstatic present, and *praesens* all signify a mode of time in subtly distinct ways. In Division II, we already saw that the ‘levelling-off’ of ordinary time entails that the ecstatic present is ontologically prior to ‘the now’. But now that we are considering the *horizon for* the ecstatic present, the initial answer we receive is *structural*: the ecstatic present is grounded in the ‘basic phenomenon’ of presence and absence, and Heidegger calls that ‘basic phenomenon’ *praesens*. In other words, Dasein is familiar with the continuing character of its ready-to-hand activity due to its familiarity with the *foundational sense* of ‘the present’. The ‘basic phenomenon’ of presence and absence is the underlying *schema* (or set of schemata) which comprise the condition(s) for the possibility of Dasein’s familiarity with entities. So what, then, is this foundational meaning that ‘*praesens*’ designates?

Fortunately, Heidegger develops the substance of this account further. In doing so, he references the broader structural question and explicitly links the familiarity that is to be explained with temporality in general:

“Original familiarity with entities lies in *dealing with them* appropriately. This commerce constitutes itself with respect to its temporality in a

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23 *SZ*, 365/416.
The first sentence restates our explanandum, i.e., the phenomenon that is to be explained. We deal with entities appropriately. In I.3, we took that for granted. Indeed, phenomenologically, we always take that for granted when dealing with entities ready-to-hand. But the key question for a fundamental-ontological schematism is what enables that possibility. Initially, Heidegger simply named the way he would explain this: familiarity is grounded in praesens. But here, we get an indication of how praesens figures in Heidegger’s account of schematism more substantively: familiarity is constituted by a ‘retentive-expectant enpresenting’. We are ‘originally familiar’ with entities due to this interpretation of time. So, what do ‘retention’, ‘expectation’, and ‘enpresenting’ signify within this context? Firstly, we can note that, despite the initial suggestions of the terminology, the praesens-analysis does not only cover ‘the’ present. Instead, “the ecstasis of the present is the controlling ecstasis in the temporality of commerce with the ready-to-hand”, whilst past and future (retention and expectation) are also structurally constitutive. Consequently, there is a second question this passage introduces: how do we understand the unity of time that underlies ready-to-hand encounter? If retention, expectation, and enpresenting designate the schematic rendering of the ecstases, how do we understand their constituting functions upon Dasein’s intentionality as essentially combined?

Let’s focus in on this notion of the ecstatic present as the ‘controlling ecstasis’. I think we can see why Heidegger would argue this: since we have seen that Dasein’s activity within an equipmental totality (as with the artisan and the hammer) is a sinking-into that activity, with artisan and hammer fading away into the ongoing totality, it is this very ‘sinking-into’ that qualitatively marks out ready-to-hand encounter. At the same time, the links of the in-order-to’s and towards-which’s (and finally, the for-the-sake-of-which) bear a clear directionality towards the future, as the factical context within which Dasein and equipment already are bears a relation to the ecstatic past. But in, e.g., the doing of the hammering itself, Dasein is ‘in the present’: the ‘sinking-into-the-task’ phenomenally.

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24 Ga24, 432/304 (translation modified).
25 Ibid., 438/308 (my emphasis).
characterizes the present character of the relevant intentionality, even whilst it does not take on the (ontologically inappropriate) present characteristic of determinate locatability on a timeline. In the ecstatic present, Dasein is consumed by its activity, and this does not correlate with some measurable quantum. Instead, this sense of presence designates a phenomenal character, the recognizable quality of an ongoing task that the activity takes up. This sense of ‘the present’ does not refer to the bare persistence of ‘objects’; rather, it emphasizes the continuing character of the equipmental task, and it brings to the forefront the relational totality appropriate for it.

However, whilst that would explain the ‘controlling’ role of the ecstatic present, I do not believe that the above is sufficient alone to explain praesens as a schematizing of ecstasis. Instead, it remains a clarification of the phenomenology: in equipmental dealings, we sink-into the ecstatic present, whilst the factical past and intended future bring their own contributions to our immediate, situational intentionality. ‘Enpresenting’ has a priority, but what is yet to be explained is how the above phenomenology of time is enabled by a schematism of ecstasis. As Heidegger affirms, “at the basis of […] our commerce with things, there lies a peculiar temporality which makes it possible to take a ready-to-hand equipmental contexture in such a way that we lose ourselves in it”.26 This ‘peculiar temporality’ is the distinction of Zeitlichkeit from Temporalität, i.e., Dasein’s temporality vs. its transcendent horizon. But at the same time, Heidegger appears to retreat from describing this ‘peculiar temporality’, for after asserting that “readiness-to-hand formally implies praesens”, he claims that “without complete mastery of the phenomenological method and above all without security of procedure in this problem area, the understanding of the temporal interpretation continually runs into difficulties”.27

And Heidegger does not explain those difficulties per se. Instead, Heidegger shifts to “[procuring] indirectly at least an idea of how a wealth of complex structures is implicit in the content of the praesens belonging to readiness-to-hand”.28 That is to say, he further clarifies the problematic, rather than treating the schemata themselves. This takes the form of focusing instead on the

26 Ibid., 438/309.
27 Ibid., 438/309.
28 Ibid., 438/309.
notion of absence and unreadiness-to-hand included in the initial rendering of the argument. Specifically, Heidegger argues that conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy do not cancel out the enpresenting of *praesens*, rather, as unready-to-hand, they represent “an un-enpresenting as a specific mode of the present in unity with an expecting and retaining of something available”.29 This is congruent with what Heidegger has established so far: unreadiness-to-hand is not equivalent to pure presence-at-hand, rather, it is a modification of readiness-to-hand that announces the possibility of pure presence.30 In the unready-to-hand, Dasein’s orientation remains equipmental, even if it is its deficient mode. Consequently, insofar as Heidegger has asserted that equipmentality is grounded in the enpresenting of *praesens*, it would follow that unreadiness-to-hand would be constituted accordingly. But what is still left open is what exactly this ‘enpresenting’ consists in.

In the end, Heidegger does not explicitly set this out. As with *Being and Time*, the text of *Basic Problems* ends before Heidegger goes on to resolve the ‘difficulties’ he intimated. But this is not to say the attempt is unsuccessful. In this section, I have tried to show that each step of argument Heidegger does set out has a sound basis. By tying transcendence to familiarity, Heidegger makes an essential clarification of our subject-matter. And with this notion of a ‘retentive-expectant enpresenting’, he does provide us with a rubric through which to structure our answer. Moreover, he makes the *Zeitlichkeit* of readiness-to-hand explicit, even whilst he does not explain the horizonal *Temporalität* that renders it possible. The question that remains, therefore, is how to interpret this ‘retentive-expectant enpresenting’ as the horizonal schemata for our equipmental world.

Such an interpretation is what I now intend to offer. With much of the argument already completed by Heidegger, can we apply the comparative analysis of Kant and Heidegger that I have undertaken to provide a missing link? That is: insofar as Kantian schematism mobilizes the imagination as the essential connector, to what extent can we reach a conception of *praesens* from Dasein’s disclosedness? And if we can come to such a conception, how does that affect our understanding of the *Being and Time* project overall?

30 See Chapter 4.
3. Schematizing Readiness-to-Hand

At this juncture, we can now begin to answer the question: how are we to proceed into the schematism itself? Our aim continues to be to understand the structural relationship between transcendence and familiarity. But where Heidegger’s focus in the extant sections of Basic Problems centres around familiarity and the immediate Zeitlichkeit of equipmental relations, I propose that we now consider a further aspect: the ‘outside-of-itself’ that constitutes ecstasis as a component of Dasein’s transcendence. We saw in Chapter Five that the ecstases are structures of pure directionality, which disclose Dasein’s own being as essentially a mode of becoming. The structure of Dasein’s self-understanding, after all, is a projection upon possibilities, which is to say, Dasein always has certain abilities-to-be rooted in an underlying for-the-sake-of-which, which functions as a rock bottom orientational principle towards those possibilities. But this is not the whole story. For at the same time, the finitude of Dasein further indicates that such possibilities are never entirely fulfillable. To-be-Dasein is always a coming-to-be: it is constituted by a futural projection that directs Dasein’s intentionality and is that by means of which the world shows up in a meaningful relationality. But if that is the case, then I contend we have a further aspect to a Heideggerian explanation of transcendence. For if Dasein’s projectedness is formative upon both its own being and the structure of world, then we ought to be able to say that the disclosure of Dasein’s being already presupposes the disclosure of world. By which I mean: the disclosure of world originates from Dasein’s self-understanding, precisely because Dasein’s own possibilities must be phenomenologically manifested within-the-world. In other words, such possibilities could not be manifested without the world already having been constituted a priori.

What one would equally want to say, then, on the ontological level, is that insofar as ecstatic temporality constitutes the structure of Dasein’s unified being – and Dasein’s being as such presupposes the constitution of world – is that the very directionality which constitutes world itself is already contained within this structure. If Dasein cannot be transcendentally disclosed without presupposing world, then the structure of world (and the familiarity that enables it) must be explicable from Dasein’s transcendental structures. This is the point

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31 SZ, 145/184-5.
Heidegger reaches in the *praensens*-analysis: ‘retention’, ‘expectation’, and ‘en-presenting’ as terms stand in for how the ecstases are to be related to world within the context of readiness-to-hand. If ecstatic temporality characterizes Dasein’s essential ‘self’-temporality, then *praesens* designates an essential shift in context, i.e., from Dasein *to world*.

We should note that this question aligns with Kantian schematism, for we are essentially asking how the ecstases apply to readiness-to-hand. How can ecstatic – the foundational activity of Dasein – be made ‘homogeneous’ with the wider equipmental context within which Dasein proximally exists? In Kant, the crucial connector that enabled categorial applicability was the imagination. As Makkreel says, “the imagination provides the *directions* that can give the pure concepts of substance and causality their objective meaning. It does so by *modulating from the medium of thought to the medium of sense*”. And where the key interpretative claim of this thesis has been that there is an essential structural analogy between Kantian imagination and Heideggerian disclosedness, I argue that it reappears here. That is, if *praesens* designates the schematized interpretation of time for readiness-to-hand, then what Heidegger wants to say through this is that Dasein is *able*-to-disclose by virtue of its familiarity with the transcendental context that inaugurates world, and that familiarity comprises a schematization of ecstasis. If the Heideggerian question of transcendence is framed in terms of providing an explanation of familiarity, then what we are equally explaining is one mode of how Dasein discloses.

Therefore, in developing the concept of *praesens* further, what should guide our analysis is *what* exactly Dasein is taken to disclose. As we have seen, Dasein discloses an interpretation of being. This is our first shift away from the precise letter of Kant: unlike categories, interpretations are not fixed. Interpretations vary: between different Daseins, across histories and geographies. This is not to say interpretation is entirely unbounded: we can be led into misinterpretations and even a lack of significance. But at the same time, given our explanandum and the ways in which Heidegger also thinks beyond Kant, this apparent variability in interpretations needs to be structurally accounted for.

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Kant, the relevant ‘interpretation’ of time – I am using the term loosely – is already baked into the relevant schema: persistence is the temporal ‘interpretation’ of substance, so to speak. But in Heidegger, time is the hermeneutic key that unlocks possible interpretation. Time is the hermeneutic context for ontological interpretation. Consequently, I would argue that the ‘directions’ praeens ought to provide are not formalized specifications of time in the way Kant sets out. Instead – and in line also with Heidegger’s throughgoing objection to the notion that the meaning of being could be captured propositionally – I argue that transcendental-ontological conditions (and in particular, schemata) must be considered enabling conditions for interpretation. They do not set out what the interpretation ‘is’, but instead structure the extent and limits for possible interpretation. Kant once described his project in the first Critique as a “metaphysics of metaphysics”\(^3\), by which he called attention to the way in which the methodological aim of the critical project is not to set out ‘the most basic entity’ à la Leibnizian monads or Spinozist substance. Instead, Kant’s question is oriented towards the possibility of metaphysics. Under fundamental ontology, therefore, to the extent that it pushes even further than Kant ever did in emphasizing the phenomenological situatedness of Dasein, this general strategy shifts to become an interpretation of interpretation. That is, insofar as ecstatic temporality signifies the temporal modes through which Dasein’s own life becomes interpretable, in now shifting to the equipmental context within which it proximally lives, schematism is in turn reoriented towards the way in which we interpret, the structures by means of which interpretation is possible as such.

So, what are those transcendental structures? If we think this through systematically, we have in place three key developments of the most foundational conditions in Heidegger, each corresponding to (what would have been) the three Divisions. Firstly, existentiality, facticity, and falling are revealed to have been the basic phenomenal characteristics of Dasein’s existentialia as care, which are then revealed on the second level to have their ‘ontological meaning’ as ecstatic. But now, in broadening out to the structures for the interpretation of world as such, we find that the ecstases (in shifting from Zeitlichkeit to

\(^3\) C, 10:269.
Temporalität signal the schematic unity of retention, expectance, and enpresenting. This is how I intend to interpret each component:

(1) Retention, in linking back to the existentiale of facticity, is the temporal interpretation (or schema) of constituting as such.

(2) Expectance, in connection with existentiality, is the schema of projecting as such.

(3) Enpresenting, in connection with falling, is the schema of emerging as such.

To put it somewhat crudely: world emerges insofar as it is constituted by a projecting. It is by understanding the temporal meaning of these concepts that we can understand how Dasein discloses ready-to-hand, thus how the structure of world is inaugurated through time, and in turn, the extent and limits of possible interpretation within that context. Similarly, from the angle of Basic Problems, we can take the following analysis to be what I take Dasein to be a priori familiar with insofar as Heidegger set out the notion of a retentive-expectant enpresenting as our rubric. And in the unity of these schemata, I will argue that we find the temporal modes of transcendence itself, through which a mode of ontological disclosure is enabled and the horizon for the being of readiness-to-hand is formed.

But how can we fill out this interpretation? With this in mind, I will first consider each schema in greater detail towards arguing for the veracity of my interpretation.34

So firstly, retention – insofar as its past-directedness connects us to Dasein’s facticity and the ways in which it has already been determined – requires us to clarify the transcendental constitution of Dasein’s existential situation. This is to say, now regarding the transcendence of ontological interpretation: what is the structure of the starting point from which interpretation is first possible?

34 To make my methodology entirely transparent: my basic aim is to account for the root-level phenomenology of Dasein insofar as it is uniquely able to have an understanding of being, that is, vis-à-vis its transcendence as world-forming. And where Kant shifts from the categories to their temporalization, here, we shift from the existentialia to the schematized ecstases. This is because the existentialia set out the phenomenal characteristics which necessitate an understanding of being given Dasein’s finitude. Therefore, the existentialia function as requirements that need to be satisfied for any such understanding interpretation. In turn, the schemata have to measure up to them.
Insofar as Dasein is thrown into the world as a transcendental presupposition for its own being, what must first be presupposed so that Dasein is able-to-be-thrown as such, that is, ‘before’ (in the sense of a priori) concrete interpretation takes place? Thus, I argue, why I take retention to be the temporalization of the ontological concept of constituting to be thrown into the world presupposes an ontological contexture which has the phenomenal character of ‘what the world has already been composed as’. To be thrown (and then to project from this thrownness) presupposes a past-directedness which makes possible the emerging (of-the-world) from which phenomenological encounter is in the first place possible. In other words, Dasein’s thrownness presupposes an a priori understandability which is always already available to Dasein at the outset of activity.

With this, we find our first connection to the underlying temporal structure of familiarity. Factual retention brings out how entities must be so constituted so that our phenomenal familiarity with our world is possible. But what is it that Dasein ‘retains’? Insofar as Dasein is thrown into a world of familiar significations, I contend that retention indicates the historical essence of past-directed meaning. That is to say, the world is firstly ‘familiar’ to Dasein insofar as given entities have already been interpreted in such a way: the hammer, e.g., is encountered as given appropriate equipment because there is a history to its appropriateness-relations, i.e., to the concrete ways Dasein has dealt with it. Now, regarding a single hammer – indeed, regarding the being of most individual entities – there will perhaps only be a limited ‘history’ of possible interpretations. But when one considers the totality of entities in the context of readiness-to-hand as such, we find that what is presupposed for all encounter in our personally contingent, ‘timely’, thrown being-in-the-world is not necessarily some rarefied history of academic metaphysics. Instead, what is transcendently presupposed is the sedimentation of all the modes through which being has actually been dealt with, as that which sits behind and informs a priori not just ‘interpretation’, but encounter itself. Facticity and thrownness, therefore, are temporalized as an a priori constituting which historically discloses the world, as the condition of the possibility for Dasein’s existential situation.

But equally: if Dasein’s existential situation is informed by the factual-retentive context into which it is thrown, then on the opposing side (and as the care structure has already made clear) one finds the expectant-projection that
characterizes ontological interpretation itself. Here, I want to expand upon Heidegger’s claim in §69(c) that “the schema in which Dasein comes towards itself futurally, whether authentically or inauthentically, is the ‘for-the-sake-of-itself’”. We have already noted that the for-the-sake-of-which ontologically characterizes the futurity of ready-to-hand encounter. But considered prima facie, the for-the-sake-of-which is not transparently a mode of transcendence. Instead, as that which Dasein is foundationally intending towards, it is the implicit organizing principle of Dasein’s life, which is to say, it is to some extent an internal phenomenon. It signifies how Dasein situates itself within-the-world since, as the foundational ‘intention’, it directs its activity. But the for-the-sake-of-which alone is essentially a projection of Dasein itself, so how can the concept connect up to the expectance that inaugurates its transcendent relationship to readiness-to-hand?

To answer that, we should return to the relational structure of world as exposited in I.3. The for-the-sake-of-which is the final link in the chain: it ties together the in-order-to’s and towards-which’s that holistically constitute some particular equipmental totality by providing them with a unifying ground. And by implicitly bring together such relationalities, its own futural characteristics inform the character of equipmental relations, which is to say, the relationality of world is related by expectances. That is to say: if the artisan hammers nails into wood, in-order-to create a chair, towards selling it at their shop, for-the-sake-of their underlying self-conception as ‘an artisan’, then what we find at each level of equipmental relationships is that, together, they form a chain of expectances. To link this back to §69(c): if ecstatic futurity is defined by the ‘rapture’ of the for-the-sake-of-itself that Dasein is ‘carried away’ in pursuing, such pursuit in turn depends upon world having the structure to enable it. The ‘whither’ of the ecstasis, therefore, is expectance as the mode of futural interpretation inherent to the inauguration of a particular equipmental totality. For whilst we have seen that equipment ‘announces itself’ as appropriate or inappropriate for a particular equipmental totality, at the root level what determines the signifiability of equipment as such is the for-the-sake-of-itself. Insofar as it determines how Dasein

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35 SZ, 416/365.
navigates the world, the for-the-sake-of-itself moreover determines the herme-
neutic context for the interpretation of world by any particular Dasein.

Consequently, what is projected is not just Dasein itself, because what is
already presupposed thereby is its interpretation of world, projected alongside it. In-
deed, I would contend that the ontological character of futurity is the projecting
of such an horizontal disclosure, an expectance that self and world cohere. That is
to say, insofar as the for-the-sake-of-itself is a ‘self’-projection, but Dasein’s ‘self’
is essentially in-the-world, the for-the-sake-of-itself transcends by forming an interpretable
world, one which transmits a readily available phenomenological charac-
ter. And in Dasein’s implicit grasping of world, this projection manifests its inter-
pretation of being.

So, where factical-retention historically discloses the existential context
into which Dasein is thrown, and expectant-projection horizonally discloses
world as an interpretable totality, the synthetic unity of these schemata enables
the emerging of world as such. From the side of retention, what Dasein is ‘thrown
into’ is a continuing enpresenting wherein entities are firstly immediately available.
Constituting implies emerging: not that the world is about to (or has) emerge(d),
but the schema of the emerging itself; the thoroughgoing continuance of the
coming-to-be of world wherein entities are encountered. And from the side of ex-
pectance, where projection is always running ahead of itself (since Dasein is al-
ways a coming-to-be), such projection is in turn mediated through what Dasein
immediately encounters. As an existentiale of Dasein in Division I, Heidegger
calls this ‘falling’ – which is then contrasted with the ‘resoluteness’ of ‘authentic’
Dasein in Division II – but I want to focus more explicitly on its phenomenology
as being-amidst entities and the continuity of the presencing of entities within-the-
world. That is to say, insofar as Dasein’s dealings in-the-world find their first
essential phenomenal character on the basis of this prior thrownness, Dasein’s
involvement in-the-world – as a being-in-the-moment (regarding whatever is available)
– is constituted on the basis of an a priori emerging which makes entities available
as such and encounterable as such. Dasein is always already amidst a continuing
world a priori, as a qualitative presupposition of its phenomenology. This is a cru-
ucial point Beistegui highlights regarding ecstatic temporality: in Heidegger’s dis-
mantling of the prioritization of the ‘now’, what it means to be in the present no
longer refers to a nexus point from which we find an objectively present ‘before’
and ‘after’. Instead, the phenomenological present is an unmeasurable continuity which sets out the felt texture of whatever is at-hand.\textsuperscript{36} But ontologically, then, considering the transcendental condition for such encounter: in the fluctuation of this midstness, this continuity, one finds the coming-to-be of world itself, the emerging of significations through encounter.\textsuperscript{37}

Thus why this is an enpresenting, and not bare presence: retention and expectance modify the immediate disclosure of world. In linking back to historicality and towards projectedness, enpresenting discloses our immediate world as familiar, but not as fixed. Consequently, enpresenting designates how (akin to Dasein itself) world is always a coming-to-be: it is a hermeneutic totality that emerges alongside and in unity with Dasein’s self-understanding. Thus ‘en-presenting’, as the schema of the ‘controlling ecstatic’ of the complex, foundational expresses this dynamism to world’s character: world is the site of the unfolding of meaning, but this is not a process that ‘ends’. Rather, insofar as world itself is a coming-to-be, what we find at the root of ontological schematism is a formal hermeneutic of becoming.

\textit{Praesens}, therefore, as a ‘retentive-expectant enpresenting’ ultimately designates the unity of three schemata: the structure of world is made possible through the \textit{historical disclosure} of factical-retention, the \textit{horizontal disclosure} of expectant-projecting, and the \textit{immediate disclosure} of emerging-enpresenting. Each schema is able to disclose a certain ontological aspect insofar as it manifests a generalizable phenomenal character which directs Dasein’s intentionality. In these terms, the schemata are \textit{a priori} orientational structures. So firstly, this a modification of Kant: the schemata here are not ‘temporalized categories’ which enumerate a pre-determined set of concepts which dictate meaning. Instead, the contribution of phenomenology is to reconceive this basic ontological level away from such dictating and instead towards the structures which \textit{enable} comportment, that is, in terms of what is necessarily presupposed \textit{a priori} for any particular Dasein’s hermeneutic transcendence. At the same time, it is a further development of Heidegger’s thinking insofar as it brings together and extends the accounts of schematism set out in §69(c) of \textit{Being and Time} and the \textit{praeens}-analysis. World is constituted, I have wanted to confirm, through a \textit{synthetic} process;

\textsuperscript{36} Beistegüi, \textit{The New Heidegger}, 78.

\textsuperscript{37} This is where I take my analysis to extend beyond the ecstatic present as \textit{Zeitlichkeit}. 
that is, through the historical, the immediate, and the for-the-sake-of-itself as the overarching horizon insofar as the unity of their relevant temporal aspects demonstrates the modes through which Dasein is able to go ‘beyond itself’, i.e., to determine world. Schematic temporalizing designates the temporal modes of transcendence itself: where Dasein is transcendentally determined by a futural projecting which necessitates its ‘going beyond’ itself a priori, the formation of world through praesens is equally a product of this process. Dasein and world are co-disclosed through this synthetic unity, that is, insofar as their respective ontological characters are only individuated on the basis of a linked interpretation of time which brings together the ‘matter’ of Dasein-in-the-world and entities-within-the-world with the ‘formal’ temporal structures which co-determine them as such. All of which is to say: the essence of transcendental ontology is founded in schematization, that is, through the disclosure of a horizon through which interpretability is first made possible. And what we find at the root of world, I contend, is an essential coming-to-be. In turn, its attendant schematism ultimately leads us to a formal hermeneutic of becoming.

Of course, in the above, we do not stray particularly far from the extant letter of Heidegger’s account. Rather, as we saw Makkreel set out in Kant, schematism concerns ‘modulation’; that is to say, a shift in context, or an extending of some extant concept to some previously unthought domain. Consequently, what I have tried to show is that there is a consistent mapping from existentiale to ecstasis to schema, each with increasing primordiality. Dasein transcends factically, for example, through what it retains, through what is preserved a priori for world to emerge as an enpresenting, upon which Dasein projects. In the distinction of Zeitlichkeit from Temporalität, I have contended that we take the central problematic of Division II from the other side. Rather than asking about Dasein’s temporality, we have asked, “in what way must the world be, if Dasein is to be able to exist as being-in-the-world?”.

Or, as Heidegger says in Basic Problems:

“Zeitlichkeit in general is ecstatic-horizontal self-projection simply as such, on the basis of which Dasein’s transcendence is possible. Rooted in this

38 SZ, 365/415.
transcendence is Dasein’s basic constitution, being-in-the-world, or care, which in turn makes intentionality possible”. 39

Here, in focusing on Temporalität in relation to world, my aim has been to set out the schematic-horizontal projection (towards world) that defines Dasein’s transcendence, and thus to fill in the missing link. I have emphasized the hermeneutic aspects of Heideggerian schematism, and connected them to an essential becoming that I take to characterize world ontologically. But what would such an interpretation imply for how we understand Heidegger’s project more broadly? In the final section of this thesis, I now want to consider and defend the philosophical implications of the above account: what does the above imply for how we understand the interrelated concepts of being, becoming, and time in Heidegger?

4. The Question of Being Reconsidered

Let’s return to the first page of Being and Time, where Heidegger set out that his aim therein was to “work out the question of the meaning of being and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of being”. 40 To what extent does the schematism conjectured above cohere with this aim? I argue in the first instance that we now have a much clearer sense of the systematic side of the problematic: we can see that what underpins fundamental ontology as a systematic programme is the transcendental movement from existentiale to ecstasis to schema. In these interconnected sets of concepts, each gives prominence to a distinct aspect on the way to the meaning of being, each with increasing primordiality. Firstly, the existentiale serve to clarify the being of Dasein insofar as it is uniquely the ontological entity, where the unity of existentiality, facticity, and falling as care expresses what must be presupposed a priori regarding Dasein’s comportment so that it is able to have an understanding of being. The ecstases, by contrast, reveal the temporal essence of care: the structure of care itself is shown to take on a determinate form as temporal by virtue of the fact that Dasein is finite being-in-the-world. And finally, schematism explicitly sets out the transcendence already presupposed

39 Ga24, 444/312.
40 SZ, 1/19.
by Dasein’s ecstatic temporalizing. That is, schematism draws focus to the rela-
tionality already presupposed in Dasein’s being as being-in-the-world and eluci-
dates the directionality implicit in Dasein’s transcendental structures, which
themselves make possible the individuation of world. In other words, schema-
tizing constitutes horizontality through (in our context) its co-determining
Dasein and world as a unity. In that sense, therefore, schematizing constitutes the
ground of being insofar as it individuates the horizon through which ontological
interpretation is first possible.41

But still, it is crucial that Heidegger’s full locution from the outset is the
question of the meaning of being. Accordingly, whilst schematism does reveal that
there are a set of general transcendental frameworks which regulate with neces-
sity the structure of ontological interpretation (even whilst any particular Dasein
is in all other senses radically contingent), we equally need to ask why Heidegger
thought to build this systematic edifice. What did Heidegger want to say about
being, in the end? I do not mean by this that we ought to impose any particular
interpretation onto being, as if that concept could be reified into some ‘eternal
essence’. As we have noted, variability is intrinsic to interpretation. But what is
worth consideration again, especially now that we are reaching the end of this
study, is being as a unique concept and what it means to speak about ‘its meaning’
within the context of schematism. What is the meaning of being? And why is it, now
that we are working towards the foundations of ontology, schematism reveals
that the meaning of being must be expressed not only in terms of hermeneutics,
but crucially also becoming?

With this in mind, my aim in these final sections is to deal with the con-
sequences of the above schematism, alongside aiming to defend my interpreta-
tion of Heidegger. As I see it, there are three central questions. The first two aim
to treat the two sides of the ‘result’ of the schematism, namely, how it is that
being can be understood in terms of hermeneutics, and relatedly, how it is that
interpretation and meaning connect to being. Secondly, how should we treat the
tension one might point to insofar as being is crucially understood in terms of

41 In the preceding, we considered one of mode of this, i.e., schematizing within the context of
readiness-to-hand. The more foundational question, that is still open, is how to express the unity
of schematic time across the modes of being, and thus to express the horizon for being as a
totality.
becoming? But there are equally grounds to reconsider the question of the ontology of time within this: what substantively is the conception of time which underlies this account?

(a) Being, Meaning, and Interpretation

Perhaps the claim that the meaning of being is a question of hermeneutics is the least contentious, for it has already been shown that an essential development in phenomenology that Heidegger made beyond Husserl was by replacing Husserl’s naïve reliance on ‘description’ with interpretative methods. This is precisely what the early Heidegger included in his conception of aletheia: the relationship of phenomenological encounter to its ‘truth’ is an unconcealing. That is, encounter involves the availability of a ‘sign’ that needs to be ‘interpreted’ under the terms of the meaningful whole to which it is a part. Worldhood itself, as we have seen, is the root structure of signifying, as what it means for Dasein to be-in-the-world is to play an essential role in the active individuation of its meaning. In so doing, Dasein projects an interpretation which determines world under a definite mode. Within this context, then, schematic time forms a particular horizon insofar as it constitutes the framework for interpretation. However, I equally want to specify this relationship between being and interpretation in greater detail. For whilst the above schematism undoubtedly posits an extremely close relationship, I want to clarify that my aim is not to assent to a view such as Sheehan’s or Dreyfus’s, where the question of being is essentially reducible or equivalent to the question of meaning or intelligibility. Sheehan in particular radically rejects Heidegger’s use of the term ‘being’ as outright misleading, because he recognizes the origin of the term in “a pre-phenomenological metaphysics of objective realism”. Consequently, he charges Heidegger with underplaying the extent to which his phenomenological reorientation centres his inquiry uniquely on the question of the source of meaning. Sheehan takes the function

42 cf. Chapter 1.
43 cf. Chapter 2.
45 Sheehan, ‘The Turn’, 83.
46 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger, 10.
of the transcendental in Heidegger’s early project to merely be a framework ori-
ented towards the question of “what makes intelligibility possible”, given this
purported reducibility of the previous ‘metaphysical’ domain to the new ‘phe-
omenological’ one.

And one could see how my account above might be amenable to such a
position, if it is also taken that the scope of the schemata’s possible disclosedness
ranged only over the context of Dasein’s understanding. And yet, whilst it goes
without saying that:

(1) Heidegger’s project aims to parse the concept of being under a different
rubric than the terms of traditional metaphysics, and that…

(2) Heidegger’s phenomenological reorientation necessarily implicates the
concept of being in an essential relationship to meaning and intelligibil-
ity…

I am nevertheless inclined to agree with Capobianco’s assessment that “a
Seinsvergessenheit is settling in anew – and in Heidegger studies of all places”, if
the question of being is overlooked or otherwise replaced by the question of the
source of meaning alone. Heidegger’s question is not the question of seeing
whether we can consider being simply ‘as meaning’, rather, it is the question of
the meaning of it. A different relationship is already implied in Heidegger’s word-
ing. But how, then, can we think that? What is the concept of being which un-
derlies fundamental ontology, even if fundamental ontology itself entails a nec-
essary relation to the hermeneutic?

In this problematic, we effectively find two sides: firstly, there is the
question of interpreting Heidegger. On this axis, I do want to claim that
Heidegger was concerned with being in a substantive sense, and not simply as a
proxy for the question of meaning. But equally, given our current context, this
answer now has to be informed by the question of the scope of ontological
schematism. Having set out schematism in relation to readiness-to-hand, what I
hope the above will enable us to understand is that Dasein’s transcendence is

47 Ibid., 133.

48 Richard Capobianco, ‘Reaffirming “The Truth of Being”’, Continental Philosophy Review 47
(2014), 276.
not limited ‘only’ to its own understanding, but that the very point of schematizing is to show the way in which Dasein’s transcendence is ontologically determinative. For what is unique about the transcendental function of schematism is that it is not simply the case that Dasein’s projecting ‘only’ reveals entities under a certain ‘intelligibility’. That term does not in and of itself suggest any particular access to ‘being’, but instead only a kind of epistemic comportment. Beyond simple intelligibility, then, the point is that ontological schematism resolutely determines entities, by means of its individuation of world, as regards their being.

Heidegger is neither a pragmatist nor a kind of ‘continental’ Wittgensteinian, for firstly, as the Division I account of worldhood has already shown, readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand are not simply epistemic comportments of Dasein that can be subsumed under previous distinctions of ‘know-how’ and ‘know-that’. Rather, they are properly modes of being precisely because the relational context of the ‘worlds’ within which they are encountered have crucially distinct intentional structures, which in turn modifies their ontological structures (i.e., appropriateness-relations vs. categoriality). But beyond this, the substantive reason that fundamental ontology presupposes a search for the most foundational conditions – i.e., from existentiale to ecstasis to schema – is because the question of transcendence does not only ask how the world is ‘understandable’ or ‘meaningful’, even whilst being able to explain that is one definite consequence. Fundamentally, temporal schemata are found at the root of the question of transcendence and are posited as a priori precisely because they determine world itself, because they are not only structures ‘for’ understanding the world, but are instead essential to the formation of world insofar as it is manifested as an encounterable totality for Dasein.

To flesh this out: world is ‘formed’ not only through the enpresenting that Dasein is amidst, but also from futural projection. Whilst enpresenting is the controlling schema within the context of a particular equipmental totality, projection comes to the forefront regarding ontological interpretation as such. It is moreover through projection that schematism (1) remains within an essentially hermeneutic paradigm, and yet (2) also maintains a determinative function regarding the horizon for the individuation of world. The individuation of

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49 This isn’t to say there aren’t some parallels, but we also shouldn’t push them too far.
meaning, therefore, will be shown to be a consequence of the formation of the unity of Dasein and world. In turn, the individuation of a given interpretation of being is accordingly the condition of the possibility for the individuation of meaning in Dasein’s existentiell life.50 This crucially links back to developing in greater detail the basic insights Kant set out regarding the pure imagination. For the a priori function of projection is not just to render understandability possible. Moreover, the possibility of that understandability is itself only possible because the transcendence of projection renders the world in a particular way. We can see this already in Kant’s own work. For whilst Kant’s idealism does restrict the scope of ontology in the first Critique to present-at-hand objects of experience, at the same time and on its own terms, the transcendence that Kantian schematism forms does amount to an active determination ‘of world’ by the transcendental subject. This is because it is only through its sensibilization of the categories – i.e., by temporalizing them – that the discursive can transcend its formal limitations and project out the structure within which all occurring occurs. Without the Schematism, it is not just that the categories would be “mere forms of thought, through which no determinate object [could be] cognized”.51 Rather, the point is that the unity that specifically schematic time provides is to constitute the essential scaffolding for the very texture of world, without which the world itself would not have a determinate structure.

And so too, I want to say, with my above interpretation of Heideggerian schematism. Whilst by means of the phenomenological axis, Dasein and world are unified from being-in-the-world, such that Kantian idealism can be overcome, at the same time, the ontologically determinative function of the schemata is not just maintained but is extended. To provide an example: in the first instance, the ecstatic past is the root condition of the possibility for Dasein’s existential situation as thrown, and therefore could be termed the ‘origin’ of historical meaning. But at the same time, any such structure of understanding essentially depends upon the world already having been so constituted a priori, because the ontological difference – as a transcendental distinction – entails that Dasein’s ontic encounter must already have been ontologically determined for its understanding to have taken on such a form. World could only ever have been

50 ‘Individuation’ is meant here as what is produced by transcendental activity.

51 KrV, B150.
disclosed historically in Dasein’s existentiell life if world had already been determined *a priori* in line with an historically oriented schema. Indeed, this conceptually separable, but phenomenologically proximal, relationship of Dasein’s projecting of the horizon to the meaning it encounters is precisely what the ontological schemata call attention to: we should ask again, from a different angle, “how [is it that] anything like the world in its unity with Dasein is ontologically possible?” It is possible because it is through the directionality of the schemata that Dasein’s transcendence is manifested, exhibited through Dasein’s projecting. The schemata are hermeneutic structures insofar as they only provide a ‘scaffold’, a time-oriented directedness within which the contingency of Dasein carries out its own particular interpretation. But at the same time, it is only through Dasein’s synthetic *a priori* activity that that very scaffold can first be formed, that is, in the synthetic unity of schematic time, the relevant horizon is formed as a framework so that world is ontically encountered by Dasein as ontologically interpretable.

So, to bring it back to Sheehan: is the source of meaning to be located at the root of fundamental ontology (and by my account, in schematism)? In one sense, yes: *but*, the source of meaning itself is a formal determination of being, at *horizon*. Within that context, therefore, one could say that the concepts of being and meaning are necessarily conjoined for the early Heidegger, and precisely what mediates their interaction is Dasein’s hermeneutic potentiality. However, being is not reducible to meaning as such. Being and meaning dovetail one another, on the ontological and ontic sides, but they are conceptually separable insofar as ontological schematism, through its forming of the horizon, is the condition for the possibility of any consequent meaning.

So, when Heidegger asks about the question of the meaning of being, the point is not to conjecture their equivalence, but instead their essential interconnectedness. More specifically, the individuation of meaning is an existentiell consequence of the relevant horizon having been formed through Dasein’s ontological schematism. As horizontal, therefore, schematism does constitute a framework for interpretation, but that framework itself is an ontological determination of world formed under the directionality of the schemata. I have

52 SZ, 364/415.
described this framework as a ‘scaffold’ – a wording that could suggest our remaining in a ‘preliminary’ sphere which should have been overcome – but I do not mean it in a ‘temporary’ sense, but rather as that which makes possible the structural integrity of world through its forming of the horizon. In that way, schematism ontically fades into the background as familiarity. For in schematizing the ecstases, that which is ‘transcended’ is the self-relation of ecstatic temporality as a structure of Dasein. Insofar as Dasein’s being-in-the-world implies this holism of itself and world, what makes that possible is a schematic which renders the world in such a way it is able to be interpreted. The schemata, then, span the boundary between being and interpretation, between the determination of world and a hermeneutic of life. Consequently, the schemata can only be such a framework for interpretation insofar as their transcendental function is to determine the structure of the ontological, and, from that, world can be encountered by Dasein in the ontic as imbued with meaning. Against Sheehan, therefore, the concept of being still has an essential role to play in fundamental ontology, because precisely what schematism brings out is the relationality in the ontological difference which underlies and has already determined a priori the question of the constitution of intelligibility.

(b) Being and Becoming

Indeed, what I would further want to contend against Sheehan is that the novel thought at the heart of fundamental ontology is not found in some reducibility of being to meaning, quite on the contrary. Instead, it is that what ontological schematism ultimately leads us to see is that becoming is found at the root of the question of being. For insofar as each schema discloses world to Dasein under a particular mode, in this very activity as a temporalizing we find therein the essential mobility in being’s signification. Consequently, the point is not to reduce being to meaning, but instead to elucidate transcendentally the conditions for the possibility of the variability in interpretations of being, given the previously asserted variations in possible being-in-the-world. Although we have noted this, I now want to set this out systematically.

Firstly, insofar as retention historically discloses the world, already brought into play is the idea that however being has so far been interpreted, on account of the thrownness of Dasein into a world of familiar significations and
the necessary contingency of Dasein within its social world, no singular interpretation of being has the ability to solidify itself into an eternal essence. Rather, transcendental interpretation is necessarily an historically iterative process. And whilst the throwness of any individual Dasein historically discloses its world as familiar, it is equally thrown into the coming-to-be of the emerging of a world in which its own encounter with presence is not a fixed ‘now’ but is amidst an interrelatedness to other Daseins and entities that are themselves equally not fixed. Ontological determination, therefore, only follows as the product of projection; that is, insofar as Dasein’s existentiality synthesizes the historical and the immediate with its own for-the-sake-of-itself, and thus a priori determines its world in terms of it.

Consequently, I would contend that if hermeneutic phenomenology takes Dasein’s being-in-the-world to be akin to an interpretable text, analogously, the residuum of those ontological determinations themselves must be considered both an historically constituted and futurally developing hypertext. This is because the hermeneutic consequence of fundamental ontology is that the history of the interpretation of being is not to be found in the history of academic metaphysics, but is instead phenomenologically locatable within the continuing enpresenting of being-in-the-world. Insofar as Dasein is embedded within the historical developing of world, in the rifts and displacements which phenomenologically characterize the changeability of Dasein a fundamental ambiguity. Therefore, as a mediator between indeterminacy and determinacy, ontological interpretation as such can only ever express the coming-to-be of Dasein’s for-the-sake-of-itself as not only essentially unfulfillable, but played out in an essential interrelatedness to a coming-to-be-as-such that plays out historically. The meaning of being, therefore, is ultimately expressed in terms of a hermeneutic of becoming because ontological interpretation itself is a necessary projecting which arises from the essential contingency of Dasein.

But to what extent is this, even if it might be the case, nevertheless unsatisfying? What does it mean to work out the question of the meaning of being ‘concretely’ if we only find at its end interpretation and becoming? And why at all would we need a transcendental and systematic programme to establish what

53 Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge, 3.
appears to be insecure and contingent? Indeed, the later Heidegger makes the history of beyng thematic at the moment when he attempts to ‘leap over’ transcendence.\textsuperscript{54} Moreover, one could equally read his later claim that Dasein is only a ‘steward’ of beyng as a metaphor for this contingency in becoming,\textsuperscript{55} that ‘new’ stewards will follow in its wake and through the developing of history. And yet, bearing my account from the previous chapter in mind, in Heidegger’s later work, I would contend that something gets lost in this attempt to overcome transcendence. What makes Dasein ontologically unique \textit{derives from} its transcendence, from its structural determination of world despite its necessary contingency. Even if all we find at its end is an interpreting which determines being from an essential becoming, then the structure of interpretation \textit{is} the key question for ontology. And for the early Heidegger, interpretation is grounded in schematism. With this in mind, on the way to the final affirmation of ontological schematizing constituting the ground of interpretation, we need to consider the concept of becoming in itself, and specify its necessary relation to Dasein’s transcendence, despite Dasein’s necessarily historical being.

Of course, the question of the relationship between being and becoming long predates Heidegger, indeed, it predates the entire philosophical context which this thesis has operated within so far. For whilst \textit{Being and Time} opens with a quote from Plato’s \textit{Sophist}, the fundamental-ontological critique of the history of metaphysics properly begins with Aristotle’s codification of the categories and his account of time. And yet, as Heidegger termed one of his later lecture courses, ‘the beginning’ of Western philosophy – or at least a notable portion of what is extant – centres around the Parmenidean account of ‘static’ being vs. the becoming of Heraclitean ‘flux’. There is, then, an ontological question which precedes the historical framing of \textit{Being and Time}, which nevertheless seems to emerge here. Indeed, by the \textit{Contributions}, Heidegger is arguing this question follows from the very “wonder that entities are and that humans themselves are and are in the midst of that which \textit{they} are not”.\textsuperscript{56} It is, as Heidegger sees it, the initial impetus for Western philosophy, even if this standard construct of a Parmenides vs. Heraclitus opposition is somewhat crude. And yet, for all its

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ga}65, 250-1/197.  
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}, 240/189.  
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid.}, 46/37.
oversimplification, a good reason for the persistence of the story in our intellectual history is precisely because of an intuitive tension that it highlights. This tension is the phenomenological oscillation between the familiarity of a world with a determinate meaning that we are typically comported towards vs. the instability of the coming-to-be and passing-away of events that are part-and-parcel of its very structure. Dasein is comported towards the world in terms of its for-the-sake-of-which, but it can never fully actualize that ability-to-be. Dasein is ontically unique by virtue of its hermeneutic ontological potentiality, but anxiety manifests the insecurity in its interpretation. Time provides Dasein and world with a structural order, and yet that structure itself is phenomenally marked by change.

So firstly, what phenomenology brings out ontologically is this very tension. Being-in-the-world presupposes an essential mediation between necessity and determinacy on the one hand and contingency and indeterminacy on the other. And it is far from a new problem: when Heraclitus says, “we step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not”, he expresses that tension in the (somewhat ontic) sense that—as I would read it—the point is to assent not to outright contradiction, but instead to ambiguity. There is a sense in which it is ‘the same river’, from our commonplace geographical assumptions, but equally a sense in which it is not, when considering the particular molecules of water which compose the river at any one time. To develop this beyond Heraclitus, a central motivation for fundamental ontology derives from its desire not to force a particular determination of being into an eternal essence, but instead to think that ambiguity. Heidegger wants to understand the structure of ambiguity in Dasein’s ontological interpretation that underlies being-in-the-world and is manifested in terms of schematic time. The point, therefore, is that the meaning of being is ultimately expressed in terms of a hermeneutic of becoming because the very ambiguity it expresses is phenomenologically demonstrable, whilst at the same time, that ambiguity is a central notion that traditional metaphysics is at pains to suppress.

In other words: one way traditional metaphysics fails to reach its purported subject-matter is through its suppression of this tension. One finds this

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already in Aristotle, that is, at ‘the beginning’ of traditional metaphysics. For whilst an early expression of the question of being is found at the start of the *Metaphysics* IV, where we saw Aristotle seek the unified meaning of being from its equivocity,\(^{58}\) only a few short sections later, he is already ruling out “the most extreme of the views […] of the professed Heracliteans”.\(^{59}\) Aristotle contends that the Heracliteans are committed to the claim that “all this world of nature is in movement”,\(^{60}\) as their central metaphysical principle. Aristotle is alarmed that the consequence of such a view is that “it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be”,\(^{61}\) such that “those who use this argument do away with substance [ousian] and essence [einal]”.\(^{62}\) In this tension between Heraclitean becoming and Aristotelian *ousia*, we find a central dispute, the consequences of which are codified in traditional metaphysics. Furthermore, it is, I would contend, a particularly revealing passage about Aristotle as a thinker. As Desmond notes, “one can be struck by what seems like an irritated tone in [Aristotle’s] presentation of […] the defenders of flux”.\(^{63}\) And when we couple this ‘irritation’ with the terms of Aristotle’s critique – namely, in terms of a purported logical contradiction – we find exemplified the central mode of thinking across the history of Western philosophy ever since. It is a mode of thinking which seeks determinacy over ambiguity, presumes formal logic to dictate normative structures for thought, and yet is moreover radically unintuitive. How is it possible for the same thing to be and not to be? At different times, or through different perspectives, to name but two possible examples. How could the world not be ‘in movement’, unless one wanted to claim in denial of one’s own phenomenology the experience of change?

But perhaps even more telling than this is that ‘flux’ is denied by Aristotle *because* he sees it as precluding access to *ousia*, and thus implicitly *because* it problematizes the conception of time as an ‘objective’ “measure of motion”,\(^{64}\) a pure

\(^{58}\) Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, 1003a32-1003b18.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 1010a10-11.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., 1007a21.

\(^{61}\) Ibid., 1007a21.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., 1007a21.


\(^{64}\) Aristotle, ‘Physics’, 220b35.
presence in terms of which the situatedness essential to worldhood is abstracted from, and whereby the question of ‘being qua being’ therein is couched in terms of resolving the contrarieties across the totality of entities.\(^{65}\) For Aristotle, the so-called question of being qua being is fundamentally a logico-linguistic problem directed towards consistency. At base, becoming for Aristotle simply lacks intelligibility.\(^{66}\) But what are we to do if those presuppositions themselves do not measure up to the phenomenology?

Firstly, to presume a necessary opposition between ‘being vs. becoming’ is inaccurate: in addressing the meaning of being in a fundamental-ontological sense, to end up at a hermeneutic of becoming is not to ‘reject being’ \textit{per se}, but instead to specify the way in which we are actually aiming to think beyond \textit{ousia}. For as Heidegger first translates Aristotle, \textit{ousia} signifies a \textit{Seinsheit}, a beingness: “the ‘entity in the how of its being’”.\(^{67}\) But his later usage of \textit{Seiendheit – entityness} (whilst awkward in English) – is more appropriate in bringing out Aristotle’s desire to suppress the ambiguity across the totality of entities and instead to identify “the \textit{koinon}, the common and thus what is common to every entity”.\(^{68}\) But this is, in its own way, another instance of levelling-off: it is an abstraction that by design seeks to overcome the same-and-different-river, the variabilities across events in time, and moreover Dasein’s ability-to-be that it can never fully be. But in searching for ‘the common’, what gets levelled-off is both the specificity and the ambiguity that actually characterizes phenomenological encounter, and in that way, \textit{is} characteristic of being. More worryingly for a Heideggerian, what gets levelled-off in this theorizing process is world itself: the \textit{history} from which ontological interpretation takes its first departure, the \textit{immediacy} within which the ontological character of the world itself becomes apparent, and the \textit{futural intentionality} in terms of which Dasein’s understanding of being is determined.

In this, we see the end point that began in 1919 with Heidegger’s desire to ‘break the primacy of the theoretical’.\(^{69}\) At base, the abstraction intrinsic to

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\(^{67}\) \textit{Ga18}, 22/17.

\(^{68}\) \textit{Ga65}, 75/60.

\(^{69}\) cf. Chapter One.
theoretical activity is inappropriate when considering the question of being. For if we are to understand being in any reasonable intelligibility, we have to be sensitive to the fact that its manifestation arrives within an ambiguous world, that is, within a temporalizing that, through its schemata, demonstrates the way in which its meaning is subject to shift, reversal, and innovation. In a science which aims to explain natural processes, for example, abstraction is a useful tool in locating and specifying the matter at hand. By contrast, to abstract being from its phenomenological manifestation is to dislocate it from ‘where’ its signifying is manifested. By abstracting being and rendering it as static *ousia*, or substantiality, or *Anwesenheit*, is not to identify being with any clearer ‘determinacy’. On the contrary, to abstract being ‘from life’ is to misidentify one’s having located a purported generality with having ‘specified’ the real matter of things. And yet being still unshakably is manifested in the coming-to-be of Dasein and world that is the transcendental background for ontological interpretation. What *ousia* as a term of art covers over, then, is that very little has actually been said in the first place.

The meta-narrative of fundamental ontology, therefore, is to dismantle the static fixity of *ousia*, and supplant ontic categorization with an ontological hermeneutic which is responsive to the coming-to-be of Dasein and world. This is manifested in the transcendental structuring for phenomenological encounter. But concurrently, this shift of from a logic of categories to a hermeneutic of becoming is not merely an abstract, formal dispute. On the contrary, the schematizing that systematically underlies and motivates the essential becoming of being follows from the phenomenological starting point that fundamental ontology presupposes. Being is an essential transcendental presupposition for *life*, even if it remains largely implicit; it is not a mere generality we can theorize by abstraction and posit as fixed and ‘determinate’. Schematic time is not a ‘common property’ applicable to the entire totality of entities; rather, schematism forms the relevant horizon in the substantive sense that it sets out the strictures within which being is able to be interpreted. It is the singular ontological necessity which regulates the contingency and particularity of Dasein’s ontological interpretation, i.e., within the particular historical formation of any individual Dasein’s life. As life changes, so do ways of being, alongside our relationality to entities-within-the-world and our self-understanding. By projecting upon possibilities, there is always the possibility of something new, and this dimension can
be as political as it is ontological. As Foucault urged, e.g., “we have to create a gay life. To become”. Undoubtedly the potency of such a claim is found in its political implications, but nevertheless, insofar as a ‘new’ form of life implies a different permutation of meaningful relationalities, a different way of Dasein’s relating to world, a distinctive way of being is posed. In any ‘new’ form of life, whether we consider them in terms of an historical genealogy or futural possibilities, there is an attendant reorientation of the totality of significance, in the very modes of being-in-the-world. Therefore, being as a coming-to-be emphasizes the mobility in ontological interpretation, in the relation of life to being. So, even whilst I argue that the meaning of being would ultimately be expressed in terms of a hermeneutic of becoming, this is not to suppress being. On the contrary, it is to situate being within the always available possibilities for Dasein and world.

In this, it appears we have strayed some way from the fragment of Heraclitus. With the incorporation of Foucault, there also seems to be posited another historical dimension which might be taken to problematize the transcendental account I have been working towards. Indeed, Foucault himself only encouraged “a reflection on the transcendental”, insofar as it could “be inverted or undone inside a concrete strategic field”. But I would again emphasize this is where the epistemological ‘letter’ vs. the ontological ‘spirit’ of Kant ought to be disambiguated. For if the scope of the transcendental could only ever range over “the problem in terms of knowledge [connaissance] and legitimation”, then Foucault is right to question politically what exactly it is that gets ‘legitimized’ in the attendant social formations. But concurrently, such a strict normalizing of a singular eternal essence is itself already ontologically problematized in the depreciation of categorial thinking. For when the transcendental is explicitly formulated as hermeneutically and phenomenologically informed, the question does not concern legitimacy, but instead priority in constitution. How is it that Dasein is

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72 Ibid., 397.
nevertheless able to project an interpretation of being within the essential coming-to-be of a world that – until its projecting – is marked by an essential indeterminacy? Here, the transcendental asks (as a complementary question to the historical) what those essential structures must be which range over the possibility of any interpretation. In the historical, what is shown is the essential mobility in Dasein’s relationship to being, insofar as Dasein’s being-amidst includes its contemporaneous social formations. But that is not to deny Dasein’s necessary ontological situation. As I hope to have set out by now, Dasein is thrown into its world, within an essential coming-to-be that also has a historico-political dimension, but which is itself indicative of a higher-order becoming which characterizes the manifestation of being as such. From the other side: if existentiell Dasein is always already within a political domain which inscribes certain normative practices which appear as necessary and universal, but are themselves radically contingent, what are the existential-ontological conditions which make possible this structure of social reality as such? In short: the ontological difference is inscribed again, and what relates the ontological to the ontic is that the essential coming-to-be is ontologically determined by Dasein through its interpreting.

*(c) Time and Becoming*

*Time* is the ontological expression of this essential coming-to-be. Insofar as schematic time is the transcendental structure of pure becoming, it determines *a priori* the extent and limits of possible ontological interpretation. We can contrast this with the nature of space: whilst space is a structure of meaning, it is properly so only on the side of ontic orientation. We can feel at home or uneasy in particular ‘spaces’, and our basic spatial intentionality is an essential mode of navigation within-the-world. But still, such orienting features of space are essentially existentiell comportments which have already been ontologically determined *a priori*. The spatiality of world is that ‘wherein’ ontological interpretation takes place – indeed, one might want to say ‘as clearing’ – but the terms of ontological interpretation itself are resolutely temporal.

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73 I would argue this is precisely what Foucault’s genealogies delineate, were it not a huge diversion.
I mean this in two senses: firstly, in terms of the (temporal) coming-to-be of the individual Dasein and its ontological interpretation therein, but also in terms of the genealogy of ways of being and ontological interpretation as such. Schematic time is the nexus point between the modal variations over which ‘being as such’ operates. Schematic time connects the pure becoming of the for-the-sake-of-itself that temporally structures the ‘life’ of Dasein to the transcendence of Dasein’s temporalizing which projects out its interpretation of world. Moreover, schematism connects us to the genealogy of being which accompanies the necessary historical situatedness of Dasein-as-such. In amounting to such a framework for interpretation, schematic time expresses this coming-to-be regarding Dasein’s ontological understanding. For whilst the way to being is found in transcendental interpretation, since Dasein is always already situated in its own necessary contingency, all those transcendental structures can be is time as an expression of the finitude of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. Time, therefore, is both an expression of coming-to-be and a structure for ontological determination: in the nature of time as a temporalizing, we find expressed the basic insecurity which means that signification is liable to change ‘throughout time’, and yet ontological interpretation is nevertheless determined by means of it. Insofar as each schema discloses an essential ontological aspect, in the midstness of the continuing changeability of time, Dasein is nevertheless able to take a stand on being. Time expresses indeterminacy and determinacy, changeability and stability, flux and constancy. It is the motive structure of this ontological ambiguity. Therefore, as a framework for interpretation, the schemata render the world understandable, and understandable in terms of time. It is through futural projection that Dasein’s interpretation is solidified into its mode of being-in-the-world. But still, in the fluidity of time as such, this interpreting cannot reify itself into an eternal essence. I take this to be the central message of fundamental ontology: whilst we can (and should) ask on the transcendental side about the constitution of ontological interpretation, by virtue of the phenomenological (and its relation to the historical), a single answer is unreachable beyond the hermeneutic structures themselves.

But insofar as it reflects how far Kant was able to go into this problematic, we can also note that what is still preserved from the original Schematism
is the specific function of time as a “third thing”. But where in the *Critique*, the ontological function of time was to connect the discursivity of the categories to the sensibility of appearance, here, schematic time mediates the ambiguity that follows from the facticity of Dasein and the coming-to-be of world into a determinate ontological interpretation. And in both instances, this mediation is made possible because *time is a structure of transcendence*. As Kant would put it, time is ‘homogenous’ with both the sensibility of the appearances and the pure aprioricity of the categories, and as the phenomenology modifies this, insofar as being-in-the-world holistically relates Dasein’s hermeneutics to the determination of world.

And it is also precisely here, through our ability to specify how time is transcendent, which distinguishes our inquiry from the later Heidegger’s, for what schematism sets out is the transcendental constitution of the clearing within which being unfolds. To explain: in Division I, Dasein’s being is posited as an essential disclosedness from its existential situation as ‘there’ amidst the world. But now, we can see that each schema sets out the formal structure for disclosing an essential hermeneutic-ontological aspect. In turn, the schemata structure the clearing as the structure of disclosedness, insofar as Dasein’s existential situation determines that disclosing be a transcendentally hermeneutic activity. The uniqueness of Dasein, consequently, is not in its ‘stewardship’ of beyng, but in its *creative possibilities towards being*: there is always the possibility of something new to be manifested in the transcendental structure of projection. As the earlier Heidegger recognized, “Dasein projects its being upon possibilities”. That is to say, Dasein projects upon an indeterminate coming-to-be that is ontologically determined by the imagination of Dasein. I mean ‘imagination’ here not as a strict ‘faculty’, but phenomenologically. The uniqueness of Dasein arises from its imaginative possibility to ontologically disclose its world, to phenomenologically situate itself within a self-understanding that is always a never entirely fulfillable

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74 *KrV*, A138/B177.
76 We have considered this in relation to readiness-to-hand. As noted, the question of the overarching unity of time is still open.
77 *SZ*, 132-3/171.
towards-which, but still, a towards-which that is orientational for life. Time may primordially be a formal structure, but it is by no means an abstract one; it is the horizon for being insofar as its directionality determines the space of existential possibilities that constitute life. Moreover, from an ethical standpoint, the essence of futurity suggests not only the possibility of something merely ‘new’, but equally the possibility of something better, i.e., the possibility of considering the notion of ‘care’ in an explicitly ethical sense. But nevertheless: the ground of interpreting world – that which is not a levelling-off but is the transcendentally hermeneutic background for all possible determination – is the transcendental constitution of primordial time. Dasein’s temporalizing determines world despite the amidstness of its coming-to-be.

From the simple hammering of a hammer right up to a possible ethics of care, time intersects at every juncture in structurally constituting Dasein and world. In its ambiguity as both indeterminate and determining, time expresses both coming-to-be and ontological determination. It is the singular necessity within which all contingency plays out and is that in terms of which Dasein’s ontological interpretation finds its structure. But at its root, the essence of time is formed from Dasein’s transcendence. That is, insofar as “Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological”, and insofar as “objects must conform to our cognition”, (or rather, world must conform to our existentiality). In the unity of being-in-the-world, ontology takes on a new form as embedded within the life and hermeneutic possibilities of Dasein. The question of being, in turn, is not reducible to the question of meaning, but it is intimately connected to transcendence as a post-Copernican turning to the relationality of the ‘being-in’ of being-in-the-world. Recognizing that time can be such a ‘third thing’ is at the core of Kant’s thinking, and we can preserve its unique function even with the addition of phenomenology into our systematics.

5. Conclusion

Having considered one mode of ontological schematism and its wider implications, what can we ultimately say about the meaning of being for Heidegger? It
would not be entirely incorrect to say that to be ‘is’ to be in time, but that equally overlooks the hermeneutic function of time as it is specifically manifested in ontological interpretation and the genealogy of the unfolding of being that is the result of continuing interpreting. Back in the Copernican Revolution, Kant set out a new possibility for philosophy, a fundamental reorientation that at least a ‘continental’ way of thinking is still centrally grappling with the consequences of. Heidegger, at least in the 1920s, crucially recognized the essential implications of that revolution for the question of being. Heidegger recognized that a thinking through of transcendence reorients our entire relation to being, as embedded within the thrown projecting of Dasein. And in synthesizing transcendental philosophy with hermeneutic phenomenology, we can equally see how the question of being extends on the other side into the questions of life and world. And I would contend that is perhaps the reason more than any other that Being and Time remains an enduring, indispensable work: it shows, above all else, that being is an essential component of life, and not the exclusive preserve of the philosopher. And even whilst there are now so many Gesamtausgabe volumes it would take up two lifetimes of reading, Being and Time remains the cornerstone of Heidegger’s thinking. In this thesis overall, I have aimed to reaffirm Heidegger’s early methods and their essential unity with Kant’s problematic. And in this chapter in particular, I have aimed to demonstrate it directly by developing Heidegger’s conception of schematism in relation to the key themes Division III suggests to us. This is not to say necessarily that the above aimed to be an historiographical reconstruction of what Heidegger would have written, rather, it is a thinking with Kant and Heidegger, and following where I could see the phenomena lead. In following that trajectory, we are now one step further to seeing how time does “manifest itself as the horizon of being” for Heidegger, as the ‘third thing’ that is the ground for ontological interpretation.

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82 SZ, 437/488.
CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have investigated the relationship between Kant and Heidegger, having aimed to use the results of that inquiry to consider further the concepts of transcendence and schematism. In particular, I have aimed to mobilize these historical resources to show that the meaning of being is a question of hermeneutics, and that an ontological hermeneutic itself ought to be understood in terms of a schematism of ecstatic temporality, which grounds Dasein’s transcendence. In turn, I have suggested that the meaning of being is ultimately a hermeneutic of becoming for Heidegger, i.e., the phenomenology leads us to an interplay of transcendence with history, as an expression of the ambiguity between Dasein’s finite contingency and its ontologically determinative possibility.

But the broader point is that on a structural level, this way of approaching ontology would not be possible without Kant’s initial contribution, and whilst Heidegger takes Kant in entirely new directions, the key turning point in the history of ontology, for Heidegger, is in fact the Copernican Revolution. With this and the transcendental function of the imagination, Kant sows the seeds for the possibility of Heidegger’s early project. And insofar as both philosophers centre time as a principle of unity, a shared principle is located therein which explains the possibility of transcendence, which relates Dasein to world. The effect of this influence, therefore, is that the formal structures of the first Critique are mimicked in the argumentative structures of Being and Time, both in the sense that worldhood and temporality are phenomenological reconsiderations of the key themes of the Deduction and Schematism, and insofar as the imagination and disclosedness both express the question of transcendence as the way to the meaning of being. Having equally aimed to defend the early Heidegger’s conception of transcendence, my systematic aim in the final chapter was to think Kantian and Heideggerian ontology together, to express the ontological meaning of schematism in a phenomenologically permissible mode. And the
central point is that schematism constitutes the framework for interpretation, such
that we can understand being in a way which thinks beyond both ousia and propos-
ositionality.

In thinking through these essential relations, however, there is perhaps
more of a risk that my interpretation of Kant may be charged with its own kind
of ‘violence’, rather than my interpretation of Heidegger. An ontological inter-
pretation of Kant would be more contested than a ‘Kantian’ reading of funda-
mental ontology. But there are, I think, two sides to this. Firstly, even if Kant
was not aware of it, he does provide the initial tools for a laying of the ground
for fundamental ontology, perhaps even in spite of himself. And certainly much
of the ontological language I have used is Heidegger’s. But nevertheless, what I
have hoped to have shown through my readings of the Copernican Revolution,
Deduction, and Schematism is that their success on Kant’s own terms is only
possible if they are understood ontologically. Consequently, the Critique is a rad-
ically different book than an entirely epistemological reading can permit. Regard-
ing the historical-philosophical aims of this thesis, therefore, I wanted to trace
an alternate history, and even whilst the background motivation for that was to
set the scene for the Heideggerian ontology, at the same time, the interpretations
themselves should stand on their own. Perhaps ‘ontology’ in our relevant sense
was a concept created by Heidegger, and there is something artificial in any ret-
rospective application of such a term. But I think it is justified in this instance,
given that with hindsight, the radical consequences of the critical project cannot
be gleaned without it. That is to say, Heidegger gave explicit expression to an
essential subtext of the Critique, and one that radically shaped his own thinking
in the 1920s.

But even with this further advance into the problematic of transcend-
ence, that does not mean there is nothing more to say. This thesis has primarily
treated the question of transcendence in relation to world and readiness-to-hand.
How does this analysis extend to other modes of being? How might the relation-
ship between being and history be further developed? And if an overcoming
of ousia fundamentally relates being to life, how do we then understand life as it
relates both to being and its less ‘a priori’ aspects? How does ontology intersect
with ethics and politics, science and art? These questions, subsidiary as they are
to the central focus of this thesis, nevertheless have essential thematic relations
which are still open for us to consider. Where we have seen that Heidegger saw Kant as ‘laying the ground’ for metaphysics, in this thesis, I have equally attempted a kind of ground-laying. I have aimed to corroborate the Kantian thread in *Being and Time* as a prolegomenon for future research. In the taking up of a problematic which was otherwise viewed as a dead-end, new pathways are opened up. In particular: if we think back to Heidegger’s early 1920s research, can we now conceive of a *Lebensphilosophie* with a transcendentally and phenomenologically assured ground? If hermeneutics is to be associated with the horizon for being, where does hermeneutics go from here?

Deleuze and Guattari famously characterized the procedure of philosophy as the “discipline that involves creating concepts”.¹ For them, this is a requisite methodological presupposition because they argue we cannot simply read concepts off ‘nature’ as if they were pre-given. Under that rubric, this thesis has attempted something a little more modest: the creative rethinking of a pre-existing set of concepts, to consider further Heidegger’s innovative but incomplete line of inquiry. But there is also a sense in which a continued commitment to a hermeneutic phenomenology, grounded in Dasein’s transcendence, democratizes philosophical ‘creation’. For whilst on the formal level, I have set out a temporal ontology understood in terms of schematism, the hermeneutic side of this is that ontological interpretation as such is not the unique province of ‘the philosopher’. Being is expressed *in the living of life* – in the ways of life we inhabit – and the creation of concepts is the mere philosophical residuum of the creative potentiality of life.

In one sense, therefore, we end this thesis with much work left to be done. The historical problematic that we have considered leads us to an open set of questions: not just in ontology, but also with regards to its interrelations to other disciplines. In this, I hope to have shown that fundamental ontology remains a live philosophical concern for us; it is not just an ‘object’ of historical inquiry. But the *origin* of this line of thought, I have tried to show, begins with Kant. And at its core, we found three key concepts: disclosedness, transcendence, and schematism. I have tried to take us one step further into this problematic. I hope that others will take us even further again.


