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Sovereign risk : constitutions rule
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Kohlscheen, Emanuel (2010) Sovereign risk : constitutions rule. Oxford Economic Papers, Vol.62 (No.1). pp. 62-85. doi:10.1093/oep/gpp005 ISSN 0030-7653.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpp005
Abstract
This paper models the executives choice of whether to reschedule external debt as the outcome of an intra-governmental negotiation process. The key issue the paper tries to explain is the stark difference in default rates between the group of developing countries that have presidential forms of government and those that are parliamentary (6.0%/year vs 1.6%/year). This difference is present in spite of the fact that the latter group tends to have a somewhat higher turnover of the executive. The conditions under which parliamentary democracies will deliver lower probabilities of default than presidential countries are derived in a model with opportunistic politicians. Empirically, I find that middle-income democracies with parliamentary regimes, more checks on the executive, lower turnover in leadership and coalition governments show lower default propensities.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Debts, Public, Democracy -- Economic aspects, Debt relief, Economic policy | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Oxford Economic Papers | ||||
Publisher: | Oxford University Press | ||||
ISSN: | 0030-7653 | ||||
Official Date: | January 2010 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Vol.62 | ||||
Number: | No.1 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 24 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 62-85 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1093/oep/gpp005 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | ||||
Funder: | Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC) | ||||
Version or Related Resource: | Kohlscheen, E. (2005). Sovereign risk: constitutions rule. [Coventry] : University of Warwick, Economics Department. (Warwick economic research papers, no.731). http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1464 | ||||
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