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Decentralization and the productive efficiency of government: evidence from Swiss cantons
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Barankay, Iwan, 1972- and Lockwood, Ben (2006) Decentralization and the productive efficiency of government: evidence from Swiss cantons. Discussion Paper. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain). (Discussion paper (Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)).
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Abstract
Advocates of fiscal decentralization argue that amongst other benefits, it can increase the efficiency of delivery of government services. This paper is one of the first to evaluate this claim empirically by looking at the association between education expenditure decentralization and the productive efficiency of schools using a data-set of Swiss cantons. We first provide careful evidence that expenditure decentralization is a powerful proxy for legal local autonomy. Further panel regressions of Swiss cantons provide robust evidence that more decentralization is associated with higher educational attainment. We also show that these gains lead to no adverse effects across education types but that male students benefited more from educational decentralization closing, for the Swiss case, the gender education gap.
| Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | D History General and Old World > DA Great Britain > DAW Central Europe |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Decentralization in government -- Switzerland, Public goods -- Switzerland, Industrial productivity -- Switzerland, Switzerland -- Economic conditions, Switzerland -- Politics and government |
| Series Name: | Discussion paper (Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain)) |
| Publisher: | Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain) |
| Place of Publication: | London |
| Date: | April 2006 |
| Number: | No.563 |
| Number of Pages: | 39 |
| Status: | Not Peer Reviewed |
| Access rights to Published version: | Open Access |
| Funder: | Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC) |
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| URI: | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1703 |
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