From Logic to Nature: A study of Objectivity and the Idea in Hegel’s *Science of Logic*

Ahilleas Rokni

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University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis does not include any material previously used or published by me before. Further, this thesis is wholly my own work and has not been submitted for a degree at another university.
Abstract

This thesis gives a new interpretation for the infamous move from Hegel’s *Science of Logic* to the *Philosophy of Nature*. Briefly, I argue that the reason for the move to the PN is grounded in the immanent development of the SL, that because of this the PN is a continuation of the examination of the determinations of thought and being that begins with the SL, and that, consequently, the PN develops according to the same methodological tenets as the SL.

My approach is to focus on the move to the PN through the development of the relation of the Concept and Objectivity. The final determination of the SL, the system, is the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity and it is this determination that subsequently develops into the self-external Idea, Nature. Thus, I begin by briefly outlining the development of the Concept through the chapters of Judgement and Syllogism, where at the end of Syllogism the Concept determines itself into Objectivity. Beginning from Objectivity, I give a detailed account of the way that the Concept develops out of Objectivity, until it relates to Objectivity in the chapter on Life. I, then, trace the development of the Concept-Objectivity relation through the Idea section, which ultimately culminates in the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity in the system. The system is the immediate self-relation of itself to itself, and despite the immediacy and identity, has a moment of difference within itself. The expression of this difference within the self-relating system necessarily leads us into the self-external Idea: the unity of the Concept and Objectivity that is external to itself, i.e. Nature.

Not only does my thesis fill an important interpretive gap regarding the coherence of the Hegelian system, a concern for many Hegelians, but I claim that it furnishes us with a concept of Nature as it is in-itself. Such a conception can open avenues for a normative ethical theory for how we ought to treat Nature in the current environmental crisis, as well as having implications for contemporary philosophy of science that engages with Nature within the parameters of science and the scientific method instead of with Nature as it is in-itself.
Introduction

1. Rationality in Nature

It is uncommon to think of Nature as being rational.¹ We typically think of rationality as this thing which humans have. We might ask of a human action: “What was the reason for that?” In this sense, we ask after the reason because humans are thinking beings that act according to reasons. One might also ask: what was the reason for why the dog jumped? But what is really meant in this case is: what caused the dog to jump? Non-thinking things like animals and rocks do not have reasons or do things for reasons but are caused to do things. Such a cause can be teleological. So an animal can jump in order to reach something. Indeed, this can be regarded as the reason why it jumps (even if the animal doesn’t formulate the latter as a reason). Neither of these forms of explanation captures how Hegel understands rationality in Nature. For Hegel, Nature is rational not because it can give reasons (or reasons can be given) for why it does what it does but becauseNature is rationally ordered and this rationality is knowable. When someone asks: what is space? One might answer: “space is everything that is around us”. But this does not tell us what space is in and for itself, it tells us what space is for us: this is how Kant would answer the question, for whom space is an a priori form of intuition, and so is independent of reason altogether.² Instead, Hegel thinks that we can give an answer to what space is without reference to what it is for us, and the reason why he can do that is because space is rationally structured and this rational structure can be known.

But we don’t tend to think of space when we think of Nature, even though we speak of “the laws of nature”, which include such inorganic things as Newton’s theory of universal gravitation and Einstein’s theory of relativity. Nowadays, with the looming dangers of ecological catastrophe, we, environmentally-minded individuals, typically think of Nature as organic, living Nature. It is the trees that maintain global oxygen levels with photosynthesis; the bees whose pollination is essential for the reproduction of plants; in short, it is the beating Earth, Gaia, that maintains herself in organic harmony. Even when we think of the inorganic

¹ Throughout this thesis, I write “Nature” when I wish to denote the whole of external reality, and distinguish it from “nature”, which is used in its common, idiomatic expression, i.e. “it is the nature of things to behave like this” or “what is the nature of this problem?”.

— of holes in the ozone layer and rising temperatures; melting ice caps and rising sea levels
— it is always mediated by concerns about the organic. Our interest in rising temperatures and
rising sea-levels depends on our concerns about deforested rainforests and starving polar bears,
on our interest in life.

Ordinary individuals rarely think of Nature as magnetism and electricity, acids and
alkali, gravitation and inertia, and space and time. In effect, even though we all learnt in school
that these concepts are part of Nature, they do not play a role in our collective imagination
when we think of Nature. One answer for why this is the case is that it is odd for someone to
think about the reason of magnetism. How can magnetism even be rational?

One field that has sought to understand the rationality of Nature is philosophy of Nature.
Approaching Nature as a distinct domain worthy of philosophical treatment is an idea that
stretches across the history of philosophy and is one that is shared by Aristotle in the Physics,
Kant in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and the second half of the Critique
of Judgement, Schelling in the First Plan of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, and, of
course, Hegel in the Philosophy of Nature (henceforth, PN). What is common amongst them
is the idea that Nature is intelligible and that philosophy can make claims about how Nature
is. Moreover, their concept of Nature includes the inorganic too. In many respects, the starting
point of Kant’s philosophy of Nature are the pure intuitions of space and time through which
we are able to experience the world; for Schelling, the inorganic is part and parcel of Nature.

But isn’t philosophy of Nature a nineteenth century relic? Given the successes of
modern science, which tells us how things do what they do, i.e. science gives causal
explanations of natural phenomena, and tells us what things are, what good is a philosophy of
a Nature that tells us what the rationality of something is? More specifically, what good is
Hegel’s PN? Before I answer this, it must be underscored that Hegel’s PN is not in competition
with science. The PN does not aim to supplant science because it is a different activity to
science. The PN does not make measurements of phenomena or make predictions about what

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3 Magnetism can be said to be rational insofar as it behaves according to scientific laws. However, this is
different to saying that this rationality can be known through philosophical thinking.
4 When I refer to the PN I am referring both to the book and the development of the determinations of thought
and being that occurs within the book. I do not distinguish between the two because I do not think that it is
necessary for the purposes of this thesis.
5 Of course, of these thinkers, Kant famously claimed that we cannot know the world in-itself but only as it
appears to us, and so stands alone in saying that we cannot truly know the reason in Nature, if such a reason
even exists. Nevertheless, despite his transcendentalism, Kant makes several claims about how Nature must be
in order for us to have experience of it and is, therefore, doing philosophy of Nature.
will be observed.\(^6\) That is what science does. Instead, Hegel’s \textit{PN} approaches Nature as something that is in-itself rational, as rationally ordered, and as something that can be made intelligible by philosophical thought.

For Hegelians, the \textit{PN} matters insofar as it forms the second part of Hegel’s system of philosophy (\textit{Logic – Nature – Spirit}). Therefore, it is an essential aspect of the Hegelian project for anyone who wants to champion a reading of Hegel that emphasises its systematicity. The move from the \textit{Science of Logic} (henceforth, \textit{SL}) to the \textit{PN} is contested within the scholarship because of metaphysical concerns regarding the transformation of thought into matter: part of the answer that I give is that there is no such transformation, that thought is not opposed to matter but is in a speculative identity with matter, and that the development of the \textit{SL} into the \textit{PN} is a continuation of the project of philosophical ontology,\(^7\) (this will be explained in greater detail in section 1.2). It also matters for non-Hegelians because it (a) provides an account of Nature that considers Nature as it is for-itself and not as it is for us,\(^8\) and (b) because such an account can open up novel avenues of research in the fields of environmental ethics and philosophy of science (more of which later).

To appreciate the import of it we must look back to the \textit{SL}, Hegel’s most important text. I explain how I read the \textit{SL} and what I think the relation of the \textit{SL} to the \textit{PN} is in Chapter 2. For now, I merely want to give a cursory answer to these questions to give an idea of the importance of the \textit{PN} to Hegelians and non-Hegelians alike. I follow recent scholarship in reading the \textit{SL} as an ontology.\(^9\) The \textit{SL} does not assume that thought and being or reason and matter are two different things. Instead, it holds them in a speculative identity wherein each is

\(^{6}\) An important caveat must be made. If one reads Hegel’s \textit{PN} as an ontology, as I do, then the \textit{PN} also makes predictions about what is necessary in reality. However, there is an important distinction between the predictions made by science and the predictions made by the \textit{PN}. The \textit{PN} makes a claim about the ontological necessity of a particular structure but it does not predict where or when it will be observed – that is an empirical question that science can only solve. The \textit{PN} tells us that universal gravitation is a necessary structure of reality and \textit{why} it exists but it does not say the universal gravitation must have always existed or that it will always exist or where one can observe it.

\(^{7}\) When I refer to the \textit{SL}, I am referring both to the book and the development of the determinations of thought and being that occurs within the book. I do not distinguish between the two because I do not think that it is necessary for the purposes of this thesis.

\(^{8}\) Richard Winfield echoes this concern in his recent monograph, ‘Nature, as a particular ontological domain, is not what is meant by that which generally is distinguished from convention in the attempt to get at what is not relative or conditioned. Admittedly, we are here concerned with getting at what nature is by nature, as opposed to how nature may be constructed by particular conventions of inquiry, each of which has its own particular perspective and bias’, (Richard Dien Winfield, \textit{Conceiving nature after Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel: the philosopher’s guide to the universe} (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017)), 5).

itself and so different from the other, but equally, each in being itself is also the other. What this means is that thought is not just thought but is also being, and that being is not just being but is also thought. Thus, if one takes the SL to make meaningful claims about pure thought, one must also take the SL to make meaningful claims about being, to wit, about Nature. There is, then, in a sense, nothing special or new about Hegel’s PN – it is as much ontology as the SL. But why do we need the PN if the SL has already supplied us with the most fundamental determinations of being? This brings us to Hegel’s unique approach to philosophy in the SL. Hegel begins the SL with an act of presuppositionlessness: pushed by the modern demand for freedom and a refusal to simply taking things on authority, Hegel doubts that past philosophical methods have properly grasped the nature of reason and so he sets aside all received assumptions and lets reason develop according to its own determinations to get to the truth of reason. The result of Hegel’s approach (more of which in Chapter 2) is that reason shows itself to be dialectical, which means that reason develops according to the play between positive and negative moments of a given determination. The development of the SL, then, is the dialectical development of reason and as the SL is completed it becomes clear that the next, necessary, step for reason is that it externalises itself. In other words, that reason becomes Nature (more on this in Chapter 2). Note: this does not mean that in the move to the PN that thought has transformed itself into matter; we have already guarded against this metaphysical difficulty by beginning with the speculative identity of thought and being (more on this in Chapter 10).

However, one objection to this view is the following: if the SL develops logically, and the PN is a continuation of this logical development, then, why is the PN different to the SL? The kinds of background concerns at work in this objection are similar to the kinds of concerns present in Maker (2002) and Halper (2002), who think that it is imperative that we read the SL as being complete and closed by the end of it so as to preserve the distinctness of each sphere (I deal with that worry in 10.2.1.2). Regarding the possible objection mentioned here, I think that that reading of the SL-PN relation that I offer provides us with a way to grasp how the PN is a continuation of the ontological project begun in the SL, whilst being able to distinguish the PN from the SL. Briefly, the difference lies between the way that the logical moments of the respective spheres relate to each other: in the SL they are self-relating, whereas in the PN they are related as self-external. The difference, then, lies not in the subject matter (SL = thought vs. PN = matter), but in the kinds of ontological relations that are investigated in each sphere, respectively. Thus, the PN is still logical insofar as it is a continuation of the examination of the determinations of thought and being but is distinct from the SL insofar as it examines a new kind of ontological relation. I explore what this difference amounts to in more detail in 10.2.2.
For now, it suffices to say that the examination of Nature is made necessary by the SL. Therefore, unlike Aristotle, Kant, and Schelling, Hegel does not merely assume Nature as a subject of philosophical inquiry. Instead, Nature shows itself to be an integral moment in the development of reason and because of the dialectical path that leads to it, is shown to be ontologically continuous with reason in the SL. Thus, Hegel’s PN shows us a way of thinking about Nature that does not reduce Nature to a mere object of cognition, as Kant does, or take Nature as something given, like Aristotle. Hegel’s unique approach to Nature allows us to think about Nature without positing an essential distinction between thought and being, and because of this, permits us to think about Nature as it is.

One answer, then, to why Hegel’s PN matters is that it gives us the opportunity to think about Nature as it is. But how does this relate to modern science? Hegel’s PN does not ignore science. Hegel is candid about the debt that his philosophy owes to experience, which includes the empirical results of science. The PN is full of concepts that were discovered, and could have only been discovered, by science (e.g. Galileo’s Law of Fall,10 Kepler’s Laws of Motion;11 Magnetism;12 Galvanism).13 Hegel does not doubt that gravitation or magnetism exist, and nor does he presume to deduce the existence of undiscovered concepts. But he does doubt that science has properly understood what gravitation and magnetism are, much as he doubts that previous philosophy has properly understood what reason is. Therefore, if there is something that Hegel’s PN can offer to science, it is a rigorous account of the rational structure of Nature. In concrete terms, this amounts to a metaphysical account of Nature that approaches Nature as what it determines itself to be instead of what it is determined to be by methods that are external to it, such as the scientific method. But is there not already a field of study that investigates the metaphysical commitments of science? There is, it is contemporary philosophy of science.14

Philosophy of science is a broad field of study and there are within it a wide range of philosophical positions. However, a prevalent position is a commitment to the scientific

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11 Hegel, PN, §270 R.
12 Hegel, PN, §312 R.
13 Hegel, PN, §330 R.
14 Importantly, there is not a monolithic metaphysics in contemporary philosophy of science. There are various strains, ranging from Quiniean naturalised metaphysics, see: Willard Van Orman Quine, “On what there is,” Review of Metaphysics (2 (5), 1948), 21–38; James Ladyman, Don Ross, David Scurrrett, and John Collier, Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), to more metaphysically “ambitious” approaches that place modality at the centre of their account, see, E. J. Lowe, “The rationality of metaphysics,” Synthese (178, 2011), 99–109. It would be of great interest to examine the diversity of the kinds of metaphysics employed in philosophy of science and to bring them into conversation with Hegel’s ontology. However, such an examination would be a thesis in its own right and so I cannot explore it here.
method as the standard of truth, to varying degrees, and the legitimising of any metaphysics by ‘methodological continuity or similarity with science’. This commitment is rooted in the Quinean turn towards a naturalised metaphysics which insists that metaphysics ‘must be responsive to the natural sciences’. Thus, a large portion of philosophy of science is characterised by its adherence to the results of science and the scientific method, in one way or another. Indeed, this methodological commitment is most vividly perceived in the application of scientific virtues to metaphysics as a way of justifying it, i.e. simplicity, explanatory power, consistency, fruitfulness, and even empirical adequacy. This is a brief sketch of the activity of philosophy of science and I by no means suggest that all philosophers of science are committed to this view. Nevertheless, there is a broad commitment to preferring metaphysical explanations that exemplify the virtues of scientific explanation. Philosophy of science, the field of philosophy that comes closest to doing what a philosophy of nature does, takes the results of science and the scientific method as its own standard of correctness.

15 ‘Those who reject metaphysics outright do so in the name of science; others grudgingly give it room at the table as long as it respects the authority of science; but even many of those who assert the autonomy or primacy of metaphysics hitch their defense of its legitimacy to its methodological continuity or similarity with science’, (Zanja Yudell, “Introduction,” in Metaphysics and the philosophy of science: new essays, ed. Matthew Slater and Zanja Yudell (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017)), 2).
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 I make this claim with great caution. I am indebted to an email exchange with Dr. Samuel Kimpton-Nye who confirmed that, broadly speaking, philosophers of science would identify themselves as being committed to the preferment of metaphysical explanations that exemplify the virtues of scientific explanation, though they would differ greatly in how they cashed out that commitment. I am also grateful for having been directed to a recent article that argues against precisely this assumption in philosophy of science: Otavio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski, “Troubles with theoretical virtues: resisting theoretical utility arguments in metaphysics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (v.101, no. 2: 2019), 456-69.
19 See further: ‘The key to solving such problems is, I hold, scientific explanation: the high-level laws, probabilities, and entities are endowed with ontological significance by their role in making sense of the world. Science carves them out of the fundamental-level substrate to take advantage of their explanatory power, rather than to admire their metaphysical curves’, (Michael Strevens, “Ontology, complexity, and compositionality,” in Metaphysics and the philosophy of science: new essays, ed. Matthew Slater and Zanja Yudell (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017)), 41); ‘Once we have our classes of models, how do we decide between competing theories, each of which purport to represent the same feature of the world? Assuming that the competing scientific theories are approximately empirically equivalent, or at least empirically acceptable, selection of a theory over its competitors is determined by a mix of desiderata, including its overall explanatory value, which is evaluated in part by its simplicity, elegance, and fit with already accepted theories, intuitions and assumptions’, (Paul, L. A. “Metaphysics as modeling: the handmaiden’s tale,” Philosophical Studies ((160: 2012)), 11); ‘A realistic picture of science leaves room for a metaphysics tempered by humility. Just like scientists, metaphysicians begin with observations, albeit quite mundane ones: there are objects, these objects have properties, they last over time, and so on. And just like scientists, metaphysicians go on to construct general theories based on these observations, even though the observations do not logically settle which theory is correct. In doing so, metaphysicians use standards for choosing theories that are like the standards used by scientists (simplicity, comprehensiveness, elegance, and so on). Emphasizing continuity with science helps to dispel radical pessimism about metaphysics’, (Theodore Sider, “Introduction,” in Contemporary debates in metaphysics, ed. Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne, and Dean W. Zimmerman ((Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008)), 24); see also, Juha Saatsi, “Explanation and explanationism in science and metaphysics,” in Metaphysics and the philosophy of science: new essays, ed. Matthew Slater and Zanja Yudell (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), 164-9, who provides a long list of advocates for this view. Saatsi is also an interesting example of
Contrary to this, Hegel’s *PN* does not take the scientific method as its standard to understand Nature. The reason for this is that the scientific method presupposes its object of study and the method by which it can come to know it.\(^{20}\) Hegel’s *PN*, on the other hand, does not presuppose that Nature is an object of philosophical examination but it deduces that it is. What this means for Hegel’s ontology is that we understand Nature as that which Nature proves itself to be. The scientific method, on the contrary, is not something internal to Nature but is a method that works remarkably well at making observations and predictions about Nature. Therefore, where philosophy of science is bound up within the field of science and beholden to it for its own standards of correctness, the approach of Hegel’s *PN* for understanding Nature is determined by what Nature itself proves to be, *i.e.* the *PN* articulates “the logic of Nature” itself (see Chapter 2 and 3 for my account of the development of the *SL*, the *PN*, and the methodological approach to their study).

Now, I started this chapter by considering a view of Nature that has been prompted by the climate crisis. One question to ask of a philosophy of nature is: does it have any implications for the ethical and existential quandary in which we currently find ourselves? This question is tackled by Alison Stone in the final chapter of her study on Hegel’s *PN*.\(^ {21}\) Ultimately, Stone does not think that the *PN* provides us with a normative ethical theory of how we should treat Nature.\(^ {22}\) I agree with Stone. Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that the *PN* offers an approach that takes Nature as it is in-itself and not as something that is purely in relation to humans. This framework could form the foundation of a normative ethical theory for how we should treat Nature, though at that point, one would have to go beyond the *PN* and, maybe, beyond Hegel. For example, the development of Spirit out of Nature in Hegel’s system underscores the essential relation between humans and Nature. Again, this does not provide us with a normative ethical theory for how we should, for example, treat organic Nature (trees and wildlife), but it does alert us to the fact that we are ontologically related to organic Nature, and that we would become fundamentally different beings were organic Nature to disappear. From this point of

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\(^{22}\) See: Stone, ‘Ultimately, I believe, Hegel’s rationalist conception of nature falls short of the phenomenological criterion of theoretical adequacy which he himself suggests. In particular, his rationalist conception, although allowing us to see all nature’s component forms as intrinsically good, also entails that humans have no responsibilities to preserve or respect natural entities (as becomes apparent in Hegel’s political philosophy).’ (Stone, *Petrified intelligence*, 136).
departure, then, a normative ethical theory that argues for the existential dangers that such an ontological re-positioning might post could be fruitful. Ultimately, any ethical theory for how we should treat Nature that is based on Hegel’s philosophy will be centred on the human being since the kinds of ethical and existential concerns that surround the climate crisis require self-conscious, free, beings that are able to reflect on the situation and to make moral evaluations regarding it. None of this is present in the PN. There is no moment of self-consciousness or explicit freedom in the PN – any ethical regard for Nature will always have to be posited externally of Nature on Nature’s behalf. On this point, it is worth suggesting that a more fruitful environmentalist ethics might be found in the Philosophy of Right. Hegel repeatedly stresses that the state is responsible for the care of its citizens, citing such concerns as ‘public health’, and although he does not specifically address the environment one could say that the present-day concerns about public health, amongst others, can take the form of environmental concerns.

I think that Hegel’s PN does have something to contribute to modern science and contemporary environmental concerns. The PN deduces Nature and develops it according to what Nature itself proves to be. It does not presuppose what Nature ought to be and it does not presuppose a method for how Nature could be understood. Regarding contemporary environmental concerns, the PN could provide the foundation of a normative ethical theory for how we should treat Nature by providing a philosophical account for the essential relation between human beings and Nature, and the existential threats that would be faced in light of any alterations in that relation. These are ways that the PN might have something to say to both Hegelians and non-Hegelians that are concerned with contemporary issues. However, before the PN can deliver on its promises, we must first look to the SL, the foundational text of Hegelian ontology that gets the project off the ground. Clarifying the development of the SL

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23 It is also for this reason that Hegel would not be particularly helpful for theorists of animal rights. According to Hegel, only self-conscious, free beings that are able to posit their own rights and thereby the rights of other self-conscious, free beings, have rights. For Hegel, then, animals do not have rights. See: ‘Personality essentially involves the capacity for rights and constitutes the concept and the basis (itself abstract) of the system of abstract and therefore formal right. Hence the imperative of right is: ‘Be a person and respect others as persons.’’, (G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: OUP, 2008), §36).

24 Hegel is reported to have said: ‘The oversight and care exercised by the public authority aims at being a middle term between an individual and the universal possibility [afforded by society] of attaining individual ends. It has to undertake street-lighting, bridge-building, the pricing of daily necessities, and the care of public health. In this connection, two main views predominate at the present time. One asserts that the superintendence of everything properly belongs to the public authority, the other that the public authority has nothing at all to settle here because everyone will direct his conduct according to the needs of others. The individual must have a right to work for his bread as he pleases, but the public also has a right to insist that essential tasks shall be properly done. Both points of view must be satisfied, and freedom of trade should not be such as to jeopardize the general good’, (Hegel, PR, §236, Add.).
into the PN and whether it is successful will not only lead us to a clearer understanding of Hegel but will also furnish us with a notion of Nature as it is in itself. This notion of Nature is one in which Nature is not just brute materiality but is both materiality and rationality.\(^{25}\) In what follows, I outline my original approach to what I call the SL-PN relation and contrast it with a brief overview of what commentators in the literature have written about it so as to bring out the distinctive character of my view.

1.1 The Project: PN as Ontology

My thesis has two, related, objectives. First, I aim to give an account of the development of the SL from the Objectivity section to the Idea section.\(^{26}\) Second, having provided an examination of the development up until the end of the SL, I give a novel account of the move from the SL to the PN. Ultimately, I argue that there is dialectical continuity between the SL and the PN, that this dialectical continuity necessarily entails that the PN is a continuation of the project of ontology that begins with the SL, and that the PN develops according to the same methodological tenets of the SL. Broadly, then, Nature is not to be understood as either purely material or purely ideal but as material-idealist whereby each determination of Nature, such as space, is simultaneously the physical thing that surrounds us and a determination of thought. In what follows, I outline the fault lines of my interpretation and contrast my position to others in the literature.

In this thesis, I interpret the SL as an ontology: it investigates the determinations of thought and being. Thus, when we investigate the determination of the mechanical object in Mechanism, we are not merely investigating what our determinations of mechanical objects

\(^{25}\) Despite the appearance of being an outmoded project, the philosophical inquiry into the possibility that rationality is a part of Nature has some notable contemporary exponents. For example, see: ‘The inescapable fact that has to be accommodated in any complete conception of the universe is that the appearance of living organisms has eventually given rise to consciousness, perception, desire, action, and the formation of both beliefs and intentions on the basis of reasons. If all this has a natural explanation, the possibilities were inherent in the universe long before there was life, and inherent in early life long before the appearance of animals. A satisfying explanation would show that the realization of these possibilities was not vanishingly improbable but a significant likelihood given the laws of nature and the composition of the universe. It would reveal mind and reason as basic aspects of a nonmaterialistic natural order’, (Thomas Nagel, Mind & Cosmos: why the materialist neo-Darwinian conception of Nature is almost certainly false (NY: OUP, 2012)), 32); and more recently, see: Winfield, Conceiving nature after Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, 1-13.

\(^{26}\) Henceforth, Objectivity and Idea.
are but, in fact, are investigating how they are in themselves. Our investigation of the determinations of thought and being proceeds according to three methodological tenets: presuppositionlessness, immanence, and sublation (more of which in Chapter 2 and 3). Over the course of the SL the determinations of thought and being become more and more determinate. In broad strokes, the SL is divided into three Doctrines: first, the Doctrine of Being in which the determinations of thought are immediately related to each other; second, the Doctrine of Essence in which the determinations of thought are mediated by each other; and third, the Doctrine of the Concept in which the determinations of thought are both immediately related to each other and mediated (see pg.65 for an explanation of these terms), which results in a new kind of relation that is called “self-determination”. The first determination of the Doctrine of the Concept is the Concept, which is a determination of thought that relates to itself as itself. My account begins with Objectivity, the second section of the Doctrine of the Concept wherein the self-determination of the Concept has proven that it is no longer a self-relating, self-determining determination but is an externally relating, externally determining determination. As Objectivity unfolds, in Teleology (the third chapter of Objectivity), the Concept becomes gradually more and more self-determining and distinguishes itself from the externally relating and indifferent moment of Objectivity. Objectivity concludes with the Concept and Objectivity in a simple unity, this is the Idea. Throughout the Idea, the Concept relates to Objectivity in different ways, though the overarching theme of this relation is that it is always the Concept, as the moment of activity [Tätigkeit] that has the urge [der Trieb] to relate to Objectivity, which is external and indifferent [gleichgültig]. This culminates in the Absolute Idea, where the final determination of the SL, the system determines itself as self-externality or Nature. By having gone through the development of the determinations of the Concept and Objectivity, then, we will have understood (1) why the final determination of the SL is the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity, (2) why externality is a logical determination that is integral to the development of the Concept and Objectivity and, therefore, (3) why the self-externalisation of the system into Nature is a logical move. Having understood this, we will then be in a position to understand the final moment of the Absolute Idea: the move into Nature.

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27 Throughout this thesis I put determinations of thought and being in italics, the mechanical object, to distinguish them from the ordinary usage of the words, and I put chapter headings in italics and capitals, Mechanism.

28 Objectivity italicised refers to the logical determination and is distinguished from Objectivity that is the second section of the Doctrine of the Concept.
In Chapter 10, I will examine the final two pages of the SL, where the move into Nature is outlined. The move into Nature receives just a single chapter for two reasons. First, a fundamental, methodological, aspect of comprehending it requires us to carefully go through the development of the Concept and Objectivity and so there is a continuation between chapters 4-9 and Chapter 10. Second, because Hegel does not actually dedicate a chapter to the move into Nature but rather includes it as the conclusion of the Absolute Idea. In the conclusion of the Absolute Idea, then, the development of the determinations of thought and being does not stop at the system; rather, I think that the investigation of the determinations of thought and being within the domain of pure thought has come to an end. The system is the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity; each side is equally the other in a self-relating unity. What this means is that when the Concept relates to Objectivity it is immediately relating to itself as the Concept and itself as Objectivity. Nevertheless, despite their absolute unity the fact that they relate to each other means that they are two different sides. Because of this difference there is now a moment of negativity within their self-relation. This negativity is expressed by “sublation”. Sublation is an aspect of thought that becomes apparent from the beginning of the SL. The negativity of a determination means that it is not simply at rest with itself but that it is also something different to itself. Since thought proves to be dialectical, i.e. each determination of thought proves to have a moment of negativity that is part of what it is as a determination of thought, then the development of thought is the movement of one determination to another. Sublation is the aspect of thought whereby the development of thought, the expression of the moment of negativity in thought, is the preservation of the determinations of thought in other determinations of thought (see pp.51-2). Thus, the difference of the self-relating system is expressed by a moment of self-sublation: if they are different through their self-relation then the expression of that difference must bear on the source of the difference, i.e. their self-relation. Self-relation that is different to itself necessarily leads to external-self-relation — we account for the moment of difference by expressing the self-relation as external self-relation. The reflexivity of the sublation means that that very reflexivity is preserved within the new determination. The determination that follows from the self-sublation of the system is the self-external Idea. This is Nature. Nature is the Idea whose moments relate to each other as external moments. Nature, then, is a continuation of the SL, but is distinguished from it by the fact that it investigates the determinations of thought and being in their self-externality. The self-

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29 This is also why it is no longer the absolute idea but just the idea in Nature. Because the absoluteness of the absolute idea was based on the self-relation of its moments.
external idea, then, is not a determination of our thoughts but is a determination of Nature as it is. There are two aspects of this reading that are new to the literature. First, I give an original account of the reasons for why the logical determination of the system necessitates its move into self-externality by paying special attention to the development of the Concept and Objectivity, because it is ultimately the self-sublation of their absolute unity that leads into Nature. Second, I give a novel conceptualisation of the determination of Nature as material-ideal, where matter and the ideal are not in opposition to each other, as in Schelling, but are in a speculative identity.

Above, I provided a summary of how I read the SL, how I read the move into Nature, and how I understand the determination of Nature. I go into more detail on these themes in Chapter 2, 3, and 10 where I give my account of the SL-PN relation. In what follows, I give an overview of the various positions on the SL-PN relation in the literature. This will help to distinguish my view from the dominant views in the literature.

1.2 An Overview of Engagements with the SL-PN Relation

In this section I will present three interpretations of the SL-PN relation from a period beginning with John Burbidge (1996) and ending with Alison Stone (2005). The reader may note that I have chosen to engage with secondary literature that is, on average, 20 years old. This is because interest in the move from the SL to the PN has dwindled since Stone (2005). For example, in more recent scholarship on the SL, such as Pippin (2019) the move to the PN is only briefly discussed in the final three pages, whilst the problematic does not appear at all in Ng (2020). One reason for the omission of more recent scholarship, then, is simply that the interest in the question of the SL-PN has declined since 2005. However, I do not only engage with these older works because they are the most recent works that focus on the topic. In fact, I think that it is essential to engage with them because the issues that they highlight have yet to be properly assimilated into, and dealt with by, Hegel scholarship. I aim to fill this lacuna by offering a thorough appraisal of their views and, ultimately, a rejection of them followed by my own positive thesis of the move into the PN.

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30 Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s realm of shadows, 319-22.
I begin with the non-idealist position that states that $SL$ and $PN$ are radically other than one another. This view is defended by John Burbidge and William Maker.\(^{31}\) The essence of this view is that as the realm of pure thought, the $SL$ must be independent from all domains of non-thought, in this case, Nature. Therefore, there is no logical continuity between the $SL$ and the $PN$, and the relation between thought and Nature is one of radical otherness. To take Burbidge’s view as an illustration, in the activity of thinking about Nature, thought can apply its determinations, i.e. finitude, contingency, mechanism, chemism, etc. to natural phenomena as a way of conceptualising what they are. But the application of these determinations is not guided by conceptual necessity but conceptual affinity. Phenomena that appear to be contingent are ascribed those categories, but there is no necessity or certainty in these ascriptions because of the radical otherness between thought and Nature. In short, the determinations of Nature are not a continuation of the development of the $SL$.

Second, there is the idealist view that the $SL$ has investigated the fundamental determinations of thought and being, and that what we investigate in the $PN$ is nothing more than a recapitulation of the $SL$. This view is defended by Edward Halper.\(^{32}\) According to Halper, we do not have to cordon off the domain of pure thought from Nature to save its autonomy, rather we must incorporate Nature into the domain of pure thought so as to guarantee its autonomy and completeness. But how do we preserve the completeness of the $SL$ in the move to the $PN$ if the domain of pure thought is complete at the end of the $SL$? Halper’s solution is to think of the determinations of $PN$ as not new determinations, since that would undermine the completeness of the $SL$, but as new combinations of determinations from the $SL$. Specifically, he suggests that we should think of this combination as having the structure of absolute idea + determination from the $SL$. The $PN$, then, would begin with, absolute idea + pure being, and would continue to follow the sequence of the $SL$, i.e. absolute idea + pure nothing, absolute idea + becoming, etc.

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Finally, there is the objective-idealist view. This view is defended by Dieter Wandschneider and Alison Stone. Unlike the non-idealist view, this view asserts a dialectical continuity between the SL and the PN, and unlike the idealist view, it asserts that the dialectical continuity leads to new determinations. The specifics of this view are that the concept of Nature is the negative unity between the non-ideal and the ideal (to use Wandschneider’s language) or matter and thought (to use Stone’s language). In both cases, the point is clear: the development of Nature is the development of a rational or ideal moment with a non-rational, material moment. As the PN progresses, then, the moment of rationality becomes more explicit and dominant over the non-rational, material moment, reaching its pinnacle with the “Organism” and leading into “spirit” in the Philosophy of Spirit.

I have chosen to deal, primarily, with these three views because they represent the most detailed engagements with the SL-PN relation in the literature. I think that each of these views is mistaken in its attempt to make sense of the relation, although in interesting and different ways. Burbidge and Maker fail to appreciate the identity that is continuous between the SL and the PN, as well as being guilty of importing determinations such as “radical otherness” into their explanations. Halper, on the other hand, fails to appreciate the difference that is generated by the move into the PN. Both of these views have as a fundamental concern the autonomy and completeness of the SL. I think that these are important tenets of the SL but that they have been misunderstood. Autonomy and completeness are by-words for independence and I think that independence is guaranteed by presuppositionlessness and immanence, not by radical separation or by radical effacement of difference (see 10.2.3 for a more detailed explanation of this). Finally, the view presented by Wandschneider and Stone comes closest to mine insofar as both think that there is dialectical continuity between the SL and the PN. However, I think that they are mistaken in conceptualising the determinations of Nature as the opposition between rationality and non-rationality. Such a reading comes closer to Aristotle or Schelling, as I will show in the next section, than to Hegel.

Of course, Hegel is not the first philosopher to give a philosophy of Nature. He is one in a rich ancestry of philosophers who have understood the importance of Nature for their theoretical projects and who have tackled this task in importantly different ways. Getting an idea of how other philosophers approached the problem of Nature will put Hegel’s project into

a wider context and will, I hope, make his project seem less bizarre. In the next section I have chosen to summarise the philosophies of Nature of Aristotle, Kant, and Schelling. I have chosen them because they wrote works explicitly concerned with Nature. The structure of the following subsection will be a brief description of the core tenets of each philosopher followed by how they are similar to or different from Hegel’s PN.

1.3 A Brief History of a Philosophy of Nature: Aristotle, Kant, and Schelling

What Hegel understood as the philosophy of Nature was clearly different from the many iterations in the history of philosophy that sought to explain the rationality within the natural world. Nevertheless, we can place Hegel within a philosophical tradition that tries to give an account of the rational, that is either merely apparent or real, in Nature. The questions and concerns that each tradition faced are importantly different and constitutive of the kinds of accounts they give to explain the fundamental structure of Nature. My aim is to give an overview of the different ways that philosophers have conceptualised Nature with the aim of providing a context for the significance of Hegel’s conception of Nature.

1.3.1 Aristotle

Aristotle’s Physics seems like the natural precursor to Hegel’s PN: Aristotle is the first figure in Western philosophy to approach Nature as a topic of study in-itself. He takes Nature to be ordered and knowable; a self-developing totality; and a development that is exhibited in a succession of stages. The aim of this section is to elucidate the basic tenets of Aristotle’s Physics and to compare them to Hegel’s. To this end, I follow Helen S. Lang’s study, The
Order of Nature in Aristotle’s Physics, which, amongst other aims, gives an overall appraisal of Aristotle’s project in the Physics.

Lang focuses on three related aspects of Aristotle’s conception of Nature. 1) Nature is that which is itself the relation between mover and moved (i.e. self-moving in a specific sense); 2) the relation between mover and moved is the relation between the potentiality of Nature and the actuality of Nature: what a natural object potentially is moves towards what it actually is; and 3) the relation between mover and moved, potentiality and actuality, can also be understood as the relation between matter and form. The matter of the natural object moves towards its form, thus actualising itself and coming to rest as what it is in actuality.

For Aristotle, conceptualising Nature begins with his first philosophy, with the basic categories of being, since anything that is anything has to be one of the aforementioned categories, which, as Aristotle shows in other texts, have motion intrinsically. Thus, Nature is essentially motion and change.

“For when something changes, it inevitably does so in respect of substance or quantity or quality or place, and, as I say, it is impossible to conceive of anything which these categories all share which is not itself either a substance or a quantity or a quality or a member of one of the other categories.”

The reason why Aristotle identifies Nature with the principle of change and stability, then, is because anything that is is made up of the categories of being which have motion and change as a fundamental feature. Since a natural object can only be defined or explained with respect

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35 Whilst I use Lang’s study as my guide through Aristotle’s Physics, it is by no means the only resource I have used in trying to understand and render Aristotle’s philosophy. Terence Irwin, *Aristotle’s first principles* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), has been a great aid. However, the focus of that study is to disclose the method of Aristotle’s philosophy by focusing on how he employs the notion of “dialectic”. Irwin engages with the Physics regularly but does not explore Aristotle’s treatment of the subject as his treatment of Nature, rather, he is interested in it from the macro-perspective of how it aligns with Aristotle’s method. The importance of Lang’s study, for my purposes, is that her engagement with the *Physics* is specifically motivated by the question: how did Aristotle understand Nature?
36 Here, again, I follow Lang: ‘Being falls immediately into the categories (Metaphysics TV, 2,1004a5). That is, there is no being apart from or prior to the categories that somehow comes to be present in them; rather, being is in the categories immediately and non derivatively’, (Lang, *The order of nature in Aristotle’s Physics*, 56).
38 Lang prefers to refer to the object’s state of “rest” rather than “stability”. For an informed discussion of an object at rest, see: Lang, *The order of nature in Aristotle’s Physics*, 48-50.
39 Lang confirms this reading: ‘Because (a) motion and change are found within the categories of substance, quality, quantity, and place, and (b) there is nothing apart from these categories, motion can be neither defined nor explained apart from these categories of being’, (Lang, *The order of nature in Aristotle’s Physics*, 56).
to the categories of being, since anything that is anything is necessarily one of these categories of being, it follows that the fundamental principle of Nature is motion.

But what causes motion in Nature? Aristotle writes: ‘The nature of a thing, then, is a certain principle and cause of change and stability in the thing, and it is directly present in it — which is to say that it is present in its own right and not coincidentally’\textsuperscript{40}. Nature, then, or the “nature of a thing” is that which is the reason for why something changes or is stable. Moreover, it is “directly present in it” and is not present “coincidentally”, which tells us that the principle of change and stability is immanent to the nature of a thing. As Lang puts it, ‘nature is uniquely defined by an intrinsic active orientation of the moved, potency, toward its mover, actuality’\textsuperscript{41}.

Thus, for Aristotle, it is this intrinsic movement within Nature that makes it what it is, and which causes both change and stability. What is essential to Nature, then, is motion.

The question now is, what is moved? Lang suggests that the principle and cause of change and stability is the movement from what a natural thing is potentiality to what it is actually, at which point the natural object is no longer changing but is stable: ‘Motion is a relation...between mover and moved’\textsuperscript{42}. The seed that is potentially the tree changes or moves itself towards itself as a tree, and once it is a tree it ceases to move and remains stable as actualised. Lang also couches the terms of potentiality and actuality in the familiar language of matter and form:

‘form acts as an object of desire - indeed, form is a final cause when it acts as a principle of motion - and matter immediately desires form as its nature and definition. Matter is potential and is moved by form because it is actively oriented toward its proper form’\textsuperscript{43}

The form of the tree acts as the principle of change or motion that impels the matter of the seed to move towards its form or to actualise itself. Importantly, whilst it is matter that moves it is the form that gives matter the impetus to move. The primacy of form over matter can also be gleaned from the text, Aristotle writes: ‘Form is a more plausible candidate for being nature than matter is because we speak of a thing as what it actually is at the time, rather than what it

\textsuperscript{40} Aristotle, \textit{Physics II}, 192b20.
\textsuperscript{41} Lang, \textit{The order of nature in Aristotle’s Physics}, 48.
\textsuperscript{42} Lang, \textit{The order of nature in Aristotle’s Physics}, 56.
\textsuperscript{43} Lang, \textit{The order of nature in Aristotle’s Physics}, 53.
then is potentially.\(^{44}\) **Form**, then, is that which causes the movement of the **matter** of the natural object because the **form** of a natural object is what is actual and what is actual is what there is in Nature.\(^{45}\) It can be said that Nature is self-moving, but in a subtle sense: insofar as a natural object is the **matter** that is moving towards its **form**, the **potential** that desires self-actualisation, it generates its own movement, but this movement is between two different moments of the natural object. It is a movement from **matter** to **form** and not just the self-movement of the natural object with itself.

To summarise, Aristotle’s conception of Nature can be understood in three related terms. 1) The fundamental principle of Nature is motion because anything in Nature is an instance of the categories of being, which have motion within themselves. 2) This self-movement, however, is not simply a movement from itself to itself, it is not a motion of identity, but a movement from **potentiality** to **actuality** or **matter** to **form**, and so is a movement of difference. 3) **Form** enjoys a primacy over **matter** because it is **form** that impels **matter** to move towards it, to self-actualise.

Let us briefly consider how Aristotle’s conception of Nature is similar and different to Hegel’s.\(^{46}\) Hegel’s notion of the dialectical development appears to follow Aristotle’s notion of self-movement,\(^{47}\) though what it is that is moving is importantly different. Whereas for


\(^{45}\) This reading is supported by Lang: ‘There are two reasons why nature is more properly identified with form than with matter: (1) a thing is what it is more properly when it is actual than when it is potential - in this respect nature and art are alike: there is nothing artistic about a potential bed or natural about flesh, blood, and bones that are not yet specified by form (193a32-193b2); and (2) form is that toward which a thing tends or grows (193b7-19). In short, form is a thing not as derivative or accidental, but as complete and as specified by the definition. And nature is just that’, (Lang, *The order of nature in Aristotle’s Physics*, 51).

\(^{46}\) Alfredo Ferrarin’s excellent comparative study, *Hegel and Aristotle*, stands out as an obvious resource for answering this question. Chapter 7 of that book, “Aristotelian and Newtonian Models in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature”, deals with the similarities and differences between Hegel and Aristotle in their respective conceptualisations of different stages of Nature. However, whilst it is hugely instructive to know how Aristotle and Hegel agree on their conceptualisation of the organism and differ on their conceptualisation of space, to take but two examples, it is not the immediate concern of this introductory subsection: Alfredo Ferrarin, *Hegel and Aristotle*, (Cambridge: CUP, 2001).

Another useful resource for appraising the similarities and distinctions in Hegel’s and Aristotle’s conception of Nature might be found in Hegel’s discussion of the *Physics* in his lectures on the history of philosophy. Hegel goes through the books of the *Physics*, giving an account of the themes presented in each one. Unfortunately, however, he makes almost no reference to his own *PN* and does not engage in a critical reflection on the *Physics* but mostly summarises it. Therefore, contrary to what one might expect, it is not a particularly useful resource for understanding the kinds of philosophical disagreement with the *Physics* that Hegel might have had. I, therefore, focus on Lang’s account of the *Physics* and will conclude this subsection with some remarks regarding the main similarities and differences between Aristotle and Hegel.

\(^{47}\) Indeed, Hegel praises Aristotle for precisely this: ‘Thus he comprehended nature as life, i.e. as that which has its end within itself, is unity with itself, which does not pass into another, but, through this principle of activity, determines changes in conformity with its own content, and in this way maintains itself therein. In this doctrine Aristotle has before his eyes the inward immanent end, to which he considers necessity an external condition. Thus, on the one hand, Aristotle determines nature as the final cause, which is to be distinguished from what is luck or chance; it is thus opposed by him to what is necessary, which it also contains within itself; and then he
Aristotle the movement is from matter to form or potentiality to actuality, the development of Hegel’s concept of Nature is the development of the self-external Idea. There is no general distinction between two terms (matter and form, for example) that underlies the motion of Nature. There is no overarching structural relationship that explains the development of Nature, each natural object develops according to its specific determinations — whereas for Aristotle, all natural objects move and change according to the above mentioned structure. These determinations are not systematically divided into matter and form or potentiality and actuality but are particular developments of the self-external Idea. Moreover, whilst form has primacy over matter insofar as it impels it to move towards form, there is no such distinction within Hegel’s concept of Nature. The impetus for motion, the dialectic, is internal to any moment and so it is equally present amongst all the moments of Nature. Thus, whilst Hegel and Aristotle agree on the self-movement of Nature, they disagree on 1) the conceptual scaffolding of that self-movement, and 2) the reasons for the self-movement.\footnote{48}

Another point of similarity is that both thinkers locate the rationality of the self-motion of Nature in a prior, more fundamental account of reality. For Aristotle, the principle of Nature is motion because that is the principle of the categories of being, of which Nature is an instantiation. Similarly for Hegel, Nature develops dialectically because it proceeds from the SL, which has shown that the fundamental determinations of being develop dialectically and have continued into Nature. However, here again, there are some crucial differences. Firstly, Aristotle connects the categories of being to Nature because ‘[i]t would be absurd, however, to try to prove that nature exists, since it is evident that there do exist many things of this sort’\footnote{49}, and if Nature exists then it must exist in accordance with the categories of being. Hegel’s approach, however, deduces Nature as an object of philosophical study. Importantly, he does not deduce that Nature exists but that the study of Nature follows logically, methodologically, from the study of pure thought. The significance of this is that Hegel shows why Nature is dialectical, whereas Aristotle merely assumes that Nature must have motion as its fundamental determination because everything that exists must be based on the categories of being. Hegel’s PN, therefore, improves on Aristotle’s, by showing within his system that Nature is necessarily related to the SL.

\footnote{48} If I have understood Aristotle’s position correctly, then, his analysis of Nature comes very close to the Objective-Idealist position of Nature that I ascribed to Wandschner (2000) and Stone (2005), whereby the essential self-movement of Nature is expressed by the movement of one thing to a different thing, rather than, as I will argue, the same self-movement of the self-external Idea.

\footnote{49} Aristotle, Physics, 193a1.
The next major philosopher to devote attention to providing a metaphysical explanation of natural phenomena is Kant. One natural point of departure for examining Kant’s philosophy of nature is the second half of the *Critique of Judgement*, “The Critique of Teleological Judgement”. There, Kant is concerned with organisms and the *appearance* of inner purposiveness that organisms display; in particular, he is concerned with the antinomy teleological judgement that is produced by two conflicting modes of comprehending nature. The one mode: ‘All production of material things is possible in terms of merely mechanical laws’, and the other mode: ‘Some production of material things is not possible in terms of merely mechanical laws’. The tension between purely mechanistic explanations of material things and the fact that some material things cannot be explained by purely mechanistic relations is certainly a central one in any philosophy of Nature, and it is clear that it is a pressing problem for Kant. Nevertheless, the reason that this tension is a problem for Kant in the first place is because of the primacy of matter and motion, *i.e.* the stuff of mechanistic explanations, as presented in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*.

The aim of the *MF*, according to Michael Friedman, is to provide a metaphysical basis for Newtonianism. Let’s clarify what Kant is *not* doing in the *MF*. He is not trying to give an...
"a priori" deduction of Newton’s mathematically derived theory of motion, *i.e.* he does not aim to provide the *a priori* principles that govern the actuality of why things move as they do. Rather, he wants to provide the necessary metaphysical background that explains why Newton’s mathematically derived theory of motion is possible in the first place. If the *Critique of Pure Reason* aims to give the conditions of possibility for any object of cognition in experience, then, the *MF* aims to use the metaphysical scaffolding of the *CPR* to explain the mathematical amenability of objects of experience to Newton’s theory. This brings us to the first aspect of how the first critique plays a role in Kant’s philosophy of nature: the pure intuitions of time and space, which make experience of the empirical world possible. Crucially, the pure intuition of space provides the necessary condition of the *a priori* science of geometry: ‘Geometry is a synthetic *a priori* science, in other words, precisely because our pure intuition of space is a subjectively given *a priori* condition for all appearances or objects of experience’. The *a priori* intuition of space, along with the *a priori* science of geometry, form the bedrock of what Kant explores in the *MF*: the bodies that move through space.

In the preface to the *MF* Kant speculates on the possibility of an *a priori* deduction of the objects of outer sense and the objects of inner sense. For Kant, there can be no deduction of the objects of inner sense, thoughts, (such objects also include intuitions and the products of imagination). With the objects of outer sense, however, the matter is quite different since geometry is the *a priori* science of space and it is upon this foundation that Kant will develop become amenable to a mathematical (rather than merely metaphysical) *a priori* treatment’, (Michael Friedman, *Kant’s construction of nature: a reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (Cambridge: CUP, 2013), 32).

56 ‘A metaphysical foundation provides a priori principles governing the existence or actuality of things, while a mathematical foundation provides a priori principles governing their real (as opposed to merely logical) possibility’, (Friedman, *Kant’s construction of nature*, 27).

57 Henceforth, *CPR*.

58 ‘Time plays a less central role in Kant’s “doctrine of body” than space. Even though time is equally *a priori* to space, Friedman notes that space is crucially prior to time: “This is especially true of the refutation of idealism, of course, which argues that even my knowledge of my own mental states in inner sense is only possible on the basis of my perception (my immediate perception) of external material bodies located outside my mind in outer sense. And the more general point, as we have seen, is that space and geometry play a privileged constitutive role in making experience or empirical knowledge first possible. In terms of the constitution of experience, therefore, outer sense is prior to inner sense. As Kant explains in the preamble to the refutation of idealism, his proof aims to show “that even our inner experience (which was not doubted by Descartes) is only possible under the presupposition of outer experience” (B275)’, (Friedman, *Kant’s construction of nature*, 5).

59 Friedman, *Kant’s construction of nature*, 4.

60 ‘Since geometry cannot apply in any substantive way to the object of inner sense, there can be no proper science of this object (the soul). Consequently, there can be no metaphysical foundations of natural science applying specifically to the soul – no Kantian explanation of how our supposed knowledge of the soul is grounded in a priori principles governing both concepts and intuitions. Our empirical knowledge of the contents of inner sense, to the extent that we have such knowledge, rather presupposes (like all empirical knowledge or experience in general) “the form and the principles” of outer intuition’, (Friedman, *Kant’s construction of nature*, 6).
his ‘doctrine of body’\textsuperscript{61}. Crucially, then, it is only phenomena that are amenable to mathematical constructions that can be the subject matter of a philosophical investigation that seeks to explain the conditions of their possibility.\textsuperscript{62}

The title given to Kant’s doctrine of body that is amenable to mathematical explanation is the doctrine of motion [\textit{Bewegungslehre}]:

‘The basic determination of something that is to be an object of the outer senses had to be motion, because only thereby can these senses be affected. The understanding traces back all other predicates of matter belonging to its nature to this one, and so natural science is either a pure or applied doctrine of motion throughout’\textsuperscript{63}

It is with the introduction of motion that the pure intuition of time makes a reappearance since it is only with time that the movement of objects in space can be experienced. Of course, it is not just the pure intuition of time that is central to Kant’s theory of motion;\textsuperscript{64} as Friedman shows, Kant relies on a wealth of material from the \textit{CPR} to develop his account of motion.

To conclude, Kant’s investigation into the metaphysical conditions of bodies in Nature finds expression in the doctrine of motion. The metaphysical justification for enquiring after this doctrine is provided by the first critique, in the pure intuitions of time and space, in the table of the categories, and in the analogies of experience, amongst other places. Why is the enquiry of the \textit{MF} directed toward motion? Simply put, because Newton’s theory of the motion of matter requires a metaphysical explanation for why it is possible in the first place; and the reason why Newton’s theory of the motion of matter requires an explanation is because it is a theory that is developed according to the \textit{a priori} science of geometry, and thus is a theory that is not only amenable to metaphysical explanation, but one that requires it. Thus, the most basic principle of Kant’s philosophy of Nature is that the possibility of the motion of objects in

\textsuperscript{61} Friedman, \textit{Kant’s construction of nature}, 5.

\textsuperscript{62} A useful example can be found in Kant’s doubt that chemistry could be amenable to \textit{a priori} deduction: ‘Kant goes on to argue that chemistry (unlike pure physics or the mathematical theory of motion) will “only with great difficulty” ever become a proper science (470–71) and that the situation is even worse in psychology’, (Friedman, \textit{Kant’s construction of nature}, 6).


\textsuperscript{64} That the pure (or general or mathematical) doctrine of motion is thereby connected with the category of causality, and thus with the analogies of experience, clarifies the sense in which this doctrine figures crucially in the \textit{a priori} grounding of \textit{experience} in Kant’s technical sense’, (Friedman, \textit{Kant’s construction of nature}, 11).
Nature is given to them *a priori* by virtue of being objects that are constrained within the epistemological limits of Transcendental Idealism, as outlined in the first critique.

Kant’s philosophy of nature bears some remarkable similarities to Hegel’s. Like Kant, Hegel opens his *PN* with space, also including a dialectic of geometry within the development of space, before introducing time. Thus, despite core methodological disagreements, both think that space (and with it, geometry) and time, are foundational concepts in Nature. Hegel is, perhaps, most overtly aligning himself with Kant in the 1817 edition of the *PN* which begins with “Mathematics” and not “Mechanics”, as it will come to be.\(^65\) Whilst Hegel changed his mind regarding the fundamental sphere of Nature from “Mathematics” to “Mechanics”, a change that is certainly significant, he did not change his mind regarding what the initial determinations of Nature are.

That said, I think that this is where the similarities end. The most important difference between them must lie in their methodologies. Both Kant and Hegel engage with Nature as something that logically follows from their accounts of first philosophy. However, it is crucial that we understand the phrase “logically follows” in each context. For Kant, Nature follows because of Newton’s geometrical proofs of the motion of bodies, and the *a priori* relation of geometry to the pure intuition of space. Thus, whilst Kant investigates the metaphysical conditions of possibility that make Newton’s discovery possible in the first place, his motivation to investigate Nature is not because the first critique makes it necessary but because of considerations external to it. Hegel, on the other hand, investigates Nature because it is made necessary by the *SL*; in other words, there are reasons that are internal to the *SL* that make the investigation necessary that are not dependent on concepts, such as “motion”, that are simply presupposed in the *MF*. Importantly, this does not mean that Hegel ignores the results of empirical science in his *PN*; indeed, he most emphatically does not, but the results of natural science are not what guide the *PN* (see 2.5 for a discussion of this). Another important difference is that, even though both think that space and time are the most basic concepts of Nature, the ways in which they conceptualise them are fundamentally different. For Kant, space and time are the pure *a priori* intuitions, without which experience of the world would be impossible; crucially, they are *our* intuitions, and they represent how we intuit reality. On the

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\(^65\) Clearly, then, the notion that the *PN* should begin with “Mathematics” was a very short-lived one since in the 1819/20 Winter Semester lectures on the Philosophy of Nature Hegel refers to the first section as “Mechanics”. For a detailed engagement for the reasons behind this change see: Wolfgang Bonsiepen, “Hegels Raum-Zeit-Lehre: dargestellt anhand zweier vorlesungs-nachschriften,” *Hegel-Studien* 20 (1985): 9-78.
other hand, for Hegel, space and time are not just moments of our cognitive apparatus through which we experience the world but are real aspects of the world itself.

### 1.3.3 Schelling

F. W. J. von Schelling engaged directly with Kant’s critical philosophy, and developed his own philosophy of nature that was partly indebted to Kant and that partly transcended Kant. I will focus on Schelling’s *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie* (and the *Einleitung* which was published one month later) as it is in this work that Schelling first explicitly understands Nature as independent of mind and as self-productive.\(^66\) I begin by setting out the problems that Schelling inherited from the transcendental philosophy and how his strategy to deal with them resulted in his philosophy of nature.\(^67\)

Schelling’s philosophy of nature is a response to the subject-object distinction that is at the core of transcendental philosophy.\(^68\) The subject-object distinction enunciated by transcendental philosophy required the philosopher to give an account of how these two distinct domains could relate to each other. In other words, *how* is it that objects conform to our cognition given the difference that sunders them? Up until 1799, Schelling was able to espouse the Fichtean legacy of grounding the *apparent* self-production of Nature in the self-production of the mind. Before 1799, then, Nature was entirely dependent on the mind, and it was the mind’s property of self-relation that gave Nature the appearance of self-production. Schelling’s novel contribution to the philosophy of nature in 1799 was to reverse this picture.\(^69\)

Schelling was dissatisfied with the transcendental philosophy because it could not ground the possibilities for its own experience, *i.e.* what grounds the initial self-positing of...

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\(^{67}\) There is much intellectual background that authors in the literature have stressed as being essential to understanding the reasons behind Schelling’s particular conceptualisation of Nature, however, for the purposes of this section I must forego a detailed exposition of Schelling’s gradual detachment from Fichte, and his gradual alignment with the works of Herder and Goethe. For an informed discussion of this topic, see: Frederick C. Beiser, “Part IV: Schelling and absolute idealism,” in *German idealism: the struggle against subjectivism, 1781-1801* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 463-596; Dalia Nassar, “Part three: Schelling,” in *The romantic absolute: being and knowing in early German romantic philosophy, 1795-1804* (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2014), 157-257.

\(^{68}\) Beiser, *German idealism*, 510-1.

\(^{69}\) ‘In other words, it is Fichte standing on his head’, (Beiser, *German idealism*, 507).
Fichte’s self-reflective I? Instead of focusing on how the mind generates Nature, then, Schelling decided to think about Nature as independent of mind; not as if it were independent of mind but as independent of mind. Thus, liberated from mind, Schelling was able to think of Nature as being self-productive because it is self-productive, and not because it reflects the self-productivity of mind. By positing that Nature is self-productive of its own accord, Schelling had granted a minimal degree of rationality to Nature. Such an image of Nature was in sharp contrast to the dominant mechanical understanding of Nature. Crucially, however, Schelling did not simply replace the mechanical understanding of Nature with his organic conception because Schelling took the results and implications of the mechanical philosophy seriously. He worked mechanistic processes into his organic conception of Nature as the simplest, and least rational aspect of Nature, and organic processes as the most complex and most rational aspect of Nature. Mechanistic processes exist and they do explain aspects of Nature, but they are now part of a larger picture: not a larger mechanistic picture of the universe, but an organic picture of Nature where mechanistic processes are a moment of the self-production of Nature.

Thus, Nature is both that which produces itself and that which is produced. Commentators conceptualise this opposition in subtly different ways but the general point is uncontroversial: Nature is the opposition between its moment of self-production and its moment of being a product. On the one hand, an organism is a self-producing whole that develops according to its own ‘lawful productivity’. The “lawful productivity” of the organism is Schelling’s way to capture the duality of necessity and freedom in the organism. As self-productive, the organism is the creator of its own laws and so freely creates them. However, its adherence to those laws is a necessity and so it cannot freely ignore them. Therefore, the organism is free in the production of its laws and bound by necessity in its adherence to them. I elaborate on the relationship of freedom, necessity, and contingency.

70 ‘While Fichte repeatedly emphasizes that philosophy can only be transcendental (i.e., its goal is to examine the conditions that make experience possible), Schelling comes to argue that a transcendental procedure fails to account for its own possibility. Thus, while Fichte claims that philosophy must begin with the self-reflective I, Schelling maintains that this I presupposes an original positing or causality and thus cannot serve as the foundation of philosophy’, (Nassar, The romantic absolute, 187).

71 ‘Mechanism is then simply the negative side of life, its lowest stage of organization and development’, (Beiser, German idealism, 516).


73 Compare Fischer, “Freedom as productivity in Schelling’s philosophy of nature”, 56-8, with Nassar, The romantic absolute, 201-2.

74 Fischer, “Freedom as productivity in Schelling’s philosophy of nature,” 57.
Further down, for now it suffices to briefly explain what “lawful productivity” is. The organism, then, is self-productive in its lawful productivity. On the other hand, the organism is a determinate something and so is a product that is produced by something else. The organism, and indeed, Nature, is thus the opposition between the dynamic moment of self-production and the static moment of being a product.

This picture is slightly different when it comes to inorganic material. Inorganic material also shares in this opposition between self-production and product, but the moment of self-production is located outside of the inorganic object. According to Fischer, ‘While an inorganic object also acts according to necessity, it is not governed by its own particular nature, but by the general and universal laws of nature’\textsuperscript{75}. Thus, the moment of self-production and lawfulness in inorganic material comes from the totality of Nature. Crucially, this does not mean that the inorganic material is other to Nature. The rock is just as much a part of Nature as the plant and that is because the rock is natural in a wider sense, \textit{i.e.} it is a part of Nature as a whole. All of Nature, then, for Schelling, is the opposition between self-production and being a product, and Nature is self-productive insofar as it is itself the source of the natural laws through which there are, and must be, inorganic objects. Such objects might not be self-productive themselves, but they are made necessary by the self-productivity of nature. In the previous paragraph I touched on the idea that the self-production of Nature is “lawful productivity” and I briefly explained that despite the self-production being a “lawful” one that it is nevertheless a free self-production. I must now expand on this and substantiate the point concerning the dimension of necessity in Nature.

The self-productivity of Nature guarantees that Nature is free. Nature is its own moment of self-production and so is not conditioned by anything outside of it. The freedom of Nature, then, is opposed to its moment of being a product.\textsuperscript{76} The opposite side to Nature’s freedom, then, is its moment of being a product. For Schelling, freedom is conceived as that which is dynamic and self-producing and as opposed to what which is static. Freedom is also opposed to necessity. Part of Nature’s freedom is that it freely legislates itself. The self-production of Nature means that the laws of nature are immanent to its being. Nature must follow these laws necessarily but in abiding by its own laws it is being free Nature. Therefore, freedom and necessity in Nature are bound up with each other in much the same kind of opposition as \textit{natura naturans} and \textit{natura naturata}.

\textsuperscript{75} Fischer, “Freedom as Productivity in Schelling’s philosophy of nature,” 61.
\textsuperscript{76} See: ‘freedom is opposed to determination or fixity, and yet freedom must always be combined with some amount of fixity’, (Fischer, “Freedom as productivity in Schelling’s philosophy of nature,” 59).
Finally, there is also room for contingency in Schelling’s account of Nature, though a rather deflated notion of contingency. According to Schelling, Nature does not develop according to contingency but only freedom and necessity. The only place where contingency can be found is in the perspective of inorganic material for whom the free, self-producing organisms of Nature do not just follow the law or necessity of Nature but also their own self-producing, free, natures. Organic material, therefore, merely appears contingent to inorganic material. Contingency, then, is a merely external and relative aspect of modality and not an actual mode of the development of Nature.

For Schelling, then, Nature is at its core the opposition between self-production and being a fixed product. Nature is also fundamentally rational in-itself, i.e. it is not posited by the mind as being rational merely because it is a reflection of the mind but it is rational. Nature is also free because of its moment of self-production and this moment of freedom is opposed to its moment of fixity: thus, Nature is the opposition between the free, self-moving production of itself and its moment of stability. Implicitly, then, Schelling is aligning freedom with unconditioned self-movement. Nature, however, is not just free, it also develops according to necessary laws. Crucially, these laws are self-legislated, they are immanent to the self-production of Nature. Nature adheres to these laws because its freedom is not an arbitrary freedom that whimsically legislates but because what it is for it to be free is for it to self-legislate and adhere to its laws. Finally, there is no room for a full and proper concept of contingency. It is only from the perspective of inorganic material that the freedom of organic material appears contingent. Nothing occurs in Nature contingently but only according to the free self-production and the (free) lawful necessity of the organism.

Schelling’s philosophy of Nature has some striking resemblances to Hegel’s. Beginning with how they are similar, unlike Kant, Schelling and Hegel think of Nature as being rational in itself and as exhibiting this rationality by being something that self-develops or self-produces. Both thinkers incorporate mechanical processes as being part of the reason of Nature and both conceptualise it as being the lowest form of reason in Nature. This is where the similarities end, however. Hegel thinks that contingency genuinely exists between externally relating natural objects. Crucially, their logical development is not contingent, it is necessary. But when we think of Nature in some respects, such as space, we know that since space relates

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77 As Fischer notes, ‘the organism, by contrast, is governed by its own particular laws, it appears contingent from the standpoint of inorganic nature. It is not merely determined by nature’s general laws, and so it is “contingent” with respect to the general laws of nature. But it is not lawless, since it is self-governed’, (Fischer, “Freedom as productivity in Schelling’s philosophy of nature,” 61).
to itself as self-external, that the moments of space are necessarily related to each as contingent. Next, Schelling and Hegel conceptualise the development of Nature differently. Schelling conceptualises Nature as being the self-production of the dynamic moment of Nature and the static moment of Nature, whereas for Hegel there is no such oppositional dynamic that explains the self-production or rationality in Nature. Nature is certainly dialectical and, therefore, dynamic, but the moments of the dynamism are not Schellingian. There is no overarching categorial opposition that explains Hegel’s conception of Nature — each moment of Nature expresses a different determinate relation (I will explain this in greater detail in Chapter 10). What I can say, however, is that the first moment of Nature is not an opposition between a dynamic moment and a static moment but is a moment that has both stability and dynamism within it. Ultimately, the reason for this lies in Hegel’s exploration of dialectic in the SL, and it is because the SL necessarily leads into Nature that Hegel is justified in thinking that Nature is dialectical.

1.4 Summary of Chapter 1

In this chapter I have claimed that I read the SL as an ontology, i.e. a philosophical examination of the fundamental determinations of thought and being, that the development of the SL is presuppositionless, immanent, and dialectical, and that the development of the SL into the PN is a continuation of the examination of thought and being. I argue for these claims in Chapter 2.

Thus, my reading is distinguished from previous readings in two principal ways. First, unlike the non-idealist and the idealist readings of the PN, I eschew the dichotomy between thought and being and suggest that the PN is an ontology that examines the determinations of thought and being. Second, unlike the objective-idealist reading of the PN that conceptualises the dialectical development of the PN as the tension between the ideal and the non-ideal or thought and matter, I do not think that there is such an overarching structure that explains the development of Nature. Instead, as I argue in Chapter 10, the system sublates itself and becomes self-externality, i.e. Nature. The first determination of Nature, then, is the self-external Idea. The determination of self-externality is real self-externality, it is the self-externality that surrounds us all, and it is also rational self-externality because it is part of the necessary development of the speculative identity of thought and being. Finally, the determination of self-externality has negativity within itself and it is because of this negativity that the PN develops,
but this negativity is not between the *Concept* and *Objectivity* or the ideal and the non-ideal, rather it is the specific negativity of self-externality that develops according to its determinations.

Finally, Hegel’s conception of Nature, as I have outlined it here, is importantly different to previous, notable, philosophies of Nature. Unlike Aristotle and Schelling, who conceive of the intrinsic motion or development of Nature to be the movement between potentiality and actuality or a moment of self-production and a moment of stability, Hegel’s *PN* shows us that the development of Nature, whilst dialectical, cannot be characterised by a single overarching tension but that it takes on a unique form in each determination of Nature. Unlike Kant, who takes space and time to be *our* intuitions, the *PN* shows us that space and time are objectively real determinations of Nature and that we can know them in-themselves. Finally, unlike all three of the above, Hegel’s investigation of Nature is motivated neither by the obvious existence of Nature nor by the mathematical constructions of Nature that require metaphysical buttressing for the conditions of their possibility. Nature is examined as a determination of thought and being because the study of thought and being necessarily leads into Nature.
2. Hegel’s Project

In Chapter 1, I discussed the contemporary relevance of Hegel’s PN, presented my reading of the SL-PN relation, and gave a brief overview of previous philosophical engagements with the PN. I mentioned in section 1.1 that I read the SL and the PN as an ontology. I also mentioned that I think that the SL and the PN develop according to the same methodological tenets. I explore these two points in this chapter. First, I give an account for why I read the SL as an ontology and I contrast my reading to other ways of reading the SL. Second, I engage with the potentially problematic assertion by Hegel that the PN must have the empirical sciences as its presupposition, an assertion commonly taken to undermine any (strong) metaphysical readings of the PN. I do this by showing that the SL and the PN must have presuppositions but must proceed presuppositionlessly.

2.1 The SL as Ontology

The SL is the methodological precursor to the PN. If we are going to be presuppositionless, a methodological tenet that I examine in 2.2, then we must approach the PN by way of the SL.¹ I read the SL as the examination of the determinations of thought and being. In other words, a determination of thought is not just something that resides in thought but is also something that has being. For the sake of simplicity, this ontological view can be broadly construed as a “Hegel is doing metaphysics” view,² with some important caveats between interpreters, mostly notably

¹ Thus, I disagree with Schelling’s remark that ‘it was not the Logic, but rather the Idea of the philosophy of nature and of spirit which Hegel already found before himself, that could attract the attention which Hegelian philosophy has attracted. There is nothing earth-shaking about the Logic’, F. W. J. von Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 154. I cannot say whether contemporaries of Hegel found the PN more interesting than the SL. However, Schelling misses the point regarding the importance of the SL. The PN is not possible without the SL and, in fact, it is only because the SL is so “earth-shaking” that the PN is possible in the first place.

² This reading of the SL as an ontology has steadily received more and more support in the literature. See: ‘Ontologie kann aber gerade als denkende Entfaltung dessen gelten, was dazu, dass überhaupt etwas ist, notwendig gehört. Sie unterscheidet sich damit von einer Inventarisierung dessen, was man bloß als seien antrifft, weil davon nicht ausgemacht ist, dass zwischen ihm und dem Sein eine notwendige Verknüpfung besteht. Ließe sich aber zeigen, dass zum Sein als solchem Leben, Erkennen, Handeln, Freiheit und Geist dazugehören, wäre damit erwiesen, dass es sich bei der Existenz von Derartigem nicht einfach um evolutionäre odersonstige Zufälle handeln kann’, (Martin, Ontologie der Selbstbestimmung, 6); and most recently, see: ‘Hegel’s logic is a logic and a metaphysics in equal measure: it is the study of both thought and being’, (Houlgate, Hegel on Being, 110).
Robert Pippin. Against this view there are readings of Hegel as not doing metaphysics, most famously advanced by Klaus Hartmann, and more recently defended by Terry Pinkard. In essence, the non-metaphysical view balks at the idea that the SL guarantees the necessary development of determinations, as well as at the necessary relation between determinations and reality and, instead, insists that there is a ‘compound relation of affinity which categories or concepts bear to one another’. Thus, for Hartmann, the SL presents one possible theory for how the determinations of thought bear affinities with each other, but not any necessary relations between each other. Moreover, since the determinations are not necessarily related to the real, they can only be approximated to the real, i.e. the determination of necessity in the SL fails to grasp the full conceptual determination of necessity and, as a result, it only applies to some cases in reality. Thus, the non-metaphysical approach argues that dialectic neither shows necessary relations between determinations, nor can it assume identity of thought and being.

However, I do not think that there is sufficient textual support for the non-metaphysical view. Hegel often asserts the identity of thought and being and the necessary relation between reality and the determinations that are explored. Now, Hartmann and Pinkard might have doubts as to whether Hegel has successfully shown that this necessary relation is the case, but there can be no doubt that this is what Hegel takes himself to be doing. Consider the following excerpt from the SL:

‘No subject matter is so absolutely capable of being expounded with a strictly immanent plasticity as is thought in its own necessary development; no other brings with it this demand in such a degree; in this respect the Science of Logic must surpass even mathematics, for no subject matter has in its own self this freedom and independence.’

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3 Pippin, Hegel's realm of shadows: logic as metaphysics in the Science of logic (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).
6 Hartmann, “Hegel: a non-metaphysical view”, 104.
7 Ibid.
8 Pinkard asserts this doubt without any ambiguity: ‘The interpretation I am giving here tries to make the case that no such metaphysical commitment to metaphysical realism about concepts is implied by Hegel's system’, (Pinkard, Hegel’s naturalism, 9 ft.21).
And from the *EL*:

‘Since philosophy differs only in form from the other ways of becoming conscious of this content that is one and the same, its agreement with actuality and experience is a necessity. […] [It is] the highest goal of the philosophical science to bring about the reconciliation of the reason that is conscious of itself with the reason that exists, or with actuality, through the knowledge of this agreement.’¹⁰

The first excerpt unambiguously expresses Hegel’s view that the *SL* is unique in that its development is both immanent and necessary — unlike mathematics, for example, which begins from a set of assumed axioms, the *SL* is able to develop its subject matter immanently and, as a result, to guarantee that this development is necessary. The second excerpt emphasises the necessary relation between thought and reality: it is a necessary aspect of philosophical thinking that it is in “agreement with” reality or “experience”, and the goal of philosophy is to make consciousness aware of this agreement. Contrary to what Hartmann or Pinkard might suggest, then, not only is the *SL* a work of metaphysics but it is a work of metaphysics that takes the speculative identity of thought and being as its starting point. Moreover, the development of the *SL* does not present us with one of many possible ways in which determinations might relate to each other but with the sole necessary way, i.e. they could not develop in any other way.

A word must be said on Pippin. In his most recent work on the *SL*, Pippin presents a reading of the *SL* as a metaphysics. However, his reading of the *SL* as a metaphysics is importantly different to what I am defending. In a revealing footnote where Pippin responds to criticism, Pippin asserts that whilst he does not deny that Hegel accepts the identity of thought and being, he thinks that ‘[w]e don’t get such a claim “for free”’¹¹. In other words, the simple enunciation that thought *is* being ‘does nothing to distinguish logical (the merely thinkable) from real possibility’¹². What Pippin demands, then, is an explanation for why thought is identical to being: a metaphysical deduction for why our thoughts are identical to objects. However, such a demand ignores the very move that Hegel is making by jettisoning the Kantian distinction between thought and being and beginning from the fact that they are, in fact,

¹¹ Pippin, *Hegel’s realm of shadows*, 58 ft.47.
¹² Ibid.
speculatively identical. As Stephen Houlgate writes, in response to Pippin (1989), ‘Pippin misses the essential lesson of transcendental logic as Hegel conceives it: namely, that being can no longer be distinguished at all from what it is understood to be’\textsuperscript{13}. This is undoubtedly an assumption of Hegel’s but it is no more or less an assumption than Pippin’s assumption that there must be something that explains the identity of thought and being. Moreover, Pippin’s assumption is manifestly not Hegel’s position.\textsuperscript{14} In the second excerpt above, Hegel writes that the highest goal of philosophy is to reconcile reason with actuality, and that this reconciliation is brought about by ‘knowledge of this agreement’\textsuperscript{15}. This knowledge is philosophy itself; more precisely, it is Hegel’s SL.

Whereas the SL as the examination of pure thought has little difficulty to be accepted as an ontology, it is a different matter altogether for the PN. In this thesis, I argue that the PN is an ontology. This is important to the overall argument because if the SL does not assume the distinction between thought and being, then the move into the PN is not a deduction of matter out of thought but a continuation of the development of the determinations of thought and being. However, this interpretation risks being undermined from the start by an important paragraph in the introduction of the PN where Hegel writes that the PN has the empirical sciences as its presupposition, a claim that appears to make the presuppositionless and immanent development of the PN conditional on non-immanent presuppositions.\textsuperscript{16} This paragraph has led to a series of interpretations that claim that the PN proceeds according to the empirical sciences. I do not think that this paragraph leads to any ambiguities; in fact, I think that it accords with other parts of the system where Hegel talks about presuppositions and presuppositionlessness. In the next section of this chapter, then, I will show that §246 does not undermine my interpretation, but that the PN proceeds like the SL. I do this by first presenting the role of presuppositions and presuppositionlessness in the SL and then in the PN.

2.2. Presuppositionlessness and Presuppositions

I have said that my interpretation of the SL-PN relation means that the PN is a work of ontology, like the SL. This means that the development of the PN is subject to the same methodological

\textsuperscript{13} Houlgate, \textit{The opening of Hegel’s Logic}, 141.
\textsuperscript{14} See: Houlgate, \textit{The opening of Hegel’s Logic}, 137-43, for an examination of why Pippin’s reading of Hegel is at odds with the text; for a more recent but briefer examination, see: Houlgate, \textit{Hegel on Being}, 127-32.
\textsuperscript{15} Hegel, \textit{EL}, §6.
\textsuperscript{16} Hegel, \textit{PN}, §246, R.
tenets as the SL: presuppositionlessness, immanence, and sublation, (see pp.49-52 for my explanation of the latter two tenets). However, Hegel seems to undermine my interpretation from the beginning of the PN. Hegel writes: ‘Not only must philosophy be in agreement with our empirical knowledge of Nature, but the origin and formation of the Philosophy of Nature presupposes and is conditioned by empirical physics’\(^{17}\). This has led some commentators, like Burbidge,\(^{18}\) to support a “weak a priorism”\(^{19}\) reading of the PN whereby, ‘we must (1) learn about nature’s constituent forms from scientists, then (2) work out rationally why these forms are as they are, by tracing how they necessitate one another’\(^{20}\). According to Burbidge, then, all that a philosophy of Nature can do is to take stock of all the categories that are employed by the empirical sciences and to use the conceptual resources of the SL to discover their inner necessity. In other words, there is no presuppositionlessness or immanence.\(^{21}\) On Burbidge’s account, then, the PN must constantly be worked and re-worked to accommodate the discoveries of the empirical sciences, thus, erasing any sense of necessity in what philosophy can say about Nature. If Burbidge is right, then, philosophy cannot make a priori claims about the basic determinations of natural forms that are true irrespective of advances in the empirical sciences. Instead, philosophy must always take the discoveries of science as its lead.

Stone also identifies the possibility of a “strong a priori” reading of the PN, one whereby, ‘we must (1) work out rationally what forms nature contains, by tracing how they necessitate one another (given the initial import of the “logical idea”), then we (2) incorporate corresponding empirical claims into the resulting theory’\(^{22}\). I think, however, that she is wrong to claim that there is a real ambiguity in the text as to which of these two interpretations is genuinely Hegel’s.\(^{23}\) Stone identifies the ambiguity by showing textual support for both views. I want to argue that the text that is usually given to support the “weak a priori” view actually supports a view of the PN as both having presuppositions and being presuppositionless, (this might sound paradoxical to readers, I explain what I mean in 2.3). In other words, I think that

\(^{17}\) Hegel, PN, §246, R.
\(^{19}\) To use Alison Stone’s terminology, Stone, *Petrified intelligence*, 5-6.
\(^{21}\) ‘The contingencies of nature disrupt the systematic coherence of the logical argument [so that] for all the value of the logical analysis in providing ways of characterizing chemical phenomena, there is no one-to-one correlation. Experience alone can show what phenomena actually occur, and logic does its best to sort that confusion of data into a coherent framework’, (Burbidge, *Real process*, 164).
\(^{23}\) See Stone, ‘We hoped for clear signals from Hegel as to the correct understanding of his approach to nature, but surveying the textual evidence has only clarified that neither his general methodological statements nor the general organization of his Philosophy of Nature unambiguously support reading the work as either strongly or weakly a priori’, (Petrified intelligence, 8).
the text supports the notion that the \( PN \) is an ontology that continues the examination of the determinations of thought and being.

My reason for embarking on this line of inquiry is simple. Any claim by Hegel that the \( PN \) is not a continuation of the examination of the determinations of thought and being undermines my interpretation of the \( SL-PN \) relation. My strategy is to engage with the apparent textual ambiguity and to dispel any doubt by exploring the role of presuppositions and presuppositionlessness in the \( SL \) and the \( PN \). I begin by exploring how the \( SL \) has presuppositions whilst also being presuppositionless. Then, by clarifying how Hegel understands presuppositions to function in the \( SL \), I show that the remark that claims that the \( PN \) must presuppose the empirical sciences is no different to his pronouncements that the \( SL \) requires experience for its content. Ultimately, what I think is that both the \( SL \) and the \( PN \) require presuppositions, \( i.e. \) experience, to investigate the determinations of thought and being, and that their development is nonetheless presuppositionless, \( i.e. \) they do not develop \textit{according} to — by merely following — experience.

\section*{2.3 Presuppositions in the \( SL \)}

Hegel is explicit that the \( SL \), indeed philosophy, needs experience. Let’s look at some examples. From the “Preface to the Second Edition” of the \( SL \):

‘To exhibit the realm of thought philosophically, that is, in its own immanent activity or what is the same, in its necessary development, had therefore to be a fresh undertaking…; but this traditional material, the familiar forms of thought, must be regarded as an extremely important source, indeed as a necessary condition and as a presupposition to be gratefully acknowledged even though what it offers is only here and there a meagre shred or a disordered heap of dead bones’\(^{24}\).

\(^{24}\) Hegel, \textit{SL}, 31/19.
And in the “Introduction”:

‘Thus the value of logic is only appreciated when it is preceded by experience of the sciences; it then displays itself to mind as the universal truth, not as a particular knowledge alongside other matters and realities, but as the essential being of all these latter’.

And from the *EL*:

‘On the other hand, it is just as important that philosophy come to understand that its content…is none other than the basic content…that has originally been produced and reproduces itself in the sphere of the living spirit, a content turned into a world, namely the outer and inner world of consciousness, or that its content is actuality…. We call the immediate consciousness of this content experience.’

Hegel is conscious of the necessity of experience to his project. Within the category of “experience” he includes language, the sciences, and, indeed, the whole of what has passed in human history. The presupposition of the *SL*, then, is the whole of experience, which means that the philosopher embarks on the project of ontology with a reservoir of concepts that are readily employed throughout human life: philosophy ‘stands in no need of a special terminology’ but already begins with the necessary terms for its development. In the “Second Preface” and “Introduction” Hegel focuses particularly on language since, after all, it is the medium of thought. In the excerpt from the “Second preface”, for example, Hegel refers to the *SL* as a ‘fresh undertaking’ that requires all the ‘familiar forms of thought’ that have been developed over time and that are, to some extent, true. They are true in the way that my skeleton is really of me, but it does not provide the full picture of me. These ‘familiar forms of thought’ are a ‘disordered heap of bones’, they are bones of something real, but they have been misunderstood because the method used to assemble them was misconceived. Houlgate puts it well when he states that thoughts ‘can be given inadequate articulation in language’ and that

26 Hegel, *EL*, §6.
27 When I refer to the logical content of the *SL* I write “determinations”, and when I talk about material that we have from experience I write “concepts”. There is no logical distinction between these two things, there is only a methodological and pedagogical difference.
29 ‘The forms of thought are, in the first instance, displayed and stored in human language’, (Hegel, *SL*, 31).
the ‘role of the Logic …is to bring us to a full understanding of such categories by drawing out their immanent implications’\textsuperscript{30}. Thus these “bones” are the same as “experience”, the ‘basic content…that has originally been produced and reproduces itself in the sphere of the living spirit’\textsuperscript{31}. It is only through living and experiencing the world that we come to make use of concepts in all their practical usages. However, because we have learnt of these concepts unconsciously, \textit{i.e.} in the pursuit of activities that do not have as their end the comprehension of these concepts in and for themselves, we have not understood the proper nature of these concepts.\textsuperscript{32} This is where presuppositionlessness comes into the picture. The \textit{SL} is not presuppositionless because it begins completely from scratch, eschewing ordinary language and the content of experience, but because it doubts that our engagement with these concepts hitherto has revealed their proper nature.\textsuperscript{33} At the core of presuppositionlessness, then, is a doubt that we have understood the proper nature of our concepts and an openness to the idea that this doubt might lead somewhere new.

2.4 Presuppositionlessness in the \textit{SL}

The “Preface to the First Edition” begins with a lamentation on the state of metaphysics during Hegel’s time. With clear reference to the Kantian philosophy that sought to rid reason of its illusions, metaphysics is now little more than a historical curiosity.\textsuperscript{34} However, Hegel is not entirely hostile to Kant. In fact, in some passages of the “Introduction” he is sympathetic to the

\textsuperscript{30} Houlgate, \textit{The opening of Hegel’s Logic}, 75.
\textsuperscript{31} Hegel, \textit{EL}, §6.
\textsuperscript{32} Hegel is clear on this: ‘Nowadays we cannot be too often reminded that it is thinking which distinguishes man from the beasts. Into all that becomes something inward for men, an image or conception as such, into all that he makes his own, language has penetrated, and everything that he has transformed into language and expresses in it contains a category-concealed, mixed with other forms or clearly determined as such, so much is logic his natural element, indeed his own peculiar nature’ (Hegel, \textit{SL}, 31/20); ‘In life, the categories are used; from the honour of being contemplated for their own sakes they are degraded to the position where they serve in the creation and exchange of ideas involved in intellectual exercise on a living content’ (Hegel, \textit{SL}, 34/24); ‘the categories serve for the more exact determination and discovery of objective relations; but in this process the import and purpose, the correctness and truth of the thought involved, are made to depend entirely on the subject matter itself and the thought determinations are not themselves credited with any active part in determining the content’, (Hegel, \textit{SL}, 35/24).
\textsuperscript{33} Thus, I agree with Pippin’s appraisal of this aspect of the \textit{SL}’s aim. Pippin writes: ‘This is not, though, because we have simply been regularly mistaken, the victim of false philosophies, the wrong ideas. It is due to the inevitable partiality and one-sidedness of various ruling concepts (let us say, for shorthand, norms for explanation and justification, the normative structure of “the space of reasons”), (Pippin, \textit{Hegel’s realm of shadows}, 27).
\textsuperscript{34} Though, it should be noted, that this was not Kant’s aim. Kant sough to revise metaphysics and to put in on the path of a secure science. For a recent discussion of this, see: Karin de Boer, \textit{Kant’s reform of metaphysics: the Critique of pure reason reconsidered} (Cambridge: CUP, 2020).
Kantian concern. When discussing Transcendental Idealism, Hegel writes: ‘This philosophy also made a start at letting reason itself exhibit its own determinations’, a reference, I think, to the Kantian insight that thought can think itself, can take itself as an object, and that by doing so the dialectical nature of reason can be expressed, as it is in the “Antinomies of Pure Reason”, for example. Indeed, Hegel praises Kant for recovering the importance of dialectic in the “Antinomies”: ‘the general idea on which he based his expositions and which he vindicated, is the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity of the contradiction which belongs to the nature of thought determinations’. But here is where the praise ends. Whilst Kant did well to explore the determinations of thought and to discover its fundamental, dialectical, nature, he erred when he assigned to the dialectical nature of thought the status of an illusion of reason. For Hegel, Kant’s mistake was that he did not extend the tribunal of pure reason to the whole history of received philosophical wisdom. Writing on precisely this, Hegel rejects Kant’s certitude at the completion of logic since the time of Aristotle:

‘Now if logic has not undergone any change since Aristotle […] then surely the conclusion which should be drawn is that it is all the more in need of a total reconstruction; for spirit, after its labours over two thousand years, must have attained to a higher consciousness about its thinking and about its own pure, essential nature’.

Here, the idea is that just as thought has developed in so many other spheres — the ethical, political, and religious — it must have also developed in philosophy. Instead of just limiting his critique of pure reason to the realm of pure thought, Kant should have extended it to the whole sphere of received philosophical wisdom. Why must thought be governed by the law of non-contradiction? Why must thought be governed by the law of the excluded middle? As Hegel writes: ‘Such presuppositions as that infinity is different from finitude, that content is other than form, that the inner is other than the outer […] are brought forward by way of information and narrated and asserted rather than proved’. If we are going to call into question

35 Hegel, SL, 47/41.
37 Pippin makes the same point: ‘And yet Hegel also never tires of saying that his own theoretical philosophy is like Kant’s in that at its heart is a logic, an enterprise in which our thinking has itself as its proper object’, (Pippin, Hegel’s realm of shadows, 11).
38 Hegel, SL, 56/52.
39 Hegel, SL, 51/46.
40 Hegel, SL, 41/33.
what metaphysics has said can be known by the activity of thought then we should also call into question everything philosophy has said is a rule of thought. In other words, we should suspend all previous presuppositions about thought until they have been proven. Such a project of doing philosophy without presuppositions is the starting point of the SL.

The SL, then, must begin without any presuppositions. Hegel doubts that prior forms of philosophical thinking have grasped the proper nature of thought, and he acts on that doubt by casting aside received philosophical wisdom with the hope that such a reconstruction might lead to a more stable knowledge. Importantly, however, Hegel’s scepticism is not Cartesian scepticism. Hegel does not doubt that all of reality exists or that everything that has been learnt through philosophical thought is wrong. Rather, his doubt is focused on aspects of received philosophical wisdom that seek to delineate the boundaries and rules of thought. In effect, Hegel’s presuppositionlessness goes beyond mere doubt as it is also grounded in a self-critical, anti-authoritarian attitude. As Houlgate puts it: ‘Hegel’s philosophy presupposes as its historical condition [...] the general modern interest in freedom, self-determination, and critical self-scrutiny, [...] which he believes suffuses modern political, economic, aesthetic, religious, and philosophical life’. Presuppositionlessness does not tell us how we ought to, or ought not to think about thought. But it is something that we have to adhere to if we are going to follow the SL in the way that Hegel wants us to and it is in this sense a methodological tenet: that by not relying on received philosophical wisdom we might figure out the proper nature of thought. As we proceed through the SL, then, it is paramount that we are wary of “importing” material into the development of thought, i.e. of allowing presuppositions to creep in. This is done by adhering to a second methodological tenet: immanence (see pp.49-51).

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41 This interpretation of the SL is largely indebted to the work done by scholars, such as John Burbidge, On Hegel’s logic: fragments of a commentary (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981; Richard Dien Winfield, Reason and justice (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988); Maker, Philosophy without foundations; and Houlgate, The opening of Hegel’s Logic.
42 Here, I agree with Pippin’s own assessment of this aspect of the aims of the SL: ‘Hegel’s diagnosis of the fix we have gotten ourselves into consists in the claim that we have not properly understood how to understand ourselves and the social and natural world in which we dwell’, (Pippin, Hegel’s realm of shadows, 27). See also: Houlgate, The opening of Hegel’s Logic, 35- 42.
43 ‘Thus the beginning must be an absolute, or what is synonymous here, an abstract beginning; and so it may not presuppose anything’, (Hegel, SL, 70/68).
44 For a fuller defence of this view, see: Houlgate (The opening of Hegel’s Logic, 24-8). Houlgate writes: ‘It is clear, then, that Hegel regards his Logic as a refinement of Kant’s theoretical philosophy in two ways. On the one hand, the Logic perfects the genetic derivation of the categories that… is made necessary by Kant’s insight that the categories have their source in the understanding alone. On the other hand, the Logic presents the thorough critique of the traditional conception of the categories that Hegel thinks is demanded by Kant’s critical turn but never delivered by Kant himself’, (Houlgate, The opening of Hegel’s Logic, 26).
45 Houlgate, The opening of Hegel’s Logic, 69.
46 Hegel, SL, 43/35.
The SL, then, is founded on both the cumulation of experience and presuppositionlessness. The philosopher has one foot in presuppositionlessness, keeping unwarranted determinations at bay from the immanent development of thought, and another foot in experience, keeping an eye on the phenomena that exemplify the determinations that are derived immanently in the SL. Now, in the next section I will argue that the same is true for the PN. That the PN also has presuppositions but that it develops in a presuppositionless way.\(^{47}\)

2.5 The Presuppositions and the Presuppositionlessness of the PN

Not only is it uncontroversial that the PN has presuppositions, but it is held that the necessity of correspondence between the determinations of the PN and experience is critical and, indeed, essential for the PN to be a coherent project. I think that the reason for this boils down to the fact that the SL is about pure thought and that there isn’t an object of “quantity” that I can point to in the world, (though all objects have “quantity” as they are extended, there is not an object that is the material instantiation of “quantity”), in the same way that there is “matter” and “light”. The materiality of Nature brings the issue of adequation to the fore in a way that the non-materiality of thought does not (though, as I have argued, thought is just as material as Nature within Hegelian ontology). Nevertheless, it should be clear by now that I do not think that this claim is justified. If the PN is to be a continuation of the SL, to wit, an ontology, then it must be just as presuppositionless as the SL and the certainty of its determinations ought to be guaranteed by the necessity of the development that led to them and not by how adequately they correspond with the findings of empirical sciences. However, there is no doubt that the

\(^{47}\) My reading of the SL as presuppositionless is undoubtedly indebted to the many scholars in the field that have emphasised this aspect of Hegel’s project. See, Winfield, ‘As such, the theory of determinacy is necessarily systematic in character in the rigorous sense that for it, no topic can warrant consideration until it has been generated immanently within the self-development of categories. Whereas foundational theories move from one topic to another according to the stipulation of their author, the philosophy starting with indeterminacy can only address contents when they emerge as stages in the self-determination that follows’, (Winfield, Reason and Justice, 142); Houlgate, ‘A science of logic has to set our familiar assumptions to one side at the beginning because it is to be the very discipline that determines what it is to think and which categories and laws (if any) are inherent in thought as such’, (Houlgate, The opening of Hegels Logic, 30); and more recently, Martin, ‘Die Entfaltung voraussetzunglosen Denkens wäre damit zwar insofern „Logik“, als es ihr um den Vollzug des Denkens rein als solchen zu tun ist, das von allen empirischen Annahmen absieht. Die Logik wäre aber darum zugleich apriorische Ontologie, weil sie denkende Entfaltung dessen ist, was sich auch dann ergibt, wenn man zunächst von ihm absieht, und was insofern notwendig ist. Als Ontologie lässt sich die Logik auch deshalb verstehen, weil die reine Unbestimmtheit, von der sie ausgeht, den Minimalbegriff des Seins abgibt. Denn offenbar ist das bloße Ist oder reine „Dass“, noch unabhängig von allem bestimmten Etwas, gerade nichts Bestimmtes und fällt daher mit der reinen Unbestimmtheit des logischen Anfangs ineins. Die Logik untersucht insofern, ob und inwiefern sich aus dem reinen Dass etwas Bestimmtes ergibt, das damit zum Dass als solchem notwendig dazugehört, und ist insofern Ontologie’, (Martin, Ontologie der Selbstdetermination, 6).
PN has presuppositions and the question is: what kind of a role do they play? Let us now turn to §246:

‘Not only must philosophy be in agreement with our empirical knowledge of Nature, but the origin and formation of the Philosophy of Nature presupposes and is conditioned by empirical physics. However, the course of a science’s origin and the preliminaries of its construction are one thing, while the science itself is another. In the latter, the former can no longer appear as the foundation of the science; here, the foundation must be the necessity of the [Concept]. It has already been mentioned that, in the progress of philosophical knowledge, we must not only give an account of the object as determined by its [Concept], but we must also name the empirical appearance corresponding to it, and we must show that the appearance does, in fact, correspond to its [Concept]. However, this is not an appeal to experience in regard to the necessity of the content.’

This is the passage that is taken to show that the PN, unlike the SL, presupposes empirical science, such that its development is meaningless without it, and that it is especially beholden to showing the adequation between the determinations of the PN and the concepts of the empirical science. One can approach the apparent contradiction in the texts by suggesting that Hegel was either unclear or himself uncertain about what he thought. Instead, I want to argue that this seeming contradiction is, in fact, no more or less contradictory than the excerpts supplied earlier regarding the presuppositions and the presuppositionlessness of the SL.

In §246 R., Hegel begins by claiming that philosophy must agree with our empirical knowledge of Nature, and that the “origin and formation” [Entstehung und Bildung] of the PN is conditioned by empirical sciences. What does Hegel mean by the “origin and formation” of it? In the next sentence, Hegel draws a distinction between the “course of a science’s origin and the preliminaries of its construction”, and the science itself. The next sentence reveals that “science” refers to philosophy. Now, since “science” refers to philosophy, or to be more precise, philosophy of nature, Hegel is stating that there is a distinction between the origin and the preliminaries of the construction of a philosophy of Nature and the philosophy of Nature

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48 Hegel, PN, §246 R.
49 For an example of this presentation, see: Stone, Petrified intelligence, 2-8.
itself. The former part of this distinction is clearly related to the “origin and formation” of empirical science that conditions the PN. Thus, what it is that conditions the PN is distinct from the PN itself.

So, how can empirical science condition the PN whilst remaining distinct from the development of the PN itself. If the origin and formation of philosophy of nature is distinct from the subject of the PN, then, it must be external to it, in some sense. In other words, there is on the one hand the origin and formation of philosophy of nature and on the other hand the PN. This distinction is the same as the distinction drawn earlier in the SL between experience as a necessity for the SL and the SL as presuppositionless. Just as the SL requires experience before it can begin whilst not being dependent on it,\textsuperscript{50} so too is the development of the PN not beholden to the results of empirical science. Hegel is clear on this. In the second half of the paragraph, he writes that philosophy, “science”, has only the necessity of the “Concept” as its foundation, and that whilst the determinations of the PN that are developed must be in agreement with the concepts of empirical physics ‘this is not an appeal to experience in regard to the necessity of the content’\textsuperscript{51}. Just as the history of philosophy must have unfolded to provide the philosopher with concepts such as quantity, essence, causality, etc, so too must empirical science develop so as to provide the philosopher with concepts such as gravitation and magnetism.\textsuperscript{52} This is a distinction between the deduction of the existence of certain determinations and the deduction of their particular, material instantiations. Hegel does not deduce specifically that a tree will have quantity but he does deduce that anything that is must have quantity by deducing the proper determination of quantity as such; similarly, in the PN, Hegel does not deduce the particular, material instantiations of space but he does deduce the proper determination of space and, therefore, that space is a fundamental determination of Nature.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} ‘Insofar as philosophy owes its development to the empirical sciences, it bestows upon their contents the most essential shape of the freedom of thought (i.e. the shape of the a priori) and, instead of relying on the testimony of their findings and the experienced fact, provides their contents with the corroboration of being necessary, such that the fact becomes the depiction and the replication of the original and completely independent activity of thinking’, (Hegel, §12, R.).

\textsuperscript{51} Hegel, PN, §246, R.

\textsuperscript{52} As Houlgate notes, ‘Hegel acknowledges, therefore, that his philosophy of nature is historically indebted to the great scientists of the past, such as Galileo, Kepler and Newton: for it is their empirical discovery of rationality in nature that paved the way for that philosophy to arise’, (Houlgate, An introduction to Hegel: freedom truth and history ((Oxford: Blackwell, 2005)),116).

\textsuperscript{53} The view that I am defending here is similar to, Houlgate, An introduction to Hegel, 115-21. I, however, have approached it through the terms of presuppositions and presuppositionlessness so as to highlight the continuity of the methodological tenets of the project between the two texts.
2.6 Summary of Chapter 2

In this chapter I explored two closely related themes. First, I presented my reading of the *SL* as an ontology against non-metaphysical readings in the literature. I then went on to defend my reading of the *PN* as an ontology by presenting a reading of §246 from the *PN* that demonstrates that Hegel’s, supposedly incriminating, assertion that the *PN* must presuppose empirical science is no different to his assertion that the *SL* must presuppose experience. I do this by examining the role of presuppositionlessness and presuppositions in both texts.

The importance of reading the *SL* as an ontology and as presuppositionless is that I am not required to explain how matter is deduced out of thought in the move to the *PN*. Such a distinction is eschewed from the outset by the Hegelian project. What I am required to show, however, and what will be the topic of Chapter 10, is that the self-sublation of the *system* or the *absolute idea* necessarily leads to the determination of the *self-external Idea* or *space*.

In Chapter 3, I continue my analysis of the methodological tenets of the *SL* by looking at how immanence and sublation function. I do this by giving a brief account of the beginning of the *SL*: *pure being*, *pure nothing*, and *becoming*. Having illustrated how these tenets work I then given a synopsis of the development of the *SL* from *becoming* to the beginning of the Doctrine of the Concept. Finally, I give an overview of the development from the *Concept* to the *Syllogism*, which will prepare the groundwork for my examination of Objectivity in Chapter 4.
3. Immanence, Sublation, and the Beginning of the SL

In Chapter 2, I introduced the first methodological tenet of the SL: presuppositionlessness. I continue to investigate the methodological tenets of the SL in this chapter: immanence and sublation. I clarify what these terms mean by showing how they function in the beginning of the SL. In 3.1, I jump ahead to the Doctrine of the Concept and give a brief account of the development of Concept, Judgement, and Syllogism. This prepares the conceptual ground for the focus of this thesis that begins with Objectivity.

As I discussed in Chapter 2, presuppositionlessness is based on the self-critical belief that the proper nature of thought can be grasped if we approach thought without assuming the authority of received wisdom about how thought ought to be or how it must be. Instead, and by building on the insights of Kant’s self-critical project, Hegel’s project asks us to set aside our assumptions about what thought is and to see where that takes us.

This is where “immanence” comes into the picture. Immanence is the methodological tenet by which the SL develops. The SL begins without any presuppositions and so we begin by abstracting all determinations from thought. We abstract from our ideas of what we think thought is: we abstract substance, causality, existence, essence, and quality from our thinking because these are all assumed ideas of what thought is. The result of this is the simple activity of thought that cannot be negated because its very negation is its affirmation. We do not assume anything more to this simple activity of thought — not even self-consciousness.

1 It is important to recognise that presuppositionlessness is an externally assumed method to the project of the SL. Crucially, however, it is not assumed from the start that presuppositionlessness will lead to a more accurate understanding of the nature of thought. Thus, I distinguish between a methodological tenet and a method. A “tenet” is a belief or an idea that is considered to be very important to an individual or a group. Presuppositionlessness is a methodological tenet and not a “method” because, one, it is not assumed from the outset that it will lead to truth, and two, is based on the belief that proceeding without presuppositions might lead us to a better understanding of the SL. Immanence and Sublation merely follow from Presuppositionlessness: once we have embarked on a presuppositionless philosophy it necessarily follows that we must think categories immanently and that we must be aware of their sublation. I follow Houlgate in my reading of presuppositionlessness as a methodological tenet (my phrasing) and not a method in the scientific sense: ‘But it [presuppositionlessness] requires a self-critical openness of mind on the part of the philosopher and in that sense has a definite presupposition’, (Houlgate, The opening of Hegel’s Logic, 60). This ‘self-critical openness of mind’ is exactly what I mean by a methodological tenet, it is a belief that a self-critical attitude might lead to a more fruitful philosophical inquiry.

2 Pippin understands the SL as the science of thought thinking itself, and, in turn, understands this activity as the activity of self-consciousness. For example, ‘The structure of his book itself suggests— and this is of course not surprising in Hegel— the general shape of some kind of ever more adequate self-consciousness about the determination of a kind of conceptual content, that kind specifiable by thinking alone’; Pippin goes on to stress that he is concerned with ‘a kind of logical (not psychological) …self-consciousness’, (Pippin, Hegel’s realm of shadows, 16). There is plenty of textual support to claim that the science of thought thinking itself is a science of non-psychological self-consciousness. For example: ‘As science, truth is pure self-consciousness in its self-development and has the shape of the self’, (Hegel, SL, 49). Here, Hegel is careful to outline that self-consciousness is “pure”, i.e. not empirical or psychological, but logical. If all we mean by pure self-
the simplest determination of thought is the simple is-ness of thought and Hegel calls this pure being. We have arrived at pure being by being presuppositionless, and we will grasp what pure being is by attending to its immanence. Immanence requires us to attend to the determination of thought at hand and to just think about its characteristics without anything else.

Hegel understands pure being in the following sense: ‘Being, pure being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself (see pg.65 for a discussion of how “immediacy” is used in the SL). It is also not unequal relatively to an other’. Pure being, then, is just itself. The simple is-ness of thought is nothing more or less than a simple self-relation. We did not get to this thought by any assumptions about what the simplest determination of thought ought to be but by simply attending to the determination of pure being. Immanence, then, is a methodological tenet that logically follows from presuppositionlessness since in the absence of any assumptions we can only proceed from what is implicit in the “material” that is brought before us by thinking about it without presuppositions. Now, it is also the case that pure being might be the end of the road and that SL does not go any further than it, and this is a possibility at the start of the project. As it turns out, however, pure being is not just this simple self-relation but is something else, it is, in fact, pure nothing. Let us think about why this is the case. Pure being is just the simple self-relation of itself with itself. As this simple self-relation it is immediately itself and has no other determination. This emptiness of pure being, however, is now a further way of understanding what pure being is. We began with the idea that pure being is just the simple self-relation with itself, but now we have grasped that it is also devoid of content. This is a new determination of thought because it is something new that has been added to our thinking. This new determination is pure nothing.

Pure being, then, is pure nothing because what it is for pure being to be is for it to be empty of determination, and equally, pure nothing is equally pure being because of its very immediacy as pure and utter nothing. They are the same as each other but they are also respectively themselves. In fact, if we attend to the determinations at hand, it is clear that pure being does not develop into pure nothing, and vice-versa, but that pure being is immediately consciousness is the activity of thought thinking itself, and if we agree that that does not require us to posit an “I”, then I have no issue with Pippin calling the activity of thought thinking itself in the SL the activity of pure self-consciousness.

3 Hegel, SL, 82.
4 This is an important thing to bear in mind and is explored extensively in, Houlgate, The opening of Hegel’s Logic, 51: ‘The aim of the presuppositionless philosopher is thus not to set out to demonstrate that the thought of being generated a more complex…view of the world; it is simple to consider the indeterminate thought of being itself, to dwell with that category for its own sake, and to observe where, if anywhere, it takes us’.
5 ‘Nothing, taken in its immediacy, shows itself…as being (als seiend)’, (Hegel, SL, 101/107).
pure nothing, and vice-versa. Hegel captures this conceptual moment by writing that they vanish into each other. The fact that they vanish into each other alerts us to a new determination, their vanishing, and this vanishing between them is becoming. Crucially, in becoming, pure being and pure nothing have not turned out to be false or are cancelled out — there is no immanent reason for why this should be the case. All that we know is that becoming is the vanishing of pure being and pure nothing. Therefore, to think becoming we must implicitly think their vanishing. They are sublated in becoming.

This brings us to the final methodological tenet that is necessitated by presuppositionlessness and immanence. If we embark on this project without any assumptions, and if we proceed by attending to the immanent determinations of thought that are at hand, then, we will notice that determinations of thought are sublated. What Hegel means by sublation is helpfully explained in an eponymous “remark” to the determination of becoming. Hegel writes: ‘To sublate' has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. When something is sublated it both ceases to be what it is, but what it is is also preserved. In becoming, then, pure being and pure nothing exist as the vanishing moments that becoming is. At the same time, however, they have also ceased to be insofar as they are no longer the thought determinations at hand. Their immanent logical determination means that they develop into becoming. One could conceivably continue to just think pure being, in the manner of Parmenides, and pure nothing, but then one would not be thinking immanently and without presuppositions. Because by thinking immanently it becomes clear that they vanish into one another, and furthermore that their vanishing is a new determination of thought, since their vanishing is a point of unity. Moreover, it is by thinking immanently that the philosopher can think of sublation and can conceive of a determination as being conceptually related to previous and upcoming determinations and to grasp that no determination is ever destroyed or set aside but is always part of another determination.

6 ‘Their truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other’, (Hegel, SL, 83/83). The vanishing of pure being and pure nothing expresses their peculiar relation, namely, that they are immediately each other. Becoming will develop into determinate being, which develops into something and other. The relation between something and other is not a vanishing because something and other are not immediately each other, as is the case with pure being and pure nothing but are each the determinate others of each other. See: Houlgate, Hegel on Being, 174-9.

7 As Hegel writes: ‘They are therefore in this unity but only as vanishing, sublated moments. They sink from their initially imagined self-subsistence to the status of moments, which are still distinct but at the same time are sublated’, (Hegel, SL, 105).

8 Hegel, SL, 107.
We have looked at how immanence and sublation are essential to the SL by taking the beginning as a template. We are now ready to begin our examination of the SL and our journey to the move to the PN. Were it possible, I would give an account of the entire development of the SL so as to show that the determinations of thought and being develop necessarily into the PN, thus grounding the ambitious move to the PN from the very inception of the project. However, such a task is beyond the limits of this thesis. My account of the SL begins with the Doctrine of the Concept, the third and final book of the SL. I begin with an overview of the essential themes of the Concept, briefly analysing the three chapters that comprise it: Concept, Judgement, and Syllogism and prepare the move into Objectivity. It is from Objectivity that I begin the detailed examination of the SL.

3.1 Concept

3.1.1 Universality

The determination of becoming develops into determinate being [Dasein] and officially inaugurates the section of Quality that designates the first part of the Doctrine of Being. The Doctrine of Being is characterised by the immediate determinateness of moments: something and other, for example, where what it is for something to be is for it to be other and vice-versa — what it is for each to be itself is for it also to be its other and this is how they are immediately determined. By the end of Quality, however, there is a moment of indifference that prevents us from distinguishing between something and other. Thus, Quality is sublated since what it is for Quality to be, i.e. determinate, being this, not that, is negated by the rise of indifference. This is Quantity. Over the development of Quantity determinations prove to be essentially indifferent to their quantity (since they can get bigger or smaller without ceasing to be what they are), and there comes a point at which quantitative changes produce qualitative change.

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9 See: ‘In something, its limit as quality is essentially its determinateness. If, however, by limit we mean quantitative limit, then when, for example, a field alters its limit it still remains what it was before, a field. If on the other hand its qualitative limit is altered, then since this is the determinateness which makes it a field, it becomes a meadow, wood, and so on. A red, whether brighter or paler, is still red; but if it altered its quality it would cease to be red, would become blue or some other colour. The determination of magnitude as quantum reached above, namely that it has a permanent substratum of being which is indifferent to its determinateness, can be found in any other example’, (Hegel, SL, 186/210).
(such as when heating water turns it into steam). The unity of quantity and quality that is distinctive of a thing is its measure.⁠¹⁰ Measure, then, develops into the Doctrine of Essence. In Essence, determinations relate to each other by reflection: determinations in a reflective relation are not just immediately themselves and immediately other than their counterparts, as in Being, but are rather constituted through not-just-being-their-negation. It is this structure of not-being-what-one-is-not that Hegel has in mind with the term “reflection”.⁠¹¹ Essence, then, continues through Appearance and Actuality before transitioning into the Doctrine of the Concept. Actuality is the unity of Being and Essence, best exemplified perhaps by absolute necessity that “is because it is” (or “is because it is”). As such, necessity is what it is through itself and so is implicitly self-determining. From the implicit self-determining of necessity, then, we get the Concept that is explicitly self-determining.

The Concept is an essential determination to the story that I want to give about the development of the SL from Objectivity to the move to the PN. There are two aspects of the Concept that I will highlight. First, the Concept is fundamentally the determination of free, unhindered, self-determination. Second, the determinations of the Concept: universality, particularity, and individuality, form the basic structure of all the determinations that we will encounter. This does not mean that every determination is merely a recapitulation of the determinations of the Concept. But as we will see, the essential determinations of the Concept play a central role because the Concept forms one-side of the development from Objectivity onwards.

The Concept is the unity of Being and Essence, the subjects of the two preceding doctrines of the SL. It does not begin from scratch but is the continuation of all that occurred before and so has their determinations sublated within it. At its inception, the Concept is pure self-relation and absolutely self-identical.⁠¹² This means that there is no difference within the Concept and that it relates to itself as itself, without being mediated by something else. The Concept that is self-relating and absolutely self-identical is the universal.⁠¹³ The basic

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⁠¹⁰ See: ‘The quantum as this no longer indifferent limit but as a self-related externality, is thus itself quality, and although distinguished from it does not transcend it, neither does the quality transcend the quantum’, (Hegel, SL, 333/394).

⁠¹¹ So, for example, a “cause” is not simply and immediately itself but is itself through not-being-its-effect and thus through being mediated by its effect.


⁠¹³ As Hegel writes: “it is itself and takes its other within its embrace, but without doing violence to it […]it bears itself towards its other as towards its own self; in it, it has returned to itself”, (Hegel, SL, 603/277).
determination of universality is that it is self-identical and self-relational without the requirement of something other than itself to relate to itself.

Now, even though universality is a relation of itself with itself it nevertheless has determinateness within it. Importantly, this determinateness is part of the universal’s moment of self-relation. This moment of self-relation is a negative relation, it is ‘the infinite unity of the negativity with itself’\(^{14}\), which stems from the moment of Essence that is sublated within the Concept, and so when we grasp that the universal is freely self-relating, we implicitly state that it is a relation of itself to itself. The next step is to make this minimal moment of difference or determinateness explicit. Crucially, this difference is latent within the self-identity of the Concept — it is not externally imposed.\(^ {15}\) When we make the difference within universality explicit the moment of difference is no less or more universality itself. Thus, universality immanently develops into particularity because: 1) universality is self-relational and self-identical, and 2) the moment of difference within self-identity is native to universality and when it is expressed does not become something outside of it.\(^{16}\)

Before examining particularity, I would like to draw attention to an expression that is revealing for my account of the move to the PN. Hegel writes that the move from universality to particularity is ‘not a transition’ because it is brought about by the universality that ‘relates itself to its own self’ and it is in this sense that it ‘determines itself freely’\(^{17}\). Now, a “transition” for Hegel is a move from one determination to another, to what is other than the first. We will see this language again in Teleology, in the subjective end, and in the move to the PN. What we should retain from this is the notion that a move from self-identical universality to particularity expresses the determinateness of universality and so involves a movement from something to something else, but it is not a transition because universality is not other to particularity. It is the self-identity of universality that means that its self-determination is not a transition and I think that it is for precisely the same reasons that the move to the PN is also characterised as free and not a transition, (see 10.2.4 for my analysis of this).

\(^{14}\) Hegel, SL, 601/274.
\(^{15}\) Trisokkas offers an erudite and clear discussion of this moment. I have rendered it in a simplified form for the purposes of this chapter. Trisokkas, however, goes into great detail regarding the role of Schein in the expression of determinateness in universality, which I think gets to the heart of the matter (Trisokkas, Pyrrhonian scepticism, 131-8).
\(^{16}\) See Hegel, ‘The true, infinite universal which, in itself, is as much particularity as individuality, we have next to consider as particularity. It determines itself freely; the process by which it makes itself finite is not a transition, for this occurs only in the sphere of being; it is creative power as the absolute negativity which relates itself to its own self. As such, it differentiates itself internally, and this is a determining, because the differentiation is one with the universality’, (Hegel, SL, 605/279).
\(^{17}\) Ibid.
3.1.2 Particularity

Particularity is the moment of the determinateness of universality. The universal remains itself in its moment of particularity.\(^\text{18}\) Let us assume a universal concept of “chair”. All chairs that exist are identical within the universal and exhibit the universal determination of a chair. However, they have a determinateness insofar as they are different from each other. Some are lounge chairs and others are swivel chairs but regardless of their particular differences we can enunciate their identity because they all fall within the same universal concept. At its inception, then, particularity is self-identical with universality.

However, it immediately becomes apparent that since particularity follows from the self-determination of universality that it is actually different from it and, since we asserted above that it is self-identical with universality, it is also different from itself. Let us attend to the determinateness of the particular. The specific determination of particularity is that it is in a relation to another moment of particularity. Particularity posits particularity, or what is the same, it posits itself since although the particular stands in relation to another, different particular, it nonetheless stands in relation to another particular and so in that sense posits itself. By positing itself it makes the determinateness, which before was merely the simple determinateness of universality, a posited determinateness — the simple determinateness of universality is posited as being different to the determinateness of particularity.\(^\text{19}\) Now, we focus on the moment of difference within particularity since it is posited and we realise that whilst particularity is different to universality it is also self-identical. The swivel chair and the lounge chair are different to the universal notion of a chair insofar as the universal notion fails to capture their particular determinations and are, in this respect, self-identical as particular chairs. However, as particular chairs they are also different to each other: the swivel chair is not just self-identical with the lounge chair but is different to it. Their difference is made explicit, they are negatively related to each other because of their difference and they sublate each other. The swivel chair posits the lounge chair as different from it, and its difference is captured in the determination of individuality. The move from particularity to individuality is a move that makes explicit the difference between particulars but which also includes their

\(^{18}\) ‘The particular…not only contains the universal but through its determinateness also exhibits it’, (Hegel, SL, 606/280).

\(^{19}\) The determinateness is now ‘posited for itself’, it is ‘the determinate determinateness or absolute negativity’, (Hegel, SL, 612/288).
self-identity since the *individual* swivel chair can only be an *individual* insofar as it is different to its moment of *particularity* and *universal*.

### 3.1.3 Individuality

In one sense, then, the *individual* is the return of *universal* insofar as it is the re-unification of the moments of *universal* into a single moment. Thus, the *individual* is just as much *particular* and *universal* as they are equally each other.\(^{20}\) Each moment in being itself is immediately the other moment. Thus, *universal* and *particular* are each *individual*’s, just as *universal* and *individual* are each *particular*’s. Therefore, in one sense, the return of the *Concept* with itself in *individuality* is the return of the *Concept* with itself and is ‘the whole [Concept]’.\(^{21}\)

This sense of *individuality* that we have been unpacking requires us to think of *individuality* as identical to *universal* and *particular*. However, it is not just the return of the *Concept* with itself but the return of the *posited* determinateness of the *Concept*. As Hegel writes, it is ‘the determinate determinateness’\(^{22}\). What this means is that what it is for the *individual* to be itself is for it to be different to the moments of *universal* and *particular* because it is brought about by the positing of the *universal*’s determinateness. The chair in my office, the *individual*, is identical to the *universal* chair, as well as to the *particular* swivel chair, but it is different to both of these since its determinateness does not come from simply being a swivel chair but by being a specific swivel chair as opposed to just any swivel chair. In the determination of the *individual*, then, there is both the *universal* and *particular* determinateness that binds it to them but also its own determinateness as *individual* that is characterised by its negativity or difference towards *universal* and *particular*. How might we characterise this negativity? Hegel says that the *individual* is now external to the previous determinations: its difference to them is expressed by it being external to them. The *individual*’s negativity, between being identical to the *Concept* as a whole and being different to and external to the determinations of the *Concept*, leads to *Judgement*. I began my examination of the *Concept* by stating that a central feature of the *Concept* is for it to be freely self-relating but

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\(^{20}\) See: ‘in *individuality* [universal and particular] do not pass over into an other, but that in individuality there is only posited what they are in and for themselves’, (Hegel, *SL*, 619/297).

\(^{21}\) Hegel, *SL*, 621/299.

\(^{22}\) Ibid.
now that the individual is external to universality and particularity the determinations of the Concept no longer freely self-relate. The determinations of the Concept that relate to each other as external to each other are, therefore, in the form of a judgement.

### 3.2 Judgement

*Judgement* is the expression of the moment of difference within the Concept. The moment of difference within universality was made gradually more explicit as we progressed through particularity and individuality. In Judgement, universality, particularity, and individuality each have a role to play – they do not merely collapse into each other as in the Concept. They take on the Judgement-specific forms of subject, predicate, and copula, in various forms.\(^{23}\)

#### 3.2.1 The Judgement of Existence

We begin with the *positive judgement*.\(^{24}\) In the *PJ* the individual and the universal become the subject and predicate, and they are immediately related to each other: each is immediately itself and not the other and so they stand apart from each other as if they were independent the subject is on one side and the predicate is on the other side. The predicate is a moment of universality and the subject is a moment of individuality. Thus, we have the *PJ*: the individual is the universal or I is U.\(^{25}\)

It has been said that these moments are only immediately related to each other: the individual is itself without being the universal. However, since I is U, it is not simply the case that the individual is independent of the universal since what it is for it to be *is* the universal — thus, there is a moment of identity between them.\(^{26}\) The individual is not just individual but

\(^{23}\) See Trisokkas, *Pyrrhonian scepticism*, 247: ‘The internalization of difference has defined the judgement as the stabilized relation between the distinct terms, universality, individuality and particularity. The stability of the relation is manifested in the simultaneous exhibition of these three determinations. Such stability designates not only how the judgement comes forth immediately (or, if you will, in a context of immediacy), but also how the judgement should always present itself. The proper form and content of the judgement is a stable exhibited relation between the fundamental concept-determinations. This renders relations of simple identity as deficient manifestations of the judgement’.

\(^{24}\) Henceforth, *PJ*.

\(^{25}\) Throughout I will use this simpler form of expressing the judgement relations.

\(^{26}\) I agree with Trisokkas’s formulation of the matter: ‘While the immediate individual could be what it essentially is even if it did not relate to the universal quality, each of the latter’s instances could exist only if it inhered in one of the individuals from which the universal quality has been abstracted. The relation of the
is also *universal*, and if the *individual* is *universal*, it follows that the *universal* is also the *individual*: thus, we get the converse proposition, $U$ is $I$. The moments of the *PJ*, then, are both the *individual* and the *universal* and so are respectively unified with the other. However, they are still different to each other and so there is a moment of negation between them. Once we render this difference explicit, we are led into the *negative judgement*.27

The difference between the two judgements leads to the development of the *universal* to a particular: $I$ is $P$.28 This is because it is *particularity* that expresses the difference within the *Concept*, and if the *universal* is different to the *individual*, as the *PJ* showed, then, it must be a particular. However, this leads to the *NJ*. This is because even though $I$ is $P$ expresses the difference implicit in $I$ is $U$, *individuality* is nevertheless *universality* and so *individuality* cannot be *particularity* and must instead be not-particularity: $I$ is not $P$. By making explicit the negativity within $P$ we show that the *NJ* undermines itself. If the *individual* is neither the *universal* in the *PJ*, nor the *particular* in the *NJ*, it could only be the case that is itself. This is the *infinite judgement*.29 Consider for example, the judgement “the soul is not-mortal”, in this judgement the *predicate*, “not-mortal” cannot explain the determination of the “soul” since the *predicate* is self-negated. Because of this self-negation, the *subject* bears no identity relation with the *predicate* and so they are external to each other.

In the *IJ*, the relation $I$ is $I$ is posited as such for the first time. In this relation of posited identity, however, the *individual* is not merely itself but is posited as itself, *i.e.* it is negatively self-related. As negatively self-related, then, the *individual* does not merely relate to the *individual* as immediate but is reflected into it. Its determination as the *individual* is posited in the determination of the other *individual* and so reflected. This leads into a new moment of the *judgement*: the *judgement of reflection*. The *judgement of reflection* leads into the *judgement of necessity*, which then leads into the *judgement of the concept*. It is unfortunately beyond the limits of the chapter to give an examination of these determinations since they do not play an

27 Henceforth, *NJ*.
28 It is not entirely clear why we hold fast to the moment of *individuality* over the moment of *universality*, or the *subject* over the *predicate*. Trisokkas makes the following helpful interpretive suggestion: ‘To begin with, note that in the positive expression of the negative judgement the subject-universal has been eliminated in favour of the subject-individual. This happens because the whole dialectic of the judgement of determinate being occurs from the standpoint of the self-subsistent subject-individual. Thus, when this judgement takes a negative form, the latter is immediately re-posited from that perspective’, (Trisokkas, *Pyrrhonian scepticism*, 258).
29 Henceforth the *IJ*.
important role in the objective of the thesis. Therefore, I skip ahead to the judgement of the concept which leads into the Syllogism.

3.2.2 The Judgement of the Concept

We begin with the assertoric judgement. The ASJ is, on the one hand, the subject as a concrete individual. The individual is concrete because it has within itself the posited determinations of the Concept, i.e. universality and particularity are posited in it and, therefore, part of its identity. On the other hand, the predicate is the universal. Whilst the individual is in-itself complete, since it is the posited totality of the Concept, it is only immediately related to the predicate. The subject relates to the predicate as something that it ought to be and not as what it is because it is immediately and externally related to the predicate. In other words, it has not posited the predicate as its own but merely stands apart from it. Thus, the ASJ is contradictory because the predicate ought to inhere in the subject but it does not – it is merely an ought, something it could be. The contradiction of the ASJ leads into the problematic judgement.

What the PBJ emphasises is that the individual is contingently related to the universal. The individual might inhere in the predicate or it might not. Its contingency is based on its external relation to the predicate, and yet it is immediately related and so there is a relation. How then do we express the fact that the individual is related to the universal but that this relation is only a contingent one? We do so by making explicit the implicit division within the subject. The subject is divided into a moment of universality and particularity. Beginning with universality, the individual is divided into universality because it ought to be that universality, it is implicitly the universal. On the other hand, the individual fails to be the universal because it is only externally related to it. This means that there is an implicit moment between the individual and the universal that acts as the middle between the two and this is particularity. Because of these reasons, the individual divides into the universal and the particular. Thus, where we had I-U we now have (U-P)-U. Thus, what it is for the individual to be is the negative unity of its moment of identity with the external universality and its contingent relation with it. The moments of external universality and contingent particularity are negatively related to
each other as different and this negative relation forms a negative unity that is the individual. This structure leads into the apodeictic judgement.\[^{33}\]

The APJ enunciates the identity between the subject and the predicate: the universal is reflected into the universal, with the particular as the copula (U-P)-U. Consider, “the house constituted so and so is good”, as our apodeictic judgement. The subject, the house, has as its essential determination the possibility of being good and, thereby, of being connected to the predicate, “good”. In the APJ, then, the subject and the predicate correspond to each other as, on the one hand, the subject that has the possibility to be “good”, and on the other hand, the predicate that is the “good” that the subject could be. In the APJ, then, the subject and the predicate correspond to each other without a moment of difference. The “house” is good because it is predicated as being “good”, and “good” predicates the “house” as being good because the “house” has the determination to be predicated as being “good”. However, despite appearances, their correspondence is mediated by the copula, the particular. Since the particular is what unites the extremes of the APJ, we must make explicit the fact that they are different to each other. Moreover, since the copula has made explicit the difference between the extremes, it follows that the copula is different to the extremes because it is that which connects them. What this means is that the determinations of the APJ, the determinations of the Concept, have proven to be identically related to each other but, actually, to be apart from each other and only externally united. By making explicit the fact that each determination is immediately apart from the other whilst also externally connected to it we move from Judgement to Syllogism.

3.3 Syllogism

3.3.1 The Syllogism of Existence

Syllogism begins with the determinations of the Concept as immediately related to each other. It is I-P-U: individuality that relates to universality through particularity. Since they are immediately related, they are also externally related and so do not contain the determinations of each other in themselves and are solely self-relating. Each immediate relation, therefore,

\[^{33}\] Henceforth, APJ.
relates to each other immediately and contingently — it is contingent because each
determination is self-relating and so bears no essential relationship to any other determination
and so is contingent. For example,

I  Caius is a human being.
P  All human beings are mortal.
U  Therefore, Caius is mortal.

It is contingent which property of Caius we choose; we could have chosen his property of being
Roman. Consequently, it is equally contingent that we connect being a “human being” to being
“mortal”, and the same goes for the conclusion. We could try to focus on the discreet
judgements, (I-P and P-U), and find how they are necessarily related to each other by adding
middle-terms to each of them but this, Hegel warns, would lead to an infinite regress.
Moreover, it merely treats a syllogism as a collection of judgements. Instead, we should think
through the syllogism by making explicit the fact that in the conclusion of the syllogism
individuality is mediated by particularity to become universal. As such, individuality has both
the determinations within itself, it has both the major premise and the conclusion as its
determination. As containing both particularity and universality within itself it is, implicitly,
the middle-term between the two determinations and so we get the second figure: P-I-U.

P  All human beings are mortal.
I  Caius is a human being.
U  Therefore, Caius is mortal.

In the second syllogism, the particular has become the subject and the individual the
middle-term that joins the subject with the conclusion, the universal. The individual, then, as
that which mediated between the extremes, should both inhere in the particular (which it
cannot because inherence is the movement from an individual to its specific qualification, and
not vice-versa), and be subsumed under the universal (which it is not because subsumption
involves being a member of a class and the individual is not thus specifically qualified). The
individual is, therefore, a contingent middle-term that does not unite the extremes, which are,
consequently, indifferent and external to each other. The upshot of this is that the extremes
have a common feature and this shared determination is a moment of universality. This is what
actually unites the extremes, and so we develop from P-I-U to I-U-P. Universality is the middle-
term since it proved to be the implicit middle-term of P-I-U; *particularity* is the conclusion since it was the subject of P-I-U and so its resolution is that it is now the conclusion; and *individuality* appears as the subject because it has proven that it cannot have the determination of being a middle-term.

The determinations of the third syllogism are no longer immediately related. Now, the whole syllogism is the complete mediation of the three determinations.\(^{34}\) The relation of I-U was mediated in the first syllogism and the relation of P-U by the second syllogism. Now, the third syllogism tells us that the extremes are united by their respective moments of *universality*. Moreover, since the moments of the syllogism are now mediated, the *universality* that joins them is simultaneously the determinateness of both moments. This means that there is no criterion by which it can distinguish the different moments of the syllogism and that it is indifferent to the two extremes. Consequently, it relates to them as if they were equally identical.\(^{35}\) Thus, the syllogism I-U-P develops into U-U-U, whereby the extremes are treated as no different to each other and no different to the middle term. It is a syllogism without real relation.

The fourth syllogism or the mathematical syllogism then develops into the *syllogism of reflection*, which develops into the *syllogism of necessity*. The final moment of the *syllogism of necessity* is the *disjunctive syllogism*. This is the final form of *Syllogism* before we move into Objectivity.

### 3.3.2 The Disjunctive Syllogism

The form of the *disjunctive syllogism* is I-U-P.\(^ {36}\) Unlike the third form of the *syllogism of existence*, however, the moment of *universality* is no longer indifferent to the extremes but is *‘pregnant with form’*.\(^ {37}\) Over the course of the *Syllogism* the determinations of the Concept

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\(^{34}\) *Individual* and *universal* were mediately coupled in the first; quality [*particularity*] and category [*universality*] in the second. In its formal structure, then, it presupposes then. But equally, as dialectical and speculative reason have shown, they presuppose the intellectual operation that it represents’, (Burbidge, *On Hegel’s Logic*, 167).

\(^{35}\) Burbidge makes this point well: ‘But as thus abstracted from any conceptual differences, there is no basis on which the extremes can be distinguished as *individuals* and *particulars*. Because they are considered only to the extent that they have been abstracted by intelligence, they are all abstract *universals*. The self-identical content of the figure of universal mediation is a process of association in which all terms are equally abstract and universal’, (Burbidge, *On Hegel’s Logic*, 168).

\(^{36}\) Henceforth, *DS*.

have posited each other and have become mediated. Thus, the *universal* that unites the I with the P is now a *universal* that is both *individual* and *particular*. The *universal* is, thus, both the unity of the two extremes and that which keeps them apart. It is both identical with *individuality* and *particularity* and different from them since each moment is itself determinate. Hegel uses the following example to illustrate this difficult point. The identity of the *universal* with the extremes can be captured as “A is either B or C or D”, whilst its moment of determinate difference is the following, “But A is B”. In the former, A, the *universal*, could be identical with the other moments, but in the latter, it is only identical with one of the moments and so determinately different from the others. The DS, therefore, presents the fully posited determinations of the *Concept*.\(^{38}\)

The *Concept* that is the posited totality of its determinations is now “objective”. The objective *Concept*, then, is when the determinations of the *Concept* that are externally related in the form of the syllogism are united by their inner necessity. In other words, even though the determinations of the *Concept* are external to each other in I-U-P, their externality is not different to their inner unity. Their inner form-determinations are equally expressed in their mediated relation to each other in the DS. Their “inner form-determinations” refers to the essential feature of the *Concept* to be united with itself, thus, each determination of the *Concept* has as its essential feature an inner identity with each other determination. It is *this* inner identity that is expressed despite their external relation in the DS.

Because of this inner identity, then, the determinations are, (a) posited as being negatively related to each other, and (b) mediated by each other as the determinations of the *Concept* that essentially relate to each other. If we make explicit the posited mediation of the syllogism it becomes clear that each determination is only such ‘by means of an other’\(^{39}\). Moreover, if each determination is itself only through the other determination, then they are all equally each other and so there is no difference between them. Thus, the explicit relation is that they are immediately identical to one another. Their immediate identity, where *universality* is equally and immediately *particularity* and *individuality*, inaugurates a new section since they no longer form a syllogism. This new section is Objectivity.

In *Concept*, we saw that *universality*, *particularity*, and *individuality* were self-identical, and that their identity was based on their self-mediation. However, by focusing on their identity we failed to make explicit their implicit difference, *i.e.* *individuality* is not just

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\(^{38}\) *The whole form determination of the [Concept] is posited in its determinate difference and at the same time in the simple identity of the [Concept]*, (Hegel, *SL*, 702/400).

\(^{39}\) Hegel, *SL*, 704/401.
the same as universality and particularity but is actually external to them. We then examined the numerous inflections of the differences between the determinations of Concept, first in Judgement and then in Syllogism. The conclusion of Syllogism proved that even though the determinations of the Concept are different and externally related that they have an inner identity with each other that is founded in their essential determination, as we saw in Concept. They are, therefore, immediately identical to each other, unlike in Concept where their identity was based on absolute self-mediation: the Concept whose form determinations are immediately identical with each other is Objectivity. As we will see, in Objectivity, the Concept will gradually make explicit the implicit mediation between its form determinations, as per their essential determination, and will eventually become explicitly itself in the Idea. But, for now, let us turn to my examination of Objectivity which begins with Mechanism.
Objectivity

Objectivity is the *Concept* that has sublated its mediation and determined itself as an immediacy.¹ The first chapter that explores this new determination is *Mechanism*. For now, it suffices to say that the *Concept* that is only immediately related to itself is Objectivity. A determination that is immediate relates to another determination without mediation: there is one determination and there is another determination and their respective beings have no effect on each other. An example might help. Let us say that you have resolved to think of the colour “red”. You do not want to think of things that are red, like roses or race cars, but just the colour itself. In thinking “red” without any further determination you are thinking “red” in its immediacy. Now, let us suppose that you wish to think the colour “blue” in its immediacy without ceasing to think “red”. On the one hand, you think “blue”, and on the other hand, you think “red”. Since both determinations are held in thought at the same time, they are related to each other, but since their respective being does not affect the determination of the other, they are only immediately related. Thus, you think “red” and only “red” *and* you think “blue” and only “blue”. This is what it means for determinations to be immediately related. Let’s consider how this might look if they were mediated. If something is mediated then what it is for it to be is no longer in isolation to something else but is *through* something else. In our previous example, you were thinking “red” and “blue” in their immediacy. You now realise that, since you are thinking both “red” and “blue”, part of what thinking “red” entails is *not* thinking “blue”. Thus, “red” is not just “red” but it is also “not-blue”. Equally, “blue” is not just “blue” but it is also “not-red”. “Red” and “blue” are mediated by each other since each is itself through not being the other, whereas when we considered them in their immediacy, each was itself solely insofar as it was itself independently of the other. Similarly in the *SL* a determination is immediate when it is first thought of as independent, i.e. as if what it were for “red” to be “red” were just “red”.

¹ When I refer to the section of Objectivity the word will be capitalised and not italicised, and when I refer to the logical determination of *Objectivity* the word will be capitalised and italicised.
4. Mechanism

Mechanism explores the logical relations that develop from the Concept’s determination of immediacy. Mechanism is important to my account because going through its development enriches our broader understanding of crucial determinations regarding the move to the PN. In Mechanism we have the inauguration of the relationship between the Concept and Objectivity, whose relation is the centrepiece for the rest of the SL. As we progress through the SL, these two determinations will become more developed until they reach an absolute identity in the system at the end of the SL. It is the development of the system that will occupy Chapter 10 of this thesis, where I will examine the final two pages of the SL, where Hegel discusses the move into Nature.

Regarding the literature, Mechanism is a chapter that has typically received little attention, though it has undergone somewhat of a revival in the last decade. Most recently, it has figured in James Kreines, Gregory Moss, and Nathan Ross who offers a perspicacious exegesis of the chapter. In the German literature there have been three significant collections of essays on the SL which have included commentaries on Objectivity by Dean Moyar, Anton Koch, and Burbidge.

I should also mention the criticisms levelled at the inclusion of Mechanism within the SL. Such criticisms have existed since Hegel’s time and have found renewed exponents in

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3 James Kreines, Reason in the world: Hegel’s metaphysics and its philosophical appeal (USA: OUP, 2015).


recent years in, Klaus Düsing, Vittorio Hösle, Rüdiger Bubner. I do not find these criticisms convincing because the claim that “mechanism” does not belong to an ontology makes no sense to an interpreter who reads the SL as presuppositionless and as developing immanently. Such concerns are grounded in presupposed notions of what should and should not form part of an ontology, rather than in the cogency of the logical development that made them necessary. Since I have already defended my approach to the SL in Chapter 2, I will not say anything further on this. Instead, I further defend my position by going on to present the development of Mechanism as presuppositionless and immanent and as wholly necessary to the project of the SL.

4.1 The Mechanical Object

The mechanical object is first an immediate identity. It is immediate because it is the result of the syllogism, whose mediation has been sublated [ausgeglichen]¹⁴-¹⁵. Thus, the determinations of the Concept that comprise the mechanical object, universality, particularity

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¹² For example, Hösle stipulates that determinations of the SL ‘sollen allem Seienden als Seienden zukommen und selbstreferent sein’, and then goes on to claim that ‘der Begriff des Mechanismus ist nicht Mechanisches’: what does Hösle mean when he writes that the concept of Mechanism is not mechanical? It is clear that he is using the term “mechanical” to refer to concrete, physical, mechanical aspects, this is clear from the example that he gives regarding the intelligibility of Life as a logical determination: ‘der Begriff des Lebens [ist] nichts Lebendiges, das Nahrung assimilierte und sich fortpflanzte’, (Hösle, Hegels System, 245-6). Granting that Hösle is right to stipulate that all determinations of the SL should be self-referring, it is a presupposition that the only way for Mechanism to be mechanical is for it to behave like physical mechanical processes (much like the only way for Life to be living is for it to assimilate food and reproduce). Hösle’s error is to presuppose what counts as “mechanical” instead of following the immanent development of Mechanism which shows us what actually counts as “mechanical”. Hösle makes precisely the same criticisms against Chemism and Life. I do not deal with this point any further but try to engage with it indirectly by giving the immanent development of each of these determinations so as to defend the thesis that they do not presuppose anything outside of the SL.
¹³ For a recent defence of the place of Mechanism in the SL, see: Ross, On mechanism in Hegel's social and political philosophy, 73-8.
¹⁴ Miller is aware that his translation of ausgeglichen as “sublated” is a compromise. It is true that the mediation of the determinations of the Concept are sublated within the mechanical object. However, in writing “ausgeglichen” instead of “aufgehoben” Hegel seeks to express that each determination of the Concept has been equilibrated in the mechanical object.
¹⁵ Hegel, SL, 711/410.
and individuality, do not develop into each other but are immediately each other; as Hegel writes, it is a “universal that pervades the particularity and in it is immediate individuality”. The immediate identity of these three determinations is crucial for two reasons. First, their “identity”. In Concept (see Chapter 3.1) the three determinations are shown to be both identical and different to each other. Let us first consider this.

Consider the concept of a tree. A universal concept of a tree will hold the most essential determinations of a tree (an elongated trunk, the ability to support photosynthetic leaves or branches, etc.). In short, things that we will generally agree upon as giving “tree-ness”. Thus, it is the case that particular trees will have “tree-ness”, i.e. they will have an elongated trunk and the ability to support photosynthetic leaves or branches. This is the sense in which universality and particularity are identical, the essential determinateness of the universal concept of a tree is to be found in the particular instance of a tree. However, particular trees cannot just be understood in terms of the essential determinateness of their universal concept because that would ignore important aspects of their own being that the universal concept fails to capture. Thus, some species of trees have red leaves whilst others have green leaves. This is the sense in which particularity is different to universality. Finally, within the species of trees with red leaves there are individual trees that have red leaves (and are identical with both the universal and the particular concept of a tree) but are different from other individual trees with red leaves. For example, they might not have grown as tall as other red-leaved trees. The individual red-leaved tree is thus also different to both other individual red-leaved trees and the universal concept of trees. This is the sense in which individuality is different to universality and particularity. Yet, at the same time, all these individual red-leaved trees are still identical with the universal concept of a tree insofar as they are all trees, in a general sense. This is the sense in which the determinations of the Concept are identical. In Mechanism, however, these differences are sublated and the determinations of the Concept are identical with each other. The universal concept of a tree pervades the particular instances of trees and is identical with the individual instance of a tree. Thus, all trees are taken to be identical and differences are not observed. This is what it means to treat a concept “mechanically”.

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16 Hegel, SL, 711/410.
17 Pace Moyar who interprets the mechanical object as having the determination of individuality: ‘Die Idee der Totalität scheint… die Idee eines vollständig bestimmten Einzelnen mit sich zu führen, der Mechanismus hingegen behandelt die Totalität der Beziehungen also Beziehungen unbestimmter Einzelner’, (Moyar, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 600). However, only the mechanical object’s indifference to external determination is described as its moment of individuality: ‘it is indifferent to the determinations as individual’, (Hegel, SL, 713/412). Even in this case, however, the individuality of the mechanical object is immediately identical to the other determinations of the Concept; it is not an essential characteristic of the mechanical object.
Second, their identity is an “immediacy”. It is “immediate” because the mediation that is normal between the determinations of the Concept has now been sublated and the moments are immediately each other. Let us return to our concept of a tree. Each way of conceptualising a tree, be it through its universal, particular or individual determination, required our thinking to move through each one of the other determinations. Thus, to think of the universal concept of a tree I must have seen particular and individual instances of trees and generalised across them to reach a universal concept. Similarly, to think of the particular instance of a tree I must have a universal concept of a tree under which to understand this particular instance of a tree as a tree; and so on and so forth. If each moment is identical, however, then there is no mediated move from one way of thinking of a tree to another. The mind moves from the universal to the individual without distinction, without mediation. In fact, since they are all the same, it moves immediately from one to the other as if it were not moving at all. This is what Hegel has in mind when he conceptualises the mechanical object as a ‘universal that pervades the particularity and in it is immediate individuality’18.

It logically follows from the immediate identity of the mechanical object that it is indeterminate. It is indeterminate because the equilibration [ausgleichen] of mediation into immediate identity means that there is no ‘determinate opposition’19 within it. “Determinacy” is a way of expressing the negative relation between two logical moments that are united through their identity but also held apart because of their differences. Since there is no opposition between the determinations of the Concept then the mechanical object necessarily lacks determinacy. This conclusion is in contrast to what is presented in Kreines who claims that “Mechanism” does not begin with the Concept immanent to the object but instead with a ‘pure mechanism hypothesis’20. Not only is the Concept immanent to the mechanical object but it is the mechanical object in its immediate identity.

Thus, the mechanical object is the immediate identity of the determinations of the Concept and lacks determinacy. However, the determinations of the Concept are not simply reduced to one another since they still have a minimal degree of determinacy. Note how despite their immediate identity we are still talking of a universality that pervades a particularity, i.e. it pervades something that it is not. In fact, the determinations of the Concept are ‘essentially determinate’21, i.e. what it is for them to be is to be different to one another. This is not merely

18 Hegel, SL, 711/410.
19 Hegel, SL, 712/411.
20 Kreines, Reason in the world, 36-9.
21 Hegel, SL, 712/411.
assumed but is the result of Concept and is grounded by the SL (see 3.1). This minimal degree is an essential determinateness, with the emphasis on “essential” because of the way they relate to each other. In the Doctrine of Essence, the mode of relation was that of “reflection” and this mode of relation is preserved within the Doctrine of the Concept and a central feature of how determinations relate to each other. Thus, the determinations of the Concept are essentially determinate and have a reflection relation. But we are in Mechanism where they are an immediate identity. Therefore, the determinations of the Concept are no longer just essentially determinate but now also have a moment of indeterminacy as part of their logical structure. Their indeterminacy is at the fore since we are in Mechanism, but their essential determinacy must not be forgotten and will play an important role in due course.

The determinations of the Concept, which comprise the mechanical object, are themselves objects. There are two points to clarify here. First, each determination is itself an object because each is immediately identical and indeterminate, which is what a mechanical object is. Second, each is an object and not simply collapsed into one object because of their essential or minimal determinacy that keeps them distinct. Each object, then, as an object is a totality and, when taken all together, they form a totality: they form a totality together because of their immediate identity. Even this “greater” totality is subject to the essential determinacy of the determinations and so the mechanical object, when taken as a totality, must also be understood as a manifold or aggregate.

This brings us to the end of subsection A.1 in Mechanism. Before proceeding it will be useful to briefly summarise the salient points of the development. First, we understood the mechanical object as an immediate identity because the mediation that has hitherto been a feature of the determinations of the Concept has been sublated. Second, because of their immediate identity they were indeterminate. Third, despite their immediate identity and indeterminacy the determinacy of the determinations of the Concept is an essential aspect of their being and so the mechanical object has determinacy. Fourth, since each determination of

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22 My account of Mechanism is generally in agreement with Burbidge (2002). At times, however, it is difficult to know the fullness of Burbidge’s view on a particular moment because of the brevity of his account. For example, Burbidge expresses the tension of the mechanical object being both indeterminate and essentially determinate as a ‘Paradoxe’ (Burbidge, “Objektivität”, 231). His approach is to separate the ‘Aspekte der Totalität’ (Burbidge, “Objektivität”, 231) and the indeterminacy of the mechanical object from each other, but how he understands the “aspects of their totality”, and thus what exactly it is that is being separated from the object’s indeterminacy, is not explained. In my view, however, they would refer to the essentially determinate moments of the Concept that are the mechanical object.

23 ‘Because this indeterminate determinateness [diese unbestimmte Bestimmtheit] is essential to the object’, (Hegel, SL, 712/411).

24 With “manifold” Hegel seeks to capture the notion of unity and separateness that the mechanical object encapsulates.
the Concept is an immediate identity, and the mechanical object is itself an immediate identity, it follows that each determination of the Concept is a mechanical object. Fifth, if each object is immediately identical to each other object, then, they can also be taken together and considered as one mechanical object. Finally, conceiving of them as one mechanical object does not eliminate their essential differences, and so they are only a single totality as a manifold, i.e. they are only externally related to each other.

4.1.1 The Mechanical Object I

In A.2, Hegel introduces “indifference” [Gleichgültigkeit]. The mechanical object is indifferent because it is both indeterminate and essentially determinate. Why is the next logical step that of indifference instead of a moment that emphasises the object’s determinacy? Because we are in Mechanism where the determinations of the Concept are immediately identical and indeterminate. To emphasise their essential determinacy would be to pluck the mechanical object out of Objectivity and to drop it back into the chapter on the Concept (see 3.1). We are in Objectivity, however, and the objects are indifferent to their essential determinacy because they are indeterminate and immediately identical.

The moments of immediate identity, indeterminacy and essential determinateness, and indifference loosely follow the three determinations of the Concept. Hegel writes that the mechanical object is “in and for itself a universal”, (Hegel, SL, 711/410) when introducing it as an immediate identity: universality is understood as the moment of self-identity. Then, when describing the mechanical object’s constitution he writes that “in the object the particularity is absolutely reflected into the totality”, (Hegel, SL, 711/412); Moreover, when expanding on the mechanical object’s essential determinateness he writes that each object ‘contains its determinateness reflected into its universality and does not reflect itself outwards’, (Hegel, SL, 712/411). I read the reflected determinateness within the mechanical object as being the moment of particularity; (indeed, as Hegel writes in the first citation), since it is the moment of particularity that expresses the moment of determinateness within universality. Crucially, in the mechanical object the moment of determinateness is in tension with the moment of indeterminacy. Finally, on indifference Hegel writes that the mechanical object is ‘indifferent to the determinations as individual, as determined in and for themselves’, (Hegel, SL, 713/412). It is the moment of individuality that stands away from the moments of universality and particularity.

What does this little analysis tell us about how Hegel thinks the logical structure of the Concept functions? There are, to my mind, two possibilities. The first is that within the Doctrine of the Concept everything falls, broadly, within the superstructure of universality, particularity, and individuality. What it means for something to be conceptual is for it to be conceived through these three general structures of identity and unity (U), difference and separateness (P), and identity/unity and difference/separateness (I). The second is that these three moments of the Concept are expressing the immediate identity of the mechanical object. That as the immediate

25 McTaggart mistakenly reads the indifference of the mechanical object as pertaining to a difference between the object’s outer relation and inner nature, (McTaggart, A commentary on Hegel’s Logic, 246-7). However, Hegel explicitly warns the reader from reading relations of Essence into the mechanical object, (Hegel, SL, 712/410). The mechanical object is a totality that is indifferent to itself, and not at one moment affected (in its outer relations) and at another unaffected (in its inner nature). When determined the mechanical object is determined in its totality, not just in terms of its outer relation, and it is indifferent to its totality.

26 The moments of immediate identity, indeterminacy and essential determinateness, and indifference loosely follow the three determinations of the Concept. Hegel writes that the mechanical object is “in and for itself a universal”, (Hegel, SL, 711/410) when introducing it as an immediate identity: universality is understood as the moment of self-identity. Then, when describing the mechanical object’s constitution he writes that “in the object the particularity is absolutely reflected into the totality”, (Hegel, SL, 711/412); Moreover, when expanding on the mechanical object’s essential determinateness he writes that each object ‘contains its determinateness reflected into its universality and does not reflect itself outwards’, (Hegel, SL, 712/411). I read the reflected determinateness within the mechanical object as being the moment of particularity; (indeed, as Hegel writes in the first citation), since it is the moment of particularity that expresses the moment of determinateness within universality. Crucially, in the mechanical object the moment of determinateness is in tension with the moment of indeterminacy. Finally, on indifference Hegel writes that the mechanical object is ‘indifferent to the determinations as individual, as determined in and for themselves’, (Hegel, SL, 713/412). It is the moment of individuality that stands away from the moments of universality and particularity.
then, forms an essential aspect of its being. This reading is in contrast to Kreines who reads indifference as a ‘lack of explanatory relevance’\(^2^7\). Kreines also opposes indifference to the immanence of the *Concept* in the *mechanical object*;\(^2^8\) however, I have shown, (a) that indifference explains an aspect of the *mechanical object*, and (b) that the indifference of the *mechanical object* partially arises out of its essential determinacy, *i.e.* the immanence of the *Concept* within the *mechanical object*.

The *mechanical object* is, then, a totality that has its determinateness reflected within itself. However, it is also indeterminate and, therefore, indifferent to the determinateness that is reflected within itself. The *mechanical objects* that comprise the *mechanical object* are also indeterminate and indifferent to the reflected determinateness or essential determinacy that is fundamental to each determination of the *Concept*. Thus, *universality* is indifferent to the moment of *particularity* or the moment of *individuality*. Since they are indifferent to their essential determinacy, they are effectively external to it. External, in the sense that they do not relate to it as if it were part of their identity.\(^2^9\) An example might help to elucidate the notion of “indifference” and “externality”. Consider a teenager that rebels against his family by treating them with indifference. The teenager is indifferent to his “essential determinacy” since his family form an essential part of his identity. As indifferent, then, he behaves as if *that* part of his identity is no longer his. Since he no longer actively relates to his family as forming a part of his identity, he is related to them merely externally. However, the essential determinacy does form a part of his identity despite his indifference and externality. In much the same way, each *mechanical object* is indifferent to its essential determinacy and externally related to each other object but is nevertheless related to them because of their essential determinacy.

The *mechanical object* is, therefore, the tension between being a totality that has its determinateness reflected within itself and being indeterminate and indifferent to that essential determinacy of these three moments it is immediately an immediate identity, indeterminate and essentially determinate and indifferent. This reading also gives more explanatory power to the *mechanical object’s* essential determinacy. What the essential determinacy “does” is to express each moment of the *Concept* differently within the *mechanical object* (it is trivially true that the *mechanical object’s* moment of immediate identity is a different moment to its indeterminacy and thus expresses the difference of the *mechanical object’s* essential determinacy), all the while emphasising the *mechanical object’s* immediate identity.

\(^{27}\) Kreines, *Reason in the world*, 38.
\(^{28}\) Note that this is not to dismiss causality, or to assert that nothing really causes anything. Hegel accepts that there can be causes and effects. He is arguing that, *under the hypothesis of pure mechanism itself*, nothing could be a cause. Or, causality could not mark any contrast to mere indifference, thus supporting any superfluity of immanent concepts and the like. But Hegel will preserve reasonable causality just as he preserves reasonable mechanism: causality too will have to be understood in terms of immanent concepts and their powers’, (Kreines, *Reason in the world*, 45).

\(^{29}\) “but the form that constitutes their difference and combines them into a unity is an external, indifferent one’, (Hegel, *SL*, 713/412).
determinateness. Here, I think Ross misunderstands the source of determinacy within the mechanical object when he explains the reason for its external relations: ‘This self-sufficiency and indeterminacy of the object is at the same time a relation to what is outside of it, namely to other objects.’ 30 I have argued that the mechanical object is determinate because of the essential relation between the determinations of the Concept and despite the mechanical object’s immediate identity and indeterminacy. This is the real impact of Hegel’s treatment of Mechanism, that it necessarily has as its background assumption the Concept: a pure, concept-less Mechanism is not to be found in this chapter but in the Doctrine of Essence. 31

The mechanical object is indifferent to the very determinateness that grounds its being, because there is no mechanical object without the essential determinateness of the determinations of the Concept. 32 Nevertheless, what it is for a mechanical object to be is for it to be indifferent to its essential determinateness. This means, as we saw above, that it relates to its essential determinateness as something external to it. Thus, the tension between each object’s essential determinacy and their indeterminacy is resolved by “externally moving” their essential determinacy. Each mechanical object necessarily relates to each other mechanical object but that relation is a merely external one. To relate to one another is to determine one another, which effectively means to negate the determinateness of the other with one’s own and in the process to receive the other’s determinateness within oneself. Consider our angsty teenager. By negating his essential determinacy he negates his connection to his family but does not thereby become independent from them but instead relates to them in a purely negative sense, as “part of what he is is that he does not want to be a member of his family, which he can only be because he is a member of his family”. Similarly, every mechanical object is externally determined by every other mechanical object despite their indifference to each other. Moreover, the external determination of every mechanical object is guaranteed by the essential determinateness of every other mechanical object. In turn, the continuity of these external determinations is guaranteed by their indifference to it. As Hegel writes: ‘there resides no self-

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30 Ross, On mechanism in Hegel’s social and political philosophy, 82.
31 See: Kreines, Reason in the world, 35-56, for a recent attempt to argue that Mechanism does begin with a concept-less Mechanism. I think that Kreines would find better support for his thesis if he looked at the Doctrine of Essence, which is concept-less, rather than in the Doctrine of the Concept.
32 Thus, on my view, the mechanical object’s essential determinacy is what keeps the object united with itself despite its indeterminacy and indifference. Pace Spieker who reads the indifference of the mechanical objects as fulfilling this role: ‘Aufgrund ihrer Selbständigkeit sind sie jedoch nur in Gleichgültigkeit (vgl. Enz. (1830) §194) geeint’, (Michael Spieker, Wahres Leben denken: Über Sein, Leben und Wahrheit in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik ((Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag GmbH, 2009)), 305). Moreover, I find no support for such a reading in Hegel, EL §194.
determination\textsuperscript{33} between mechanical objects. Here, self-determination is opposed to external determination. If the mechanical objects were self-determining then there would be mediation between them and not indifference in relation to their essential determinacy. Since, however, they are indifferent to and external to their essential determinacy they cannot determine themselves.

4.1.2 The Mechanical Object II

Looking now at the external determinateness between objects in subsection A.3, it is immediately clear that it is an identical determinateness in two connected senses. First, it is identical because it is always the relation between two mechanical objects that are immediately identical, indeterminate, and indifferent. In short, it is identical because each object is indifferent to their essential determinateness.\textsuperscript{34} Second, since their mode of relation is identical it follows that each object contains the same determinate content as every other object.\textsuperscript{35} The identity of their determinateness, however, manifests a contradiction. The mechanical objects are supposed to be indifferent to each other and yet they are identical. This contradiction, then, lies firmly at the core of the mechanical object since it is precisely through being what it is that it has generated its own contradiction. The reinstatement of each object’s separate identity is because of its indifference to every other object’s external determinateness, which very indifference is the reason for the self-subsistence and externality to and from other objects.\textsuperscript{36}

The mechanical objects, thus, are in a negative unity. A “negative unity” is one in which the moments of the unity negatively relate to each other because they are identical and different to each other. Here, the objects are identical with each other because of the ways given above, and hence are in a negative unity. This unity also includes the negativity of difference between objects because of their separate identity, and so they are in a negative unity. This negative

\textsuperscript{33} Hegel, SL, 714/413.
\textsuperscript{34} Or as Burbidge puts it: ‘alle Objekte sind in derselben Weise und im selben Ausmaß bestimmt, weil es keine Bestimmung gibt, die die Bewegungsart des einen Objektes von der des anderen unterscheiden könnte’, (Burbidge, “Objektivität”, 231).
\textsuperscript{35} See: ‘the determinateness is merely doubled, once in one object and again in the other, something utterly identical’, (Hegel, SL, 714/413).
\textsuperscript{36} As Findlay put it: ‘In seeking to preserve the apartness and distinctness of Objects, it has rendered them indistinguishable: in seeking to make them wholly indifferent to each other, it has made them wholly determined by one another’, (Findlay, Hegel, 245).
unity of the identity of determinateness and indifference to external determinateness is called the formal mechanical process.\textsuperscript{37}

4.2 The Mechanical Process

The \textit{mechanical process} begins with the \textit{fmp}, which begins by examining the \textit{mechanical object} as a negative unity. One side of the negative unity is the identical determinateness of every \textit{mechanical object}, and the other side of the negative unity is the self-subsistence of each \textit{mechanical object} as indifferent to the external determinateness of the other \textit{mechanical objects}. The \textit{fmp} begins with this contradiction.\textsuperscript{38}

In subsection B.a1, the \textit{fmp} begins by emphasising one side of the \textit{mechanical objects’} negative unity - their identity with other \textit{mechanical objects}. Thus, the \textit{mechanical objects} raise themselves to \textit{universality} when we posit them as identical to each other.\textsuperscript{39} This process of raising the \textit{mechanical objects} to \textit{universality} is called \textit{communication} [\textit{Mitteilung}]. \textit{Communication} is the first determination of the \textit{fmp}.\textsuperscript{40} Crucially, the process of \textit{communication} ‘does not involve the transition into an opposite’\textsuperscript{41} because the \textit{mechanical objects} are identical to each other. Thus, there is no difference between the \textit{mechanical object} as \textit{individual} and the \textit{mechanical object} as \textit{universal}, the same determinateness is communicated from one object to the other and there is no “transition into an opposite”. Thus, I disagree with Ross’s reading which asserts that: ‘Hegel describes the relation between universal and singular as one of ‘communication’\textsuperscript{42}. On Ross’s reading, then, there would be a moment of change since there would be a movement from \textit{universality} to \textit{individuality}. Hegel, however, is clear that in the universal moment of \textit{communication} the object ‘universalises itself without any alteration whatever’\textsuperscript{43}.

\textsuperscript{37} Henceforth, \textit{fmp}.
\textsuperscript{38} My approach to explicating the \textit{Mechanical Process} (the \textit{fmp} and the \textit{rmp}) is importantly different to, Moss “Hegel’s free mechanism”, 77-8. I disagree with Moss’s approach, primarily because there is no textual evidence to support his hypothesis that the \textit{Mechanical Process} follows a syllogistic development.
\textsuperscript{39} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 716/415.
\textsuperscript{40} The two processes, [the first] the raising of the individual determinateness into universality in communication…’, (Hegel, \textit{SL}, 717/417).
\textsuperscript{41} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 716/416.
\textsuperscript{42} Ross, \textit{On mechanism in Hegel’s social and political philosophy}, 84.
\textsuperscript{43} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 716/416.
Now, in B.a2, the mechanical object is immediately posited as a particular object amongst other objects; it is posited as particular because in the immediate identity of communication, the communication of the universal determinateness across a plurality of objects is implied. Once we have posited their identity in communication, we must make explicit that the communication of the universal determinateness involves different objects.\textsuperscript{44} Importantly, this positing is not a moment of self-determination. The mechanical objects do not have the urge [\textit{der Trieb}] to posit each other so as to unite with each other. The reason why a different moment of their relation is posited is because of their essential determinacy: recall that their essential determinateness is the continuing presence of a minimal difference that lies at their core. Thus, it is their essential determinateness that necessarily requires particularity to be posited after universality. This explanation for why the moment of particularity is posited in the \textit{fmp} is absent from other accounts on Mechanism. Other accounts accept the basic premise that particularity is necessarily posited because of the implicit particularity of communication. This is correct to a certain extent but it does not account for the source of this positing.\textsuperscript{45} Where does it come from if it is not by the self-determining activity of the Concept? It comes from the mechanical objects’ essential determinacy, but as something external and indifferent from them.

I now examine the moment of particularity in the \textit{fmp}. Hegel writes that ‘what is communicated is, as a universal, positive in the particular objects and only particularises itself in their diversity…what is communicated remains what it is; it merely distributes itself to the objects or is determined by their particularity’\textsuperscript{46}. Here, we are dealing with the relation of particular mechanical objects. First, the determinateness of each mechanical object, before it relates to another mechanical object, is the determinateness of universality that was initially communicated. This is because the particular mechanical objects, in their initial conception, have not yet determined each other. Second, however, what is communicated does not merely remain what it is because it is now being communicated between particular objects. There is a difference between the universal moment of communication that holds all objects as immediately identical and two objects whose particularity necessitates difference. Thus, whilst what is communicated from one particular object to another is the same determinateness as what was communicated by universal communication, it is now determined by that particularity.

\textsuperscript{44} ‘Now if in the interaction of objects their identical universality is first posited, it is equally necessary to posit the other moment of the [Concept], particularity’, (Hegel, SL, 717/416).

\textsuperscript{45} See: Moyar, “Die Lehre Vom Begriff”; Kreines, \textit{Reason in the world}, Moss, Hegel’s free mechanism, Ross, \textit{On mechanism in Hegel’s social and political philosophy}.

\textsuperscript{46} Hegel, SL, 717/417.
since it is being communicated to another particular object. This moment is called distribution [die Verteilung] and it designates the communicated determinateness between particular objects.

Now, this moment of distribution is brought under the umbrella term of action. Action is the particularisation of communication and its distribution to another particular object. Hegel writes further on the particularisation of the communicated determinateness:

‘its action is primarily not a loss of its determinateness but a particularisation, whereby the object which at first was the whole of that individual determinateness in it, is now a species of it, and through this the determinateness is posited for the first time as a universal’

It is repeated that the determinateness of communication is maintained in the moment of action. Following that, and ignoring for the moment the reference to an “individual determinateness”, let us consider why the active object is posited as universal for the first time? This is related to the fact that the active object is immediately also universal since it distributes the universal moment’s determinateness. Not only is the universal determinateness distributed to another particular object but it is also posited, for the first time, as a universal because it has become a determinate universal. It is a determinate universal because its determinateness does not merely reside within the self-identical moment of universality but is distributed across its particulars. The active object is posited as a universal for the first time because in distributing the latter’s determinateness to a particular object the determinateness is determined. This is subtly different to Ross who reads action as the distribution of communication to the individual.

That is only half the picture, Ross misses that it is not just the determinateness of communication, but the determinateness of communication that is determined through particularity and has become a determinate universal.

Now, let us consider what the “individual determinateness” refers to. It will be useful to look at the sentence that follows it: ‘The two processes, the raising of the individual determinateness into universality in communication, and the particularisation of it, or the reduction of what was solely a one to a species, in distribution, are one and the same’

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47 Hegel, SL, 717/417.
48 Ross, On mechanism in Hegel’s social and political philosophy, 85.
49 Hegel, SL, 717/417.
to remain self-subsistent against other mechanical objects. Thus, in the first instance their self-subsistence was raised into universality when they were posited as identical in communication. In the second instance, their particularity is posited and their implicit difference is made explicit. Hegel’s point is that both processes, the positing of the individual determinateness as universal and as particular, are one and the same process because the positing of the one immediately necessitates the positing of the other. There is no moment of mediation between which these processes must pass - they are immediate processes. As soon as the mechanical object is posited as communicating its universal determinateness, it is equally posited as particularising this determinateness in distribution.

The next moment of the fmp is reaction and it concerns the second particular object i.e. the object to which the universal determinateness is distributed. It follows, then, that this other mechanical object becomes an active object: it ‘has taken up into itself’ the entire universal, and so is now active against the first\(^50\). Reaction, then, is the process whereby the other mechanical object determines the first active mechanical object with that same universal determinateness as well as the ‘specific share’\(^51\) of the individual object. The determinateness distributed between objects in the processes of action and reaction includes the identity of the universal and the specific particular determinateness of each mechanical object as self-standing. This latter point is crucial to understanding to how difference is gradually made explicit from the immediate identity of the mechanical object. In the fmp the mechanical objects are understood with a greater degree of difference between each other insofar as one is the active object and the other the reactive object.

Reaction concludes with the mechanical object’s return into individuality as it ‘expels the positedness of an other in it and maintains its relation-to-self’\(^52\). When the second active object reacts and gives the universal determinateness to another mechanical object it particularises itself and instantiates its externality and independence from universal communication. This moment of indifference to the communicated universality is the moment of rest.

The fmp marks the re-introduction of mediation into the relations of the mechanical objects. Recall that in the moment of reaction each object gave back its ‘specific share’\(^53\) of the communicated determinateness, which means that they are not merely identical with the

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\(^{50}\) Hegel, SL, 717/417.

\(^{51}\) Ibid.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) Ibid.
communicated *universal*ity but minimally different. Crudely put, if their previous minimal difference, conceptualised as “essential determinacy” was at 1 point of difference, then the *fmp* has increased that difference by another point. If there is difference between the determinations of the Concept, i.e. if they are not immediately identical, then there must be mediation. Indeed, the determinateness of their universality is communicated to each object and that is returned in reaction with the object’s ‘specific share’, their specific determinateness. There is no distinction between two billiard balls hitting each other and a billiard ball hitting a cannon ball, both events are examples of action and reaction. But there is a qualitative difference insofar as the specific nature of the reaction will be different, according to which the billiard ball will react differently to the cannon ball. Hegel does not say this explicitly. In fact, he says nothing of what the object's ‘specific share’ consists. All he writes is that the action of the *fmp* ‘shows itself to be a merely superficial, transient alteration in the self-enclosed indifferent totality of the object’.

In conclusion, the move to rest marks the sublation of the minimal mediation that occurred in the *fmp*. As Hegel writes:

> ‘in rest the mediation is posited as a mediation that has sublated itself; in other words, it is posited that the product is indifferent to this determining of it, and that the determinateness it has received is an external one to it’.

The positing of individuality or rest means that the object is indifferent to the determining of the *fmp*. Moreover, much like in the previous section (in A.2), by being indifferent to the determinateness that it has received, despite it being a mediation, the object relates to this determinateness as something that is external to itself. The return into individuality in rest, the coming to rest of the billiard ball, is indifferent to the prior moments of action and reaction, whether the billiard ball was hit by a billiard ball or a cannon ball. In its individuality, rest is the negative unity of the sublated mediation of the *fmp*. This negative unity is made up of the

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54 Hegel, *SL*, 718/418.
55 In fact, Hegel does not talk of “difference” [*Unterschiedenheit*] but “diversity” [*Verschiedenheit*], which is a different determination altogether. These two categories are treated in *Determinations of reflection* chapter in the Doctrine of Essence, (Hegel, *SL*, 417-424/46-55). I chose to stick with “difference” so as to not introduce too many new categories for the reader. Moreover, whilst I am sure that there is a good logical reason for the distinction that Hegel draws between calling the objects in the *fmp* “diverse” and, as we will see, the objects in the *rmp* “different” and “opposed”, it does not seem pertinent to explain the logical development for my present purposes and so I will not explore the matter further.
communicated *universal* determinateness and the *particular* moment of *reaction*, which constitutes the object’s ‘specific share’. Considered together, they are a negative unity, the object’s moment of *individuality* as *rest*.

**4.2.1 The Real Mechanical Process**

The *real mechanical process* begins with the *mechanical object at rest*. The determinateness of the *mechanical object at rest* includes the sublated mediation of the *fmp*. This sublated mediation indicates that the *mechanical object* has developed opposition within itself, *i.e.* the manifold *mechanical objects* are no longer immediately identical to each other but, as mediated through each other, are negatively opposed to each other. The *rmp*, then, examines the different ways that the *mechanical objects* relate to each other in opposition.

The first moment of the *rmp is communication*. Like the *fmp* the *rmp* begins with the communicated determinateness of identity between the *mechanical objects*. This is their moment of *universality* whereby each object relates to every other object as identical to it. So far, then, *real communication* is the same as *communication*. However, unlike *communication*, *real communication* is the relation of *mechanical objects* that are also opposed to one another since the *mechanical object at rest* has within itself the sublated mediation of the *fmp*. This means that the *real communication* of the *mechanical objects*, their identity relation, is no longer simply assumed but is posited in a specific opposition. The sublation of the mediation within the *mechanical objects* now means that each object has the determinateness ‘reflected into itself’. Now, the objects have the difference, the determinateness, also within themselves and not *just* as a result of external communication. However, since they are still indifferent to determinateness, they are indifferent to their own determinateness and so not self-determining. They are still dependent on external determination, though in the *rmp*, as we shall see, that external determination will meet with the specific reflection-into-self of each object.

When discussing the adequacy of objects to each other in *real communication* Hegel talks of the “sphere” that is shared by both objects: objects that enter into *real communication* occupy the same sphere. Therefore, before the moment of *real communication* there is the

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57 Henceforth, the *rmp*.
58 To distinguish them I will refer to *communication* in the *rmp* as *real communication*.
59 Hegel, *SL*, 719/419.
possibility that the determinateness of the mechanical objects involved is such that they cannot enter such a relation and no real communication can take place. This is what Hegel is describing in the introductory paragraph to the rmp: ‘The object that on the one hand lacks all determination whatever and is neither elastic nor self-subsistent in its relationships, has on the other hand a self-subsistence that is impenetrable to other objects’\(^{60}\). All the mechanical objects of the rmp are self-subsistent and non-self-subsistent in their opposition to each other. But an object that is not open to this opposition, an object that does not possess this determination as part of its being, is self-subsistent precisely because it is closed off from any communication with the other objects.\(^{61}\)

The identical determinateness between the mechanical objects is the second moment. Here, for the first time, the process of real communication takes place. The mechanical object communicates its determinateness to another mechanical object that can ‘specify the communicated universal for itself’\(^{62}\), meaning that the communicated determinateness is ‘identical with the nature of the object’\(^{63}\), i.e. it is identical to its own individual negativity and can enter into a relation with it.\(^{64}\)

*Resistance* [Widerstand] is the third moment of the rmp. Resistance is the moment of particularity that involves the distribution, or positing, of the determinateness that is being communicated. The universal mechanical object posits the individual mechanical object whereby the individual mechanical object, upon having the former determinateness communicated to it, resists against it. Now, resistance can either be successful or unsuccessful. The third moment of the rmp details successful resistance. Resistance is successful when the communicated determinateness is adequate to the self-related negativity of the individual mechanical object. The individual mechanical object’s self-subsistence is such that it can reconcile the communicated determinateness with its own determinateness.\(^{65}\)

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\(^{60}\) Hegel, SL, 719/419.

\(^{61}\) Hegel writes that such a non-relation would lead to an “infinite judgement”, (Hegel, SL, 641-3/324-6). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine this remark, but it would be interesting to investigate why Hegel makes this claim.

\(^{62}\) Hegel, SL, 719/420.

\(^{63}\) Hegel, SL, 720/420.

\(^{64}\) Hegel also refers to real communication as *power* [Macht], although he introduces this term rather late in the text. Its late appearance might seem to signal a new dialectical moment. I will return to *power* when I discuss the moment of violence.

\(^{65}\) The importance of resistance for the instantiation of an object’s identity in a manner distinct from the *formal mechanical process* is well put by Burbidge: ‘Das stärkere Objekt kann nicht ohne weiteres das schwächere überwinden, da sonst die Charakteristika der Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit auf verschiedene Gegenstände verteilt würden und nicht mehr auf dasselbe Objekt zentriert wären’, (Burbidge, “Objektivität”, 233). A resisting object is one that can establish its identity as different to the communicated universality.

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of successful *resistance* is the formation of a new individual *mechanical object* that has the initial determinateness and the communicated *universality* as its determinateness.

The fourth moment is unsuccessful *resistance*, where the individual *mechanical object’s* determinateness is inadequate to the communicated *universality*. Its inadequacy comes down to its ‘relative lack of self-substinance’ in the face of the communicated universality. The moment of inadequate *resistance*, then, is part-and-parcel with the moment of *violence* [Gewalt]. Hegel writes: ‘What turns power [Macht] into violence is this, that though power, an objective universality, is identical with the nature of the object, its determinateness or negativity is not its own negative reflection into itself by which it is an individual’. Hegel refers to *power* as an ‘objective universality’, and moreover, that it is what leads to *violence*, i.e. the consequence of the universal *mechanical object’s* communicated determinateness. *Power* is what *real communication* becomes when *resistance* to it is inadequate.

*Extinction* [Untergang] is the fifth and final moment of the *rmp*. *Extinction* is the individual *mechanical object* that has received the *violence* of *power*. To recap, the *mechanical object* undergoes *violence* because its negativity is not the same as the negativity of the *power* and because it cannot reflect the determinateness of the *power* into itself and reconcile itself with it. As extinct the *mechanical object* is an abstract *negativity* in relation to the *power* because its determinateness bears no identity with it. The object is “abstract” in relation to the *power* because it continues to exist but is not posited by the *power*. To use earlier terms from the *rmp*, it is no longer within the same sphere as the *power*. Consider, as an example, the Gallic Wars. Rome, the *real communication*, communicated its determinateness to Gaul. Gaul’s determinateness was inadequate and Roman *real communication* became *power* and *violence*. As a result Gaul was annihilated, *extinguished*, and ceased to be an adequate opposition for Rome. They could not occupy the same sphere as Rome, and they became an abstract negativity in the sense that they do relate to Rome as the same Gaul that could offer *resistance*, thus the “negativity”. This relation is merely “abstract” because it falls outside the sphere of the *rmp*, i.e. they no longer partake of the same sphere. Crucially, they are an ‘abstract negativity’ only in relation to Rome and only when they are conceptualised as a *mechanical object* in the *rmp*.68

67 Ibid.
68 The logical development of the *rmp* is immediately followed by a remark on the concept of fate, (Hegel, *SL*, 720-1/421-2). I do not engage with this paragraph as it does not bear on the development of the *rmp* to the *product* of the Mechanical Process. See: Moyar, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 609-12, for a recent examination of this paragraph.
4.2.2 Product of the Mechanical Process

The first paragraph of B.c begins by looking back at the product of the formal process. Hegel discusses two different ways of thinking about the determinateness of the extinct object, which is now the product: one, the product as the “abstract negativity” that returns to rest, and two, the product that has also taken up the determinateness of the objective universality and has posited within itself the totality of the Concept. First, Hegel begins the paragraph with the object that was at rest and compares the product to it: ‘the extinction of the process results on the one hand in rest, as the original formalism of the object, the negativity of its being determined for itself’⁶⁹. The “abstract negativity” of the product means that it no longer participates within the same sphere as the objective universality: it has returned to its ‘original formalism’, i.e. the determination of rest at the end of the fmp. The object that has returned to rest has, once again, ‘the negativity of its being determined for itself’ or as Hegel puts it at the beginning of the rmp: ‘the reflection into self of the determinateness’⁷⁰. On the one hand, then, Gaul is at rest, i.e. they no longer occupy the same sphere as Rome.

Hegel, then, writes that the product at the end of the rmp is ‘on the other hand the sublating of the determinedness as the positive reflection of it into itself, is the determinateness that has withdrawn into itself or the posited totality of the [Concept] - the true individuality of the object’⁷¹. On the other hand, the product is not just an “abstract negativity” but is also the individual determinateness that has had the universal determinateness of the objective universality posited within it and is the positive reflection of this positing. The reflection is “positive” because the product now has within itself the totality of the determinations of the Concept. Hegel writes this explicitly:

‘The object, determined at first in its indeterminate universality then as a particular, is now determined as objectively an individual, so that in it that mere semblance of individuality which is only a self-subistence opposing itself to the substantial universality, has been sublated’⁷².

⁶⁹ Hegel, SL, 721/422.
⁷⁰ Hegel, SL, 719/419.
⁷¹ Hegel, SL, 721/422.
⁷² Ibid.
The *product* has the totality of the *Concept* posited within itself because it developed through the *rmp*, in which it was first determined as a *universal* in *real communication*, a *particular* in *resistance*, and an *individual* in *extinction*. Now that its individuality has been sublated by the *objective universality* it is a “true individuality”. The *individuality* is “true” because it is the mediated result of the posited determinations of the *Concept*. Thus, I agree with Ross, who writes that ‘[i]n this act of violence, the singular is cleansed of any still abstract, insufficient independence, and it becomes what Hegel calls ‘the true individual’’. Gaul no longer occupies the same sphere as Rome and so is excluded from the *rmp*. However, through their *extinction* Gaul is now a *product* that has within itself the posited totality of the *Concept* and is a true individual. Gaul is no longer the non-self-subsistent object that is opposed to self-subsistent Rome but has posited within itself the determinations of the *Concept*. It no longer needs to be opposed to Rome to be what it is.

First, then, the *Concept* is “posited” as a totality because the result was brought about by the positing of *objective universality*. Second, it is the *Concept*’s “totality” because through being posited by *objective universality* both the *universality* and the *individuality* of the *product* have determined each other and have consummated the mediation of the *Concept*. The *product*, then, is an *individuality* that is thoroughly a *particularity* and a *universality* insofar as it has been posited by these moments and received their determinateness. Thus, the individual is a “true” individual.

### 4.3 Absolute Mechanism: The Centre

The first aspect of the *product* that has to be clarified is its determination as the ‘*posited totality of the [Concept]*’

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73 Ross, *On mechanism in Hegel’s social and political philosophy*, 88.
74 Hegel, *SL*, 721/422.
determining movement. It is not completely self-determining, however, since it is still a mechanical object. As a mechanical object it is also indifferent to determinateness, even its own, and as such is still the external relation of mechanical objects. The development of these two determinations of the product takes us out of the “Mechanical Process” and into “Absolute Mechanism” where the product becomes the centre.  

The centre is self-determining, but also external and indifferent to determinateness. Therefore, when we begin to think about the centre, we have to hold these two fundamental determinations in mind. As self-determining it is no longer externally determined but has the source of its determinateness immanently within itself. Simultaneously, however, the centre is indifferent to its determinateness and is still externally related to the other mechanical objects. It is not, however, an external relation of centres but an external relation of non-self-subsistent objects that have their essential determinacy in the centre.

The centre is the ‘pervading immanent essence of the objects’76. This is because it is identical to the non-self-subsistent-objects and as identical with them it serves as the source for their essential determinateness. The centre, as self-determining, is ‘the essential determinateness [...] by which they are united in and for themselves, and is their objective universality’77. It is through the determinateness of the centre that the non-self-subsistent-objects are united with the centre. The determinateness of the non-self-subsistent-objects, on the other hand, is that of mutual externality and is unessential to the unity of the objects with the centre.

Now, let us consider the ways in which, first, the non-self-subsistent-objects relate to each other, and second, the non-self-subsistent-objects relate to their centre. First, the non-self-subsistent-objects relate to each other only externally because they are not each the posited totality of the Concept, i.e. centres. 78 Second, the centre is identical to the non-self-subsistent-objects within the fmp and the rmp. Hegel writes that the relation of the non-self-subsistent objects to each other is that of ‘mutual thrust and pressure’, (Ibid.). These words are undoubtedly used to evoke the material relation of objects but given the paucity of what he writes on them it is unclear whether he thinks that their relation is that of the Mechanical Process. In the sentence before he states the ‘individual universality of the single objects and their mechanical process’, (Ibid.) is their genus. Without getting into the precise meaning of “genus” in this sentence, it is telling that Hegel refers to the activity of the single objects as the “mechanical process”. This is by no means explicit, but it does suggest that the relation of the non-self-subsistent objects is that of the fmp and rmp.

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75 Many commentators have emphasised that the development of Absolute Mechanism follows a syllogistic development. I give an account of the development of Absolute Mechanism that is not based on a syllogistic development. Instead, I have sought to show that sense can be made of the logical development through the resources of Mechanism alone - what this means exactly, will become apparent over the course of my examination. For a recent examination of Absolute Mechanism that focuses on its syllogistic development, see: Moyar, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 614-7.
76 Hegel, SL, 722/423.
77 Ibid.
78 It is possible that they relate to each other as objects within the fmp and the rmp. Hegel writes that the relation of the non-self-subsistent objects to each other is that of ‘mutual thrust and pressure’, (Ibid.). These words are undoubtedly used to evoke the material relation of objects but given the paucity of what he writes on them it is unclear whether he thinks that their relation is that of the Mechanical Process. In the sentence before he states the ‘individual universality of the single objects and their mechanical process’, (Ibid.) is their genus. Without getting into the precise meaning of “genus” in this sentence, it is telling that Hegel refers to the activity of the single objects as the “mechanical process”. This is by no means explicit, but it does suggest that the relation of the non-self-subsistent objects is that of the fmp and rmp.
objects because it is their essential determinateness.\textsuperscript{79} Their identity with the \textit{centre} is their \textit{‘being in their centre’}\textsuperscript{80}: another way of expressing the fact that their essential determinateness, their being, lies in the \textit{centre}. It is crucial to recall at this point that their identity is not posited but is immanent to them. Positing would open up their difference because positing one side in a unity determines the other side and thus makes explicit the fact that there is a difference within the unity. The non-self-subsistent-objects, however, are immediately identical to the \textit{centre}. Nevertheless, the determinateness of the non-self-subsistent-objects does not correspond to their identity with their \textit{centre}, because of their purely external relation outwards.\textsuperscript{81} There is, thus, a tension between their essential determinateness that immanently pervades the non-self-subsistent-objects, and their peculiar, individual determinatenesses of indifferent externality. In the unity, then, the non-self-subsistent-object is both the immanent identity with the \textit{centre} and the striving towards identity with the \textit{centre} because of its own individual determinateness of externality and indifference: their unity, then, is not a ‘mere order or arrangement and external connexion of parts [but] a genuine One’\textsuperscript{82}. In this unity, then, it is misleading to continue to think of the \textit{centre} as a ‘mere’ mechanical object [bloßes Objekt] that is externally related to indeterminate and indifferent mechanical objects, because it is their immanent and pervading essence that determines them.\textsuperscript{83}

Now, this identity leads to two reciprocal moments. First, the ‘non-self-subsistent...are likewise by the regress of the [Concept] determined into individuals’ and the ‘identity of the central body with itself which is still a striving, is infected with externality’\textsuperscript{84}. First, since they are identical, the \textit{centre} must have as its determinateness the externality of the non-self-subsistent-objects, and second, the non-self-subsistent-objects must be self-determining \textit{centres} in their own right. The non-self-subsistent-objects, then, are determined as individual \textit{centres}.\textsuperscript{85} However, they do not relate to each other as \textit{centres}. To be a \textit{centre} means to be the essential determinateness of unessential non-self-subsistent-objects. Crucially, the unity of the relative \textit{centre} with the non-self-subsistent-objects is brought about by the original

\textsuperscript{79} Their [the non-self-subsistent objects] identity with the central body is…’, (Hegel, \textit{SL}, 722/423).
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} ‘It remains, however, merely an \textit{ought-to-be}, since the externality of the objects which is still also posited does not correspond to that unity’, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{82} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 723/424.
\textsuperscript{83} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 722/424.
\textsuperscript{84} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 723/424.
\textsuperscript{85} Crucially, however, there is no means of distinguishing between them, and so it must be posited that only some of the non-self-subsistent-objects become relative centres. Thus, there is no onto-logical standard for deciding which objects are relative centres and which are merely non-self-subsistent-objects. The logical necessity that such objects must relate in such a way has been given, but which objects are which is a matter for the natural sciences.
determinateness of the centre or absolute centre. This is because the absolute centre is the essential determinateness of the non-self-subsistent-objects and it is because of their unity with the absolute centre that the non-self-subsistent-objects take up the determinateness of the absolute centre. Therefore, their determination as relative centres is rooted in their determination as non-self-subsistent-objects in relation to the absolute centre.

Now, it has just been said that the determinateness of the relative centre is brought about by the absolute centre, and that the relative centres have non-self-subsistent-objects of their own. Before, we saw that it was the determinateness of a non-self-subsistent-object to strive towards the centre because of its identity with it. The same is true of the relative centres and their non-self-subsistent-objects.\footnote{See: ‘the relative individual centres [...] subsume[s] under [themselves] the non-self-subsistent objects whose superficial or formal individualisation [are] supported by it’, (Hegel, SL, 723/425).} This striving, however, is also a striving for the absolute centre since it is from the absolute centre that the relative centres receive their determinateness.\footnote{‘These non-self-subsistent objects [...] are the link between the absolute and the relative central individuality to the extent that the latter has in them its externality by virtue of which the relation-to-self is at the same time a striving towards an absolute centre’, (Ibid.).} Thus, the non-self-subsistent-objects have returned into the absolute centre through the mediation of the relative centres. This return, and the process whence it comes is free mechanism. The process is “free” because it has come about through the self-determining activity of the absolute centre, which determined the previously non-self-subsistent-objects as centres. What we now have to consider is the determinateness of the non-self-subsistent-objects and the relative centres. This is examined in the law.

4.3.1 The Law

The preceding development expressed the identity between the centre and the non-self-subsistent-objects. The centre is the essential determinateness of the non-self-subsistent-objects and it pervades them immanently, i.e. the centre does not posit the non-self-subsistent-objects as being identical with it but is so immediately. The non-self-subsistent-objects do not themselves possess the essential determinateness of the centre but are fundamentally indifferent and external to it. The development of the centre was, thus, faced with the following tension: the centre is the essential determinateness that immanently pervades the non-self-subsistent-objects, which belong to the centre as part of the determinateness of the centre, but
which are also indifferent and external to that determinateness. The non-self-subsistent-objects strive to be identical to their centre but are not in-and-for themselves identical with it. This relation of identity produced the subsequent development of the relative centres and their return into the absolute centre.

The next step is to make explicit the difference between the centre and the non-self-subsistent-objects. Hitherto, the difference between their identity within the essential determinateness of the centre and their externality and indifference to that essential determinateness has not been properly expressed. Their identity has been maintained in their particularity, a determined universality, but their moment of difference, particularity, has not been made explicit. It is in the Law that ‘the more specific difference between the ideal reality of objectivity and its external reality is made prominent’.\(^89\) The “ideal reality of objectivity” refers to the identity of the centre with its non-self-subsistent-objects that strive to be identical with it. It is “ideal” because their identity is only a striving, *i.e.* it would cease to be “ideal” if the non-self-subsistent-objects were to be absolute centres themselves. In the law, then, we make explicit the difference within the centre between its ideal reality of identity with its non-self-subsistent-objects and the ‘external reality’ of those non-self-subsistent-objects as indifferent to the determinateness of the centre.

The expression of their difference, then, is between the centre that is ‘absolutely determined and self-determining’\(^90\) and the external, non-self-subsistent-objects that do not correspond to it. The next step in the development of the Law is quite obscure and so I quote the whole sentence and break it down into its key components:

\begin{quote}
‘But individuality is in and for itself the concrete principle of negative unity, and as such itself totality, a unity that sunders itself into the specific differences of the [Concept] and abides within its self-identical universality; it is thus the centre expanded within its pure ideality by difference’.\(^91\)
\end{quote}

\(^{88}\) Hegel, *SL*, 724/426.
\(^{89}\) Ibid.
\(^{90}\) Ibid.
\(^{91}\) Ibid.
First, we have to identify what the “individuality” is. The “individuality” refers to the *centre*, which is described as such in the beginning of *Absolute Mechanism*. The *centre*, however, as we have seen is not just an *individual*. As the self-determining, essential determinateness of the non-self-subsistent-objects it is also *universality* and *particularity*: the former as their immanent determinateness, and the latter as including within itself a plurality of different objects. Thus, the *centre* is the individual, and this individual is a negative unity because it has within itself the different determinations of the *Concept*. Now, in the *Law* this negative unity ‘sunders itself into the specific differences of the *Concept*’, i.e. the individual *centre* makes the difference between itself as the individual and the other moments of *universality* and *particularity* explicit. Why does this happen? Essentially, since the *centre* is a negative unity, it cannot simply abide as a negative unity but must make explicit the difference within itself. This difference, as we have seen, is the difference between the individual *centre* as the essential determinateness of the non-self-subsistent-objects and the indifference and externality of the non-self-subsistent-objects to their essential determinateness. At the same time, however, the *centre* and the non-self-subsistent-objects are still identical insofar as they have the same essential determinateness. What is new in the *Law* is that the ‘difference…[is]…its essential nature and taken up into pure universality’—the *centre* and the non-self-subsistent-objects are now united through their identity and their difference. As Hegel writes: ‘the objective being-*in-and-for-self* appears therefore more specifically in its totality as the negative unity of the *centre*, which divides itself into *subjective individuality* and *external objectivity*, maintains the former in the latter and determines it in an ideal difference’. The *centre*, the “subjective individuality” is the immanent essence of the non-self-subsistent-objects, the “external objectivity”. There is now the developed determination that the difference between objects is explicitly contained within the unity. In their *lawful* unity, then, the *centre* determines them in an “ideal” way, i.e. their difference is not posited but is immanent to their unity. Because their difference is not posited, but is only ideal, the real difference between the *centre* and the non-self-subsistent-objects has not actually been resolved: the ultimate resolution of this difference is the reason for the transition to *Chemism*, as we will soon see.

The *lawful* unity, then, is the absolute unity of the determinations of the *Concept*, where the differences of the determinations are expressed in their mediation, but not yet posited. In

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92 ‘In the first place then the empty manifoldness of objects is gathered into objective individuality, into the simple self-determining *centre*’, (Hegel, *SL*, 721/423)
94 Ibid.
95 Hegel, *SL*, 725/427.
other words, the immediacy with which Mechanism began still lingers in its conclusion. Even though the determinations of the Concept are now mediated and their differences have been expressed, they are not yet posited. As we saw, their difference is only ideally expressed. Nevertheless, the objects of the lawful unity are self-determining, since the essential determinateness immanently pervades them through their differences, and it is in this lawful unity that free mechanism has “free necessity”. The relation of the lawful objects to each other is both necessary and free because, 1) they immediately relate to each other because of their shared essential determinateness, and so every relation to an other object is equally a self-relation, and 2) their essential determinateness is the posited totality of the Concept and so their movement between each other is a mediated movement between the determinations of the Concept, which is the expression of freedom. Caution must be given, however, since whilst the lawful objects are undoubtedly free, they still only relate to each other externally.96

4.3.2 Transition to Chemism

The Law concludes with the negative unity of the centre and the non-self-subsistent-objects. The determinateness of their negative unity is the law, which as we have seen, immanently pervades the objects which maintain their difference within itself. This final structure of Mechanism, where the centre and the objects freely relate to each other is not, however, the final structure of the SL. We know this because despite the absolute structure of free mechanism the real difference between the objects has not been made explicit.

As I explained above, the lawful relation is an “ideal” one, which means that the objects have not posited each other as different. Instead, their difference is merely immanent to them. However, the objects are individuals and self-subsistent and not just objects of the centre.97 Therefore, we must develop their difference and by developing their difference we leave Mechanism. We leave Mechanism because we dismantle the absolute relation of centre and lawful object when we develop the latter’s difference. Hegel states that the immanent difference

96 I have found Moyar particularly unhelpful with respect to his examination of the law. He contextualises Hegel’s account with modern accounts of “laws”, as well as giving numerous examples of objects that might pertain to Hegel’s concept of the “law”, both of which are illuminating. However, he does not explain the logical necessity of the Law and its logical determinations. See: Moyar, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 616-7.
97 “these are self-subsistent individuals of the totality”, (Hegel, SL, 725/428).
of the objects must pass over into ‘objectified opposition’: ‘the centre itself has in consequence fallen asunder and its negative unity [has] passed...over into objectified opposition’\textsuperscript{98}.

This structure of opposition logically follows from the negative unity of the lawful objects and their centre. By developing their difference, by emphasising their individuality as self-subsistent individuals, we develop their negative unity from one of immanent difference to real opposition. In emphasising their self-subsistence, however, the objects have not detached themselves from their centre but have developed their relation to it. Hegel writes that ‘[c]entrality is, therefore, now a relation of these reciprocally negative objectivities in a state of mutual tension’\textsuperscript{99}. Crucially, “centrality” has become the relation of the objects. Recall that the centre was the source of their essential determinateness. By accentuating their difference we are in fact accentuating their determinateness, \textit{i.e.} the negativity that makes them different. That determinateness is none other than the determinateness of the centre. The centre, then, has “moved” from being that which unifies the objects in identity and difference to that through which the objects relate to each other in opposition. When we have centrality as the relation of the opposed objects, we have transitioned from Mechanism into Chemism.

4.4 Concluding Remarks

My examination of Mechanism marks the first step on our path from Objectivity to the move to the PN. We began Mechanism with the mechanical object, the immediate identity of the Concept. Over the course of Mechanism, the determinations of the Concept developed and their immediate identity gradually became more differentiated and mediated. By the conclusion of Mechanism, we saw that the lawful object exhibited freedom insofar as the differences of the determinations of the Concept were exhibited, but that this freedom was limited to a free necessity because, 1) the differences of the determinations of the Concept were not yet posited as different, and 2) the determinations of the Concept were still only externally related.

The development of the Concept with Objectivity, of course, is the grand narrative of the final six chapters of the SL. It is precisely the development of these two determinations that will necessitate the move into the PN and it is for that reason that the development of Mechanism is important to my account of the SL -PN relation. For now, however, let us turn to

\textsuperscript{98} Hegel, SL, 726/428.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
Chemism, where we will see the explicit opposition of the determinations of the Concept and its further development towards self-determination.
5. Chemism

Chemism develops out of Mechanism by making explicit the opposition between the lawful objects. The opposition of the chemical objects is between the two determinatenesses that belong to each one; on the one hand, their essential determinateness as the two moments of the unified Concept and, on the other hand, their individual determinateness as self-subsistent objects. This opposition develops further until we make explicit the self-determining moment that is implicit in Objectivity, i.e. the determinateness of the Concept. Chemism concludes with the opposition of the Concept, that is itself external, and Objectivity, that is now explicitly treated as a logical moment. Therefore, Chemism is crucial to understand the development of self-determination within Objectivity and to understand the reasons behind the opposition between the Concept and Objectivity that arises in the Idea. Moreover, by analysing Chemism I continue with the methodological commitment of the thesis to trace the development of the Concept and Objectivity into the system in the Absolute Idea and, thus, prepare the ground for my account of the move into Nature that is outlined in the final pages of the Absolute Idea in Chapter 10.

Regarding the literature, Chemism is a chapter of the SL that has received little attention. I have chosen to primarily engage with Burbidge in the body of the text, since it remains the most detailed study on the subject. I also engage with Sans SJ, and Moyar, whose studies on Chemism are particularly illuminating, in the footnotes of the chapter. The examination that I offer here builds on Burbidge’s excellent study by confirming many of his interpretations but also by challenging some of his readings of Chemism. By contributing to a more refined understanding of Chemism I not only pave the way for giving my account of the move into the PN but also engage with a neglected part of Hegel scholarship.

1 There are, of course, the classic commentaries on the SL that have given an account of Chemism, though they tend to be exceedingly brief. See: McTaggart, A commentary on the Hegel’s Logic, 255-9; Stace, The philosophy of Hegel, 271; Mure, A study of Hegel’s Logic, 243-9; Findlay, Hegel a re-examination, 246-8; Taylor, Hegel, 321; Harris, An interpretation of the Logic of Hegel, 266-7. See also, more recently: Martin, Ontologie der Selbstbestimmung, 393-404; Rosen, The idea of Hegel’s Science of Logic, 458-9.

2 Burbidge, Real process, 75-105.


5.1 The Chemical Object

In the last section, “C. The Transition to Chemism”, the difference between the lawful objects was only ideal and immanently present. The next step of the development is to make explicit the difference between the lawful objects, such that it is no longer merely ideal. The hitherto merely ideal difference, then, develops into the chemical object that has difference as its essential determination. The determinateness of the objects becomes explicit and is an essential part of their relation. In the introductory paragraph to Chemism Hegel writes that Chemism is the ‘difference that has become objective’ and that this is because ‘it already begins with determinateness and positedness’. The essentiality of difference to Chemism will become apparent as we progress through Chemism: for now, it suffices to highlight that Chemism begins with difference because the final determination of Mechanism requires us to make the merely ideal difference of the lawful objects explicit.

5.1.1 The Chemical Object as such

The first moment of Chemism is the chemical object in its universality. To be “in its universality” means for its moments to be unified in their identity. As in Mechanism, the moments of Chemism are the determinations of the Concept and they are objective. However, the chemical objects are not merely identical. Unlike the mechanical object, which is indifferent to its essential determinateness, the chemical object contains difference as its most essential determination. The chemical object, then, is the unity of individuals, i.e. different chemical objects. It is ‘essentially a particularization...thus it is a principle - universal determinateness’, the determinateness not only of the one individual object but also of the

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5 Hegel, SL, 727/428.
6 Ibid.
7 Hegel also refers to Chemism as the ‘moment of judgement’, (Ibid.). On the one hand, the parallel that he wishes to draw is straightforward enough: Judgement and Chemism are the moments of difference in the sections of the Concept and Objectivity, respectively.
Now, it is curious that there is not a single judgement in Chemism but there are three syllogisms. If not to allude to what is to follow, i.e. that moments of Judgement will play a role in Chemism, then why does Hegel align these two chapters? I think that it would be a mistake to look too deeply for their connection. Hegel aligns them simply because difference is essential to them. This is not to say that there is no difference in Mechanism or, as we shall soon see, in Teleology. There most certainly is. But difference is not their essential determination. Beyond these base similarities, however, I do not think that the alignment of Judgement with Chemism advances our understanding of Chemism or the logical development of Chemism.
The essential determinateness of the chemical object is a determinate universal because the universal moment of the chemical object necessarily implies the other chemical object: the other chemical object is implied because difference is essential to the chemical object. Moyar does not explicitly take the moment of universality to be a determinate universality; he writes that ‘the objects are essentially connected with each other through a universal principle’. However, stating that the universal is a principle is not the same as stating that the universal is a determinate universal. The “principle” of the chemical object, then, is that in its universality it has ‘universal determinateness’, i.e. there is already a moment of difference in its moment of universality which belongs to both of the chemical objects. This moment of difference is the individual determinateness of each chemical object to be opposed to the other chemical object. Thus, the chemical objects are, on the one hand, the Concept ‘as the inner totality of the two determinatenesses’, and on the other hand, the individual objects in ‘externality and existence’. In other words, the determinateness of the chemical objects is both what unites them in a relation of universality, since it is in their nature to be united despite their difference to each other, and it is what makes them individual chemical objects that exist apart from, and are opposed to, one another. I will now examine the universality and individuality of the chemical object.

First, the universality of the chemical objects is the Concept that is the ‘inner totality’ of the chemical object. In Mechanism it began by being the essential determinacy of the mechanical object that was counterbalanced by indeterminacy and indifference; it concluded with the free necessity of the Law where the Concept was explicit as an inner determinateness within the lawful objects. However, even then it was explicit only through the external relations of the objects and not by the inner relation of the respective lawful objects. At its essential core, the Concept, is the uninterrupted mediation of itself into itself. Thus, within Objectivity, where it must relate to itself through external relations, it is not yet fully itself. This tension between the Concept and externality, then, is expressed in the idea that the inner determinateness of the chemical object is the Concept. Indeed, in the “mechanical object”, the inner determinateness of the Concept was also present in the form of “essential determinacy”.

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8 Hegel, SL, 727/429.
10 Here, I follow the German rather than the English translation. Miller translates ‘seiner Äußerlichkeit und Existenz ausmacht’ as ‘in its externality and concrete existence’, (Hegel, SL, 727/429). Miller does not seem to be aware that existence and an existence that is concrete denote different logical structures. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explain why this is the case, I merely highlight the incongruence.
11 Hegel, SL, 727/429.
12 Hegel, SL, 602/275.
Now, that essential determinacy is much more developed in Chemism, indeed, it is founded on the explicit opposition between the chemical objects, but the basic idea is the same.

Second, the chemical object has externality and existence because of its moment of individuality. Its externality is based on the basic determinateness of individuality, i.e. individuality is external to universality, and thus, takes on the guise of self-subsistence and independence. Its existence is based on the relation of one individual object to another object - the individual object relates to another because it has the form of self-subsistence and so is self-subsistent against itself, which it relates to as an other. The individual objects are united by their shared universality - the ‘universal determinateness’, which is not just a moment of universality that is detached from particularity, but is a determined universality, i.e. it is universal through its particular relation: it is ‘essentially particularization’). The mediation of universality and individuality through particularity, means that the chemical objects do not just exist in abstraction but exist in real opposition to each other.

Now, the side of the chemical objects that is the inner Concept is ‘in its own self the necessity and the urge to sublate its opposed, one sided-existence and to give itself an existence as that real whole’. The “urge” to sublate the opposition between the chemical objects as self-subsistent individuals proceeds from the fact that the inner determinateness of both chemical objects is the Concept that is ‘in itself’ [an sich]. The Concept is only in-itself determined in each chemical object because it is not yet in-and-for itself united with externality. Thus, the universal determinateness of the chemical objects has the urge to sublate the externality that keeps it from uniting with itself and ‘to give itself an existence as that real whole that according to its [Concept] it is’. Crucially, the urge to sublate the externality is necessary because it comes from the inner determinateness of the chemical object, i.e. the universal determinateness of both chemical objects in which each is in-itself identical with the other. On the other hand, the individual chemical object does not have the urge to unite with the other chemical object because what it is for it to be an individual object is to be self-subsistent. Therefore, the structure of the chemical object is (a) the shared inner determinateness that has the urge to

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13 Hegel, SL, 621/299.
14 This reading is indebted to a remark by Professor Stephen Houlgate who suggested that the existence of the chemical objects might be due to the fact that they are not merely external and indifferent to each other but are explicitly related to each other.
15 Hegel, SL, 727/429.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
sublate the opposition and (b) the two individual chemical objects whose essential determinateness is to be self-subsistent.

It becomes clear from the end of the first paragraph of “A. The Chemical Object” that we are dealing with two sides of the chemical object. There is the single chemical object that is the in-itself unity of the opposed chemical objects in determinate universality, and these opposed chemical objects are equally individual chemical objects whose essential determinateness is to be external and self-subsistent. I will now consider how this relation develops.

5.1.2 The Reflection of Determinateness in the Chemical Object

We continue with the chemical object ‘as a self-subsistent totality in general’.\(^{20}\) Importantly, we are not considering either of its two sides from the other, but are considering the chemical object as such. The chemical object is a self-subsistent totality because it is objective, and a feature of Objectivity is independence from determination and self-subsistence. Let us now consider this moment, which is outlined in the third paragraph of “A. The Chemical Object”, in more detail.\(^{21}\)

The self-subsistence of the chemical object is exhibited in the fact that it is ‘reflected into itself and to that extent is distinct from its reflectedness outwards’.\(^{22}\) The chemical object as a ‘self-subsistent totality’ is ‘the individual not yet specified as different’,\(^{23}\) i.e. a self-subsistent totality that is independent of any determination. The self-subsistent chemical object has as its base determination its own ‘immanent determinateness’,\(^{24}\) which is simply the reflection of itself into itself. However, the reflection-into-self, the ‘immanent determinateness’, is that which constitutes the chemical object’s difference [Differenz]. In other words, what it is for a chemical object to be, i.e. in opposition to another chemical object, is constituted by the chemical object itself. If we consider the chemical object as just this self-

\(^{20}\) Hegel, SL, 728/429.
\(^{21}\) In his otherwise insightful account, Moyar omits this moment of the development from his analysis. See: Moyar, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 619.
\(^{22}\) Hegel, SL, 728/429.
\(^{23}\) Ibid.
\(^{24}\) Hegel, SL, 728/430.
reflection we are, in effect, abstracting it from its essential determinateness as essentially particularised: it is merely a ‘formal abstract universality’.\textsuperscript{25}

To fully comprehend the chemical object, then, we must also consider the outward relation of the chemical object. Its relation outwards is the immediate determinateness and is what constitutes its externality and existence, \textit{i.e.} its difference [\textit{Differenz}]. Consequently, the chemical object contains its relation to another within its relation to itself: the relation of the difference [\textit{Differenz}] to itself is the relation of difference to another chemical object: ‘Accordingly, a chemical object is not comprehensible from itself alone, and the being of one is the being of the other’.\textsuperscript{26} Hitherto, there are two aspects to the chemical object. First, its self-subsistent independence as a chemical object, second the internal opposition that is generated out of its own self-subsistence, and consequently, its relation to another chemical object.

This brings us to the third and final moment of the reflection of the chemical object’s determinateness. Its reflection outwards is at the same time a return into itself since the chemical objects have the Concept as their inner determinateness. As a result, the chemical objects form a negative unity in which they are explicitly opposed to each other as particulars. In this negative unity the return of the reflection outwards is the ‘determinateness absolutely reflected into itself and is the concrete moment of the individual [Concept] of the whole’.\textsuperscript{27} The “absolute” reflection of the determinateness simply describes the fact that the determinateness has gone out and returned into the chemical object.

The chemical object, therefore, that had failed to be self-subsistent can now be considered as a totality that has its determinateness absolutely reflected into itself. In this negative unity, however, the Concept has the urge to sublate its moments of \textit{individual} externality. Crucially, it is this absolute reflection of determinateness that distinguishes the present chemical object from the chemical object at the beginning of Chemism. Hegel writes that the absolutely reflected chemical object is the ‘individual [Concept] of the whole, which [Concept] is the universal essence, the \textit{real genus} of the particular object’.\textsuperscript{28} This is one side of the chemical object, the side which has the urge to sublate the externality of the other individual chemical object and to unite under their Concept or “real genus”. On the other side, the chemical object is also the individual that exists apart from the other chemical object. The chemical object, therefore, is ‘the contradiction of its immanent positedness and its immanent

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} Hegel, SL, 728/430.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
individual [Concept]\textsuperscript{29}: where the ‘immanent positedness’ is the opposition of the chemical objects to each other and the ‘immanent individual [Concept]’ is their shared essential determinateness. These two sides of the chemical object are in contradiction because, on the one hand, they have the determinateness to remain individuals and, on the other hand, they have the determinateness to be united within a whole. This contradiction has arisen out of the chemical object’s lack of self-subsistence.\textsuperscript{30} The process that will follow from this contradiction is a process of self-determination, because the process develops from within the chemical object itself, and not from an object that is different to it. We still do not have the kind of self-determination that is in-and-for itself the relation of the Concept with externality - the Concept is still simply an inner moment. Let us now turn to the Chemical Process.

5.2 The Chemical Process

Just as the mechanical object developed into the mechanical process, so too does the chemical object develop into the chemical process. An important difference in the layout of the text, however, is that Hegel does not divide the chemical process into a “formal” and a “real” one, and the final section of Chemism is not called “absolute chemism”. Nevertheless, the text clearly distinguishes between a “formal” and a “real” unity over the course of the chemical process and one of my aims will be to show that the “formal/real” distinction is also present in the chemical process. Furthermore, there is also textual support for the notion that there is a moment of “absolute chemism”. Given that Mechanism and Chemism develop similarly, it is tempting to suggest that they represent fundamental aspects of objective processes, however, it is beyond the scope of this thesis for me to speculate as to what are these implications for objective processes. I now turn to the formal chemical process\textsuperscript{31}.

5.2.1 The Formal Chemical Process

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} See: ‘it spontaneously tenses itself against this deficiency and initiates the process by its self-determining’, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Henceforth, the fcp.
“B. The Chemical Process” ‘begins with the presupposition that the objects [are] in tension’.\footnote{Hegel, SL, 728/430.}

In the conclusion to “A. The Chemical Object” it was said that the \textit{chemical object} is the contradiction of its immediate positedness and its immanent \textit{Concept}. In other words, the \textit{chemical objects} are united in their identity with the \textit{Concept}, but as individual objects are opposed to each other. Importantly, their positedness did not develop from a positing but from a presupposition, \textit{i.e.} the original presupposition of \textit{Chemism} that determinateness is essential to it. This is how the \textit{chemical objects} can be in a state of positedness without having posited each other.\footnote{Thus, I agree with Sans SJ: ‘Die Abhandlung der Wissenschaft der Logik über den chemischen Prozeß setzt die Affinität oder Verwandtschaft der beteiligten Objekte voraus. Aufgrund ihrer natürlichen Bestimmtheit strebe jedes nach der Aufhebung der „Einseitigkeit seiner Existenz“, um „die Realität dem Begriffe, der beide Momente enthält, gemäß zu setzen“, (Sans SJ, “Weisen der Welterschließung”, 48).}

The reason why their contradiction develops into the \textit{chemical process} is because each \textit{chemical object} is a self-contradiction. We can no longer consider them as striving towards each other in the absolute reflection of the \textit{chemical object} but must now examine the dynamic development that comes from each \textit{chemical object} being self-contradictory. Each \textit{chemical object} is self-contradictory because it is in-itself the \textit{Concept}, and so implicitly both itself and its other, and an external one-sided \textit{individual}, and so explicitly just itself. Thus, their contradiction is not an external relation but is essential to them. Moreover, since each \textit{chemical object} is the \textit{Concept} in-itself its urge to sublate the other is also in-itself: thus, they are self-sublating.\footnote{This is a more developed form of what we saw in the section where we examined the reflection of determinateness within the \textit{chemical object}. There, the reflection-into-self was immediately the reflection-out-of-self, here, in affinity the striving to sublate itself (reflection-into-self) is immediately the striving to sublate the other (reflection-out-of-self).} Hegel names the specific self-contradiction of the \textit{chemical process affinity}.\footnote{Sans SJ gives a brief history of this concept in both the nascent field of chemistry and in Romance literature, see: (Sans SJ, “Weisen der Welterschließung”, 38-41). Sans SJ’s paper engages with concerns regarding the function of Objectivity and \textit{Chemism} in the SL, see: (Sans SJ, “Weisen der Welteröffnung”, 37-8). His answer, briefly, is that it offers a third way of understanding the kinds of relations that objects can have that transcends the Kantian “mechanism/teleology” dichotomy, see: (Sans SJ, “Weisen der Welterschließung”, 60-3). His approach to giving this answer is to focus on the empirical instantiations of some logical moves in \textit{Chemism} so as to show that it is indeed a different way to explain object relations. Because of this approach, it is not possible to engage with the majority of Sans SJ because it is not his aim to give a detailed reading of \textit{Chemism}. His paper is very instructive for those interested in understanding the wider implications of \textit{Chemism}.}

\textit{Affinity} describes the self-propelling nature of each \textit{chemical object} towards the other \textit{chemical object}. Since they are both the \textit{Concept} in-themselves their \textit{affinity} is grounded in their determinate identity: they share an identity, but that identity is spread across two different, objects. It is only because they are identical in their difference that they have the \textit{affinity} to sublate that difference and unite. The conclusion of this unification would be to give the \textit{Concept}, the merely inner determinateness, the reality that the \textit{chemical objects} enjoy by being
external. Hegel writes that this striving for unity is the chemical object’s urge ‘to posit a reality conformable to the [Concept]’.

On the other hand, however, each chemical object is an individual that is external and violent to its Concept. This ‘external [violence]’ is a violence against affinity. Now, one might think that the äußere Gewalt that holds the objects apart is something external to the objects themselves. Hegel does not explicitly state that violence comes from the objects themselves and coupled with the externality of the violence it looks like a possible reading. This reading requires us to think that the immanent development of Chemism requires something external to it to develop. My reading of Chemism, and of the SL, however, is that it develops through its own resources and does not refer to anything outside of it for its immanent justification.

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36 Hegel, SL, 728/430.
37 It is curious to note that Hegel uses the noun Ausgleichung to describe how the tension between the chemical objects will be removed. Throughout the Logic, he uses this word in three different forms: as a noun, Ausgleichung, as a verb, ausgleichen, and as an adjective, ausgeglichen. As far as I can tell he uses the word sparsely. In the Doctrine of Being it appears once as a noun in the introduction to Chapter 3 Being-For-Self, (SL, 157/174), never as a verb and once as an adjective in the first remark to The Infinity of Quantum, (SL, 265/310); it does not appear in the Doctrine of Essence at all, and it appears in the Doctrine of the Concept once as a noun in the above case, never as a verb, and thrice as an adjective, once in Mechanism in the opening paragraph of the Mechanical Object, (SL, 711/410), once in Chemism in the Chemical Process (as we will soon see), (SL, 729/431), and once in the concluding sentence of the introduction to the Idea, (SL, 760/469). I cannot comment on its use in the Doctrine of Being as it is beyond the scope of this thesis but it might be more than just a passing curiosity that it is used three times in Objectivity, which seems disproportionate. Moreover, in each case it is used to describe the same kind of structure, i.e. a moment of Objectivity wherein the moments of the Concept are no longer in determinate opposition. I do not want to overstate the intentionality behind Hegel’s use of this word. It does seem, however, that he employs it to express a moment of equilibrium between the determinations of the Concept that is not just a sublation. They are indeed sublated but they are also in a state of equilibrium in being sublated. Another possibility is that we find ausgeglichen often in Objectivity because of the scientific connotations of the word, i.e. of objects being in equilibrium.

38 Here, Miller translates Gewalt as “compulsion”, and it is worth recalling that in Mechanism he translated it as “violence”: so it seems as if Miller does not think that Hegel is using Gewalt to designate the same kind of conceptual relation. However, there are some obvious similarities, i.e. there is the exercise of an external determination on something else, but that is really not sufficient to claim that Hegel is referring to the same ontological relation through the word Gewalt. We might also translate it as “force” which seems to be what Miller is trying to evoke with “compulsion”. Of course, the downside of translating it as “force” is that Kraft is generally translated as “force”, which again raises questions about Hegel’s terminology. For the sake of uniformity, I will translate Gewalt as “violence” but with the preceding remark as an essential caveat to my choice.

39 Hegel, SL, 728/431.

40 I am especially indebted to a discussion with Professor Stephen Houlgate who alerted me to the possibility of this reading. Houlgate’s reading of the moments of “likeness” and “unlikeness” in Diversity in the Doctrine of Essence follows a similar line: “It is important to stress that likeness and unlikeness are external characterizations of the diverse. As such, they fall outside the sphere of “reflexion into self” that constitutes the diverse themselves. Accordingly, likeness and unlikeness are not themselves constituted by “reflexion into self””, (Stephen Houlgate, “Essence, Reflexion, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic,” in A companion to Hegel, ed. Stephen Houlgate and Michael Baur ((Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011)), 150). Houlgate’s reading of Diversity should not be mapped-on to the above-mentioned suggestion for how the äußere Gewalt might be read: it merely serves as an example for how such a reading might proceed.
Contrary, then, to the above hypothesis, I think that the violence that keeps the chemical objects apart comes from the chemical objects themselves. Firstly, whilst it is true that Hegel does not explicitly state that the violence comes from the chemical objects, he does not explicitly suggest that it comes from elsewhere either. Secondly, an immanent justification for locating the violence within the chemical objects can be provided. The externality of the violence can be in the external opposition that each chemical object has to another, i.e. it is the essential determinateness of each chemical object to be opposed to another chemical object; this opposition is an external relation; thus, they do violence against the unifying urge within each chemical object because each is the external opposition to the other. Therefore, the “externality” of the violence can be located in the objects’ external opposition to each other, and the reason why it happens in response to affinity is because the unifying urge of affinity runs contrary to their essential determinateness.

Each individual chemical object, then, does “violence” [Gewalt] against the unifying urge of the Concept or affinity, and thus, does violence against itself. Their self-contradiction is posited by the chemical objects and this is different to the presupposed opposition with which the process began. Thus, Hegel writes that ‘each of the objects is posited as self-contradictory and self-sublating in its own self’. The significance of this is that the chemical objects do not develop because of the presupposition of Chemism, i.e. the presupposition that what it is for a chemical object to be is to be opposed to another chemical object. Instead, each chemical object posits the other chemical object because of their immanent determinateness.

Since the chemical objects are in a state of tension because of their equilibrated affinity and violence it is through the unifying urge of the Concept of the chemical objects that they are brought into a whole. Thus, the Concept as the essential determinateness of the chemical objects is taken as the ‘middle term whereby these extremes are concluded into a unity’. The external concretely existing individuals, the chemical objects, are the extremes of the middle term, the Concept: and they are united in this form through the Concept that is their middle-term. This unity is only a formal unity because it sets to one side the determinateness of the individual chemical objects and focuses on their identity through their shared Concept. Interestingly, Moyar omits the moment of äußere Gewalt: he refers to their affinity but not to their violence. By not referring to their violence, i.e. the aspect of their being that prevents their unification, he does not give the reason for the “formality” of the fcp that follows. In other

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41 Hegel, SL, 728/430.
42 Hegel, SL, 729/431.
words, in the absence of violence it is not the case that the unification of the objects would be a merely formal one since there would be no opposition between the chemical objects preventing their unification in the first place. However, each object is in-itself the urge to unite and, pace Moyar, the external force against unity. The unity is, however, merely a formal unity because the determinateness of the Concept is external to the individual chemical objects. The formality of the relation is due to the merely in-itself relation of the unity: each chemical object is only in-itself the Concept, and so their respective relation to the Concept is merely in-itself or one-sided. Thus, their unity is a formal unity; contrarily, a “real” unity would be the unity of two chemical objects that are each for-themselves the determinateness of the Concept.

Now, Hegel calls the formal unity an ‘absolute unity’ which might seem to contradict my suggestion that Chemism is divided similarly to Mechanism. However, the “absoluteness” of the formal unity lies in the fact that all three moments are united, whereas in the moment of absolute chemism they are not just united but posited in-and-for themselves, as we will soon see. The formal unity is only formally absolute, i.e. they are related to each other only one-sidedly. The middle term is an ‘abstract neutrality’ or the ‘theoretical element’ because the real difference [reale Unterschied] of the chemical objects, their self-subsistent determinateness (their external side), has not been posited. The Concept is that which connects them in an “abstract” or “theoretical” sense, but not in a real sense because it reduces their self-subsistent determinateness to the formal unity — it is not taken into account.

Interestingly, despite the abstractness of the Concept as the middle term of the chemical objects it is their real possibility [die reale Möglichkeit], i.e. there is a real possibility that they could express their real difference through the middle term. As we will see, this “real possibility” will return in the real chemical process.

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44 Moyar’s exclusion of äußere Gewalt is also a problem for the alternative interpretation of äußere Gewalt given above, since the issue is not about where we should locate the äußere Gewalt, but the role that its presence plays on the logical development. Burbidge is particularly perspicacious regarding this issue and it is clear that we have the same concern in mind regarding the provenance of violence in the fcp: ‘This pressure towards combination is so strong [...] that the two objects can only retain their existence by some kind of external force: the concept of chemical object requires that the existing particulars not be allowed simply to dissolve each other. In other words, the presupposition for any thought of a chemical process must contain not only the basic affinity of these two objects, but also their independent existence’, (Burbidge, Real process, 83)

45 Hegel, SL, 729/431.

46 Ibid.

47 In fact, as Hegel writes, the chemical objects have entered into an ‘external community’, (Hegel, SL, 729/431). They are in a “community” because they are united in their Concept, but their relation is a purely “external” one because the chemical objects, as externally existing, did not themselves posit their relation and so they stand externally to their formal middle term and, subsequently, to each other.

48 Henceforth, rcp.
In the *fcp* the *Concept* is the middle-term that is the element of *communication* between the *chemical objects*. The individual *chemical objects* conform to their essential urge by sublating the other and unifying. The *Concept* is now ‘posited as a reality’\(^{49}\) since it is united with the concretely existing *chemical objects*. Crucially, the ‘*real differences* of the objects are reduced to *its* unity’\(^{50}\), which reaffirms that it is merely formal and that it does not consider the individual determinations, and therefore real determinations, of the *chemical objects*.\(^{51}\)

In this unity, the determinateness between the *chemical objects* is ‘weakened, with the result that in this reciprocal integration the striving reaches its quiescent neutrality’\(^{52}\). It is no longer an object, since the tension and opposition that characterises *chemical objects* is extinguished: it is a *chemical product*.\(^{53}\) Their opposition has been neutralised because the formal unity excludes the chemical objects’ ‘real difference’: their self-subsistent individuality. The possibility for opposition is preserved within the *chemical product* but the determinateness is ‘as yet not absolutely reflected into itself’\(^{54}\). This is because the *Concept*, as the middle-term of their formal unity, is one-sidedly connected to the *chemical objects*. Even though they form an absolute unity, their determinateness is not absolutely reflected into each other precisely because the real difference [*reale Unterschied*] of the *chemical objects* was not posited in their unity.

### 5.2.2 Burbidge on Chemism

Pausing the exegesis for a moment, I will engage with Burbidge.\(^{55}\) I agree with Burbidge up to this part of *Chemism*. We disagree, however, on how the *fcp* develops. I will first give Burbidge’s view and then recapitulate my view to show how we disagree.

\(^{49}\) Hegel, *SL*, 729/431.

\(^{50}\) Hegel, *SL*, 729/431.

\(^{51}\) It should be noted, however, that despite the fact that the *chemical objects*’ *real difference* is reduced to their unity that they still have a ‘negative bearing of each to the other’, (Ibid.). This moment of negativity comes from the fact that the *Concept* is posited as a reality through their external relation. Importantly, their real moment of negativity, their difference, is not posited and what is posited is just the *Concept*, which is why they are still only in a formal relation despite being negatively related to each other.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.

\(^{53}\) *The product is neutral*, that is, a product in which the ingredients, which can no longer be called objects, have lost their tension and with it those properties which belonged to them as tensed’, (Ibid.). Here, what I have interpreted as the *formal chemical process* concludes with a *chemical product* much as the *fmp* concludes with the object as a product - though the proper understanding of the *mechanical object* as a product is reserved for after the *rmp*.

\(^{54}\) Hegel, *SL*, 729/432.

\(^{55}\) Burbidge, *Real process*. 

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Burbidge recognises that the Concept is a ‘kind of middle’\textsuperscript{56} for the chemical objects insofar as it is their ‘universal determinateness’\textsuperscript{57}. However, it is ‘only something subjective’\textsuperscript{58}, i.e. the Concept, as subjectivity, is not part of their existence as objective individuals: ‘[the basic concept of the chemical object] has nothing to do with the existing objects that are being understood. Their separate existence stands opposed to, and cannot be identified with, the shared concept’\textsuperscript{59}. We get a snippet of how Burbidge conceives of the Concept in his introductory paragraph to Mechanism: ‘The act of understanding the objective realm involves the subjective dynamic of conceiving, judging and inferring; at the same time it considers the object to be independent of this dynamic’\textsuperscript{60}. For Burbidge, then, the “subjective” or the Concept, is outside of the chemical objects to the point of not being identifiable with them. Instead of thinking of the Concept as the middle-term, Burbidge identifies the middle term as the ‘formal element of unity’\textsuperscript{61}, referring to Hegel’s ‘the theoretical existence of the concrete existence of the chemical objects’\textsuperscript{62}. This concludes Burbidge’s analysis of the middle-term in the fcp. He, (a) recognises that the Concept is a kind of middle-term but not the middle-term that unites the objects in the fcp, and (b) instead identifies their middle-term as the formal element, which is not the Concept.

Contrary to Burbidge, I have argued that the text supports the idea that the Concept is the middle term of the chemical objects in the fcp. First, Hegel writes the following on this matter: ‘Now the middle term whereby these extremes are [united]\textsuperscript{63} is first the implicit nature of both, the whole [Concept] that holds both within itself’\textsuperscript{64}; here, the ‘middle term’ is the Concept. Hegel then writes: ‘Secondly, however, since in their concrete existence they stand confronting each other, their absolute unity is also a still formal element having an existence

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\textsuperscript{56} Burbidge, \textit{Real process}, 84.
\textsuperscript{57} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 727/429.
\textsuperscript{58} Burbidge, \textit{Real process}, 84.
\textsuperscript{59} Burbidge, \textit{Real process}, 84.
\textsuperscript{60} Burbidge, \textit{Real process}, 77.
\textsuperscript{61} Burbidge, \textit{Real process}, 84.
\textsuperscript{62} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 729/431.
\textsuperscript{63} The original German reads: ‘Die Mitte, wodurch nun diese Extreme zusammengeschlossen werden, ist erstlich die ansichseiende Natur beider, der ganze, beide in sich haltende Begriff’, (Hegel, \textit{WL}, 31). Miller translates it as: ‘Now the middle term whereby these extremes are concluded into a unity is first the implicit nature of both, the whole [Concept] that holds both within itself’, (Hegel, \textit{SL}, 729). Miller renders ‘zusammengeschlossen werden’ as ‘concluded into a unity’, and whilst I think that this translation is perfectly good it is not an instance where Hegel explicitly calls the unification of the external chemical objects with each other through the middle-term a unity [\textit{eine Einheit}]. Thus, to make my point against Burbidge’s reading as precise as possible I have altered Miller’s ‘concluded into a unity’ with ‘united’, which is a reasonable translation of “zusammenschließen” (other possibilities include “to merge”, “to lock together” or “to connect”, all of which convey the same meaning of unification).
\textsuperscript{64} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 729/431.
distinct from them. In the first quotation, “united” referred to the unity of the extremes with the Concept that “holds both within itself”; in the quote that immediately follows, the opposed chemical objects are said to be in an “absolute unity”. Thus, it is reasonable to think that reference to a “unity” between two sentences that follow from each other refers to the same “unity”.

Now, Burbidge’s reading depends on reading the middle-term as the ‘formal element having an existence distinct from them’. I think that this is mistaken for four reasons: first, Hegel explicitly identifies the middle-term with the Concept; second Hegel writes that the absolute unity is the ‘still formal element’ [noch formales Element], in other words, it has not changed from what it was, and is, still the Concept; third, the text does not explicitly state that the Concept is not the middle term; and fourth, it is perfectly consistent with the Concept to be the absolute unity of the chemical objects and, because of their externality, to be itself external to them. It is true that Hegel switches from talking about the Concept to the ‘formal element’ as the middle term but given the absence of any rejection of the Concept it makes more sense to read the “formal element” as the Concept than as a new determination that remains unexplained. Moreover, throughout my exegesis of Chemism I have shown that the Concept is the universal determinateness of each chemical object and have shown its role in the development of the chemical object. It follows from its status as the universal determinateness that it would be the middle-term that unifies them since it is their respective point of identity. The Concept is their merely formal element because it excludes their externality and real difference. I now return to the exegesis.

The chemical product has lost the tension that constituted the contradiction at the beginning of the chemical process. The chemical process began with the striving of each chemical object to sublate the other chemical object. The conclusion of the fcp is the formal unity wherein the striving of each chemical object is extinguished [erloschen]. Nevertheless, since the essential determinateness of the chemical object is a presupposition, the chemical product’s ‘capability of their former self-subsistence and tension is preserved’. To make sense of this we must cast our minds back to the beginning of Chemism, where the chemical object is understood as being essentially a relation to another chemical object. The determinateness of the chemical object does not arise over the course of Chemism but is already

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65 Ibid.
66 Hegel, SL, 729/431.
67 Ibid.
68 Hegel, SL, 729/432.
69 Hegel, SL, 727/429.
there from the beginning. The significance of this for the chemical product is that even though
the difference between the chemical objects has been extinguished, the chemical structure as
such has determinateness as its essential presupposition. Consequently, the determinateness of
Chemism is presupposed and the possibility for it is always present because the chemical
product is the product of two chemical objects and their essential determinateness or
presupposition is preserved, sublated, in the chemical product. The chemical product is still
only a formal unity because the determinateness of the individual chemical objects was not
‘absolutely reflected into itself’, i.e. the chemical objects are not in-and-for themselves the
Concept but only in-themselves [ansichseien] the Concept. I will now briefly turn to a
second point of disagreement with Burbidge before examining the rcp.

My second point of contention with Burbidge stems from his reading of the middle term
of the fcp and concerns his reading of the “neutrality” of the object. According to Burbidge,
the middle term ‘contributes nothing more than an indifferent neutrality to the tension that
divides them’, and then goes on to write that this middle term is not immanent to the objects
but necessitated by thought: ‘because thought, in its attempt to make coherent the chemical
object, has required it’. As a result, the neutral third element that has been introduced by
‘conceptual thought... [to]...resolve the contradiction’ serves three functions: first, ‘it
reaffirms the separate existence of the two objects, since unity comes from somewhere else’;
second, ‘it enables the process to happen by bringing them together’; ‘it contributes its own bit
- the unity- towards the final result’.

The problem with this reading is that it renders the fcp dependent on external thought
for its development. For Burbidge, the middle term is not immanent to the chemical objects
but something external to them that is inserted to resolve their contradiction. Here, I think Burbidge
fails to consider the fact that the chemical objects are not merely in contradictory but that they
are ‘self-contradictory and self-sublating’. As I argued above, the resolution of their
contradiction comes from their inner determinateness and the process is, therefore, immanent.

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70 Hegel, SL, 727/429.
71 I find Moyar’s analysis of the fcp lacking in detail and I disagree with his point that ‘Der Prozess lässt sich am
einfachsten fassen, wenn man ihn sich so vorstellt, dass zwei in Wasser getauchte Elemente reagieren und zu
einer “ruhigen Neutralität (GW 12, 150) gelangen’, (Moyar, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 620). I have sought to
show that the fcp can be shown to be legible without substituting the logical development for an empirical
example.
72 Burbidge, Real process, 84.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Hegel, SL, 728/430.
to the chemical objects and not external to them. Therefore, I disagree with all three of Burbidge’s “functions” of the neutral object. First, I do not think that their unity ‘comes from somewhere else’ because each chemical object is in in-itself the Concept and it is through their identity as each in-itself the Concept that they are externally united through the Concept. Burbidge is right that ‘the separate existence of the two objects’ is reaffirmed since they are only externally connected through their middle-term, the Concept; but this external connection does not come from somewhere else, rather it comes from the very being of the chemical objects. Second, the formal neutrality does not enable ‘the process to happen by bringing them together’ as if it were something added to the process to facilitate it but is itself the process since it is by the self-contradictory and self-sublating urge of each chemical object that they externally unite. Finally, and related to the previous two points, the formal unity does not contribute ‘its own bit - the unity - to the final result’, since the formal neutrality is generated by the inner urge of the chemical objects and so nothing is contributed from without, rather, the unity is generated from within. I now turn to my examination of the rcp.

5.2.3 The Real Chemical Process I

In my division of the text, the rcp begins in subsection B.2 and continues in a fragmentary manner in B.3. The opposition of the fcp has been sublated within the neutral product. However, within the realm of Chemism, it is ‘essential to the [Concept]’ that it be this negative unity. In one sense, it is essential to the Concept because the determinateness is sublated within the Concept and so is there to be expressed. In a more fundamental sense, however, it is essential to the Concept because Chemism began with the determinateness of the chemical object as its presupposition. Thus, for the Concept to have an existence as a moment of

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77 Burbidge, Real process, 84.
78 Burbidge, Real process, 84.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 This is missing from McTaggart who seems to focus his account of the rcp entirely on §201 of the EL. He comments that the account given in the EL is clearer than that given in the SL but that they nevertheless express the same meaning, (McTaggart, A commentary on Hegel’s Logic, 256-7). This is, however, mistaken. As evidenced by McTaggart’s dissatisfaction with the move from the neutral product to the rcp, §201 of the EL simply asserts that the extremes of the syllogism appear from the neutral product. There is no reproduction of the contents of the first paragraph of B.2, the paragraph with which I have just dealt, and which explains how we
Chemism it must presuppose the essential tension that constitutes it since the Concept is the implicit unity of two opposed chemical objects.\footnote{84}{Burbidge’s explanation of how the external negative unity comes into being seems to rely on the notion that conceptual thought introduces it into the picture from outside. For example, he writes that ‘[c]onceptual thought reflects on this new kind of chemical object and identifies what must be added to make it genuinely chemical. In contrast to the quiescent neutrality, one needs a singular, dynamic activity’ [my emphasis], (Burbidge, \textit{Real process}, 87). I am not familiar with Burbidge’s grand reading of the Doctrine of the Concept, but it seems as if our source of disagreement falls to what is designated by Hegel’s word “Concept”. For me, the Concept is a part of the chemical structure just like the external chemical objects, whereas Burbidge seems to be subsuming Concept under an idea of “conceptual thought” that stands outside of the logical development and inserts its own moments of conceptuality to develop it when required. For me, the Concept is immanent to the SL and not grounded in a subject that employs conceptual thought - this does not seem to be the case for Burbidge.} 

Crucially, the rcp also begins with a presupposition because the chemical object has not yet posited itself. As such, there is no self-determination within Chemism, and the Concept cannot ‘spontaneously re-kindles itself’\footnote{85}{Hegel, \textit{SL}, 730/432.} \([\text{anfachen}]\) but must presuppose the determinateness that belongs to the chemical object in Chemism.\footnote{86}{Here Miller’s translation does justice to the German \textit{anfachen}. It is worth noting that this is the first and only time the word is used in any of its forms. Undoubtedly, it is used to capture the particular “chemical” process by invoking the idea of fanning a fire.} Therefore, since the determinateness of the neutral product cannot manifest within the neutral product it must appear as ‘outside the neutral product’\footnote{87}{Ibid.} \([\text{anfachen}]\). The moment of negativity outside of the neutral product is ‘the abstract individuality’\footnote{88}{Ibid.}, which has an existence outside of the neutral product but has its reality in it.\footnote{89}{Ibid.} Now, let us consider the determinations of the abstract individual. First, it has existence:\footnote{90}{Again, Miller translates ‘und zugleich selbst zur Existenz gekommen ist’ (Hegel, \textit{WL}, 432) as ‘and has at the same time come into concrete existence’, (Hegel, \textit{SL},730). If we continue to understand existence as the mere relation between chemical objects, and an existence that is concrete as the development of a mere relation into an absolute relation, then existence seems to be the correct translation of what is happening in the logical moment. I say this because “existence” describes the tension of Chemism: ‘Now in this product, the tension of the opposition and the negative unity, as activity of the process, are indeed extinct. But since this unity is essential to the [Concept] and has at the same time come into concrete existence, it is still present, though its place is outside the neutral object’, (SL,730/432). If I am correct, then, the tension that now stands outside the chemical product has only existence, and not concrete existence, because they are only related to each externally and not absolutely related.} as all moments in Chemism that are external to each other have existence. Second, it is “abstract”. It is abstract because it is not related to the neutral product. Much like the reflection-into-self of the chemical object in subsection A. meant that it was an ‘abstract universality’\footnote{91}{Hegel, \textit{SL}, 728/430.}, so too does the absence of any outward reflection mean that the object outside the neutral product is...
an abstract individual. Third, and now looking forward to the next moment of the rcp, the abstract individual has its reality in the neutral product since objects in Chemism only have reality or existence by relating to other objects. Since it is both “abstract” and a “negativity” it is ‘tensed within itself against its abstraction and is an inward restless activity that turns outwards to consume’ [sich verzehrend]. The reflection-into-self of the abstract individual is the reflection outwards to the neutral product.

The essential determinateness or negativity of the abstract individual is to be in chemical opposition. In its abstraction it is not opposed to anything. The self-reflection of the abstract individual, however, is equally its relation outwards: ‘It relates itself immediately to the object whose quiescent neutrality is the real possibility of its opposition’. Recall that in the fcp the middle-term was also the ‘real possibility’ of the external chemical objects. In both processes it is their real possibility and not merely a contingency or formal possibility because the external chemical object relates to it through a shared inner determinateness. Importantly, the relation is still only “immediate” because the moment of reflection-into-self is immediately the reflection-out-of-self: there is no mediating moment since what it is for it to be chemical is to be in relation to another.

The neutral product has ceased to be a “product” and is now an object because it has been posited into chemical opposition by the individual. The object is ‘now the middle term of the previously merely formal neutrality, now inwardly concrete and determinate’: the chemical object is the middle-term of the individual. The middle-term is also ‘concrete and determinate’ because the external individual relates to it, but only inwardly since it has not posited the individual. For now, then, we have the chemical object that has been posited by the individual as the middle term, and the individual that has not been posited by the middle term as one of the extremes of the syllogism.

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92Crucially, the rcp does begin with a presupposition but this presupposition only presupposes the abstract individual. This is not sufficient to start the chemical process again: ‘The process does not spontaneously rekindle itself, for it had the difference only for its presupposition and did not itself posit it’, (Hegel, SL:730/432). Even though the abstract individuality is presupposed by the chemical product, the rcp proper only begins once the abstract individual posits the neutral product.
93 Hegel, SL, 730/432.
94 Here, Hegel uses the verb sich verzehren for the first and only time in the SL.
95 Hegel, SL, 730/432.
96 Hegel, SL, 729/431.
97 Hitherto, Hegel has made no reference to a syllogism. Even if one were to assert the primacy of the syllogism to understanding the rcp, see: Burbidg, Real process, for example, it is clear that the syllogism does not play a role in the initial stages of the rcp. Compare my account to Moyar who begins his account of the rcp with the disjunctive syllogism, see: Moyar, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 620.
98 Hegel, SL, 730/432.
99 Moyar focuses solely on the appearance of the disjunctive syllogism in his examination of the rcp, see: (Moyar, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 620). It is true that the disjunctive syllogism is important for understanding
Hegel expands on this relation in the second paragraph of subsection B.2. The immediate relation of the external individual to the middle-term is that the latter is ‘determined by it and thereby [dirempted]’\textsuperscript{100}.\textsuperscript{101} In other words, its determinateness is made explicit. Importantly, this relation is not a return to earlier forms of opposition in Chemism because we are only dealing with the middle-term and one of the extremes of the syllogism. As Hegel writes ‘this determination does not constitute the other extreme of the syllogism but belongs to the immediate relation of the differentiating principle to the middle-term in which this principle gives itself its immediate reality’\textsuperscript{102}. As we saw above, the individual is the “differentiating principle” since it is its activity that rekindles opposition, and it is by positing the middle-term that it gives itself an immediate reality. It might be thought that this moment of re-kindling is a continuation of the moment of affinity, since both moments are the “spark” that starts the chemical process. Indeed, this view is held by Sans SJ who remarks that the “differentiating principle” is part of the ‘context of explaining elective affinity’\textsuperscript{103}. I think that this is mistaken for two reasons. First, affinity is never mentioned again since the beginning of the fcp; second, the logical structure that affinity describes, is not repeated in Chemism. Affinity and the individual that acts as a “differentiating principle” are different logical moments of Chemism that form part of different kinds of processes. One distinction, for example, is that the “differentiating principle” acts on a neutral product whereas affinity was the self-contradictory and self-sublating urge of two opposed chemical objects. It is the “differentiating principle”, then, and not a moment of affinity that gives itself an “immediate” reality by relating with the object.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{100} Here, Miller translates the German dirimiert. “Disrupt” certainly communicates the idea of the object’s neutrality being disturbed but it does not have the sundering connotation of dirimiert. Given how the rcp develops I think that “sundered” or “dirempted” work better since, as we will see, the neutral object is split apart into its constitutive parts.

\textsuperscript{101} Hegel, SL., 730/432.

\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{103} Sans SJ, “Weisen der Welterschließung”, 54. (my translation).

\textsuperscript{104} Pace Burbidge who states that since the ‘pure negative activity lacks any content of its own…[it]…contains no principle that would generate any specific differentiation between objects’, (Burbidge, Real process, 88). It is true that the external individual needs to posit the neutral product to gain reality, but this is not tantamount to saying that it lacks the principle to generate difference. A little later Burbidge writes that ‘the activity [of the external individual] is strictly negative; it works against the content that it presupposes’, (Burbidge, Real process, 89). On my reading, however, it is the neutral product that presupposes the external individual (not the other way around as Burbidge claims), but because of the former’s neutrality it is the positing activity of the external individual that makes this process different to the fcp. For Burbidge, however, the distinction lies in the fact that the external individual has no differentiating principle of its own.
Hegel identifies the middle term of the syllogism as being like the middle term of the *disjunctive syllogism*: ‘besides being the universal nature of the object, and by virtue of which the object is both objective universality and also determinate particularity’. Let us break-down each of these descriptions. First, the middle-term is the “universal nature of the object”. Now, the *individual* has given itself reality by relating to the middle-term. It has become a *chemical object* by relating itself to something negatively. Following this line of thought, the middle term is the “universal nature” *because* of its determinateness, i.e. the fundamental essence of chemical object-hood, that the *individual* becomes an object. Second, as the moment of *universality* in *Chemism* it is a *universality* that is in a negative relation to an other object, it is also in a *particular* relation, i.e. it has determinateness and is a “determinate particularity”.

Hegel then introduces the other extreme of the syllogism. It stands opposed to the ‘external self-subsistent extreme of individuality; it is therefore the equally self-subsistent extreme of *universality*’. Hegel does not give any explanation for this and, in fact, seems to rely entirely on the parallels with the *disjunctive syllogism*. However, I, think that an account can be given that explains why the second extreme is a moment of *universality* through the resources of *Chemism*.

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5.2.4 The Real Chemical Process II

First, I want to draw attention to the diremption [die Direktion] of the middle-term which I think is a useful term to keep track of. It is first mentioned in the first sentence of the paragraph, and it refers to the immediate relation of the *individual* to the *neutral product*. It is mentioned again in the second sentence, but that usage is not of interest right now. It is used a third time after Hegel has introduced the other extreme of the syllogism:

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106 Here, I agree with Burbidge’s analysis of the determination of the middle term (Burbidge, *Real process*, 88).
108 Indeed, this is the account given by all commentators on *Chemism*.
109 Burbidge’s account of B.2, (Burbidge, *Real process*, 87-90) is focused on giving the logical development through syllogistic reasoning. I do think that Burbidge is right to examine the syllogistic side of *Chemism*. However, given how much emphasis he gives it I am concerned that his account overshadows the “chemical reasons” for the development. Thus, whilst I do not necessarily disagree with Burbidge, I think that my account broadens the conceptual resources available to understand *Chemism*. Given limitations of space, my account examines the logical development using just the language and conceptual resources of *Chemism*. Therefore, whilst I cannot comment on the accuracy of Burbidge’s reading, I can assert that our conclusions are very similar indeed.
‘The other extreme of the syllogism stands opposed to the external self-subsistent extreme of individuality; it is therefore the equally self-subsistent extreme of universality; hence the [diremption] suffered by the real neutrality of the middle term in this extreme is that it is split up into moments whose relationship is not that of difference, but of indifference’\(^{110}\)

The “other extreme of the syllogism”, what is equally the “self-subsistent extreme of universality”, is also a result of the diremption of the chemical object, which is now the determinate particularity. Hegel writes, “hence the [diremption]”, i.e. it is at this point of the logical development when the other extreme has been developed that he concludes that the chemical object has been dirempted. The diremption of the chemical object, then, is into the extremes of the syllogism: on the one hand the individual and on the other hand the universal. This is not abundantly clear, but I think that it makes the most sense given Hegel’s talk of the diremption of the chemical object. He refers to that which is dirempted as the “middle term” and as we have seen the middle-term of the rcp is the dirempted chemical object. So far, I have only explained how the other extreme of the syllogism is determined, but I have yet to explain why it is determined as a universal.

The answer lies in the essential structure of Chemism. The chemical object is the negative unity of two individual chemical objects that are united through a shared universal determinateness. Because this universal determinateness is shared, it is immediately determinate universality, or what is the same, particularity. It is, therefore, fundamental to Chemism that a chemical structure has these components: a shared universal essence, the individual objects, and the particularisation of that essence across the two objects. We saw in the rcp that the moment of individuality was necessitated by the basic presupposition of Chemism and that it immediately related to the neutral product. The neutral product is determined or dirempted, as we saw above, as a chemical object. This moment of diremption has two simultaneous moments: in the first moment the individual gains concreteness by being related to another, thus becoming properly chemical, and the neutral product has become that which gives concreteness to the individual. As such, as we saw above, it is the objective universality that determines the individual in a chemical relation and is a determinate

\(^{110}\) Hegel, SL, 730/433.
particularity because it is related to that individual. In the second moment, the determinate particularity is also dirempted since it is determined by the individual - note, that in the first the neutral product was determined by the individual but only in relation to it. Now, in the second moment of the diremption we must consider the diremption of the determinate particularity as the negative unity that was determined. The determinate particularity, as the objective universality, has the universal determinateness within itself. Therefore, the difference that is expressed within it, upon being determined, is the difference between particularity and universality. Since it is already immediately related to the individual, the moment determined cannot be a moment of particularity and so, it follows, it must be a moment of universality.

Looking at the extremes of the syllogism, what we have hitherto understood as the moments of individuality and universality, Hegel states that each is a self-subsistient moment and that it is indifferent to the other: crucially, they are not indifferent to their middle-term but to each other. Let us now consider Hegel’s usage of the term “indifference”. The first time “indifference” is used to describe an aspect of the chemical object it is used to explain the purely in-itself relation of the chemical object: ‘an indifferent base, the individual not yet specified as different; the person, too, is such a base related at first only to itself’\(^{111}\). Indifference is used to describe a relation inwards that is independent from its relation outwards. In such a relation there is no difference since difference could only be brought in by relating outside of oneself. The second time, indifference is employed to describe the neutral object in which the individual ‘has its reality’\(^{112}\). Here, Hegel is less explicit in explaining why the neutral object is indifferent, however, a plausible explanation can be given if we rely on our above understanding for how indifference functions in Chemism. The chemical object is indifferent to the individual because it merely relates to-itself and has no outward relation. We can now apply what we have learned to the abstract and indifferent extremes of the rcp.

Hegel re-names the two extremes of the rcp as the ‘abstract indifferent base’ (i.e. the moment of universality) and the ‘energising principle’ (i.e. the moment of individuality). These new terms for the extremes of the syllogism do not seem to be given as replacements for the previous names, but to describe these moments in their relationship to each other. Each of these moments is separated from the other by the middle-term and they do not immediately relate to each other.\(^{113}\) Henceforth, I refer to the extremes as elements, which are in abstraction to each

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\(^{111}\) Hegel, SL, 728429.

\(^{112}\) Hegel, SL, 730/432.

\(^{113}\) See: ‘the determinateness has not reached its reflection-into-self in an other as in the neutral product, but has in itself returned into its abstraction, and is an originally determinate element’, (Hegel, SL, 730/433).
other because they are unable to reflect their determinateness outwards — they are merely self-relating. This return into a moment of abstraction is like the moment of abstraction in the beginning of Chemism, where we saw that the self-representation of the chemical object was not self-subsisting and that it necessarily reflected outwards. It is in this sense that the elements are ‘originally determinate’ \(^{114}\) since they appear to be just like the first, original, moment of Chemism. In a sense, the development of Chemism is a return to the beginning of Chemism - but this is not the whole story. Whereas before the abstract chemical object was presupposed, here it is posited, it is the result of the development of Chemism and so what appears as a return to the beginning, as Hegel warns it might, \(^{115}\) is a development into a more explicit relation of the determinations of Chemism. The next, and final, step of Chemism is explored in the section that I have labelled absolute chemism, which begins in B.3 and continues into “C. The Transition of Chemism”. The final section of Chemism does not just deal with absolute chemism but also summarises the entire chapter. My exegesis will focus solely on the passages that I take to be dealing with absolute chemism. Having done this I will then conclude with my account for why Chemism develops into Teleology.

5.3 Absolute Chemism

Subsection B.3 begins with where the rcp left off. The indifferent base and the energising principle, which are externally joined by the middle-term, the real neutrality. Hegel makes two opening remarks about these elementary objects: first, they are ‘liberated from chemical tension’ \(^{116}\), and second, that ‘in them, the original basis of that presupposition with which chemism began has been posited through the real process’ \(^{117}\). First, then, as abstract and indifferent the elements are not opposed to each other and are free from their chemical determinateness. Second, however, their respective essential presupposition (essential determinateness) has been posited through the development of the rcp and each element now has the determination to posit another element and instigate a chemical process for-itself.

\(^{114}\) Hegel, SL, 730/433.

\(^{115}\) ‘This disruption may in the first instance be regarded as the restoration of that opposition of the objects in tension with which chemism began’, (Hegel, SL, 730/432).

\(^{116}\) Hegel, SL, 731/433.

\(^{117}\) Ibid.
Now, each *element* is the contradiction between their indifference and their ‘inner determinateness’\(^{118}\) and has the urge [der Trieb] to posit another *element* and neutralise itself. The contradiction arises because the *element* is both indifferent to the other *element* and the inner urge outwards to posit the tension within itself and thereby to posit another *element*. In this moment the *elements* are now objects, *i.e.* each is the inner activity outwards to posit the tension within itself and thereby its tension with another *chemical object*. This is crucial:

‘[the *chemical object*] is the urge outwards that sunders itself and posits tension in its object and in another object in order to have something with which it can enter into a relation of difference and in which it can neutralize itself and give to its simple determinateness an existent reality’\(^{119}\).

The *chemical object* posits the tension within itself because it is the contradiction between its indifference and its inner urge. Then, it relates itself to the external *chemical object* to which it is opposed. The initial moment of self-positing is equally a moment outwards because of its essential determinateness as a *chemical object*. The urge outwards gives the *chemical object* ‘its simple determinateness an existent reality’\(^{120}\), *i.e.* only by relating to an other does the *chemical object* have existence. In this state of mutual tension, the *chemical objects* have returned to the beginning of Chemism where they seek to neutralise their determinateness and form a stable unity. However, this is only partly true because Chemism began with a presupposition and not by a *chemical object* positing itself and thereby another *chemical object*. In fact, to read this moment as a return to the beginning of Chemism would be to ignore the crucial result of the rcp: that the *chemical objects* have posited their own determinateness.\(^{121}\)

We have, in fact, reached a new moment in Chemism.\(^{122}\) Hegel writes: ‘chemism by this return

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\(^{118}\) Ibid.

\(^{119}\) Hegel, SL, 731/433.

\(^{120}\) Ibid.

\(^{121}\) See: ‘[the *chemical object*] is the urge outwards that sunders itself and posits tension in its object and in another object’, (Ibid).

\(^{122}\) Burbidge reads the two abstract *elements* as establishing the ‘presuppositions necessary for the objective realm to be considered chemical at all’, (Burbidge, Real process, 91); elsewhere of the final syllogism he writes: ‘we discover that a different kind of syllogism has been playing a role behind the scenes’, (Burbidge, Real process, 90). I disagree with Burbidge here because such readings that emphasise the end of chapters as the truth of the beginning of chapters reduce the beginning to a mere methodological steppingstone instead of taking them as ontological entities in their own right. I read each moment of the SL as examining a moment of being. Thus, there is a moment when objects relate to each other chemically on the basis of a presupposition and a moment when objects relate to each other on the basis of the abovementioned syllogism and the former is not reducible to the latter nor vice-versa.
into its [Concept] sublates itself. Chemism has returned into its Concept by positing the universal determinateness, the Concept, that is the urge for the chemical objects to unite. The Concept, then, by way of the external relations of chemical objects has posited itself. We have returned to the inner determinateness of the Concept from the liberation of the abstract, indifferent elements, and have posited it for the first time.

So far, I have set out the starting point for absolute chemism: each chemical object has the urge to posit another chemical object. We must now consider the result of this positing. My examination of absolute chemism continues in “C. The Transition of Chemism” where the self-determination of absolute chemism takes us from Chemism into Teleology. The section begins with a remark concerning chemistry that acts as an example for the opening moment of absolute chemism that we have just examined. I will not consider this remark as it will distract us from the purely logical development of Chemism. Following the remark there is a long explanation of the logical development hitherto. This explanation is meant to inform our understanding of absolute chemism, but it does not carry the logical development forward, and so I skip it and follow the main thread of the development.

Now, before the logical development of absolute chemism, Hegel includes a discussion concerning the lack of self-determination in Chemism so far. This is included because the development of Objectivity could be said to be the gradual re-emergence of the Concept from objective relations. In Mechanism, the Concept was the immediate identity of its determinations that lacked determinacy and were indifferent to each other and concluded with free mechanism, which saw a kind of self-determination develop in the moment of the Law. Similarly in Chemism, the Concept has the inner urge to bring the external chemical objects into a unity so as to unite itself with itself but has been thwarted at each point by the externality of objective relations. That said, the moment of absolute chemism signals a change in the winds for the Concept. Hegel writes that the processes of Chemism, ‘which have proved themselves necessary’, have gradually sublated the externality that has kept the Concept apart from the external side of the chemical object and that the Concept ‘emerges as a totality determined in and for itself and not conditioned by externality’. Our first task is to understand why this is the case, because Hegel does not explicitly explain why the Concept is now a

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123 Hegel, SL, 731/434.
124 Sans SJ gives a very illuminating discussion of the significance of this empirical example. See: (Sans SJ, “Weisen der Welterschließung”, 50-1).
125 See: ‘Chemism itself is the first negation of indifferent objectivity and of the externality of determinateness; it is therefore still infected with the immediate self-subsistence of the object and with externality’, (Hegel, SL, 731/434).
126 Hegel, SL, 731/435.
determined totality. I think that it is because the rcp developed each of the determinations of the Concept as a distinct moment, *i.e.* universality (the indifferent base), particularity (the middle-term), and individuality (the energising principle). This is different to the beginning of Chemism where universality and particularity were bound up within the determinate universality and individuality stood apart from them as a self-subsistent moment. Now, in absolute chemism, the elements posit themselves, and thereby posit each other through their middle-term: in doing so, each of the determinations of the Concept have posited themselves and, in turn, each other, thereby determining the Concept as a totality. This helps to explain the sudden shift in emphasis from the chemical objects to the Concept in the final sentences of Chemism, which is central to understanding the transition from Chemism to Teleology. Now, let us return to our tensed chemical objects and consider the final stage of their development.\(^\text{127}\)

Each chemical object, as we have seen, is the contradiction of its indifference and its determinateness. As such, each is self-contradictory because its indifference is also indifference to its own determinateness. Thus, each has the urge to posit itself and in doing so determines itself. Simultaneously, when it posits itself it posits another object because of their shared inner determinateness and relates outwards.\(^\text{128}\) The inner determinateness of the chemical object is the Concept and thus, what the process reveals is the Concept positing the Concept of the other chemical object or the Concept positing itself. By positing itself it relates to itself and thus is self-mediating for it is itself the unity between the inner determinateness and the external moment of the chemical object.

Equally, this moment of self-mediation is an external positing and the chemical object posits another chemical object, sublating the last moment of externality making that too ‘the [Concept’s] own moment of self-mediation’\(^\text{129}\). These moments of externality that have been posited by the Concept are accordingly sublated within it, thus giving us the Concept that has

\(^{127}\) Burbidge reads this section syllogistically, see: (Burbidge, Real process, 89-90). Sans SJ also dedicates much space to the syllogisms in Chemism, see: (Sans SJ, “Weisen der Weltauschließung”, 48-55). But I think that Burbidge is mistaken to emphasise the syllogism in absolute chemism, see: (Burbidge, Real process, 92-5), because Hegel’s account is not couched in syllogistic terms as explicitly as his account of the rcp and that perhaps that should give us pause regarding the importance of the syllogism in Chemism. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate in detail the chapter on Syllogism, as well as to consider the importance of Syllogism to different logical processes. My attempt to deal with this limitation is to 1) give an account of Chemism from within the resources of Chemism, and 2) to not engage with the preference for syllogistic accounts of Chemism in the literature.

\(^{128}\) See: ‘Now further, the inner determinateness as such of these objects is essentially the contradiction of their simple indifferent subsistence and themselves as determinateness, and is the urge outwards that sunders itself and posits tension in its object and in another object in order to have something with which it can enter into a relation of difference and in which it can neutralize itself and give to its simple determinateness an existent reality’, (Hegel, SL, 731/433).

\(^{129}\) Hegel, SL, 733/436.
its determinations posited within it: a determinate totality. This is the conclusion of absolute chemism. It is crucial to recall that the Concept has not returned into a state of absolute self-mediation such as we saw in the Concept chapter. Whilst it is free from relating to itself through an external relation, it is nevertheless still in a relation with ‘objective externality, to which it relates itself only as to an unessential reality’." The Concept has externality sublated within itself and so retains externality as a moment of its being. The Concept, however, is not in an external relation to itself, instead, its moment of externality is expressed through its external relation to Objectivity. We will examine what it means for the Concept to be related to Objectivity as an ‘unessential reality’ in the next chapter. For now, however, the Concept that is free within Objectivity Hegel calls end. We examine the end in the next chapter on Teleology.

5.4 Concluding Remarks

My account of Chemism is motivated by two reasons: first, scholarly study of Chemism has dwindled since Burbidge, (Sans SJ and Moyar being the exceptions that prove the rule), and so it is important to offer an updated account of Chemism; second, Chemism marks a significant development in the logical relationship of the Concept and Objectivity, a relationship that is the touchstone of my account of the move into the PN. The development of Chemism can be simplified as the development of the inner Concept as against the moment of externality within the same chemical object. Gradually, the Concept develops such that it posits itself and, thereby, posits its own moment of externality. This concludes with the Concept that is no longer the inner moment of externality but is now a moment in-and-of-itself that is external to the moment of externality. Chemism, therefore, is central to any explanation for how the Concept becomes (a) self-determining in Objectivity, and (b) for how the Concept acquires the determination of externality for itself. Let us now turn to Teleology where we will examine this relation.

130 Ibid.
131 Burbidge, Real process.
132 Sans SJ, “Weisen der Welterschließung”.
133 Moyar, “Lehre vom Begriff”.

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6. Teleology

*Teleology* is the third and final chapter of Objectivity. In this chapter we investigate the ways in which the free *Concept* relates to the *Objectivity* that confronts it. Now, one of the most contested moments of the move to the *PN* is the fact that the move is supposed to not be a transition. Much is made of the supposed novelty and importance of the absence of any transition from the *SL* to the *PN*,¹ which, alongside other so-called novel aspects, demand special interpretations of the move. What is particularly interesting about *Teleology*, from this perspective, is that it contains precisely such a move. In the moment of the universal *subjective end*, the self-relation of the *Concept* with its moment of externality is said to not involve a transition [*ein Übergang*] but rather a movement from itself to itself. This is like the claim made by Hegel at the end of the *SL*.² In both cases, the self-relating movement of the *Concept* with its moment of externality is not a transition because it is the movement of the *Concept* with itself. In both cases, this self-relating movement results in the development of this unity and expresses its difference. In the case of the *subjective end*, it leads to the particularisation of its identity relation with its externality, whereas in the final moment of the *SL* it is the self-externalisation of the *SL* itself. Now, this logical similarity does not suggest that the universal *subjective end* acts as a key for explaining the move to the *PN*. Despite similarities, there are substantive differences between the moves, the most crucial one being that the move to the *PN* is made by the absolute unity of the *Concept* and *Objectivity*, whilst in the *subjective end* the *Concept* is not united with *Objectivity*. The importance of the similarity is to highlight that there is nothing special or peculiar about the absence of a transition in the move to the *PN*. The move from the *SL* to the *PN* is one move amongst many of the ongoing dialectical development of the system. This culminates in the final determination of the *SL*, the *system*, which is the determination that develops into Nature. Hegel treats this final move in the final pages of the *Absolute Idea*, which I analyse in Chapter 10 of this thesis.

Finally, a few words regarding the little attention that *Teleology* has received in the literature.³ Commentators have typically been more concerned with the more practical notions

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¹ For example, see: ‘In qualifying this expansion, we might call it, of the bearing of the logical on the extralogical (Hegel cautions us that it should not be understood as a “transition” in the sense we have become used to within the Logic’), (Pippin, *Hegel’s realm of shadows*, 321); Pinkard, *Hegel’s naturalism*, 36 ff.22; Hegel, *SL*, 843/572.


³ There are, of course, the classic commentaries on the *SL* that have given an account of *Chemism*, though they tend to be exceedingly brief. See: McTaggart, *A commentary on Hegel’s Logic*, 259-71; Stace, *The philosophy of Hegel*, 271-6; Mure, *A Study of Hegel’s Logic*, 249-59; Findlay, *Hegel a re-examination*, 248-52; Taylor,
of teleology that can be extracted from the account. Thus, there are numerous works in which
the actual development of *Teleology* features as a subsidiary concern and the authors are
concerned with more overarching ways of reading Hegel’s concept of teleology as such.\(^4\) I do
not engage with these works because their aim is not to give an account of the logical
development of *Teleology* but to accommodate it within a wider reading. Whilst it would be
interesting to see how my interpretation of *Teleology* might affect their wider reading, such a
task would require more space than I presently have. Finally, there is Pierini whose monograph
represents the sole effort,\(^5\) in recent times, to give a detailed exegetical account of *Teleology.*
We are in almost complete agreement regarding the logical development of *Teleology* and I
have found his work on the chapter extremely illuminating.

6.1 The Subjective End

The *Concept* had liberated itself from *objective externality* by the end of *Chemism.* Externality
is now sublated within the *Concept* and is a moment of it. This structure lacks the essential
opposition that characterised *chemical* relations, since the *Concept*, which was the object’s
inner determinateness, is no longer opposed to the external existence of the object.
Consequently, we are no longer considering a *chemical object* but a teleological one. The first
section of *Teleology* is “A. The Subjective End”. I discern four stages in the development of
“A. The Subjective End” and have divided my account accordingly. The first subsection deals
with the initial conceptual configuration of the *subjective end* (henceforth, *end*) and is focused
in the first paragraph of section A. The second subsection explicitly conceptualises the *end* as
having a structure of *universality* and examines the immediate moments of it - this stage is to
be found in the second paragraph of section A. The third subsection deals with the immediate
relation outwards or the *particularisation* of the universal *end*, which is to be found in the third

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“Objektivität”, 237-40; Martin, *Ontologie der Selbstbestimmung*, 405-14; Koch, “‘Subjektivität und
Objektivität’”; Moyar, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 623-48; Karen Ng, *Hegel’s concept of life: self-consciousness,
freedom, logic* (NY: OUP, 2020), 219-42.

paragraph of section A. Finally, the fourth subsection deals with the sublation of the moment of particularity and is in the fourth paragraph of section A. I begin by examining the initial conceptual configuration of the end.

6.1.1 The Initial Configuration of the Subjective End

We begin our examination of Teleology with the Concept that relates to itself as a self-determining moment and that has externality as a moment. The two moments, self-determination and externality are different to each other and so their difference generates the determinateness within the structure. The reading put forward is in contrast to McTaggart who claims that the logical structure of “A. The Subjective End” is of the end and the means. This is, however, a misinterpretation for two reasons. First, the end begins as the simple unity of the Concept and objective externality, and second, the means is only developed after we have developed the initial relation of the Concept and objective externality. McTaggart further asserts that the objective externality (what he calls the means) is a plurality of possible objective externalities. I find no textual support for this suggestion and I do not know why McTaggart claims this. The text states that the Concept relates to its moment of objective externality and not to a plurality of them. Returning to the logical development, this structure is now conceptualised as the end and it is the simple unity ‘that repels itself from itself and in so doing maintains itself’. The end is both itself in its moment of self-determination (as the Concept) and its moment of objective externality (as Objectivity): but they are different to each other and so the end through being itself as either one of these moments is also not-itself because they are different to each other. Thus, the logical structure of the end is both a self-repelling and a self-maintaining. Within the structure of the end, the Concept is the moment of self-determination and so it is the Concept that generates the self-relation. Crucially, there is no division, disunity, or separation, of the simple unity in its moment of self-repelling, as Pierini

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6 As Hegel puts it, the Concept ‘possesses within itself the determinateness of externality’, (Hegel, SL, 740/445).
7 McTaggart, A commentary of Hegel’s Logic, 265.
8 Ibid.
9 In fact, the whole of McTaggart analysis of “A. The Subjective End” is confusing, see: (McTaggart, A commentary of Hegel’s Logic, 265-6). He discusses such themes as the plurality of means which the end can make use of irrespective of their natures, which are not at all present in the logical development. I have also looked at the EL to see whether McTaggart’s analysis is influenced by its contents rather than the SL but have found no mention of these themes either. I also wish to flag that the whole of McTaggart’s analysis of Teleology is difficult to follow - he discusses logical developments under the wrong sections and focuses on “problems” that are not mentioned in the text. All in all, I find that McTaggart’s analysis of Teleology is uninformative and rather misleading.
suggests: ‘It is concerned with a unity that divides itself [sich entzweit] and which is not lost in the separation’\(^{11}\). I think that Pierini overstates the moment of self-repelling and that, on the contrary, the end is the unity that simultaneously self-maintains and self-repels. The Concept has the urge [der Trieb] to posit itself in the moment of objective externality because it has the essential urge to be identical with itself, but at the same time it cannot unite with the objective externality because they are different. This tension will be the focus of “A. The Subjective End”.

In the introductory paragraph to this chapter I claimed that a proper appreciation of Hegel’s point in the initial conceptualisation of the end, that there is no transition in the self-relation of the end, can help to “normalise” the infamous non-transition from the SL to the PN. The reason why there is no transition is that the Concept and the objective externality are united in the simple unity of the end: the move from the Concept to the objective externality is not a move between external moments. Hegel elaborates on what the absence of a transition means by giving examples of logical moves that are transitions. Drawing on categories from the Doctrine of Essence, in the second half of the first paragraph of “A. The Subjective End”, Hegel declares that the end is not like a ‘force expressing itself nor a substance and cause manifesting itself in accidents and effects’\(^ {12}\). This is because a force is merely an abstract inner that has not yet externalised itself in its effect and a cause only has actuality in its accident. In other words, each must externalise itself into an other to realise its inner determinateness. The end, on the other hand, has externality as its moment and so does not transition between its inner determinateness, the Concept, and its outer manifestation but is immediately both.\(^ {13}\)

However, the end is not just immediately both — it is also immediately not both. It is not just self-maintaining but also self-repelling. Thus, whilst there may not be a transition within the simple unity of the end, there is nevertheless an expression of difference that must be accounted for. The first moment of the end, then, has been an examination of how it maintains itself, the second moment of the end considers how self-maintenance leads to self-repulsion, which makes explicit the implicit difference within it.

\(^{11}\) Pierini, Theorie der Freiheit, 130. (my translation).

\(^{12}\) Hegel, SL, 740/445.

\(^{13}\) Pierini includes a detailed discussion of the kinds of logical distinctions that Hegel is marking out by making this comparison, and its relation to figures in the history of philosophy, see: Pierini, Theorie der Freiheit, 130-2.
6.1.2 The Reflection-Into-Self of the End

Since the end has the Concept as one of its moments, it follows that it also has the determinations of the Concept. The simple unity of the end can now be expressed as the moment of the universal end. Immediately after its universality is stated, the indeterminate activity of the universal end, however, immediately determines itself because the moments of the ‘self-repellent negativity’ are different to each other and so the movement from the Concept to externality opens up their implicit difference. This movement has developed out of the self-enclosed unity of the universal end — moreover, there is no transition at this point because the moments do not relate to each other as others.

The particular moments that develop out of this “self-repellent negativity” are ‘the totality of the form reflected into itself”, on the one side, and the ‘content as against the posited differences of the form” on the other side. The moment of particularity expresses the identity of the end (the identity of the determinations of the Concept and the objective externality) and the difference of the end (the difference of the determinations of the Concept to each other as each is also the objective externality and so external to the other). On the one hand, the determinations of the Concept are identical to each other as moments of the end, and on the other hand, they are indifferent and external to each other since they are also imbued with externality. Their identity is conceptualised as their form, and their difference as their content.

Now, we will consider the moment of particularity further. The moment of identity, as the total reflection of the form into itself, is immediately a moment of individuality. It has the totality of the Concept reflected within itself: it has both self-determination and externality. The moment of difference, on the other hand, is the posited differences of those determinations and so it stands external and opposed to the individual. It also has as its determination the determinations of the Concept and externality, but with an emphasis on their difference and so there is no self-determination. Henceforth, I will refer to this moment of externality as Objectivity. The determinations of the Concept are merely indifferent and external to each other. This is the state of the particular moments. Since it is the moment of self-determination,

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14 See: ‘self-equal universal and this, as containing self-repellent negativity, is in the first instance universal, and therefore as yet indeterminate, activity’, (Hegel, SL, 741/446).
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 See: ‘absolute reflection of the form into itself’, (Ibid.).
the individual has the urge to posit Objectivity and so it relates outwards.19 Through the process of developing purely with itself, the end has externalised itself and its moments are now in an explicitly external relation. This external, particular relation is the subject-matter of the next stage.

6.1.3 The Reflection-Outwards of the Individual

Let us recap: on the one side, we have the individual moment that has the totality of the Concept reflected into itself, and on the other side, we have Objectivity as the determinations of the Concept that are indifferent and external to each other. Importantly, since the individual is self-determining it is also the urge and activity to posit Objectivity and to sublate its externality. In this subsection, we will examine this relation as it is developed in the third paragraph of “section A”.

First, the individual. It is 1) a ‘concrete form’20, and 2), an ‘infinite subjectivity’21. It is a “concrete” form because it is the self-reflected totality of the Concept that has externality as its moment; and it is “infinite” because the self-reflected totality of the Concept is with itself, as is the case in the unity of the individual: its self-relation is infinite. Now, the individual has the urge to relate outwards and to posit Objectivity. In this relation, the individual ‘is distinct from the concrete form, and is a determinate content’22: the individual is now “determinate” because it is determined in its relation to Objectivity (and not just in its self-relation) and it is a “content” because it relates outwards and posits its determination, its content, in Objectivity. In this outward relation, the infinite form of the individual becomes a finite content and it is this finite content that determines Objectivity.

Let us further examine the determinate content that is related outwards and the more precise determination of Objectivity. Since the individual is now finite, its determinate content is no longer infinite subjectivity but has ‘the form of objective indifference’23. It has this form because the determinations of the Concept that make up the content of the individual are no longer in an infinite self-relation — they are in a finite relation, i.e. they are external to each other. As we have seen, the relation outwards is an immediate relation and the individual’s urge

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19 See: ‘subjective end and its activity is directed against external objectivity’, (Ibid).
20 Hegel, SL, 742/446.
21 Hegel, SL, 742/447.
22 Hegel, SL, 742/446.
23 Hegel, SL, 742/447.
to posit Objectivity is immediate. The relation outwards, therefore, has ‘the shape of a presupposition’\(^{24}\), because the immediacy of the relation makes it explicit that Objectivity was always already confronting the individual. Once again, because the relation-into-self is immediately a reflection-outwards, and because Objectivity is already external to it, the determinateness that is related towards it has the shape of a presupposition because it is relating to something that was already there. The sublation of this presupposition will be the focus of the fourth and final subsection of “section A”.

### 6.1.4 The Sublation of the Presupposition

The individual has the urge to ‘sublate its presupposition, that is the immediacy of the object, and to posit the object as determined by the [Concept]\(^ {25}\). Both the individual and Objectivity have the Concept as their inner moment — it is their moment of identity. However, they are different with respect to how the determinations of the Concept are related. In the individual they are reflected into each other and in Objectivity they are indifferent and external to each other. The urge to unify with Objectivity, then, is the urge of the Concept to unify with itself by sublating the externality of Objectivity.

What is interesting about the expression of this urge is that the individual makes itself objective (as we saw above, in relating outwards it loses its infinite form and becomes a finite content) in order to relate to Objectivity. This is the negative aspect of the relation-outwards. The positive aspect of it is the ‘union of objective being’\(^ {26}\) with the individual. The individual posits Objectivity and sublates the presupposition of their relation. Hegel describes this moment of sublation as equally a repulsion, since the sublation of Objectivity is not just a unification of the Concept with itself but, in fact, a unification of the Concept with something that is ‘inadequate to the nature of this unity’\(^ {27}\). Thus, they are united in a negative unity and Objectivity is determined by the individual. Objectivity continues to be external and indifferent to the individual because it has not returned the positing of the individual — but has only received the individual’s determination. Objectivity that is posited by the end is the means. The

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\(^{24}\) Ibid.

\(^{25}\) Hegel, SL, 742/447.

\(^{26}\) Ibid.

\(^{27}\) Ibid.
individual, on the other hand, will be referred to as the end from now. I now turn to “B. The Means”, the second section of Teleology.

6.2 The Means

6.2.1 The Initial Configuration of the Means

“B. The Means” is a brief section of six paragraphs. There are no subsection numbers and so I refer to the paragraph number when I wish to identify a particular part of the section.

In his analysis of “B. The Means”, Pierini interprets the first paragraph as marking the first step in its logical development. However, I think that this is mistaken. In fact, I want to suggest that the first paragraph is a recapitulation of “A. The Subjective End” and that there is nothing new to be added to what has been said above. For example, Hegel concludes both “A. The Subjective End” and the first paragraph of “B. The Means” with the statement that the posited object is now the means: ‘[the external objectivity] is to be posited as something determined by the [Concept], and in the first instance as means’ and ‘The object thus determined is so far only the means’. It would be odd if Hegel concluded that the object had only now become the means after two distinct logical developments whose respective conclusions are that the object has only now become the means. Pierini, however, is sensitive to this textual tension and suggests that the first paragraph of “B. The Means” is the proper deduction of the means, of which earlier we only received an allusion. However, I think that the language used is distinctly similar to that of the previous section. For example, Hegel refers to the development as the ‘first negation’ and the ‘first immediate positing’, in which the end is ‘not yet the realized end itself, but only the initial step towards it’ and Objectivity is still only

29 Hegel, SL, 743/448.
30 Ibid.
a presupposition\textsuperscript{32}. It would be odd for Hegel to state that \textit{this} moment is the ‘first immediate positing’ of \textit{Objectivity} when in the sublation of the presupposition he states that \textit{that} is an immediate positing of \textit{Objectivity}.\textsuperscript{33} I do not want to labour the point. The essential distinction between our accounts is that I take the \textit{end’s} immediate positing of \textit{Objectivity} to give us the \textit{means}, whereas for Pierini, this is but a preliminary step before the actual development of the \textit{means}, which follows the exact same logic. Where I think the move is satisfied in one logical move, Pierini thinks that it is satisfied in two logical moves. It is for this reason that despite this difference we nevertheless agree on the logical structure of the \textit{means} and on what follows.

Hegel begins his discussion of the \textit{means} by referring to three logical moments - the \textit{end}, the \textit{means} and \textit{Objectivity}. This should strike the reader as odd, since “section A” concluded with just two logical moments, the \textit{end} and the \textit{means}. For whatever reason, Hegel does not explicitly explain why there is the \textit{means} and \textit{Objectivity} instead of just the \textit{means} that is \textit{Objectivity}. I will now explain why it is the case that we have both the \textit{means} and \textit{Objectivity}. First, recall the determinations of the \textit{end} and \textit{Objectivity} from “A. The Subjective End”. The \textit{end} has the urge to realise itself by uniting itself with \textit{Objectivity} whilst \textit{Objectivity} is indifferent. Both are external to each other. Once the \textit{end} has posited \textit{Objectivity} it has determined it with its determinateness. This is the first step or one side of the positing. The second side requires us to examine the determined \textit{Objectivity}. It must take on this determinate, so much so far is clear. However, this determination is in direct conflict with its essential determination of being external and indifferent. How, then, can we satisfy this conflict? We satisfy it by giving each side its due. We divide \textit{Objectivity} into an \textit{Objectivity} that is determined by the \textit{end}, \textit{i.e.} the \textit{means}, and an \textit{Objectivity} that remains indifferent to the \textit{end}.\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Objectivity} is the independent side of the \textit{means}, the moment of objective self-subsistence, since it still has indifferent determinateness as its determination.

Let us now consider the initial conceptual configuration of the \textit{means}. As we saw above, the \textit{end} posits \textit{Objectivity}, \textit{Objectivity} divides itself into the \textit{means} that is determined by the \textit{end} and \textit{Objectivity} that remains indifferent to the \textit{end}. Crucially, despite this indifference, \textit{Objectivity} cannot be entirely detached from the \textit{end} because the \textit{end} is partially related to it through the \textit{means}. This yields the following structure: the \textit{end} - the \textit{means} - \textit{Objectivity}. Clearly, this structure has syllogistic features insofar as the \textit{means} is the middle-term that unites

\textsuperscript{32} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 743/448.
\textsuperscript{33} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 742/447.
\textsuperscript{34} This is what Hegel alludes to, belatedly, in the sixth paragraph of “B. The Means” where he writes: ‘But the means has also a side from which it still has self-subsistence as against the end’, (Hegel, \textit{SL}, 745/451).
the two extremes.\textsuperscript{35} The \textit{means} has both determinations: it has the determination of the \textit{end} since it is posited by it as well as the determination of \textit{Objectivity} since it is still an external and indifferent object itself.

Let us recap. The \textit{means} has two sides to its being, on the one hand, it has the determination of the \textit{end} posited within it, and on the other hand, it has ‘the shape of an external existence indifferent to the end itself and its realization’\textsuperscript{36}. Its being is to connect the \textit{end} to \textit{Objectivity} precisely because of its two sides. The \textit{end}, as the inner determinateness of the \textit{Concept}, has the urge to posit the indifferent \textit{Objectivity} that has remained self-subsistent against its initial positing. The \textit{means} has both the determination to be connected to the \textit{end} and, therefore, to potentially communicate its determination to indifferent \textit{Objectivity} and the determination to be indifferent to this communicated determination. I now turn to the development of this initial structure.

\subsection*{6.2.2 The Relation of the \textit{End} to the \textit{Means}}

Beginning from the third paragraph Hegel explicitly identifies the syllogistic structure that we have been examining so far with the ‘\textit{formal syllogism}’\textsuperscript{37}. The \textit{means} is the formal middle-term and I now consider the relation of the terms to each other.\textsuperscript{38} It has already been said that the \textit{means} is external to the \textit{end} and to the \textit{end}’s determination that has been posited in it, but since it is external and indifferent it is also external and indifferent to \textit{Objectivity}. The \textit{means} is external and indifferent to both the extremes of the “\textit{formal syllogism}”; at the same time, however, the \textit{means} is a ‘mediating middle term’\textsuperscript{39} since it externally connects the two extremes. Indeed, \textit{because} the mediation between the extremes is external the \textit{means} itself is not mediated but is an immediate object.

\textsuperscript{35} Here, I think Pierini is quite right to emphasise the importance of the syllogistic structure for the \textit{means}: ‘Der Schluss und das Urteil sollen hier nicht als Metapher oder bloß erläuternde Übertragungen des Sinnes in andere Worte verstanden werden; sie sind Operationen, die nach Hegel für jeglichen Gegenstand gelten’, (Pierini, \textit{Theorie der Freiheit}, 150).

\textsuperscript{36} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 743/448.

\textsuperscript{37} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 743/449. See also, 3.3.1 for my examination of the first figure of the syllogism which is also called the “\textit{formal syllogism}”.

\textsuperscript{38} Pierini helpfully explains \textit{why} Hegel identifies it as the \textit{formal syllogism}: ‘Das Charakteristikum des formalen Schlusses liegt darin, dass dort abstrakte Determinationen verbunden werden, während in der Zweckbeziehung das eine Extrem selbstbestimmende Tätigkeit ist und das andere Extrem sowie die Mitte Objekte, Totalitäten sind. Die Abstraktheit liegt jedoch nicht in der Gestalt der Determinationen, sondern in der Beziehung der Elemente, diese Differenz gilt es herauszuarbeiten’, (Pierini, \textit{Theorie der Freiheit}, 153)

\textsuperscript{39} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 744/449.
We will now move onto the fifth paragraph where we will examine the relation of the end to its mediating middle-term, the means. Since the means has the posited determinateness of the end as a part of its own determination it is in-itself the end. Their relation is one-sided because the means is indifferent and external to the determinateness that has been posited. Consequently, it has not posited the end in return. Nevertheless, whilst one side of the means is to be indifferent and external to the posited determinateness another side is open to external determination. Indeed, it is open to the end because it is ‘in itself identical with the end’\(^{40}\). Their identity facilitates their communication. Hegel recalls this determination from Mechanism because the means has the determination of a mechanical object: it is an object that is external and indifferent to the determinateness of the Concept that is merely in-itself. It is because of this logical similarity that the end’s determinateness is “communicated” to the immediate object.

The end, then, communicates its determinateness through the means. Again, this determinateness is immediately communicated because they are identical. Now that the end has communicated its determinateness to the means the latter has lost its self-subsistence and has become the external side of the end.\(^{41}\) As we have seen, objects have a self-subsistence against external determinateness because indifference is essential to their being. The means has now lost its self-subsistence because it has been ‘posited as penetrable by the [Concept]’\(^{42}\). What it is for the means to be itself is to be penetrated by the end and for it to be the end’s moment of externality. Moreover, the end is now the means’ ‘subjectivity or soul’\(^{43}\). “Soul” is being used in a very specific sense. Hegel uses the word soul to describe the self-movement of the Concept and now that the means is absolutely penetrated by the end, indeed, by the Concept, it has that self-movement too.

We have now resolved one side of the “formal syllogism” and we now have to consider the negative unity of the end with the means that is confronted by external Objectivity.\(^{44}\) The other extreme of the syllogism that relates to the end externally and through the means has now been brought closer to the end since the end is no longer mediated by the means but is now immediately related to Objectivity by being united with the means. Indeed, as we saw, it is the soul of the means and the means is now its external side. Consequently, the end is now immediately and externally connected with Objectivity. Moreover, as it is united with the

\(^{40}\) Hegel, SL, 745/450.
\(^{41}\) Hegel, SL, 745/451.
\(^{42}\) Hegel, SL, 745/450.
\(^{43}\) Hegel, SL, 745/451.
\(^{44}\) See: ‘the presupposition still persists’, (Ibid.).
means and has the externality of the means as its moment it is now also identical with Objectivity and so is directed against Objectivity. Finally, now that the end has the moment of externality or objectivity within its determination it no longer merely strives to sublate the presupposition, as was the case in the Subjective End, but is the activity [die Tätigkeit] to sublate the presupposition confronting it. The difference between urge [der Trieb] and activity lies in the kind of relation there is between the Concept and the external object. When the Concept is striving to give itself externality it has the urge to give itself externality, but once it has externality and is negatively related against another external object it no longer has the urge to give itself externality because it already has it. Now, it is part of the Concept’s being and so is concomitant with its activity. Much like when someone strives to become a footballer their activity is tied up in the external relation between not-yet-being-a-footballer and being-a-footballer, thus it is an urge or a striving since the activity is external to the activity’s aim. However, once they are a footballer their activity is no longer a striving because who they are and their being-a-footballer are one and the same continuous activity.

6.3 The Realised End

The section of the realised end is divided into three subsections. The section, however, does not follow a linear development and there are many instances where Hegel is thinking ahead or looking back over the development. These moments of premonition and repetition can cause confusion because Hegel does not clearly delineate such remarks from the next step of the development, thus giving the impression that they are in fact further developments of the realised end. The best way to deal with difficulty is to not approach the section in a strictly linear fashion. Instead, I will tease out the logical development by focusing on the most pertinent passages.

There are two overarching points that will be the focus of the realised end. They are the two ways that the end through the means relates to Objectivity. First, it relates to it merely as an external object, i.e. since the end relates to Objectivity through the means it is through the externality of the means that the externality of Objectivity is posited. Second, it is not just an external relation since the means has the determinateness of the end within it and so Objectivity

45 See: “because the moment of objectivity is posited in the means in its determinateness as something external, and the simple unity of the [Concept] now has this objectivity as such in itself”, (Ibid).
is in fact posited by the inner determinateness of the means-end unity and brought into a unity with the end, thus leading to the objective end. I begin with the external relation of the end to Objectivity.

6.3.1 The merely external relation of the end to Objectivity

The end is in a negative unity with the means; and since the means was the middle-term of the syllogism, the end - the means - Objectivity, their unity brings the end in direct contact with Objectivity: the end/the means - Objectivity. The activity of the end is now directed against Objectivity, what Hegel also refers to as the ‘original presupposition’. In this initial stage the relation is an immediate one, i.e. the end has not posited Objectivity and brought it into a unity with itself. Since both are objects and have the determination of externality the activity of the end relates only externally to Objectivity.

This is one of the overarching points that are the focus of my interpretation. The relation of the end to Objectivity is between finite contents, much like the relation of the individual to indifferent Objectivity. Another way of putting it is to say that they are in a particular relation to one another. The end, then, relates as a finite content in an immediate relation with Objectivity. If we consider this immediate relation between the end and Objectivity purely in these terms then there is no reason to consider the determined Objectivity to be anything other than a means. For, as we saw earlier, an object that is posited externally and immediately by the end is a means. From this perspective, then, ‘it is...a matter of complete indifference whether we regard an object determined by external end as a realised end or only as a means; the determination here is relative, external to the object itself and not objective’. It is a matter of indifference because the external determination of Objectivity by the end has the form of indifference and so Objectivity itself is merely another immediate, external object that is posited by the end.

One way to understand this might be to think of any activity that requires a series of steps to be completed, but where the focus is not on the completion of the activity but on the

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46 For the sake of concision, in this section I simply write “the end” when referring to the unity of the end and the means.


48 Hegel, SL, 750/457.

49 Importantly, when Hegel writes that the ‘determination...[is]...not objective’ he means that it is not the return of Objectivity into the end, which would constitute a unity between the end and Objectivity that is not merely external.
completion of each step.\textsuperscript{50} Take carpentry. One must first cut down a tree, then saw the tree into manageable chunks of wood, then carve the wood into the right shape, then treat the wood, and, finally, add a layer of paint. Each step has the content of the \textit{end} as its external determination but none of them is the realisation of that \textit{end} for-itself.\textsuperscript{51} In each step the \textit{end} is positing an immediate object as its \textit{means}, thereby entering into an immediate relation with the next immediate object and continues to relate to it purely in an external way. Thus, treating it as a \textit{means} or a relative end. Indeed, each step is also a relative end since, whilst successfully cutting down the tree is an \textit{end} in-itself it is an \textit{end} that is subordinated to the absolute end of forming a chair and thus a relative one. It is only when the chair is complete that the \textit{end} becomes the \textit{realised end}, but this requires the reflection of \textit{Objectivity} into the \textit{end}. We do not yet have the objective reflection of the \textit{end} into-itself and so are not yet at the stage of thinking about the \textit{realised end}. This is the second overarching point of the section of the \textit{realised end} and I now turn to it.

\textbf{6.3.2 The mediated relation of the \textit{end} to the \textit{Objectivity}}

Hitherto, we have considered the relation of the \textit{end} to \textit{Objectivity} from the side of their externality. As externally related objects the process of their relation is akin to the immediate relation we investigated in parts of \textit{Mechanism} and \textit{Chemism}. This is one side of their relation. However, the unity of the \textit{end} with the \textit{means} does not just result in another immediate object since the self-determining activity of the \textit{end} is part of their unity. Moreover, this self-determining activity is identical to externality now that it is united with the \textit{means}. Therefore, it is, by extension, implicitly identical with \textit{Objectivity}. Equally, \textit{Objectivity} is identical with the \textit{end}, though it is indifferent to this identity.\textsuperscript{52} We now have to make this identity explicit.

When the \textit{end} relates to \textit{Objectivity} it is meeting with itself. \textit{Objectivity} is now a moment of the \textit{end}, its moment of externality. This relation, unlike the immediate relation of the \textit{end} to

\begin{flushleft}  \textsuperscript{50} Pierini has an excellent discussion of Hegel’s references to empirical examples of this teleological relation and offers a good analysis for how his examples relate to the purely logical development, see: (Pierini, \textit{Theorie der Freiheit}, 168-73).  
\textsuperscript{51} See: ‘they possess self-determination only externally and are only relative ends, or essentially nothing but means’, (Hegel, \textit{SL}, 750/457).  
\textsuperscript{52} Thus, Hegel writes that ‘the end, as the [Concept] that freely exists in face of the object and its process and is a self-determining activity, is no less the absolute truth of mechanism, and therefore in mechanism it is only meeting with itself’; (Hegel, \textit{SL}, 747/453).
\end{flushleft}
the *means* or the immediate relation of the *end/means* to *Objectivity* is a mediated relation. It is mediated because the determination of the *end* returns into itself through itself in *Objectivity*. The determination goes through the *end* in *Objectivity* because it is identical with *Objectivity* and so when it relates to *Objectivity* it is effectively relating to itself. Significantly, however, by relating to itself through *Objectivity* the latter’s moment of externality becomes the *end’s* moment of externality. As Hegel writes: ‘the end possesses, therefore, in externality *its own moment*; and the content, as content of the concrete unity, is its *simple form* […] [that] has a concrete existence as the abiding self-identical’\textsuperscript{54}.\textsuperscript{55} In the final moment of *Teleology*, then, the *end* and *Objectivity* are united in the objective *end* as identical.

6.4 Concluding Remarks

*Teleology* is crucial to my overall argument for two reasons. First, few commentators in the literature have engaged with it with the aim of elucidating the development of the chapter, with the notable exception of Pierini, and so it is important to give an updated account of the chapter. Second, *Teleology* marks an important moment on the path to the *PN* because it is the moment when the opposed *Concept* and *Objectivity* become identical. This identity will be the focus of the *Idea*. Therefore, by clarifying why the moment of the *end* eventually unites with the

\textsuperscript{53} Compare this with Thomas Khurana, *Das Leben der Freiheit: Form und Wirklichkeit der Autonomie* (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2017), 281. Khurana’s analysis of the *realised end* stops at the external relation of the *end* to *Objectivity* (see 6.3.1). Consequently, his explanation for the move to *Life* is that since *Teleology* strives for inner purposiveness but is unable to reach it in the *realised end* that we must think of *Life* as fulfilling such an aim. However, Hegel’s point regarding *Teleology* is that it does not involve such a clear-cut distinction between outer and inner purposiveness. In fact, according to Hegel there is a moment of inner purposiveness in the final determination of *Teleology* where the *end* and *Objectivity* are mediated in the *objective end*. Insofar as the moments are mediated, then, they belong to *Teleology*. However, once we have made explicit the fact that they are immediately identical we have moved into the *Idea* and *Life*. Therefore, there is inner purposiveness in *Objectivity* but it is an inner purposiveness whereby the *end* and *Objectivity* are externally united and in this external union are mediated by each other. It is distinguished from the inner purposiveness of *Life* by the fact that the *Concept* (what was the *end* in *Teleology*) is immediately identical with *Objectivity*, i.e. their unity is not mediated but immediate.

\textsuperscript{54} Hegel, *SL*, 748/454.

\textsuperscript{55} Burbidge offers a brief but accurate account of *Teleology*. There is but one point of disagreement regarding the logical development of the *realised end*. I have argued that the *realised end* comes about because we have made explicit the moment of identity between the *end* and the *Objectivity*. Burbidge, on the other hand, seems to claim that thought is able to think beyond the infinite mediation of relative ends and think their overall unity: ‘Allerdings würde die positive Seite im ennui dieser Iteration dann darin liegen, daß das Denken den Zirkel reflektieren kann, der unendlich weiterläuft und eine andere Struktur aufweist als alles, was wir bisher angetroffen haben’, (Burbidge, “Objektivität”, 239). As we saw in *Chemism* it is characteristic of Burbidge’s interpretive approach to posit the thinker of the *SL* as acting upon the *SL* as a way of moving it forward. I have argued against such a reading in Chapter 2 where I argued in favour of presuppositionlessness and immanence. I have sought to give an immanent account for why the *realised end* develops from the *end*. 
indifferent *Objectivity* that was confronting it in the moment of the *realised end* we will be in a better position to understand their eventual absolute identity in the *Absolute Idea*. For now, however, let us return to the text and consider the next and final section of the *SL: The Idea*. 
The Idea

My account of the SL began with Objectivity. Objectivity is the Concept that has sublated the self-mediating relation of its determinations and has become an immediate identity. Over the course of Objectivity, the Concept developed out of its objective relations and “resurfaced” as self-mediating and free. The indifference and externality of Objectivity is not erased because of the return of the Concept but is an essential moment of the Concept. Teleology concluded with the self-identical unity of the Concept and Objectivity; in other words, we leave the sphere of Objectivity because the logical structures that characterised it, the dominance of externality and indifference over the Concept, have been sublated. A new sphere is inaugurated by their development into a self-identical unity and this is the Idea.¹

Hegel provides a discussion of the significance of the Idea in the introduction to the Idea.² In this section, Hegel looks ahead to the Realphilosophie and writes about how the Idea is the determination of reality. We have not yet reached concrete reality, Nature, and so in one sense Hegel’s discussion is premature. On the other hand, this account of how the Idea is reality illuminates Hegel’s conception of being, in general. As I will argue, Nature is the self-external Idea but this does not mean that Nature is just an illusory construction by our minds. The self-external Idea is concrete reality, and so for Hegel reality is the unity of the Concept and Objectivity. This discussion cannot replace the logical development of the SL into the PN but it does illuminate aspects of Hegel’s thought regarding his conception of reality.

Hegel begins by stating that in the Idea the Concept is the ‘adequate [Concept]’ and that it is the ‘true as such’³ [das Wahre als solches]. The Concept is “adequate” because it is explicitly identical with Objectivity, and it is their explicit identity that Hegel marks as being the “true”. However, his decision to mark the Idea as the “true” should raise concern — does this mean that what preceded the SL is not true? A part of the answer requires us to understand that Hegel’s conception of reality is the unity of the Concept and Objectivity. Unlike Kant, for whom ‘the objective and subjective world in general, ought to be congruous with the Idea, but...are not themselves the congruence of [Concept] and reality’⁴, Hegelian reality is that

¹ When I refer to the name of the section, I write Idea; and when I refer to the logical determination, i.e. the unity of the Concept and Objectivity, I italicise it: Idea.
³ Hegel, SL, 755/462.
⁴ Hegel, SL, 756/464.
congruence. The first point that we must grasp is that reality is the unity of the Concept and Objectivity, i.e. the Idea. However, this does not mean that all of reality is always the Idea. This is an important distinction to draw and it is the distinction between the general unity of the Concept and Objectivity and the adequate unity of the Concept and Objectivity. Let us remind ourselves that the Idea is not just the unity of the Concept and Objectivity but the unity in which the Concept is adequate. I will begin by explaining what it is for reality to not always be the Idea.

Hegel writes that there are things in reality that are not congruous with the Idea because their determination does not have the adequate Concept with Objectivity but, for example, the only implicit Concept with Objectivity.² He gives the example of inorganic nature: ‘if it is separated into its [Concept] and reality, [it] is nothing but the subjective abstraction of a thought form and a formless matter’³. One might tend to think that inorganic nature is not conceptual and conceptuality only begins with self-conscious thinking. According to Hegel, however, such a way of thinking would fail to grasp the object. However, is there not a contradiction? How can inorganic nature not be the Idea whilst reality is the Idea? Is Hegel not guilty of extending the Kantian distinction between concepts and objectivity to a distinction between a true reality that is the Idea and untrue moments of the reality that are not the Idea? By way of answering this question, let us return to the first problem I posed - if the Idea is the “true” then is the development that preceded it untrue? The answer is yes and no. Hegel employs the word “true” in two different senses - there is the general sense that all necessary development is “true” because it is the development of the Concept in-itself, and the more specific sense of the unity of the Concept and Objectivity when the unity is adequate.

Is the move from the mechanical object to the fmp true, even though it is not the adequate unity of the Concept and Objectivity? Is it only true once we have completed the SL? Or is it only true once we have developed into the PN, thus proving that the development leads into reality and is not just some figment of pure reason, as Kant warned us? I think that all these ways of posing the question are mistaken because the essential thrust of each is a presupposition about how the SL ought to be. It is a mistake to ground the truthfulness of the development in the adequate unity of the Concept and Objectivity because the SL did not begin with this unity as its target. Neither did it begin with the certainty or necessity of ending, nor was it expected

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² See: ‘That actual things are not congruous with the Idea is the side of their finitude and untruth, and in accordance with this side they are objects, determined in accordance with their various spheres and in the relationships of objectivity’, (Hegel, SL, 757/465).
³ Hegel, SL, 757/464.
that it would develop into reality. None of these positions can be grounds for the truthfulness of the \textit{SL} because they presuppose what it is for something to be true. The \textit{SL} begins with two basic tenets, presuppositionlessness and immanence, which guarantee that 1) the development is not guided by assumptions about how things \textit{ought} to be, and 2) that in the absence of proceeding according to assumptions it proceeds according to whatever is immanently present. Therefore, the development of pure \textit{being} to pure \textit{nothing} is just as true as the development of 
\textit{Life}, the first chapter of the \textit{Idea}. This is the general notion of truth in the \textit{SL}. Hegel writes:

\begin{quote}
‘That actual things are not congruous with the Idea is the side of their \textit{finitude} and \textit{untruth}, and in accordance with this side they are \textit{objects}, determined in accordance with their various spheres and in the relationships of objectivity, either mechanically, chemically or by an external end’\textsuperscript{7}.
\end{quote}

Hegel is clearly talking about reality — “actual things” — and he is accounting for the fact that there is plenty in reality that is not the \textit{Idea}, \textit{i.e.} inorganic nature. Inorganic nature is finite and untrue because it is not the adequate unity of the \textit{Idea}. The untruth of inorganic nature, however, is not the same that it is false. Nature is the unity of the \textit{Concept} and \textit{Objectivity} in its self-externality. Therefore, inorganic nature is its unity only in-itself and is just as true as pure \textit{being} or the \textit{mechanical object}. This is one way that we might understand how reality can be both the \textit{Idea} and have within itself untrue moments of the \textit{Idea} — mechanistic explanations of reality are not “true” (adequate) in the sense that they involve finite relations of objects, but they are \textit{true} insofar as they correctly explain moments of reality. Hegel addresses this concern:

\begin{quote}
‘That the Idea has not completely leavened its reality, has imperfectly subdued it to the [Concept], this is a possibility arising from the fact that Idea itself has a \textit{restricted content}, that though it is essentially the unity of [Concept] and reality, it is no less essentially their difference’\textsuperscript{8}.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{7} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 757/465. 
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid.
All of reality is not the truth of the Idea because all of reality is not the adequate Idea. However, there are things in reality that are the adequate Idea, like the state: ‘The worst state, one whose reality least corresponds to the [Concept], in so far as it still exists, is still Idea; the individuals still obey a dominant [Concept]’\(^9\). The state, then, is one such moment of reality that is the Idea and has its truth in this respect.\(^10\) This is a more specific notion of truth. Thus, there are some determinations of reality that are the adequate unity of the Concept and Objectivity and have truth in a more specific sense. Nature, however, is not the adequate unity of the Concept and Objectivity. Nature is the self-external Idea and so only the Idea that is in-itself. It is, thus, true in a general sense.

Grasping the significance of the Idea for reality, then, is fundamental to understanding the relationship of the SL to the Realphilosophie. Of course, the aim of this thesis is to give an account of the move to the PN, which inaugurates the Realphilosophie. But even within this narrow framework its significance can be appreciated because it is the Idea that self-externalises into Nature and it is its development that is the development of Nature.\(^11\)

7. Life

The first expression of the Idea is Life, where the Concept and Objectivity are in an immediate unity. The determination of the Idea is crucial since what the PN proves to be is the self-external Idea or the unity of the Concept and Objectivity in its self-externality: this is examined in Chapter 10 where I conclude my examination of the SL by looking at the final two pages of the Absolute Idea. Our examination of Life lays the foundation for our understanding of the Idea as the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity at the end of the SL and inaugurates a difficulty with their union that will become familiar as we progress through the Idea. That is, on the one hand, the externality and indifference of Objectivity will continue to be a point of

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\(^9\) Hegel, SL, 758/465.
\(^10\) It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine why the state is the adequate Idea where inorganic nature is not.
\(^11\) Hegel says as much in this section: ‘Although therefore the Idea has its reality in a material externality, this is not an abstract being subsisting on its own account over against the [Concept]; on the contrary, it exists only as a becoming through the negativity of indifferent being, as a simple determinateness of the [Concept]’, (Hegel, SL, 759/467). Contrary to many interpretations of the move into Nature that suggest the development of Nature to be the activity of the Concept on externality, I follow Hegel in reading Nature as the unity of the Concept and Objectivity in its self-externality where Nature is the self-externality of the Idea.
hindrance and the focal point of difference between the two sides. On the other hand, the activity and the urge of the Concept has as its determination that urge to overcome the externality and indifference of Objectivity and to make it identical to itself — though the Concept, too, is a focal point of difference as its urge to overcome the difference of Objectivity is different to Objectivity. This difference is only overcome in the final moment of the SL, the system, where the moments become absolutely identical.

Regarding scholarly interest in Life, there has been a surge of interest in the last decade. Part of this renaissance is motivated by a desire to put Hegel in conversation with Kant’s more limited view concerning inner teleology, and part of it is concerned with elucidating Life from a particular perspective. I do not engage with these works as their concerns are not to elucidate the dialectical development of Life. There are, however, several works that do examine the logical development of Life: Englert; Martin; Spieker; and Carlson. I have found these works illuminating to varying degrees and engage with them where necessary.

Finally, a word must be said on the place of Life in a philosophical project that seeks to give the fundamental determinations of thought and being. The inclusion of Life, amongst Mechanism, Chemism and the Idea of the Good, has been criticised because it is, purportedly, not a determination that can be treated logically. As Michael Thompson rhetorically notes,

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19 See also, Rainer Schäfer, “Hegels Ideenlehre und die dialektische Methode,” in *G. W. F. Hegel: Wissenschaft der Logik*, ed. Anton Koch and Friedrike Schick (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2002), 243-64.

‘how can anyone pretend that thought about living things differs in any such respect from, say, thought about planets?’\textsuperscript{21}, the point being that surely organic beings have the same logical structure as inorganic things since everything is, at its base, reducible to the inorganic. However, the \textit{SL} has shown, just as Thompson more recently believes to have shown independently of Hegel, that \textit{Life} is a logical determination that can be treated in-and-of itself and is not reducible to merely objective relations of things.\textsuperscript{22} As Thompson notes, ‘[t]hought, as thought, takes a quite special turn when it is thought of the living’\textsuperscript{23}, and for Hegel this is the \textit{Idea} as the unity of the \textit{Concept} and \textit{Objectivity}. The validity of treating \textit{Life} as a logical determination lies in presuppositionlessness and immanence, a point that is ironically missed by detractors who claim that \textit{Life} should not be a logical determination.\textsuperscript{24} What is \textit{Life}, then, for Hegel? I think it would be a mistake to insist that \textit{Life} only provides us with the ontological infrastructure necessary to think concrete life. Instead, our scope should be wider and we should think of \textit{Life} as a particular form of thought and being, a form that might be echoed in concrete living beings but might also be echoed in Hegel’s concept of beauty,\textsuperscript{25} for example.

\textsuperscript{21} Michael Thompson, \textit{Life and action}, 26.
\textsuperscript{23} Michael Thompson, \textit{Life and action}, 27.
\textsuperscript{24} This is where Hegel and Thompson diverge. Hegel’s approach to \textit{Life} is substantially different to Thompson’s, the latter lamenting the fact that Hegel has an ‘ungraspable method and a completely indefensible form of expression in writing’, (Thompson, \textit{Life and action}, 12). I am sympathetic to the difficulties that Thompson identifies in engaging with Hegel. I hope that the analysis of the development of the determination of \textit{Life} that I offer in this chapter can play some part in disambiguating the text.
\textsuperscript{25} See, for example, how Hegel conceptualises beauty in the 1831 lectures on aesthetics: ‘We called the beautiful the Idea of the beautiful. This means that the beautiful itself must be grasped as Idea, in particular as Idea in a determinate form, i.e. as Ideal. Now the Idea as such is nothing but the Concept, the real existence of the Concept, and the unity of the two. For the Concept as such is not yet the Idea, although ‘Concept’ and ‘Idea’ are often used without being distinguished. But it is only when it is present in its real existence and placed in unity therewith that the Concept is the Idea. Yet this unity ought not to be represented, as might be supposed, as a mere neutralization of Concept and Reality, as if both lost their peculiar and special qualities, in the way in which caustic potash and acid interact to form a salt, and, combining, neutralize their contrasting properties.\textsuperscript{2} On the contrary, in this unity the Concept is predominant. For, in accordance with its own nature, it is this identity implicitly already, and therefore generates reality out of itself as its own; therefore, since this reality is its own self-development, it sacrifices nothing of itself in it, but therein simply realizes itself, the Concept, and therefore remains one with itself in its objectivity. This unity of Concept and Reality is the abstract definition of the Idea’, (G. W. F. Hegel, \textit{Hegel's Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art}, trans. T. M. Knox ((Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975)), 106).
7.1 The Living Individual

7.1.1 Universal Life

The first chapter of the Idea to be examined is Life. Before we turn to the first section of Life, “A. The Living Individual”, let us look at the final determination of Teleology. Hegel writes that in the realised end the Concept is ‘distinct as a [for-itself] identity from its [in-itself] objectivity, and thereby to possess externality’\textsuperscript{26}. The Concept is for-itself identical with Objectivity, which means that the Concept has related back to itself as itself through Objectivity such as to be identical with Objectivity. On the other side of the structure, Objectivity is only related to the Concept in-itself and so it does not possess the determinations of the Concept for-itself and so is only in-itself identical with the Concept. Thus, the Concept possesses externality of Objectivity, whereas Objectivity does not possess the self-determination of the Concept.

This is the structure with which Life begins. First, let us consider the three ways in which Hegel describes the first moment of Life: ‘The [Concept] of life, or universal life, is the immediate Idea’\textsuperscript{28}. Each term refers to the same logical moment but emphasises a different way of conceiving it. Beginning with the most general, the first moment of Life is the “immediate Idea”. Now, a moment is “immediate” or “has immediacy” when we consider it independently of other moments. This “immediacy” refers to the first structure of Life, i.e. the Concept that is for-itself identical with Objectivity and Objectivity that is in-itself identical with the Concept. The moment of immediacy is between these two moments because we have still to examine their determinations; and since this structure is all there is in the Idea it is, for now, the immediate Idea.

Next, the first moment is the “[Concept] of life”. As we saw above, the structure of Life is the self-determining identity of the Concept and Objectivity. The first moment of Life can

\textsuperscript{26} I have altered Miller’s translation which renders fürsichsehende as “explicit” and anschsehende as “implicit”. Miller’s translation is correct insofar as when something is for-itself it is in an explicit relation with something else and when something is in-itself it is in an implicit relation. However, I think that what the translation gains in readability it loses in precision and, here, I think it is crucial to render the Concept’s relation to Objectivity as being for-itself and Objectivity’s relation to the Concept as being in-itself. These terms explain the final structure of Teleology with greater clarity than “explicit” and “implicit”. I use these terms often to cash out what is meant by for-itself or in-itself, but I would not use them to replace these terms, which are the precise logical determinations that the SL develops.

\textsuperscript{27} Hegel, SL, 754/461.

\textsuperscript{28} Hegel, SL, 764/474.
rightly be called the “Concept” of Life since the Concept is self-determining within its relation to Objectivity and it is the “motor” for the development of Life.

Finally, it is called “universal life” In this initial stage, their immediate identity means that they are in a universal relation with each other: the Concept is identical to Objectivity and relates to it as identical without any difference within the structure.

These three definitions of Life are then taken together as expressing ‘the [Concept] whose objectivity corresponds to it’\(^\text{29}\). However, Objectivity does not correspond to the Concept because the former is only in-itself the Concept. Indeed, Objectivity corresponds to the Concept insofar as the Concept ‘posits’ it as corresponding to the [Concept]\(^\text{30}\). Thus, their correspondence is because of the Concept’s for-itself identity with Objectivity: there is no determination from Objectivity to correspond to the Concept.

This is universal life where Objectivity corresponds to the Concept because the latter posits it as corresponding to its negative unity.\(^\text{31}\) As we have also seen, the Concept relates to Objectivity as an immediacy. We have also seen that the Concept relates to itself through itself in externality, therefore, it is self-determinate within its unity: ‘the infinite relation of the [Concept] to itself is as negativity a self-determining’\(^\text{32}\). In its immediate relation to Objectivity, then, the Concept determines itself with the aim of making Objectivity for-itself identical with it. To recap: despite their identity there is a difference in universal life because the correspondence of the Concept to Objectivity runs unilaterally. The difference, then, is that Objectivity does not correspond to the Concept the way that the Concept corresponds to Objectivity.

Let us now examine the self-determining movement that expresses the relation of the Concept to Objectivity. The process of this self-determination is ‘the [in-itself] positing that only becomes...for-itself through its return into itself - a creative presupposing’\(^\text{33}\). Thus, in the immediacy of universal life, the Concept first posits Objectivity: so far, their relation is just in-itself. Next, because the Concept is already for-itself identical with Objectivity and self-determining within this identity, it returns-into-itself through Objectivity: now, the Concept’s

\(^{29}\) Hegel, SL, 764/474.

\(^{30}\) Ibid.

\(^{31}\) Pace Carlson who begins his account of “A. The Living Individual” from particular life, see: (Carlson, A commentary on Hegel’s Science of Logic, 565).

\(^{32}\) Hegel, SL, 764/474.

\(^{33}\) Ibid. I have altered Miller’s translation of ‘das Setzen an sich’, (Hegel, WL, 474) from “implicit” to “in-itself” to show the continuity of Hegel’s thought from the end of *Teleology*. With respect to his translation of ‘Fürsichsein’ he writes both “explicit” and “for-itself”. Miller is obviously aware of his choice of translation and I do not claim that he has made a mistake. I simply think that using the terminology that immediately denotes the logical relation rather than a synonym is more helpful for clarifying the logical progress of the text.
relation to Objectivity is for-itself and also a “creative presupposing”. First, the movement back into-itself is a “presupposing” because it is the return of the first positing. Second, it is “creative” because its identity with itself is established through Objectivity, despite Objectivity’s lack of determination to correspond to the Concept, and so we might say that the Concept’s return-into-self is a creative enterprise: ‘The Idea of life in its immediacy is as yet only the creative universal soul’\footnote{Hegel, SL, 764/474.}. As we have seen before, “soul” refers to the free movement of the Concept with itself - here, in universal life, this free movement is the self-determining, and creative, movement into Objectivity back with itself.

7.1.2 Particular Life

The self-determination of universal life has expressed the difference within itself: Objectivity does not have the determination to actively relate to the Concept. Thus, we can no longer consider them as identical moments within a single structure and so must make explicit their difference.\footnote{Ibid.} Hegel writes: ‘the diremption of itself into itself as subjective individuality and itself as indifferent universality’\footnote{Ibid.}. Here, we have the two moments of particular life: on the one side the moment of subjective individuality and on the other side the moment of indifferent universality. Then, Hegel writes: ‘[universal life] has thereby sundered itself into the two extremes of the judgement, which immediately becomes a syllogism’\footnote{Ibid.}. The two moments, then, are in the form of a judgement that becomes a syllogism. Writing generally about the opposition in particular life, Hegel states that its determinations are ‘the general determinations of the [Concept]’\footnote{Hegel, SL, 765/474.}. The “general determinations” of the Concept refers to the moments of universality, particularity and individuality: Hegel is referring to the fact that the opposed moments have both the determinations of individuality and universality and so their determination includes both. As of yet, however, the moment of particularity is implicitly present as the moment that joins the extremes. For the present, then, particular life is the I-U judgement relation (but will become the I-P-U syllogism).

\footnotesize

\footnote{‘universal life becomes a particular’, (Hegel, SL, 764/474).}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
\footnote{Hegel, SL, 765/474.}
After writing the above, Hegel contrasts the fact that particular life has the general determinations of the Concept as its determination with the fact that ‘the filling\(^{39}\) of these determinations is the Idea\(^{40}\). This should be read similarly to how I read the three definitions of the first moment of Life. The determinations of particular life are the general determinations of the Concept because it is the sundered Concept. The determinations of particular life have also the determination of the Idea as their “filling”. In concrete terms, this means that particular life has the identity of the Concept and the Objectivity as its determination and that their sundering in particular life does not mean that we return into the sphere of Objectivity where they were not identical.\(^{41}\)

This reading makes a lot of sense if we look at the sentence that follows: ‘One extreme is the unity of the [Concept] and reality, which is the Idea, as the immediate unity that at an earlier stage appeared as objectivity\(^{42}\). One of the sides of particular life, then, is the unity of the Concept and Objectivity, which are as of yet only an immediate unity. This unity is equally a moment of the immediate Idea. This explains why Hegel states earlier that the filling of particular life’s determinations is the Idea: despite the sundering of universal life, the identity of the Concept with Objectivity is such that it is part of the Concept’s being to be united with it.

We have, then, on the one side of particular life the immediate unity of the Concept and Objectivity. As I have already said, the reason why one side of particular life is the unity of the Concept and Objectivity is that it is in the nature of the Concept, within Life, to have its identity for-itself in the Objectivity and to determine itself externally through it. Whilst this accounts for the determination of the Concept it ignores the basic determination of Objectivity, that of indifference. The other side of particular life, then, is the moment of indifferent Objectivity, what was above called ‘indifferent universality’\(^{43}\). The moment of Objectivity in particular life is importantly different from its earlier appearances in Objectivity because it is now posited by it.\(^{44}\) Whereas in Objectivity, the moment of Objectivity was ‘the immediate

\(^{39}\) Die Erfüllung is a term that Hegel rarely uses.

\(^{40}\) Hegel, SL, 765/474.

\(^{41}\) That Hegel has this concern can be gleaned from the sentences that follow: ‘But here [objectivity] is in a different determination. [In Objectivity] it was the unity of [Concept] and reality, where the Concept has passed over into the reality in which it is merely lost; it did not stand over against the reality, or in other words, because the [Concept] is for the reality only an inner, it is merely a reflection external to it. That objectivity is therefore the immediate itself in an immediate form. Here, on the contrary…’, (Ibid.).

\(^{42}\) Ibid.

\(^{43}\) Hegel, SL, 764/474.

\(^{44}\) See: ‘has proceeded from the [Concept], so that its essence is positedness, and it exists as a negative’, (Hegel, SL, 765/474).
itself in an immediate form’, now in *Life*, it is an immediacy but one that has proceeded from the self-determination or positing of the *Concept*. Since *Objectivity* has proceeded from the positing of the *Concept* it is itself the ‘totality of the [Concept]’. That it is the totality of the *Concept* means that it has the determination of the *Concept*, but because of its indifference to determination this determination is ‘only lent to it’, or in other words, it is only in-itself and not for-itself the totality of the *Concept*.

This reading is in contrast to Carlson who reads indifferent *Objectivity* as the ‘body parts’ of the *Concept* and the *Concept* as the “soul” that ‘animates’ them. I think that Carlson has conflated the content of paragraph four of “A. The Living Individual” with paragraph two. I, on the contrary, read the second paragraph as pertaining to *particular life* and paragraph four to the *living individual*. In *particular life*, the *Concept* is not yet “soul” because it is not the ‘completely determined within itself...self-moving principle’, and *Objectivity* is still self-subsistent and indifferent as against the *Concept*. It follows, that it is also misleading to conceive of indifferent *Objectivity* as the “body” of the *Concept*. As I will argue in the following section, it is only once we have considered the immediate unity of the *Concept* with its own moment of *Objectivity* that determinations such as the “soul” and the “body” can be employed.

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45 Hegel, *SL*, 765/475.
46 Ibid.
47 Thus, I disagree with Spieker, see: (Spieker, *Wahres Leben Denken*, 357), who reads the sentence ‘Here, on the contrary, [the Objectivity] has proceeded only from the [Concept], so that its essence is positedness, and it exists as a negative’, (Hegel, *SL*, 764/474) as pertaining to *universal life* instead of to *particular life*, as I have argued above. Spieker also reads the sentences in paragraph two where Hegel states that the *Concept* is not lost in *Objectivity* as describing *universal life*. I think that the error of this interpretation lies in how Spieker understands the relation of the *Concept* to *Objectivity* in *universal life*. It is true that *Objectivity* in *universal life* only corresponds to the *Concept* insofar as the latter posits it as corresponding to this unity, see: (Hegel, *SL*, 764/474), but this does not yet amount to *Objectivity* existing as a negative because it is still within the identity of *universal life*. Moreover, given their unity there is no reason to think that *Objectivity* might be lost in the *Concept* or vice-versa. In fact, it makes much more sense to think of the latter possibility in *particular life* since that is when the *Concept* posits *Objectivity* and “risks” reverting to the status the *Concept* had in *Objectivity*. It is only once the moment of *universal life* has determined itself into *particular life* and the *Concept* posits the indifferent *Objectivity* that is created out of the sundering that the latter exists as a negative: indeed, it exists just as a negative because it does not relate to the *Concept* and so stays at the point of having been negated by the *Concept*.
49 Hegel, *SL*, 765/475.
50 Carlson’s interpretation of the indifferent *Objectivity* as the “body” that is animated by the “soul”, the *Concept*, leads him to claim that “there is a mind-body split. Idea so far suffers from “the form of immediate being which, posited on its own account is indifferent to the subject.” (765) Such a Universality merely inheres in the subject. Universality is, “as it were, only lent to [Objectivity].”’, (Carlson, *A commentary on Hegel’s Science of Logic*, 565) Here, again, we see another example of Carlson conflating the content of paragraphs two and four, but more importantly, this leads him to think that the mind/body distinction that is developed in *Life* is of a graver kind than it actually is. In fact, as we will see in the *living individual*, and assuming one is inclined to read the moments of the *soul* and *Objectivity* of the *soul* as referring to the mind and the body, the distinction is
On the one side, then, there is the immediate unity of the Concept and Objectivity. On the other side there is indifferent Objectivity. The Concept relates to Objectivity only in-itself, since it is already in a unity for-itself with Objectivity, and as such, Objectivity is the determination of the Concept. However, owing to its indifference to determination it has the appearance of a self-subsistent Objectivity.

7.1.3 Individual Life

Particular life concluded with two opposed moments. On the one hand, there is the immediate unity of the Concept and Objectivity, and on the other hand, there is indifferent Objectivity. Beginning with Objectivity it will be recalled that it is itself the totality of the Concept, but only in terms of its content. This is because the Concept has posited Objectivity and has determined it. The reason for why its form is not the totality of the Concept is that Objectivity has not returned this determinateness: it is not self-determining and does not have the infinite self-movement of the Concept.\(^{51}\)

Let us now turn our attention to the immediate unity of the Concept and Objectivity. This unity determines itself into a negative unity because of the self-determining movement of the Concept. Hegel writes that this unity ‘constitutes the true centrality, namely the [Concept’s] free unity with itself’\(^{52}\). The first part refers to the centre in Mechanism: recall that the centre was the essential determinateness of the non-self-subsistent objects and, as such, the objects strove to unify with their centre.\(^{53}\) What makes the negative unity of Life an example of ‘true centrality’ is that the identity between the Concept and Objectivity is explicit: Objectivity does not merely strive toward the centre but is identical with the centre and in a unity with it. Thus, because of their identity, the Concept freely relates to itself with Objectivity. This negative unity is the living individual. It is the ‘simple but negative self-identity’\(^{54}\) of the Concept with a slight one. It is true that the objective side of the living individual is different to its soul but this difference is tempered by their identity, in which the soul as identical with Objectivity moves within itself as itself.

\(^{51}\) This is a development from the moment of the subjective end in Teleology where the subjective end, having sundered itself into moments of finite content that are opposed to its infinite form related to indifferent Objectivity that confronted it, see: (Hegel, SL, 741-742/446-447). In Teleology since the Concept and Objectivity were not united by their identity when the Concept related to Objectivity the latter did not have the totality of the Concept as its content. Life, then, shows a further development of this relation: now, when the Concept posits Objectivity, the latter takes up the totality of its determination as its content.

\(^{52}\) Hegel, SL, 765/475.


\(^{54}\) Hegel, SL, 765/475.
itself through *Objectivity*. Crucially, it is the living *individual* because “individuality” is the moment of negative-unity that reconciles a relation of *particularity*.

It is clear that there is no explicit difference within the ‘simple negative self-identity’ and that it is identical with itself in its negativity. In other words, the *Concept* is identical with itself in its negative relation with *Objectivity*. Hegel calls this initial moment of free self-movement within the *living individual* the moment of the *soul*. Now, the *soul* describes a moment that has the self-determining movement of the *Concept* as its essential determination. Thus, it follows that since the *soul* is the negative self-identity of the *Concept* with *Objectivity* that it ‘possesses an objective being of its own’

The externality of the *Concept* is not something that it must posit but is its own moment of externality. The *soul’s* moment of externality is ‘immediately identical with the [Concept]; thus, it has this corporeality in general by nature’

In the fourth paragraph, Hegel includes, amongst the above points regarding the externality of *soul*, points concerning the syllogistic and teleological structure of the *living individual*. Beginning with the syllogistic structure it will be recalled that the judgement relation of *particular life* (I-U) was said to become a syllogism immediately. It is in this paragraph that Hegel picks up the thread of this thought: Hegel writes that ‘objectivity is also the middle term of the syllogism; the corporeality of the soul is that whereby the soul unites itself with external objectivity’

The idea, then, is that the two moments that compose the negative unity of the *living individual* are part of the syllogism. We have already seen that the *Concept* is the moment of *individuality* and that *Objectivity* is the moment of *universality* (I-U). Now, we see that the *Concept* is the negative unity of the *Concept* and its own moment of externality, which in similar fashion to the *subjective end* and the *means*, relates the *Concept* to indifferent *universality*. Thus, we must make explicit the fact that between I-U the middle-term that is the externality of the *soul* must be a moment of *particularity*. Thus, the syllogism of the *living individual* is I-P-U.

Hegel also conceives of the *soul* as a teleological structure. He writes that the externality of the *soul* is ‘a reality that is subjugated to the end, the immediate *means*’

However, it is crucial to highlight that this moment of the *living individual* is merely analogous

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55 See the *universal concept*: (Hegel, SL, 602/276).
56 Hegel, SL, 766/475.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
to the teleological structure and not the same as it. Because the Idea begins with the identity of the Concept and Objectivity it is contradictory to think of the relation of the Concept to its moment of externality as being teleological. Doing so would immediately take us out of Life and back to Teleology. Strictly speaking, then, it does not make sense to speak of teleological relations in Life. They are living relations and they are merely analogous to teleological relations insofar as they involve the positing of externality by the Concept. But that is where the analogy stops: because living relations are already identical with each other, they do not become so.

The living individual, then, is the immediate unity of the Concept to its Objectivity or of the soul and its externality. Now, we must consider the precise relation of the soul to its own moment of externality. Hegel emphasises the teleological and syllogistic readings of this development in the fifth paragraph of subsection 1 and in subsection 2, and we will examine those too, but I think that it is a mistake to overstate the similarities. Life should, first and foremost, develop through its own resources. Syllogism and Teleology are, of course, sublated within Life and so form part of its own resources, but this does not amount to developing Life syllogistically or teleologically. Rather, it merely serves to describe relations in those terms. They cannot have an operational function because that would take the structure back into their respective sections. Therefore, I will first give a living reading of the relation of the soul to its externality and I will then examine the syllogistic and teleological analogies that can be made.

7.1.4 The Members of the Living Individual

Hegel begins by making explicit the difference within the simple negative self-identity of the living individual. The Concept is distinct from its own externality since the latter, whilst

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60 Pace Spieker who claims that the Objectivity of the soul could not be an immediacy because otherwise the Concept or the soul would be lost in it: ‘Die Verbindung kann ja keine unmittelbare sein, denn dann wäre die Seele nur in Objektivität versenkt und verloren’, (Spieker, Wahres Leben Denken, 359). It seems that Spieker is making the mistake of assuming that all “immediacy” is a return into Objectivity. This, however, is clearly not the case. “Immediacy” merely describes the kind of relation between two moments and, whilst it is particularly representative of the Doctrine of Being and the section of Objectivity it does not constitute a return into these sections. The soul and its Objectivity are immediately connected because we have yet to think through the logical implications of their unity. This is an immediacy that is different to the immediate identity that we encountered at the start of Mechanism. In the former it merely describes the logical moment at hand, whereas in the latter it forms part of the character of Objectivity.

61 See: ‘the [Concept] is in [the living individual] as determinate [Concept], distinct from its externality, and in its distinguishing, pervading the externality and remaining identical with itself’, (Hegel, SL, 766/476).
identical with the Concept, is not itself the determinate totality of the Concept, i.e. it is not itself self-determining. This is an important point to recall: no matter the degree of identity between the Concept and Objectivity, the latter has as its essential determination an indifference to determinateness. Thus, whilst the Concept can freely relate to itself through Objectivity, through externality, this does not mean that Objectivity has the determination of the Concept. However, the Concept is also identical with its externality, thus, it remains identical with itself through this.

Hegel goes on to write that ‘[t]his objectivity of the living being is the organism [...]’. In respect of its externality the organism is a manifold, not of parts but of members.62 The organism is the moment of difference whereby the soul is different to its own moment of externality but still identical with it such that its determination pervades it. This is the only time that Hegel uses such a word and I only use it to refer to this moment of the living individual and the process that follows it. The organism is a moment of particularity insofar as it is the moment where the simple self-identity of the soul has broken down into its moments of difference: the soul and the moment of the soul as external: the members of the organism. Here, Hegel distinguishes members from parts, the latter pertaining to purely objective relations where the Concept is implicitly present. The members of the organism develop in two steps. First, they ‘subsist only in the individuality’63 which reminds us that their being as the external moments of the Concept is logically bound up with the living individual, i.e. such a unity is logically coherent only within Life. Second:

‘[t]heir externality is opposed to the negative unity of the living individual; the latter is therefore the urge to posit the abstract moment of the [Concept’s] determinateness as a real difference; since this difference is immediate, it is the urge of each single, specific moment to produce itself, and equally to raise its particularity to universality, sublate the other moments external to it and produce itself at their expense’64.

The externality of the members is opposed to the negative unity of the living individual. This much we already knew from our analysis of the difference within the soul in the paragraph above. Now, the members are the “abstract moment of the [Concept’s] determinateness” because they have as their content the determination of the Concept but are also external to the

62 Hegel, SL, 766/476.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
Concept and are abstract because they are abstracted from the Concept. As abstract moments, their difference to the Concept is an ideal one. Thus, the Concept has the urge [der Trieb] to posit the ideal difference as a real difference because it is the Concept's nature to be explicitly identical with itself. By positing them, by establishing a relation with the external members their difference becomes a real difference because they are now in an explicit relation.

Now, let us consider this moment from the side of the externality of the living individual, the members of the organism. The difference between the soul and the external moment of the soul is immediate since it is not a posited difference: it is a difference that simply is as part of their being.65 It is the same regarding their identity - the members are immediately pervaded by the Concept. Therefore, once the Concept has the urge to posit the members, the members themselves immediately have this determination because of their immediate identity with the Concept. Since the determination of every particular member is identical to the determination of the Concept it follows that every positing of a member by a member is a positing of their universal moment as the members of the living individual. Thus, we have a situation whereby each member has the determination of the living individual as their negative unity to posit every other member so as to unify once more and return to their state of negative unity as the living individual. This is what Hegel means when he writes that each member 'sublate[s] the other moments external to it and produce[s] itself at their expense'.66 But equally, the sublation of each member is also a self-sublation since each member that raises itself to universality will be creating the negative unity that will be opposed to another member that will then raise itself to universality.67

65This is best expressed by Spieker who interprets the “real difference” as expressing the ideality of the unity of the soul with its members: ‘Der Realität des Unterschieds entspricht seine Idealität:Kein bestimmtes Darstellungsmoment des Begriffs kann beanspruchen, das Bestehen des Begriffs zu sein. Der Begriff hat kein bestimmtes Dasein, vielmehr manifestiert er sich in der Außerlichkeit in deren Instabilität. Die Außerlichkeit bildet keinen Gegensatz, sondern hebt sich auf zur negativen Einheit des Begriffs’, (Spieker, Wahres Leben Denken, 360). The point being that the soul is not located in one member or another but that its being is in the reciprocal difference of the members with each other that mutually maintain each other. Thus, it is ideal. 66Hegel, SL, 766/476. 67McTaggart does not examine the “logic” of members but he does critique Hegel for claiming that there is an ontological distinction between a hand being cut off from its body and a piece of granite that has been removed from its quarry. This, of course, goes against Hegel’s own remark that there is an ontological distinction between an object being the member of a living individual and an object being a mere object. McTaggart employs a reductionist strategy to efface the ontological distinction and calls the difference ‘only a matter of degree’, (McTaggart, A commentary on Hegel’s Logic, 277). He claims that the atoms of the dissected hand will still be the same atoms as when the hand was connected to the body and that, for this reason, there is no distinction between the two examples. Assuming, however, that this is true, there is an important ontological distinction that cannot be effaced by an appeal to the identity of lower-level matter. Hegel’s point is that the removal of a member from the living individual involves the removal of the Concept as the self-determining identity of that member. Whereas, removing a piece of granite from its quarry is, from the perspective of Mechanism, a moment of the real mechanical process, where the chisel does violence to the granite and, despite the latter’s resistance, overcomes it, or from the perspective of Teleology, the end of the agent uses the chisel as
Hitherto, my examination of the members of the living individual has focused on the immanent logical development of Life. To achieve this I have cut quotes so as to avoid Hegel’s insertion of syllogistic and teleological language. I think that it is paramount to the project of the SL that any development proceeds immanently rather than by the (justifiable) insertion of past categories. As I have already argued, I think that they play a purely descriptive and not an operational role. That said, Hegel does include syllogistic and teleological language in this section and it would be worthwhile to consider their presence in this section.

First, the syllogistic reading. Hegel refers to the development of the members as the ‘syllogism of external purposiveness’ and that this development is an analysis of the ‘first premiss’ of this syllogism. There is no “syllogism of external purposiveness” in Syllogism and it seems clear that Hegel names it so because of the parallels with Teleology that he also draws. Moreover, Hegel identifies this as the first premiss of the syllogism, i.e. the I-P of the I-P-U. Hegel also writes that in the initial differentiation of the members from the soul that ‘the objectivity has not yet in its own self sublated itself, and therefore to that extent the end is not yet in and for itself in this premiss, and only becomes so in the conclusion’.

This refers to the resolution of the opposition between the living individual and its members, i.e. where the Concept returns into itself and is for-itself through Objectivity. According to Hegel, this moment is the conclusion of the first premiss of the syllogism of external purposiveness.

Second, the teleological reading. Hegel reads the negative unity of the living individual as the end and its moment of externality as the means: ‘[the organism] is the means and instrument of the end, perfect in its purposiveness since the [Concept] constitutes its substance’. The second half of this quote is of interest because Hegel seeks to raise the merely objective teleological relation to the living relation by adding that the relation is ‘perfect’ because of the identity between the living individual and its members (this is what is entailed by ‘substance’). This is an unfortunate formulation, however, because it is a contradiction. A teleological relation is an objective one and calling it “perfect” does not raise it from its

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68 Hegel, SL, 767/477.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Hegel, SL, 766/476.
objective characteristics. In fact, to understand the organism in teleological terms is, in my view, to view it outside of the sphere of the Idea, i.e. to not think of it as living.

Our examination of the living individual ended with the fact that it formed a syllogism with its moment of externality and indifferent Objectivity: I-P-U. Because of the immediate relation between the living individual and its externality we first had to examine their relation and this was done in the above section of the members of the living individual. Thus, Hegel writes: ‘This process of the living individuality is restricted to that individuality itself and still falls entirely within it’\textsuperscript{72}. The conclusion of the section, then, is that the I-P relation is resolved and that we now have the simple negative unity of the living individual.\textsuperscript{73}

\section*{7.2 The Living Individual in its Reality}

Hegel explains why the next step of Life is an examination of the ‘living individual in its reality’\textsuperscript{74}. He begins by stating that the “logic” of members is the ‘[Concept] of the living subject and its process... [and] the determinations...are the self-related negative unity of the [Concept] and objectivity’\textsuperscript{75}. The first half of the quote refers to the logical development that we have just examined: the process of the living individual is the process of the living individual.

\textsuperscript{72} Hegel, SL, 767/477.
\textsuperscript{73} McTaggart’s account of Life begins with a preliminary discussion where he outlines two instances where he believes Hegel’s analysis of Life has been led astray by Hegel’s adherence to biology. These are: 1) The determination of Life is treated as if it dealt with a plurality of organisms, and 2) Hegel claims that the body is an inadequate manifestation of the soul. Both of these points are, unfortunately, not defended with any textual support and so it is difficult to engage with the reasons for why McTaggart thinks this, see: (McTaggart, \textit{A commentary on Hegel’s Logic}, 275-6). I do not see any textual support for the first point. In fact, I think it is clear that until the Genus we are always examining the relation of the living individual (or one Organism, in McTaggart’s terminology) and the Objectivity, in various guises. What is further perplexing about McTaggart’s view is that he quotes Hegel from the §219 of the EL stating that the living individual faces an inorganic nature and dismisses this as impossible (\textit{A commentary on Hegel’s Logic}, 280). It is very odd that he does not provide textual evidence for his point and, in the absence of textual evidence, uses his position to ignore textual evidence that runs counter to his point. I will not say anything further on this matter.

McTaggart’s second criticism is also not supported with any textual evidence. He asserts that there is no logical reason for asserting that the body is the inadequate manifestation of the soul and, moreover, that the inadequacy of this manifestation is connected to Life being the immediate Idea. Much like the above point, in the absence of textual support it is not possible to argue against this position with any degree of precision. I will simply say that the text does not use such a formulation, and in fact, clearly states that in the living individual the body is a very adequate manifestation of the soul: ‘The living being possess corporeality in the first instance as reality that is immediately identical with the [Concept]; thus it has this corporeality in general by nature’, (Hegel, SL, 766/475).

\textsuperscript{74} Hegel, SL, 767/477.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
and its members. He then contrasts this process to what it is not: ‘But since there are moments of the Idea of life within its [Concept], they are not the specific [Concept]-moments of the living individual in its reality’. The “specific [Concept]-moments” refers to the three determinations of the Concept: universality, particularity, individuality. The point is that the aforementioned process does not develop according to the determinations of the Concept. Instead, it develops according to the moments of the “Idea of life within its [Concept]”. Hitherto, the “Idea of life” is the negative unity of the Concept with Objectivity as the living individual: thus, the development up until now is the development of the negative unity within the Concept. Thus, and to return the language of Syllogism, what was examined in the “logic” of members was the judgement relation I-P, which is the negative relation between the Concept [I] and Objectivity [P]. The logical development of this process did not follow the determinations of the Concept, but instead the judgement relation which was the negative unity of the Concept and Objectivity. This process concluded with the living individual and its members raising themselves to universality.

The “logic” of members, then, is contrasted to the ‘living individual in its reality’, which, we does develop through the determinations of the Concept. In the sentence that follows Hegel writes: ‘The objectivity or corporeality of this individual is a concrete totality; the above moments are the sides out of which life constitutes itself; they are therefore not the moments of this life that is already constituted by the Idea’. Again, Hegel contrasts explicit, the “logic” of members with the ‘living individual in its reality’: the first and third clause referring to the former and the second clause to the latter. Hegel refers to the Objectivity of the living individual that has returned into the negative unity and is fully determined by the Concept, i.e. it is a concrete totality. In the second clause, Hegel refers to the ‘above moments’ as the sides ‘out of which life constitutes itself’. Now, it looks as if Hegel is referring to the usage of the word “moments” in the previous sentence and if this is the case, then he is saying that the living individual has not yet constituted itself through these moments. It becomes clear in the third clause that this is the case. Since the “above moments” are “not the moments of this life that is already constituted by the Idea”, which, as we have seen, is the development of the members of the living individual. So, Hegel is stating that the outcome of the “logic” of members is the concrete totalisation of Objectivity within the living individual. This did not occur through the

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76 Hegel, SL, 767/477.
77 Hegel, SL, 767/478.
development of the determinations of the Concept but through moments of the idea of Life, i.e. the negative unity of the Concept and Objectivity.

We are now prepared to understand the significance of the final sentence of the first paragraph of subsection 3. Hegel writes: ‘But the living objectivity as such of the individual, since it is ensouled by the [Concept] and has the [Concept] for its substance, also possesses for its essential difference the determinations of the Concept’. The “living objectivity” is a synonym for Objectivity as a concrete totality; what it means for it to be a concrete totality is for it to be thoroughly determined by the Concept or to have the Concept “for its substance”. Thus, Objectivity is for-itself identical with the Concept and, as such, has as its own essential determination the determinations of the Concept.

Hegel concludes the paragraph by writing: ‘accordingly the shape [Gestalt], in which they are externally distinguished, is divided or incised (insectum) on the basis of that difference’. Now that Objectivity is a concrete totality it has within itself the determinations of the Concept. Moreover, these determinations are “externally distinguished” because they are also objective, i.e. external. We will now investigate the development of the living individual in its reality. Importantly, we are not just investigating Objectivity but are investigating the relation of the Concept to Objectivity where each is a concrete totality.

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78 Hegel, SL, 767/478.
79 Thus, I disagree with Carlson’s reading on the move to the living individual in its reality: ‘The Understanding's proposition about Organism is that Universality permeates it’, (Carlson, A commentary on Hegel's Science of Logic, 566). There is no reference in the text to the “understanding” playing a role in the transition and, moreover, it is not the case that universality permeates the organism but that the development of the objective side of the living individual is now a concrete totality and is for-itself identical with the Concept, which means that we must now consider how the determinations of the Concept develop in the developed negative unity of the Concept and the Objectivity in the living individual.
80 Hegel, SL, 767/478.
81 A word must be given on the change in the text from the living individual [das Lebendige Individuum] to the living being [das Lebendigen]. Now, it is by no means clear whether Hegel uses the terms interchangeably or whether he uses them to designate different moments of Life. If we consider that he uses the terms interchangeably then one would have to explain why the “living individual” is entirely absent from subsection 3 of “A. The Living Individual” and why, at times, it seems as if Hegel uses it to refer exclusively to logical moments where it is in a judgement relation or syllogism. On the other hand, the “living being” is used in the “logic” of members, whilst both terms are used in “B. The Life Process” and “C. The Genus”. In the absence of a clear logical distinction and for the sake of concision I will simply refer to all instances of the living being as the living individual.
7.2.1 Sensibility

The *Concept* and *Objectivity* are each a concrete totality: what makes them “concrete” and a “totality” is the fact that each is united with the other. The *Concept* is in-and-for-itself united with *Objectivity*, and vice-versa. They also relate to each other within a unity. In this unity ‘absolute difference with its negativity [is] dissolved in simplicity and self-similar’ and it is ‘brought to view...in sensibility’\(^{82}\). Note, that they are absolutely different because as concrete totalities each side is in-and-for-itself itself and *not* the other. However, their difference as concrete totalities is only implicit and we are only focusing on their identity — they are both a concrete totality.

Their identity is within a moment of universality which we call *sensibility*. Within *sensibility*, the *Concept* relates to *Objectivity* immediately, *i.e.* there is no mediation between them that makes their difference explicit. Now, since each concrete totality is the unity of the *Concept* and *Objectivity*, their relation is a movement from one moment of externality to another moment of externality. Simultaneously, however, since each is equally the unity of the *Concept* and *Objectivity* (with emphasis on the *Concept*), their relation is equally a movement from one inner side to another inner side. This movement, which will soon be the reason for why we must make explicit their implicit difference, is a movement of ‘absolute negativity’\(^{83}\). Their negativity or determinateness, then, is only a ‘simple immediacy’\(^{84}\) since they relate to each other as immediately identical.

However, this movement *does* involve difference because it is a movement from externality to externality. Note, that the source of the difference is located in the movement between external sides *because* the determination of the *Concept* is to be united with itself, whereas the determination of *Objectivity* is to be external and indifferent to anything. Thus, we make explicit the implicit difference in the absolute negativity of *sensibility* by grasping that the movement from the *Concept* to *Objectivity* is the movement between different, external moments. The different implicit within *sensibility* develops particularises into the moment of *irritability*.\(^{85}\)

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\(^{82}\) Hegel, *SL*, 768/478.

\(^{83}\) Ibid.

\(^{84}\) Ibid.

\(^{85}\) McTaggart does not think that *irritability* follows from *sensibility* but that instead they both proceed from the idea of *Life*. This is the case, he argues, because each assumes that there is something external to the living *individual* and this follows from Hegel’s earlier premise that *Life* posits a plurality of organisms.

I have already made my case against thinking that *Life* posits a plurality of organisms. Specifically on the *Living Individual in its reality*, it is wrong to think of the moment of the *Objectivity* as a moment of indifferent
7.2.2 Irritability

The moment of *particularity* is the ‘opening up of the negativity that is locked-up in simple self-feeling’\(^86\). We make explicit the difference between the moments in *sensibility*, namely that the movement from externality to externality is a movement between different moments and not *just* identical moments. Recall that as concrete totalities the moments are self-determining, thus, they have the urge [*der Trieb*] to posit their difference. Having posited their difference, each moment ‘relates itself to the external as to a *presupposed* objectivity and is in reciprocal *activity* with it’\(^87\). As in many instances before, the *particular* relation of the *Concept* to *Objectivity* involves the former relating to the latter as presupposed (the *subjective end* to *Objectivity*; the *Concept* to *Objectivity* in *universal life*). This is because the moments are detached in their moment of difference and yet connected to each other. It follows that if you are different from something else but are nevertheless able to relate to it that it takes on the form of a presupposition, of something that is presupposed as being identical with you because it is not yet posited as being identical. Moreover, the moments are in a reciprocal relation with each other: again, this is because of the equality of their determinations. Both are concrete totalities and so the external relation of one to the other is equally the external relation of the other to the one.\(^88\) This movement outwards and immediate self-relation is *irritability*. If the external relation of each is the self-relation of each it follows that the moments will return into each other as a negative unity. This is the third and final determination of the *Concept*, *individuality*.

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\(^86\) Hegel, *SL*, 768/478.

\(^87\) Hegel, *SL*, 768/479.

\(^88\) See: ‘the particularity, the negativity of its determinateness, as a direction outwards, is the self-related negativity of the [Concept]’, (Ibid.).
7.2.3 Reproduction

The return into-itself in irritability is examined in two steps. First, there is the reflection-into-self, whereby one side sublates the immediacy of irritability and posits the presupposed Objectivity. Hegel also calls this moment “theoretical reflection” because the positing of Objectivity is as yet only one-sided and, therefore, only “theoretical”. Here, “theoretical” is used in much the same way as “formal” or “ideal” have been used. Second, there is the return of the reflection-into-self whereby the ‘[Concept] posits itself in its external objectivity as negative unity’. The posited determinateness returns from Objectivity as the Concept that returns into-itself. This is the real reflection since it is the return of the posited determination, which leads to reproduction. 

Hegel emphasises the fact that the determinations of sensibility and irritability are sublated within reproduction. From sensibility, then, ‘life for the first time has...feeling’ and from irritability ‘the power of resistance’. It is clear why the negative unity of the living individual has the moment of feeling, but it is less clear why it has resistance. If we cast our minds back to the section on the real mechanical process it will be recalled that resistance was a moment that involved the communication of a determinateness from one object to the other: the communication could either be adequate to the object and therefore the resistance would be successful or it could be inadequate and therefore resistance would be unsuccessful. Thus, the fact that irritability involves the relation of two external objects opens the possibility for claiming that resistance could be an element of their relation. Interestingly, this broadens our understanding of resistance: it is not merely a moment of mechanism but a moment that expresses the relation between mutual externalities within Life. There is a moment of resistance.

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89 Hegel, SL, 768/479.
90 Ibid.
91 Daniel Lindquist states that, for Hegel, the “logic” of the members of the living individual is equivalent to the moment of reproduction in the Living Individual in its reality: “The structure process refers to the reciprocal means-ends structure Kant had seized upon. Hegel (1969, 766) will call the relevant “parts” of a living being members (Glieder). A member is made possible only by the whole to which it contributes and that produces it in its own activity [...]. The leaves and branches of Kant’s tree are members in this sense, as are the roots, sap, and so on of the tree. A whole system of members of this sort is what enables a tree to live as a tree, to keep itself alive through the activity of its members. (Hegel sometimes calls this “the process of reproduction,” meaning by “reproduction” self-maintenance, the “re-production” of the tree itself; my relabeling avoids the unfortunate ambiguity of the word “reproduction” when talking about living beings.).” (Lindquist, “Hegel’s ‘idea of life’ and internal purposiveness”, 387). This is, however, to confuse two distinct ontological moments of the living individual. The “logic” of members is the process whereby we examine the judgement relation between the living individual and its immediate Objectivity, whereas the moment of reproduction falls under the general Concept-determinations of the living individual as the simple unity with its Objectivity.
92 Hegel, SL, 769/479.
93 Ibid.
within the *living individual’s* relation with the external moment of itself. This brings my analysis of the *Concept* determinations of the *living individual* in its reality to an end. I will now examine the fifth paragraph of subsection 3, which prepares us for the move into “B. The Life Process”.

The paragraph consists of two dense sentences. The first one states that the moment of reproduction, which is the moment of the return of the two concrete totalities, means that the *living individual* ‘posits itself as an actual individuality, a self-related being-for-self’\(^{95}\). So, by the end of this section, the *living individual* has made explicit the dialectic between the *Concept* and *Objectivity* and is now simply a self-relating *living individual*. We are then told that the *living individual* is not just a self-relating being, but that it is also a ‘real relation outwards, the reflection of particularity or irritability towards an other, towards the objective world’\(^{96}\). Here, Hegel reminds us of the syllogism that we have set to one side (I-P-U) which connects the *living individual* to the moment of *Objectivity* that remained indifferent to its positing. Much like when we set *Objectivity* aside during the development of the immediate means. The *living individual* is in a relation with indifferent *Objectivity*. It relates to it because the moment of self-relation within the *living individual* is immediately a moment of external relation because externality is a moment of the *living individual*.

Thus, in the second sentence of the paragraph, Hegel writes that ‘when the individual posits itself as a subjective totality, the moment of its determinateness as a relation to externality becomes a totality as well’\(^{97}\). The *living individual* posits itself as self-relating as a “subjective totality”. The emphasis is placed on the subjectivity of the *living individual*, even though it is just as much objective, since it is because of the self-determining activity of the *Concept* that the *living individual* relates outwards to the self-subsistent moment of *Objectivity*. This brings us to the *Life-Process*.

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\(^{94}\) As I have already mentioned, McTaggart reads the moment of the *Objectivity* in the *living individual in its reality* as the *living individual’s* ‘relation to what is outside it’, (McTaggart, *A commentary on Hegel’s Logic*, 279). He also interprets the move to the *Life-Process* as exemplifying the ‘relation of the Organism to the outside world’ (Ibid.). This is all McTaggart says on the move to the *Life-Process* and it is not at all clear how he distinguishes between *Objectivity* that is outside the *living individual* in this section and *Objectivity* that is outside the *living individual in the Life-Process*.

\(^{95}\) Hegel, *SL*, 769/480.

\(^{96}\) Ibid.

\(^{97}\) Ibid.

\(^{98}\) On the transition to the *Life-Process* I have found Lindquist’s account particularly confused. Lindquist’s approach is to bring into the *SL* the kind of extra-logical concerns that are present in Kant’s scepticism of inner purposiveness, thus Lindquist writes: ‘If all we know about members is that they are reciprocally means and ends of each other, that they are made possible only by the organized whole that they constitute, we have not yet provided a way to grasp members as really present in nature. If we help ourselves to physics in the way Kant did, we are provided with one way of thinking of parts and wholes in nature: different parts are spatially distinct
7.3 The Life-Process

7.3.1 Transition to the Life-Process

The first paragraph of “B. The Life-Process” repeats much of the material from the last paragraph of the previous section. However, whilst the content that is communicated is the same, the language that Hegel uses to communicate it is different and so a brief analysis of this paragraph will prepare us for the language of the Life-Process.

In the following two sentences Hegel uses language that seems to be inappropriate to the SL. I will show, however, that the usage is metaphorical, and provide a reading of what is meant. Hegel writes: ‘In its self-feeling the living being has this certainty of the intrinsic nullity of the otherness confronting it. Its urge is the need to sublate this otherness and to give itself the truth of this certainty’\(^99\). Terms like “certainty” \([Gewißheit]\) and “to give itself the truth of its certainty” seem to invoke a self-conscious being and indeed, it might be that Hegel is allowing himself the opportunity to describe the extra-logical implications of this stage of Life, \(i.e.\) a self-conscious being might encounter the world beyond them with the feeling that it is devoid of content and that it can only be meaningful once the living being has imbued it with its own absolute content. However, this is far too speculative and there is no reason to rely on

\(^99\) Hegel, SL, 770/480.
an extra-logical explanation when a straightforward logical one is available. Here, we should read “certainty” as “unity” and “to give itself the truth of its certainty” as “to unify with Objectivity and be for-itself”. The certainty of the living individual is its urge to sublate indifferent Objectivity and to unify with itself. The living individual, therefore, has the urge to posit and sublate the indifferent Objectivity confronting it. This process is facilitated by the immediate objectivity which it posits conformably to its [Concept] as a natural means, and through which it is mediated into an external relation with indifferent Objectivity. The first part of the Life-Process, then, is this initial positing, where the living individual has the urge to sublate Objectivity. This moment is called need.

7.3.2 Need and Urge: Part 1

The process begins with the living individual positing itself: it posits itself because the Concept is a moment of the living individual and, as such, the initial move of the Concept is to relate to itself. This process is need: need begins with the self-positing of the absolute living individual that relates to indifferent Objectivity. Since, however, the living individual is

100 Hegel, SL, 770/481.
101 After arguing against Hegel’s point that the living individual is faced by an inorganic nature and maintaining his position that Hegel reads Life as discussing a plurality of organisms, McTaggart states that this distinction makes no difference to the logical development because: ‘For all that the category requires is that the Organism should stand in relation to something with which it is not in organic relation’, (McTaggart, A commentary on Hegel’s Logic, 280). And this raises an interesting point, I think quite by accident, concerning the possibility of a difference between the objects involved and their relation. In other words, can an Organism relate to an Organism in a non-living way? For example, if one Organism treats another Organism as a means to an end then we have an interesting tension because, on the one hand the other Organism is treated as an indifferent, immediate Objectivity since it is subordinated as means, whilst on the other hand, it has the conceptual structure of an Organism and not just an indifferent, immediate Objectivity. In this case a distinction is created between the objects involved and their relation. Is there a contradiction or tension, here, within the Organism? Between how it is and how it is being related to? Is logical priority given to the Concept that posits first? Moreover, this is not an ontological relation that is described by the SL. Does this mean that it is a further ontological relation that is made up of the simplest ones, a kind of compound relation? Or maybe, it is quite simply the moment of the Objectivity in the Life-Process and, in stating this, we are saying that it does not matter if the Objectivity is in fact an Organism but are merely concerned with how the living individual relates itself to the Objectivity - hereby giving priority to the Concept that posits. I am not sure which of the two is correct, or if indeed only of the options must be correct.

102 Here, Carlson is mistaken when he states: ‘Life preys on Life. Life as a genus must feed on its various species. The Understanding therefore proposes that the Individual Life has a Need’, (Carlson, A commentary on Hegel’s Science of Logic, 568). Again, he uses the “understanding” as the mechanism for why the living individual has the urge to posit indifferent Objectivity. Also, nowhere is it stated that the Life or the living individual is the “genus” and, moreover, that because it is the “genus” the logic develops because the “genus” must feed on its various species’. In the absence of textual support, this claim seems to rely quite heavily on empirical ideas about Life.
absolutely self-related, *i.e.* no further development is available within its own conceptual resources, then it posits itself ‘posits itself as denied’\(^{103}\). Here, “denied” [verneint] captures the completeness of the structure of the *living individual* and the idea that it denies itself the possibility of merely residing within itself.\(^{104}\) Having been denied, then, there is only one conceptual pathway available to the *living individual*: a relation outward.\(^{105}\) This is because the moment of *Objectivity* within the *living individual* mediates between the *living individual* and indifferent *Objectivity*; once the *living individual* has denied itself it necessarily relates outwards to the only moment that is available - ‘to an other’.\(^{106}\) Thus, the content of the *living individual* is posited and indifferent *Objectivity* is determined: crucially, the *Concept* is not lost in indifferent *Objectivity* but ‘remains the identity of the self-similar [Concept]’\(^{107}\). This is because the determination that is posited is the absolute content of the negative unity of the *Concept* and the *Objectivity*. Thus, Hegel writes, ‘[the *Concept’s*] self-determination has the form of objective externality, and as it is at the same identical with itself it is absolute *contradiction*’\(^{108}\). Thus, on the one hand we have the *living individual* that is the absolute unity of the *Concept* and *Objectivity*, and indifferent *Objectivity* that has the *Concept*’s determination as its content. The contradiction, then, arises because the *Concept* is identical with itself in indifferent *Objectivity* but, at the same time, is different to itself since the identical moment of self-determination in *Objectivity* has the form of externality and not of self-determination.\(^{109}\) Moreover, not only does the identical moment of self-determination have the form of externality but it is, in this particular relation of their judgement relation, in ‘an absolute disparity with itself’\(^{110}\) because they are also separated from each other. This contradiction of being absolutely identical with itself whilst also being separated from itself

\(^{103}\) Hegel, *SL*, 770/481.

\(^{104}\) Here, I think that Spieker is mistaken in his analysis. He accords the *Concept* or the *living individual* with indifference towards the indifferent *Objectivity*: ‘Zugleich ist das Subjekt dieser Objektivität gleichgültig, denn die Bestimmung, Mittel des Subjekts zu sein, ist ihr äußerlich’, (Spieker, *Wahres Leben Denken*, 363). On the contrary, the *living individual* is actually the urge to posit the indifferent *Objectivity* because it has exhausted the logical possibilities of its self-positing - thus, its moment of self-positing or self-determination necessarily leads to a moment of external determination.

\(^{105}\) In *Need*, the Living Individual "posits itself as denied." (770) But in its *Need*, the Living Individual maintains and distinguishes itself from what it needs’, (Carlson, *A commentary on Hegel’s Science of Logic*, 568). Carlson is correct to point out that the moment of self-denial marks out the *living individual* as complete and distinct from *Objectivity*.

\(^{106}\) Hegel, *SL*, 770/481.

\(^{107}\) Ibid.

\(^{108}\) Ibid.

\(^{109}\) McTaggart is unable to understand why a contradiction arises within the *living individual*, see: (McTaggart, *A commentary on Hegel’s Logic*, 280). His account does not try to make sense of the fact that the determination of the *Concept* is posited in the indifferent *Objectivity* and it remains external to it whilst being also identical to it - thus, a contradiction.

\(^{110}\) Hegel, *SL*, 770/481.
Hegel calls *pain* [der Schmerz]. *Pain* is the absolute contradiction of the *Concept* that persists externally to itself as itself.

### 7.3.3 Need and Urge: Part 2

In the first part of the *Life-Process*, then, the *living individual* is in a relation with indifferent *Objectivity*. The first moment of this relation is *need*, whereby the *living individual* has the urge to posit *Objectivity* as identical to it. In positing it, however, the indifferent *Objectivity* has the self-determination of the *Concept* as its content, as its inner moment, but still has the outward form of externality and objectivity. Therefore, the *living individual* is in contradiction with itself since the moment of the *Concept* in *Objectivity* lacks the form of self-determination and is separated from it. This moment of identity in contradiction is the moment of *pain* and it is here that our examination stopped.

In the third paragraph of “B. The Life Process” Hegel examines how the *living individual* further relates to *Objectivity*. Hegel writes: ‘[the *Concept*] relates itself to its external, indifferently existing world as to an… intrinsically [Conceptless] and unessential actuality’\(^\text{111}\). Despite the fact that indifferent *Objectivity* has the self-determination of the *Concept* as its content it is still related to it as if it were without the *Concept* because *Objectivity* is only in-itself the *Concept*, *i.e.* it has not returned the determination of the *Concept*. It is further interesting that whilst *Objectivity* is actual that its actuality is ‘unessential’. Here, I think, the unessential actuality is due to the fact that *Objectivity* still has the form of externality. Hegel uses the word “essential” to express the identity of the *living individual* to *Objectivity*, which, is a reference to their identical content where Hegel refers to the realised unity of the *Concept* and *Objectivity* in the first part of *need*: ‘since each of the essential moments of its unity is realised as a separate totality’\(^\text{112}\).

Now, *Objectivity* is unable ‘to maintain itself against the living being’\(^\text{113}\) because it is indifferent to the self-determination of the *Concept* that it has as its content. In other words, it is open to determination and is unable to do anything against it because it is indifferent to determinateness. Thus, whilst it is true that the latter can act mechanically or chemically against

\(^\text{111}\) Hegel, *SL*, 771/482.
\(^\text{112}\) Hegel, *SL*, 770/481.
\(^\text{113}\) Hegel, *SL*, 771/482.
the *living being*, the relation is not thereby reduced to a mechanical or chemical relation — unless we were to reduce the *living individual* to a mere object.

In fact, in the *Life-Process*, Hegel states that ‘where [Objectivity] enters into relationship with a living being it does not act on it as a cause, but excites it’\(^{114}\). The difference between “excitation” and “causation” is that for Objectivity to excite the *living individual* it must have already been posited by the *living individual*. Hegel writes that ‘the action on the subject’, “excitation”, ‘consists merely in the *living individual* finding the externality presented to it conformable’\(^{115}\). This should not be interpreted as saying that the *living individual* has a “choice” in selecting an externality that is conformable to it.

### 7.3.4 Conformability and Appropriation

Hitherto we have examined the initial positing of indifferent Objectivity by the *living individual* and the specifics of this one-sided relation. I begin by examining a further aspect of this relation. We have seen how the Concept has posited the Objectivity and has determined it with its self-determining content and that this identity of content makes indifferent Objectivity conformable to the *living individual*. What we have yet to consider is the objective side of their relation, *i.e.* that since both have Objectivity or externality as a moment of their being then one side of their relation must fall under either mechanical or chemical relations. This external relation, as we saw in both Mechanism and Chemism falls under violence.\(^{116}\)

The objective side of the relation, however, is not all there is to the *Life-Process* since we are not in the sphere of Objectivity. In fact, the Concept is dominant over Objectivity and whilst the moment of externality marks the ‘beginning of the dissolution of the living being’\(^{117}\), since it exposes itself to the finitude of particular objective relations, the relation passes over from the merely objective/external relation to the conceptual/inner relation. On this Hegel writes:

\(^{114}\) Hegel, *SL*, 771/482.

\(^{115}\) Ibid.

\(^{116}\) Ibid.

\(^{117}\) Hegel, *SL*, 772/483.
‘The external purposiveness [...] is sublated by reason of the fact the object, relatively to the [Concept], is not a substance, and that therefore the [Concept] cannot become merely the object’s external form, but must posit itself as its essence and immanent pervading determination, in conformity with the [Concept’s] original identity’

Let us break down this rather dense sentence. First, we are told that the relation of the living individual and indifferent Objectivity is akin to that of external purposiveness because it involves the subjective positing of indifferent Objectivity. The externality of this relation, however, is sublated because Objectivity is not a “substance”. Now, to be the “substance” of something else is to be the source of determination of that thing. For example, in the “logic” of members, the living individual was the substance of its members because the determination of their identity with the living individual and with each other resided in the determination of the living individual. Objectivity, however, is indifferent and so has no such determination relative to the living individual and so it is not a substance. Since it is not the substance of the living individual then it cannot be the essence of the living individual such that the living individual becomes the substance’s moment of externality. In fact, it is the converse. It is the living individual that is the substance of Objectivity and so it posits Objectivity’s moment of the Concept — ‘but must posit itself as its essence’ — that is identical with it and thereby brings itself into unity with itself.

The above moment is the process whereby the living individual appropriates [anneigt] Objectivity and brings it into identity with itself, i.e. gives its substance to Objectivity. Thus, the living individual returns into itself from Objectivity and determines the latter as an absolute living individual itself. What began as a move outwards towards an other has ended up being a return into itself, ‘in which the living being posits itself as self-identical for-itself’. The consequence of this is that we have resolved the judgement relation with which we began: it has sublated itself into a moment of universality since we now have two self-identical moments of living individuality. The unity of these two moments or species, since they are identical in their determinateness, is the Genus.

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118 Hegel, SL, 771/483.
119 Ibid.
120 Hegel, SL, 772/483.
Before, however, we turn to the \textit{Genus} a word must first be said on the first sentence of the fifth paragraph of the \textit{Life-Process}. Clarifying the aim of this sentence will prepare us to understand the conclusion of the \textit{Genus} in the next section. Hegel writes: ‘The immediate Idea is also the immediate, not the [\textit{für sich}]\textsuperscript{121}, identity of the [Concept] and reality’\textsuperscript{122}. In beginning of \textit{Life}, I drew a three-fold distinction between the terms that Hegel used to describe the first moment of \textit{Life}: one of those terms was the immediate Idea. There, I said that he calls it the immediate Idea so as to refer to a macroscopic view of the section of the Idea. If the Idea is the sphere in which we examine the unity of the \textit{Concept} to \textit{Objectivity}, then, the first moment of the Idea is clearly the immediate Idea. Briefly looking forward, just as with the conclusion of the members, the \textit{living individual} in its reality and the \textit{life-process}, the conclusion of an immediate relation of the \textit{Concept} to \textit{Objectivity} is a mediated one, whereby their identity is such that the \textit{Concept} freely moves within \textit{Objectivity} as itself and with itself. In the conclusion of \textit{Life} the Idea will become the mediated Idea — but we are not there yet.

At the beginning of the \textit{Genus}, then, the logical structure is still the immediate Idea. Because, whilst the moments of the \textit{Genus}, the \textit{living individuals}, are the mediated relation of the \textit{Concept} and \textit{Objectivity}, respectively, they are still only immediately united. In other words, they are only in-themselves united but not yet for-themselves united. As we will see at the end of the \textit{Genus}, it is only once the \textit{living individuals} have become for-themselves that we reach the mediated Idea.

7.4 The \textit{Genus}

The \textit{living individual} determined \textit{Objectivity} with the totality of its determination, making the identity between itself and \textit{Objectivity} explicit in the process. The significance of this move for Hegel is that \textit{Life} does not just develop from the urge of the \textit{Concept} but from the urge of the \textit{Concept} that is identical with \textit{Objectivity}, \textit{i.e.} the Idea.\textsuperscript{123} The \textit{living individual} is the ‘actuality of the Idea’\textsuperscript{124} because it proceeds from externality: it is the external, self-determining activity

\textsuperscript{121} Continuing with my earlier approach, I have altered Miller’s translation of \textit{für sich} from “explicit” to for-itself.

\textsuperscript{122} Hegel, SL, 772/483.

\textsuperscript{123} See: ‘Thus, Hegel writes: ‘as such [the \textit{living individual}] is the actuality of the Idea, in such a manner that now the individual brings itself forth out of actuality’, (Hegel, SL, 772/484).

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
of the living individual with indifferent Objectivity that determines Objectivity as identical and marks the living individual as “actual”.

The actual living individual is, firstly, the genus ‘as identity of itself with its previously indifferent otherness’\(^{125}\). The genus is the moment of universality that has as its moments the simple identity of the living individual with Objectivity. Hegel does not write much more about the universal moment of genus until paragraphs four and five where the universal determination takes centre stage. For now, however, the genus particularises itself since the moments of the living individual and indifferent Objectivity are, in fact, different. The particularisation of the genus is ‘the duplication of the individual’\(^{126}\). This follows from the fact that Objectivity became the Concept for-itself at the end of the Life-Process. Each moment is, therefore, a living individual in its own right. Even though, each side is a presupposition for the other since they are also external to the other living individual and relate to it as such.

Contrary to the beginning of the Life-Process where the lack of explicit identity between the absolute living individual and indifferent Objectivity gave the former the urge to sublate the nullity of the latter, in the particular genus the living individuals are identical with each other and so have the ‘certainty of [themselves]’\(^{127}\). Again, “certainty” is not a claim to perception or self-consciousness, but it is a way to express the identity of the moments. Since they have the certainty of each other, \(i.e.\) are identical, they do not have the urge to sublate their otherness but rather are merely ‘persisting’\(^{128}\). The word bestehender might also be translated as “existing” and it is clear that Hegel is using the word to express the initial equilibrium of the particular genus.

In fact, their urge to sublate their particularity is rooted in their identity. The living individuals are in contradiction with each other because they are both the same totality of universal determination and are self-subsistent as against each other. Thus, they have the urge to sublate their contradiction. Here, the universal genus is also actual since it is the Concept of the living individual — it is its inner determination.\(^{129}\) As such, the urge to sublate each other

\(^{125}\) Hegel, SL, 773/484.
\(^{126}\) Ibid.
\(^{127}\) Hegel, SL, 773/485.
\(^{128}\) Ibid.
\(^{129}\) Compare with Carlson’s more metaphorical explanation for what is going on in the particular genus: ‘If Individual Life is Genus, and if the nature of Individual Life is to sacrifice itself for an other, then Individual Life, as Genus, presupposes there is another Individual Life for whom it should sacrifice itself’, (Carlson, A commentary on Hegel’s Science of Logic, 570). Nowhere is it suggested that self-sacrifice is the reason for why the living individual has the urge to sublate the other living individual. By relying on such metaphorical language Carlson effaces the more important ontological reasons for why the living individual has the urge to sublate the other living individual.
is an inner urge. What is in question is the contradiction that has arisen from the whole
determination of the living individual; in other words, the root of the contradiction is that the
identity of both the living individuals lies in the universal genus.

To realise this urge then, each living individual must posit the other and sublate its
individuality. Since both the living individuals have the urge to posit themselves as universal
and since both are identical to that universality they sublate their individualities and their
particular relation. Thus, ‘their realised identity is the negative unity of the genus that is
reflected into itself out of its diremption. It is thus the individuality of life itself’130. The
particular genus unites into the individual genus but the determination of the individual genus
is that of the universal genus insofar as the determinateness of their urge was to posit
themselves as universals.

In the sixth paragraph Hegel remarks that the individual genus will just fall back into
the universal genus, since the latter is its determination, and that the genus process is merely
trapped in this infinite regress. The downside of this is that it remains in the sphere of
immediacy because we do not made explicit the mediated identity of the universal with the
individual in the individual genus but have instead continued to think of them as detached
immediacies, i.e. the individual genus must become the universal genus, but not that the
individual genus is already the mediation of the universal genus. Hegel explores this
implication in the seventh and last paragraph of the “C. The Genus”. I analyse the brief logical
move that develops the individual genus into the simple universality of the Idea of Cognition.

Hegel writes: ‘The Idea, which as genus is [in-itself], is now [for-itself], in that it has
sublated its particularity which constituted the living species, and has thereby given itself a
reality that is itself simple universality’131. This concisely repeats everything we have analysed
in the Genus so far: the in-itself relation of the living individuals in the particular genus has
developed into a for-itself relation since they are united in their identity. This identity is the
determination of the universal genus which is actual in the individual genus. It is actual or has
a reality because the universal genus concretised itself by determining itself into the individual
genus. Now, since the individual genus is the for-itself relation of the living individual to the
other living individual then it is equally the relation of the universal genus to itself. Thus, the
individual genus, then, is immediately a ‘simple universality’ since its content is self-identical.

130 Hegel, SL, 774/485.
131 Hegel, SL, 774/486.
Hegel goes on to write that this ‘simple universality...is the Idea that relates itself to itself as Idea, the universal that has universality for its determinateness and existence - the Idea of Cognition’\textsuperscript{132}. Each moment of this simple universality is the relation of the Idea to itself because each one is the totality of Life, which, is the immediate Idea. Thus, the immediate Idea relates to the immediate Idea. The determinateness of this universality is the determination of the universal genus that is actualised in the individual genus. This moment is the Idea of Cognition.

7.5 Concluding Remarks

My account of the Idea began with a discussion of the importance that Hegel gives to the Idea. It is true that the Idea is the general structure of reality and that Nature is the Idea that sublates and externalises itself. As Nature, the Idea is no longer in-and-for itself but a self-external and indifferent structure. On the one hand, then, Nature or reality as such, is the Idea, but on the other hand, it is not the Idea that is in-and-for itself. The significance of examining the Idea, then, for my thesis cannot be overstated enough: if the Idea is the logical structure that becomes Nature, then it is essential that we get a firm grasp on the structure and development of the Idea. This begins with Life, and with the peculiar kind of relations between the Concept and Objectivity that develop within Life.

Finally, I should address a recent trend in the scholarship that emphasises the “living” and the “organic” aspect of Hegel’s concepts, indeed, of the entirety of Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel sometimes describes determinations in the SL with organicist language.\textsuperscript{133} This is highlighted by a distinction that Hegel makes between a “dead” determination that does not account for its moment of negativity and a “living” determination that does account for its moment of negativity. Proponents of this view take these modes of description and emphasise “life” and “organics” as an overarching principle of the Hegelian project, especially vis-à-vis

\textsuperscript{132} Hegel, SL, 774/486.
\textsuperscript{133} See, ‘Only when the manifold terms have been driven to the point of contradiction do they become active and lively towards one another, receiving in contradiction the negativity which is the indwelling pulsation of self-movement and spontaneous activity’, (Hegel, SL, 442/78); ‘[The determinations of the Concept] are not inert entities like numbers and lines whose relation does not itself belong to them; they are living movements; the distinguished determinateness of the one side is immediately internal to the other side too. What would be a complete contradiction in the case of numbers and lines is essential to the nature of the [Concept]’, (Hegel, SL, 617/294).
the role of contradiction. This view, for example, has been championed by Hahn who focuses on contradiction in organic entities, and more recently, Karen Ng has sought to push this analogy further by arguing that the ‘concept of life in Hegel’s philosophy…plays a constitutive, systematic role in how he conceives of the activities of reason and thought’. Unfortunately, I cannot agree with Ng on the systematic role that Life is supposed to have on the rest of Hegel’s philosophy. Whilst I think that Hahn is correct to draw on the metaphor of life and organicity as a means of clarifying the role of contradiction in the SL, I think that it is misleading to assign to Life the role of being a principle of the system. Hahn’s suggestion relies on the intuitive appeal of the metaphor to make sense of contradiction in living entities, whilst Ng’s turns a determination of the SL into a governing principle of the whole of the SL. I think that this is mistaken because (a) it undermines the immanent development of the SL and (b) is at odds with the text. Nowhere in Life does Hegel announce that the determination of Life is the well-spring of the SL. It is true that Hegel uses organicist language to describe the dialectic but this is used purely figuratively and not as a veiled attempt to underscore the constitutive role of Life in the SL.

134 See Hahn who gives pure being as an example of a determination of the SL that is supposed to explain the conceptuality of living entities: "The argument in "Being" is meant to be quite general and apply to any living entity that undergoes growth and change. Besides sentient animals and geological examples, Hegel also draws his examples of Being from the spiritual, social, philosophical, and scientific realms, including the Being of God or the Absolute Being (SL 100, 481; EL §86), thinking man (SL 441), life and death, life and self-consciousness (SL 83), Fichte's first originary principle, I = I (EL §86)’, (Hahn, Contradiction in motion, 19, ft.19).

135 Ng, Hegel’s concept of life, 3.

136 On this point I must note that it is not always clear as to whether Hahn thinks that contradiction is a feature of everything in reality or just a feature of living entities. Given that her thesis is concerned with living entities it is entirely reasonable for her to stick to just examples of living things. Nevertheless, this has the unfortunate consequence of seeming as if she assigns ontological contradictoriness to just them. See, for example, ‘Hegel thinks that, if we pay attention to our experience, we'll see that we're confronted by contradictions all the time. He insists that contradiction pervades all natural life-forms, including human life-forms and their aesthetico-cultural and moral forms of expression. We already intuitively experience unity in organic life-forms; now properly philosophical thinking must be brought to see an element of contradiction in every growing, living thing’ (Hahn, Contradiction in motion, 1). I emphasise that I am not claiming that she is guilty of this but merely note that there is the potential for misunderstanding.
8. The Idea of Cognition

The Idea of Cognition is the second chapter of the Idea.¹ In Cognition, the logical moments are the Idea in-itself, i.e. they are the unity of the Concept and Objectivity. Despite what one might expect, however, this is not yet the culmination of the SL. As we have seen, it is the nature of Objectivity to be external to other logical moments, and this basic determination of Objectivity is preserved within the Idea. Thus, the respective unities of the Idea in Cognition are external to each other but are also identical since they are each the Concept in-itself.

Cognition represents the next step in the relation of the Concept to Objectivity, wherein Objectivity is no longer bereft of the Concept but is the Concept in-itself, i.e. the immediate Idea and is now related to another immediate Idea. What distinguishes Cognition from Life, then, is that it is the immediate relation of two immediate Idea whereas Life was the relation of the immediate Idea to indifferent Objectivity. Therefore, it is central to my account of the move to the PN since it represents the moment where the immediate Idea becomes the fully mediated Idea, i.e. the absolute idea. It would be difficult to understand the move to the PN as the self-sublation of the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity specifically without a proper understanding of how the Concept develops further with Objectivity and how the respective immediate Ideas in Cognition because for-themselves in Cognition. It is this development that culminates into the system and, ultimately, as I argue in Chapter 10, justifies why the system proves to be Nature in the final pages of the Absolute Idea.

Aside from the logical development, large portions of the chapter are dedicated to criticisms of traditional accounts of the soul, arithmetic and geometry, and the methodology of the natural sciences. Hegel gives many examples to elucidate the conceptual development of Cognition, many more than what is normal. I have used Hegel’s examples to elucidate the dense dialectical development but have placed these examples in the footnotes for the sake of concision. Where possible, I have cited works in the literature that offer a deeper analysis of these remarks should the reader wish to enquire further. Finally, Cognition is a chapter of the SL that has received little attention in the literature.² The earliest contemporary treatments of

¹ Henceforth, Cognition.
² The classic examinations of Cognition are: See: McTaggart, A commentary on Hegel’s Logic, 287-303; Stace, The philosophy of Hegel, 286-90; Mure, A Study of Hegel’s Logic, 269-89; Findlay, Hegel a re-examination, 256-64; Taylor, Hegel, 334-9; Harris, An interpretation, 282-7. See also, more recently; Martin, Ontologie der Selbstbestimmung, 512-53; Rosen, The idea of Hegel’s Science of Logic, 467-70.
the chapter can be found in Düsing and Hösle,\(^3\) which are not favourable to the inclusion of the Idea of the Good, a chapter that is typically read as relating to moral and practical philosophy, within a project of ontology. More recently, Hegel’s Idea of the True has been treated in Bowman,\(^4\) whilst an engagement of the Idea of the Good with contemporary analytic philosophy of action has been done in Manchisi.\(^5\) Finally, the most recent examination of Cognition as a whole can be found in Siep.\(^6\)

8.1 The Immediate Identity of the Immediate idea

Cognition begins with the simple identity of the Idea with itself. Each moment of the Idea is the unity of the Concept and Objectivity. Moreover, as the Genus has shown, the difference between the Concept and Objectivity has been sublated and they are now a ‘pure self-identity’\(^7\). In other words, there is no real difference between the Concept and Objectivity. Thus, the Concept is ‘for itself’\(^8\) since it is related to itself as itself, without otherness: another way to express this relation is to say that the Concept is free with itself.

The first determination of Cognition is that it is an ‘abstract universality’\(^9\). One would have expected Cognition to be concrete because Objectivity, the moment that has made the Concept concrete, is identical to it. Herein lies a subtle distinction between Objectivity and concreteness that we have not yet encountered: concreteness is given to the Concept by something other than itself. This means that being in-and-for-itself identical with Objectivity does not automatically confer concreteness on the Concept — rather, concreteness is a matter of relationality. Crucially, this means that the Concept cannot concretise itself but must always go outside of itself to become concrete. In this first stage of Cognition, then, the Concept is an abstract universal since it merely relates to itself as itself.

However, the Concept does not merely relate to itself as itself, it has itself as its object, i.e. the Concept has Objectivity as the Concept as its object. Thus, we cannot simply consider

\(^3\) Düsing, Das Problem der Subjektivität; Hösle, Hegels System.
\(^6\) Siep, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 686-734.
\(^7\) Hegel, SL, 775/487.
\(^8\) Ibid.
\(^9\) Ibid.
them as purely self-identical since one side of *Cognition* has the other side for its object. The next step, then, is to make explicit the difference that exists between them. Consequently, the simple moment of abstract universality develops into a judgement in which the ‘Idea is duplicated into the subjective [Concept] whose reality is the [Concept] itself, and into the objective [Concept]’\(^{10}\). A degree of difference has been introduced into abstract universality and this has reconceptualised it as a judgement. The subject of the judgement is the *subjective Concept* and the predicate is the *Objective concept*.

So far, we have examined the first paragraph of *Cognition*.\(^{11}\) From the end of this paragraph up until the three paragraphs before “A. The Idea of the True”\(^{12}\) there follows a remark where Hegel situates himself with respect to competing philosophical conceptions of cognition. Whilst this section is a rich resource for understanding Hegel’s attitude towards this aspect of the history of philosophy it does not bear on the logical development of *Cognition* and so I will pick up the thread of my analysis from the third paragraph before “A. The Idea of the True”.\(^{13}\)

*Cognition* is the judgement relation between the *subjective Concept* and the *Objective concept*.\(^{14}\) Their relation is an immediate one, *i.e.* they are not yet related to each other, and the relation is finite and subjective. The relation is finite for much the same reason for why it is immediate: the *subjective Concept* relates to the *Objective concept* but there is no reciprocal relation. Similarly, it is subjective. Here, “subjective”, refers to the relation of the *subjective Concept* to the *Objective concept*, since the latter is the object of the former it is the *subjective Concept* and, therefore “subjectivity”, that is relating to the *objective Concept*. Note that “subjective” is also a term that implies the finitude of the relation, *i.e.* the relation is “subjective” because it lacks *Objectivity* and must go out of itself and posit the *Objective concept*. The *subjective Concept* that immediately relates to the *Objective concept* in a subjective relation “seeks the true”, which is ‘this identity of the [Concept] itself and reality’\(^{15}\). What is “true”, then, at this stage in the *SL* is the identity of the *Concept* with *Objectivity*, an

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\(^{10}\) Hegel, *SL*, 775/487.

\(^{11}\) Ibid.

\(^{12}\) Hegel, *SL*, 782/496.

\(^{13}\) For a discussion of some of Hegel’s points against traditional rationalist psychological theories, see: Siep, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 687-92.

\(^{14}\) See: ‘While the Idea is indeed the free [Concept] that has itself for object, yet it is immediate, and just because it is immediate it is still the Idea in its subjectivity, and therefore in its finitude in general’, (Hegel, *SL*, 782/496).

\(^{15}\) Hegel, *SL*, 782/497.
identity that is fully mediated and for-itself. The urge towards truth will be the focus of the next section of Cognition: The Idea of the True.

Cognition is the judgement relation of the subjective Concept and the Objective concept: they are in an immediate relation. The subjective Concept relates to the Objective concept because it has the urge to unite with it so as to make itself identical with it. Upon further inspection, however, it becomes clear that the judgement relation is in fact a syllogism. Since the two moments are in fact united through the Concept. Their unity, then, is what joins them and is the middle-term of the syllogism. The one extreme of the syllogism is the subjective Concept that is merely abstract since it is entirely subjective and lacks Objectivity. The other extreme of the syllogism is the Objective concept that is a simple, concrete moment. The subjective Concept, therefore, immediately relates to the Objective concept so as to give its abstract being concreteness as well as to posit the Objective concept as identical with itself and to bring it into truth. Thus, we turn to The Idea of the True.

8.2 The Idea of the True: The Subjective Idea

This section examines what follows from the immediate relation of the subjective Concept to the Objective concept. Hegel begins the section with a new term, the “subjective idea”. Whilst the subjective Concept was the moment that immediately related to the Objective concept, the subjective idea is the subjective Concept that has the urge to posit the Objective Concept. Hegel also ceases to write of the “objective concept” and instead writes of Objectivity, or the “world” and “implicit being”, which are both terms that he typically uses to refer to Objectivity. For the sake of concision I will only use Objectivity.

The section begins with the subjective idea as the urge to posit Objectivity. It is the urge to posit Objectivity because ‘it is the contradiction of the [Concept] to have itself for object

16 Siep characterises “untrue” as ‘nicht nur bloße Entgegensetzungen, sondern auch die Unterscheidung des Erkennens von Gegenständen, an die es sich angleichen sollte’, (Siep, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 692). This is correct, and I would merely add that the “difference between cognition and its objects” is the lack of adequacy or mediation between the Concept and the Objectivity.

17 I think that Schäfer is mistaken when he states: ‘Der Gegenstand erscheint der Subjektivität als das bloß Gegebene’ (Schäfer, “Hegels Ideenlehre und die dialektische Methode”, 250). He does not draw a conceptual distinction between Objectivity as the presupposed world opposing the subjective idea and the given, which as we will see, is the content of Objectivity that the subjective idea gives to itself when it posits Objectivity. Importantly, I do not think that Schäfer has misunderstood the development of the subjective idea since he is clearly aware of the significance of the subjective idea receiving the content from Objectivity; see: Schäfer,
and to be its own reality’. The basis of the urge, then, is the difference that exists within the Concept which is a moment of both the subjective Concept and the objective concept but relates to itself in the latter as an object. This difference is at the core of what the Concept is and so is not a mere difference but a contradiction. The resolution of this contradiction proceeds in two steps. First, the subjective idea sublates its own ‘subjectivity, to make its first, abstract reality into a concrete one and to fill it with the content of the world presupposed by its subjectivity.’

It is the “subjectivity” of the subjective concept that constitutes its relation to Objectivity as merely immediate and is the reason for why the Concept takes itself as its object. The sublation of its own subjectivity, then, is a step towards eliminating this difference. The subjective idea, then, posits Objectivity and in doing so posits its content for-itself. In this first moment of positing, then, the subjective idea has both sublated its subjectivity and given itself the content of Objectivity. This content Hegel calls the given. Second, by positing its own subjectivity in Objectivity, the subjective idea has sought to unify itself with it. Objectivity, however, is indifferent to this posited determination and so does not return the determination to the subjective idea. The result of this first negation is, first, that the subjective idea has the given as its object and has sublated its subjectivity in the process, and second, that Objectivity is in-itself the subjective idea but because of its indifference to determination simply remains as itself. Our attention, then, must turn to the subjective idea that immediately relates to the given, to the content that it has just posited as its own. The first stage of this immediate relation falls under analytic cognition.

“Hegels Ideenlehre und die dialektische Methode”, 251. However, he fails to appreciate the logical distinction between Objectivity and the given by using the concept, the given, to refer both to Objectivity that is opposed to the subjective idea and the content of Objectivity that the subjective idea gives to itself.

18 Hegel, SL, 783/498.
19 ‘Der Mangel oder die für die theoretische Idee konstitutive Nichtentsprechung von Begriff und Objektivität besteht darin, dass solches Erkennen seine Entsprechung zu objektseitigem Sein diesem gegenüber nur als nachgeordnet begreifen kann’, (Martin, “Die Idee als Einheit von Begriff und Objektivität”, 239). Whilst it is true that the Concept is not adequate to Objectivity and this inadequacy is part of why the Concept has the urge to posit Objectivity it is too general to serve as the reason for why the subjective idea has the urge to posit Objectivity. Specifically, the ontological reason for Concept’s urge is that it is a contradiction for the Concept to have itself as its object. For a confirmation of the reading that I have proposed here, see: Siep, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 696.
20 Hegel, SL, 783/498.
21 From the second half of the second paragraph of “A. The Idea of the True” there begins what is essentially a remark concerning the shortfalls of the Kantian ding-an-sich as the really true. This remark continues into the third paragraph after which some sentences Hegel admits that what has passed is ‘an external reflection’ and that we have to consider ‘cognition in its own self in its positive activity’, (Hegel, SL, 785/500). What follows in paragraphs 3-5 is, in my opinion, a continuation of the implications of the remark and a recapitulation of what we have already examined, but not a continuation of the logical development. This is in contrast to Siep’s reading of this section who not only reads the above quoted sections as part of the logical development but as proof that Kant’s “scepticism” ‘immer noch der Hintergrund der Entwicklung ist’, (Siep, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 695). Besides the fact that we disagree over the function of this part of the SL, I fundamentally disagree with his reading because it suggests that the SL is not presuppositionless.
8.2.1 Analytic Cognition

First, analytic cognition is ‘the immediate communication of the [Concept] and does not as yet contain otherness.’ The Concept immediately relates to the given and pervades it with its determination, i.e. its determination is communicated to it. Moreover, since the Concept has communicated its determination to the given it is identical with it. There is, therefore, no real difference between the Concept and the given, such that the given is not really the object of the Concept but is the Concept as object. This structure, however, lacks concreteness because the Concept merely moves within itself as itself in analytic cognition. Importantly, Hegel writes that ‘transition into an other, the connexion of different terms, is excluded from itself and from its activity.’ The Concept does not relate to the given as something that is different to it, none of the terms of the given are distinguished as different to each other, universality is no different to individuality, for example, and so the movement from term to term in analytic cognition is no movement at all. Instead, it is a dynamic stasis, a veritable Sisyphus. However, we must make explicit the inner difference of the given, i.e. that the determinations of the Concept are, in fact, different to each other and comprehend that analytic cognition does involve mediation. We make explicit their difference, then, and develop into synthetic cognition.

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22 For an informative overview of Hegel’s treatment of arithmetic in “a. Analytic cognition” in relation to other instances in the Hegelian corpus, see: Siep, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 697-700.
24 My reading is importantly different from Schäfer’s who claims that analytic cognition ‘emphasises the general features of an object’: Das analytische Erkennen setzt einerseits den konkreten, vereinzelten Gegenstand voraus und hebt nun – in traditioneller Terminologie – allgemeine Merkmale am Gegenstand hervor’, (Schäfer, Hegels Ideenlehre, 251). Here, I think that Schäfer’s analysis is being driven by Hegel’s remarks on analytic cognition in the philosophical tradition rather than by the conceptual significance of analytic cognition, which lies in the abstract identity of the Concept with the given.
26 This, then, is analytic cognition. The irony will not be missed that the Concept, far from liberating itself from being its own object, in its attempt to do so has in fact made it conceptually impossible for it to distinguish itself from its object. Here, there is a criticism of the Kantian turn that sought to think that objects must conform to our cognition, for a brief discussion of this see: Siep, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 697.
27 Schäfer’s examination of analytic cognition and synthetic cognition seems to suggest that he does not think that the latter develops out of the former: ‘Hierbei gehen analytisches und synthetisches Erkennen auf verschiedene Weise vor’, and later writes: ‘Anders geht dagegen das synthetische Erkennen vor’, (Schäfer, Hegels Ideenlehre und die dialektische Methode”, 251). He formulates them as going on “different ways” and introduces synthetic cognition as developing in a way that is contrary to (“Anders geht dagegen”) analytic cognition. Such a reading ignores the immanent development of the SL. I, instead, claim that synthetic cognition immanently develops out of analytic cognition.
8.2.2 Synthetic Cognition

In *synthetic cognition* the moments of the *Concept* are treated as diverse. On the one hand, each moment is identical to each other moment because of their identity as moments of the *Concept*, and on the other hand, each moment is external and indifferent to each other moment because they are in the form of the *given*, *i.e.* *Objectivity*. Thus, their identity with each other is only an inner one, it is only in-itself the *Concept* because the *Concept* has not yet sublated the otherness of *Objectivity* but has merely posited it as being in-itself the *Concept*. Because their identity is only an inner one the relations of the moments of the *Concept* are merely necessary and, as we will see, lack freedom altogether. The first moment of *synthetic cognition* is *definition*.

8.2.3 Definition

The first moment of *synthetic cognition* examines the *given* as the identity of its moments. *Definition* is similar to the moment of *universality*, where we examine the moments as identical. As Hegel writes: ‘Definition, in thus reducing the subject matter to its [*Concept*], strips it of its externalities’.* Here the ‘[*Concept*]’ seems to refer to the *Concept* as *universality*; Hegel is stating that in *definition* the other moments of *universality* are reduced to being identical to *universality*. The moment of *particularity*, which expresses the difference of

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28 Indeed, as Siep states: ‘Es konstituiert zwar sein Objekt als eine Einheit mannigfaltiger Bestimmungen, aber noch nicht als ein sich selbst reflektierendes System dieser Bestimmungen’, (Siep, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 700).

29 Here, I think Siep is mistaken to state that the necessity of the relations between the *synthetic* objects is not an inner one: ‘Entsprechend ist die Notwendigkeit des Beweisens keine innere der Sache’ and he goes on to quote Hegel to support his claim: ‘Das synthetische Erkenne “findet [...] Sätze und Gesetze, und beweist deren Nothwendigkeit, aber nicht als eine Nothwendigkeit der Sache an und für sich selbst, d.i, aus dem Begriffe, sondern des Erkennens, das an den gegebenen Bestimmungen der Unterschieden der Erscheinung fortgeht”(GW 12, 209, 33-36)’, (Siep, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 700). However, in this quote Hegel does not claim that the *synthetic* objects do not have inner necessity because they are not in-and-for themselves but that *synthetic* objects are not in-and-for themselves necessary. Indeed, this is correct. *Pace* Siep, the objects are necessarily related because of their inner identity: ‘The reality it gives itself is the next stage, namely, the stated identity of the different terms as such, an identity therefore that is at the same time still inner and only necessity, not the subjective identity that is for itself’, (Hegel, *SL*, 794/511). The necessity is not yet in-and-for-itself because the external side of the *synthetic* objects has been sublated by the *Concept*.

universality, and the moment of individuality, which is external to the universality, are brought into identity with it.

This is crucially different to analytic cognition, which did not treat the moments of the Concept as different. In definition, on the contrary, it is only because they are different that it is significant that they are reduced to a single identity. Their identity is, however, only in-itself since the Concept, which forms the basis of their identity, is only in-itself related to the given, to Objectivity. Therefore, their external side, the given, bears no weight on their identity and the moments of the Concept are, from this side, only contingently related. Their inner relation to each other is a necessary one, but their external relation to each other is a contingent one. Their external relation is merely contingent because the given is not for-itself the Concept and so is not unified with the Concept.  

31 Rather helpfully, Hegel gives numerous examples for how his analysis of definition relates to three different kinds of objects: 1) artefacts, 2) geometrical objects, 3) concrete objects. The basic problem is that in definition the Concept and Objectivity are merely immediately related to each other. Both have the Concept as their inner, but their respective inner Concept is only in-itself and is not related for-itself, i.e. mediated, by the inner Concept of the other. Turning our minds from the realm of pure thought and to the empirical world, we can represent this conceptual tension in the following way: the world is the Idea in the general sense that I have noted, i.e. it is in-itself the unity of the Concept and Objectivity. In the case of definition, then, we might say that the relation of the Concept to Objectivity is like the relation of the agent to the world when he is investigating the world: by relating to the world as a scientist, let’s say, the agent takes the position of being objective and ridding himself of subjectivity, and relates to the world as equally objective and empty of subjectivity. Thus, both have the Concept only in-itself, since both are implicitly the Concept (for the agent is a rational agent and the world is implicitly the Idea) and relate to each other externally, i.e. each respective inner Concept does not relate to the other inner Concept for-itself. The problem, then, is that since the inner Concept of each is not mediated by the other, their relation is a purely external one and, therefore, contingent. I have set up the initial premiss that prepares us to give examples of what Hegel means by the externality and contingency of definition, I will now look at Hegel’s examples.

First, artefacts. The definition of an artefact does not succumb to the contingency of a merely external relation because ‘the end that they are to serve is a determination created out of the subjective resolve and constituting the essential particularization, the form of the concrete existent thing, which is here the sole concern’, (Hegel, SL, 796/514). If we cast our minds back to Teleology, it will be recalled that the relation of the end to the means involved the former determining the latter with its determination. Thus, when a lumberjack uses an axe to chop some wood, the relation between the lumberjack and the axe is in-and-for-itself because the end has posited itself through the means. Because of this relation of inner identity, it follows that the definition of the axe is easily discovered according to the determination of the lumberjack that uses it: ‘the nature of its material and its other external properties, in so far as they correspond to the end, are contained in its determination; the rest are unessential for it’, (Ibid.). It is essential to the axe that it has a metal head (its material) that is shaped in a curved manner (its external property) since these are necessary for it to be in accordance with its determination. On the other hand, it is irrelevant to the essence of an axe if the colour of the head is red or black, because the colour of the head does not pertain to its concurrence with its determination, i.e. the redness or blackness of the head does not bear on whether the axe is able to perform its function. Note, however, that in the absence of a lumberjack, in the absence of an end whose determination can be known, the determination of the axe would be external to the agent and any attempt at a definition would be between external moments and, therefore, contingent.

Second, geometrical objects. The objects of geometry are similar to artefacts insofar as they are only what they are meant to be’, (Ibid.), i.e. the geometer draws geometrical objects with a presupposed notion of what they are. This presupposition is that they are ‘abstract determinations of space’, (Ibid.), and that their abstraction has ‘lost all further concrete determinations and now too possesses only such shapes and configurations as are posited in it’, (Ibid.). Let us take as an example the first definition of Euclid’s Elements so as to elucidate Hegel’s point: “A point is that which has no part” Now, there are obviously no points in the world that have no parts. Euclid must abstract from the real world to be able to conceive of a point in this way, and it is in this sense that reality

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8.2.4 Division

In *definition*, the determinations of the *Concept* are united through their inner identity as moments of the *Concept*. Their inner relation is, therefore, a necessary one. However, since the *Concept* is not in-and-for itself related with *Objectivity* its relation to it is that of externality and contingency. Now, the moment of *universal*ity, the *definition*, ‘must *particularise* itself’\(^{32}\), in other words, it necessarily develops into the moment of *particularity* as the moment of difference within itself.\(^{33}\) The reason for this is that *definition* is a determinate universality, it has lost its concrete determinations and that what a point is is whatever Euclid posits it to be. It would follow from this that Hegel takes the relation of the geometry to geometrical object to be entirely contingent because their relation is an external one. The abstraction of a geometrical object from reality by the geometer is not done through a relation that is in-and-for itself but through a relation where the *Concept* is, respectively, merely in-itself. Now, Hegel makes the important caveat that with the case of geometry, unlike arithmetic, the posited determinations of the geometrical object ‘run a further course of their own and possess a reality distinct from their [Concept]; but this no longer belongs to the immediate *definition*’, (Hegel, *SL*, 797/515). As we will see in the *theorem*, the third moment of *synthetic cognition*, despite the contingent relation of the geometer to the geometrical object, relations of necessity can be deduced from them and herein lies the highest point of geometry - I will return to this point in the *theorem*.

Third, concrete objects. This can be any object, that does not fall under the above two categorisations of 1) artefacts and 2) geometrical objects, and it is primarily distinguished from them by the fact that it is a thing of ‘many properties’. (Hegel, *SL*, 797/515), and the task of *definition* is: ‘to determine which of the many properties belong to the object as genus, and which as species, and further which among these properties is the essential one; this last point involves the necessity of ascertaining their interrelationship, whether one is already posited with the other. But for this purpose there is so far no other criterion to hand than *existence* itself. The essentiality of the property for the purpose of the definition, in which it is to be posited as a simple, undeveloped determinateness, is its universality’, (Ibid.).

The artefact has its *definition* by virtue of what it has been determined to be by the *end*, the geometrical object has its *definition* by virtue of what has been abstracted from reality and posited as the *definition*, but the concrete object confronts the agent with a great variety of properties and no way to determine which ones are more essential than others. Thus, Blumenbach, who observed that only humans amongst all the animals had earlobes, posited that earlobes were an essential determination of humans, see: (Hegel, *SL*, 798/516). But this decision is an entirely contingent because Blumenbach relates to reality as an external *Objectivity* and is not in-and-for himself united with it: consequently, the identification of the earlobe as the universal element that defines humans, whilst it may be empirically true, bears no connection to the *Concept* of either humans or earlobes. As Hegel writes, ‘it represents nothing but the form determination of the [Concept] in a given content, without the reflection of the [Concept] into itself’. (Hegel, *SL*, 800/519). Hegel's criticisms of such taxonomic endeavours within the natural sciences develop into a fascinating discussion on the distinction between a thing’s *Concept* and its actualisation and the conceptual grounds behind why a thing might be good or bad, with respect to how well it corresponds to its *Concept*. This is clearly related to Hegel’s earlier remarks concerning the *Idea* and reality, which I discussed above, but takes us beyond the remit of this thesis, since the process of actualisation of a particular *Concept* is not quite my concern.

Now, the process of *definition* requires us to move through the other determinations of the *Concept* and to identify them as identical despite this, *i.e.* Blumenbach can make the earlobe the *definition* of the human only once he has considered the numerous particular moments of the human (the nose, fingers, legs) and abstracted from their differences to posit one moment, the earlobe, as their universalising principle. Now, as I said above, the significance of *definition* is that it takes each of the moments of the *Concept* as different and unites them through the inner necessity of the *Concept* despite its differences. Thus, mediation is a presupposition of *definition* and we must now make this mediation explicit whereby we consider the moments of the *Concept* as different and opposed to each other. This is *division*.

\(^{32}\) Hegel, *SL*, 800/519.

\(^{33}\) Here, I am in agreement with Siep: ‘Dieses Besondere unterscheidet sich von anderem und daher hat die Definition einen internen Bezug zur Einteilung’, (Siep, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 706).
is a universal that pervades its moments of particularity, but without making their difference explicit. Thus, mediation is implicit within it and we have now to make that mediation explicit.

We have, then, the moment of division, which is a moment of particular givens that are in opposition to each other. In division the particular givens are related to each other through their inner identity as moments of the Concept and this relation is necessary. However, their external relation is still a contingent one. The relation of the given to another given in division does not consider the determination of each given’s external side. The moments of division relate to each other as external and contingent because they have developed out of the external and contingent relation of definition. In other words, since the relation of the Concept to Objectivity in definition was not in-and-for-itself, it follows that in the moment of division, which is the particularisation of definition, that the Concept and Objectivity will remain external and contingent to each other. What this means in empirical terms is that the ground for division, i.e. the reason given to divide an object according to a principle, is external to the Concept of the object.

The moments of division are merely externally related to each other. However, they both have the Concept in-itself and so both have the inner urge, the necessity, to sublate each other and to unify as a self-negative individual. Importantly, their unity is not based on their external relation but on the identity of their inner Concept. The individual moment that is developed out of this is the theorem.

34 So let’s take one of the current definitions of a parrot: ‘a tropical bird with a curved beak and usually colourful feathers, some of which can be taught to repeat words’, (https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/parrot, accessed on 28/07/2021). Working off this definition, one could go about the world and identify all the different kinds of objects that are parrots. In this example, the definition of what a parrot is is the ‘assumed ground of division’, (Hegel, SL, 804/523), upon which the difference between the objects that are parrots and objects that are not parrots rests. Were the definition of a parrot to be different, ‘if their difference rested on a different consideration’, (Ibid.), then objects that were previously not considered parrots might now be identified as parrots and vice-versa, ‘they would not be co-ordinated on the same level with one another’, (Ibid.). As in definition, the basic problem is that the Concept of a parrot is not in-and-for-itself united with its Objectivity. On the contrary, they are external to each other and, therefore, only contingently related. However, the picture is not too bleak for division. Hegel acknowledges that there are moments in the natural sciences where the conceptual act of division has been carried out well, i.e. where the ‘grounds of division and divisions that, so far as sensuous proper-ties permit, show themselves to be more adequate to the [Concept]’, (Hegel, SL, 805/526). For example, Hegel praises the fact that the teeth and claws of animals, what they use to eat, are used as the criteria through which to classify them, (Hegel, SL, 806/526). Here, he has singled out “assimilation” as an essential moment of the Concept of an animal because it marks the moment of the animal’s individuality, (Ibid.). Hegel does not explain why we should take these grounds as more adequate to the Concept than other grounds, but I suspect that it is related to the development of the animal and the plant in the Organics section of the PN. However, I cannot go into more detail. It suffices to say that in division the moments of the Concept and Objectivity are externally related to each other, and therefore, contingent. Even in the successful case of the definition of the animal, the process by which the natural scientist has come to this conclusion is based on this externality and contingency that is fundamental to the external world.
8.2.5 The Theorem

Now, just as division proceeds from the inner necessity of the Concept, so too is the theorem ‘the transition of particularity into individuality’. The theorem, then, has proceeded from the inner, necessary movement of the Concept and has that inner necessity for its determination. It is the moment of individuality of synthetic cognition and as such is the ‘self-related determinateness, the immanent difference of the object and the relation of the differentiated determinatenesses to one another’. The theorem is the self-related, negative unity of the determinations of the Concept and the given, Objectivity.

The moments of the theorem no longer stand as immediate or opposed to each other but are mediated. This mediation, this self-relation, Hegel calls the proof of the theorem and it expresses the necessity of their self-relation. This is an important point. The transition into the theorem is necessary because of the inner necessity of the Concept but the given was not part of this necessity — it was only externally attached to it. In the theorem, however, the Concept is related to the given as for-itself and their self-relation is necessary and this necessity is the proof of the theorem.

The theorem that has been proven, then, is the self-related negative unity of the Concept and Objectivity. This moment of unity brings the Idea of the True to a close. The Concept has sought the “true” via analytic and synthetic cognition and has, at best, reached necessity but not freedom. At the end of the theorem, the Concept has unified itself for-itself with the given/Objectivity, and so has sublated its immediate relation with the moment of Objectivity that was placed between itself and Objectivity or the presupposed world. The Idea, ‘in so far

35 Hegel, SL, 806/526.
36 Ibid.
38 In Schäfer’s account of why the Idea of the True develops into the Idea of the Good it becomes clear that he reads the entirety of the Idea of the True as being the relation between the Concept and Objectivity, instead of the relation between the Concept and the given. This leads Schäfer to conclude that: ‘Dabei ist zu berücksichtigen, daß erkennende Subjektivität und objektive Welt eigentlich bereits Ideen sind, d.h., eigentlich sind beide bereits Subjekt-Objekt-Einheiten’, (Schäfer, “Hegels Ideenlehre und die dialektische Methode”, 253). This reading puts him in the awkward position of having to explain why Objectivity is not for-itself the Concept despite the fact that at the end of the theorem the Concept is united with Objectivity as an individual. Schäfer’s solution is to claim that Objectivity is in fact the realised Idea but that from the perspective of the Concept is only in-itself the Idea. I think that this reading is mistaken and that we can save ourselves from having to speak about the “perspective” of the Concept by realising that the development of the Idea of the True is between the Concept and the given, where the given is not the presupposed Objectivity but the content of Objectivity that the Concept posited in the subjective idea. As I highlighted throughout my exegesis, the Concept cannot sublate the
as the [Concept] is now explicitly determined in and for itself\textsuperscript{39} is now the Idea of the Good. The present logical structure is the Concept that is in-and-for itself united with Objectivity and the indifferent Objectivity that confronts them: from here begins the development of the Idea of the Good.

8.3 The Idea of the Good

The Idea of the Good did not enjoy a warm reception in the years following Hegel’s death. From Karl Philip Fischer’s omission of it (amongst other chapters of the SL) to,\textsuperscript{40} more recently, Hösle’s criticism of it.\textsuperscript{41} The general criticism being that a metaphysical account of “practical” or “moral” philosophy has no place in the abstract science of the SL — the same kind of critique that is usually levelled at Mechanism, Chemism, and Life.\textsuperscript{42} As I have already stated elsewhere,\textsuperscript{43} I find that these criticisms miss their mark because they are based on assumptions about what a first philosophy should offer. The aim of the SL, however, is to investigate the basic categories of thought and being without such presuppositions guiding our thinking. It is not, therefore, a valid criticism of the SL to state that it presupposes too much when what is claimed to be presupposed is outside of the SL, i.e. “practical” and/or “moral” concerns. That argument should only be made from within the development and I will show that the development of the Idea of the Good is entirely justifiable.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{39} Hegel, SL, 818/541.
\textsuperscript{40} Karl Philip Fisher, Grundzüge des Systems der Philosophie oder Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (Erlangen: Heyder & Zimmer, 1851); Hösle, Hegels System, 250-9. Specifically, Hösle explains the presence of the Idea of the Good by way of Hegel’s historical sensitivities. On the one hand, he is following the Platonic tradition of placing the Good as the highest point in philosophy, see: Hösle, Hegels System, 251, and on the other hand, he is engaging directly with Kant and Fichte’s concerns regarding the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity in practical reason, see: Hösle, Hegels System, 256-9.
\textsuperscript{41} An impressively detailed list of works from 1848 that have engaged negatively with the Idea of the Good is presented in Friedrich Hogemann, “Die ‘Idee des Guten’ in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik,” in Hegel-Studien vol.29 (1994), 79-102.
\textsuperscript{42} Hogemann, “Die ‘Idee des Guten’ in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik”, 93, provides his own response to this criticism and I generally follow the same line.
\textsuperscript{43} See Chapter 2 and the introduction to Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{44} Hogemann provides a clear account of the development of the Idea of the Good, see: (Hogemann, “Die ‘Idee des Guten’ in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik”, 94-6). He also examines earlier occurrences of the “good” in the
Unlike in the *Idea of the True*, Hegel uses no examples in the *Idea of the Good* and is exceedingly brief. Nevertheless, whilst Hegel does not give obvious examples of how the conceptual resources of the *Idea of the Good* might explain specific moral or practical situations, he *does* make remarks that give us a general idea of the concrete implications of the conceptual development. I will draw on these remarks to help elucidate the logical development. Finally, I have divided the section in three sections: the *Good in-itself*, the *Good Will*, and the *Absolute Action*. These subdivisions do not appear in the text, but I think that they clearly represent the three stages of the conceptual development and, in fact, make it easier to follow than in the monolithic way that Hegel presents it in the SL.

8.3.1 The Good in-itself

The *individuality* with which the *Idea of the True* finished is in-and-for-itself the absolute unity of the *Concept* and the *given*. Being “good” is thus the accomplished aim of being “true”, however, as we will see being “good” does not *ipso facto* mean that the moment is “true”. This absolute unity in which the *Concept* is in-and-for-itself with the *given* has led the development from the *Idea of the True* into the *Idea of the Good*, where the *Concept* is no longer merely in-itself the *given* but now has it for-itself and is immediately *Objectivity*.\(^{45}\) What is “good” then is the *Concept* that is in-and-for-itself unified with *Objectivity*.\(^{46}\) Also, as that which is only within itself and is confronted by *Objectivity* the *good* has the urge to posit itself in external actuality. The *good*, then, is 1) the absolute unity of the *Concept* and *Objectivity*, and 2) the urge to posit itself in external actuality. As long as the *good* does not posit *Objectivity*, so long as it does not *particularise* itself, its content is infinite because it is the infinite self-

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Hegelian corpus, see: (Hogemann, “Die ‘Idee des Guten’ in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik”, 82-4) and, at the end of his paper, considers the implications of Hegel’s account in the SL for other accounts in the history of philosophy, see: (Hogemann, “Die ‘Idee des Guten’ in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik”, 96-100) and for the PR, see: (Hogemann, “Die ‘Idee des Guten’ in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik”, 100-2).

\(^{45}\) Or as Hogemann puts it: “Jetzt sagt uns Hegel, was das Gute ist: es ist Bestimmtheit...die in dem Begriff enthalten ist”, (Hogemann, “Die ‘Idee des Guten’ in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik”, 95). Importantly, and Hogemann is aware of this, the *good* is not just “determinateness” [Bestimmtheit] but is the peculiar determinateness of the in-and-for-itself unity of the *Concept* and *Objectivity* as the conclusion of the *Idea of the True*.

\(^{46}\)Indeed, this is not the first time that a logical moment has been said to be “good”. If we cast our minds back to the beginning of the “B. The Life-Process” where the absolute subject that emerged from “A. The Living Individual”: ‘The immediate shape is the Idea in its simple [Concept], objectivity that is conformable to the [Concept]; as such, it is good by nature’, (Hegel, SL, 770/481).
determination of the Concept and Objectivity. Crucially, once it does posit Objectivity its content will become finite.

To give an example of this moment, then, we might imagine a human that has an idea of what is good. Insofar as their idea of what is good is the Idea that is the in-and-for itself the unity of the Concept and Objectivity then the Idea is the good. Let us assume that our human thinks that what is good is to be courageous: that it is good to be courageous is undisputed, since the “goodness” of courage is conceptually buttressed by the in-and-for-itself unity of the Concept and Objectivity. However, whilst the goodness of the action is not dependent on its externality, it is nevertheless a part of its determination to have the urge to externalise itself. Therefore, the goodness of courage exists in the human and as goodness it has the urge to give courage external actuality.

8.3.2 The Good Will

The Concept is the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity. It has as its presupposition the Objectivity that confronts it. Since the Concept is in-and-for itself the absolute unity it is in-and-for-itself “good”. However, it is opposed to the Objectivity that has the shape of ‘non-actuality’\(^{47}\), which means that Objectivity lacks the determination of the Concept or subjectivity. The Concept, therefore, has the urge to realise itself in Objectivity. Crucially, this realisation is not to make the good “good” since it is already “good” by virtue of the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity. It is, rather, to give the good external actuality. Put simply, what is good is “good” in-itself regardless of whether it has been externalised. But this good does not have external actuality, i.e. if the good is not posited in Objectivity it will lack external actuality.\(^{48}\)

The good in-itself is the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity and does not require Objectivity: as the absolute unity, it posits itself and in positing itself immediately relates outwards because of the identity between the good and Objectivity. Whilst the good in-

\(^{47}\) Hegel, SL, 818/542.

\(^{48}\) Hogemann’s formulation on this move is particularly clear: “In diesem Prozeß will es sich aber keine Objektivität geben, - denn alle Objektivität hat es schon bei sich; es kann ihm nur noch darum gehen, die Bestimmungen der objektiven Welt aufzuheben und sich in ihr die Form äußerlicher Wirklichkeit zu geben’ (Hogemann, “Die ‘Idee des Guten’ in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik”, 95).
itself is ‘infinite through the form of the [Concept], whose own determinateness it is’\textsuperscript{49}, it becomes finite in its moment of \textit{particularisation}. The content of the \textit{good} is the in-and-for-itself unity of the \textit{Concept} and \textit{Objectivity}, but it lacks the infinite form of the \textit{Concept}. The \textit{good} that is posited in \textit{Objectivity}, then, does not have the same form as the \textit{good} that was previously merely in-itself. This leads to the subtle distinction between the \textit{good} that is “good” and true in-itself, as we saw above and the \textit{good} that is not yet the realised \textit{good} in its form of \textit{particularity}. It is not yet in-and-for itself because it becomes finite in its \textit{particularisation} and requires the external actuality of \textit{Objectivity} to realise itself.

In its moment of self-determination and \textit{particularisation}, the \textit{Concept} becomes its own \textit{means} for realising its own \textit{end}, \textit{i.e.} the \textit{good} is the \textit{means} for realising itself in \textit{Objectivity}. This moment is the \textit{will}: ‘the end that wills by means of itself to give itself objectivity and to realize itself in the objective world’\textsuperscript{50}. The \textit{will} is the \textit{good} that looks outwards and uses itself as a \textit{means} through which it relates to \textit{Objectivity}, to the external actuality.\textsuperscript{51} The \textit{will} that posits \textit{Objectivity} has the \textit{good} as its determination, and whilst its determination is the infinite unity of the \textit{Concept} and \textit{Objectivity}, its content is finite.\textsuperscript{52} The moment of the \textit{will}, then, posits its determination in \textit{Objectivity} but fails to realise itself in \textit{Objectivity} so long as it remains in a finite relation of \textit{particularity} with it.

What the development of the \textit{will} provides is an account for why the \textit{good} can fail to be realised - if we remain within the purely moral and practical conceptual sphere to which the \textit{Idea of the Good} relates. Let us continue with our human who knows that to be courageous is \textit{good}, and that along with knowing the \textit{good} has the urge to realise the \textit{good} by giving it external actuality. The human, therefore, has the urge to act courageously as a way of realising the goodness of it. The human self-determines and particularises its determination of the \textit{good} — it sees something occurring in the world that might demand courage. The determination of courage is still \textit{good}, but now it is posited in relation to something external from it, say a building on fire. Hegel explains \textit{why} the \textit{good} might fail to actualise itself in externality: ‘good in its concrete existence is not only subject to destruction by external contingency and by evil, but by the collision and conflict of the \textit{good} itself’\textsuperscript{53}. For example, a strong wind (external

\textsuperscript{49} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 819/543.
\textsuperscript{50} Hegel, \textit{SL}, 818/542.
\textsuperscript{51} Siep puts it well when he writes: ‘Der Wille ist aber gerade als Selbstbestimmung immer auch ein besonderer, ein Wille zu einer bestimmten Handlung’, (Siep, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 722).
\textsuperscript{52} See: ‘the good has only attained a contingent, destructible existence, not a realization corresponding to its \textit{Idea}’, (Hegel \textit{SL}, 820/544).
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
contingency) might be fanning the flames of the building on fire, which makes it impossible to put the fire out; or an arsonist (evil) might have used a kind of combustible that is very difficult to extinguish; or, there might be a number of courageous humans eager to realise the good (the collision and conflict of the good), but they might have conflicting ideas for how to realise it and get in each other’s way. Crucially, acting courageously by putting the fire out, the realisation of the good, is not what makes it good: the sheer determination of courage is good in-itself. However, as we have seen, the good is equally its determination to posit itself in external actuality and to realise itself. Objectivity, however, is indifferent and external to the will and the difference in their determinations means that the will does not realise itself in Objectivity as the good. This lack of correspondence is either because of the indifference of Objectivity: contingency, evil, conflicting goals, or the fault of the will itself. Hegel writes: ‘it is only the will itself that stands in the way of the attainment of its goal, for it separates itself from cognition, and external reality for the will does not receive the form of a true being’\textsuperscript{54}. Another way of thinking about the finitude of the good is that it is the good itself that must make itself finite in the form of the will because it has the urge to realise itself in external actuality. The good human, therefore, that wills the good is simultaneously hindered by the inherent limitations of making itself finite and positing an Objectivity that is indifferent and external to its determination of the good.

8.3.3 The Absolute Action

The will posits Objectivity with its determination of the good with the aim of realising the good in external actuality. Now, given the indifference and externality of Objectivity, the determination of the will cannot be automatically taken up by Objectivity, but will be equally determined by Objectivity. Therefore, the determination of the will, the good, will not be realised in Objectivity exactly as when it was merely in-itself. To pick up our example once again, the human’s idea of courage will not be perfectly instantiated in its attempt to be courageous.

There are now two ways that one might think about this failure of realisation. One approach is to focus on the subjectivity of the will, the determination of the good, and continue

\textsuperscript{54} Hegel, SL, 821/545.
to posit Objectivity until it realises the good. However, this approach fails to properly comprehend the positing of Objectivity and merely focuses on the one-sided moment of the good. Instead of focusing on the one-sided determination of the good, we should make explicit the fact that Objectivity has been posited by the determination of the good and that it is no longer an external, indifferent immediacy confronting the good but something that now has the Concept in-and-for-itself. The presupposition is sublated and the Concept enters into a unity with Objectivity. In this unity we have the absolute action, where Objectivity is posited as having a ‘true being’ since it is now in-and-for-itself united with the Concept.

Returning to our example, then, the Idea of the Good is not realised in the perfect realisation of the determination of the good as it exists in-itself, but the good being posited in Objectivity by the will. The human who has the urge to act courageously realises the good in positing the good in the world, regardless of the hindrances that it faces. An act of courage is no less realised because of external hindrances to its perfect realisation and herein lies the importance of Hegel’s notion of the good. The good is realised insofar as it is posited in the world and not insofar as it is perfectly realised in the world.

The Concept is now free in its self-identity with Objectivity and is, therefore, a universal. It is universal because, as a freely self-identical moment it admits no difference within itself. This freely, self-relating moment of universality is the Absolute Idea.

8.4 Concluding Remarks

The development of Cognition has shown us how the relation of the Concept and Objectivity develops from immediacy to absolute mediation. It forms an essential part of the story that I will tell about the move to the PN because it is effected by the self-determination of the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity. Part of the motivation to give the development of Objectivity and the Idea before going into the move to the PN is to underline the dialectical continuity between the moves. The reader will recognise that the self-determination of the absolute idea is a perfectly legitimate move. They will also recognise the cogency of the fact

55 ‘[t]he progress to the spurious infinity, has its sole ground in the fact that in the sublating of that abstract reality this sublating is no less immediately forgotten, or it is forgotten that this reality is in fact already presupposed as an actuality that is intrinsically worthless and not objective’, (Hegel, SL, 822/545).
56 Hegel, SL, 823/548.
that self-determination can also mean self-sublation, as we saw in the development of the subjective idea, and that the self-sublation of subjectivity leads to the negation of subjectivity. Both cases underline a similarity with the move to the PN. The reason why the system determines itself into self-externality is because it sublates its subjectivity through a moment of self-determination and becomes external to itself. The dialectical development of the move into the PN does not require us to do anything different to what we have been doing in our examination of the SL. We have only to attend to the immanent determinations at hand and to keep at bay any presuppositions about how we think things ought to develop.
9. The Absolute Idea

We have reached the Absolute Idea, the final chapter of the SL. The Absolute Idea explores the absolute unity and identity of the Concept and Objectivity through the development of the method. The method culminates in the system, the simple self-relation of itself with itself, which sublates itself into Nature: the final two pages of the Absolute Idea that deal with the move into Nature are examined in Chapter 10. By approaching the Absolute Idea from Objectivity, I have provided an explanation for why we begin this chapter with the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity, the reason for why they have the determinations that they do, and, ultimately, why they develop into Nature. Unlike previous chapters of the SL, the Absolute Idea has attracted a disproportionate amount of scholarly attention, in particular because of its discussion of the “method” of the SL.¹ In this chapter, I engage primarily with Angelica Nuzzo who has written extensively on the chapter.

9.1 The First Determination of the Absolute Idea: the method

Before we consider how the absolute idea is reality, we must first grasp what Hegel thinks the absolute idea to be. All of the determinations of the SL are the absolute idea insofar as the development of the SL is the self-determination of the absolute idea.² Crucially, this does not mean that we can reduce all the determinations of the SL to the absolute idea. The mechanical object is not just the absolute idea because it is a moment in its own right as distinct from the absolute idea. But it is also identical to the absolute idea insofar as its development is the self-determination of the absolute idea. The absolute idea, then, can be a placeholder for the whole of the SL but with the important caveat that the full significance of the SL cannot be grasped

² ‘[It is] the sole subject matter and content of philosophy...it contains all determinateness within it, and its essential nature is to return to itself through its self-determination or particularisation’, (Hegel, SL, 824/549).
by the mere utterance of the word the “absolute idea” but by the development of each moment of the absolute idea.

Hegel goes on to distinguish the logical exposition of the absolute idea from other “modes” \([\text{Weisen}]\) of examining it. Regarding the SL, he writes: ‘The logical Idea is the Idea itself in its pure essence, the Idea enclosed in simple identity within its [Concept] prior to its immediate reflection [\(\text{Scheinen}\)] in a form-determinateness’\(^3\). Within the realm of pure thought, then, the absolute idea is ‘perfectly transparent to itself’\(^4\), the basic point being that thought does not relate to itself as an other but as something that is identical to itself. In contrast, when thought becomes self-external, as in the case of Nature, it relates to itself as something different to itself.\(^5\)

In what precisely does this distinction lie? It has to do with the way that the Concept relates to Objectivity, i.e. it has to do with the adequate exposition of the Idea.\(^6\) Within the realm of pure thought or SL the Concept relates to Objectivity as identical, as an infinite self-relation. However, in Nature, the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity are not in an infinite self-relation because their fundamental determination is self-externality and indifference. The natural Idea, in contrast to the logical Idea, has the form-determination of the Idea sublated within it, but the determinations of the Idea relate to each other as external and indifferent and so they are opposed to each other in the particular relation of content (we have seen the move from infinite form to finite content many times: see, 6.1 and 8.1 for some examples of it).

The logical Idea is the infinite self-relation of the Concept and Objectivity. However, pure thought is not the only mode through which the Idea finds expression: ‘Nature and spirit are in general different modes of presenting its existence, art and religion its different modes

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\(^3\) Hegel, SL, 825/550.

\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^5\) Hegel refers to this relation of difference as a Scheinen - a mode of relation from the Doctrine of Essence. It is beyond the scope of this brief discussion to examine why Hegel might think that the absolute idea as Nature constitutes a Schein relation but the basic point is simple enough. SL or pure thought are the essence of the absolute idea and Nature is an imperfect reflection of the essence of the absolute idea. To take a simplistic example, the reflection of light that a star makes in a lake is a Schein of its essence - there has to be a real star for it to be reflected in the lake and, therefore, the reflection of the star bears a relation to the real star’s essence, however, it is only an imperfect expression of it. Thus, Nature reflects the essence of SL, but SL cannot be understood purely through Nature since Nature imperfectly reflects the essence of SL.

\(^6\) Hegel writes that the ‘logical Idea has itself as the infinite form for its content — form which constitutes the opposite to content to this extent that the content is the form-determination withdrawn into itself and sublated in the identity’, (Ibid.).
of apprehending itself and giving itself an adequate existence. In these modes the Idea is different to how it relates to itself in the SL because the essential determination of Nature, for example, is that of self-externality and indifference and so the Idea relates to itself as finite rather than as infinite. Let us now turn to the development of the absolute Idea.

Cognition concluded with the following statement about the logical structure with which it concludes: ‘an objective world whose inner ground and actual subsistence is the [Concept]. This is the absolute idea. Looking ahead to the first sentence of the Absolute Idea, Hegel writes that, ‘the absolute Idea has shown itself to be the identity of the theoretical and the practical idea’. The identity of the theoretical idea and the practical idea at the end of Cognition, then, develops into the absolute idea, which is the identity of the Concept and Objectivity. The moments of the Concept and Objectivity that are in a relation of identity have sublated within themselves the entirety of what has preceded them, and so are not just the Concept and Objectivity, but the unity of the Concept and Objectivity that has sublated within itself the development of Objectivity and the Idea.

This reading is importantly different from Nuzzo's reading that suggests that the first moment of the absolute idea is the ‘final result’ of the SL and that to understand the absolute idea we must look back to the moments that constitute it. In one sense, Nuzzo is right, the ground of each logical moment is found in the development that preceded it, i.e. the first moment of Life, universal life, has its ground in the development of the realised end in Teleology. However, even though the ground of any logical moment is to be found in the development that leads to it, it is not the case that we must use the preceding development as a means to understand the immanent logical moment. We did not invoke the subjective end, the means, or the realised end, to examine the immanent development of Life: Life developed immanently according to its own determinations. This does not mean that the moments of Teleology are absent from Life, indeed, they play an important descriptive role, but they do

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7 Hegel, SL, 824/549. Here we see the distinction between the Idea and the adequate Idea at work. Nature and Spirit are modes of the Idea that merely show its existence, whereas art and religion are modes of the Idea that show its adequate existence, i.e. modes in which the Concept is in-and-for-itself identical with Objectivity.

8 Hegel, SL, 823/548.

9 Hegel, SL, 824/548.


11 Nuzzo writes: ‘Put in the terms of Hegel's general methodological device: the work of the “progressive further determining” (vorfürwärtsgehendes Weiterbestimmen) of each moment can only be achieved through the process of a “retrogressive grounding” (rückwärtsgehendes Begründen) of the preceding whole’, (Nuzzo, “The idea of 'method' in Hegel's Science of Logic”, 2).

12 For example, in the logic of the members, see: (Hegel, SL, 766/476) Hegel describes the members as the “means” of the living individual to constitute itself, and whilst the invocation of the determination of the
not drive the development further, they are not operational in the development of Life. Indeed, this is not to deny the descriptive role of Cognition in the Absolute Idea, but pace Nuzzo, I do not think that we have to go backwards to understand the absolute idea but must look to its immanent structure instead.

Despite what I have argued, returning to the text, Hegel seems to confirm Nuzzo’s suggestion: ‘The absolute Idea, as the rational [Concept] that in its reality meets only with itself, is by virtue of this immediacy of its objective identity, on the one hand the return to life’¹³. Nuzzo reads this as supporting her aforementioned suggestion for how one should understand the absolute idea.¹⁴ It appears as if Hegel understands the absolute idea as being a return to Life. However, if we look at the dependent clause that follows from the above quote, Hegel writes: ‘but it [the absolute idea] has no less sublated this form of its immediacy, and contains within itself the highest degree of opposition’¹⁵. In matter of fact, then, whilst the immediate identity of the Concept and Objectivity is logically similar to the immediate identity of the Concept and Objectivity that we encountered in Life,¹⁶ it is certainly not a return into Life since to get to this point in the SL we have sublated Life and advanced well beyond it. To make my point one more time, Life is present in the absolute idea insofar as it is sublated within the absolute idea - but this does not reduce the absolute idea to Life, nor is Life one of the definitions of the absolute idea, as Nuzzo claims.¹⁷

As I have argued, we do not have to make logical recourse to Cognition or Life to understand the immanent development of the absolute idea. It is true that they are its necessary, logical predecessors, but they are not necessary to understand its present logical structure. In fact, Hegel has already told us what its logical structure is, it is ‘the rational [Concept] that in its reality meets only with itself [and is the] immediacy of its objective identity’¹⁸, i.e. it is the

¹³ Hegel, SL, 824/549.
¹⁴ ‘Taking an even more regressive step backwards, the second determination of the absolute idea presents the new moment as the dialectical unity of life and cognition (Erkennen), (Nuzzo, “The idea of ‘method’ in Hegel’s Science of Logic”, 2).
¹⁵ Hegel, SL, 824/549.
¹⁶ Hegel, SL, 764/474.
¹⁷ Nuzzo builds on her reading that Life and Cognition are retrogressively definitions of the absolute idea to make a further claim about Hegel’s project and how it compares to Kant’s critical project and other philosophies, see: (Nuzzo, “The idea of ‘method’ in Hegel’s Science of Logic”, 2-4). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage with the implications of our disagreement in the SL on her expanded reading and so I will not engage with it - I limit myself claims made about the SL.
¹⁸ Hegel, SL, 824/549.
identity of the Concept and Objectivity that have sublated within themselves the entirety of what preceded them. Nuzzo identifies this as the third definition of the absolute idea, the third retrogressive definition after the first two definitions of Cognition and Life.\(^9\) I, instead, claim that this is the immanent logical structure of the absolute idea.

The absolute idea, then, is the identity of the Concept and Objectivity - ‘the rational [Concept] that in its reality meets only with itself’\(^{20}\). In this moment of identity, then, the absolute idea is ‘the absolutely universal Idea’\(^{21}\); the absolute idea is a universal moment because its moments, the Concept and Objectivity, are identical with each other. In their identity they relate to each other through their negativity, and this negativity is their form. The form of the absolute idea is the relation of the Concept to Objectivity that admits of no difference. Now that we have made the identity relation of the Concept and Objectivity explicit by referring to their form, we can begin to examine the more precise determination of this moment: this is the method.

9.1.1 The Beginning, der Anfang

The first moment of the method is the beginning. Hegel’s account of the beginning is primarily located in subsection 1 of the Absolute Idea and it is, primarily, in these pages that I will focus my reading.\(^{22}\) Here, and throughout, I am in general agreement with Nuzzo and Houlgate as regards the logical development of the method.\(^{23}\) My account, however, is importantly distinguished from theirs as I place greater emphasis on the development of the method as a continuation of the development of the moments of the Concept and Objectivity, which is fundamental to my thesis.

Before we consider subsection 1, though, Hegel makes some important remarks concerning the method. I have already examined the initial identity of the Concept and Objectivity. Let us now examine it further and consider what it means for the Concept and Objectivity to be identical. Hegel writes, ‘what is to be considered here as method is only the

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\(^{19}\) Nuzzo, “The idea of ‘method’ in Hegel’s Science of Logic”, 5.

\(^{20}\) Hegel, SL, 824/549.


\(^{22}\) Hegel, SL, 827-830/553-556.

movement of the [Concept] itself, the nature of which movement has already been cognised. What we are investigating, then, is the very movement of the Concept itself, i.e. the self-determination of the Concept, or what is the same, the urge [der Trieb] of the Concept to relate outwards so as to relate to itself. It is this movement that we have been investigating, in one form or another, throughout the SL and, thus, it is a movement that we have ‘already...cognised’. The method, then, is the absolute self-relation and self-determining movement of the Concept with Objectivity, or what is the same, with itself. As Hegel writes, ‘the [Concept] is everything, and its movement is the universal absolute activity, the self-determining and self-realising movement’. The first moment of the method is the movement of the Concept with itself. The four sentences that follow in this paragraph are re-iterations of this same point: the method is the ‘unrestrictedly universal’, the ‘absolutely infinite force’, the ‘subjectively self-knowing [Concept], and also the objective manner’.

But what about Objectivity? How is its identity with the Concept different from what was previously examined? Their identity is one in which Objectivity is no longer distinguished from the Concept because it is indifferent to it; now, Objectivity has the self-determining movement of the Concept within itself: ‘an objective world whose inner ground and actual subsistence is the [Concept]’. However, Objectivity is not just the Concept - it is still Objectivity as different to the Concept. The difference is between the Concept as self-movement and Objectivity as self-movement. Note that the difference is no longer between the Concept as self-determining and the Objectivity as only externally determinable. The self-movement of the Concept is the movement of the Concept through itself and therein lies the difference: the difference within the self-movement is the movement of the Concept through Objectivity, or what is the same now, through itself. The self-movement of the Concept is not just this brute, self-identical movement. Rather, it is the movement from itself into itself as the movement from one thing to another, i.e. as the movement from the Concept to Objectivity. This is why Hegel writes that the subject matter is the ‘activity’s own essentiality’, i.e. both have the self-movement of the Concept as their essence. Objectivity exists and is not just subsumed into a ubiquitous Concept. As Hegel writes at the end of the paragraph:

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24 Hegel, SL, 826/551.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.  
28 Hegel, SL, 826/552.  
29 Hegel, SL, 823/548.  
30 Hegel, SL, 827/552.
‘the [Concept] is the middle term only because it has equally the significance of the objectivity, and...the objective does not merely attain an external determinateness by means of the method, but is posited in its identity with the subjective [Concept].’

For Hegel, it is crucial to highlight that the Concept has the “significance of the objectivity”, i.e. we are not just left with the amorphous blob of the Concept before our minds. Equally, Objectivity is not just objective, i.e. external to the Concept, but is now identical to it, ‘posited in its identity with the subjective’. The method is the self-movement of the Concept, which is equally the self-movement of Objectivity. Crucially, Objectivity is no longer indifferent or external to the Concept, as it has been since Mechanism, but is now identical with the self-movement of the Concept. With this preamble made, we are now ready to begin our examination of the beginning.

Why is the first moment of the method the beginning? To answer this question, we must first understand what Hegel means by the beginning. When considering the moment of the beginning we must be careful to distinguish between the beginning of the SL, i.e. pure being, and the beginning as a determination of the SL. Hegel is quite clear on this: ‘Because it is the beginning, its content is an immediate, but an immediate that has the significance and form of abstract universality. Be it otherwise a content of being, or of essence, or of the [Concept].’

The beginning invokes the logical status of “immediacy” and it describes the immediacy of any kind of beginning that can be found throughout the SL. It is not focused on the beginning of the SL but on all beginnings throughout the SL. What we are investigating in the determination of the beginning, as the identity of the self-movement of the Concept and Objectivity, is “immediacy” as such. Hitherto, “immediacy” has been thought of as a determination’s moment of independence, of self-subsistence. But in the method the moment of “immediacy” is not just a moment of independence but a moment of the Concept that is in-itself. I think that this can be clearly seen in the second paragraph of subsection 1, where Hegel describes the beginning as the Concept that is in-itself: ‘the beginning has for the method no other determinateness than that of being simple and universal; this it itself the determinateness

31 Hegel, SL, 827/553.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
by reason of which it is deficient'; ‘the immediate of the beginning must be in its own self deficient and endowed with the urge to carry itself further'; ‘every beginning must be made with the absolute, just as all advance is merely the exposition of it, in so far as its in itself is the [Concept]'. In all these instances it is the immediacy of a beginning that is emphasised; a beginning is still only in-itself the Concept, and not yet for-itself; it has the urge to develop itself further and to unite with itself.

Now that we have clarified that the beginning refers to the logical instances of immediacy in the SL, we can answer why the beginning is the first moment of the method. The method is the self-movement of the Concept and Objectivity in the SL. The first moment of the self-movement of the SL must be the self-movement in its immediacy since it is the first moment of a determination. Now, however, there is the added layer that the moment is not just in its immediacy but is immediacy as such - it is the moment of immediacy that is the first moment of the self-movement of the Concept in the SL. The moment of the beginning, then, is the logical instance of all the moments of a beginning in the SL; each of these moments is an instance of the self-movement of the Concept and, as such, is in-itself the Concept and has the urge to develop further. Thus, the beginning develops into the advance [der Fortgang].

9.1.2 The Advance, der Fortgang

The second moment of the method is the advance. Hegel’s account of the advance is located in the first half of subsection 2. It begins with the following statement: ‘The concrete totality which makes the beginning contains as such within itself the beginning of the advance and development’, thus, as I said above, the beginning has within itself the urge to advance and develop; Hegel goes on, ‘[a]s concrete, it is differentiated within itself'. The beginning of the method, then, makes the difference within itself explicit. The reason for this difference is the self-movement of the Concept, but as self-differentiated it is no longer just an immediacy but the movement outwards from that immediacy. Hegel then refers to a number of moments from the SL that express this kind of self-differentiation: ‘the emergence of real difference,

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34 Hegel, SL, 828/554.
35 Hegel, SL, 829/555.
36 Ibid.
37 Hegel, SL, 830-837/556-565.
38 Hegel, SL, 830/556.
judgement, the process of determining in general. Again, much like in the beginning, I do not think that Hegel is referring to any one moment of self-differentiation in the SL but is considering all instances as instantiated within this first moment of the advance.

From these introductory sentences there follows a long remark on the nature of dialectic, its reception in the history of philosophy, and the proper application of it. I will not examine these paragraphs as they do not contribute to the immanent logical development of the advance. That said, it is clear why Hegel has appended this remark - the moment of self-differentiation and the moment of mediation that is soon to follow are the hallmarks of dialectic. Hegel is underlining the importance of the dialectic to the SL.

Having concluded his remark on the dialectic, Hegel states explicitly what we had already taken as implicit: that the moment of difference in the beginning is the negation of the beginning, it is the first negation. Hegel writes: ‘Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first [...] [and] it is therefore determined as the mediated - contains in general the determination of the first within itself’. The advance, then, is the moment of difference within the beginning that negates itself and produces the first negation of the beginning. This first negation, or the advance, contains within itself the beginning and so is, in fact, the negation of itself. It is the negation of itself because what it was for it to be was the negation of the beginning, but by containing the beginning within itself it is equally the negation of itself. Thus, the advance acts as the mediating term between the beginning and the second negation, the result. Importantly, the negation of the advance is the self-movement of the Concept negating itself - recall that the Concept has the urge to unite with itself. Thus, the advance negates itself and in doing so we have a mediated term that has resulted from this ‘sublation of mediation’. If the beginning is the logical instantiation of all the moments of immediacy that had within themselves the urge to self-differentiate, then the advance is the logical instantiation of all the moments of that very self-differentiation. The advance concludes in a negative unity, the result.

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39 Ibid.
40 Hegel, SL, 830-833/556-561.
41 Hegel, SL, 837/565.
9.1.3 The Result, *das Resultat*

The *result* is the mediated unity that has as its moments the immediacy of the *beginning*, the first negation of the immediacy of the *beginning* by the *advance*, and the second negation of the *advance*. The *result* contains within itself all the stages of development that make up the subject matter of the *SL* because it contains: all the moments of immediacy, all of their moments of self-differentiation that negated the first moment of immediacy, and all the moments of the second negation that negated the first negation and brought the preceding moments into a mediated unity.

The conclusion of this logical development, then, is that the content of the *SL* is now something “deduced and proved”42. We do not merely infer that the movement from an immediate beginning to a mediated unity is correct because we have reached the *absolute idea*, but show that immediacy itself, as a logical moment, necessarily develops into a mediated unity. In the *result*, both the form of the *SL*, as the self-determining movement of the *Concept*, and the content of the *SL*, as the subject matter, *Objectivity*, through which the *Concept* determines itself, are united. In their unity, the *result* ‘as the whole that has withdrawn into and is *identical* with itself, has given itself again the form of *immediacy*’43. The mediated unity of the *result* is immediately an immediacy, a new beginning. Why is that? Because this is precisely what the development of the *method* has shown us - that there is a necessary development from immediacy to mediation and back to immediacy. We do not cease to consider this just because we are at the end of the *SL* and expect to finish - the logical development has shown us that the development cannot stop because it has within itself the urge, the *Concept*, which continues on the path of self-determination. Hegel is quick to deter any ideas that the return into immediacy is a return to the beginning of the *SL* because this would be to ignore the significance of the *result* as the sublated mediation of all that has passed.44 The logical development does not lead backwards but forwards. Forwards to a new determination, a new *beginning*, but not the beginning: ‘As simple self-relation is a universal, and in this universality, the negativity that constituted its dialectic and mediation has also collapsed into simple determinateness which can again be a beginning’45. The negative unity of the *result* immediately develops into a simple

43 Hegel, *SL*, 838/566.
44 ‘It may seem at first sight that this cognition of the result is an analysis of it and therefore must again dissect these determinations and the process by which it has come into being and been examined’, Ibid.
45 Ibid.
determinateness, a self-relating moment of *universalities* the *system*. We have now to look to this final moment of the *SL* before the move into *PN*.

9.1.4 The *System*

According to Hegel, this new simple determinateness of *universalities* is the *system*: ‘The method itself by means of this moment expands itself into a *system*’\(^{46}\). The *system*, then, is the sublated conclusion of the *method* and it is the unity of the form and the content of the *SL*. In short, it is the *SL* in its immediacy and totality. Now, the logical development that follows is not entirely clear, but I think that a line can be traced by focusing on the instances where Hegel writes of something that “expands” [erweitert] or an “expansion” [die Erweiterung]. Interestingly, though, Hegel never mentions the *system* again and doubts may confidently be raised as to whether my focus on the *system* is justified. Whether one wishes to call it the *system* or not Hegel repeatedly refers to the “expansion” of something. I think that this refers to the *system* and that the *system* is the penultimate determination of the *SL*. The moment of *universalities* and immediacy of the *system* then expresses its moment of difference, and finally, the resolution of this difference brings us to Nature. The aim of this section of the chapter is to defend the interpretation that the *system* plays the role that I am suggesting that it does.

After Hegel has introduced the *system* as the moment of *universalities* that immediately proceeds from the *result*, Hegel spends three paragraphs reflecting on this transition.\(^{47}\) I do not think that these three paragraphs advance the dialectic. These three paragraphs make no mention of an “expansion” but, instead, make repeated reference to beginnings and advances and the *method*. Without going through them line by line, I think that it can be fairly asserted that the *system* does not develop in these paragraphs and that instead Hegel is recapitulating the development of the *method*.

It is not until the fourth paragraph that we get an idea of how he thinks that the universal moment of the *system* might develop: ‘This expansion may be regarded as the moment of content, and in the whole as the first premiss; the universal is communicated to the wealth of content, immediately maintained in it’\(^{48}\). Here, “expansion” [die Erweiterung] clearly refers to

\(^{46}\) Hegel, *SL*, 838/567.
\(^{48}\) Hegel, *SL*, 840/569.
the expansion of the result into the system that is quoted above. The system, then, is the moment that contains within itself, in its immediacy, the entire content of the SL. Hegel, then, prepares us for a move from the simple universality of the system to a moment of differentiation by stating that the universal, i.e. the system, communicates its determinateness to its content. In other words, we are making explicit the difference within the system that has hitherto been implicit: it is not just the totality of the system in its immediacy but is also the difference of the system that is the difference of each of the moments of the system, i.e. the content of the system.

Looking to the next step, then, Hegel does not just allude to this moment of communicated determinateness that expresses the moment of difference within the system, but explicitly says so: ‘But the relationship has also its second, negative or dialectical side’49. We are familiar with this by now - the second or negative side is the first negation of the immediacy, which in this case is the negation of the system in its universality. Now, what proceeds from these two illuminating sentences is a long reflection on the different ways that one could think about the SL and the infamous remarks on the SL being a circle of circles.50 It is not until the penultimate paragraph that Hegel picks up the thread of the dialectic, making explicit reference to the system.

In the penultimate paragraph of the SL, Hegel once again returns to talking about the universal moment of the system as the totality of the SL and underlines the point that the development of the SL is the expression of the immediacy of being since in its conclusion the entire SL is a simple self-relation. However, he introduces a nuance. It is not just the immediacy of being but the immediacy of ‘fulfilled being…[of] the [Concept] that comprehends itself’51. The simple self-relation of the SL then is a fully determinate self-relation, it is an immediacy that has within itself the complete development of itself and it is this complete development that is an immediate self-relation. Hegel continues to discuss this theme of a completed systematic exposition of the Idea before concluding with a description of a dialectical step, he writes: ‘Because the pure Idea of cognition is so far confined within subjectivity, it is the urge to sublate this’52. It is without doubt that Hegel is describing the next or, at the very least, a dialectical step. The first question, then, is: Is this “urge to sublate” the same moment of difference as the above-mentioned ‘second, negative or dialectical side’53? I argue that it is. I think that this is the case because of two reasons. 1) Hegel introduces the determination of the

49 Hegel, SL, 840/569.
51 Hegel, SL, 842/572.
52 Hegel, SL, 843/572.
53 Hegel, SL, 840/569.
system as the determination that follows from the method and more specifically, as being the expansion of the SL. If the system comes after the method, then, it must be examined in the SL. Even though Hegel does not refer to the system again, he does refer to the “expansion” [die Erweiterung] of the SL, which I think we should interpret as a reference to the system since it is the sole determination [indeed, the sole noun] to have been described as “expanding” or as an “expansion”. Hegel has introduced a determination that has “to go somewhere” — the system cannot just be introduced and then evaporate into thin air. 2) Since no other determination has been introduced, and since Hegel refers to the moment of negativity within the system, which we have seen is the self-relation of the SL, then it can plausibly be asserted that the urge by subjectivity to sublate itself is that moment of negativity in the self-relating system.

If I am right, however, it is particularly odd that Hegel does not mention this determination again. One possible line of explanation is that whilst Hegel writes “system” only once, he does refer to the entirety of the SL often; he even writes of the ‘systematic exposition’ [Die systematische Ausführung]. These usages then might be metaphors for the system since they all refer to the same thing: the entirety of the SL. This suggestion also finds support in the EL where Hegel refers to the conclusion of the method as ‘the systematic totality which is only one idea’ [Hegel, EL, §243]. However, I think that the best defence for my interpretation is that it makes sense of the various strands that were exposed throughout my exposition. By thinking of the system as the determination that follows the method, I can give an account of the repeated references to “system” and to “expansion” and I can connect these references to a clear dialectical step that follows from them. In the remainder of this section, I explore the self-sublation of the system.

Let us recall some salient points. First, the system has begun its moment of self-differentiation by communicating its determinateness to its content, i.e. the determinateness of the system is that its whole content is contained within its immediacy as system and so it communicates that determinateness to them so as to determine them as the unified moments of itself. Second, the system is the simple unity of the Concept and Objectivity. Hegel has not mentioned these determinations in unison since the development of the method began.

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54 Hegel, SL, 843/572.
55 Hegel, EL, §243. See further, ‘Insofar as this determinacy or the content, with the form, leads itself back to the idea, this idea exhibits itself as the systematic totality which is only one idea, the particular moments of which are in themselves this same idea to the same extent that they bring forth the simple being-for-itself of the idea through the dialectic of the concept’.
56 ‘This expansion may be regarded as the moment of content, and in the whole as the first premiss; the universal is communicated to the wealth of content, immediately maintained in it’, (Hegel, SL, 840/569).
Nevertheless, he not only mentions them suddenly in the final paragraph of the SL, but also assigns to them an important logical role. Indeed, this should not come as a surprise since, after all, the development of the method is the development of the Concept and Objectivity. Let us now look at these final sections.

Hegel tells us that the development of the SL is ‘confined within subjectivity’ and the subject matter of this subjectivity is said to be ‘pure truth’. We can confidently interpret “subjectivity” and “pure truth” as referring to the activity of pure thought in the SL. If we continue to think that the system is the same as the totality of the SL, as I argued above, then the confinement of the SL within subjectivity is equally the confinement of subjectivity within the system. However, what is different in the system is that it is not just another moment in the Idea that shows a kind of relation between the Concept and Objectivity because their difference, by the end of method, has been sublated. There is no longer any minimal difference between the Concept and Objectivity, they are now in an ‘absolute unity’, and so when we think of the system as the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity we are actually thinking of objectified Concept and conceptualised Objectivity or Concept/Objectivity and Objectivity/Concept. They are no longer opposed to each other as the Concept and Objectivity. There is, however, a moment of difference within the universal moment of the system and this is within the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity.

The next step, then, is to locate the source of this difference within the development of the system. If something has the urge to sublate something else it must be in a state of particularity with that something else: the urge to sublate only makes sense when there is something different to a moment that it tries to unite within itself. Because of this, I think that we should locate this moment of difference in the system: the system has differentiated itself and it now has the urge of subjectivity to sublate itself. What is sublating what? The system is sublating itself. The whole system as the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity is essentially the difference between itself and itself: between Concept/Objectivity and Objectivity/Concept. Thus, what is being sublated is the self-relation of the system by the self-relation of the system. This explains why the first moment of the PN is self-externality and not just externality. Externality must be external to something; self-externality is external to itself. If we sublate self-relationality by self-relationality we get negative self-relationality, that which relates to itself but not as itself. That is, self-externality. There is more to say on the move from

57 Hegel, SL, 843/572.
58 Ibid.
59 Hegel, SL, 843/573.
the self-sublation of the self-relating *system* to the *self-external Idea* in the *PN* and I deal with it in the next chapter.
10. The Move from the SL to the PN

The primary aim of this thesis is to give a novel account of the move from the SL into the PN. This is to be achieved in two steps: first, by giving an exegesis of the development of the logical categories from Mechanism to the Absolute Idea, and second, by building on the results of this development to provide an account of the SL-PN relation that has more breadth than is normally afforded to it. There have been many accounts of the SL-PN relation, and it is impossible for me to engage with all of them. I have chosen to engage with works that have as their primary aim to give an account of the SL-PN relation, and thus are more detailed.¹ My account differs from these by beginning with Objectivity, a neglected determination that plays a crucial role in the last six chapters of the SL and, consequently, in the move to the PN. Thus, we approach the SL-PN relation with a greater comprehension of the categories involved by beginning from the emergence of Objectivity and the submergence of the Concept in Mechanism and tracing the gradual re-emergence of the Concept into the Idea, and finally examining the relations that develop between the Concept and Objectivity as they unify in the absolute idea. Consequently, a subsidiary aim of this thesis is to fill a gap in the Anglophone literature by giving a detailed analysis of the logical development, as is the case with some chapters that have been neglected in the literature, (Teleology and the Idea of Cognition), and to give an updated analysis of the logical development, as is the case with other chapters that have been investigated but where I think that the interpreters have missed certain points (Mechanism, Chemism, Life, and the Absolute Idea). The subsidiary aim of this thesis has been completed. In this chapter, I build on the results of the preceding chapters and give my analysis of the move from the SL to the PN. Now, having presided over the gradual unification of the Concept and Objectivity, which finds its fulfilment in the final moment of the absolute idea, the system, one might rightly wonder why Hegel has shown us their unification if only to rupture it once more with the transition into Nature. Indeed, this is precisely the interpretation presented by Wandschneider (2000) and Stone (2005) who claim that the development of Nature is the dialectical

¹ This means that I do not engage directly with interpretations of the SL-PN relation that are found in book-length commentaries on the SL or on the whole of Hegel’s system. One reason for this is that the move into the PN is not a central issue of these works and so is afforded less space and detail than is required. This is not to say that these interpretations are not worth engaging with, they most certainly are, but given the brevity of their accounts in comparison to the breadth of other accounts and limitations of space I can only note their presence here: Pippin, Hegel’s realm of shadows, 319-22; Siep, “Die Lehre vom Begriff”, 766-79; Bowman, Hegel and the metaphysics of absolute negativity, 227-35; Martin, Ontologie der Selbstbestimmung, 608-11; Hartmann, Hegels Logik, 459-61; Hösle, Hegels System, 288; Harris, An interpretation of the Logic of Hegel, 302-6; Taylor, Hegel, 350-1; Findlay, Hegel a re-examination, 267-74; Stace, The philosophy of Hegel, 304-11.
development of thought and matter. However, I wish to present a different view of the development of these determinations into Nature and, consequently, a different view of Nature itself. In this chapter, I will argue that the move into Nature is not followed by a renewed rupture between the *Concept* and *Objectivity*. Rather, Nature is the absolute unity of the *Concept* and *Objectivity* that is external to itself: the *self-external Idea*. Thus, the development of Nature begins with the development of the determination of the *self-external Idea*.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I present views in the literature on the *SL-PN* relation and I outline the fault lines of each interpretation, which will help to give a structure to my own account of the *SL-PN* relation. There are three essential points that concern the *SL-PN* relation:

1) what is the logical reason for why the *SL* develops into the *PN*?
2) what is the relation between the *SL* and the *PN*?
3) how does Hegel’s *PN* develop?

I explain how each view in the literature answers these three questions differently. In the second section, I give my account of the *SL-PN* relation and give my position regarding these three points. Before beginning, however, I will sketch out my view of the *SL-PN* relation. I do this to offer some context for the reader whilst they read through the various accounts of the *SL-PN* relation.

I understand the *SL* to be the development of the determinations of thought and being. Thought is “pure” in the *SL* because it is unconstrained by presuppositions about how it might be or ought to be - we are purely concerned with how it presents itself. Pure thought is not opposed to being or externality, and so the determinations of pure thought should not be taken to be independent of externality, rather, they are always already instantiated in externality in one form or another. Thus, the move into the *PN* is not the move from non-externality to externality, but a continuation of the self-development of the *Idea* into its next moment, that is, self-externality. This move is done entirely from within the resources of the *Idea* and it does not presuppose anything. The move from the *SL* into the *PN* is not the creation of externality out of non-externality, or of matter out of thought, but the making explicit that pure thought is
self-externality: ‘What is recognized in nature is not something other than the idea. It is just that in nature the idea is in the form of externalization’.

I think that there is sufficient textual evidence for this move from the last two paragraphs of the SL, and the bulk of my account for the move from SL into the PN will be supported by those two paragraphs. The move from the SL to the PN is a logical move and, I claim, is no different to any logical move in the SL. Consequently, since Nature is the self-external Idea, I think that the PN develops in the same way as the SL, i.e. dialectically. I think that the development of the PN is the self-development of the Idea: importantly, this self-development is not the inner, ideal self-development of the Idea that is submerged or lost within the externality of space and time as something other to the Idea, but the self-development of externality that is the Idea. It might appear as odd that my discussion of this move should only occupy one chapter, however, my discussion of the move into Nature is the final piece in a long chain of argumentation that begun with the mechanical object. In this chapter, I will engage with the final two pages of the Absolute Idea, (and the first few paragraphs of the PN), which detail the move into the Nature, thus bringing my investigation that began with Mechanism to a close.

A note regarding terminology. In Chapter 9, I argued that we should think of the last determination of the SL as the system. Unfortunately, however, Hegel does not use this word in the final paragraphs of the SL and, instead, refers to either the Concept or the absolute idea. It might be, therefore, confusing for me to use one term, the system, and to quote Hegel using another, the absolute idea. Nevertheless, beyond their superficial differences I do not think that there is a conceptual distinction. I think that is it clear that when Hegel writes the “absolute idea” in the final paragraphs of the SL that he means the entirety of the SL, which is precisely

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2 Hegel, EL, §18. See also: ‘Nature has presented itself as the Idea in the form of otherness. Since therefore the Idea is the negative of itself, or is external to itself Nature is not merely external in relation to this Idea’, (PN, §247); ‘Die Natur hat sich als die Idee in der Form des Andersseyns ergeben. Da in ihr die Idee als das Negative ihrer selbst oder sich äusserlich ist, so ist die Natur nicht nur relativ äusserlich gegen diese Idee, sondern die Aeusserlichkeit macht die Bestimmung aus, in welcher sie als Natur ist’, (Hegel, EL 1817, §193); ‘Die Natur wird hier betrachtet als die verkörperte unmittelbare Idee, sie ist die Idee selbst; die Naturphilosophie ist die Darstellung der Idee selbst in einer concreten Form, in der Form der Äußerlichkeit, hier erscheint die Idee nicht ihrer reinen Freiheit sondern der Form, die Naturphilosophie ist ein concretes Beispiel’, (G. W. F. Hegel, Vorelesungen über die Philosophie der Natur I [Lectures on the Philosophy of Nature I], ed. Wolfgang Bonsiepen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2012), 8; ‘Die Natur ist das Andere der idee, nicht das relativ Andere, sondern an sich selbst das Andere, Äußerliche. Die Idee ist in der Natur als Begrifflosse, als subjektlosse, reale, als Sein überhaupt. Diese Grundbestimmung ist die wahrhafte, die Bestimmung welche von der Idee ausgeht’, (Hegel, Vorelesungen über die Philosophie der Natur I [Lectures on the Philosophy of Nature I], 510).
what I mean by the *system*. Moreover, when Hegel writes the “*Concept*” I think that he is referring to the moment of subjectivity and activity in the *system* (or the *absolute idea*) and not to something different from it. Given their identity, then, it would be simpler if I switched from writing the *system* to the *absolute idea*. However, doing so would underplay the significance of my interpretation. By accounting for the determination of the *system* I can explain potential textual inconsistencies, (see 9.1.4), and tie together sentences referring to the sublation of subjectivity as the commencement of a new sphere into a wider dialectical narrative. Therefore, I shall continue to use the *system* to refer to the final determination of the *SL*; and whenever Hegel writes the *absolute idea* or the *Concept*, I take these terms to be doing the exact same conceptual work.

I now turn to the first section of this chapter where I examine the accounts given in the literature of the *SL-PN* relation and outline their main theses.

### 10.1 Accounts of the *SL-PN* Relation

#### 10.1.1 Nature is not logical - a non-Idealist Nature

For many interpreters it is unpalatable that Hegel’s philosophy might deduce the existence of Nature and, to add insult to metaphysical injury, provide an *a priori* account of Nature, *i.e.* an account of the basic categories of Nature that is not contingent on developments in the natural sciences. One way of avoiding this is to argue that the *PN* is a radically distinct domain from the *SL*. This view is defended by Maker in Chapter 5 of *Philosophy Without Foundations*, and again in two articles, *The Very Idea of Nature*, and *Idealism and Autonomy*. Maker’s view on the *SL-PN* relation is (on the whole) the same throughout these works; for the sake of

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4 Maker, “The very idea of the idea of nature, or why Hegel is not an idealist”.
5 Maker, “Idealism and autonomy”.

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simplicity, I will focus on his most recent article, but I will occasionally draw from the other two if it is required.

Briefly, Maker argues that Hegel’s systematic requirement, which is that the system be ‘an autonomous, self-contained, self-grounding system’\(^6\), demands that the SL, as the realm of autonomous self-determination, is delineated and distinguished from other realms of non-self-determination. The SL or self-determining thought, therefore, is completed at the end of the SL and part of this completeness is that it is distinguished from Nature as a ‘radical other’\(^7\). Maker’s reading is motivated by the desire to avoid the horns of either reading Nature as merely identical to thought,\(^8\) an ontology or Identitätsphilosophie,\(^9\) or as a method that is instrumentally applied to Nature.\(^10\) Therefore, for the SL to be a success it must be complete and self-contained and it must have a radical other against which it can contrast and recognise itself as *the* domain of autonomous self-determination.

The above paragraph outlined Maker’s preliminary concerns regarding the possibility of a philosophy of nature. I will now summarise his reading of the move into the PN (i.e. 1). He begins by underlining that the discussion on the *method* is focused on the “form” of the SL and not the “content”; this distinction is crucial because Hegel distinguishes between the logic as “form” and the content that will be dealt with later as the PN.\(^11\) Maker, next, claims that Hegel’s discussion of dialectic, found in the middle of the *Absolute Idea*, introduces the notion that philosophy moves towards and comprehends the other, thus foregrounding his interpretation of Nature as other to the SL.\(^12\) Maker finds textual support for his reading in Hegel’s pronouncement that the move into the PN is not a transition, *i.e.* according to Maker, if it is not a transition it cannot be a move that occurs logically and so is a move from the SL to something that is other to the SL.\(^13\) The SL thereby maintains its autonomy precisely because the move is not logical.\(^14\) Recall that, for Maker, the autonomy of the SL can only be guaranteed

\(^6\) Maker, “Idealism and autonomy”, 59.
\(^7\) Maker, “Idealism and autonomy”, 69.
\(^8\) Maker, “Idealism and autonomy”, 60.
\(^9\) See Maker, “The very idea of the idea of nature, or why Hegel is not an idealist”, 3. See also: ‘Were Hegel to claim that the *Logic* constitutes a *method* either in the sense that it is implicitly *about* the real as such (an ontology) or in the sense that it constitutes the necessary categories in terms of which the real is to be thought (a transcendental logic), this would be to once again - *and in his own terms illicitly* - reinstate or presuppose without justification just that model of cognition which has come to self-suspension in the *Phenomenology*’, (Maker, *Philosophy without foundations*,114). I disagree with Maker’s comprehension of ontology as a method that can be applied to the real world. As I have argued in Chapter 2, Hegel’s ontology is not applied to the real world but *is* the real world. Therefore, the continuation of his ontology in the PN is not the beginning of an *application* of ontology as a method, but the continuation of the same study of the determinations of thought *and* being.
\(^10\) Maker, “Idealism and autonomy”, 60.
\(^11\) Maker, “Idealism and autonomy”, 64.
\(^12\) Ibid.
\(^13\) Maker, “Idealism and autonomy”, 65.
\(^14\) ‘autonomy [that] is attained through the acknowledgement of an other autonomous domain’, Maker, “Idealism and autonomy”, 65.
by its radical detachment from other domains; the same goes for the PN, which is autonomous precisely because it is radically other to the SL.

Let us now consider how Maker conceives of the SL-PN relation (i.e. 2) and, briefly, how the PN develops (i.e. 3). Maker’s view alters slightly in his 2002 article from Chapter 5 in his 1994 monograph. In the latter, Maker states that if the SL is the realm where ‘pure thought determinacies … evidenced a lack of self-sufficiency or self-stability’\(^{15}\), then the PN as its radical other must exhibit determinacies that are ‘independent and self-sufficient in their determinacy, as external to one another’\(^{16}\). This is in line with Maker’s view that the PN is radically other to the SL. In his 2002 article, however, he grounds this reading in the Zusatz of §244 in the EL,\(^{17}\) where Hegel is reported to have said that the ‘Idea that has Being is Nature’\(^{18}\). The determinacies of the determination of pure being, unlike the Idea have an ‘independent, subsisting character’\(^{19}\), and just as pure being is other to the Idea so too is the PN other to the Idea. Whilst the PN is radically other to the SL and does not develop in a thought-like manner, it can nevertheless be thought about philosophically because it has been conceived as autonomous to pure thought and, therefore, can be treated as it is, in-and-for-itself, and not as a sphere that is subordinated to thought.\(^{20}\)

To summarise, Maker interprets the PN as being radically other to the SL: as not being in any way SL-like or thought-like, but as developing in a philosophically systematic, non-logical manner.\(^{21}\) Maker champions this reading because he wishes to avoid reading Hegel as either claiming that the PN is thought-like or that the PN must proceed by way of an application of the categories of the SL.

I have found Maker’s articulation of the philosophical concerns regarding a philosophy of nature illuminating. I think Maker is correct to wish to avoid reading the PN as being either reducible to thought or an application of thought. However, I disagree with his claim that (a) this is Hegel’s view, and (b) that this suggestion is methodologically coherent. It is telling that Maker is unable to offer textual support for his interpretation that Hegel thinks that the PN is the “radical other” of the SL, indeed, Hegel never says as such.\(^{22}\) Nevertheless, Maker’s

\(^{15}\) Maker, Philosophy without foundations, 118.

\(^{16}\) Maker, Philosophy without foundations, 119.

\(^{17}\) Hegel, EL, §244, Zusatz.


\(^{19}\) Ibid.


\(^{21}\) Unfortunately, Maker does not give an example to illustrate how he thinks that the PN develops.

\(^{22}\) In fact, Hegel says the exact opposite. See, ‘What is recognized in nature is not something other than the idea. It is just that in nature the idea is in the form of externalization’, (Hegel, EL, §18); ‘Nature has presented itself as the Idea in the form of otherness. Since therefore the Idea is the negative of itself, or is external to itself, Nature is not merely external in relation to this Idea…; the truth is rather that externality constitutes the specific character in which Nature, as Nature, exists’, (Hegel, PN, §247). The substantiation of this reading will form the basis of the second part of this chapter; ‘Die Natur ist die Idee in der Form des Anderseins, und damit ist sie Idee in der Form des Außerlichseins von sich selbst. Das Innere ist sofern der Begriff welcher ist in der Form
concerns are worth taking seriously, whether or not they represent Hegel’s views. His fundamental concerns are: 1) the SL must be complete and self-contained if it is to deliver on its promises; 2) the only way to reconcile the necessity for systematic completeness and the existence of the PN is to read the PN as being radically other to the SL. I think that both views are mistaken. I deal with both these issues in the second section of this chapter, where I give my account of the SL-PN relation.

10.1.2 John Burbidge’s Version of a Non-Idealist Nature

Burbidge also has an interpretation of the SL-PN relation that can be found in the conclusion of his monograph, as well as his article, Chemism and Chemistry. The arguments in his article are a condensed version of what can be found in his monograph and so I engage primarily with his monograph.

Burbidge’s interpretation of the SL-PN relation is like Maker’s insofar as he also conceives of the PN as a radical other to SL. His view, however, exhibits some small variations that I will briefly outline. Unlike Maker, Burbidge does not think that the SL is detached from the PN, but he does think that Nature is other than thought. Burbidge is like Maker insofar as he also conceives of the PN as ‘an alien other’ to thought, but is different in that, according to Burbidge, thought can find an inherent “logic” in the PN. Burbidge gives the following reason for why the SL develops into the PN:

‘As soon as thought has in this way self-reflectively identified the nature of its own systematic development, it notices what it is missing. What about a realm that is radically other than thought, that has all the characteristics that thought lacks?’

For Burbidge, then, thought relates to the Nature by presupposing Nature as a radical other. It is not as a logical relation but an external relation whereupon the SL is instrumentally applied to Nature: ‘While doing so, however, it retains instruments it can continue to use. For in the

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23 Burbidge, Real process, 202-12.
24 Burbidge, “Chemism and chemistry”, 3-17.
25 Burbidge, Real process, 208.
26 Since I am not investigating the actual development of the PN, but only the conceptual reasons for the move into Nature and the conceptual structure of the SL-PN relation, I will not consider the concrete reading of Chemical Process in the PN that Burbidge provides in his study.
27 Burbidge, Real process, 205.
course of its own development concepts have emerged with which it can describe what this possible other would be like. Like Maker, then, Burbidge’s strategy for the derivation of Nature is for the SL to posit that which is radically other to itself, i.e. non-thought. Unlike Maker, however, who wants to avoid a notion of the SL-PN relation that sees the SL applied to Nature, Burbidge sees this approach as being the most fruitful. In thinking about Nature, then, the philosopher of Nature can use all the categories from the SL that have been securely deduced as a means of “finding” an inherent “logic” to Nature. Crucially, for Burbidge, this process will always be conditional on discoveries made by the natural sciences, so the task of a philosophy of Nature is to find the inherent “logic” of discoveries made by scientists. Thus, when a new discovery is made, the inherent “logic” of the old discovery is no longer valid and a new inherent “logic” must be discerned.

Thus, for Burbidge, Nature is radically other to SL, it is not thought-like. However, thought can apply its categories to Nature as a means of discerning an inherent “logic” within Nature. This inherent “logic”, however, lacks the necessity of pure thought or SL, and is contingent upon the discoveries made by natural scientists.

I disagree with Burbidge’s notion of Nature as a radical other to the SL and with his suggestion that a philosophy of Nature can securely proceed by the external application of logical categories. For, as Burbidge accepts, such a philosophy of Nature does not deduce necessary relations of natural categories, but only contingent ones. However, Hegel repeatedly states that the development of the PN is a necessary development that is not conditioned by the contingent discoveries of the natural sciences.

10.1.3 Nature is logical - an Idealist Nature

The antithesis of Maker’s position is defended by Halper. Even though Halper’s position is the same throughout these two works, his 2002 article is more detailed and so I refer primarily to that. I am interested in Halper’s position regarding the three points of the SL-PN relation:

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28 Ibid.
30 I have already argued against this point in Chapter 2. See also, ‘It has already been mentioned that, in the progress of philosophical knowledge, we must not only give an account of the object as determined by its [Concept], but we must also name the empirical appearance corresponding to it, and we must show that the appearance does, in fact, correspond to its Notion. However, this is not an appeal to experience in regard to the necessity of the content’, (Hegel, PN, §246. R); ‘Nature is to be regarded as a system of stages, one arising necessarily from the other and being the proximate truth of the stage from which it results: but it is not generated naturally out of the other but only in the inner Idea which constitutes the ground of Nature’, (Hegel, PN, §249).
31 Halper, “The logic of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature: nature, space and time”, Halper, “The idealism of Hegel’s system”.

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1) what is the logical reason for why the SL develops into the PN?
2) what is the relation between the SL and the PN?
3) how does the PN develop?

Unlike Maker, Halper extends the idealist project of the SL into the Realphilosophie, and maintains that the PN, indeed the whole Realphilosophie, does not generate new categories but new compounds of the categories from the SL that follow the sequence of the SL. What is fascinating about Halper’s interpretation is that he is sensitive to the same concerns surrounding the completeness of the SL as Maker but deals with the problem by idealising Nature. Halper avoids the concerns regarding completeness by claiming that the “new” categories of the PN are not new categories per se but only compounds of existing categories. For example, the first moment of the PN, the self-externality of the Idea, is not a new logical moment but a compound of the absolute Idea + pure being: the next determination is the absolute Idea + pure nothing, and so on and so forth until the conclusion of the system in absolute spirit, which is the absolute Idea + the absolute Idea. In this manner, the SL remains complete because there are not any new categories, but only variations of the old ones.

Let us now consider Halper’s account of the move into Nature. Halper fastens onto Hegel’s allusions that the end of the SL is a return to a kind of being, ‘The method is the pure [Concept]that relates itself only to itself; it is therefore the simple self-relation that is being. But now it is also fulfilled being’ and tries to explain why Hegel would describe the absolute idea as being “only like itself” and a “simple self-relation”. He does this in two steps: first, he suggests that since the absolute idea is “simple self-relation” that it is being, but second, that the absolute idea cannot be literally reverted to being since it is the totality of the SL and so the only way to make sense of this is to understand that the absolute idea is related to being. Halper’s first point, then, is that as a “simple self-relation” the absolute idea is the form of being: being emerges because it is expressive of the absolute idea’s form, but crucially, is not

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32 See W. T. Stace for a much earlier defence of an idealist reading of the PN. Stace is wary of the difficulties posed by the interpretation that Hegel deduces matter from thought. Instead, he argues, all Hegel does is to deduce thoughts from thoughts: ‘If Hegel appears to deduce nature from the Idea, what he actually deduces in not nature itself, in the absurd sense supposed, but the thought of nature. If, within the philosophy of nature he seems to deduce animals from plants, what he is really doing is to deduce the thought of “animal” from the thought of “plant”. […] Everywhere, throughout the entire system, he is concerned solely with thoughts, and there is nowhere any attempt to do anything except deduce one thought from another’, (Stace, The philosophy of Hegel, 298). Stace is right to be concerned about the deduction of matter from thought but this is not a problem that Hegel has to contend with at the end of the SL. The speculative identity of thought and being is guaranteed from the start of the SL and so the move into the PN is not a deduction of matter from thought, but the deduction of a further determination of this speculative identity.
33 Hegel, SL, 842/572.
34 Halper, “The idealism of Hegel’s system”, 35.
the same as the *absolute idea*. So, in what sense are they related? Halper’s second point is that we can only make sense of their relation by comprehending that *being* is appended externally onto the *absolute idea*: ‘Since all the logical categories belong to the content of the Absolute Idea, the Being that it recovers must, in some way, stand outside this content as an additional determination that remains distinct from the content of Absolute Idea’\(^\text{36}\). This external relation however, *absolute Idea + being*, unlike other logical developments, does not generate new categories since, according to Halper, the completeness of the *absolute idea* makes it indifferent to determination.\(^\text{37}\) Incidentally, it is the imperviousness of the *absolute idea* to further determination that means that Nature begins with externality and indifference.\(^\text{38}\) The unity of the *absolute idea + being* is Nature. Nature develops because *being* is inadequate to the *absolute idea*: it is inadequate because the *absolute idea* recognises *being* as a moment of itself, but as the simplest moment of the *absolute idea*. Halper does not explicitly state the logical reasoning behind the move from the *absolute Idea + being* to the *absolute idea + nothing*,\(^\text{39}\) but the point seems to be that the *absolute idea* continues to determine the external determination (*being, nothing, etc.*) until it finally becomes adequate to itself, the *absolute idea + the absolute idea*. Thus, for Halper, the development of the *Realphilosophie* is a recapitulation of the *SL*.\(^\text{40}\)

Therefore, for Halper, Nature is idealistic insofar as it is identical with thought or the *SL*. Halper’s strategy for maintaining the completeness of the *SL* in the face of a further system is to claim that there are not any new categories in the next system but only reformulations of the same logical categories.

Much like Maker’s articulation of the problem, I have found Halper’s attempts to square the circle of the completeness of the *SL* and the continuation of the system in the *PN* provoking. Particularly, Halper’s suggestion for how this might be achieved is unique in the literature. However, I disagree with Halper on a number of points. First, I disagree, on textual grounds, with the notion that Nature progresses in the fashion suggested by Halper, *i.e.* *absolute idea + being, absolute idea + nothing*, etc. There is no textual support for such a reading. Second, I think that the notion that the *absolute idea* can be related to a determination like *being* and remain undetermined by it is antithetical to the Hegelian notion of dialectic. Finally, I think that the Halper’s concerns regarding the completeness of the *SL* can be reasonably dealt with without requiring us to turn the *PN* into a mere recapitulation of the *SL*.

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\(^\text{36}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{38}\) Halper, “The idealism of Hegel’s system”, 38.
\(^\text{40}\) Halper, “The idealism of Hegel’s system”, 36. For a diagram of this see, pp.38-46.
We have looked at Maker, who claims that Nature is a radical other to the SL and that it develops entirely unlike thought; Burbidge, who similarly argues in favour of the radical otherness of the PN, but unlike Maker thinks that the categories of the SL can be applied to the PN so as to reveal the inner “logic” of a temporary scientific discovery; and Halper, who claims that the PN is entirely ideal, and that there are not any new categories in the PN but only variations of the categories that we have already seen in the SL. I would now like to introduce a third position: Dieter Wandschneider’s notion of the objective-idealistic concept of Nature. This view is articulated in numerous places, but finds its most recent exposition in Wandschneider. For the sake of simplicity, I focus on just this paper.

I begin with his account of the move into the PN (i.e. 1). Wandschneider’s view is that at the end of the SL the ‘law of dialectics’ does not end but continues, and since the SL is the realm of ‘conceptual interrelation’ it must posit the other of itself which is the realm of ‘separateness’, i.e. the non-ideal. Thus, Wandschneider explains the move into the PN by making negativity a principle of the SL instead of giving a reason that is based on the immanent determination of the final determination of the SL. Now, even though Nature is the non-ideal, the other of SL, it is still in a relation to SL since it is posited as other by SL: ‘it remains dialectically connected to the Ideal’. Thus, pace Maker and Burbidge, the concept of Nature is the negative relation of the ideal and the non-ideal and it develops dialectically out of the SL (i.e. 2).

Wandschneider is much more in the idealist camp of interpretations of the PN. But unlike Halper, he thinks that the PN develops with its own, new categories. Let us look closer at how Wandschneider conceives of this development (i.e. 3). He states: ‘Separateness is the manner in which the Being-of-nature appears, but the essence that underlies it is the Logical-
ideal, through which it remains implicitly determined.” The SL or the Idea, then, remains the inner dialectical “engine” of the PN and relates to the PN as externality and separateness. This relation ultimately concludes with the unified ideality of the idea and externality, i.e. the making explicit the PN’s inner ideal moment. It is important to stress that, for Wandschneider, the Idea and Nature are distinct moments: SL is ideal and logical whilst Nature is non-ideal and non-logical. Thus, the PN is the development of the unity of the categorial and the concrete, which form the ‘internal connection of natural phenomena’, and not merely the development of natural, i.e. non-categorial, processes.

Finally, that way that Wandschneider conceives of the relationship between philosophy and the natural sciences illuminates how he conceives of the development of the PN. If the concept of Nature is the dialectical unity of the ideal and the non-ideal, the activity of doing a philosophy of nature is then the activity of matching logical categories to natural categories. The philosopher of Nature must identify affinities between logical and natural categories if they are to think about Nature concretely. However, this is a double-edged sword because any affinity between logical and natural categories is only a ‘possibility’. To take an example that Wandschneider uses to make this point:

‘If an organism, for instance, is to be understood as a real system in a real environment system-theoretical aspects must also be considered […]. Such empirical borrowings are indeed unavoidable if we are to clarify under what concrete empirical conditions something like 'self-preservation' can be realized in an empirical world’

Matching-up logical-natural categories to their empirical counterparts, then, is mired in possibility and approximation, but is indispensable if the a priori deduction of these categories is to be actualised and concretised in any meaningful sense, i.e. for the philosopher of nature to be engage with and contribute to the development of natural science.

Wandschneider’s view is close to mine in three respects: we agree that the PN develops in dialectical continuity from the SL, that the categories of Nature are new logical categories,
and that Nature aims at ideality or self-determination. I disagree with him, however, on the reasons he gives for the move into the *PN* and the conceptualisation of Nature. The move into the *PN* is not explained according to reasons that are immanent to the determination at hand but because of the general principle of dialectic. Whilst Wandschneider’s point is comprehensible, given the discussion Hegel has on dialectic in the *Absolute Idea*, I think that immanent reasons must be provided to explain a logical move rather than a general appeal to the negativity of the dialectic. Regarding the conceptualisation of Nature, Wandschneider takes Nature to be the dialectical development of the ideal and the non-ideal, but I think that this is to create too sharp an opposition. I argue that Nature is the *SL* in its moment of self-externality and self-externality and that the dialectical development is driven by the tension in the *Idea* as self-externality. *Pace* Wandschneider, then, the dialectic of Nature is not driven by the opposition between the ideal and the non-ideal, but by the tension of the *Idea* in its self-externality, *i.e.* the tension that is inherent in Nature *tout court*.

### 10.1.5 Alison Stone’s Version of Nature as *SL* + Matter

Alison Stone’s monograph continues to stand as one of the most impressive defences of Hegel’s *PN*.\(^1\) It might seem odd that a book-length treatment of the *PN* should not receive its own section. However, Stone’s treatment of the *PN* deals with many issues that are not concerns of this thesis. She tackles topics such as the superiority and importance of Hegel’s *PN* in relation to the natural sciences, and the possible ethical implications of the *PN*. I am solely concerned with:

1) how Stone understands the move from *SL* to the *PN*?
2) how Stone understands the concept of PN?
3) how Stone conceptualises the development of the *PN*?

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\(^1\) Stone, *Petrified intelligence*. 
Beginning with Stone’s account of the move from the *SL* to the *PN* (i.e. 1). Stone does not give a close-textual analysis of the final paragraphs of the *SL*, but instead draws together several different threads to present her interpretation of the move to the *PN*. She begins by clarifying how she understands the *Idea*: ‘The idea signifies rationality that manifests itself comprehensively within ontological structures, rather than existing in contradistinction to them’\(^52\). This is a subtle aspect of Stone’s reading that must be highlighted: she continuously talks of the *Idea* or rationality as “manifesting itself” or “transforming itself” into reality or matter: ‘the ontological structures that compose reality become material when their indwelling rationality entirely abandons them’\(^53\), and a few lines further down, ‘it remains hard to understand how it is possible for ontological structures that are initially non-material to become transformed into matter’\(^54\). For Stone, then, the *Idea* transforms itself into something that it is not, *i.e.* matter: there is a distinction between the *Idea*, the ideal, and matter, the non-ideal.\(^55\)

Now, let us consider how Stone understands the concept of Nature (*i.e.* 2). As I mentioned above, the *Idea* is not externality but external to externality. Stone writes that at the conclusion of the *PN* that ‘Nature has also overcome matter’s antagonism to thought’\(^56\), and when theorising about the beginning of the *PN* that, ‘[Nature’s] initial state of externality is contradictory, because externality is in some sense conceptual just insofar as it is entirely material and antithetical to conceptuality’\(^57\). In both cases the *Idea* or the “conceptual” is in tension with externality or the non-ideal, in other words, the *Idea* is external to externality. It is in this sense that Stone’s view is like Wandschneider’s: both conceive of Nature as the negative unity between the ideal and the non-ideal or the conceptual and the material. Whereas I conceive of the *Idea* as self-externality, as Nature, Stone conceives of Nature as the opposition between *Idea* and matter.

\(^{52}\) Stone, *Petrified intelligence*, 99.

\(^{53}\) Stone, *Petrified intelligence*, 100.

\(^{54}\) Ibid.

\(^{55}\) A consequence of this interpretation is that thought, or the *SL*, must ‘primarily exist without any concrete instantiation’, (Stone, *Petrified intelligence*, 128), a reading that leads Stone to conclude that the *SL-PN* relation, as Hegel presents it, is unsuccessful because it posits the existence of non-material ontological structures. I disagree that the *SL* posits the existence of ontological structures that exist prior to material instantiation - I think that Stone is confusing the methodological development of the *SL* with the ontological claim of the *SL*. It is true that materiality does not figure in the *SL*, but this is not because the *SL* exist prior to the *PN*. This is because the *SL* begins without presuppositions and develops immanently, and matter is not posited in the *SL* until the *PN*. But this is a methodological point and not, necessarily, a point about how things are. In fact, as I argued in Chapter 2, if we begin the *SL* with the speculative identity of thought and being then we do not have to give an account of how thought becomes matter because the opposition that is presupposed by that transformation is eschewed from the start.

\(^{56}\) Stone, *Petrified intelligence*, 52.

\(^{57}\) Stone, *Petrified intelligence*, 36.
Finally, Stone’s view regarding the development of the PN (i.e.3). Stone argues that each natural form has an internal contradiction and that the development of the PN is the resolution of this internal contradiction, the internal contradiction being between the SL and matter.\(^{58}\) This development is rationally necessary and all natural forms exist because they are rationally necessary.\(^{59}\) I am in partial agreement with this picture of the development of Nature. Where I disagree, however, is in the identity of the moments of the internal contradiction and the conceptualisation of its resolution: I think that the contradiction is the contradiction of the Idea in its self-externality and that its resolution is its self-resolution.

10.2 My Account of the move to Nature

In the preceding section I outlined the central points of some of the key interpretations of the SL-PN relation. I examined the non-idealist position (Maker and Burbidge), the idealist position (Halper) and the ideal+non-ideal position (Wandschneider and Stone). I will now present my reading. I proceed by clarifying my position on the same three points that guided my exposition of the above interpretations.

1) What is Hegel’s account of the move from the SL to the PN?
2) How does Hegel understand the PN?
3) How does the PN develop?

There are a lot of sources that one could use. Aside from the SL and the PN, the relevant published material include the EL as well as the 1817 EL and the 1827 EL. However, I think that the account of the move to the PN in the EL is too simplistic and, in parts, unclear and that a more detailed and coherent account can be found in the SL. I discuss the shortcomings of the EL in 10.2.5. There are also the unpublished materials, such as the lectures on the Philosophy of Nature (1819/20, 1821/22, 1823/24, 1825/26, and 1828). I think that precedence should always be given to the published materials and so my account focuses on the SL and the PN. However, I do include references to the lectures in the footnotes when they corroborate what

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\(^{58}\) Stone, Petrified intelligence, 61.

\(^{59}\) Stone, Petrified intelligence, 64.
is said in the published materials. With these disclaimers made, I proceed to give my account of the SL-PN relation.

10.2.1 The Move to Nature according to the SL (1816)

10.2.1.1 The Penultimate Paragraph of the SL

In this section I go through the final two paragraphs of the SL to give my account of the move into Nature from the resources available in the SL. It is in the SL where we find the most detailed accounts of the developments between logical moments and whilst many commentators use the EL to give their account of the move to the PN I argue that preference should be given to the SL. My aim is to tease out the sentences that I think are particularly pertinent to understand why and how the system develops into Nature and to give my account of it. I concluded Chapter 9 with an analysis of the system and the immanent moment of difference that develops therefrom. I recapitulate the salient points before expanding on them.

First, the SL is complete and the examination of the determinations of pure thought has come to an end with the system (‘the systematic exposition is itself a realisation of the Idea’). Looking forward to the PN, then, we do not investigate further determinations of pure thought; nevertheless, this does not mean that what we investigate is entirely divorced from thought. In

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60 For example, see: Even though Pippin also quotes from the SL, his interpretation of the move into the PN is heavily coloured by the language from the EL, ‘The idea itself as nature, and nature as the reflection or Widerschein of the idea, is obviously what poses the difficulty for any commentator. This makes the point that in any investigation of nature or spirit there must be an a priori element reflecting the basic structure or moments of the logic of being and the logic of essence, but inflected in a way the reflects the domains of nature and spirit’, (Pippin, Hegel’s realm of shadows, 321). This notion of the PN being the Widerschein of the Idea is absent from the SL and it is not entirely clear how we should interpret it. I discuss this in 10.2.5.

61 It is worth reminding ourselves of what Hegel writes in the penultimate paragraph of the SL: ‘this idea is still logical, it is enclosed within pure thought, and is the science only of the divine [Concept]. True, the systematic exposition is itself a realisation of the Idea but confined within the same sphere. Because the pure Idea of cognition is so far confined within subjectivity, it is the urge to sublate this, and pure truth as the last result becomes also the beginning of another sphere and science. It only remains here to indicate this transition’, (Hegel, SL, 843/572).

62 Ibid.
fact, as I will argue, and following Houlgate, the PN is a continued investigation into the categories of thought insofar as Nature is knowable and rationally ordered.

Second, the system develops into the PN because it has the urge to sublate itself and this sublation results in the beginning of a new sphere, i.e. Nature. Self-sublation, then, is critical to understanding why the SL develops into the PN. The reason for this self-sublation lies in the difference immanent to the system. According to my interpretation, the system is the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity and it is this unity that is ‘communicated to the wealth of content’, i.e. the system itself or simply the SL. In this moment of self-relation, however, there is an implicit moment of difference and it leads to self-sublation. By emphasising this moment of the self-sublation of subjectivity I also account for why Hegel writes, towards the end of the final paragraph, that the first determination of the PN exists ‘without the moment of subjectivity’. If one does not explain the move into the PN as the self-sublation of the system, as the self-sublation of self-relation, then it is unclear how one would explain the absence of subjectivity in the PN from within the resources of the SL. The absence of subjectivity must be an immanently determined moment of the PN, it cannot be assumed, and I think that my suggestion for how we should read the moment of difference in the system provides us with an immanent reason for why there is no subjectivity in the PN. Simply put, subjectivity is the self-relation of the system and once the system has self-sublated its self-relation, it has sublated its subjectivity, thereby making the first determination of Nature entirely non-subjective.

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63 See Houlgate, ‘The other thing that becomes apparent from Hegel’s circuitous logical derivation of nature is that nature is essentially rational. This is necessarily the case because nature is simply the immediate existence of the self-determining reason or “Idea” that being proves to be. The claim that nature is rational is thus not one that is asserted arbitrarily by Hegel, but one that he can claim to have proven at the close of the Logic’, (Houlgate, An introduction to Hegel, 108).

64 Thus, I think that Schelling is mistaken when he claims that the PN is opposed to the logical: ‘it must completely leave the position within logical science which it still had as just the result of logical science and go over into the unlogical world, indeed into the world which is opposed to what is logical. This world which is opposed to what is logical is nature; but this nature is no longer a priori nature, for a priori nature would have had to be in the Logic’, (Schelling, History of modern philosophy, 153). I also think that Schelling is misled to oppose an a priori development of Nature to the a priori development in the SL. Just because the SL gives us the fundamental determinations of thought and being it does not mean that everything is reducible to those determinations. In fact, as the move into the PN demonstrates, the determinations of the PN are just as fundamental as the determinations of the SL. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between the spheres that are investigated in the SL and the PN. Namely, that the SL is the sphere of pure thought whereas the PN is the sphere of the self-externality of thought.

65 Recall: ‘This expansion…[is]…the moment of content, and in the whole as the first premiss; the universal is communicated to the wealth of content, immediately maintained in it. But the relationship has also its second, negative or dialectical side’, (Hegel, SL, 840/569).

66 Hegel, SL, 843/573.
The activity of thought, then, having completed itself within its sphere of pure thought has a moment of negativity immanent to it. This point is particularly pertinent to interpreters such as Maker and Halper who claim that the negativity or dialectic that has been discovered to be the self-movement of thought stops being an ontological fact at the end of the SL.\textsuperscript{67} I explore the question of the SL’s completeness in the next subsection.

10.2.1.2 The SL and the Question of Completeness

There is no doubt that the SL ends. The absolute idea is the point where we have examined all the categories of pure thought that there are and can go no further within pure thought. The question now is: how do we understand the completeness of the SL? We have already seen that for Maker and Halper the completeness of the SL means that a logical deduction of Nature is incoherent.\textsuperscript{68} Both scholars go on to present views of the SL-PN relation that are, I claim, thoroughly un-Hegelian because both read completeness as “closed”. It is true that the SL is closed insofar as there are no new logical determinations in the PN. Nevertheless, I do not think that the completeness of the SL means the closure of the SL and I think that there are two good reasons for not thinking so.

First, it is a presupposition that completeness necessarily entails closure. One of the central tenets of the SL is presuppositionlessness, which both Halper and Maker praise and are eager to preserve; presuppositionlessness means that we should cast aside all our preconceptions about thought and being. It is a presupposition of thought that for a system to be complete it must be closed. In fact, as the SL shows us, a system can be both complete and open. Consider, for a moment, an example: Mechanism is a chapter that is complete insofar as all mechanical relations are contained within Mechanism and nowhere else in the SL. Nevertheless, despite its completeness, even though we can point to its beginning and to its

\textsuperscript{67} Even though Halper does think that the dialectic continues into the PN it is not dialectic as what we have understood in the SL. Halper’s notion of dialectic in the PN ignores immanence and sublation, in short, it is an entirely formal dialectic that merely appears dialectical because of the development of the categories of the PN. Proper dialectic, however, means that the development from one determination to another is born out of the immanent determination of the former.

\textsuperscript{68} So how can a philosophy that unequivocally rejects a role for the given and claims to generate all its determinacies from within nonetheless attend to the worlds of nature and spirit as found beyond the system?”, (Maker, “Idealism and autonomy”, 60); ‘Because Absolute Idea returns, as it were, to the beginning of the categorial development, logic constitutes a closed system. The puzzle is how there can be additional parts to the system’, (Halper, “The Idealism of Hegel’s system”, 21).
end, Mechanism is conceptually related Syllogism, as the section that leads into it, and Chemism, as the section into which it leads. In the former it is related to Syllogism as containing within itself the determinations of Syllogism, and in the latter, it is related to Chemism since it logically leads into it. Indeed, if we conceptualise the SL as a system of interrelated categories that are sublated as the development proceeds, Mechanism is ontologically complete and related to every determination that came before it. From this microcosmic perspective, then, the SL has already shown us that a logical “system” can be both complete and open.

However, Halper and Maker might argue that the completeness of Mechanism is not comparable to the completeness of the SL since the latter is the entirety of the system of pure thought, of which the former is but a moment. Mechanism continued from the examination of a determination of pure thought to a determination of pure thought - the move into the PN, instead, exhibits no such continuity. If this is right, we are comparing apples to oranges. In fact, I agree with Halper and Maker: the move from Mechanism to Chemism is different to the move from SL to the PN. But, I think, it is only different in degree and not in kind, which brings me to my second reason. Whilst it is true that the move from the SL to the PN is different insofar as it is a move from sphere to sphere, it is nevertheless generated by the same dialectical necessity that generates the SL.69 Hitherto, I have located the dialectical necessity in the self-sublation of the system. This is only the first part of the story. In the next section I examine why the self-sublation of the system necessarily leads to Nature.

10.2.1.3 The Final Paragraph of the SL

The final paragraph of the SL begins thus:

‘The Idea, namely in positing itself as absolute unity of the pure [Concept] and its reality and thus contracting itself into the immediacy of being, is the totality in this form - nature’70

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70 Hegel, SL, 843/573.
The first part of this sentence re-affirms that the conclusion of the SL is the ‘absolute unity of the pure [Concept] and its reality [i.e. Objectivity]’. These two moments are absolutely united because they are absolutely identical - the Concept is with itself as itself in its unity with Objectivity. From this unity, as we saw, there develops an immanent difference within the self-identical self-relation of the system. Thus, the system relates to itself as system and posits itself as different in this self-relation, i.e. it has the urge to sublate itself. Hegel uses the Idea as a synonym for the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity, which he referred to above as the completed systematic exposition, i.e. the system. Hitherto, I think that this paragraph re-affirms the moment of negativity in the system or the self-sublation of subjectivity.

Now, a moment of negativity, self-sublation, or self-positing, must be followed by a moment that reconciles this difference. The system has sublated its determination of self-relation and so what should logically follow from this moment of difference is a moment of immediacy. I think that this is what is captured by the last part of the above excerpt. Where the determination of the system was the expansion, the conclusion of the system is the contraction. The moment of contraction expresses the dialectical reconciliation of the moment of difference within the self-relation of the system. This moment of immediacy can also be tied together with the notion that it is a result of the self-sublation of the self-relation of the system: if self-relation sublates itself then it has also sublated all kind of mediation, and if the result of this self-sublation of self-relation is self-externality, then this moment of self-externality must be an immediacy. This reading is partially in tension with the reading proposed by Houlgate. Houlgate’s account of the move into the PN does not accommodate the point that the system ‘is the urge to sublate’ and its subjectivity or the notion that the system posits itself. These moments are crucial to my reading of the move into the PN as they set up the moment of difference within the system that is ultimately sublated and that leads to the PN. Instead, Houlgate’s account locates the reason for the move into the PN in the immediate, self-relation of the Idea and it is because of this immediate self-relationality that it immediately contracts itself into Nature. I agree with Houlgate that this moment of self-relation is an important

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71 It is an important aspect of Houlgate’s reading that the SL’s object of study is “being”. Thus, when Hegel writes at the end of the SL that the Idea is now “fulfilled being” Houlgate understands it as “being”, i.e. the object of study, in which the Idea is fully self-determined. Moreover, Houlgate interprets references to “Nature as being” as referring to the fact that Nature has proven itself to be a constituent part of the study of being, i.e. philosophy. See: Houlgate, An introduction to Hegel, 108-10.

72 Hegel, SL, 843/575.

73 See Houlgate, ‘In so far as it [the Idea] is purely self-relating, it is always and only itself, always and only what it is. Accordingly, the Idea is not just being that determines itself and develops in a certain manner, but also being that is immediately itself, being that simply is what it is. In this way, Hegel argues, the Idea
aspect of the logical development into the PN. I also agree with Houlgate that the advent of self-externality is explained by the loss of ‘the very character that defines it as self-determining reason’, i.e. self-relationality. However, I think that his account misses the moment of immanent difference in the self-relating system that self-sublates and contracts itself into the immediacy of the PN. If we follow Houlgate, it is unclear why sheer self-relationality needs to lead to a new determination — let alone self-externality — because it is unclear what the reason is for the self-relating Idea to contract itself into an immediacy that is Nature. In contrast, I think that my account makes use of important textual points that play a role in explaining the origin of that negativity and the reason why it is sublated.

It is in this paragraph, too, that Hegel introduces the infamous “non-transition” of the move into the PN. Unlike previous developments in the SL the move into the PN is not a move from something to something other to it, rather it is the Idea’s movement within itself. Indeed, the importance of underlining the self-sublation of the system is highlighted by the fact that the move into the PN is a self-movement: ‘there is no longer any immediate determination that is not equally posited and itself [Concept]’. I have highlighted the occurrence of such a self-movement that is not a transition in earlier moments of the SL, and in all cases the common denominator is that there is a moment of self-movement without an other. Here, too, in the move into the PN the self-sublation of the self-relation of the system is a movement that occurs entirely within itself and the immediacy that results because of it is the immediacy of just this self-movement.

Clarifying the reasons for why the move into the PN is not a transition also helps to explain the language of “freedom” that suddenly floods the text. This is also one of the aspects of the transition that has attracted most attention. Most notably, Schelling, who finds the language of “free release” [frei entläßt] as an unsatisfactory way for Hegel to make sense of the move into the PN. According to Schelling, the Concept cannot take the decision to release itself into Nature because only that which really exists can take a decision. The central issue

75 Hegel, SL, 843/573.
76 For example, in the move from universality to particularity, see: (Hegel, SL:605/279), and in the moment of the subjective end, see: (Hegel, SL:740/445).
77 Schelling goes so far as to say that ”[it] is one of the strangest, most ambiguous and thus also timid expressions behind which this philosophy retreats at difficult points”, (Schelling, History of modern philosophy, 155).
78 ‘Besides, anyone who was still able to doubt that the Idea at the end of the Logic was meant as the really existing Idea would now have to convince themselves of this fact; for that which is supposed freely to decide must be something which really exists, something that is just a concept cannot decide’, (Ibid.).
with Schelling’s interpretation is that it places the weight of dialectical necessity on this language of free release. I do not think that the thrust of the dialectical necessity that leads us into the PN is found in these wordings; it has already taken place a few sentences before and with much more clarity. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the language of freedom is important to the move into the PN but I think that it is descriptive rather than operational. In other words, I think that it is a way of describing the self-movement of the system rather than giving a reason for it. The movement of the system, or the Idea, or the Concept, they all mean the same thing in this case, is a movement from itself to itself. The talk of “free release” and “resolve” are not ways of smuggling in a practical explanation for why the SL becomes Nature. Because this movement does not involve a relation to an other it is not a transition and, what is effectively the same thing, it is a free movement. “Freedom”, then, is expressed in the moment of self-relation regardless of where that self-relation leads. Interestingly, it is the absolute freedom of this system that leads to its development into a sphere of un-freedom, of contingency and necessity.

10.2.1.4 The problem of EL §244

The interpretation that I have defended of the move to the PN is based entirely on the account given in the SL. One might also look at the account given in the EL since it is the last published material by Hegel that outlines the move to the PN. Indeed, given that the second part of the SL was published in 1816 and the third edition of the EL was published in 1830, it is not entirely

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79 It is worth pointing out that Schelling makes no reference to the moments of the system that I have emphasised as crucial to understanding the dialectical necessity of the move into the PN.

80 Thus, I agree with Houlgate who argues that ‘Hegel’s talk of free “resolve” in this context should be regarded as metaphorical: the move to nature is in fact the impersonal, logical process whereby the Idea determines itself to be nature’, (Houlgate, An introduction to Hegel, 110).

81 For example: ‘the pure Idea in which the determinateness or reality of the [Concept] is itself raised into [Concept], is an absolute liberation; ‘in this freedom, therefore, no transition takes place’; ‘the Idea freely releases itself in its absolute self-assurance and inner poise’, (Hegel, SL, 843/573).

82 Pippin is a recent defender of such a view: ‘Of course, we cannot understand this very well without studying what this looks like in the two other parts of the Encyclopedia, but the phrase “resolves to release freely from itself” suggests a practical dimension underlying the Logic’s movement that we discussed in chapter 7 and that surfaces here as a result of the Logic’s own self-consciousness about its proper subject matter, an incompleteness captured so mysteriously in our title, the realm of shadows’, (Pippin, Hegel’s realm of shadows, 321).

83 See Khurana who correctly equates the freedom of the move into the PN with the study of Nature as it is for itself and not as it is for us: ‘Die Naturphilosophie beginnt also nicht mit der Präsupposition von subjektivem Sinn, den sie in der Natur sorgsam versteckt, um ihn dann Schritt für Schritt wieder zu bergen, sondern überlässt die Nature – zumindest dem Anspruch nach – zunächst sich selbst und stellt sich so gerade der Herausforderung aus der Natur in all ihrer Zufälligkeit und Äußerlichkeit und Ungerechtetheit dennoch die Idee wiederzugewinnen’, (Khurana, Das Leben der Freiheit, 307).
misguided to think that Hegel might have improved upon his earlier formulation of the move into the PN in the 1830 EL. However, I do not find this line convincing. It is well known that the EL was designed to function as a propaedeutic to the SL for Hegel’s students, sacrificing the detail of the SL for ease of comprehension. That said, given that the EL is one of the few published materials that we have of Hegel’s mature philosophy I will say a few words on it.

What is most odd about §244 is that it gives an entirely different account of the move to the PN. There is no mention of the self-relation of the system, or of the urge of subjectivity to sublate itself, or of the self-positing of the absolute idea, or of the contraction of the absolute idea into the immediacy of Nature — terms that are central to my interpretation. Instead, Hegel writes that the Idea intuits itself and as intuting is Nature, and that the intuting Idea is posited by external reflection as immediate. These two terms, “intuiting” and “external reflection” are odd as they express functions that are normally considered as being external to the SL. “Intuition”, for example, is the empirical activity of consciousness, and “external reflection” is an act of thinking that occurs outside of the SL.

If one were to go through Hegel’s usage of these terms, one would find plenty of textual evidence that supports the point that the contents gained from “intuition” and “external reflection” are different to the examination of the determinations of thought and being in the SL. On first glance, then, we are left with two unpalatable conclusions. Either Hegel is endorsing a non-immanent explanation for the development of the SL to the PN, or Hegel is using a non-immanent explanation for the development of the SL to the PN because it is easier for his students to understand. If the former, then this poses a serious threat to my interpretation, and if the latter, then the EL must be uncomfortably set to one side.

There is, however, a third option. Careful analysis of the instances that Hegel uses the term “intuition” [Anschauung], and its many inflections, reveals that he uses it in three senses.

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84 Regarding Mechanism, compare what Hegel writes in the SL (718-721/419-422) to the EL (§195 – §196), and regarding Life, compare the SL (764-765) to the EL (§216).

85 ‘The idea, which is for itself, considered in terms of this, its unity with itself, is the process of intuiting [Anschauen] and the idea insofar as it intuits is nature. As intuiting, however, the idea is posited by external reflection in a one-sided determination of immediacy or negation. Yet the absolute freedom of the idea is that it does not merely pass over into life or let life shine in itself as finite knowing, but instead, in the absolute truth of itself, resolves to release freely from itself the moment of its particularity or the first determining and otherness, the immediate idea, as its reflection [Widerschein], itself as nature’, (Hegel, SL, §244).

86 For example, see: ‘Philosophy, if it would be science, cannot, as I have remarked elsewhere, borrow its method from a subordinate science like mathematics, any more than it can remain satisfied with categorical assurances of inner intuition, or employ arguments based on grounds adduced by external reflection’, (Hegel, SL, 27/16); and see: ‘Given that the determinacies of feeling, intuition, desire, volition, etc., insofar as we are conscious of them, are usually called representations, it can be said quite generally that philosophy replaces representations with thoughts and categories, but more specifically with concepts’, (Hegel, EL, §3, R.)

The first, and by far most prevalent, is as a mode of consciousness — the empirical reception of content. The second, rather uncommonly, is used idiomatically as, for example, “to make something evident”.\footnote{See: ‘was, um anschaulich gemacht zu werden, einer weitläufigeren Exposition bedürfte, als hier gegeben werden könnte; aber das Nötige kommt späterhin beim umgekehrten Verhältnis vor’, (Hegel, SL/\textit{WL} \textit{1}, 184/208).} The third, and the one that I will be concerned with, is intuition as intellectual intuition that Hegel equates with pure thinking, \textit{i.e.} the activity of the SL. Hegel does not often make this comparison but there are two instances where he is undoubtedly equating intellectual intuition with pure thought. In the section, “With what must Science begin?”, Hegel considers numerous approaches to first philosophy amongst which one of them is the notion of intellectual intuition. Hegel understands intellectual intuition as the thinking of God that includes all being within itself, \textit{i.e.} it is not just the subjective, inner side, of a thinking subject but of a thinking that includes objective reality.\footnote{‘True, intellectual intuition is the forcible rejection of mediation and the ratiocinative, external reflection; but what it enunciates above and beyond simple immediacy is something concrete, something which contains within itself diverse determinations’, (Hegel, \textit{SL}, 77/78).} This is precisely how Hegel thinks of his philosophy. Philosophy is not just the subjective, inner side, of a thinking subject but is the speculative identity of thought and being (see 2.1). Thus, whenever Hegel writes of intuition as \textit{intellectual} intuition, he explicitly connects it with his philosophy. The important point of similarity being that both intellectual intuition and his philosophy include thought and reality within their determination.\footnote{For example, see: ‘If, therefore, in the expression of the absolute, or eternal, or God (and God has the absolutely undisputed right that the beginning be made with him)-if in the intuition or thought of these there is \textit{implied} more than pure being-then this \textit{more} must make its \textit{appearance} in our knowing only as something \textit{thought}, not as something imagined or figurately conceived; let what is present in intuition or figurate conception be as rich as it may, the determination which \textit{first} emerges in knowing is simple, for only in what is simple is there nothing more than the pure beginning; only the immediate is simple, \textit{for only in the immediate has no advance yet been made from a \textit{one} to an \textit{other}’; (Hegel, \textit{SL}, 78/79); ‘Pure \textit{intuiting}, moreover, is altogether the same as pure thinking. Initially, 'intuiting' and 'believing' express the specific representations that we connect with these words in ordinary consciousness. In this respect they differ, of course, from thinking, and this difference is intelligible to just about everybody. But believing and intuiting are now supposed to be taken in a higher sense as well, as believing in God, as intellectually, intuiting God; in other words, we are supposed to abstract precisely from what constitutes the difference of thinking from intuiting, from believing’, (Hegel, \textit{EL}, §63, R.).} If we follow \textit{this} usage, then the first sentence of \textsection 244 becomes less mysterious: ‘The idea, which is \textit{for itself, considered} in terms of this, its \textit{unity} with itself, \textit{is} the \textit{process of intuiting} [\textit{Anschauen}] and the idea insofar as it intuits is \textit{nature}’\footnote{Hegel, \textit{EL}, §244.}. In other words, “The Idea, which is \textit{for itself, considered} in terms of this, its \textit{unity} with itself, \textit{is} the \textit{process of thinking} and the idea insofar as it thinks is \textit{nature}”. This is a more palatable interpretation because the movement of the \textit{system} into Nature is indeed the movement of thought or the movement of its process of thinking. I note, however, that whilst this resolves
the original issue regarding the possible role of empirical intuition in the move to the PN, it
does not give us a reason for why the move to the PN happens. Stating that the movement of
the Idea is the movement of thought does not explain how and why this movement specifically
results in Nature. But we should recall that the EL is only a propaedeutic and that it does not
provide us with the same level of detail as the SL — we should be content with the fact that the
text does not contradict what is found in the SL. But what of “external reflection”? How are we
to explain the inclusion of “external reflection” in the move to the PN?

I think that the most fruitful approach to explaining the sudden inclusion of “external
reflection” in §244 is to interpret it as referring to the logical determination of external
reflection from the Doctrine of Essence.\footnote{Hegel, SL, 402/28. I say that the inclusion of “external reflection” is sudden because it is only used twice, as far as I can tell, in the EL: Hegel, SL, §214, R., §244.} Without going into the details of external
reflection,\footnote{For a clear discussion of this determination, see: Houlgate, Essence, Reflection, and Immediacy in Hegel’s Science of Logic, 145-7.} the aspect of external reflection that is most pertinent to explaining its usage in
§244 is that it presupposes a being that has genuine immediacy.\footnote{See: ‘External reflection therefore presupposes a being, first, not in the sense that its immediacy is only positedness or a moment, but, on the contrary, that this immediacy is self-relation and the determinateness is only a moment’, (Hegel, SL, 403/28).} External reflection posits
itself and, in doing so, presupposes an immediacy that stands outside of it. This bears striking
resemblance to what Hegel writes in the second sentence of §244: ‘As intuiting, however, the
idea is posited by external reflection in a one-sided determination of immediacy or negation.'\footnote{Hegel, EL, §244.}

There is a difference, however. In the EL, Hegel does not write that external reflection posits
itself but that it posits the intuiting Idea — as if it were outside of it or other to it. This is
peculiar because in external reflection it is an act of self-positing that leads to the immediacy
that is outside of the moment of external reflection. One might gloss over this apparent
incoherence by suggesting that the positing of external reflection must be a self-positing
because the totality of the system, i.e. the intuiting Idea, was shown to be self-relating. This is,
indeed, plausible, but the lack of textual evidence might leave some unconvinced.

I would also like to point out a third term that Hegel uses in the final sentence that might be
cause for confusion: ‘the immediate idea, as its reflection [Widerschein], itself as nature.'\footnote{Hegel, EL, §244.} Since the translators included the original German in their translation of Widerschein as
“reflection”, I think that we can confidently assert that they are aware of a potential
misunderstanding and do not intend to translate Widerschein as the logical determination of
reflection but, instead, as metaphorical reflection. Hegel never uses the term Widerschein as a
synonym for the determination of reflection and so one should be tentative about interpreting this rare appearance as embodying that determination. Instead, I think that we should read it metaphorically — as a way to express the fact that Nature is a mode of the Idea’s being.

All in all, §244 is an exceedingly odd paragraph. Terms such as “intuition”, “external reflection” and “Widerschein” stand out as uncommon terms and one is left baffled as to why Hegel would use such terms to explain this tricky move. I have managed to make sense of his use of “intuition” and have offered a plausible reading for “external reflection”. Nevertheless, even with these clarifications, the move to the PN as presented in §244 leaves much to be desired. It does not provide us with a specific reason as to why the intuiting Idea develops into Nature, it simply asserts that the Idea that intuits itself is Nature. In the SL, however, we know the determination of the system, we know precisely why the system sublates itself, and because of this we know why the determination of Nature is the self-external Idea. It is because of the richness of the SL in comparison to the dearth of detail in the EL that I focus my account of the move into the PN on the former text.

The movement from the SL to the PN, then, is an entirely logical move. The reasons for it (i.e. 1) what is the logical reason for why the SL develops into the PN?) can be discerned in the immanent determination of the system, and the first determination of the PN can be made sense of through those immanent determinations. The self-sublation of the self-relation of the system is the free movement from the absolute mediation of the system to the immediacy of the PN. The first determination of the PN, then, is the Idea in its self-externality (i.e. 2) How does Hegel understand the PN?). Crucially, this determination contains within it the entirety of the system which has been sublated. Thus, the PN does not begin afresh, as a given, but forms part of the dialectical development of the determinations of thought and being. In the final section

97 Indeed, as far as I can tell it appears only once in the SL, (Hegel, SL, 486/132), and once in the EL, (Hegel, EL, §244.
98 Contrast my approach, which focuses on the immanent determination of the determination of the system into the PN, with the approach suggested by Wolfgang Neuser, “Hegels Deutung der Naturgesetzlichkeit als Logik der Natur,” in Sich in Freiheit Entlassen, Natur und Idee bei Hegel, ed. Helmut Schneider (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004), 21-30. Neuser’s interpretation takes as its starting point the fact that the Idea is described as the identity of form and content; he then goes on to suggest that at the end of the SL we realise that we have only been examining the relationship of form and content as an identity relation and that we have to account for possible cases of otherness. Thus, we think Nature. For example, ‘Der Inhalt war immer nur deckungsgleich mit der Form in der Logik. Es gilt nun, eine Logik der Andersheit zu formulieren, der zufolge Form und Inhalt konsequent als je andere bestimmt und festgehalten wird’, (Neuser, “Hegels Deutung”, 28). The main issue with Neuser’s approach is that it relies on a moment of external reflection: one has to step outside of the SL and assume, based on our current understanding of Nature, that there might be a kind of form/content relation that is based on otherness rather than identity. But this approach does not take presuppositionlessness or immanence seriously because, (a) it presupposes a concept of Nature that it uses to assume the possibility of other kinds of form/content relations, and (b) it does not attend to the immanent determination at hand.
99 Thus, I disagree with the view that is briefly proposed at the end of Stanley Rosen which claims that the move into the PN is not logical and that Nature is somehow created rather than logically deduced: ‘Hegel ends the SL
of this chapter, I will examine what Hegel has to say on the move into the PN from the perspective of the PN and consider how the PN develops (i.e. 3) how does Hegel's PN develop?)

10.2.2 The Move to Nature according to the PN (1830)

In the last two paragraphs of the SL, where Hegel details the move into the PN, we noted four central aspects of the move: 1) the development of the determinations of pure thought is complete with the conclusion of the SL, but the dialectical development of the Idea (since the system is the final determination of the Idea, I have no issue in conceptualising the development of the PN as the development of the self-external Idea) continues; 2) the dialectical development continues because of the immanent negativity that is present in the self-relation of the system which leads to the urge to self-sublate this moment of negativity; 3) the system sublates itself as system and becomes Nature; the first moment of the PN is an immediate moment because immediacy is the logical outcome of the self-sublation of the self-relation of the system; 4) the self-sublation of the system is a sublation of itself by itself, there is nothing external to it that is determined, and so the move into the PN is the free movement of the Idea moving within itself. The aim of this section is to take these central themes from the SL into the “Introduction” of the PN and to investigate whether there is any continuity. I begin with the “Introduction” to the PN, paying special attention to the material published by Hegel and only making use of Michelet’s Zusätze when they can support the main text.

10.2.2.1 The Introduction to the PN (1830)

In my examination of the SL points 1 and 2 stated that the examination of thought and being does not end in the SL: only the examination of pure thought ends. The self-sublation of the

with a brief indication of the next science, i.e., the science of the emergence of the idea from the subjectivity of the concept. This proves difficult, since there are no more dialectical transitions available to Hegel. He therefore claims that “the idea freely discharges itself in its absolute freedom and tranquillity” as external idea. This points us toward the Realphilosophie. In other words, we have thought the logical or categorial structure of the world. It now remains for us who are at one with God to create the world’ (Rosen, The idea of Hegel’s “Science of Logic”, 485).
"Idea" into Nature means that in Nature we are not dealing with something external to the "Idea" but with the "Idea" itself, albeit the self-sublated "Idea." What we still do not know, however, is what exactly all this looks like.\(^{100}\) I think that we get our first inkling of it in the "Introduction" to the PN:

‘Nature has presented itself as the Idea in the form of otherness. Since therefore the Idea is the negative of itself, or *is external to itself*, Nature is not merely external in relation to this Idea...; the truth is rather that *externality* constitutes the specific character in which Nature, as Nature, exists.’\(^{101}\)

Nature is the "Idea" in its otherness - the self-sublation of the "Idea" has logically resulted in the "Idea" that is other to itself. If the "Idea" at the conclusion of the SL was the absolute unity of itself with itself, then, it follows that the self-sublation of that would lead to the "Idea" being other to the absolute unity of itself to itself. The self-otherness of the "Idea" is further explicated as self-externality: the self-sublation of self-relation is self-externality. Nature is the "Idea" that is external to itself. Crucially, the "Idea" is not opposed to Nature or opposed to itself as Nature but is itself Nature in this self-otherness and self-externality. Khurana puts it well when he states that the "Idea" is not normative in Nature, it does not direct Nature, but it quite simply *is* Nature.\(^{102}\)

The self-externality of the "Idea" is the determination of Nature.\(^{103}\)

What I am suggesting here is starkly different to the views presented by Maker and Burbidge who read Nature as a "radical other" to SL. Recall that Maker’s motivation for interpreting Nature as a "radical other" is founded on the presupposition that the SL, as the domain of autonomous self-determination, must end and be distinguished from other non-self-determining domains. I have already argued against the presupposition that the SL must be a closed system for it to be complete, therefore, I have implicitly argued against the notion that

\(^{100}\) Even though Hegel does give us an idea of what we thinks the first determinations of the PN are in the final sentences of the SL: ‘the externality of space and time existing absolutely on its own account without the moment of subjectivity’, (Hegel, SL, 843/573).

\(^{101}\) Hegel, PN, §247.

\(^{102}\) See: ‘Die »Idee« soll in diesem Sinne nicht als eine normative Kategorie verstanden werden, die von außen an die Natur herangetragen wird; sie charakterisiert die Natur vielmehr selbst’, (Khurana, Das Leben der Freiheit, 304)

\(^{103}\) See, for example, in the introduction to Hegel’s 1919/20, winter semester lecture on the Philosophy of Nature: 'Die Natur wird hier betrachtet als die verkörperte unmittelbare Idee, sie ist die Idee selbst; die Naturphilosophie ist die Darstellung der Idee selbst in einer concreten Form, in der Form der Äußerlichkeit, hier erscheint die Idee nicht ihrer reinen Freiheit sondern der Form, die Naturphilosophie ist ein concretes Beispiel', (Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur I [Lectures on the Philosophy of Nature I], 8); see also: ‘Das Anderssein ist also die Bestimmtheit der Natur; sie ist aber nicht nur dieses Anderssein, sondern die Idee unter der Form des Andersseins. Das Anderssein hat die Idee zu seiner Substanz’, (Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur I [Lectures on the Philosophy of Nature I], 205).
Nature is a “radical other” to SL. Since, if the system is not closed but continues dialectically to become Nature, then Nature could not possibly be the detached “other” that Maker and Burbidge claim it to be. I also believe that I have shown textual support against this view. Maker and Burbidge provide no textual support to show that Hegel thinks of Nature as a “radical other”. In the above quotation, however, Hegel is clear that not only is Nature not a “radical other” to SL, but that it is not even other to SL — *pace* Wandschneider and Stone — Nature is the self-otherness of SL.

I think that we are now able to formulate the sense in which Nature is a different sphere to SL, pure thought, and yet develops logically. Let us recall one of Maker’s concerns: any reading of Hegel that claims a logical continuity from the SL to the PN risks reducing Nature to thought. However, as I have argued, the negativity immanent to the system takes us out of the domain of pure thought and into the domain of thought as self-externality. Let us briefly cast our minds back to the penultimate paragraph of the SL where we read that the *absolute Idea* has the ‘urge to sublate [its subjectivity]’\(^\text{104}\). If pure thought is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, the self-sublation of that subjectivity leads us into something that is still thought-like, but not pure thought since pure thought is absolute self-relation. In one sense, Nature is remarkably like Objectivity - there, just as in Nature, subjectivity was submerged within external relations and it was the purely inner of the objective relations. In fact, the similarity seems even stronger when one notice’s the (very approximate) parallel development of “Mechanism” → “Chemism” → “Life”, in the SL, and “Mechanics” → “The Chemical Process” → “Organics”, in the PN. It would be a mistake, however, to overemphasize these similarities, and not just because the sequences of the developments are different.\(^\text{105}\) In Nature, the absolute unity of subjectivity and objectivity, and not just subjectivity, is external to itself.

I think that it is because of this development that Hegel can assuredly state that Nature inaugurates a new sphere. In fact, I think that it is because of the self-sublation of self-relationality, which leads to the determination of the *absolute Idea* as the *self-external Idea*, that we are warranted in thinking that we are dealing with a new sphere. Let us unpack this thought. The SL came to an end insofar as the system was the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity. However, as we saw, even this supposed end point developed further into Nature. If the development continued, however, why should we think of the SL and the PN as two

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\(^{104}\) Hegel, *SL*, 843/572.

\(^{105}\) *The Chemical Process* in the PN is just the third section of the chapter on “Physics”, where the other two sections are neither clearly mechanical, nor chemical. Moreover, there is not a parallel account of *Teleology* in the PN to mediate the move from *The Chemical Process* to “Organics”.
different spheres? Because the *system*, which is the moment of immediacy in which the whole of the *SL* is self-relating, sublated itself and so effectively the *SL* sublated itself. We move from the sphere of pure thought to the sphere of the self-externality of thought because everything that pure thought was, self-relation, sublated itself. It is also in this sense that Nature develops logically: if Nature is the sublated *system*, then it has within itself the entirety of the *SL*. However, “developing logically” is not the same as the “development of the *SL*”, and whilst Nature develops dialectically like the *SL*, it is different to the *SL* insofar as it is the self-sublation of the *SL*.

Now, the *self-external Idea* or Nature *tout court* means that the determinations of Nature are external to themselves as well as to each other:

‘In this externality, the determinations of the [Concept] have the show of an *indifferent subsistence* and *isolation (Vereinzelung)* in regard to each other, and the [Concept], therefore, is present only as something inward. Consequently, Nature exhibits no freedom in its existence, but only *necessity* and *contingency*’¹⁰⁶

This excerpt tells us a little more about what it means for Nature to be the *Idea* in its self-externality. Let us not forget that the *system* is the absolute identity of the *Concept* and *Objectivity*, and that the determination of the *Concept* was to be the self-relating identity of its three moments. In the *PN*, then, the determinations of the *Concept*, *universality*, *particularity*, and *individuality* are preserved as self-external, *i.e.* they are external to their own determination as determinations of the *Concept*, as well as being external to each other. As self-external, it logically follows that they appear as self-subsistent and isolated from each other and, therefore, indifferent. In this sense, they are somewhat like their appearance in the *mechanical object* but are now external to themselves and not just external to each other, as well as being the absolute unity of the *Concept* and the *Objectivity*.¹⁰⁷ What does it mean for *universality* to be external to

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¹⁰⁶ Hegel, *PN*, §248.
¹⁰⁷ Contrast my reading with the interpretation proposed by Klaus J. Schmidt, “Die logische Stuktur der Natur,” in *Sich in Freiheit Entlassen, Nature und Idee bei Hegel*, ed. Helmut Schneider (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2004), 31-61. In this essay, Schmidt argues that the *PN* develops according to *Prozeßcharakter* of the *Concept*, in other words, he thinks that the *PN* develops because of the activity of the *Concept* on *Objectivity*: ‘Der *Aufbau der Naturphilosophie* richtet sich methodisch nach der Struktur der Idee, die Hegel als „Einheit von Begriff und Realität“ bzw. von „subjektivem Begriff und […] Objektivität“ definiert…, wenngleich er betont, daß mit dem Wort Einheit ein unpassender Ausdruck verwendet wird. Unpassend gewählt ist der Ausdruck Einheit aus zwei Gründen. Zum einen unterschlägt er den *Prozeßcharakter* des Begriffs. Zum anderen verschweigt er den dominierenden Part des Begriffs in dieser Einheit, denn der Begriff ist er „selbst und sein Gegenentf“. “er greift über sein Anderes über”, (Schmidt, “Die logische Stuktur der Natur”, 33). Schmidt’s interpretation eschews the result of the *system*, *i.e.* that the *Concept* and *Objectivity* are in an absolute identity, in favour of holding onto a notion of the *Concept* from the sections of Objectivity and the Idea, which whilst true
itself? It means that it is external to the moment of itself that is the self-determining activity of the *Concept* - universality is still a determination of the *Concept*, but it is no longer explicitly in an identity with it. Nor is it in an identity with the other determinations of the *Concept* that are equally self-externa. This, in turn, means that any subsequent relation between the determinations of the *Concept* is either a contingent or a necessary one, but never a free one. I do not want to get into a more detailed discussion on the aspect of the modalities in Nature, though it is a vital aspect, but it suffices to say that the reason why natural relations can only either be contingent or necessary is that the determinations of the *Concept* in Nature are self-external.

I want to take a moment to underline the novelty of the interpretation that I have just proposed. In the literature, the self-externality of the *Idea* or Nature is typically taken as being composed of two different things that are in a negative unity, *i.e.* the *Idea* is the inner and Nature is the outer and together they are the self-externality of the *Idea*. This interpretation, for example, is found in Wandschneider & Hösle:

‘Die Natur ist damit einerseits selbst als Idee gefaßt, aber diese in ihrer Andersheit, d. h. sie ist die aus ihrer Innerlichkeit herausgetretene, entäußerte Idee. Sie ist das Andere der Idee, das aber, indem es *dialektisch* auf diese bezogen bleibt, seinen Grund in der Idee selbst hat und deren Binnenstruktur in äußerlicher, d. h. begriffloser Weise wiederholt’

The authors clearly understand Nature to be the otherness of the *Idea*, ‘aber diese in ihrer Andersheit’, but they flesh out this self-otherness as a difference between *Idea* and Nature instead of the difference within *Idea* as Nature. It is only by stating this difference that the authors can claim that the *Idea* is the inner dialectic of Nature whilst simultaneously claiming that Nature lacks the *Concept*, (see ‘[in] begriffloser Weise wiederholt’). We saw the same interpretation supported by Wandschneider and Stone. However, externality does not lack the *Concept*; on the contrary, externality is a conceptual moment, as we saw throughout the *SL*. Moreover, as we saw above in §248, Hegel clearly conceptualises the externality of Nature as the determinations of the *Concept*: it is the determinations of the *Concept* that are a ‘show of an indifferent subsistence and isolation (Vereinzelung) in regard to each other’. This is crucially

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*has been surpassed. This brings Schmidt close to Wandschneider and Stone as he is also a proponent of the notion that the dialectical development of Nature is the development of an active part over a passive part.*

different to thinking of Nature as lacking the Concept, because, even though Hegel does say that the Concept ‘is present only as something inward’ this does not mean that it is present as something different from something else. It is present as inward in the way that Concept was present as inward in Mechanism: the determinations of the Concept are still essentially determinate and Nature is the rational unity of the Concept, but since they are self-external, i.e. external to each other, the Concept is not related to itself as Concept, or is not the explicit Concept, and so is only an inner.

Let us now consider what Hegel has to say on the development of the PN:

‘Nature is to be regarded as a system of stages, one arising necessarily from the other [...]: but it is not generated naturally out of the other but only in the inner Idea which constitutes the ground of Nature’.

This builds on what we have asserted so far by explicitly stating that since the Idea is only the inner of Nature it is the activity that carries forward the development of Nature, i.e. the development of Nature has the same kind of necessity as the SL because the Idea is the inner of Nature. The PN, then, develops necessarily and, in a sense, logically, though the subject matter is not that of pure thought but of thought, or reason, as Nature: thought in its self-externality. The development of Nature is the development of the Idea that is only in-itself in self-externality: ‘The movement through its stages is more precisely this: the Idea posits itself as that which it is in itself’.

Therefore, and in a way that is entirely in keeping with the development of the SL, the development of Nature is the gradual movement of the Idea from being merely in-itself to becoming for-itself. In concrete terms, the Idea that is for-itself in Nature is the development towards self-determination, which will ultimately be expressed in self-consciousness.

What have we learnt so far? First, that Nature is the Idea in its self-externality and that as such the Idea is only in-itself as Nature. Second, even though the Idea is only in-itself as Nature it is the activity of the Idea that drives the development of the PN and so the development of it is both necessary and logical, insofar as it is the gradual self-determination of the Idea. Nature, then, is not other to the SL or to thought - it is the self-externality of the

109 Hegel, PN, §249.
110 Hegel, PN, §251.
111 See, for example, ‘Die verschiedenen Gestaltungen der Realisierung des Begriffs sind also seine eignen Momente. Die Wahrheit der selbständigen Bestimmungen ist denn nicht selbstständig zu sein, negirt zu werde’, (Hegel, Vorelesungen über die Philosophie der Natur I [Lectures on the Philosophy of Nature I], 216).
Idea and this self-externality is not merely the idea of self-externality but is self-externality itself, as it is in the world. Thus, when the development of the PN begins in §254 the self-external Idea is space. Again, this is not just our idea of space but concrete space as it is in the world around us. According to Hegel, then, space (the self-external Idea) cannot be just understood in purely physical terms as atoms or a vacuum, thought is also undoubtedly that, because what it is also for space to be is for it to be the self-external Idea. What this tells us is that space is a real feature of the world, it is not just a mode through which we intuit it and nor is it merely an aspect of our peculiarly human cognition of reality but an objective aspect of the world. Moreover, with our knowledge of the determination of space as the self-external Idea we are able to think through its immanent structure and grasp what else is necessary in Nature. Space will differentiate itself into its dimensions before proving itself to be the basic concepts of Euclidean geometry: the point, line, plane, and surface. The negativity of the surface will then prove to be time. The development of the PN will not deduce the existence of these concepts, they have already been proven to exist through sheer experience or the natural sciences. What the PN will show us is whether they are necessary to Nature. Are space and time necessary features of Nature or not? If Hegel is right, they are indeed necessary features of Nature and we can say that they are because of their immanent development from each other and, ultimately, from the SL.

10.3 Concluding Remarks

The aim of this chapter has been to outline the chief interpretations of the PN in the secondary literature and to contrast them to my account of the SL-PN relation. In the first section of this chapter, I examined the non-idealist position that takes Nature to be thoroughly unlike thought; the idealist position that takes Nature to be merely an extension of the SL; and finally, the objective-idealistic position that takes the concept of Nature to be the unity of the ideal and the non-ideal (thought and matter).

In the second section of this chapter, I delved into the primary material, looking at the final two paragraphs of the SL and the “Introduction” to the PN. I argued that the SL as the examination of the determinations of pure thought concludes with the system, but that this conclusion is not a closure. In fact, the system determines itself into Nature - thus, Nature is the system in its self-externality and self-otherness. This does not mean, however, that Nature is
merely an extension of the SL — since, as we saw, the subject matter of the SL, the examination of pure thought, has come to an end. The self-external Idea, then, is not merely an idealist position, but a material-idealist position, where the Idea is literal self-externality and not just the idea of self-externality. On my reading then, Nature is neither idealist nor non-idealist, and it is not the dialectical development of the ideal and the non-ideal. Nature, as the Idea in its self-externality is externality as that which is both ideal and non-ideal at the same time.
11. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis has been to argue that the move from the SL to the PN is a logical one, that it is a continuation of the project of the SL, i.e. the examination of the determinations of thought and being, and as a consequence, that the PN is an ontology that examines the determinations of self-external thought and being. The originality of this thesis is in (a) my approach to answering the question, and (b) the answer I give. I noticed that the final determination of the SL is the unity of the Concept and Objectivity, and so I decided to begin my investigation of this relation from the appearance of the Concept in the Doctrine of the Concept. I traced the relation of the Concept and Objectivity throughout the final book of the SL before giving my interpretation of the move into the PN. I argued that the final moment of the SL, the absolute unity of the Concept and Objectivity (what I also called, the system) sublated its own determination of immediate self-relation. The self-sublation of self-relation necessarily leads into a determination that is external to itself: the self-external Idea. The self-external Idea is concrete externality, it is the physical space that surrounds us and not just our idea of space. However, we have come to understand it through philosophical thought and so it is not just the physical space that surrounds us but is also the determination of space that has proven itself to be a necessary moment of the development of the determinations of thought and being.

My investigation of the SL began with an overview of the section of the Concept where the determination, the Concept, is introduced, and its form-determinations, universality, particularity, and individuality, are developed. Then, I gave a synopsis of Judgement and Syllogism before beginning the part of my thesis that engages with the SL in detail.

Objectivity inaugurated a fundamental change in the way that the Concept would relate to itself. Beginning in Mechanism, the determinations of the Concept were only externally related to each other, and they developed through these external relations until they determined themselves into lawful objects that were immanently different from each other. This development from merely external relation to immanent difference meant that we transitioned into a new sphere.

Chemism begins with this immanent difference in the chemical objects. Their difference is conceptualised as the difference between their respective inner Concepts and their moment of external individuality. The inner Concept strives to sublate the difference between the chemical objects and, by the end of it, has liberated itself from being a merely inner moment...
and has determined itself into a moment that is now opposed to the moment of externality with which it was in tension. This opposition leads us into the next, and final, sphere of Objectivity.

In Teleology, the Concept was the subjective end that was confronted by Objectivity. For the first time, the determinations of externality, self-subsistence, and indifference coalesced into a single determination, Objectivity. The end related to Objectivity, first through itself and then through the means. The conclusion of this relation was that the relation of the end to Objectivity through the means was actually the relation of the end to itself with Objectivity. Upon making the implicit self-identity of the Concept and Objectivity explicit we transitioned from Objectivity to the Idea.

The immediate Idea is Life. In Life, Objectivity corresponds to the Concept because it is posited by it but, nevertheless, Objectivity is external and indifferent to the Concept. The indifference of Objectivity is gradually overcome, first by the “logic” of members, then through the living individual in its reality, and finally through the Life-Process, at the end of which Objectivity was posited as the Concept in-and-for-itself. The relation of the Concept that is in-and-for-itself Objectivity and Objectivity that is in-and-for-itself the Concept is the Genus or the mediated Idea, which develops into the Idea of Cognition.

Cognition begins with the subjective idea that is in-and-for-itself united with Objectivity and, as a result, is in contradiction with itself because it is a contradiction for the Concept to take itself as its object. The Concept sublates its own subjectivity and relates to Objectivity through the development of the Idea of the True. This concludes with the determination of the theorem wherein the Concept is once again posited as being in-and-for-itself Objectivity. The second section of Cognition, the Idea of the Good, investigates the relation of the Concept that is in-and-for-itself Objectivity to the moment of indifferent Objectivity. Finally, the Concept posits Objectivity and Objectivity returns the posited determination to the Concept. Thus, the Concept and Objectivity are in-and-for-themselves united in the Absolute Idea.

The Concept and Objectivity are in an absolute unity. In this unity they are the identical self-movement of the Concept and this is the method. The method develops through the moments of the beginning, the advance, and the result. In the result, the Concept and Objectivity have proven themselves to be the immediate unity of the system. The system is the simple self-relation of the system with itself or the simple self-relation of the Concept and Objectivity. Within this moment of simple self-relation there is a moment of difference since the system relates to itself as itself — this moment of difference led to the self-sublation of the
The **self-external Idea** is the first determination of Nature. It is the unity of the *Concept* and *Objectivity* that is external to itself. This does not mean that the *Concept* is external to *Objectivity*, rather, that the unity of the *Concept* and *Objectivity* is external to itself. What exactly this means and how precisely this develops is a question that I leave for the second half of this project where I plan to continue my examination of Hegel’s project of ontology by investigating the determinations of the *PN*. What is crucial for my thesis, however, is that the development of the *system* into the **self-external Idea** occurs because of reasons that are entirely within the *SL*. Therefore, the *PN* is a continuation of the project of ontology that began with the *SL* and is a further examination of the determinations of thought and being. The **self-external Idea**, then, is both a logical determination as well as concrete, physical space. The originality of Hegel’s conception of Nature is that Nature, indeed the whole of reality, is the speculative identity of thought and being: thus, there is no such thing as concept-less being or objective-less thought. The upshot for Hegelians that are interested in Hegel’s project of ontology and the integrity of the Hegelian system is that I have provided a coherent reading of the move into the *PN* that opens a promising path for preserving the integrity of the system. For non-Hegelians, the move to the *PN* provides a way for thinking about Nature as it is in-and-of-itself instead of how we take it to be. Thus, it might provide the metaphysical foundation for a normative ethical theory that seeks to outline how we ought to treat Nature in light of the current environmental crisis; it might also provide a new way for philosophy to engage with modern science since it offers a way of thinking about Nature as it is and not as it might be understood through the scientific method. However one might prefer to think about the significance of a concept of Nature as it is in-and-for-itself there can be no doubt that Hegel’s approach to thinking about Nature is radical because it makes Nature *as* Nature a viable object of philosophical study.
Abbreviations


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