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Intuitions about joint commitment

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Michael, John and Butterfill, Stephen A. (2022) Intuitions about joint commitment. Philosophical Psychology . doi:10.1080/09515089.2022.2153659 ISSN 0951-5089. (In Press)

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2022.2153659

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Abstract

In what sense is commitment essential to joint action, and do the participants in a joint action themselves perceive commitment as essential? Attempts to answer this question have so far been hampered by clashes of intuition. Perhaps this is because the intuitions in question have mostly been investigated using informal methods only. To explore this possibility, we adopted a more formal approach to testing intuitions about joint action, sampling naïve participants’ intuitions about experimentally controlled scenarios. This approach did reveal patterns in participants’ responses which may hint at potential conceptual links between commitment and joint action. It did not however provide evidence to support the view that commitment is essential to joint action, at least not from the agents’ own perspective. We conclude that intuitions alone, even when drawn systematically from a large sample, may be a poor basis for theorizing about joint action.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
SWORD Depositor: Library Publications Router
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Commitment (Psychology), Intuition , Joint attention , Intentionalism , Responsibility
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophical Psychology
Publisher: Taylor and Francis
ISSN: 0951-5089
Official Date: 1 December 2022
Dates:
DateEvent
1 December 2022Available
23 November 2022Accepted
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2153659
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: In Press
Reuse Statement (publisher, data, author rights): This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology on 01 Dec 2022, available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09515089.2022.2153659
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit: 16 December 2022

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