Longworth, Guy. (2008) Comprehending speech. Philosophical Perspectives, Vol.22 (No.1). pp. 339-373. ISSN 1520-8583

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Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology P Language and Literature > P Philology. Linguistics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Language and languages -- Philosophy, Interpersonal communication, Sociolinguistics, Burge, Tyler. Philosophical essays
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophical Perspectives
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
ISSN:	1520-8583
Date:	December 2008
Volume:	Vol.22
Number:	No.1
Number of Pages:	35
Page Range:	pp. 339-373
Identification Number:	10.1111/j.1520-8583.2008.00151.x
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/17242

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