Equilibria in load balancing games
Chen, Bo. (2009) Equilibria in load balancing games. Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica, Vol.25 (No.4). pp. 723-736. ISSN 0168-9673Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10255-009-8832-8
A Nash equilibrium (NE) in a multi-agent game is a strategy profile that is resilient to unilateral deviations. A strong Nash equilibrium (SE) is one that is stable against coordinated deviations of any coalition. We show that, in the load balancing games, NEs approximate SEs in the sense that the benefit of each member of any coalition from coordinated deviations is well limited. Furthermore, we show that an easily recognizable special subset of NEs exhibit even better approximation of SEs.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||Q Science > QA Mathematics|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica|
|Official Date:||October 2009|
|Number of Pages:||14|
|Page Range:||pp. 723-736|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
|Funder:||"Taishan Scholar" Project in Applied Mathematics, Qufu Normal University|
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