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Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare
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Hindriks, Jean and Lockwood, Ben (2009) Decentralization and electoral accountability: Incentives, separation and voter welfare. In: 4th CESifo-Delphi Conference on Government, Institutions and Macroeconomic Performance, Munich, Germany, May 30-31, 2008. Published in: European Journal of Political Economy, Vol.25 (No.3 Sp. Iss. SI). pp. 385-397.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.01.004
Abstract
This paper provides a systematic analysis of fiscal decentralization on the quality of government by studying jointly its effects on electoral discipline and selection, in a setting where, realistically, voters only have limited information about fiscal policy in other jurisdictions, ruling out yardstick competition. Fiscal centralization reduces the extent of electoral discipline. as a corrupt (rent-seeking) incumbent can target good behavior only at a "minimum winning coalition" of regions (selective rent-diversion) in order to retain office, but thus makes it more profitable for bad incumbents to pool with good ones, thus increasing the probability of electoral discipline occurring at all. Voters tend to prefer centralization when politicians are low quality i.e. more likely to be corruptible. Centralization with uniform taxes can dominate both unconstrained centralization and decentralization, explaining why uniform taxes are so widely observed. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
| Item Type: | Conference Item (Paper) |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Journal or Publication Title: | European Journal of Political Economy |
| Publisher: | Elsevier BV |
| ISSN: | 0176-2680 |
| Date: | September 2009 |
| Volume: | Vol.25 |
| Number: | No.3 Sp. Iss. SI |
| Number of Pages: | 13 |
| Page Range: | pp. 385-397 |
| Identification Number: | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.01.004 |
| Status: | Peer Reviewed |
| Publication Status: | Published |
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
| Conference Paper Type: | Paper |
| Title of Event: | 4th CESifo-Delphi Conference on Government, Institutions and Macroeconomic Performance |
| Type of Event: | Conference |
| Location of Event: | Munich, Germany |
| Date(s) of Event: | May 30-31, 2008 |
| URI: | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/17393 |
Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge
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