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CONDILLAC AND THE LANGUAGE OF SENSATION

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ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the empiricist project as it came to be formulated in the 18th century and specifically the attempts to determine the limits of human knowledge through its reduction to sensation. Taking Locke's departure from Cartesianism as my starting point, I pursue the efforts of Condillac to complete this reduction in two early works: the Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines (1746) and the Traité des sensations (1754). By according a central role to language in the Essai, Condillac attempts a radical solution to the problem of how sensation alone can be a sufficient basis for the development of advanced faculties. I argue that Condillac's conception of signs as the principle which develops human understanding is best conceived as a means of circumventing what is arguably the central difficulty for Lockean empiricism, namely the problem of idealism.

In the Traité Condillac attempts to complete his account of the development of the understanding by uncovering the conditions under which a pre-linguistic awareness is generated. However his efforts to discover the conditions of human knowledge within the sensible, inevitably involve Condillac in a negotiation with the 'rationalist' system-building from which he tries to distance himself. The recent discovery of an overtly Leibnizian tract, Les Monades (1746), provides, I argue, the key to a full understanding of Condillac's philosophy. In the thesis I describe the line of tension traced by Condillac as he accepts and rejects by turns some form of monadological system as the basis to his sensationalism. Through an analysis of the relationship with Leibniz I argue that the empiricist project inevitably becomes caught within the Condillacian dilemma: a dilemma arising from the dual obligation to place constraints on, and to uncover the conditions of possibility for, human inquiry.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

References to Condillac's works are to the Le Roy edition of the "Oeuvres philosophiques" except for the "Traité des sensations" which are to the Fayard edition and "Les Monades" which is published in Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century.

Sources cited in the text are given in abbreviated form. The following abbreviations have been used and full details are given in the Bibliography.

Works by Condillac:

E = Essai sur l'origine des connaissance humaines, in Oeuvres philosophiques Vol.I
TS = Traité des sensations
LM = Les Monades
OPI = Oeuvres philosophiques vol. I
OPII = Oeuvres philosophiques, vol. II

Others:

Berkeley

NT = Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision
A = Alciphron

Descartes

PWDI = The Philosophical Works of Descartes vol. I
PWDII = The Philosophical Works of Descartes vol. II
OD = Oeuvres de Descartes

Diderot

LA = Lettre sur les aveugles

Leibniz

NE = Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain

Locke

EH = Essay Concerning Human Understanding
The decision to write a PhD thesis centering on a philosopher whose work attracts relatively little attention today merits some prefatory comments. However, it may be that any explanation that I could offer for such a decision will tend to understate the role that chance played in its formation. It should be recalled that to alight on a particular field of interest must be to arrest a series of more or less lucky encounters and arbitrary choices: the discovery of an obscure reference for example, or the fortuitous decision to pursue an idea raised in conversation. If the development of my interest in Condillac appeared at the time to be governed largely by psychological proclivities rather than by the rigour of the ideas with which I was concerned, I am able now - after the fact - to discern a certain logic in the history of my researches and which I can here briefly relate. I leave it to the reader to decide how far such a narrative falsifies the original meandering thought processes of which it is the culmination.

I first became interested in Condillac after writing my undergraduate dissertation on the role of the notion of 'intuition' in Bergson's philosophy. At that time I was concerned with a difficulty Bergson has in grounding his philosophy in a pre-conceptual experience which is supposedly not amenable to linguistic expression while he nonetheless expresses that philosophy in language. The problem is how to make sense of, or how to speak about, a supposed immediate, primitive experience which is to be the basis for Bergson's philosophical method, if that experience cannot in strictness be captured by linguistic categories. Bergson tackles this problem by attempting to find a point at which 'concepts' and 'intuition' first diverge. A point in the evolution of the
human species and in the epistemic development of the individual in terms of which knowledge and the possibility of its expression connects with its grounds.

The philosophical significance of positing such a point of contact should not be underestimated. Essentially it is to claim, contra-Kant, that 'intuition' is not blind, rather that it constitutes the primitive origin of experience. Further it is to reject any radical disjunction between the form and content of experience: to claim, in other words, that advanced conceptual understanding is generated out of an original, non-conceptual experience.

My interest in the problematic of how to account for the generation of a capacity to conceptualise out of a primitive intuitive understanding, led (inevitably as it seems to me now), to the question of the origin of language and to the first modern attempt to answer it in Condillac's *Essai sur l'origine des connoissances humaines*. The significance of Condillac's treatment of the question (as indeed of the discussions his *Essai* spawned), lies less in the success or failure of its attempt to uncover the historical or biological beginnings of language, as in becoming the focus for a series of problematics concerning the generation and development of thought. And it is these problematics which have formed the subject matter of this thesis.

For Condillac it is language which organises the development of the faculties out of the immediate data of sense. And his project is to trace the process of that development in order to delineate the realm of legitimate knowledge. If, as Kant argued, a narrow conception of sensation will never be a sufficient basis on which to account for the possibility of objective experience, then for Condillac to complete this project will require a complication of the Lockean or Berkeleyan conception of the sensible. What I have attempted to
demonstrate is that the central role accorded signs by Condillac leads to just such a complication, in which sensation itself comes to be viewed as a kind of language, and the generation of the understanding akin to the process of learning to speak.

This study of Condillac's genetic epistemology has led me to the conviction that 18th century empiricism is not as naive as the Kantian tradition would have us believe and that the epistemological problems with which Kant was struggling were already exercising the minds of those that preceded him. The attempt to delimit the proper realm of inquiry and to unearth the conditions of possibility for objective experience are central problematics of the Enlightenment. Condillac's approach should not be seen as a pre-critical and ultimately flawed attempt to account for the conditions of possibility of experience, but as a legitimate if no less problematic alternative to transcendental idealism and one deserving of serious attention.

Condillac's is a philosophy of its time. It reflects perhaps more clearly than any other the major conflicts of the day. Neither clearly 'rationalist' or 'empiricist', 'ancient' or 'modern' it brings elements of both into an uneasy relation as though Condillac were tempted by both the major currents of his day and felt compelled to speak with both voices. Rather than signalling the need to abandon study of his philosophy on the grounds of its incoherence, I would argue that it is precisely Condillac's ambivalence that makes him an invaluable point of focus for a study of Enlightenment philosophy. My aim in this thesis has not simply been to produce either a critique or a defence of Condillac's system which would expose or resolve its internal conflicts. Rather I have tried to remain alive to what is positive in the tensions that can be discerned within it. A proper understanding of the manner in which such tensions are produced, provides insights into the workings of the thought of
the Enlightenment and suggests an alternative to Kant's attempt to move beyond it. Rather than search for a dialectical synthesis the thesis is an attempt to understand the contradictions of Condillac's philosophy in terms immanent to it: that is in terms of Condillac's own understanding of error and inconsistency.
NOTE

Condillac's concern with language means that his terminology is of great importance. Because the translations of his texts often pay little attention to consistency in their rendering of key terms I have opted to translate the passages I quote myself and to leave the original French in square brackets immediately afterwards. Translations of other French texts are also my own while those from Latin are taken from other sources and are credited either in the text or the end notes. Where I do not provide any definition of Condillac's terms I refer the reader to his Dictionnaire des synonymes (the third volume of the Le Roy edition of the Oeuvres philosophiques), which I have employed to clarify his meaning where there might be any significant ambiguity.

A list of abbreviations is given on page i. It should be noted that wherever I refer to the 'Essai' I mean Condillac's Essai sur l'origine des connoissances humaines, while the 'Essay' refers to Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 'Traité' refers to the Traité des sensations. References to the Traité des systèmes and Traité des animaux employ the full titles. The orthography of the primary texts is often erratic, thus rather than attempt to distinguish printing errors from peculiarities of spelling I have left all quotations as they appear in the editions I have used.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to extend my warm thanks to my supervisor Dr. Andrew Benjamin for his support and encouragement during the writing of this thesis.
Introduction

Section 1: The Condillacian Project

The seventeenth century sees the emergence of a novel approach to the prosecution of philosophical inquiry for which the principal ambition is to escape the Scholastic tradition. Prejudice and error are perceived to be so deeply engrained in the edifice of human knowledge as to bring it to the point of collapse. Only by its demolition, it is argued, can secure foundations be established for a new philosophy. The demand for a break with its past thereby involves philosophy in a critique of what it has been, and only through this process of self-questioning can the determination of what it must become be secured.¹

This process, however, is not confined to the moment of the new philosophy's conception but continues to figure what it becomes. In the Enlightenment, philosophy continues to seek its legitimacy through a rejection of its parentage. (I use the term 'Enlightenment' in its standard if rather vague sense, to refer to the period beginning early in the 18th century which is characterised in philosophy by the emergence of empiricist, naturalist and materialist doctrines.) The perceived failure of previous attempts at rebirth leads not to any return to Scholasticism but to an intensified effort to uncover a new beginning. Thus the project of philosophy becomes to regenerate itself through a search for an ever more radical origin; an origin which because so far undiscovered has left philosophy tied to its past. What comes to be realised, however, as the obverse of this ever more radical search, is that philosophical
inquiry must engage in a dialogue with the tradition in order for it to effect its renaissance. To determine a new canon it must first condemn, and exclude, the apocryphal. Paradoxically, therefore, the efforts of philosophy to conceive itself within itself need to be pursued through a painstaking critique of its past. And the very attempt to distinguish its own from the traditional definition of its project thereby infects its self-definition.

The concerns of this thesis begin with the project of marking out a new space of inquiry, and concentrate on the version of it set out in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). The central interest, however, will be with the efforts of Condillac to rework the Lockean project through the expurgation of what is not radical enough from within it. Condillac sets himself the task of beginning the Essay over again; of rewriting it as Locke should himself have done, so that philosophy might finally dissociate itself from its heritage and establish itself on a firm footing. Condillac writes:

Locke [...], only left things imperfect in his work because he didn't develop the first advances of the operations of the soul. I tried to do what this philosopher forgot to; I returned to the first operation of the mind and I have, it seems to me, not only given a complete analysis of the understanding but I have also discovered the absolute necessity of signs and the principle of the connection of ideas.

["il (Locke) n'a laissé des choses imparfaites dans son ouvrage que parce qu'il n'a pas développé les premiers progrès des opérations de l'âme. J'ai essayé de faire ce que ce philosophe avait oublié; je suis remonté à la première opération de l'âme, et j'ai, il me semble, non seulement donné une analyse complète de l'entendement, mais j'ai encore découvert l'absolue nécessité des signes et le principe de la liaison des idées." E pl114]
Condillac's intention to return to a more radical beginning is already suggested by the title of his first work, the *Essai sur l'origine des connoissances humaines*, which in the original edition of 1746 was subtitled as 'Work in which all that Concerns the Human Understanding is Reduced to a Single Principle' [ouvrage où l'on réduit à un seul principe tout ce qui concerne l'entendement humain] with its emphasis on the source rather than extent of knowledge. For, according to Condillac, the need to complete Locke springs from the latter's failure to reduce the understanding to its source. The consequence of this, as we shall see, is that certain traditional assumptions are retained in Locke's Essay which tie it to its past. Only by a return to the origin of human knowledge can the unique principle that directs its acquisition be unearthed. It is, in Condillac's words, his intention to "bring back to [rappeler à] a single principle everything that concerns the human understanding". ["mon dessein est de rappeler à un seul principe tout ce qui concerne l'entendement humain". E p4] A principle which he calls a first 'experience' or 'experiment', a première expérience which "is neither a vague proposition, nor an abstract maxim, nor a gratuitous supposition; but a constant experience". ["ce principe ne sera ni une proposition vague, ni une maxime abstraite, ni une supposition gratuite; mais une expérience constante, dont toutes les conséquences seront confirmées par de nouvelles expériences." E p4] Only by first returning human knowledge to its unitary origin can its extent be determined. "We must", argues Condillac, "return to the origin of our ideas, develop their generation, follow them to the limits that nature has prescribed, there to fix the extent and the bounds of our knowledge and renew the whole human understanding." ["Il faut remonter à l'origine de nos idées, en développer la génération, les suivre jusqu'aux limites que la nature leur a prescrites, par-là fixer l'étendue et les bornes de nos connoissances et renouveler tout l'entendement humain." E p4]
Our interest in Condillac springs from this attempt to radicalise the Lockean project. What is also of interest however is the manner in which this project implicates Condillac in the tradition he wants to escape. Ironically, the most wayward metaphysicians serve Condillac as the best guides. As he writes in the Introduction:

[T]hose [metaphysicians] who are furthest from the truth became for me the most useful. Hardly had I come to know the uncertain road that they had followed, when I thought I could see the route I should take. [...] It is essential for whoever wants to make progress on his own in the search for truth, to know the mistakes of those who thought they were opening up the way for him. The experience/experiment [expérience] of the philosopher, like that of the pilot, consists in the knowledge of the reefs where others have been wrecked; and, without this knowledge, there is no compass which can guide him.

["ceux (les métaphysiciens) qui se sont le plus éloignés de la vérité, me devinrent les plus utiles. A peine eus-je connu les voies peu sûres qu'ils avoient suivies, que je crus apercevoir la route que je devais prendre. [...] Il est essentiel pour quiconque veut faire par lui-même des progrès dans la recherche de la vérité, de connoître les méprises de ceux qui ont cru lui en ouvrir la carrière. L'expérience du philosophe, comme celle du pilote, est la connaissance des écueils où les autres ont échoué; et, sans cette connaissance, il n'est point de boussole qui puisse le guider." E pp3-4]

(When translating expérience, we need always to bear in mind the original meaning of putting to the test or a trial (Latin experiri) a meaning still captured in the English 'experiment'. The 'experience' of the philosopher is a trying out of different routes, a process of experimentation by which knowledge is acquired.)

The method by which to chart a path to truth is one borne on the back of the errors of the past. The elimination of this
prejudice and the rebirth of a new philosophy become possible because of the failure of philosophy since Bacon to do just this. Locke opens up the direction for Condillac's researches precisely to the extent to which his own failed. By this line of thought Condillac is able to distinguish two sorts of metaphysics, his own (and to some extent Locke's) from those of the past; the 'good' from the 'bad'. [OPII p400] The one vainly believes it can find its way by the compass of reason alone in isolation from the history of thought and from the distractions of everyday living. [E p113] The other, more restrained, "proportions its researches to the frailty of the human mind" ["l'autre, plus retenue, proportionne ses recherches à la foiblesse de l'esprit humain" E p3], and navigates precisely by heeding the mistakes of those who have gone before: that is to say, according to a method of trial and error. Paradoxically, it seems that the conditions of possibility for the radical new beginning that is demanded of philosophy lie in the tradition. The method by which philosophy is to conceive itself anew is guided by its past.

But Condillac's metaphysics follows the old not just by heeding its errors, but also in its ambition to be first philosophy. Indeed the new metaphysics remains comprehensible only in terms of the one it tries to regenerate since the very notion of starting afresh which it radicalises is derived from its immediate predecessors, principally Bacon, Descartes and Locke. Though the parlous state of contemporary metaphysics it is still that which should prepare the mind for the study of all other sciences. "The science which most contributes to illuminating the mind, to rendering it precise and extensive, and which therefore prepares the way for the study of all others, is metaphysics. It is so neglected today in France that this doubtless appears paradoxical to many readers." ["La science qui contribue le plus à rendre l'esprit lumineux, précis et étendu, et qui, par conséquent, doit le préparer à l'étude de toutes les autres, c'est la métaphysique. Elle est..."
aujourd'hui si négligée en France, que ceci paroîtra sans doute un paradoxe à bien des lecteurs." E p3] While inheriting the ambitions of the old philosophy, the new distinguishes itself by being a more restrained, more limited version. It defines itself within the framework of the old; confining itself within bounds that the old should not have crossed. It reinscribes a canon, a standard, which delimits a space for good metaphysics within the over-reaching, speculative and ultimately self-deluding metaphysics of essences. Of the two metaphysics Condillac writes:

One is ambitious; it wants to penetrate into all mysteries: into the nature, the essence of beings; into the most well hidden causes. This is what flatters it and what it resolves to discover. The other is more reserved; it proportions its researches to the frailties of the human mind. Not so much worried by what must escape it as eager for what it can grasp; it knows to contain itself within the limits which are marked out for it.

["Il faut distinguer deux sortes de métaphysique. L'une ambitieuse, veut percer tous les mystères; la nature, l'essence des êtres, les causes les plus cachées, voilà ce qui la flatte et ce qu'elle se promet de découvrir; l'autre, plus retenue, proportionne ses recherches à la foiblesse de l'esprit humain et aussi peu inquiette de ce qui doit lui échapper, qu'avide de ce qu'elle peut saisir, elle sait se contenir dans les bornes qui lui sont marquées." E p3]

The bad metaphysics becomes apocryphal; excluded from the modest bounds of the new canon. And through this process of exclusion the new philosophy can hide its past from view.

*
Before expanding on these rather general remarks and the implications they have for Condillac's project, we need to look in a little more detail at what Locke attempts to do in his Essay. For it is to the spirit of Locke that Condillac is most faithful. Locke follows Bacon in demanding a return to 'experience' as the foundation of an epistemology which is to be first philosophy. 'Experience' functions as that in terms of which human knowledge is articulated and defined. This ubiquitous notion operates at several levels in marking out the epistemological space of the Essay; but at every level we can identify the same ambition: the search for a new beginning.

At the outset Locke directs the reader to make use of his own thoughts rather than to follow the opinions of others. ("[I]t is to them, if they are thy own, that I refer myself". ['Epistle to the Reader', EHI xxxi]) The individual's attention to his own thought locates the origin of knowledge in the thinking subject, in part as a prophylactic against the prejudice of received opinion and traditional expectations. Through the appeal to the immediacy of "everyone's own observation and experience", Locke can delineate the new limits of human understanding without his inquiry being filtered through the interpretative baggage of a philosophical tradition he wants to escape. [EHI p77, see also EHI p60]

The appeal to experience is also put to work in the critique of innate ideas that clears the ground for Locke's study. The claim that innate principles are not 'in' our experience functions to exclude them from the inquiry. 'Experience' operates as a criterion by which to distinguish what we can truly know, and what we merely opine; between mathematical certainty and natural philosophy. We cannot know the real essence of natural kinds, we are told, because the substratum is not an idea; is not, that is, a part of 'experience'. [EHI p53 & p140] This argument leads to the demand for an observational and experimental method in natural philosophy.
Finally, and most crucially, the project of the Essay attempts a reduction of human understanding to 'whatsoever is in the mind when a man thinks'; that is to 'ideas' conceived as the immediate contents of 'experience'. [EHI p9]

How comes it [the mind] to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.[EHI p77]

The requirement of a return to experience, the central plank of 'empiricism', is the extreme case of the attempt to break with tradition and to rely only on what is given in the immediate present. The privileging of immediacy and the elimination of prejudice that are so central to Cartesian 'rationalism' find, I will argue, their logical conclusion in 18th century empiricism. For only in a philosophy which conceives itself in terms of a direct experience of particulars of sense can the knowing subject bypass a transcendent God as guarantor or inscriber of certainty. And only by a complete reduction of the contents of the mind to 'experience' can the risk that second-hand ideas might prejudice the inquiry be eliminated. As this project is further radicalised by Condillac, 'experience' itself must be analysed into its most immediate contents; namely sensation. And this radicalisation is equated by Condillac with the rupture that it is empiricism's ambition to effect.

It is in his critique of Descartes that Condillac best expresses what is at stake in trying to begin anew. Condillac takes Bacon's advice that our ideas, being badly made, need to be made again. But asks why such advice was not heeded at the time.
No one knew better than he [Bacon] the cause of our errors; for he saw that ideas, which are the work of the mind, had been badly made, and that consequently, in order to make advances in the search for truth, they would have to be remade. [...] But could he be heard?

"Personne n'a mieux connu que lui la cause de nos erreurs; car il a vu que les idées, qui sont l'ouvrage de l'esprit, avaient été mal faites, et que, par conséquent, pour avancer dans la recherche de la vérité, il falloit les refaire. [...] Mais pouvoit-on l'écouter?" E p115]

What is required for such a project to be fulfilled: for Bacon to be heard? Condillac looks for his answer in Descartes's failure. By retaining certain ideas abstracted from particular experience, specifically the ready-made principles etched on the soul, Descartes failed to return to their origin: failed in other words to heed Bacon's demand. By stopping short of a full account of the generation of ideas, the possibility that their origin lies in the presuppositions of past philosophies is never eliminated. As such Cartesianism remains tied to its Scholastic past. It would seem that the elimination of error and the escape from prejudice remained a forlorn hope:

So long as there was a predisposition in favour of the jargon of the schools and innate ideas, the project of renewing human understanding remained chimerical. Bacon proposed a method which was too perfect for him to become the instigator of a revolution; and Descartes's would necessarily succeed because it allowed a portion of error to subsist.

"Prévenu, comme on l'étoit, pour le jargon de l'école et pour les idées innées, ne devoit-on pas traiter de chimérique le project de renouveler l'entendement humain? Bacon proposoit une méthode trop parfaite, pour être l'auteur d'une révolution; et celle de Descartes devoit réussir, parce qu'elle laissoit subsister une partie des erreurs." E p115-116]
Bacon demands too much, and philosophy, unable to cleanse itself completely, ends up retaining the errors of the past. For the method of doubt is not radical enough.

Descartes was right to think that to arrive at certain knowledge one had to begin by rejecting all we thought we had acquired, but he was wrong when he thought that to this end it would suffice to doubt. To doubt whether two and two are four, or if man is a rational animal, is to have the ideas of 'two', 'four', 'man', 'animal' and 'rational'. Doubt allows ideas to subsist as they are: thus, since error derives from our ideas having been badly formed, doubt could not prevent it.

["Descartes a eu raison de penser que, pour arriver à des connoissances certaines, il falloit commencer par rejeter toutes celles que nous croyons avoir acquises; mais il s'est trompé, lorsqu'il a cru qu'il suffisait pour cela de les révoquer en doute. Douter si deux et deux font quatre, si l'homme est un animal raisonnable, c'est avoir des idées de deux, de quatre, d'homme, d'animal et de raisonnable. Le doute laisse donc subsister les idées telles qu'elles sont: ainsi, nos erreurs venant de ce que nos idées ont été mal faites, il ne les sauroit prévenir". E pl12]

What is needed to eliminate error is a return to primitive and particular simples of sense. While, according to Descartes, "the most simple things are innate ideas, general principles and abstract notions which he regards as the source of our knowledge"; in the method which Condillac proposes, "the most simple ideas are the first particular ideas which come to us by sensation and reflection". ["Chez lui les choses les plus simples sont des idées innées, des principes généraux et des notions abstraites, qu'il regard comme la source de nos connaissances. Dans la méthode que je propose, les idées les plus simples sont les premières idées particulières qui nous viennent par sensation et par réflexion." E pl12] If Descartes "hadn't been prejudiced in favour of innate ideas he would have seen that the only way to make a new fund of knowledge is to
destroy the ideas themselves in order to take them back to their origin, that is to say, to sensations". ["Si ce philosophe n'avoit pas été prévenu pour les idées innées il auroit vu que l'unique moyen de se faire un nouveau fonds de connoissances, étoit de détruire les idées mêmes pour les reprendre à leur origine, c'est-à-dire, aux sensations." E p112]

The critique of Descartes reveals Condillac's conviction that it is not sufficient simply to expose the errors of past philosophies in order to start over. He writes:

It will not be sufficient to discover the errors of philosophers if one doesn't penetrate into their causes. Indeed we should go back from one cause to the other until we reach the first; for there is one which must be the same for all those who err, and which is the unique point where all the paths that lead to error begin. Perhaps then, next to this point, we would see another where the unique path to truth begins.

["Ce ne seroit pas assez de découvrir les erreurs des philosophes, si l'on n'en pénétroit les causes: il faudroit même remonter d'une cause à l'autre, et parvenir jusqu'à la première; car il y en a une qui doit être la même pour tous ceux qui s'égarent, et qui est comme un point unique où commencent tous les chemins qui mènent à l'erreur. Peut-être qu'alors, à côté de ce point on en verroit un autre où commence l'unique chemin qui conduit à la vérité." E p4]

Error is always identifiable by an uncritically held assumption which ties a philosophical system to its tradition. Condillac discovers the source of Descartes's error in the failure to destroy all his ideas and so to break completely with the past. If this is the source of all error its discovery paves the way for the path to truth precisely by demonstrating that this path originates, as it were, before prejudice, indeed before any judgement, in an original experience.
The same is true of Condillac's reservations about Locke. The intention in beginning Locke's project over was to eliminate any suggestion of an innate capacity to organise the material of sense. Locke failed to cleanse his system of such capacities because he spoke of the understanding as independent of sensation. Thus he supposed for instance "that as soon as the soul receives ideas from the senses, it can, at will, repeat them, compound them, unite them together in an infinite variety, and make all sorts of complex notions from them." ["Il suppose [...] qu'aussi-tôt que l'âme reçoit des idées par les sens, elle peut, a son gré, les répéter, les composer, les unir ensemble avec une variété infinie, et en faire toutes sortes de notions complexes." E p 5] To the extent that some innate capacities are not eradicated from the Essay Locke fails to eliminate prejudice, because he refuses to think through the radical implications of the principle that all knowledge is derived from sensation. In other words his inability to establish that advanced cognitive operations could be no more than 'sensations transformed' stems from his refusal to pursue his inquiry to its unique root. Locke leaves the project incomplete, and Condillac takes it upon himself to pursue the empiricist epistemology to the point where every idea can retrace its genealogy to sensation.

Given Condillac's interest in discovering the causes of the errors of his teachers, we can expect him to have a diagnosis of Locke's. And Condillac provides such a diagnosis in the introduction to the Essai. Locke, we are told, allowed himself to go wrong because he did not appreciate the importance of setting his arguments out in their proper order. Condillac complains that:

It doesn't seem [...] as though [...] [Locke] ever achieved his initial intention [son principal object, viz. to demonstrate that all knowledge derives from sensation] in the treatise he left on the human understanding. He
embarked upon it by chance, and pursued it in the same manner; and although he anticipated that a work composed in this way would inevitably attract criticism, he did not, as he says, have the courage or the time to rewrite it. This is why we must reject the monotonous passages, repetitions, and disorder that reign in it. Locke was quite capable of amending these faults, and this perhaps renders him all the more inexcusable. He saw, for example, that words and the way we use them could shed light on the principle of our ideas: but because he saw this too late, he didn't deal until his third book with a subject which should have been the object of the second. If he could have taken it upon himself to begin his work again, there is reason to suppose that he would have developed the motive forces [les ressorts] of the human understanding. Having not done so he passes too briefly over the origin of our knowledge, and this is the part he examines most superficially.

["Il ne paroît pas cependant que ce philosophe ait jamais fait son principal object du traité qu'il a laissé sur l'entendement humain. Il l'entreprit par occasion, et le continua de même; et, quoiqu'il prévît qu'un ouvrage composé de la sorte, ne pouvoit manquer de lui attirer des reproches, il n'eut, comme il le dit, ni le courage, ni le loisir de le refaire (Voyez sa préface). Voilà sur quoi il faut rejeter les longueurs, les répétitions, et le désordre qui y règnent. Locke étoit très-capable de corriger ces défauts, et c'est peut-être ce qui le rend moins excusable. Il a vu, par exemple, que les mots et la manière dont nous en servons, peuvent fournir des lumières sur le principe de nos idées (III,ch.viii.par.1): mais parce qu'il s'en est aperçu trop tard (III,ch.ix.par.21), il n'a traité que dans son troisième livre une matière, qui devoit être l'objet du second. S'il eût pu prendre sur lui de recommencer son ouvrage, on a lieu de conjecturer qu'il eût beaucoup mieux développé les ressorts de l'entendement humain. Pour ne l'avoir par fait, il a passé trop légèrement sur l'origine de nos connaissances, et c'est la partie qu'il a le moins approfondie." E p5, see also pl14]

Locke falls short of a demonstration of the principle that all knowledge comes from sensation because he refused to rewrite the Essay and place his discoveries within a systematic, ordered framework. For if the path toward truth is that of the proper generation of ideas from their sensible source, error is a consequence at once of a failure to reduce ones ideas to that source, and (which is the same thing) to pursue the proper
order from that source. These two faults must be identical for Condillac because to make explicit, or explicate, the proper order of ideas is to demonstrate their generation and development from sensation. So both Locke's and Condillac's projects should marry what they hope to demonstrate with the proper method. To establish the empiricist principle (that all knowledge begins with sensation) is to explicate the transformation of sensation into advanced knowledge.

It seems that for Condillac the disorder of the Essay allows Locke to overlook the importance of the origin as methodological starting point and leads him toward a fairly random description of human knowledge. And hence the emphasis in the Essay on the extent as opposed to the origin of human understanding. In effect this oversight can be identified with the lack of order; for the proper order just is that of a genealogy from the sensible origin, and to overlook or forget a step is to deviate from this order. (See below, Intro. pt.2) For if "it is [the] order of thoughts that needs to be developed, if we want to understand the ideas we have of things", ["c'est cet ordre de pensées qu'il faut développer, si nous voulons connoître les idées que nous avons des choses" OPII p381], then to misconstrue the proper order of that development is to misunderstand our ideas. Condillac writes: "With regard to works of reasoning, it is only insofar as an author imposes order that he can perceive those things which had been forgotten [oubliées] or which hadn't been expanded enough." ["S'il s'agit des ouvrages de raisonnement, ce n'est qu'autant qu'un auteur y met de l'ordre qu'il peut s'apercevoir des choses qui ont été oubliées ou de celles qui n'ont point été assez approfondies." E p116] Given this conviction of Condillac's, it becomes clear that his critique of past philosophies must proceed by uncovering the points at which they demonstrate a lack of awareness of the genealogy of their ideas. Paradoxically any system of ideas must in fact be reducible to sensation. Error is therefore the product of the
failure of such a system to make this explicit, and the symptom of this is to suppose that its ideas have some alternative etiology, for example an innate faculty. It is crucially important therefore, Condillac insists, for philosophers to lay bare the process of their thinking to make the job of discovering their errors easier for future generations, that progress might be made. [E pl15]

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We have seen Condillac's new metaphysics find its way by retracing the steps of the former metaphysics' fallacious reasonings to their source. Once this critique has served its purpose, Condillac wants to break with the philosophical tradition at its root - at the point where it goes astray - and mark out the space of genuine understanding. That the source of error is located in the failure to break with traditional prejudice, is discovered through an analysis of these failures. In other words, Condillac appreciates the need to engage with his predecessors in order to discover how to break with them. The irony implicit in this method should be plain; namely that error is a consequence of being tied to a past and of not eliminating prejudice: of putting judgement before experience. But the possibility held out by Bacon of a philosopher who might escape such prejudice had to await a mature age; one in which the particular prejudices have betrayed themselves as such so that a thinker, a Condillac, might avoid them. [E pl15]

Now, Condillac needs to distinguish sharply the methodological principle by which to recover the origin of knowledge from those of past metaphysicians. Metaphysics traditionally flatters itself that certain of its ideas are innate and have no genesis in experience. Such philosophy is "a science which proposes to treat of everything in general before having
observed anything in particular; that is to say, to speak of everything before having learned anything". ["une science où l'on se propose de traiter de tout en general, avant d'avoir rien observé en particulier, c'est à dire, de parler de tout, avant d'avoir rien appris". OPII p229] It reverses the natural order of the formation of ideas because it mistakes generalities for the original simples of the understanding; taking abstract maxims as axioms with which to construct synthetic systems, instead of retracing the development of such generalities to their origin in the perception of particulars. [E p110ff]

Condillac's method by contrast consists in a genetic analysis that ultimately reduces all operations and products of the mind, including, most significantly, philosophical systems, to sensation. Analysis will decompose the old philosophy of the search for essences, by exposing the origin of its axioms. Following Locke Condillac sets himself the task of finding a première expérience which will "show tangibly [sensiblement] what is the source of our knowledge, what are its materials, by what principle it is put to work, which instruments we use and how we should employ them". ["montrer sensiblement quelle est la source de nos connaissances, quels en sont les matériaux, par quel principe ils sont mis en œuvre, quels instrumens on y emploie et quelle est la manière dont il faut s'en servir." E p4]

It is worth stressing that this source must be experiential; indeed must, because of its primacy, be the only indubitable experience. Condillac informs us in the introduction to the Essai that he has found this source in the connection of ideas. ["J'ai, ce me semble, trouvé la solution de tous ces problèmes dans la liaison des idées." E p4] This 'first experience' is at once the point of origin and the principle of generation for human knowledge. The origin consists of the content of what is experienced and in the active principle for its generation.
This double function is expressed in the ambiguity of the expression *première expérience* (first experience/experiment). The origin is not merely a passive apprehension of sensation but primordially an active process of experimentation, of 'trying out' new connections of ideas. Condillac's sensationalism does not, therefore, eliminate an active principle from the mind; (as Maine de Biran argued) but rather affirms an original unity of mind and body from which the faculties develop through the activity of sensation. This does not undermine Condillac's search for a unitary origin to experience. For Condillac the separation of mind from body is already an abstraction from the indubitable experiential origin. "I do not feel on the one hand my body, and on the other my soul; I feel my soul in my body; all my sensations appear only as modifications of a single substance". ["Je ne sens pas d'un côté mon corps, et de l'autre mon ame; je sens mon ame dans mon corps; toutes mes sensations ne me paroissent que les modifications d'une même substance". OPI p436] For the same reason Condillac can speak of the double objet of the *Essai* to demonstrate the role of the original apprehension of sensations and of the original mode of their interconnection through the operation of signs. [E p4]

The principle of the analysis of complex ideas involves the decomposition of connections and their experimental reconnection. It is a retracing of the actual growth of knowledge or experience. For "the order of analysis is [...] the same as the order of the generation of ideas." [L'ordre de l'analyse est [...] l'ordre même de la génération des idées." [OPII p379] The analysis of the generation of metaphysical systems will reduce them to their sensible origin, show how they developed, and thereby demonstrate their failure to self-consciously understand their own principle of generation. The new philosophy can then reconstruct itself according to the proper principle. The advantage of the new philosophy therefore lies in its reflective awareness of its own process of
production: its conformity to itself as expressed in its fidelity to experience as a method and an origin. The new philosophy will establish that past philosophies did not know their own source and demonstrate that they were not self-generating. In this way it can recover its own origin by a self-conscious realisation of its proper lineage. The recovery would then allow it to escape error through the identification of itself (qua reflective systematisation) with itself (qua experience or process of experimentation); in other words, would allow it to define itself. Past philosophies are always different from themselves; in that the self-conception of the principle of their generation is false and therefore, as it were, detoured or derivative. Error can only occur when the genealogical line contains an aporiatic moment; a point at which the origin is hidden from view because the principle by which the system is connected with that origin is not incorporated within it.

It should be clear from this account, that Condillac conflates logical precedence in a system (in particular in a philosophical system) and its historical generation. In order to understand him, indeed to understand the philosophy of the Enlightenment, these two forms of explanation need to be thought together. This identification however produces tensions between the genealogical critique of systems and the legitimation of the new philosophy. For the latter remains a product of certain historical developments, and therefore can only legitimate itself through an ideal reconstruction of its production from the première expérience. While this tentative distinction troubles the whole project there is a philosophical imperative implicit in Condillac's work that we make the identification. In a sense that will be made clearer, this identification is what allows Condillac to resist making a transcendental move, for only by equating the principle of generation of knowledge with its material can an immanent account of the structure of human understanding be given.
However we now encounter a new problem. Condillac needs to formalise the language in which the good/new metaphysics must be written. But clearly it will not be possible to use the principles of the old metaphysical systems, since these are detoured from the path of truth. But no more can the discoveries of the new metaphysics be used since it has not yet been formalised. Rather another, more fundamental metaphysics is needed; an instinctive or natural metaphysics from which the language of the more advanced version must grow. [OPII p435]

The good metaphysics began before languages and it is to it that they owe all that is best in them. But this metaphysics was less a science than an instinct. Nature led men without them knowing it; and metaphysics only became a science when it ceased to be good.

["La bonne métaphysique a commencé avant les langues et c'est à elle qu'elles doivent tout ce qu'elles ont de mieux. Mais cette métaphysique était alors moins une science qu'un instinct. C'était la nature qui conduisait les hommes à leur insu; et la métaphysique n'est devenue science que lorsqu'elle a cessé d'être bonne." OPII p400]

Good metaphysics, then, was originally mute and unreflective, but was corrupted. The new metaphysics must recover this lost origin where it will find the principles for the generation of a language from which to derive its own. An understanding of the origin and development of language is therefore crucial if we are to re-establish a proper philosophical language, in the place of the one that somehow became perverted. Consequently, a central concern of the *Essai* is to account for the original generation of language. [E p60ff] For Condillac the institution of signs, as a special case of the connection of ideas, is crucially important in the development of advanced faculties.
"[T]he use of signs", he writes, "is the principle which unfolds the germ of all our ideas." ["l'usage des signes est le principe qui développe le germe de toutes nos idées". E p5] Indeed the connection between ideas is made possible by the prior connection of ideas with signs. Condillac needs to solve the difficulty of how linguistic signs can be instituted and to do so appeals to a natural 'language of action'. [OPII p391] This original language is constituted by "the cries that nature has established for the feelings of joy, fear, pain, etc." ["les cris que la nature a établis pour les sentiments de joie, de crainte, de douleur, etc.". E p19] Without such original, natural signs, there could be no language, because we cannot begin to represent thoughts by arbitrary signs without a prior agreement as to their signification. And such agreement requires some medium for the communication of thoughts which precedes any institution. Thus, for Condillac, all languages, and by extension any advanced thinking, are grounded in a natural connection between the feelings within and their outward expression. If signs guide the connections that are made between ideas then the very possibility of experience and thought are woven into the natural order in which there is a natural connection between thought and world. The new metaphysics must therefore be able to trace its lineage back to the original gestural language in which the natural metaphysics expresses itself. And the 'bad' metaphysics must be shown to have perverted the proper order of development from the language of action.

It is in the De l'art de raisonner, (a section from Condillac's Cours d'étude (1772) devised for the Prince of Parma) that this new distinction is elaborated. The two metaphysics, the original and the new, operate essentially as practice to theory. As Condillac has it, they are distinguished in the same manner as the immediate experience of the sensible, what he terms sentiment; is distinguished from 'reflection' [réflexion]. The former instinctively follows the principle of
the generation of knowledge, while the latter has become self consciously aware of it. The latter develops the theory from what the former practices. "The metaphysics of reflection is therefore no more than a theory which develops [...] all that was practiced in the metaphysics of feeling [sentiment]." ["La métaphysique de réflexion n'est donc qu'une théorie qui développe, dans le principe et dans les effets, tout ce que pratique la métaphysique du sentiment." [OPII p619] (I will be using the French word sentiment in order to retain the sense that this experience consists of sensation. At the same time, however, it is more than merely sensation since it involves the practical activity which the sensible demands of the organism.) The original, pre-reflective metaphysics has only an implicit understanding. The good metaphysics will explicate what is hidden in this origin.

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But there is another associated strand in Lockean empiricism which is of equal importance to the appeal to experience and to which we need now to turn. For ultimately this appeal is at the service of Locke's endeavour to articulate the limits of human understanding: "to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge", so that sure routes can be determined for our thoughts to take on the perilous waters of the 'vast ocean of Being'. [EHI p6] This strand is associated with the attempt to break with the systems of the past, since it is involved in a division between the proper and improper objects of knowledge. Those objects of human understanding which are truly its own will be those of the new philosophy; for those of the old philosophy are, by and large, beyond the reach of the understanding.
Locke repeatedly expresses awe in the face of the immensity of creation; an awe which is characteristic of what I will refer to as 'empiricist modesty'. That is, the supposedly humble concession that the limited human understanding cannot grasp what is beyond its reach. In a characteristically ironic expression of this modesty Locke styles himself an 'underlabourer' working within certain confines because of the inherent limitations of his faculties. ['Epistle to the Reader', EHI xxxv] The best the philosopher can do is to clear away certain confusions so that the limits to our capacities can be observed. He never tires of insisting on the need to:

confine our thoughts within the contemplation of those things that are within the reach of our understandings and launch not out into the abyss of darkness (where we have not eyes to see, nor faculties to perceive anything) [...] The meanest and most obvious things that come in our way have dark sides that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into. [EIII p158]

The intent of this modesty is at once to keep the inquiry within measure and to establish that inquiry as such must be kept within measure. Before Locke, we are given to understand, if philosophers recognised that their faculties were limited, they certainly overestimated their reach. Philosophy was conceived in conceit; the new philosophy begins with a recognition of the folly of its past. [EIII p158] (We should point out parenthetically that Locke's modesty is rhetorical: it is a false modesty. Thus, for example, when arguing that the soul need not always think, he confesses to having "one of those dull souls that doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas". [EHI p81] Locke's understanding, unlike that of the Author of nature, is limited to experience in this world. The sceptical expression of ignorance since Socrates is always ironic, it always veils an intellectual pride. We will see that in Condillac the avowed intention to 'moderate' the
inquiry belies an implicit imperative to push the limits further back. The modesty is false because inquiry cannot ultimately be kept within the measure it tries to set itself.

That human understanding is limited is presupposed by Locke as by his predecessors. "He that knows anything knows this in the first place: that he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance." [EIII p158] What needs to be discovered is simply where the limits lie, and Locke supposes from the outset that the bounds lie far closer to home than is commonly thought. Out of this presupposition certain paradoxes unfold in Locke's text which will be examined in some detail in Chapters 8 and 9. It will be argued that it is through an effort to resolve these paradoxes that Condillac's design develops. Ultimately Condillac is not satisfied with the constraints of Locke's modesty, because the limits for which Locke searches cannot be presupposed. The frailty of the human spirit is not simply a constraint on the extent of human knowledge. As we have already seen this frailty becomes a tool for discovery; it is not that which limits human knowledge, but a stepping stone for its expansion. To articulate boundaries before the inquiry begins must be to retain uncritically certain assumptions from a sceptical tradition. And therefore, for Condillac, the understanding's limitations must be produced by the understanding; not imposed on it from without by the nature of 'Being'. Consequently Condillac's project becomes the quest to determine the limits through an examination of the experiential content which produces them.

To make this point clearer we need to see how empiricist modesty produces a tension with Condillac's conception of what explanation is. He cites with approval the maxim that knowledge is gained only by moving from the known to the unknown.
Let us recall that we can only go from the known to the unknown. But how are we able to move from the one to the other? Only because the unknown is located in the known, and it is there only because it is the same thing. We can therefore, only move from what we know to what we do not, because what we do not know is the same thing as what we do. [My emphasis.]

"Rappelons-nous que nous ne pouvons aller que du connu à l'inconnu. Or, comment pouvons-nous aller de l'un à l'autre? C'est que l'inconnu se trouve dans le connu, et il n'y est que parce qu'il est la même chose. Nous ne pouvons donc passer de ce que nous savons à ce que nous ne savons pas, que parce que ce que nous ne savons pas est la même chose que ce que nous savons." OPII pp431-432

The implications of this view of the search for truth for Condillac's epistemology are extensive and we will have occasion to examine many of them. For now the importance lies in what it means for his theory of what it is to analyse or explicate. The increase of knowledge comes down to an explication of what is contained implicitly in what is to be explained. The genetic analysis of experience ultimately functions to uncover the principle of generation that lies implicitly within the original experience. And this is his model of explication generally, for which the process of discovery follows the path from identity to identity.

To see this we need to recall Condillac's doctrine of an original metaphysics from which the new must develop: the picture of an original truth to which all knowledge needs to be connected and from which it unfolds. Genuine knowledge is merely an extension of what preceded it, generated through a process of making explicit what is originally 'contained in' the première expérience. The progress from known to unknown is ultimately an unfolding through analysis of what is germinal in the original and pragmatic metaphysical understanding. It is ideally a process that adds nothing, but proceeds by identical propositions so that each new formulation can be analysed back
into the original material, the self-evident simples of sense. And the new metaphysics will be expressed in a language which was contained implicitly in the original language of action, because a well formed language is ultimately identical with, although a more developed version of, that language. In other words, a relation of analyticity should obtain between the language of action and the properly constructed philosophical language. Other metaphysics have failed when this process of explication adds something that was not contained in the original experience and when they express themselves in terms which cannot trace an etymology back to the gestural origin. They fail, in other words, because they are not aware of the genealogy of the terms they employ.

The genetic analysis by which one can establish an identity between the immediate sensible content of experience and advanced knowledge implies a continuum between the conceptual and sensible, between instituted languages and the language of action. The possibility of a continuum between the pre-linguistic and linguistic will establish an identity between advanced knowledge and its legitimating source. In effect, as we will see, this means that the sensible must itself be conceived as a sign system: as a language. There is therefore a parallel between the question of the origin of language and of experience. Both are primitive sign systems; and the language which expresses the development of the understanding must itself develop in the same manner as what it expresses. The limits of what can legitimately be said thereby determine, and are determined by, what is properly within the bounds of what can be experienced.

But if what can be said, and if experience have certain limits, these limits must be articulable in terms of the principle that generates what they contain. In other words, what is required is a genealogy of a limit which demonstrates its immanent generation by a series of identical propositions. The limits
are either contained implicitly within the première expérience, and within the language of action, or do not admit of inquiry at all; for that which is not within experience cannot function as explanation of anything. Thus when Condillac speaks of nature limiting the knowable we must read 'nature' as that which determines the natural metaphysical understanding and not as Locke's 'ocean of Being'. For Condillac 'nature' is an epistemological principle, not an ontological category. That is to say, it is what generates what can be said to exist, rather than being a limiting principle extrinsic to sensation and experience.

To pull back from a complete explanation is, for Condillac, to attribute 'occult qualities'. To attribute limits at the beginning of the inquiry is, firstly, to reverse the proper order of our ideas, and secondly to attribute external limitations. The effort to avoid this trap is the spur to his project to complete Locke. Condillac's problem is that he is caught between the need to open all experience to analysis without occultism, and his empiricist need to limit his inquiry. Here we see at the inception of Condillac's project the tension I will be tracing. For at the outset he wants it both ways. He wants a complete analysis of human understanding and indeed claims to have achieved this in the Essai.[E pl14] And yet to provide an integrated account without remainder, begins to appear to be an infinite, and so uncompletable task. Consequently there is a concomitant need to impose limits on the inquiry; while to do so must prejudice the inquiry. What I have sketched here is the direction Condillac takes in overcoming this dilemma and which this thesis will pursue.

What Condillac retains of empiricist modesty is a condemnation of the 'bad' metaphysics. 'Bad' not because it tries to extend the limits of human understanding, but because in its desperation to do so it makes appeal to transcendent justifications, to essences and to 'occult qualities'. If,
however, the 'rationalist' goût de système confronts its nemesis in Locke's Essay, his modesty expresses a human limitation which must ultimately be of his own devising. For Condillac the limitation, although determined by man's fall, can only be discovered within the project of determining what can be known: that is to say, through the self-determination of a philosophy.

The empiricist spirit of the 17th and 18th centuries culminates in Condillac's attempt to limit the extent of legitimate inquiry by a refusal to engage in speculation into conditions of human knowledge other than those determined within 'experience'. There is, I believe, an integrity in this determination not to search for such conditions in 'transcendental categories' and 'forms of intuition'. (I use the word 'integrity' in the sense of it having a certain honesty, but advisedly so, since this honesty derives from the acceptance that the inquiry should be 'untouched' ('inTEGRAL') by anything extrinsic to it: that is 'complete' or integral in itself.) The attempt to delimit the extent of human understanding through the discovery of a single generative principle is the attempt to find within experience that which conditions the possibility of experience. It is to uncover the implicit origin which will be the immanent principle of explication and production of human knowledge. The demand for a new beginning is, then, not merely a device for avoiding error: no mere methodological demand that explication be the unfolding of a single principle; although it is also this. But rather, explanation must at the same time be discoverable within what is explained if 'occult qualities' are to be avoided. Condillac transforms empiricist modesty into an imperative for the construction of a complete account of human experience in terms of what is given immediately and immanently. The complexity of experience must be explicable in terms of the simple, and the simple must be found within that experience. In other words, the conclusion of the seventeenth century break with tradition
must be the search for a radical empiricism. An empiricism which seeks to avoid at all costs any appeal to transcendent pseudo-explanation; for to explain simply is to explicate what is implicit in the explanandum.

In this light we can read the Kantian philosophy as a betrayal of this ambition. Transcendental argumentation works in the wrong direction. Its search for conditions of possibility in the form of experience turns away from what needs to be addressed, namely how this form is produced internally. For Condillac it is no good looking beyond the particular content of experience to account for its construction. A transcendent or transcendental explanation of experience is no explanation at all for its form is not conditioned by its content. Whatever synthetic unity is to be identified in experience can only be accounted for in terms of certain possibilities of connection of simples given immanently in those simples. The imposition of rules governing the synthesis of intuitions and eternal forms of intuition serves only arrest the development of the human understanding. Condillac's attempt to identify the content of experience with its generative possibilities is expressed in the ambiguity of the 'première expérience' on which his system rests. Both a primitive and immediate apprehension of sensation and the 'ressort' of the organism: an active experimental engagement with the sensible through which it is transformed. In this manner the limits to human understanding are drawn from within experience and consequently they must remain subject to further expansion. For reasons that should become clear, however, this internal limit is not, indeed cannot be argued for explicitly.

In Condillac we will find a thinker who tries to push the imperative of 'good' metaphysics to analyse what is in experience to its limits. But implicit in the new philosophy's effort to limit or determine itself without positing external constraints (categories, principles) are certain paradoxes
which themselves figure the manner of its self-determination. Thus the project to describe the immanent generation of these limits itself generates its own internal flaws which delimit the manner in which that project develops. Condillac's expression of empiricist modesty, in other words, produces tensions which draw him into dialogue with what lies beyond the scope of his inquiry: namely the 'bad' metaphysics. This is not always explicitly recognised in Condillac's writing. But this is also the point. For, as will be shown, what lies beyond the limits of legitimate inquiry must remain partially hidden, as the implicit unthought, fissure within the project.

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To sum up, it will be useful to recast the argument I have been pursuing in reverse. We have seen that an immanent critique of human understanding is required by Condillac's rejection of prejudice and occultism. It follows from this that any limits to the understanding must themselves be produced immanently. This however leads to the difficulty of how the contents of the mind - what is immanent to it - can delimit the form - what we can term the 'transcendental conditions'. Condillac approaches the problem by identifying the principle of generation with the content in an original experience. The principle of production of the limit must lie hidden within the principle of the connection of ideas. It cannot however be given explicitly in the origin but must await explication. The process of explicating the instinctive metaphysics will produce limits to an inquiry.

This approach has important parallels with the attempt of the new philosophy to determine itself. For the need for self-determination implies that philosophy cannot search for the conditions of its own development outside itself, in the
tradition. Thus it must discover its method and so determine the space of its operation immanently, in the process of discovery. This process must then, be one of self discovery; an uncovering of what must already implicitly be given at its inception which generates the space of inquiry. The germ of a whole philosophy should be given in its first tentative expression.

However, as we have seen, the new metaphysics' search for its origin, the process by which it establishes its own validity through self-analysis, must retrace a path through error. Its genealogy is pursued through the history of philosophy, not just because error guides one where not to go, but also because, qua a history of false starts, philosophy is a natural process of experimentation. The new philosophy is the culmination of a history of failures to start afresh. The genealogical path to truth therefore incorporates that of error. The risk of error is a requirement of the advance of human knowledge beyond that of the instinctive metaphysics. Indeed "[w]e only fall into more error because we acquire more knowledge [than animals]. Of all created beings the one that is least made for error is the one which has the least portion of intelligence." ["Nous ne tombons dans plus d'erreur, que parce que nous aquérons plus de connoissances. De tous les être créés, celui qui est le moins fait pour se tromper, est celui qui a la plus petite portion d'intelligence." OPI p491]

Paradoxically all philosophies are in strictness products of the première expérience, since there is no other principle governing the development of thought. The new philosophy therefore, can only legitimate itself by establishing the superiority of its own lineage to that of previous philosophies. And this is achieved by its being reflectively aware of its conformity to the unique principle of generation. It understands that its origin and the origin of all genuine knowledge lies within the sensible and thus expresses itself in
a language which can trace its lineage back to the original language of action. The terms it uses, in other words, derive their significance from the sensible and particular, rather than the abstract and general. This, however, produces a tension between the actual historical development which culminates with Condillac's project and its ideal reconstruction from this principle. Now, if the demonstration of the limitations on human inquiry, when taken up by Condillac, begins with a critique of the excesses of previous philosophies, then it can only delimit itself through the incorporation within itself of what it explicitly rejects. In other words it must include within its own genealogy the detours it wants to eradicate. The new philosophy, therefore, cannot escape its history. It, like the philosophies it decries, appears unable to guarantee that it has escaped prejudice. It must have within it what cannot on its own terms be thought.

What I will try to show in what follows is that Condillac is forced into just such an implicit incorporation into his system of a metaphysics he explicitly rejects. Within the original experience there is already implicitly given a principle of limitation. Both within the project and outside of it, identical to and different from the new philosophy, lies its other. Thus the new philosophy in conceiving itself is simultaneously conceived through what it is not. It tries to delimit itself but is always delimited by its other. In fact it is precisely because it is both delimited by, and includes, what it rejects that it is able to produce limits for itself from within itself. The incorporation of that from which it explicitly distinguishes itself leaves Condillac's philosophy with an internal measure of its own reach which allows for a strategic and unstable acceptance of limits for the purposes of particular inquiries, but cannot fix the limit on all possible inquiry. The other of Condillac's metaphysics threatens to lead it beyond the ambit it sets itself; beyond modesty. Ultimately
the extent to which inquiry must fail to determine itself from within itself and to be its own measure, is that to which Condillac, contrary to his explicit pronouncements, pushes back the limits and attempts to "uncover mysteries and the most hidden causes". [E p3] His modesty is always itself moderated by an unexpressed metaphysical ambition. The way Condillac negotiates this tension is the subject of this thesis.
The final chapter of the Essai, 'The order to be pursued in the exposition of the truth' [De l'ordre qu'on doit suivre dans l'exposition de la verité] deals with how to effect the transition from order of discovery to order of exposition. We have already seen that in Condillac's account there is a certain tension between the claim on the one hand that the proper order of the generation of ideas must follow the 'natural' path, and the acceptance on the other of the necessity that the search for truth be detoured through error. Here Condillac argues that the method of exposition should be identical to that of discovery and yet, somewhat paradoxically, that the exposition must rework the original process of discovery to eliminate its detours. In the opening paragraph of the chapter in question Condillac writes:

Everyone knows that art should not be apparent in a work; but perhaps it is not so well known that only through great art can it be hidden. There are many writers who, in order be more fluid and natural, think they need not subject themselves to any order. However, if by 'perfect nature' [belle nature] is meant flawlessness, it is clear that one must not try to imitate it through negligence: for art can only disappear once one employs enough of it to avoid oversights.

["Chacun sait que l'art ne doit pas paraître dans un ouvrage; mais peut-être ne sait-on pas également que ce n'est qu'à force d'art qu'on peut le cacher. Il y a bien des écrivains qui, pour être plus faciles et plus naturels, croient ne devoir s'assujeter à aucun ordre: cependant, si par la belle nature on entend la nature sans défaut, il est évident qu'on ne doit pas chercher à l'imiter par des négligences, et que l'art ne peut disparaître que lorsqu'on en a assez pour les éviter." E pl16]
The record of one's reasoning, argues Condillac, needs to be properly ordered so that it is easy to ascertain if anything has been forgotten or omitted. Any fault in the order of exposition will betray an error in the original reasoning, since the proper order of exposition should follow the same route as the natural development of thought. [E p117] However things are not so simple for Condillac precisely because the steps taken by the unreflective understanding, insofar as they were not attended to, are not readily recalled by the reflective, theoretical metaphysics. What this means is that the reflective, or conscious appropriation of the development of the natural metaphysics involves a process of completing the original. The art of exposition constitutes a rewriting of the original development of thought: a reconstruction in which those steps that were made naturally and without conscious awareness - à notre insu - are brought to attention. [OPII p382] The original sentiment has to be altered for it to ground the possibility of reflection. This explication of the implicit developments brings the forgotten steps into consciousness through the introduction of art. Only once the whole development is made explicit through its being properly ordered is the possibility of error eliminated since all the gaps are filled with clear reasoned steps.

Any gap in theoretical reasoning can only be accounted for in terms of a forgotten development which took place at the level of the natural metaphysics. And it is the use of arbitrary symbols that will distinguish for us the purely theoretical from the natural: from sentiment. The problem with which Condillac is dealing in the final paragraphs of the Essai is that of how to recover all the missing steps within what is written, how, that is, to complete the transition from sentiment to theory and instituted language. In the main the Essai addresses conscious reasoning processes (that is, linguistically governed ones) which are translated into an ordered text. And it is not until the Traité des sensations...
that Condillac tackles the problem raised here at the end of
the **Essai**: namely how to recover the original metaphysics for
consciousness and within a work of philosophy.

As we saw in the critiques of Descartes and Locke, according to
the **Essai** error consists in straying from the natural path to
truth. The natural metaphysics, therefore, insofar as it is
directed by nature, cannot err. Consequently the risk of error
can only be run in the exposition: reasoning can only take a
wrong turn through the attempt to grasp its original
development reflectively. What I want to stress about this
account of error is that it is essentially the consequence of
an analysis being **incomplete**. As I argued earlier, for
Condillac, error is the failure of a system to provide a
complete genetic analysis of itself. The inability to fill in
all the steps, to leave one or more unreflected upon, produces
the picture of a path to truth which is detoured. Error is a
gap in the order of exposition: a gap which represents a
failure to bring a certain step in the reasoning process to
attention. Having allowed a gap to remain un-noticed, the order
of exposition is compromised and as such contains falsehoods.
Thus, as we saw, the consequence of Locke's failure to rewrite
the **Essai** was that he omitted or forgot certain steps, whence
Condillac's mission to complete it. As Condillac writes toward
the end of his **Essai** "I have tried to do what this philosopher
[Locke] had forgotten to do; I returned to the first operation
of the mind, and, it seems to me, [...] I have given a complete
analysis of the understanding". ["J'ai essayé de faire ce que
ce philosophe avoit oublié; je suis remonté à la première
opération de l'ame, et j'ai, ce me semble, [...] donné une
analyse complète de l'entendement". **Essai** p114]\(^8\) For Condillac,
then, a system is false if it is in need of completion, and it
needs completing if it leaves implicit what should be made
explicit. In turn, to make a step explicit is to write it into
the proper order of exposition, thus producing a complete
genetic analysis.
Appearing as they do in the last chapter, the remarks about the place of 'art' in a work invite us to reread the Essai as itself an artful attempt to recreate the natural order of reasoning. Specifically, in pursuit of this art it must bring to attention and make explicit what is implicit in human understanding by filling in the steps in the development of the faculties which we have forgotten having made. To do this, a generative order must be introduced into the work of the mind. However Condillac admits to having had the experience himself of not having imposed sufficient order and thereby of having lost or forgotten steps in the reasoning process.

With regard to works of reasoning, it is only insofar as an author imposes order that he can perceive those things which had been forgotten or which hadn't been sufficiently expanded. I have often had the experience. This essay for example, had been completed [achevé] and yet I still didn't understand the full scope of the principle of the connection of ideas. This was due exclusively to a passage of about two pages which had strayed from the place where it should have been.

[S'il s'agit des ouvrages de raisonnement, ce n'est qu'autant qu'un auteur y met de l'ordre qu'il peut s'apercevoir des choses qui ont été oubliées ou de celles qui n'ont point été assez approfondies. J'en ai souvent fait l'expérience. Cet essai, par exemple, étoit achevé, et cependant je ne connoissois pas encore dans toute son étendue le principe de la liaison des idées. Cela provenoit uniquement d'un morceau d'environ deux pages, qui n'étoit pas à la place où il devoit être." E pl16]

By admitting to having himself neglected to expound the development of ideas in the proper order, and to that extent to having been in error, Condillac seems to provide a glimpse at the process of the development of his ideas that leads to the artful reconstruction. However, and as Derrida points out in his introduction to the Essai, the status of the remark itself is difficult to evaluate.9 There are, in fact, two sides to the
difficulty. Firstly we are led to wonder whether these pages were ever resituated. That is to say, has Condillac left the Essai in an artless condition, retaining an oversight in order to lay bare the actual and natural development of his thought? After all, Condillac made no amendments to the Essai after its first publication and is keen that philosophers be open about the progress of their thought. [E p115] And yet if this were his intention he would surely have indicated which pages they were. And that it is Condillac who berates Locke for not revising his essay, might quickly dissuade one from entertaining such a suggestion. However if we suppose that the pages had been resituated by the time he wrote about them being out of place, we are led toward another difficulty: namely to understand in what sense the work could have been achevé while two pages were misplaced. For as we have seen Condillac insists that the main objective of Locke's project, his principal objet, will only be reached when the development of the human understanding is transcribed in the correct order.

One might think it inappropriate to quibble here: that plainly Condillac means the work was substantially complete (achevé) while it still had to be rewritten or reordered. However a distinction between writing and rewriting, or between writing and reordering, cannot work here, because for Condillac it is precisely a process of rewriting which is at stake; and it is precisely the project to put things in the proper order - to re-order Locke - in which Condillac is engaged. In other words the Essai in no sense could have been achevé while it was still in a process of being rewritten. The principle of the connection of ideas has not been fully understood, not been fully analysed so long as our ideas are connected in the wrong order. This realisation should lead us back to question the present state of the work and its claim to be complete. Can we then take more seriously the suggestion that these lost pages were never resituated? that the work is still to be completed? If so this would belie both the claim that the work had been
completed (achevé), and that it represents a complete (integral) account of human knowledge (une analyse complète [E pl14]). This is, nonetheless, the reading I want to pursue and the first question it needs to address is why these two pages should remain out of order; unrecovered within the theoretical exposition. Why, in other words, was the Essai not completed?

In search of an answer, we need to look at the other side of this difficulty, namely that to speak within the Essai of its having been completed leaves us puzzling as to whether this final chapter had itself been included in the work. This same peculiarity effects the claim referred to earlier that Condillac had just provided a complete analysis of the human understanding, occurring as it does within a work it claims to be already complete. [E pl14] If such remarks are not included within the work, would it be in accordance with the proper order to leave a discussion of how to order ones investigations until after their completion? Certainly according to Condillac the final section of the Essai, dealing with method, must come last. He writes: "It was not possible for us to establish a good method before; but it seems to me that now it discovers itself [se découvre] and that it is the natural result [suite naturelle] of the investigations we have made." ["Il n'étoit pas possible auparavant de nous faire une bonne méthode; mais il me semble qu'actuellement elle se découvre d'elle-même, et qu'elle est une suite naturelle des recherches que nous avons faites." E pl104]

Not only is the method itself natural and given prior to any reflection, but the reflective moment which explicates the method that had been followed implicitly, itself follows naturally from the original development. The methodological conclusions are the natural next step [suite naturelle] in a natural process. And moreover this reflexive moment of self discovery is also an uncovering, an ex-position. In bringing the development of the human understanding to consciousness the
principle of that development itself begins to be disclosed, and it is disclosed precisely as that which must lead to this disclosure.

It would seem, therefore, that because the method discovers itself in the natural course of the investigation, that the completion of the *Essai* must occur in the final exposition of the principle which orders the exposition as a whole. The final chapters on method rewrite the original development from which they arise. The completion of the *Essai* becomes possible through the artful reconstruction described in these final pages and so they would need to be included within it. And yet, such a completion is disallowed not simply by the inclusion within the final pages of references to being already complete, but because what is being made explicit must have been implicit at the beginning of the work. As a principle of the ordering of ideas the methodology must be at work from the outset, albeit without Condillac's knowledge: as one might say *à son insu*.

But to the extent that the *Essai* is written (that is rewritten), it will consciously include from the beginning the principle it wants to uncover at the end. The discovery that the natural order of the connection of ideas must be followed from its origin in sensation is implicit in the beginning since to construct the *Essai* is to reconstruct the prereflective natural process. Thus the first paragraph of the first chapter speaks of the project to return to the origin of our ideas, to find a first simple thought and to develop it. And the introduction speaks of the need to return human understanding to a single principle and claims (in the past tense) to have found the solution to the problem of how to account for human understanding in the connection of ideas. So the methodological disclosure is not even merely *implicit* at the beginning. The work as a whole, qua a piece of writing, must be *explicitly* theoretical and reflective from the outset.
But while the method is both explicated at the end, and already explicit at the beginning, it must also turn up, out of turn, throughout the work. For, as Condillac writes at the end, in order to deal with the question of method it will suffice to develop a few of the reflections that are scattered [répandues] within the work. ["Il suffira de développer quelques-unes des réflexions qui sont répandues dans cet ouvrage." E pl04] And again this raises the question of how such reflections could have arisen undeveloped within the work in its pre-reflective moment. Are they in their proper places? In one sense they need to be found within the work as precursors to the final section which is here conceived to be outside the work proper. But in another, they must be out of place, undeveloped asides répandues haphazardly, and only finding their place by being gathered up within a conclusion which is the work's completion. It would appear, then, that the reflections on method must be not only after and before, but also throughout the work.

Condillac never tells us which passage had been misplaced. Could it then be this final chapter, dealing with the order of exposition? After all it is these two pages that seem necessarily unplaceable: necessarily, as it were, out of order. The speculations on method must at once be discovered as the culmination of the work since the principle of natural reasoning is discovered in it; and as the precondition for writing it, since they provide the theorisation of how to order the natural metaphysics. These pages must both come before the natural development in order to record its steps and after as the culmination of its development.

We now begin to see why the Essai cannot be completed. Within the problematic of placing these pages lies a structure which is endemic to Condillac's system as a whole and which requires that human inquiry remain incomplete. And if what is true of the exposition is true of what it tries to expose this will be also true of the inquiry into the human understanding itself.
The human understanding cannot complete itself by coming to a full understanding of its own development because the attempt to transcribe the natural metaphysical process of reasoning will always leave gaps. The appropriation of the implicit process by an explicit series of connected ideas cannot be completed because the work cannot be a complete reconstruction of the natural development so long as it simultaneously undermines the actual development by reordering it in the exposition. Thus the process of rewriting must distort the order of discovery in the very effort to reinscribe it posthumously as natural. As such if error consists of those connections which are not made explicit its elimination becomes impossible. However, insofar as these connections remain implicit they are not perceived as error. Until they can be placed within the proper order of exposition they remain lost or forgotten (oubliés) and the work can have the appearance of being complete. Condillac is trapped within the illusion of believing he has completed the Essai while producing these rather artful reflexive paradoxes which undermine this claim. It is as though these oversights are themselves introduced to betray the central error of the Essai. Its claim to be complete is its own principal négligence.

If I am right that a theoretical metaphysics that made explicit all that was implicit in the natural metaphysics would of necessity be endless - uncompletable - we might well expect as a requirement of the form the Essai takes for there to be within it an oversight or error (négligence) that allows the inquiry to come to an end. Only by supposing that these pages could be properly placed can Condillac stop writing. The oversight by attempting to lay bare the natural and actual development of his thinking is not artful enough. Thus the project which wants to be bounded by a natural metaphysics is always primarily limited by the artful and speculative. It therefore draws its own limits despite itself. As such the limit to inquiry cannot be drawn with absolute conviction. As
we shall see the limits shift according to the exigencies of the inquiry in question. The limit is to be stretched by the next project; which itself must have its forgotten side. What Locke achieved is open to further completion, in a incompletable process.

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Condillac's candour about the missing pages, while gesturing toward a disclosure of the workings lying behind the artful reconstruction, actually conceals as much as it reveals. It merely plunges us into a series of impenetrable questions concerning the status of these pages. In this respect it exposes the same structure as Condillac's metaphysics as a whole. These lost or forgotten pages indicate, I suggest, a hidden (implicit) side to Condillac's project which I will be examining in the second part of this thesis. But some scene setting is in order here.

While still writing the Essai, Condillac was preparing a dissertation on Leibniz's system of monads which he was to submit in competition to the Berlin Academy in 1746. Prior to the discovery of this text in 1980, Condillac had been known primarily as an exponent of Lockean empiricism. And while the studies of both Knight and Le Roy detect certain affinities between the philosophies of Condillac and Leibniz, they conclude that any positive influence is negligible. From his reputation as the foremost French critic of the excesses of 'rationalist' speculation one would expect this new text to expand on the critiques of Leibniz conducted in both the Essai of 1746 and the Traité des Systèmes of 1749. Yet, Les Monades, which must have been in preparation while the Essai was still being written and just three years before the Traité des Systèmes, claims to establish the existence of monads. [LM

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The discovery of a text by Condillac in defence of Leibniz's system has inevitably led to the need for a reevaluation of his philosophy. And while we should heed Auroux when he warns against supposing that Les Monades expresses Condillac's considered opinions, we will see that Condillac's Leibnizianism is not isolable from the canonical texts.¹¹

In his introduction to Les Monades Bongie shows the extent to which Condillac was concerned to disclaim authorship of this work. According to Bongie "[i]n a certain rather paradoxical sense it may even be true that Condillac kept this work, or rather its full implications, something of a secret for a time even from himself."[LM pl4] He certainly kept it a secret from his correspondents. As Bongie points out, Condillac's letters to Gabriel Cramer at the time he must have been preparing the Dissertation make no mention of it despite their frequent discussions of Leibniz.¹² And even Maupertuis, the president of the Berlin Academy, with whom Condillac corresponded at the time, appears to have been unaware of Condillac's submission. [LM pl3]

Even the one published reference to the Dissertation was not specific enough to lead to its discovery. In the Traité des animaux (1755) Condillac admits that a chapter has been "taken almost complete from a Dissertation that I wrote some years ago which is published in an anthology of the Berlin Academy and to which I did not put my name." ["presque tiré tout entier d'une Dissertation que j'ai faite, il y a quelques années, qui est imprimée dans un recueil de l'Académie de Berlin, & à laquelle je n'ai pas mis mon nom". OPI p365]

These observations of Bongie's expose the force d'art with which Condillac attempted to disguise the original order of development of his ideas. Condillac continued to introduce passages from the Dissertation into later works. Such self-plagiarism appears to run counter to his claim that the order
of exposition should follow the order of discovery. This coupled with the refusal to acknowledge his work for the Berlin Academy amount to a complex effort at dissimulating the progress of his thinking.

It is somewhat surprising that we should discover such dissimulation in a thinker who exalts the virtue of laying bare the false starts of past researches. In the penultimate chapter of the Essai Condillac writes: "Philosophers would have made up for the helpless situation in which the study of ourselves mostly leaves us if they had left us the history of the progress of their minds". ["Les philosophes auraient suppléé à l'impuissance où nous sommes, pour la plupart, de nous étudier nous-mêmes, s'ils nous avaient laissé l'histoire des progrès de leur esprit." E p115] We have seen one example of Condillac attempting to follow his own advice in the admission referred to earlier at the end of the Essai. We encounter another example in the Traité des sensations where he makes much of a confession to his earlier prejudices concerning Molyneux's problem. [TS p10ff] Why then does Condillac attempt to disguise the history of the progress of his own mind? And what implications does this have for the way we are to understand the relationship of the exposition to the original, or natural development?

If we look again at our discussion of the missing pages such dissimulation will appear less surprising. Condillac's admission to having had the experience of forgetting or misplacing pages leads to the acceptance that he cannot completely conform to the methodological exigencies exalted at the end of the Essai, namely to lay bare the history of the progress of his thought. For the demand that the exposition retrace the original development of thought is only answered through the introduction of art with which to reconstruct an idealised genealogy of the system. It follows that the writing of all his philosophical works, not just the Essai, must
involve a continual process of completion and reconstruction. Without art the development of his thought would appear too negligent; too prone to error and the hope is that by rewriting the history of his thinking he might recover the appearance of a natural progression without false starts. However the artful reconstruction will always fall short of being an accurate representation of the original development in virtue of being artful as opposed to natural. The reconstruction can only appear natural because art hides itself: "ce n'est qu'à force d'art qu'on peut le cacher".[E p116] What this means is that I disagree with Bongie's assessment that Condillac hides his dissertation simply to stay in favour with the spirit of the Encyclopaedists. Rather, I want to argue for its structural necessity to Condillac's project.

The rewritten genealogy at one level ignores the negligent step which is Les Monades, but it cannot eradicate it. Les Monades must at the least be a necessary error warning Condillac where not to tread: an essential detour on the path to truth. But more than this it must also be part of the natural development of his thinking; paradoxically in need of being reinscribed into the Condillacian cannon and of being ignored as a false start. It occupies the ambivalent position of appearing both as irrefutably part of the actual history of Condillac's thought and as an error. Qua error it should be overlooked - oublié - and qua actual historical episode it needs to be assigned its proper place. However the error which it represents must, on Condillac's terms, consist in a gap in the history of his thought. Les Monades cannot be completely ignored, but like the missing pages of the Essai needs to be resituated; whence his concern to rewrite it into the subsequent works, in order to recover a truth for it by reinscribing it within the proper order. For the work of philosophy is to recover the forgotten steps in its history, to write them back into the system's genealogy. In this sense Les Monades can represent the implicit or forgotten dimension within Condillac's thought. A dimension
which cannot be fully appropriated within the explicit exposition of the published work, but which cannot be excluded either. The canonical texts, in other words, must leave gaps, not just as negligent remarks concerning their own completion, but in the form of this apocryphal metaphysical treatise.

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Before turning to *Les Monades* it will be necessary to continue the reading of the final chapter of the *Essai* and address another perhaps even more puzzling remark. After concluding that the method of analysis to be pursued in the discovery of truth is identical with the method of exposition, and summing up the importance of signs within his sensationalist epistemology, Condillac ends the *Essai* by presenting the reader with a problem, namely:

To determine on the basis of a man's work, the character and extent of his spirit, and consequently to say not only what are his talents of which it provides the evidence, but also what are those that he can acquire. To take, for example, Corneille's first play and show that when this poet composed it he already had, or would soon have, all the genius which warranted him such great success. Only the analysis of the work can make known what operations contributed to it, and to what extent they were exercised; and only the analysis of these operations can distinguish those qualities that are compatible in the same man, from those that are not, and in this way solve the problem. I doubt that there are many problems more difficult than this one.

["L'ouvrage d'un homme étant donné, déterminer le caractère et l'étendue de son esprit, et dire en conséquence non seulement quels sont les talens dont il donne des preuves, mais encore quels sont ceux qu'il peut acquérir: prendre par exemple, la première pièce de Corneille, et démontrer que, quand ce poëte la composoit, il avait déjà, ou du moins auroit bientôt tout le génie qui lui mérité de si grands succès. Il n'y a que l'analyse de l'ouvrage qui
puisse faire connoître quelles opérations y ont contribué, et jusqu'à quel degré elles ont eu de l'exercice; et il n'y a que l'analyse de ces opérations qui puisse faire distinguer les qualités qui sont compatibles dans le même homme, de celles qui ne le sont pas, et par-là donner la solution du problème. Je doute qu'il y ait beaucoup de problèmes plus difficiles que celui-là."

The oddity of this final paragraph springs from the fact that there is no obvious thematic continuity between it and the rest of the chapter. It seems to have nothing to do either with the discussion of the proper order of exposition, or with the concluding summary of the intentions of the book that immediately precede it. It does however hark back to Pt.IV Ch. 15 'Du génie des langues' [On the Genius of Languages] in which the influence of the character of a language on the literary and philosophical works of a nation is discussed. The coincidence of concerns between the final paragraph and the Du génie chapter, however, serves primarily to make Condillac's final problem appear all the more out of place. The immediate difficulty is, therefore, not so much to determine a writer's thought from the first work as to determine why the problem is presented here at all.

To end his first work by drawing attention to a problematic centred on the production of a first work is surely to invite the reader to direct his or her efforts at a solution, to the Essai itself. The Essai, must usurp Condillac's example of Corneille's first play, as the work around which the problematic revolves. In other words these remarks are an invitation to the reader to determine on the basis of the Essai the 'character and extent' of Condillac's thought, what 'talents' he has, and those he might still acquire. The problem is to discover what lies implicitly in the Essai on the basis of which both to extrapolate a broader system of thought, and describe a certain potential for its development. Condillac is
suggesting, then, that the work is not complete in itself but that there is a implicit potential that directs us beyond it. A careful reading might enable us to uncover a greater system of thought within which the Essai is placed as a part, and also predict the subsequent history of this thought.

We can flesh out these general remarks by conceiving the Essai in terms of what Condillac has to say about the development of language and the role within it of philosophical and literary writings. In the Du génie chapter Condillac argues that a "language expresses the character of those who speak it". ["chaque langue exprime le caractère du peuple qui la parle." Ep98] And further that it is the state of development of a language which makes possible the appearance of great writers, be it in literature or in philosophy. In turn it is the imaginative writer who will transform the language so opening the way for its further development. Consequently a Corneille born at a different time may not have demonstrated any talent while the great Corneille determined the progress of the French language and made possible a whole generation of writers. [Ep101] From this perspective, (pursuing the parallel between Condillac and Corneille) Condillac's Essai appears firstly as a product of a linguistic milieu: the tradition of philosophical discourse. At the same time the work must involve the attempt to forge a new language with which to express the new system. And finally it offers the possibility that it could be the spring for a new method of philosophical expression.

If all this is suggested indirectly by Condillac's discussion of the genius of language and by his presentation of this most difficult of problems, it is underlined by his direct comments about the Essai. Introducing it, Condillac declares that: "I had, in a way, to make myself a new language"; one which would escape the chaos of contemporary metaphysical expression by rooting the definitions of its terms in the sensible origin. ["toute cette partie de la métaphysique [the study of the
operations of the mind] a été jusqu'ici dans un si grand chaos, que j'ai été obligé de me faire, en quelque sorte, un nouveau langage. E pl114] The language of the new philosophy must both escape its past and be born of it. It cannot forge a completely new language but must rather sublimate the chaos of metaphysical error and the inexactitudes of ordinary language: that is, conceive itself anew by purifying the existing language. For, as Condillac writes, the only way in which error is to be avoided is for each step in the development of a language to be based on the one that immediately precedes it. [E pl06ff] A language must be generated from the preceding language and its worth calculated in terms of the veracity of its lineage to the language of action. The transformation of language to language must proceed by identities so that nothing is added that is not contained implicitly in the preceding language. So providing a complete genealogy of a language with each step filled in, will legitimate it; and a legitimate language must thereby be contained implicitly within the germ of the language of action.

It seems, then, given this picture, that Condillac is offering his essay as a work that is itself to be further developed and which may spawn a new way of thinking. Just as the development of the faculties pursued within the Essai proceeds, according to Condillac, analytically from language to language; so the Essai as a whole must be a natural development in an historical progression. And the new sort of language he has forged here should form the basis for that of the next work. Through its analysis we can decipher the future works hidden within the first one since its language contains implicitly the further progression. What Condillac is asking, is for us to analyse the language of this work as he has analysed language within it, so that the Essai becomes the germ from which the later works grow, just as the language of action is the germ for the production of the Essai.
If Condillac's problem gives the appearance of being out of place, it once again mirrors the problematic of the final chapter. We've seen that these words, written to end the Essai, offer a clue as to how it is to be deciphered or completed. The suggestion being made of course is that the first work is incomplete, a part of a whole with which it awaits integration. Condillac's project is always open: always a projection beyond itself. The incompleteness of the Essai indicates, therefore, at once a gap and a space for development. It demands a proper order by which the concealed or implicit is explicated or made explicit. Genius is already contained in the first work composed, analysis of it will uncover what this genius can and cannot produce. The genius is what generates its future states, just as Condillac argues that the subject of a true proposition contains its predicates. There is in other words a relation of analyticity between the present state of the mind and its potential.

The only clue as to how the development of Condillac's thought might be extrapolated from the Essai, is given in the suggestion that the analysis of the work should separate those qualities which are compatible in the same man from those that are not. (For 'qualités' we must read 'works' since these are the only qualities available to scrutiny. "[I]l n'y a que l'analyse de l'ouvrage qui puisse faire connoître quelles opérations y ont contribué". [E p118]) Condillac appears to imagine that some kind of logic of compossibility obtains within his psychic life. A logic for which what is contained germinally within the 'genius' must be connected with what is given on the surface and deducible from it. The surface here of course being the published work, the depth, the hidden system of thought that produces it and to which it directs the reader. This hidden side then is to be developed through a kind of translation which brings to the surface what is implicit. That is to say, that the analysis of the work will pursue its natural development; moving from identity to identity so that
nothing is added, but the implicit space of compossibilities is brought into view. The qualities of the mind - its products - are determined by its true nature. Such products are compossibles involved in some kind of harmony.

Without having dwelt on the name of 'Leibniz' I expect the Leibnizian flavour of my reading of Condillac will have become clearer. On this reading, to be explicit, these final remarks offer a key to an underlying Leibnizian logic which plays beneath the surface of the empiricist rhetoric. What they suggest is that a proper analysis of the Essai might uncover Les Monades as what is germinal within it. Les Monades would be the continuation of it - the next stage in the development of Condillac's new language. Condillac's conclusion to the Essai represents both an invitation to uncover an implicit hidden side and a clue to the nature of what is hidden: namely a monadology. For the structure of the invitation mirrors that of a Leibnizian metaphysics, be it here focused on the self. And yet how can we think of this development as compossible with the Essai as Condillac appears to demand that we do? Our problem is that the Essai would appear to contain its own contradiction. Its predicate, it appears, will negate it since empiricism cannot accommodate such a metaphysics. But if Condillac is right that a proper analysis of a work "can distinguish those qualities which are compatible in the same man from those that are not" ["puisse faire distinguer les qualités qui sont compatibles dans le même homme, de celles qui ne le sont pas..." E pl18] we ought to conclude that Les Monades and the Essai are not simply incompatible and we certainly should not jettison his monadology from our interpretation of Condillac's philosophy.

This leads us back to the central problematic of this thesis; namely what is the nature of the incompatibility between the project Condillac sets himself in the Essai and the claim to have established the existence of monads in Les Monades, and
how are these two seemingly opposed strands to be retained. What I will try to demonstrate begins with the fairly uncontroversial claim that the Lockean project to delimit a legitimate area for human inquiry, contains within it certain tensions. It is endemic to such a project that it contain at least implicitly what it tries to distinguish itself from. Condillac's attempt to radicalise Lockean empiricism fails to resolve this difficulty. Indeed his rigorous approach serves to exacerbate it and he evolves a system which I argue has two aspects: an explicit Lockean empiricism and a largely hidden engagement with the 'bad' metaphysics it tries to expurgate. The necessity of the empiricist project to negotiate with what it wants to reject binds it to the bad metaphysics. The peculiarities of Condillac's empiricism mirror the underlying metaphysical framework. I will show that both aspects of Condillac's thinking are tied into a relation in which each structurally organises the other. This means that the apocryphal Les Monades is never completely hidden but is in a process of becoming explicit. Consequently the process of understanding Condillac's philosophy is identical to that of his conception of the understanding as such. It involves a development from an original language according to identities, in which the implicit side is explicated.

However despite this structure of development or unfolding, a tension must remain between the 'good' and the 'bad' metaphysics in order for one to be in need of explication. For the project cannot make everything explicit at once. A complete analysis for which everything would be explicit and compossible cannot be achieved; for one because such an account runs against the modesty of the empiricist enterprise. And the extent to which the empiricist project remains incomplete it must involve an implicit hidden side which negates it and with which it remains in tension. What is required is a conception of a development according to identities which in the broader picture always promises to recover or sublimate the
contradiction. But ultimately neither can be subsumed within
the other and no synthesis is effected. While the hope is held
out of a complete language, its development must proceed
indefinitely under the motor of the attempts to limit itself.

These points are taken up in Part II where the role of Leibniz
within Condillac's system is given further scrutiny with a view
to discovering an effective model of the relation between the
two aspects of Condillac's thought. Before discussing Leibniz,
in Part I I conduct an analysis of various other thinkers who
bear directly on Condillac and appear to have had a substantial
influence in determining the direction of his thinking. Through
various readings of their work I hope to explicate in some
detail the problematic I have outlined here.
Chapter 1: Sensations, Objects and Cartesian Doubt

The empirical philosophy as practiced by Locke consists in a critical examination of the instruments of knowledge which is conducted through an analysis of the extent of their dominion. In the hands of Condillac, its aim becomes to circumscribe the limits of human understanding by tracing its development from its source in sensation. For Condillac an explanation of the mind is only to be found through an examination of its genesis and evolution, and consequently the critical problem becomes a genetic problem and psychology becomes the foundation of epistemology.

One half of Locke's empiricist platform locates the origin of human knowledge in the senses. But at the same time he follows Descartes in taking sensations to be caused by a contact between sense organs and objects. [e.g. EHI p78] This second empiricist 'principle', however is anti-Cartesian to the extent that it becomes an attempt to conceive of the relation between world and mind without recourse to any common term; that is through the notion of a direct and transparent influence.

I use the term 'principle' here in Condillac's preferred sense as that from which a system begins. In the Traité des systèmes he identifies three sorts of principle. Firstly, abstract and general maxims as employed in the construction of the systems of, for example, Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz. Secondly, suppositions which are thought to explain things, but which have no independent means of verification. And thirdly, well
established facts verified by experience. The third category is the only sort that can ground a legitimate system. [OPI p121ff] Condillac defines such a principle thus: "in any system there is a first fact, a fact which is the beginning of the system, and which, for this reason, is called a 'principle', because 'principle' and 'beginning' are two words which originally signify the same thing". ["Dans tout système, il y a un premier fait, un fait qui en est le commencement, et que, par cette raison, on aurait appelé principe: car principe et commencement sont deux mots qui signifient originairement la même chose." OPI p123] We will see that the distinction between the beginning of a system and what an inquiry intends to demonstrate becomes problematic for the empiricist project. I will, however, be employing the terms 'first' and 'second' 'principles' of empiricism to refer to the claims that all knowledge is derived from experience or sensation, and that sensations are caused by the impact of material objects on the sense organs, respectively. This usage is of course problematic because neither of these are 'facts' discovered within experience which could be the beginning of an empiricist epistemology. But I will be arguing that this problematic is endemic to Condillac's project and in this sense the ambivalence which troubles my use of the terms is inescapable.

Now, if Descartes had made the connection between mind and matter possible by appeal to innate principles of reason (ideas of extension, durability, number, motion and so on) which thought and the world necessarily share; for empiricism the world of matter, in a way which remained problematic, had to have an immediate effect on thought. The attempt to establish a direct, causal relation between them necessarily involves the elimination of a principle of mediation.

Although it may be that such mediation could never be completely excluded; I will be arguing that the purpose of the new philosophy is, nonetheless, oriented by this ideal. Its
project is, in other words, determined by the effort to proscribe ideas which refuse to be accounted for within any generative account of the human understanding — determined, in other words, by its opposition to a rationalist prejudice: the inclination to pre-empt the development of the understanding by determining its parameters in advance. It is not surprising therefore, that the first book of Locke's *Essay* should be devoted to refuting the doctrine of innate ideas. But if, as Condillac claims, Locke's method was not radical enough it is largely because of its incorporation of a Cartesian framework in its theory of perception. This, as we will see, is a consequence of a failure properly to take account of the role of language in the evolution of the understanding. For this reason I want to turn to certain fundamental characteristics of the Cartesian system which I think have direct bearing on the way Locke organises his analysis. This will then provide the background to the conception of Condillac's reaction to Locke which I recommend, namely that it is an attempt to eliminate these Cartesian elements.\(^1\) It will be largely in terms of the internal tensions of the Cartesian system, which I want to isolate in this section, that we can see Locke's project operating. The discussion attempts to uncover what I take to be the fundamental moment of failure in Descartes's account of perception. For it is at that moment that the motor of Condillac's empiricism is constructed.

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The crucial point that Descartes wants to make with regard to perception, is that much of what is given in sensation bears no essential relationship to the object that occasions it. We cannot infer on the basis of a sensible impression anything positive about material objects. Thus we make a fundamental error if we suppose that the material cause of sensation is in
anyway akin to the sensation itself. As Descartes puts it repeatedly, there is nothing in the image that resembles what it represents. It is, he says, to confuse the sensation with the object to suppose that the relation between them could be one of resemblance. It will be worth quoting Descartes himself firstly from La Dioptrique (1637), (Optics):

We must take care not to assume that, in order to sense, the soul needs to contemplate certain images which are sent by objects to the brain, as our philosophers commonly do [...] They had no reason to posit such images, unless, by observing that our thought can be easily stimulated by a painting into conceiving the object that is depicted in it, it seemed to them that thought must be stimulated in the same way by little paintings which form in our head, for it to conceive what affects the senses. Instead of this, we should consider that there are several things other than images which can stimulate our thoughts; such as, for example, signs and words, which do not resemble in any way the things they signify.

Il faut [...] prendre gard à ne pas supposer que, pour sentir l'âme ait besoin de contempler quelques images qui soient envoyées par les objets jusques au cerveau, ainsi que font communément nos philosophes; [...] ils n'ont eu aucune raison de les supposer, sinon que, voyant que notre pensée peut facilement être excitée, par un tableau, à concevoir l'objet qui y est peint, il leur a semblé qu'elle devrait l'être, en même façon, à concevoir ceux qui touchent nos sens, par lieu que nous devons considérer qu'il y a plusieurs autres choses que des images, qui peuvent exciter notre pensée; comme, par exemple, les signes et les paroles, qui ne ressemblent en aucune façon aux choses qu'elles signifient." [PWDI p165; OD VI 112]

This error is not made only by philosophers, however, but pervades our natural way of thinking.

The chief and most common error which is to be found here consists in my judging that the ideas which are in me resemble, or conform to, things located outside me.[PWDII p26 (translation modified); OD VII, 37]
Sensations then, are not images and any resemblance between objects and the moving 'picture' they might produce in the brain cannot be the basis for any judgement about the nature of the world. If it were, as Descartes points out, we should need an extra set of eyes in our brain to observe the resemblance. [PWDI p167; OD VII, 130] There must, in other words, be a radical disjunction between the physical process the body undergoes when encountering material objects, and sensations. Sensations are like a language in their apparent ability to refer to the world without resembling it: a language in which states of the brain "are ordained by nature" to make the soul have particular sensations. [PWDI p167; OD VII, 130] The locution 'ordained by nature' stands for the point at which Descartes's explanation ends. Where there is no resemblance, there can be no explanation. No judgement as to why the connection should be one way rather than another, is possible. In this sense the relation between sensation and object can, following Saussure, be termed 'arbitrary' (arbitraire).²

But if the mind can be led from an idea to the object without there being any resemblance, the question becomes how it is that sensations represent. If there is only an arbitrary relation between sense impression and object what is it that secures this relation? Descartes answers that insofar as we are limited to sensation there is no such security. The Meditationes de Prima Philosophia (1641), (Meditations) begin by attempting to bring us to an appreciation of the inadequacy of the senses as a basis for knowledge of an external, material world. For example he writes: "In the first Meditation reasons are provided which give us possible grounds for doubt about all things, especially material things". [PWDII p9; OD VII, 12. My emphasis.] The method of doubt at one stroke frees us from preconceived opinions and "provides the easiest route by which the mind may be led away from the senses". [PWDII p9, OD VII, 12.] Indeed the primary objective of Descartes's method must be to avoid the "first and main cause of all our errors", namely
the intimate tie between mind and body which in early childhood makes them indistinguishable [PWDI p218; OD VIII A 35] Union with the body clouds thought and encourages the will to exceed the understanding, and consequently the project of philosophy must begin by extricating the soul from the grip of matter. If a real, substantial distinction between res cogitans and res extensa is to be established it will be by first excluding the sensible from the inquiry [PWDI p54; OD VII 78]:

I shall now close my eyes, I shall stop my ears, I shall withdraw all my senses, I shall eliminate from my thoughts all images of bodily things [...] I shall regard such images as vacuous, false and worthless [PWDI p24; ODVII 34]

And by detaching the mind from the senses sensation becomes detached from the object. Thus the chief error, the confusion of sensation with objects, is overcome through a prior separation of the mind from sensation and ultimately from the body. By disentangling itself from the original confused state the Cartesian mind escapes the distractions of base bodily need into a realm of pure thought which has no corporeal correlate and from which it can assume a disinterested perspective. This new perspective reveals the inadequacy of sensible ideas as a basis for knowledge and in so doing makes it evident that there can be no necessary connection between them and objects. The conclusion can then be drawn that one's habitual way of thinking is confused: that sensible qualities are only confusedly thought to belong to objects.

But before arriving at this conclusion, Descartes needs to show how, through this detached contemplation, we can come to distinguish between two sorts of idea. For if he is to move beyond the initial sceptical position of the first Meditation he needs to disentangle those ideas which are reliable indicators of the nature of the external world, from the rest.
If sensations have no relation of conformity with what they indicate, if the relation of sensation to object is arbitrary, this cannot be established by comparing the two (since there is no independent access to the things in themselves) and so needs to be shown on the basis of the sensation alone. Consequently what is required is the identification of some deficiency among certain ideas, namely sensations, which prevents any legitimate ascription of them to objects. Something must be given immanently in the nature of sensations which proscribes any inference from them to the nature of the things they seem to represent. Descartes comes to distinguish ideas that are only arbitrarily connected with the world from the rest on the basis of a distinction between the confused and the distinct. As he says in *Principia Philosophiae* (1644) (Principles):

If we perceive something by our senses, no matter whether we are awake or asleep, so long as we separate what is clear and distinct in the notion that we have of this thing from what is obscure and confused, we can easily assure ourselves of what is true. [PWDI p203.; OD VIIIA 17 ]

The point here is that we need to look first to our ideas themselves, prior to their confusion with objects, in order to distinguish the distinct and confused. As Descartes puts it in the Meditations: "before I inquire whether any [...] things exist outside me, I must consider the ideas of these things, in so far as they exist in my thought, and see which of them are distinct, and which confused." [PVDII, p44; OD VII 63. My emphasis.]

As we might expect it turns out that there are five principal kinds of 'confused thought' corresponding to the five external senses. "As far as the external senses are concerned, five are commonly listed corresponding to the five kinds of confused thoughts which the resulting motions produce in the soul."
By distinguishing the confused from the distinct, Descartes distinguishes the sensible from the intelligible. And, significantly, it is precisely the confused nature of sensible appearances that originally encouraged the faulty judgement which connects sensation and object since inferences based on confused ideas lead to error. So it is that confused ideas are wrongly judged to exist in objects, while distinct ones really do. In truth we cannot tell whether confused ideas represent anything at all, as Descartes points out when contrasting the distinct perception of the primary qualities of magnitude and so on with:

the rest, including light and colours, sounds, smells, tastes, heat and cold and other tactile qualities [which] I think of only in a very confused and obscure way, to the extent that I do not even know whether they are true or false, that is, whether the ideas I have of them are ideas of real things or of non-things. [PWDII p30; OD VII 44]

On this reading, then, it is in the appearance of certain impressions that confusion is first encountered, and this means that any judgement concerning external objects will be uncertain. The clear and distinct ideas Descartes requires to guarantee some coherence between the mind and the world are discovered in a subset of the apparent properties of objects; namely those of extension, magnitude, motion and so on. The others are experienced, as we have seen, only in a confused way so that one cannot know whether they are real or illusory. Thus falsehood is not just a property of judgements. Ideas have another sort of falsehood in virtue of their tendency to represent what is not a positive thing as if it were one. Clarity and distinctness are what allow one to conclude that the idea represents some thing. It is a necessary condition for true inference. In response to Arnauld's query about the idea
of cold Descartes writes: "my only reason for calling the idea 'materially false' is that, owing to the fact that it is obscure and confused, I am unable to judge whether or not what it represents to me is something positive which exists outside of my sensation." [PWD p164; AT VII 234]

Thus for Descartes a confused idea cannot lead to a definite positive conclusion (although we can stumble on the truth by accident [PWDI p207;OD VIIIA 21]) and we fall into error only when we make judgements about things that we have not clearly and distinctly perceived. [PWD p204; OD VIIIA 17] Indeed a defining characteristic of a confused idea would appear to be that it cannot ground valid inferences. For if, as Descartes says, we never go wrong when we assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceive it follows that errors of judgement are exclusively made on the basis of obscure or confused ideas. [PWDI p207; OD VIIIA 21] Consequently in the Principles, Descartes can determine pain as confused to the extent that it is likely to occasion a judgement that the pain is a quality of the body not the mind. We have a confused idea of a colour, because "we do not really know what it is that we are calling a colour" and for this reason "we cannot find any intelligible resemblance between the colour which we suppose to be in objects and that which we experience in our sensation". [PWDI p218; OD VIIIA 34]

It seems that the necessary condition for correctly judging that there is a conformity or resemblance between idea and world, rests in the idea being clear and distinct, and sensations, because they are 'confused thoughts', cannot ground such judgement. On the other hand the ideas we have of extension are clear and distinct in virtue of their amenability to mathematical and geometric description. The confused idea is only accidentally connected to the world and so provides no positive information concerning what exists, but only of how it effects the senses. Distinct ideas, however, have an internal
relation of conformity to objects and so provide us with knowledge of the world as it is in itself. In other words, confused ideas can only tell us about the secondary qualities of objects, whereas distinct ideas provide us with access to the primary qualities, which is to say, to the truth.

Thus the absence of any internal connection between sensation and object is made up for through a guaranteed regularity in the arbitrary relations secured within a coherent structure of the intellelible idea of extension. It is the grammar of a geometry common to ideas and reality that guarantees the reference of thought to a world beyond it and allows one to infer the existence of extended matter. The arbitrary and confused sensation only bears witness to anything beyond it in virtue of its position as an element within a distinctly perceived structure.

However, in order to arrive at this position, Descartes has had to sift through our ideas concerning objects in order to isolate those that can be recovered for reason in virtue of their being grounded in distinct ideas. Out of the original confusion he needs to distil those ideas which can legitimate judgements. The distinction, however, is not that easy to make. As Descartes himself admits in a letter to Bourdin: "It requires some care to make a proper distinction between what is clearly and distinctly perceived and what merely appears to be". [PWDII p310; OD VII 462] The dilemma for this enterprise is that if the capacity to make a clear judgement requires that one have distinct ideas, then this must apply to the judgement as to which ideas are distinct and which confused. If correct judgement requires a distinction to be drawn between the confused and the distinct, then no less does a distinction between confused and distinct require correct judgement.

To expand on this impasse we need to look once more through the moves of Descartes's argument. To begin with he searches for a
criterion by which to delimit those ideas which actually conform with objects, from among all those that are confusedly thought to. But the distinct ideas can only be identified by being distinguished from the confused ideas with which they are confused. Faced with the difficulty of providing an independent definition of how this distinction is to operate, Descartes can only identify the distinct ideas as those which conform to reality. Conformability defines distinctness, while confusion in the idea is what stalls legitimate inference. Yet clearly the issue of conformity is precisely what was in question.

What Descartes wants is for the distinct ideas of reason to span the inside/outside divide so that they can be employed to isolate 'confused thoughts' (sensations) and determine them as ideas that fail to conform to things. But he cannot give a purely phenomenal, account of the difference between distinctness and confusion. And ultimately he can only appeal to the 'natural light' of self evidence which will be discussed below. It should be emphasised that Descartes's position is not that we implicitly reason and make justified inferences as to the primary qualities of objects and that unjustified inferences are confused with these; but rather that the original judgement that objects in themselves possess primary qualities is itself a confused one; based not on reason but on natural impulse. For if distinct ideas are confused with the confused they cannot be the basis of a legitimate judgement. And consequently if the judgement is correct, it is so only by accident.

It may be objected that Descartes's position is not at all to define confused ideas by their failure to conform, or (which is the same thing) by their inadequacy as a basis for judgement. But rather that sensations are confused only to the extent that they become involved in inconsidered judgements and become confused with objects. In the Principles Descartes argues that sensations in themselves are clear and distinct. He writes:
[P]ain and colour and so on are clearly and distinctly perceived when they are regarded merely as sensations or thoughts. But when they are judged to be real things existing outside our mind, there is no way of understanding what sort of things they are. [PWDI p217; OD VIIIA 33]

And in the third Meditation:

Of course, if I considered just the ideas themselves simply as modes of my thought, without referring them to anything else, they could scarcely give me any material for error. [PWDII p26; OD VII 37]

It seems that detached contemplation of sensation will leave us only with distinct ideas. Among appearances there is no possibility of confusion. The confusion, according to this view, is exclusively a consequence of the rash judgements of early childhood. [PWD p218-9; OD VIII A 35-36] It may be because he is wary of begging the question that Descartes tries to appeal to the ideas of sense as themselves originally clear and distinct, and argue that they are only confused in virtue of their involvement in an intemperate judgement. Descartes's difficulty shows itself in his vacillation over what he takes the essential nature of sensation to be: that is, either distinct or confused in itself.

But even if we take this to be Descartes's considered position he reaches a parallel difficulty. For if the ideas of sense considered in themselves are clear and distinct they should, on his own terms, be a solid basis on which to draw inferences; and yet this is what he wants to deny. And further, if all ideas were distinct there would be no criterion by which to separate those that lead us to the truth about the world, and those that do not. There would on this account have to be something wrong with the inference, rather than the sensations.
when we judge them to resemble things. The confusion would lie exclusively in our tendency to make confused judgements. But the same difficulty arises that there is no independent criterion for distinguishing proper from illegitimate inference. Further this position sits uncomfortably with the claim that a distinction needs to be made between ideas that appear to be distinct and those that really are. For we might well wonder how a such a distinction is to be made among appearances.

What this all amounts to is that Descartes needs an 'original' (clear and distinct) idea of the difference between the confused and the distinct. For it would seem that to distinguish the distinct from the confused would require some original capacity which is not already confused. This original vision is provided by the notion of the natural light of reason: the lumine naturale. [PWDII p41; OD VII 60 & PWDI p10; OD X 361]) This clearly cannot solve the paradox because if we could originally reason, we would not originally be confused. Reason has to be confused with bad judgement otherwise we would not need Descartes to separate it out. Nevertheless, I want to end this section by looking more directly at the (necessarily flawed) attempt to distinguish the faculties responsible for reasoned and unreasoned inference.

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Descartes hopes to establish that the mediation of geometry is able to recover a coherence between world and mind which will be inherently more satisfactory than the original confused perception which results from the mind's enslavement to the body. [PWDI p219; OD VIIIA 36] If this can be done our reading of the Meditations will leave us with a new and improved understanding of the nature of objects. Descartes provides a
genealogy of the confusion of sensation and object which tries, paradoxically, to demonstrate its inadequacy in terms of a new understanding which is born out of that confusion (that is, the understanding we have after reading the *Meditations*). In this way he hopes to address two related questions. Firstly why we do confuse sensation with object, and secondly why this is an error. The structure of his analysis presents the original confusion as illegitimate only, as it were, after the fact. That is on the basis of a subsequent adherence to reason.

In the third *Meditation* Descartes poses a question concerning the ideas which he takes to be derived from things outside of himself: namely "what is my reason for thinking that they resemble these things?". [PWD II p26; OD VII 38] As it turns out the first of these reasons is that 'nature' has taught him to think this. He is led to the belief by a 'spontaneous impulse'. Further it is nature that seems to persuade us that there is an object beyond our ideas with which to confuse the sensation; something we could not know on the basis of access to the arbitrary sign system of sense experience. But, for Descartes, what nature teaches is not a justification. The seemingly natural impulses, the *impetus naturales* [OD VII 39] do not necessarily lead to the good or the true. Idealism is not to be avoided for Descartes by appeal to 'blind impulse'; rather it is by embracing the light of reason.\(^3\)

Descartes concludes:

All these considerations are enough to establish that it is not reliable judgement but merely some blind impulse that has made me believe up till now that there exist things distinct from myself which transmit to me ideas or images of themselves through the sense organs or in some other way. [PWDII, p27; OD VII 40]
Descartes avails himself of the same distinction at the level of these faculties, that he had tried to apply to ideas. The method of doubt will separate the natural attitude of confused understanding from the clear and distinct understanding of the natural light. Blind impulse leads one to ascribe inessential properties to objects, and only a subsequent adherence to the dictates of reason allows one to distil out the distinct and essential properties of res extensa. What this makes clear, as I argued earlier, is that there is no original capacity to distinguish the distinct from the confused, since this capacity is originally confused with the confused. The illegitimate inference originally operates equally with regard to primary as to secondary qualities, even though the Meditations intends to demonstrate that in the former case it happens to be right; albeit for the wrong reasons.

This blind impulse is therefore an original reaction, but one which is not, for all that, to be privileged. It is the first error of childhood rather than the foundation of knowledge. Reason, while posterior to impulse, becomes its corrective. The difficulty, however, remains of justifying the replacement of the impetus naturales with the lumine naturale. What is it, in other words, in the natures of these faculties which should lead us to value one over the other?

Clearly for a genetic epistemology, such as Condillac's, the very primacy of the natural impulse must be grounds for regarding it as what legitimates judgement. Thus Condillac is able to reverse the Cartesian opposition. The natural light of reason can be valued only to the extent that we are able to trace its lineage back to natural impulses. Just as the metaphors of the natural light and the mind's eye derive from an original sensible signification, grounded, as Condillac would say, in the language of action; so the capacity to reason derives from an impulsion to 'see' objects outside of oneself. When Descartes complains that the images of sensible objects
blind his mind's eye, he captures the paradox of his endeavour. [PWDII p32; OD VII 47] For the intellectual vision he wants to privilege is nonetheless derived from that of sensation, just as the metaphorics of the 'natural light' derive from a primary reference to sensation.

Condillac develops this reversal in the Essai. The "first and main cause of all our errors", the confusion of mind and body, becomes in effect Condillac's première expérience. [PWDI p218; OD VIIIA 35] If for Descartes the confusion of sensation with object is a consequence of a prior confusion of the soul and the body, by taking this latter confusion as his indubitable starting point, Condillac hopes to legitimate the former. This attempted legitimation of the projection of sensations beyond the mind and onto objects will be a central focus of our discussion throughout this thesis. But before comparing the Cartesian attitude to this original confusion to Condillac's it will be necessary to examine Descartes's approach in more detail. Descartes is clear that "I am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship, but that I am very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unit" [PWDII p56; OD VII 81] Because of this intimate conjunction the soul feels pain and hunger, rather than becoming explicitly aware that the body is damaged or requires food. The primary function of the method of doubt is to effect a separation, between mind and body and so to pave the way for the arguments for the 'real distinction'. The necessity for such a separation lies in the fact that:

The body has an obstructive effect on the soul. We are aware of this phenomenon in ourselves, when we prick ourselves with a needle or some sharp instrument: the effect is such that we cannot think of anything else [...] In infancy therefore the mind was so swamped inside the body, that it could only think of bodily matters. The body is always a hindrance to the mind in its thinking, and this was especially true in youth.4
We have seen that the Meditations open by contrasting the original confusion of prejudicial thinking with doubt, the senses with reason, and in so doing, determine the development of the subsequent arguments. By identifying "the chief and main cause of all our errors" with the fact of the intimate connection of mind and body, and deprecating the original condition in which the mind "had no leisure for any thoughts except those by means of which it had sensory awareness of what was happening to the body", Descartes undermines the worth of the original experience of "early childhood" in favour of that of advanced, thought. [PWDI p218; OD VIIIA 35] Such thought by purifying itself paradoxically becomes, as it were, more original than the primordial experience. That is to say, that the discovery of the real, substantial distinction of mind and body establishes the metaphysical priority of the distinction over man's condition since the fall. But my contention is that Descartes prejudices the inquiry in the first Meditation by beginning with a detached attitude which permits doubt as to the adequacy of sensation as a basis for knowledge.

The extent to which the mind is able to purify itself of confusion with the body is expressed in Descartes's resistance to Gassendi's materialist objections. In the 'Fifth Replies' he writes that he "distinctly showed on many occasions that the mind can operate independently of the brain; for the brain cannot in any way be employed in pure understanding, but only in imagining or perceiving by the senses". [PWDII p248; OD VII 358] The real distinction means that the understanding can operate independently of sensation, and that there need not be any corporeal correlate, no associated brain activity, for acts of pure thought. Sensation and imagination are effectively sullied forms of thought in virtue of the fact that they require a physiological correlate to occur. This means that imagination and sensation must be regarded as hybrid notions in Descartes's dualism. Although appearing to the mind, because caused by corporeal movements they can be the exclusive
attribute neither of res extensa or of res cogitans. As Descartes puts it in the Principles:

we [...] experience within ourselves certain [...] things which must not be referred either to the mind alone or the body alone. These arise [...] from the close and intimate union of our mind with the body. This list includes, first, appetites like hunger and thirst; secondly, the emotions or passions of the mind which do not consist of thought alone, such as the emotions of anger, joy, sadness and love; and finally, all the sensations, such as those of pain, pleasure, light, colours, sounds, smells, tastes, heat, hardness and the other tactile qualities. [PWDI p209; OD VIIIA 23]

Those ideas that can be attributed to the mind alone will be the distinct ideas which are given innately, namely the ideas of reason and of the primary qualities of matter.

Compare this, then, with Condillac's attitude to the relation of soul and body. Condillac shares Descartes's intuition concerning the intimacy of the relation, but goes further in denying that the mind can operate independently of the brain. In the Traité des Animaux (1755) Condillac conducts a critique of the Cartesian animal-machine as described by Buffon in his Discours sur la nature des animaux. Condillac attacks the distinction made first by Descartes between 'sensations corporelles' and 'sensations spiriteuelles'. The difference depends, according to Descartes, on whether the sensations in question are ultimately caused by the action of the body or of the soul. [e.g. PWDI 335ff; OD XI 343ff] Condillac objects that:

The unity of the person necessarily supposes the unity of the sentient being; it supposes a single unitary substance, differently modified by impressions made upon the parts of the body. A unitary 'me' formed of two sentient principles, the one simple, the other extended, is a manifest
contradiction; if there is one person in the supposition there cannot be two in reality.

[L'unité de personne supose nécessairement l'unité de l'être sentant; elle suppose une seule substance simple, modifiée différemment à l'occasion des impressions qui se font dans les parties du corps. Un seul moi formé de deux principes sentans, l'un simple, l'autre étendu, est une contradiction manifeste; ce ne seroit qu'une seule personne dans la supposition, c'en seroit deux dans le vrai". OPI p342]

Condillac thus fuses mind and body: insisting on their original unity. The confusion which produces the hybrid of sensation is not the source of all error but the basis of all knowledge. "I do not feel my body on the one hand and my soul on the other," he insists, "I feel my soul in my body". ["Je ne sens pas d'un côté mon corps et de l'autre mon ame: je sens mon ame dans mon corps" OPI p341] The original confusion is not something to escape, not a condition of which knowledge is derived analytically from the prior substantial distinction, but the only possible basis for his epistemological enterprise. Condillac's anti-cartesianism is expressed in a desire for a concrete metaphysics conforming to experience, beginning from the primitive indubitability of an immersion in nature and corporality.

As François Dagognet writes in his introduction to the Traité des animaux Condillac appeals to an existential je sens as opposed to the Cartesian je pense; to a kind of Être au monde. This is not to say that Condillac espouses a materialism. On the contrary, he is keen to insist on the distinction between the body and soul warning us that: "[o]riginal sin has rendered the soul so dependent on the body, that many philosophers have confused these two substances." ["Le péché originel a rendu l'ame si dépendante du corps, que bien des philosophes ont confondu ces deux substances." E p7] (His own proof of the
distinction is reminiscent of Leibniz and is based on the observation that the subject of thought must be unitary, while that which is extended is an aggregate.) But nonetheless his concern in the *Essai*, is exclusively with the state of the soul since the fall, a state of concupiscence which is, he says, "the only possible object of philosophy since it is the only one that experience makes known". ["C'est cet état de l'âme que je me propose d'étudier, le seul qui puisse être l'objet de la philosophie, puisque c'est le seul que l'expérience fait connoître." E p7] There can, in other words, be no knowledge in this world which does not take the original confusion as its point of departure. Original sin ties the soul to the body and means we have to gain knowledge through the senses. Thus Condillac does not identify soul and body, but argues that the fusion of the two constitutes the basis of epistemology and is not that which is to be escaped.

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Despite the fact that Locke professes to oppose Cartesian rationalism by establishing that all knowledge comes from sensation, his philosophy remains allied to the Cartesian paradigm. Because, amongst other things, he retains the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, Locke fails to produce a truly radical empiricism. Locke finds that the only way to explain the representative character of perception is by supposing there to be a mediating term between thought and objects. Locke concludes his speculations on bodies by observing:

"that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by
The distinction is then once more between relations of resemblance which admit of inference to the things themselves, and unmediated and arbitrary connection, the direct influence I spoke of earlier. The notion of a mediating term between object and idea which guarantees coherence through a relation of resemblance, is contrasted to the arbitrary language of secondary qualities which is made referential only in virtue of an underlying Euclidean 'grammar'. However, the empiricist project that Locke initiates is committed to a reduction of the former to the latter. Thus if Condillac is to escape the prejudices of Cartesianism he will need to eliminate such elements from Locke's project as he rewrites the Essay. The desire to eliminate innatism, must, according to its own logic, reduce primary to secondary; the idea of res extensa to that of confused sensation; necessary conformity to arbitrary connection. The first empiricist principle, namely that all knowledge begins with sensation, is to be established by completing this reduction. Consequently any knowledge of the nature of objects in themselves can only be grounded on the perception of secondary qualities. Descartes's principal error will be the only route to knowledge of an external world and his 'confused thoughts' will have to be the basis of judgement. The error becomes a principle, the beginning of a new system. Sensible ideas will no longer be construed as blinding the mind's eye, but on the contrary must become the source of its insights.
Chapter 2: Locke's Cartesian Heritage

If the light of reason cannot illuminate any distinction between itself and natural impulse, then there is no way of distinguishing those ideas that are legitimately projected onto objects and those that are not. Accordingly, the hope of delimiting a space in which ego and world can co-habit is vain. The consequence of this, as we have seen, is that the new philosophy must eliminate the prejudice of a tertium quid bridging the gap between thought and matter. Having discredited innatism in the first book of the Essay we might therefore expect Locke to abandon the notion of any resemblance between ideas and objects. The new philosophy should, we might suppose, content itself with a description of the process by which a world is constructed out of sensation and natural impulse and not try to further legitimate that construction in terms of any objective conformity. It should begin with the principle that nature leads us to judge of the nature of objects on the basis of confused thoughts. This will indeed be Condillac's construal of its task. However, Locke's retention of primary qualities ties him to the Cartesian prejudice and stalls the completion of this project.

Before turning once more to Condillac's reworking of Locke it will be necessary to draw out the tensions in Locke's analysis of perception that the retention of primary qualities implies. This will involve framing Locke's analysis of perception within the general project to refute the supposition of innate ideas with which Locke begins the Essay. It is significant that according to Locke this refutation is strictly speaking unnecessary.
It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show [...] how men [...] may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any such original notions or principles. [EHI p9]

To be convinced that there are no innate ideas and that the first empiricist principle is correct, we can skip Book 1 and move directly to the initial supposition of Book 2: "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper void of all characters, without any ideas." [EHI p77] While the latter supposition is presented as the alternative to innatism it must nonetheless establish itself on its own terms. It cannot be recommended simply through its opposition to rationalist prejudice since to do so would concede too much. It would be to take the disjunctive syllogism as primary: to suppose that to establish the falsity of the doctrine of innate ideas it is sufficient to demonstrate the necessity of the tabula rasa.

Book 2 therefore continues the refutation of innatism, and it does so, as we saw in the Introduction (see p7ff above), through an appeal to the notion of 'experience'. In opposition to the deployment of abstract principles Locke turns to the indubitability of experiential and experimental givens and in particular to sensation to establish the empiricist supposition that the mind is originally devoid of any ideas. But the paradox for a philosophy that wants to proceed through experiment rather than by grounding itself on first principles, is that it seems nonetheless to found itself on an axiom; namely that nothing is in the mind which is not first in sensation. Empiricism wants simultaneously to do away with ideas of reason given logically prior to experience as its conditions of possibility, and yet appeals to sensation as the foundation of experience.
Condillac is aware that it is not sufficient to declare oneself in favour of a truth; arguing that while the Peripatetics took for a principle that all knowledge comes from the senses, they were a long way from understanding it. [TS p286] And although Condillac hails Locke as the first to have demonstrated this truth, the demonstration, as we have seen, remained incomplete. To understand how Condillac hopes to effect its completion it will be necessary to isolate the moment where Locke goes astray. The key flaw, I want to argue, occurs in Book 2 of the Essay, in the chapter on perception in which Locke introduces Molyneux's problem:

I shall here insert a problem of that very ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge, the learned and worthy Mr. Molyneux, which he was pleased to send me in a letter some months since; and it is this: Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man to be made to see: quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube?

Molyneux's answer is 'Not' for:

though he has obtained the experience of how a globe, how a cube affects his touch, yet he has not yet obtained the experience that what affects his touch so or so must affect his sight so o so. [EHI p114]

Locke agrees with Molyneux's judgement. The answer must be 'Not' because it appears to follow directly from the principle that all knowledge comes from sense experience. What is not in sensation cannot be in the mind; and that of which one has had
no experience, one can have no knowledge. Therefore if there has been no experience of a connection between the ideas of sight and those of touch, then no knowledge of such a connection can be had. To answer in the affirmative would appear to presuppose access to some super-sensible schema of representation, which, ex hypothesi is impossible. In other words, Locke derives his solution, as it were, a priori from the initial supposition of Book 2. This experiment is not, therefore, employed to establish the principle, but to elucidate it.

We might argue that this need not be a problem. Locke after all presents the discussion as an incidental insertion within his general strategy. It appears in italics: as a quotation from Molyneux's letter. It is not a problem of his own devising and is not presented in his own words. In this sense it stands outside what is proper to Essay. Nonetheless, for Condillac a complete demonstration should involve no detours. And if Locke's solution is a consequence, rather than a proof of the principle which the Essay is intended to demonstrate, then Locke has got his arguments in the wrong order. In Condillac's eyes, it must follow from this that there is a fault with the analysis.

This is, I suggest, one reason why Condillac's efforts to complete the demonstration of the empiricist principle are so centrally concerned with this issue. The Essai devotes a whole section to the solution of this 'Metaphysical Problem'. The section is placed at the half-way mark of the Essai at the end of the discussion of the material of consciousness which constitutes Part One and immediately before Part Two and the analysis of language and method. But Condillac takes it up again in the Traité des sensations. In the introductory overview he presents his solution in the Essai as the principle prejudice or error of the early work which needs to be put right.
But not only is it necessary for Condillac to find the correct solution. I will be arguing that by extending the scope of the problematic in the *Traité des sensations* it becomes a means to **demonstrate** rather than illustrate the empiricist principle. The error Condillac identifies in the analysis of the problem therefore operates at two levels. Locke's solution is not simply misconceived; it is misconceived because it is misplaced. Through correcting Locke's solution Condillac rewrites the *Essay*. But Condillac comes to regard his own *Essai* as incomplete. In the *Traité des sensations* the rethinking of Molyneux's problem comes to figure the entire work. It is no longer merely inserted to support the empiricist principle, but becomes integral to, even identifiable with, the demonstration itself.

Before this can be established however, it will be necessary to understand the difficulties Condillac has with Locke's account. Consequently we need to take a more detailed look at the analysis conducted in the *Essay*. To begin with it is important to note that Locke's statement of the question is not whether the newly sighted has any visible ideas. Indeed the supposition is that he could at the least perceive, however imperfectly, the sciagraphy and (two dimensional) magnitude of the objects before him; for why else introduce the condition that they be of the same size and composed of the same substance? Rather the question hinges on whether he can 'distinguish and tell' which is which. The ambiguity of this 'tell' is suggestive of the interconnection between questions pertaining to perception and to language in the *Essay*. An interconnection which makes it unclear what exactly the Molyneux problem is. Continuing the discussion quoted above Locke writes:

I [...] am of opinion that the blind man, at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw them, though he could unerringly name them by his touch. [EHI p114]
Is the failure of the man regaining his sight to relate the difference simply a consequence of an underlying inability to distinguish among his sensations; to 'tell' which is which? Or is it rather that he can in some sense distinguish the objects of sight, but cannot confidently 'say' which is which; that is, cannot 'name' them and communicate the distinction?

Locke's reasoning can, on the one hand, be taken to be that the language of the blind can only have reference to ideas they have had, and therefore that since the names of the objects will not yet be connected to the new ideas of sight they would not be able to 'tell' or 'say' which was which. However the issue of 'telling' is not confined to speech. The blind man, we are told, is able to 'name the objects by touch'. This is not simply to say that he can connect the tangible idea with a linguistic sign. The suggestion is also that he can identify the thing itself by touching it. Touch names its object: it picks it out. That is, the tangible experience is the sign for the object. Sensible ideas, for Locke, are the signs by which we can tell things apart and by which we 'name' or identify them.

To be able to 'name' an object and 'tell' what it is involves both identifying it by its sensible sign, and connecting the sensible idea with a word. Locke interlaces the questions of what can be said and what can be perceived. The problem of how a word is connected to an idea becomes fused with that of how the sensation is connected to a supersensible object. Locke's analyses, as we have seen, employ the criterion of what can be experienced to determine what can be known. However the treatment of Molyneux's problem demonstrates that the category of what cannot be experienced is bound up with that of what cannot be said. The clarity of the blind man's sensations is discussed in terms of what he can say with certainty. Clarity of speech becomes a criterion of clarity of sensations. But at
the same time the clarity of a sensation is determined in terms of its functioning as a name for a thing.

But if the sensation is the name for the object what is to prevent the blind man from seeing objects immediately? In other words what is at stake in Locke's introduction of the condition that the identification be made "at first sight"? This is not in Molyneux's original formulation in his letter to Locke. While it may function to emphasise the injunction on touching the objects it clearly does more than this. For Locke is not concerned to argue, as Berkeley would, that it is by connecting visible and tangible ideas that we are able to identify objects by sight. Rather it must have something to do with a learning process being set in motion within the realm of visible ideas. At first sight the blind man cannot tell the objects apart because the visible ideas he has are as new names, the meanings of which are yet to be learnt. To know a thing, it would seem, consists in re-cognising its sensible name. The repetition of a sensation allows for the identification of its object. On this reading the failure to distinguish the objects 'at first sight' is a consequence of the fact that the visible names are foreign to the blind man.

This reading will doubtless appear somewhat at odds with the discussion that follows in which Locke explains how the immediate visible sensations lead the mind to judge of the primary characteristics of objects. However, I hope to show that only this reading can render the possibility of such judgement plausible. Locke writes:

Because sight, the most comprehensive of all the senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to that sense; and also the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion, the several varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper objects, viz. light and colours: we bring ourselves by use to judge of one by the other. This, in many cases by a
settled habit, in things whereof we have frequent experience, is performed so constantly and so quick, that we take that for the perception of our sensation which is an idea formed by our judgment; so that one, viz. that of sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself; as a man who reads or hears with attention and understanding, takes little notice of the characters or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them. [EHI p115]

Locke's position would appear to be this: the immediate ideas of vision, or its 'proper objects', are the secondary qualities of light and colours and, it would seem, two dimensional magnitude. However, since sight also conveys the primary qualities of objects the question becomes how the move is made from the one to the other. At first glance the newly sighted man only perceives the secondary qualities of objects, but is able to learn the connection between primary and secondary. The immediate ideas of vision function to lead the mind to the mediate ones because there is a regular connection between them. Primary qualities 'change the appearance' of the secondary; which is to say that changes in the secondary qualities will correspond to an alteration in the distance, position or figure of an object perceived; much as an image of an object projected within the eye alters in accordance with the alterations in the object. There is a structural isomorphism between primary and secondary qualities: a regularity which can be learned. If the primary qualities organise and regulate the secondary, we can, on the basis of the second, judge of the first. And it is through experience, or 'by use', that we acquire the habit of making the judgement. [EHI p111ff]

Locke's answer to Molyneux's problem shows that he does not want to say that we can see distance immediately. Since there is no suggestion (that I can see) that it is through touch or any other sense that the perception of distance is made
possible, the obvious difficulty is to understand how we arrive at knowledge of primary qualities given that we have no immediate access either to them or to the world they supposedly represent. How is the object as it is in itself known independently of its visible name? Locke's description of the process whereby we learn to see distance refuses to confront the issue, preferring to appeal to 'experience' and 'habit' which appear to explain nothing.

Locke clearly does not see the difficulty. Our problem is therefore to understand why not. The solution, I believe, lies in the fact that Locke regards all sensible ideas as the names for things. Locke is able to pass over the question of how visible ideas refer to objects, because he takes it to be in the nature of sensible ideas that they pick things out. Their capacity to name or refer to transcendent objects is, for him, unproblematic. Once a particular sign has been repeated it will be recognised as a name for a specific object. The sensible sign leads the mind transparently to the object. Since the object itself is thereby identified and its characteristics known, all that needs to be done is for the newly-sighted man to learn the structural relation obtaining between the secondary and the primary qualities of the object. Effectively, because secondary qualities are the names of objects we can employ them to make a judgement as to the primary. This judgement then allows us to 'see' objects at a distance. The regular interaction among our sensations is underpinned by the conformity between the world and the ideas of primary qualities. Therefore the only problem for Locke is how we come to perceive primary qualities (given that the immediate or 'proper' objects of sight are only secondary) and not how we come to be acquainted with things in themselves.

However this is an explanation of Locke's thought and not its justification. The problem of how it is known that sensations name objects cannot be eliminated. Locke's oversight is
betrayed in his use of the analogy with language to evoke the relation between the immediate objects of vision and the mediate ones: an analogy which is invoked precisely in order to give credence to his solution to Molyneux's problem. Locke is concerned that his answer will be at odds with the experience of seeing which suggests that distance, movement and so forth are perceived immediately. It is, Locke thinks, counterintuitive to suppose that we need to learn to see, or that we judge distances, since we do not remember the process of learning and are not aware of making any judgement. This is a real worry for Locke because his treatment of the Molyneux problem runs against the rhetorical strategy of the Essay as a whole, in that it appears not to be borne out by experience. Somehow he needs to persuade us that we have forgotten learning to see, and that we can make an unconscious judgement: persuade us in other words that there is an aspect to seeing which does not form part of our experience. To explain why we have no such awareness Locke argues that the immediate sensations of light and colour are normally ignored as the attention is focused on space, figure and motion. They are ignored because we are so used to making the judgement and take immediate sensations to be signs of primary qualities. By thinking of light and colour by analogy with language the solution becomes more credible, for, as Locke points out, when reading little notice is taken of the characters on the page since our attention is focussed on the ideas they signify. Nonetheless no one would deny that we need to learn to read.

Now, if Locke is able to pass so nonchalantly over the problem we have identified, for Condillac this must be because he has set out his argument in the inappropriate order. And if, as I want to suggest, it is by invoking the relation of word to idea that his account is made plausible, it can be conjectured that the error proceeds from the misplacement of the analysis of language. Indeed the analogy with language in this discussion occurs in Book 2 (which concerns ideas), that is, prior to the
discussion of words in Book 3. Therefore Locke's reflections on perception operate in terms of a theory of language which has not yet been subjected to scrutiny. Consequently, if Locke is able to think of perception in terms of language without noticing our difficulty, it is because the manner in which the signifying relation is set up has not yet been problematised. At this stage it has not yet occurred to Locke that signs could be deceptive. It is not until the ninth chapter of Book 3 that the implications of the "imperfection there is in language" begin to dawn and Locke realises that "the very nature of words makes it almost unavoidable for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations". [EHII, p76] Later in that chapter Locke confesses that:

when I first began this discourse of the understanding, and a good while after, I had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to it. But when, having passed over the original and composition of our ideas, I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge, I found it had so near a connexion with words that, unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed, there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge, which, being conversant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions. And though it terminated in things, yet it was, for the most part, so much by the intervention of words that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much between our understandings and the truth which it would contemplate and apprehend that, like the medium through which visible objects pass, their obscurity and disorder does not seldom cast a mist before our eyes and impose upon our understandings. [EHII pp87-88]

As we have seen Condillac is not sympathetic to Locke's confession in the 'Epistle to the Reader' to being "too lazy or indifferent" to rewrite the Essay. Condillac argues that when Locke realised that "words [...] could shed light on the principle of our ideas" he should have made language the object of his Second Book. ["Epistle to the Reader" xxxiii; E p5]
While Condillac has in mind the general point that Locke does not account for the importance of language in the shaping of ideas, what he says is equally applicable to the specific point that the theory of language uncritically held in the Second Book, facilitates the refusal to question the relation of signifier to signified. In Book 3 the principal imperfection that Locke identifies in words results from the fact that "sounds have no natural connexion with our ideas, but have all their signification from the arbitrary imposition of men". [EHII p77] The consequence is that their signification can become doubtful and uncertain. Because the connection is arbitrary, there is no guarantee of its security. Once Locke appreciated that words can confuse, and began his task of removing the mist of words, then his conception of the signifying relation developed. Locke came to see that the connection between the word and the idea 'hidden in another's breast' is unsecure, and further, that even one's own thought is mediated through words. As a result, no longer could he coherently take the unconscious judgement of perception to be unproblematic. Consequently if he had rewritten the Essay he could not have been so confident that we could judge of primary qualities exclusively on the basis of immediate access to the secondary.

Although Locke did not rewrite the Essay, the shift of ground in his theory of perception is in evidence in Book 3. In support of this claim we need look no further then the passage just quoted. There Locke likens the medium of words which obscures the relation between the understanding and the truth, to the medium through which visible objects pass before being perceived. Whereas in Book 2 learning to see involved making a unproblematic judgement on the basis of a transparent acquaintance with objects, in Book 3 seeing has become mediated and thereby prone to error. The medium through which we see has become a veil disguising the object from view. This medium, the light which interposes itself between the object and the
sensation, masks the object as much as it illuminates it. The sensible sign, therefore, no longer simply identifies the object. The 'naming' of the object is no longer transparent.

It follows from this that the manner in which the judgement enables us to perceive primary qualities will also be problematised. The medium of which Locke speaks, insofar as it interposes itself between the true nature of things and ideas, can also be equated with the medium by which the real, primary characteristics of objects are generated from immediate perception. Thus the manner in which the perception of light and colour discloses itself as representative of the primary qualities of the object, namely the unconscious judgement, must now also appear deceptive. Therefore the judgement can no longer be invisible to consciousness. If there is indeed a judgement by which we are led from immediate ideas to mediate ones it must reveal itself to consciousness: it must take on a certain opacity. A mist has interposed itself between light and colour and their signification. And the transparent signifying function has been sullied. It would seem that with the mist of words Locke introduces the veil of perception.

The insights of the Third Book therefore undermine the claims of the Second. And, as Condillac suggests, the coherence of the Essay would demand a reordering of its arguments. While Locke only undertook the restoration of the security in the relation of word to idea in his Third Book, by contrast Condillac's Essai discusses the role of signs from the outset. By the time he deals with Molyneux's problem, therefore, this reordering necessarily has an influence on the discussion.

In Condillac's reworking, signs are accorded a privileged place in the development of the understanding. They are restored to their proper position at the beginning of the genetic analysis. The claim that the principle of development for the whole understanding is to be found in the liaison d'idées inscribes
the signifying function at the very heart of consciousness. [E p4] The liaison d'idées reduces the activity of the mind to the deployment of an arbitrary law. There is no reason that can be proffered as to why certain ideas are given alongside certain others. This, we might say, is simply given. But their connections nonetheless form the material of consciousness. What this means is that the principle of the development of the understanding involves relations of arbitrary signification at the outset. Indeed the principle of the connection of ideas is itself conceived in terms of the linking of ideas with signs. For Condillac does not merely want to claim that it is the connection of ideas with signs that allows for the appearance of advanced faculties, but, more radically, that it is only because ideas are connected with signs that ideas can become connected among themselves. Consequently, he can argue that the use of signs is the unique principle which develops the germ of sensation. [E p5]

To elucidate this point further it may be helpful to think of the Condillacian notion of the connection of ideas in terms of the Cartesian conception of connection between the sensible idea and the object that occasions it. For Descartes this relation is arbitrary: there is no resemblance between the sensation and the object. The only means of discovering the true characteristics of objects is via their resemblance to distinctly conceived primary qualities. Locke's recourse to this paradigm runs into difficulties precisely because the arbitrary connection becomes associated with naming and identification. Paradoxically, arbitrary signification becomes transparent, such that knowledge of the name is sufficient for knowledge of the thing named. But the difficulty with this is that if there is a direct but arbitrary connection between sensation and object, and we only have access to sensations, we cannot know that there are objects, and the problem of the veil of perception arises. For Condillac, what this means is that sense can only be made of an arbitrary connection if it
operates within consciousness. The arbitrary signifying relation that originally obtained between the object and the sensation, now characterises the most fundamental operation of the mind, namely: the liaison d'idées.

It is crucial to see how this pans out in Condillac's original critique of Locke's treatment of Molyneux's problem in the *Essai*. For his change of heart on this issue is, I will be arguing, the key to understanding how the two works relate and so to the order of the development of his thought. Condillac is not able to accept the possibility of our forming certain judgements of which we have no awareness. His conception of empiricism at this stage will not countenance an explanation of the perception of distance which appeals to what is not in experience. To conclude the discussion of Molyneux's problem he writes:

I thought that, in a work in which I propose to expose the material of our knowledge, I should make a rule for myself to establish nothing which was not incontestable, and that anyone could, with the slightest reflection, perceive in himself.

["J'ai pensé que, dans un ouvrage où je me propose d'exposer les matériaux de nos connoissances, je devois me faire une loi de ne rien établir qui ne fût incontestable, et que chacun ne pût, avec la moindre réflexion, apercevoir en lui même." E p59]

As Le Roy points out, the invocation of an unconscious judgement amounts to imagining a mysterious activity in the mind, a supposition from which all the analyses of the *Essai* attempt to distance themselves. [Editor's note E p59] Locke's explanation that 'frequent experience' and 'use' allow us to ignore the judgement is not satisfactory, since it supposes that an arbitrary and transparent relation can exist between immediate sensations and objects hidden from consciousness.
Further, a judgement cannot alter the idea of the sensation, as Locke claims, and make it appear other than it is in itself, for the very precariousness of the judgement necessitates that it be opaque and recoverable for consciousness. If we did make such a judgement we would not confuse it with the sensation; we would, as Condillac has it, see in one way and judge in another. [E p54] At the time of the Essai Condillac could have no truck with the idea of an unconscious confusion of one idea with another, since he was convinced that the processes that condition the way we see must be distinctly perceived by consciousness. For insofar as they are hidden from consciousness they cannot form part of any explanation of experience. And if it were the case that we forget making these judgements, a little reflection should allow us to recall them, just as we are able to focus attention on the words on the page rather than on the ideas they signify. [E p55] Thus, if the visible image is a sign for the extended one, we should at least be aware of the secondary qualities in themselves, and yet no one is aware of the flat image. This is because, for Condillac, the function of the sign is not transparent; both the signifier and signified must appear to consciousness if a connection between them is to be made. Since the sign, and the connection of ideas is the principle of consciousness, they cannot be invisible to it. Condillac also points out that the very assumption that the immediate object of sight is a flat image, involves a confusion between the image on the retina and the impression on the mind, and presupposes that secondary qualities are not completely discrete and non-extended. [E p54ff] This confusion is invited by the camera obscura analogy for the understanding with which Locke operates, and which consequently needs to be modified as we shall see in Chapter 11.

By these and similar arguments Condillac rejects Locke's claim that there is a judgement based on an arbitrary sign system involved in seeing distance. But it does not follow that he
takes the relation of sensations to things to be a one of resemblance. This would be to return to the Cartesian picture of a *tertium quid* which Locke's critique of innate ideas begins to undermine. There cannot be any knowledge of a resemblance between ideas and things. Sensations are neither arbitrary signs, nor resembling pictures of anything transcendent. And therefore there can be no basis on which to judge of primary qualities on the basis of the immediate visible ideas. Consequently, Condillac argues (with certain provisos which we will come to), that the primary qualities are perceived immediately by sight. The conditions of possibility for seeing distance are contained within visible sensations. In other words Condillac provides an immanent account of how sensations become projected into a three dimensional space: an account that can be cashed out in terms of the indubitability of the première expérience.

It is important here to make some additional observations in support of my claim that Condillac's resituation of the role of signs determines this disagreement with Locke's theory of vision. For the centrality of language to Condillac's account has far reaching consequences for his epistemology. We have seen that for Locke sensations have a primary structural isomorphism with the world and only secondarily do they diverge. In the same way the primary function of language is to represent ideas, it only diverges from this function as an afterthought. Now, if words' original function is simply to reflect ideas then the connections between words will be determined by the connections between ideas. And if the world has a causal but arbitrary influence on the mind the latter will be determined by the way the world is. It simply and unproblematically signifies objects, just as ideas are signified by words. Language conforms to thought as the mind passively reacts to the world. A significant epistemological implication of Locke's theory of perception as presented in Book 2, therefore, is that the mind is passive in respect of
material objects. (This need be no surprise given the specular model of the understanding he inherits from Descartes which we will be discussing in Chapter 11 below.) Even in Book 3 the capacity of words to influence thought is always a perversion of the proper order, and so too is any influence of thought on the world. This is to say that for Locke, even though secondary qualities do not resemble anything, in virtue of their capacity to indicate primary qualities, they become falsely projected onto objects. Falsely because the proper order of influence is from objects to sensations, not vice versa. Similarly words begin to colour and confuse thought only as a deflection from their proper function of signifying ideas. Therefore so long as the discussion of signs comes after that of perception, the mind must remain passive.

The reordering of the Essay effected by Condillac produces a reorientation of these relations. Once signs are conceived as the very organising principle of thought, if the parallel holds, then sensations determine the world rather than vice versa. If signs enable thought to develop and organise the connections between ideas, then what Locke took to be a deflection from their proper role has become the primary function. Concomitantly the projection of secondary qualities onto objects is no longer an error, since such projection has become the original function of sensation. Sensations are directed out into the world since they are the original raw material of its construction. No longer the final term in a series of efficient causes, they are the origin and ground from which the world of efficient causes is produced.

Condillac's treatment of Molyneux's problem and his introduction of an active and interactive model of mind and matter, have significant parallels in his theory of language as an active partner in the evolution of thought. Condillac's conception of the development and role of signs in the understanding is intimately bound up with the requirement of an
immanent account of the production of the perception of distance. More specifically there is a parallel which is not accidental between the question of the origin of language, of which Condillac treats in the *Essai*, and that of the possibility of the blind man coming to see. The question of the origin of language is significant for Condillac because if signs organise the connection of ideas, it would seem that there can be no progression of thought without signs. But if there is no connection among ideas, then there is no manner in which signs and ideas can become connected. For a sign can only become a sign for an idea by entering consciousness, that is, by becoming an idea itself. There must therefore, as we have seen, be an original and natural connection among ideas which is the seed for all subsequent chains of connections. And this ground, while being the condition of possibility of experience, must itself be indubitably experiential.

A similar concern for the question of the origin of language is the aporia that Rousseau highlights in his own treatment of the question. Rousseau makes the observation that it is difficult to square the apparent fact that men needed language to learn to think, and yet that they no less need to think in order to discover the art of language. The problem is that the institution of a language appears to require agreement as to how to fix the meaning of words and yet such agreement appears to require a language. Again Condillac's solution is an original language of action: a language which is natural to the organism and which expresses specific needs. The connection between certain needs and their outward expression in cries and gestures is naturally and immediately understood by other members of the species and so can form the basis of the institution of signs. [E p60ff.]

In the *Essai* Condillac solves the dilemma of how the blind man comes to see distance on the basis of non-extended sensations in the same manner: namely by appeal to the 'natural'
propensity of the organism to order sensations in a certain way. That is, by denying that sensations are originally non-extended and discrete. Rather they must be originally contiguous: naturally connected up in spatial relations. Visible extension is an immanent function of the complex of relations that obtain between sensations, and experience must bear this out.

This does not mean that on first regaining his sight the blind man would immediately see the whole spectacle of nature. Just as the language of action does not explicitly and immediately produce all the advanced faculties. Rather, Condillac's position is that the perception of a complex scene involves analysis of the sensations themselves. Condillac writes of the cataract patient:

"Mais il ne faut pas croire qu'au moment qu'il ouvre les yeux, il jouisse déjà du spectacle que produit dans toute la nature ce mélange admirable de lumière et de couleur. C'est un trésor qui est renfermé dans les nouvelles sensations qu'il éprouve; la réflexion peut seule le lui découvrir". E p57

It shouldn't be supposed that at the moment when he opens his eyes, he should already enjoy the spectacle which this admirable mixture of light and colour produces in the whole of nature. This is a treasure which is contained within the new sensations he experiences; only reflexion can discover it for him.

It is by attending to information contained within the structure of visible ideas that the scene can be developed. More strictly, as we shall see, the attention functions to develop or unfold what is contained in sensation. Implicit in the sensible are the means to produce the whole of nature. There is an original confusion of light and colour which tends toward producing distinctions as the organism attends to the new experience. The elements so discerned are
then connected up to produce the vision of different objects in the one view. This process, Condillac claims, is borne out by the experience of looking at a complex painting. [E p57] Not everything that it contains is perceived at once. In order to see (voir as opposed to regarder), we need to consider each part in turn. The original indistinct confusion needs to be analysed into elements in order to be reconstructed. The perception of the landscape is implicit in the original view. In the same way the whole of language and thought are given implicitly in the original natural connection of sensations and the language of action.

* *

In sum, what we have seen is that, for Condillac, the problematic of instituting signs is paralleled in that of accounting for how the language of vision is to provide knowledge of the world. The reworking of Locke's position leads Condillac to regard the sensible sign as containing within itself the means for learning what it signifies. Or rather, immanent to the complex of connections that obtain within vision are the means to generate the perception of extension. Sensations do not therefore transparently signify some transcendent reality. Rather extension is given 'implicitly' within the sensible, and is made explicit through a process of analysis.

However, if the eye judges distance naturally, one would think that on first opening his eyes the blind man would immediately begin to discern objects by sight. Consequently, in the Essai Condillac feels he has to account for experimental evidence which seemed to suggest that the newly sighted were unable to distinguish objects for some time after having cataracts removed. Significantly his response to this problem has
recourse to the physiological basis for vision. This recourse betrays a certain dissatisfaction with the account so far given. For in the Essai, as I hope to show, while the problem has been resituated in the analysis, the displacement this effects does not yet resolve the difficulty.

Condillac's reflections on what goes on in the eye try to explain why it needs exercise to begin to discriminate figure and distance. He suggests that when light first penetrates the pupil there is a great mixing or shaking up of the sensitive fibres at the back of the retina. [E p58-59] This confusion is then communicated to even more sensitive fibres in the brain where the mixture is separated out into its elements. What is initially bound up becomes untied in the brain in order once more to be connected up into a representation of an extended world. This mechanism needs time to recover from a certain stiffness that comes with lack of use. Now, the point to be made about these conjectures is that they go beyond Condillac's account of the analysis of 'ideas'. It would seem that there is more to the perception of extension than the (in principle conscious) process of making the implicit explicit. Below the realm of consciousness - in the body - Condillac posits certain physical processes operating under causal laws, which perform the groundwork for reflective analysis. It turns out that sense data are organised into a representation of an extended world in virtue of the physiological propensity of the organism to so order the material. Indeed the mechanism appears to follow the same pattern as the conscious analysis of visible ideas by which we come to discern objects, since it involves separating out elements from an original confusion and subsequently producing connections between elements.

These connections are causal and therefore arbitrary, since for empiricism there cannot be any reason for a causal relation discoverable through unaided contemplation; rather causal relations have to be discovered through observation. These
conjectures thereby problematise Condillac's analysis. For while arbitrary connection supposedly only makes sense if it recoverable for consciousness, here, below the level of consciousness, he invokes a physiological mechanism which functions according to arbitrary or direct influence. In placing certain fundamental operations by which we come to perceive a world, outside the ambit of his genetic psychology Condillac involves himself in vain conjectures. Strictly speaking they fall outside the proper arena of his discussion: namely the material of the understanding. The problem of providing the ground for the perception of distance has been displaced to a realm outside, or prior to, consciousness. Such operations precede the development of the understanding from an original experience. They attempt to provide a basis for what on the terms of the *Essai* need not have been called into question.

Now, if Condillac became dissatisfied with his self-imposed law to deal only with what anyone could experience it may be because in the Molyneux problem this approach appears somewhat *ad hoc*. Condillac appears to be answering the question of how we perceive distance by saying that we just do. His account appears not to be an explanation at all. It precisely refuses to give reasons because where there can be no judgement, namely outside of experience, empiricism cannot venture. The appeal to physiology or nature as the ground for the language of action, for perception and for the *première expérience*, in the examples I have given, is to concede that the self-imposed limits need to be stretched. Condillac is unable to sustain his empiricist modesty. In other words the genetic analysis of the understanding appears incomplete because it cannot account for its ground on its own terms.

The sense that the solution in the *Essai* is incomplete, leads Condillac to return to the Molyneux's problem in the *Traité des sensations*. The *Traité* must start more radically than the *Essai*
in order to provide an account of the grounds of perception which can be brought within the ambit of the analysis. If the **Essai** is incomplete it is because it has not succeeded in putting the arguments in the correct order. The **Traité** must fill in the gap in the **Essai**. It must complete it by re-ordering it. This will involve returning to an even more originary experience thereby stretching the limits of what counts as 'experience' for the purposes of the project of empiricism. It will try to recover the experience that precedes the discussion of words. In putting signs first in the **Essai**, as Condillac admits in a letter to Maupertuis in 1752, he may have given them too great a role in the development of the understanding. ["Je souhaiterois que vous eussiez fait voir comment les progrès de l'esprit dépendent du langage. Je l'ai tenté dans mon Essai sur l'Origine des Connoissances Humaines, mais je me suis trompé et j'ai trop donné aux signes". OPII p536] Ideas need to be returned to the position of priority through a purified analysis of sensation. Ironically, it would seem that language must, after all, be posterior to ideas.

If the **Traité** is written to ground the **Essai**, this demonstrates the paradoxical structure which I claimed in the Introduction figures Condillac's project. The order of discovery should lead directly to the truth. And yet the later developments must rework the original process and correct the detours which led to it. The completion of his own early work involves a reordering in which the later work must come first as its ground. And yet, according to the genetic account of the development of knowledge the later work requires the early error as the condition of its possibility: indeed the early work contains within it all subsequent developments. This problematic is played out in the rhetoric of empiricism that we have been focusing on in this Chapter. The question of which should come first, ideas or words is mirrored, in the shifting analogies between perception and language. As ideas and words vie for the most original status, the deployment of the analogy
of language to elucidate a theory of perception shifts to an analogy with perception to elucidate a theory of language. The question remains: which then is the literal and which the figure? Which comes first?

Before responding to this question and before discussing the Traité it will be apposite to take a brief look in the next section at Berkeley's theory of perception because of the influence it has on Condillac's treatment of Molyneux's problem. For the problem is not only a focus for questions to do with language and perception. It also represents the central problematic of the empiricist project.
Chapter 3: Berkeley's Confusion

Condillac's solution to Molyneux's problem in the Traité des sensations owes much to Berkeley's approach in A New Theory of Vision (1709). It will therefore be useful to take a brief look at the account of vision that Berkeley gives and at the difficulties that it entails. The difficulty I want to concentrate on centres on the use to which Berkeley puts the notion of 'confusion'. This discussion will then shed light on the parallel difficulties that Condillac attempts to deal with in his own theory of vision.

Berkeley's problem and a central dilemma for sensationalist epistemology is summed up in the New Theory when he says that "distance is in its own nature imperceivable and yet is perceived by sight". [NT p15] There is a form to vision which appears not to be reducible to the original content; for from the quality of the impression on the retina no knowledge can be had of the object which produced it, nor its distance. In other words the dilemma is how the appearance of magnitudes and quantities is to be explained given the assumption that immediately we perceive only visible qualities and intensities.

The solution which is Berkeley's new theory is to regard each 'visible idea' as signifying those of touch. Visible extension is constructed by learning the regularities through the association of visible with tangible ideas. Once the regular connections between the two senses are learnt the presence of the visible idea consisting only of light and colour, recalls the tangible experience of extension and figure. In this way visible ideas come to signify an extended world which is originally discovered through touch.
Berkeley's approach returns us to Molyneux's problem and the question of what, if anything, guarantees any coherence among the senses. Without any innate ideas, there can be no common sense to mediate between the five external senses. Without formal properties which can be understood through pure reason, and therefore capable of proofs in geometry and mechanics independently of, or prior to the experience of particular senses, there is no necessary synaesthetic connection. If sight and touch are not connected except through habit, we no longer need talk of a uniform substratum underlying them. And if their relation is arbitrary the trouble becomes to explain the apparent fact that there is some coherence in experience.

The Cartesian-inspired solution of an appeal to geometry; to a primary extended medium of exchange with rules of translation, is not easily abandoned. In his Lettre sur les sourds et muets (1751) Diderot imagines five individuals each confined to the use of just one sense. He argues that despite the fact that each would think the others were out of their wits they could at least discuss geometry. In Euclid they find the medium through which their languages become commensurable. But Berkeley refuses to appeal to any principles of translatability that are themselves available to the mind. For the forms that experience take are a function of the relations that obtain between, or rather develop out of the elements of that experience.

Consequently he rejects the Cartesian argument that the perception of distance is constructed or inferred from the knowledge of the angles of light rays entering the eye. [NT pl8] Any such appeal involves an illegitimate reference to what is precisely in need of explanation, namely knowledge of the distance the object is from the eye. Berkeley's arguments against incorporating such information into the process of perception, like those of Condillac in the Essai, centre on pointing out that we are not aware of making any such
judgement. If we employed a faculty of 'natural geometry', as Descartes supposes, we would be conscious of making the inference. For:

"To know one thing by means of another must I not first know that other thing? When I perceive your meaning by your words must I not first perceive the words themselves? and must I not know the premises before I infer the conclusion?" [A p165]

There can be no explanation of why any particular visible idea is connected with its tangible counterpart, because there is no necessity in that connection, as is demonstrated by the visible image in a mirror where the usual relation of signifier to signified is disrupted. [A p172 & NE p32] That we are not conscious of the computation, is the same as saying that the angles are not immanent in the visible idea, otherwise we should be able to see them. Just as we know that the symbols of speech have no necessary connection, nor any similarity with what they refer to (since we should perceive any resemblance), so generically different and qualitatively disparate impressions can be connected only through their repeated conjunction in experience. It is only the universality and regularity of their arrangement, which distinguish the symbols of sense impressions from those of speech. [NE p35]

In order for it to be possible to learn the language of vision there must be certain determinate features within vision which can become associated with the tangible perception of particular distances. That is, the language of sight must have a certain articulation. The immediate objects of sight can only lead the mind to the mediate ones if the former disclose certain marks or signals. Thus Berkeley needs to give an immanent account of the articulations within vision; an account involving purely qualitative features in the visible image.
Berkeley identifies three such features. The first is the sensation accompanying the lessening and widening of the distance between the pupils, the second, is termed 'confusions of appearance' and the third, the sensation of 'straining the eye'. [NT p16-19]

Berkeley does not dwell on the first and third of these at any length and really it seems to me that they should not be listed with 'confusion of appearance' at all, for neither of these sensations is an identifiable feature of vision. Whatever the sensations of moving the pupils closer together, or straining the eye are like, they are certainly not characterisable in terms of light and colour. Berkeley seems to be confused here. For clearly only if there are regularities in the visible ideas themselves could one begin to form connections between them and touch. Yet these features are, he says, "ideas or sensations [...] that attend vision"; and seems to regard them as sensations that mediate between vision and the palpable experience of extension. [NT p19]

There is a suggestion that Berkeley is aware of the subordinate position of his third feature when he says that straining is intended to prevent the image from becoming confused and when this fails the experience of straining the eye "supplies the place of confused vision" as an index of distance. [NT p19] As for the first feature, it is perhaps best understood as a replacement for the Cartesian argument that we judge distance by comparing the angles of the lines which lie perpendicular to the plane of the eyes as a blind man judges with two sticks. [PWD p170; OD VI 137] If we do judge from the position of the two eyes relative to each other, Berkeley is saying, then it is not because of any necessary connection between that position and the distance of the object. In other words we do not employ any 'natural geometry' as Descartes would have it. Rather, to see distance is to learn a language of arbitrary signifiers.
Whatever Berkeley's precise intentions in employing the first and third experiences, I think it is clear that they will not be sufficient to explain the language of vision. They are merely additional intermediaries between vision and touch which may aid the learning process. Ultimately for there to be articulations within vision there must be certain features immanent to it and it will be degrees of 'confusions of appearance' that must perform this function.

However our difficulties of interpretation do not end here since Berkeley leaves unclear what is meant by 'confusions of appearance'. This obscurity may be a consequence of Berkeley's need to use a vocabulary which is inappropriate to his subject. His description of visible appearances should not, strictly speaking, employ a vocabulary that relies on experience gained from the sense of touch. (This is the error he falls into with the other two examples.) On his own terms such an appeal would reverse the order of the genesis of ideas and beg the question. But since ordinary language is based on the habitual association of senses, which is to say based on the false assumption that there is a necessary connection between them, or a third term binding them together, Berkeley will need to depart from ordinary usage. Berkeley is conscious of the dilemma which involves him in a constant struggle with the inappropriate medium of words in his efforts to communicate his ideas. This is how he expresses the difficulty in the New Theory:

In treating of these things, the use of language is apt to occasion some obscurity and confusion, and create in us wrong ideas: for language being accommodated to the common notions and prejudices of men, it is scarce possible to deliver the naked and precise truth without great circumlocution, impropriety, and (to an unwary reader) seeming contradictions. [NT p68]
If we peer through the confusion of language what is the naked and precise nature of 'confusions of appearance'? It becomes clearer as Berkeley's discussion develops that a confused image is one which is out of focus. Since Berkeley cannot allow himself any appeal to objects outside the eye, the expression 'confusion of appearance' functions to mark the reduction of the transcendent concept of 'focus,' to a feature immanent to the visible image.

We have seen that such a reduction is necessary since the Cartesian natural light is not going to make extension visible. For Berkeley there can be no innate, clear and distinct idea of extension and thus no immediate access to a medium through which light can be conceived to pass and which could account for the confused appearance of vision. Clear and distinct ideas are no longer the medium through which knowledge of extension is gained. In their stead Berkeley places confused ideas of sense and in so doing reverses, the Cartesian picture. Confusion becomes the medium through which the world is discovered. "This confused appearance of the object doth therefore seem to me to be the medium, whereby the mind judges of distance." [NT p18]

Berkeley's intention is in part to refute the Cartesian theory of perception. And, I suggest, part of the appeal of the notion of confusion, lies in the fact that for Descartes it is what prevents the legitimate projection of sensation onto objects. Sensation, qua confused, is only arbitrarily connected with objects and consequently, if it becomes the basis of the perception of distance, the sensible must constitute an arbitrary system of signs. In this way, Berkeley grounds his argument that the visual image cannot resemble the world. Thus Berkeley retains the Cartesian contention that the confused idea leads us to the further confusion of that idea with a material object. But while he ultimately agrees that this confusion is an error (since there is no material object), it
is nonetheless an unavoidable and legitimate reaction to the ideas presented to us.

The other reason Berkeley employs the notion of confusion has to do with the fact that it can become a sign without our being aware of it. It enables Berkeley to reject innate ideas as the irreducible conditions ordering the perception of distance, while remaining alive to the fact that we are unaware of distance being constructed out of the immediate content of sensations. The problem with an account which tries to reduce the form of experience to the original content is that the content ought to be perceived by consciousness. Consciousness in other words should be aware of its own conditions. But if the idea that signifies is characterised as confused, it can contain elements that are not brought fully to consciousness. As a condition for the development of the understanding therefore, confusion marks the threshold between what is conscious and what unconscious. It allows for a description of the structure of vision in terms of its contents which while conditioning it, do not enter transparently into its construction and become immediately visible. Confused appearances are all there as it were, and yet simultaneously absent because indistinct.

Berkeley's project, then, modifies the Cartesian theory of perception of an extended world as a product of clear vision. It is not the natural light of reason that clearly and distinctly illuminates extended substance, but confused sensations. Berkeley's strategy is paradoxically to use confused appearances as if they could be arbitrary signifiers of extension in order to reduce materialism to absurdity. For, he comes to argue, if sensible signs are arbitrary, they cannot be known to represent objects at all.

However, as the material world drops out of Berkeley's account of perception he encounters a new problem, namely how to
characterise confusion positively given that there is no way of defining it by opposition to the clarity of a reasoned and geometric conception of the object. If, as I have tried to show, Descartes needs a faculty which embraces both sides of the world/mind divide, in order to distinguish the distinct from the confused, then Berkeley is going to find parallel difficulties in providing such a distinction which remains true to his idealist convictions. In other words, whereas Descartes attempts to determine confusion in terms of mistaking appearances for the real features of objects, Berkeley requires it to be something immanent in vision prior to, and completely independent of any judgement concerning reality.

But why should Berkeley be unable to provide an account of degrees of confusion which does not transcend appearances? The reason is that an image can only be perceived as confused or blurred by contrast with a distinct one which, in some sense, it falls short of. To say that an image is confused is to say that (at least) two distinct images are fused together. But if the image appears as one, there is no criterion by which to judge that the image is really double. Berkeley's use of the notion of confusion, therefore, must make implicit appeal to an illegitimate distinction between the apparent and the real.

One might argue, in Berkeley's defence, that the distinction could be made within the realm of appearances through a distinction between the occurrence of a phenomenal image on separate occasions. What appears as two distinct images on one viewing might be contrasted with a confused image on another which could dimly be perceived to be the consequence of a fusion of elements of each. But this presupposes some criterion by which to identify successive ideas of vision such that the same idea can be perceived in different manners. Yet for Berkeley, strictly speaking, all ideas are particulars. There could not therefore be any criterion by which to judge that successive appearances were more or less confused versions of
the same ideas. Of course we do suppose our ideas to persist when they are not being perceived, but this is merely a convenient fiction. Therefore while they might appear to be the same, there can be no rule by which to judge that they do not merely appear so, and consequently there could be no way of determining what really is more or less confused. If two successive ideas are different then the only way to judge that they were really the same would be to suppose that there were some underlying reality of which they were relatively imperfect representations. And the reality of objects is precisely what Berkeley wants to deny. Further to suppose that successive appearances could be of the same thing is to presuppose a veridical vision with which to contrast the confused one. That is, it supposes some real distinction which the confused appearance is insensitive to. But a distinction between veridical and illusory cannot be presupposed within the realm of appearances. The confused idea could after all be the proper appearance, and the perception of two distinct ideas could be the illusion: for example when one sees double.

Berkeley's difficulty is that if the appearance is to have some definite degree of confusion of elements, there must be some definite degree of a coming-together in the appearance itself. Within appearances in other words we must be able to make a clear distinction between different degrees of confusion. But visible ideas, qua confused, do not admit of clear distinctions. The only way they could would be through a distinction between appearing confused and really being confused. There cannot be, in other words, a criterion by which one idea can be determined to be a confused version of two others, because a distinction between a veridical and an apparent criterion cannot be made. (There are some echoes here of Wittgenstein's 'private language argument.') It would seem therefore that the attempt to make confused appearance an index of distance must fail since it cannot be characterised in a way which is immanent to the phenomenal.
The difficulty can be expressed another way. For to conceive the relation of sensation to object as one of non-conformity (since there is no object) presupposes we understand what conformity would be. But Berkeley denies that any sense can be made of such a notion. The confused appearance is precisely that which does not signal any transcendent reality and yet without an account of how distinct ideas succeed in transcending appearances, the former cannot disclose any articulation since there is no objective criterion by which distinctions could be made.
Chapter 4: Molyneux's Problem: Searching for an Empiricist Method

The difficulties with Berkeley's account in the New Theory need to be kept in mind as we begin to turn our attention to the Traité. Berkeley's solution to Molyneux's problem will have to be revised by Condillac as he attempts to provide an immanent account of the vision of distance. But before looking to the details of Condillac's approach we need to understand what is at stake in finding a solution to Molyneux's problem for a sensationalist epistemology and for the project to establish the principles of empiricism.

The first point to recall is that Locke's a priori answer to Molyneux's question is a bald statement of principle. He does not present the problem as evidence for his position, but as an illustration of it. It is an affirmation of the empiricist project in which knowledge is gained through adherence to experience. At the same time the problem symbolises the historical origin of the new philosophy at which the bandages of ignorance are removed. By representing the turn away from the light of reason to that of the senses, the fable of the blind man regaining his sight establishes the battle ground on which the rationalist faithful would need to fight. Yet such a fable could not remain a theoretical possibility. Ultimately if it is true that all experience originates in the senses it was felt that this should be provable experimentally. That is to say; if it is true at all it must be a contingent truth. The desire for a final solution could only be satisfied through empirical evidence; through an experimental psychology. For if Locke's solution were a necessary truth - a truth of reason - then empiricism would be grounded on rationalism.
Consequently the various actual cases of successful cataract operations in which people recovered their sight were widely discussed at the time.\(^1\) And although the accounts of these cases appeared broadly to support Molyneux's prediction, they were never completely satisfactory to the philosophical community. It was always imagined that once a controlled experiment were conducted, the issue could be resolved. Yet while the promise for such a solution was offered, it was simultaneously denied because the very need was determined by an uncritically held assumption. For the desire for an experimental proof is determined by the conviction in empiricism's first principle, while, paradoxically, such a proof is required to establish that principle. Or put another way, the value of an experiment as proof of the principle depends on the prior acceptance of the experimental method; which is to say, depends on the principle in question.

To take one example, this bind is played out in the reflections of Diderot's *Lettre sur les aveugles* (1749). Diderot complains that no one born blind who has actually recovered their sight was philosophically minded enough to recount the experience adequately. Similarly the physicians conducting the operations had not set up the conditions properly such that any sure conclusions could be drawn. These frustrations are dramatised in his own failed attempt to be present at the unveiling of a blind woman after a cataract operation as recounted in the beginning of the *Lettre*. The letter is written to apologise for having failed to honour a promise to secure an invitation for Diderot's correspondent to witness the operation. And the speculations that follow the apology are intended, however inadequately, to compensate for her absence. [LA p81-82]

Diderot presents himself as condemned to philosophical speculation because of an obstructive physician. Réaumur denies the philosopher access to his patient and thereby frustrates the resolution to Molyneux's problem. But why is Diderot
prevented from being present? Is it that Réaumur fears that the truth will be exposed, and the philosophes provided with the evidence with which to drag a reluctant age into the light? Diderot's framing of the question - "If you are curious to know why this skilled Academician conducts in secret experiments that, according to you, couldn't have too great a number of enlightened witnesses [...]" ["Si vous êtes curieuse de savoir pourquoi cet habile académicien fait si secrètement des expériences qui ne peuvent avoir, selon vous, un trop grand nombre de témoins éclairés [...]"] - certainly suggest that it is these enlightened spirits that Réaumur wants to resist. Réaumur "wants only to let the veil fall before a few inconsequential eyes". But Diderot has a further explanation, namely that: "the observations of such a famous man have less need of spectators when being made, as auditors when completed". ["les observations d'un homme aussi célèbre ont moins besoin de spectateurs, quand elles se font, que d'auditeurs, quand elles sont faites." [LA p82]

Diderot suggests in these lines that seeing the experiment would provide immediate evidence of what the physician hopes to obscure through providing a second-hand account in words. While disguising the event by translating it into words leads to a proliferation of listeners, it distances them from the truth. However, what appears superficially as a stab at Réaumur's desire to retain a monopoly on the first hand experience of the events and so secure his personal fame, can also be taken as a moment of candour about Diderot's own position. For Réaumur's desire for self-aggrandisement is a foil for the requirement that Diderot not attend the experiment. The refusal of access to the aveugle née is, Diderot tells us, what provokes the philosophical conversations between him and his friends which are transcribed in the letter. Diderot's thoughts on the blind are intended to take the place of the experiment his correspondant was unable to attend. "How pleased I would be," he writes, "if the account of our discussions could take the
place of the spectacle that I too easily promised you!" ["Que je serais heureux, si le récit d'un de nos entretiens pouvait me tenir lieu, auprès de vous, du spectacle que je vous avais trop légèrement promis!" LA p82] In effect the account requires the possibility of an experiment to begin; but one at which Diderot was not present. To present the transcription of these thoughts as an inadequate replacement for the immediate revelation, is, therefore, somewhat disingenuous. Diderot after all is primarily concerned with writing and philosophising. The fact of his publishing this 'letter' bears witness to Diderot's need of auditeurs for his words, rather than spectateurs to his deeds. As regards Molyneux's problem this is no accident. For I want to argue that no observation of an experiment could in fact have answered any of the questions raised and discussed in the Lettre. The experiment of the cataract operation is necessarily inadequate as a means of establishing the empiricist principle. For the problem is intrinsically theoretical rather than experimental.

Diderot's absence is necessary because the attempt to determine conditions for a controlled experiment that might bring the truth to light must fail. The attempt to avoid any ambiguity in the result appears to lead to certain practical requirements which are impossible to fulfil; for example: that the eyes of the patient be both completely healthy at the moment he first opens them and yet completely functionless for his whole life up to it. It is also difficult to distinguish what in the patient's reaction can be put down to the physical and emotional shock of regaining his sight, and what is of epistemological relevance. There are other difficulties that we have already touched on. Once certain perceived requirements are seen to be irrelevant (such as the size and distance of the objects that Locke introduces) it becomes difficult to give any account of what the experience would be of a first moment of sight if it involves no perception of extension. As Condillac asks: is it meaningful to speak of perceiving a mathematical
point. ["Qu'apercevois-je donc? Un point mathématique. Non, sans doute. Je verrois certainement de la lumière et les couleurs." E p56] Most importantly, though, for our purposes, is the difficulty of drawing a distinction between questions of physiology and psychology or epistemology. It seems unavoidable that the eyes would need time to adjust to the new influx of light. But when does the physiological adjustment end and the epistemological problem begin? It appears that the experiment leaves it undecidable whether the failure to identify the objects is a consequence of a certain stiffness in the eye, or of the lack of certain experiences. Condillac's discussion of Molyneux's problem in the Essai shows that the experimental evidence cannot establish the issue either way. [E p53ff] For the same evidence can be employed to support either position. As Condillac argues, those who have observed such operations employ the experience to confirm their prejudices rather than to determine the truth. "Those who observed [a] person born blind at the moment when his cataracts were removed, hoped to see an opinion confirmed that they had been prejudiced in favour of." ["Ceux qui observoient cet aveugle-né au moment qu'on lui abaissoit les cataractes, espéroient de voir confirmer un sentiment pour lequel ils étoient prévenus." E p59]

If empiricism cannot employ experimental evidence to establish its first principle Diderot's promise is necessarily broken. The broken promise leaves him implicated in the physician's crime of concealment. He finds himself caught between, on the one hand, an appeal to the ideal of a key experiment which would unveil the truth for all to see, and on the other, the dishonourable necessity of cloaking it in words.
The form of a transcription of insights gained in conversation is also used by Condillac to replace the hidden original experience/experiment in the *Traité des sensations*. Condillac, in conversation with a certain Mademoiselle Ferrand, imagines a statue which is organised on the inside like us but deprived of any ideas. Because it is encased in a marble skin it is unable to use any of its senses. The treatise consists of a description of the experience of this statue as the skin is made pliant and it is given the use of its senses one by one. "Nous imaginâmes une statue organisée intérieurement comme nous, et animée d'un esprit privé de toute espèce d'idées. Nous supposâmes encore que l'extérieur tout de marbre ne lui permettoit l'usage d'aucun de ses sens, et nous nous réservâmes la liberté de les ouvrir à notre choix, aux différentes impressions dont ils sont susceptibles." [TS p11]

The *Traité* then describes the process by which the appearance of sensations leads to the development of the understanding. In this way it hopes to fulfil its "principal object"; namely "to make us see (faire voir) how all our knowledge and all our faculties come from [...] sensations". "Le principal objet de cet ouvrage est de faire voir comment toutes nos connaissances et toutes nos facultés viennent des sens, ou, pour parler plus exactement, des sensations". TS p285] The principle will be made evident by its being developed. By unravelling what is contained within the principle, or more precisely within sensation, the demonstration of it can be completed. The principle or beginning generates the system, and in the process establishes itself. Thus Condillac can say that his is a system which makes itself. "un système qui s'est en quelque sorte fait tout seul". TS p293] That is, the system generates itself out of what is contained immanently within the sensible. "For sensations give birth to the whole system of man (système de l'homme): a complete system, the parts of which are all connected and mutually supporting." ["C'est donc des sensations que naît tout le système de l'homme: système complet dont
It is clear that the method employed in the *Traité* owes much to the Molyneux problem. What Molyneux asks of sight Condillac asks of each of the senses in turn. In so doing he places the problematic of how we learn to perceive at the heart of the work. As I argued earlier, this is a consequence of needing to find the proper place for the Molyneux question within the genetic analysis, such that it would no longer be a mere incidental illustration of the empiricist principle, but could become the very manner of its demonstration.

Condillac's change of heart on the issue is also significant. He writes that at the time he published the *Essai* he was prejudiced into thinking that the eye is able to judge distance and so forth naturally. He was himself guilty of using the cataract operation as a foil to confirm a prejudice. The prejudice of his earlier work was, he writes, dissipated by the light generated in his discussions with Mademoiselle Ferrand. [TS p13] Casting himself in the role of the blind man to whom sight is restored and the truth revealed, Condillac explains that his former blindness derived from the illusion that nature gave us the entire use of our senses at the very instant they were formed. And this was a consequence of our having "forgotten the ignorance in which we were born: a state which", Condillac writes, "leaves no traces". ["Nous ne saurions nous rappeler l'ignorance dans laquelle nous sommes nés: c'est un état qui ne laisse point de traces après lui." TS.p10] For the Condillac of the *Traité*, we can only recall forgetting what we have first learnt. And therefore the ignorance of the first moment of our existence, since it precedes all learning, is veiled from our view. Condillac continues his summary of the intentions of the work (in the *Dessein de cet ouvrage*) with these words:
We only remember having been unaware of what we remember having learnt; and to notice what we learn, we must first know something. It is necessary to feel oneself to be with some ideas in order to observe that one feels oneself to be with the ideas one has not had. This reflective memory, which makes us now so sensible of the passage from one piece of knowledge to another, cannot return to the first ones: on the contrary it presupposes them, and this is the origin of the tendency we have to think they are born with us.

"Nous ne nous souvenons d'avoir ignoré, que ce que nous nous souvenons d'avoir appris; et pour remarquer ce que nous apprenons, il faut déjà savoir quelque chose: il faut s'être senti avec quelques idées, pour observer qu'on se sent avec des idées qu'on n'avoit pas. Cette mémoire réfléchie, qui nous rend aujourd'hui si sensible le passage d'une connoissance à une autre, ne saurit donc remonter jusqu'aux premières: elle les suppose au contraire, et c'est-là l'origine de ce penchant que nous avons à les croire nées avec nous." TS p10

Innatism is a consequence of thinking that what one cannot remember learning, must be born with us. But we cannot remember acquiring our first ideas, or learning the first things we know, since such recollection is only possible after one has acquired ideas and knowledge. What Condillac comes to realise is that the first perceptual experience cannot lead immediately to knowledge. There must after all be an unconscious or forgotten process by which we come to perceive: a process which is the condition of possibility for advanced perception, or that which is presupposed by the capacity to reflect on one's own development. This means that the original transition from the being of the statue to the having of certain ideas - the transition from sensation to idea - cannot itself be recalled. We must, in other words, 'be with' or 'have' ideas before becoming aware that we have them. Interestingly it is not simply seeing which needs to be learned. "To say that we have learned to see, to hear to taste, to smell and to touch appears the strangest paradox", but the Traité is designed to establish
it and so eradicate the vestiges of innatism that remained in the Essai in the guise of an appeal to physiological mechanism.

Condillac's task, however, is paradoxical in more than one way. We saw that the problem with Locke's treatment of Molyneux's problem was that it did not appear to conform to experience. Condillac's critique centred on the claim that what cannot be recalled and thereby made part of experience, cannot be employed in an explanation of the development of the understanding. The attempt to overcome this objection must now be central to the Traité and Condillac opens his account of its aims by raising this very issue. Condillac negotiates the difficulty with an insight that was already present in the Essai. There he argued that there are ideas that we have but which, because of the paucity of attention paid them, are very quickly forgotten. In an epistemology of experience, it would seem, the only way to develop an immanent account of its construction is to appeal to a category which is paradoxically both within and without experience. The category of the forgotten allows Condillac to negotiate the difficulty of accounting for the apparent need for an unthought, or unconscious aspect to experience. Consequently Condillac begins the Traité by insisting on the existence of a hidden process that grounds the development of the understanding, but which cannot itself be recalled. In so doing Condillac admits that the première expérience necessarily escapes recovery for consciousness. We, like Diderot, are necessarily absent from the original experience/experiment: the moment in which our senses are first opened.

If Berkeley employs the notion of confusion to hedge around the problem of how, within the content of experience, there can be the conditions for its construction, Condillac employs the notion of forgetting. The forgotten is what is indistinct within the realm of the sensible, and because it is not completely recoverable for consciousness it can operate as its
condition of possibility. We can forget having learnt to see, just as for Berkeley confusion involves the irrecoverable condition of possibility for learning the language of vision. The forgotten is paradoxically both experiential and so can form part of the analysis, and yet absent and so can be employed as the condition of possibility for the system of man.

Condillac's intention, however, is to bridge the gap between experience and its forgotten origin. The *Traité* attempts to do the impossible: to recall the forgotten process and lift the veil on the origin of human understanding. Rather than attend an actual experiment which, as we saw, could never resolve the issue, he reconstructs the process of coming to perceive by recourse to his imagined statue. The forgotten process has to be reconstructed in imagination in order, somehow, to recover the *première expérience* and experience it anew. This forgotten experience replaces the doctrine of innate ideas by giving a quasi-phenomenological account of the grounds of the understanding. Qua condition of experience it cannot be recalled, but the process of coming to perceive is nonetheless given a phenomenological description which ties it into a continuum with experience. In this way it is an improvement on the doctrine of innate ideas because it avoids the appearance of a radical discontinuity between it and experience.

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But how is this reworking of the Molyneux problem to be a demonstration that all knowledge comes from sensation? Condillac wants to allow the statue to tell its own story, through which it will show, or literally, 'make visible' (*faire voire*), the evolution of its understanding. But what is meant precisely by making the empiricist principle visible? How, in other words, is the *Traité* to be read such that it will not
merely illustrate a prior conviction in the principle? Before
the main body of the Traité Condillac inserts a short piece of
advice on how to read it. Only those readers who place
themselves exactly in the place of the statue, he warns, will
be able to understand the work. We must, Condillac insists:

begin to exist with it, have just one sense when it has
one; to gain only the ideas that it gains, to acquire only
those habits that it acquires: in a word, it is necessary
to be no more than it is. It will only judge things like us
when it has all our senses and all our experience; and we
will only judge like it when we suppose ourselves deprived
of all it lacks.

["J'avertis donc qu'il est très important de se mettre
exactement à la place de la statue que nous allons
observer. Il faut commencer d'exister avec elle, n'avoir
qu'un seul sens, quand elle n'en a qu'un; n'acquerir que
les idées qu'elle acquiert, ne contracter que les habitudes
qu'elle contracte: en un mot, il faut n'être que ce qu'elle
est. Elle ne jugera des choses comme nous, que quand elle
aura tous nos sens et toute notre expérience; et nous ne
jugerons comme elle, que quand nous nous supposerons privés
de tout ce qui lui manque." TS p15]

Condillac is concerned to place the original experience from
which the understanding develops at the forefront of his
analysis. The analysis of the statue is presented as a strategy
by which we can be led to a rediscovery of ourselves. And the
process by which we recover ourselves will allow us to become
reflexively aware of our own generation from sensation. Only
through such reflexive understanding of our development, as we
saw in the Introduction, can the demonstration that all
knowledge comes from sensation be completed. But only through a
complete identification with the statue can we be led through
this process of self discovery. Only by stripping ourselves
bare of all ready-made ideas can we re-enact the generation of
the understanding. A conscientious reading of the Traité,
therefore, must involve being within the experience of the
statue: being conscious with it. By becoming the statue we can be led back to a rediscovery of our selves as the statue transforms itself into us. Such a reading might bridge the gulf between the appeal to experience as a proof of the empiricist principle and as a mere illustration of it. It would allow for an identification between the première expérience and the claim that all knowledge comes from the senses which could establish the indubitability of each.

And yet the status of this demand is interesting because of the very impossibility of acceding to it. The reader will always be more than the statue. Insofar as we observe it we cannot completely coincide with it. The recovery of the original experience - the condition of the success of the demonstration of the Traité - cannot be effected, because, as Condillac admits, the possibility of reflecting on our own development presupposes an inability to recall it. For while empiricism wants on the one hand to characterise 'consciousness' as a form of knowing which is transparent to, or 'with' itself, on the other hand the conditions of possibility for conscious awareness, which become equated with the origin of its development, always remain, as we might say, 'unconscious'. Even a thought experiment must leave some gap which separates the experiment from the observer. Consequently, Condillac and his readers, like Diderot in the Lettre sur les aveugles, are necessarily absent at the moment the statue's senses are opened.

While this warning tries to insist upon an impossible identity between reader and statue, the division between the two troubles the entire work. The Traité begins with the statue limited to the sense of smell and argues that this is an insufficient basis for the statue to gain the idea of anything other than itself. Ex hypothesi, in the original experience there can be no projection beyond the sensible. Smell, and as it turns out, all the senses bar touch, can only provide
knowledge of modifications to the statue's own being. At the first moment of its existence the statue has no notion of self: it is no more than a particular smell. [TS p56] Condillac writes:

If we present it with a rose, for us [par rapport à nous] it would be a statue which smells a rose; but for it [par rapport à elle], it would be no more than the smell of that flower itself. Therefore it would be the odour of a rose [...] In a word, for it [à son égard] odours are no more than its own modifications or manners of being [manières d'être].

["Si nous lui présentons une rose, elle sera par rapport à nous une statue qui sent une rose; mais par rapport à elle, elle ne sera que d'odeur même de cette fleur. Elle sera donc odeur de rose [...] En un mot, les odeurs ne sont à son égard que ses propres modifications ou manières d'être". TS pl5]

Thus on the opening page of the Traité itself Condillac reintroduces the distinction that the Avis tried to eliminate, namely that between the experience of the statue and that of the experimenter observing it. The reader must enter the experience of the statue, and yet simultaneously retain a certain distance so as to gain a critical understanding of the processes involved. We need to become the statue, but also, to understand what is being done to the statue (for example its being presented with a rose), in order to appreciate the nature of the experiences it would have. There is a tension, then, between arguments which appeal to what the statue could possibly know on the basis of the sensations it has, and the demand that we attend only to its experience: a tension, one might say, between a kind of 'phenomenological' description, and a hermeneutic detachment. We need to put ourselves in its place to appreciate that it can have no idea of being other than its own, while the very import of this only makes itself
felt by contrast with the developed understanding of other beings which the statue will acquire. In other words, if the perception of anything which transcends immediate sense experience needs to be accounted for immanently then the demand of the Avis for an original projection beyond self-consciousness belies the origin hoped for. The possibility of the re-production in imagination appears to undermine the foundations of its production, since the structure of a conscientious reading incorporates a separation of the self from itself.

Thus, the complete development of the statue with which the Traité will end is also inscribed at its beginning. The principle to be established is both what is demonstrated by the system, and the point from which it generates itself. The reader follows the development of the statue from within its experience, but also from the perspective of the completion of its development. These two perspectives can only coincide at the end when in the final chapter Condillac hands the narrative voice to his statue.

If we suppose that our statue remembers the order in which the senses were given it, it would suffice to make it reflect on itself, in order to put before its eyes the principal truths that we have demonstrated.

["En supposant que notre statue se souvînt de l'ordre dans lequel les sens lui ont été accordés, il suffiroit de la faire réfléchir sur elle-même, pour remettre sous les yeux les principales vérités que nous avons démontrées." TS.p257

(Note the ambiguity of 'les yeux', that is, either the statue's eyes or ours. It is both a demonstration 'for the statue' and 'for us'.)"

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In the final chapter (bar the conclusion) the statue begins its recollections, asking: "What am I, and what have I been?" ["Que suis-je, diroit elle, et qu'ai-je été?" TS p257] and in so doing synthesises the experiences 'for us' and 'for it'. It has come to judge like us, and so can retrace its evolution, just as we have traced it through the work. If it can account for its evolution from sensation to the point where it judges like us, Condillac asks by way of concluding the Traité: "why should it not be the same with man?" ["Elle n'est donc rien qu'autant qu'elle a acquis. Pourquoi n'en seroit-il pas de même de l'homme?" TS.p268] If it is no more than us why suppose ourselves to be more than the statue? As its development and ours coincide, the imagined reconstruction of which the Traité consists is recalled so that it can be reinscribed as properly experiential. The imagined statue attempts to bridge the gap through a veridical recollection of which we are no longer capable. The recollection brings the forgotten process to light allowing both us and the statue to see it. The process by which it learns to sense, is thereby itself made sensible: we are enabled to see the process of learning to see. That is the learning to see and the making visible of this process coincide. Elsewhere Condillac writes that "to fulfil the object of this work, it will be absolutely necessary to place the principle of all our operations before our eyes: and also never to lose sight of them". ["pour remplir l'objet de cet ouvrage, il falloit absolument mettre sous les yeux le principe de toutes nos opérations: aussi ne les perd-on jamais de vue." S.p288] As the implications of the principle are made explicit and the statue develops we need to keep each step, clearly in view; for if we miss a step we can no longer be sure that some extraneous element has not been introduced into the story. The work has to be shown to unfold itself according to what is contained within its principle without appeal to anything other.
And yet, that we can at best simulate being the statue, and so at best partially understand the work suggests once again that the Traité is not a complete demonstration. Inevitably we will lose sight of the principle to be proved. Something has after all been misplaced, namely the statue's recollection of its own development. For if the statue can recall the process then the first person account must come at the end. But, at the same time the original narrative is itself a reconstruction. And if the statue can recall the process, then its narrative would be unnecessary, because we would be able to recall it without the aid of Condillac's analysis. In other words its capacity to recollect distinguishes it from us. Yet if it is different from us then the demonstration has failed. Indeed the extent to which the statue can remember is the extent to which the analysis is incomplete. Strictly of course, as Condillac's use of the conditional suggests (i.e. "If we suppose that our statue remembers"), any such recollection must be impossible. The statue's narrative cannot provide an escape from the bind that the forgotten process cannot be completely recovered for consciousness. While what is recalled must come first, the possibility of its recollection as first is belied by the fact that memory comes after, and does not coincide with the original experience.

This bind is reflected in the way Condillac frames the Traité. He warns the reader of the necessity of abandoning all acquired ideas and stripping away prejudice. The empiricist principle states that at the origin there are no ideas and so the demonstration must begin by eliminating all acquired notions. To retain such ideas, in particular the belief that we do not need to learn to use our senses, is to prejudge the Traité and undermine the demonstration. However this warning must itself come before the work. Indeed the French prévenir, to warn, means literally to go before. But to be forewarned is also to be prejudiced (prévenu). The starting point of empiricism which would come before all prejudice is itself to be reached only
after a more original prejudice: namely that we adhere to the empiricist principle itself. The principle, therefore, can only be proved if we begin with it.

Ultimately the inability to find a coherent order to the work is reflected in the ambiguity discussed earlier as to where to place words. Condillac's statue is speechless, and we are asked to identify with it in its pre-linguistic state. By placing words after the development described in the Traité Condillac hopes to recover an immediate pre-linguistic experience. Yet, nonetheless, our identification with this experience is mediated through language, firstly through Condillac's own voice, and then the statue's. This mediation is another illustration of the necessary separation between the reader and the statue. The première expérience must be made visible to the reader, while it is simultaneously disguised by the mist of words. The reader must both be an auditor of the statue's words and a spectator of its deeds.

In fact the statue finds its own voice only after its story is complete, but nowhere in its development does it acquire a language. [TS pl36] Language would have to be learned after the development described in the Traité, that is to say after the institution of signs as discussed in the Essai. Thus although the Traité attempts to ground the analysis in the Essai, it must also presuppose that analysis. For according to the Essai memory only becomes possible through the use signs. [E pl5] Only a sign can function to recall an idea which is not present. Consequently the statue would need to have acquired a language before beginning its development in order for it to recall that development and recount its own story. And in this sense the Essai should precede the Traité. At the same time however, as I have argued, the Traité is intended to precede the Essai and provide its unthought ground and as such it remains hidden from the later perspective of the Essai. It cannot be recalled by an understanding which develops through
the deployment of signs. As such it should be regarded as the hidden original experiment/experience which was gestured to in the Essai in the speculations on physiology. Thus language must come both at after the Traité, but also before it qua condition of possibility for its being recorded.

Condillac became aware of the apparent inconsistency between the Essai and the Traité on the issue of the role of signs in the development of the understanding. And he made a significant revision to the Traité to account for how the statue can acquire as much knowledge as it does without language. The statue can only analyse naturally, we are told because it has no language. [S p136] And an analysis without signs can only be very limited. Condillac makes a distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge [connoissances de théorie and connoissances pratiques] which map on to the different projects of the Essai and the Traité respectively. [TS.p136 & p221] Theoretical knowledge requires a language because it consists of a series of distinct ideas, and signs are needed to order and determine them. Practical knowledge however consists of confused ideas which regulate our actions without our being capable of noticing how they make us act. Confused ideas are a kind of implicit knowledge through which nature leads the statue into action. Nature 'reasons for' the statue before it has any reflective awareness. The statue's development is governed by habits which follow from a natural imperative rather than from any reflective judgment. That is, they are motives for action consequent upon habitual associations of degrees of pain and pleasure with certain concatenations of ideas. Such judgements remain impulsive or instinctual and necessarily cannot be accounted for from the theoretical perspective, since there can be no reason for them. In a passage added after the initial publication Condillac writes:
When I treat of the ideas that the statue acquires, I don't pretend that it has knowledge of which it can give a precise account: for it only has practical knowledge. All its light is properly an instinct, that is a habit of acting on the basis of ideas which it does not know how to be aware of, a habit which, once acquired, guides it with certainty, without it needing to recall the judgements that the habit made it make [...] To acquire theoretical knowledge it is necessary to have a language.

"Lors que je traite des idées qu’acquiert la statue, je prétends pas qu'elle ait des connoissances dont elle puisse se rendre un compte exact: elle n'a que des connoissances pratiques. Toute sa lumière est proprement un instinct, c'est-à-dire, une habitude de se conduire d'après des idées dont elle ne sait pas se rendre compte, habitude qui, étant une fois contractée, la guide sûrement, sans qu'elle ait besoin de se rappeler les jugemens qui la lui ont fait prendre [...] Pour acquérir des connoissances de théorie, il faut nécessairement avoir un langage..." TS p136

It is instructive to note the ambiguity in Condillac's use of the expression 'se rendre compte' in this passage. The capacity of the statue to give an account of its development in language is elided with the possibility of recalling and being aware of that development. That of which the statue becomes aware - (se rendre compte) - is, in other words, mediated by its ability to recount it - (se rendre un compte). Thus the immediacy of consciousness is mediated by recollection and language.

This passage betrays the glimmerings of an awareness of a difficulty which threatens to undermine the plausibility of the method adopted in the Traité. Condillac hoped to show that the lights that guide his statue are instinctive. They, like Descartes's impetus naturales, should be prior to rational explanation and therefore must remain beyond the ambit of an inquiry into the theoretical understanding which the Essai conducts. The statue, in other words, cannot have a language within the development of the Traité because its knowledge there is practical. And yet, as I have been arguing, without a
language, as Condillac suggests in this passage, the statue could neither recall nor recount that development. That this passage was added to the *Traité* after 1754 is significant because it represents a belated attempt to clarify the relation of the *Traité* to the *Essai*. The proper order is once again being reinscribed after the fact.

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Clearly the problematic of order and method centres on the role of signs and on the possibility or otherwise of recollection. It will be necessary, therefore, to analyse Condillac's account of memory in the *Traité*. By way of introducing the discussion, however, it will be worth looking once more to the *Avis*. What is significant about Condillac's forewarning to his readers is that it is something he says he forgot to mention in the work itself. He writes:

> I forgot *oublié* to give forewarning *de prévenir* of something I should have said, and perhaps repeated in several places in this work; but I hope that the admission *aveu* of this oversight *oubli* will be as good as repetitions and without the inconvenience.

> "J'ai oublié de prévenir sur une chose que j'aurois dû dire, et peut-être répéter dans plusieurs endroits de cet ouvrage; mais je compte que l'aveu de cet oubli vaudra des répétitions, sans en avoir l'inconvénient." TS p9 'Avis important au lecteur'

The *Avis* is also an *aveu*. It is an admission of an oversight, and a warning of an oversight yet to come. It functions to warn us that Condillac forgot to repeat this warning within the work and to take the place of those warnings. To admit this here is more convenient than to rewrite the *Traité*, for the admission
can take the place of repetitions within the work itself. But why, we might ask, did he forget to mention it within the work? Part of the answer has to be that it does not properly form a part of the work. It is a condition of its intelligibility, not an integral part of the genetic analysis itself. Immersed in the development of his statue, Condillac forgot that his readers might not automatically follow him. Although Condillac says that the warning should have been repeated within the work, in a sense it is necessarily forgotten in the work since it precisely involves temporarily adopting a transcendent position vis-à-vis the statue: a position that, paradoxically, the Avis warns against.

Condillac admits that his warning will appear out of place, [déplacé], occurring as it does before we have been introduced to his statue. But this appearance will be further reason for us to take note of it and not to forget it. ["On ne comprend point encore ce que c'est que la statue que je me propose d'observer; et cet avertissement paroîtra sans doute déplacé: mais ce sera une raison de plus pour le remarquer, et pour s'en souvenir." TS p9] Condillac is concerned to overcome the dilemma of presenting an experience mediately through words. While the original experience is disguised by the cloak of language, Condillac hopes for the possibility of a reading which will enable us to return to that experience. But even if the story is convincing, even if the statue appears to possess all the understanding that we do, the demonstration will remain incomplete. For all that can be shown is that all that is in the mind could have begun with sensation. It cannot exclude other possibilities. So Condillac can only conclude the Traité with a rhetorical question. If the statue is nothing more than it has acquired, why should the same case not apply to man? [TS p268] The proof is not any deduction from abstract principles; no appeal to the light of reason. Its appeal is rather to an original fact to be verified in the light of our own experience, while paradoxically, we remain absent from that
primitive expérience. The treatise presents this statue, not so much in order for us to compare it with our own experience (as Locke does and as Condillac himself tries to in the Essai), but as a means to living, or reliving the conditions of experience. The completion of the proof depends on the coincidence between the experience of the statue for it and for us: but this coincidence is always déplacé. We are unable to bring before our eyes the very process whereby we come to see.

For Condillac then, despite the tensions of its method, this proof is the only one possible. It is a compromise between a deduction a priori and an experiment. It is an ideal reconstruction of an experiment that cannot in fact be conducted. It is also, qua ideal, not necessarily accurate in all its details. As we saw with the Essai (p32 above), so in the Traité there is a tension between the ideal process, and the actual development.

But while words appear to deny access to the immediacy of the experience, Condillac attempts to forge a method of writing in the Traité which will take us from the disguise of language to the experience itself. What is required in philosophy is the forging of a new language which will be adequate to the original experience because grounded in it. The conformity between its language and method and its ground is designed to bridge the gap between the principle as initial axiom and as that which needs to be established. For so long as the demonstration is distinct from the original experience it cannot be a complete demonstration and we will always be absent from the experience/experiment. Its completion would consist in eliding the proof with the experience/experiment: bringing them together such that to follow the proof can simultaneously be to have immediate access to the indubitability of the première expérience. The project to complete or correct the Essai and to reduce all knowledge to sensation transformed, therefore, involves the effort to resolve the bind of a philosophy that
simultaneously denies the validity of first principles (ie generally accepted propositions) and argues from the basis that everything begins with experience. Condillac's attempt to prove the empiricist principle without appeal to first principles or to an unformulatable experiment will therefore need to bring the experiment into the writing of the demonstration.

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These rather elliptical remarks should begin to clarify themselves if we look to what Condillac has to say about his intentions in the *Traité*. In the *Extrait Raisonné* he declares that the "principal object of this work is to show [faire voir] how all our knowledge and all our faculties come from the senses". [[le principal objet de cet ouvrage est de faire voir comment toutes nos connaissances et toutes nos facultés viennent des sens". TS p285]^2 But the extent to which the truth of the principle is uncovered and made visible is the extent to which it will appear self-evident and in no need of any demonstration. The coincidence hoped for between the principle to be proved and the original experience, by making everything self-evident, may, Condillac fears, lead people to think that nothing of import has been said. If the analysis is complete the whole development from sensation will be opened up to view and nothing will be hidden. The *Essay*, by contrast, being incomplete and disordered must be obscure and difficult to follow. Ironically this obscurity is the reason for its success. Condillac writes:

In 1746 [in the *Essay*] I tried to give an account of the generation of the faculties of the soul. This endeavour appeared novel, and had some success, but the success it had it owed to the obscure manner in which I executed it. For such is the lot of discoveries of the human spirit: the bright light to which they are exposed, makes them appear
so simple, that one reads things of which one had no inkling and yet one thinks one has learned nothing.

"J'essayai en 1746 de donner la génération des facultés de l'âme. Cette tentative parut neuve, et eut quelque succès mais elle le dut à la manière obscure dont je l'exécutai. Car tel est le sort des découvertes sur l'esprit humain: le grand jour dans lequel elles sont exposées, les fait paraître si simples, qu'on lit des choses dont on n'avait jamais eu aucun soupçon et qu'on croit cependant ne rien apprendre. TS p291"

As Réaumur realised, so Condillac sees that success is consequent upon disguising the truth. In leaving part of the explication hidden the partially revealed truth appears more novel. The obscurity and confusion of hiding the truth in a proliferation of words thereby leads to having many listeners. So the truth of the empiricist principle, as brought to light in the Traité, is, we are told, the reason that it may be regarded as demonstrating nothing that was not already evident. Condillac continues:

This is the fault of the Traité des sensations. When one read in the introduction that judgement, reflexion, the passions, in a word, all the operations of the soul, were no more that sensation itself differently transformed, one thought one saw a paradox denuded of any sort of proof; but no sooner has one completed the work, then one is tempted to say that it is a simple truth that none is unaware of.

"Voilà le défaut du Traité des Sensations. Lorsqu'on a lu dans l'exorde le jugement, la réflexion, les passions, toutes les opérations de l'âme, en un mot, ne sont que la sensation même qui se transforme différemment, on a cru voir un paradoxe dénué de toute espèce de preuve; mais à peine la lecture de l'ouvrage a-t-elle été achevée, qu'on a été tenté de dire, c'est une vérité toute simple, et personne ne l'ignoroit." TS p291"
Part of my intention here has been to argue that Condillac's new solution to Molyneux's problem is required because of the exigencies of the two works in which the question is raised. That is to say that the *Essai*, dealing as it does with the development of the understanding through the analysis of the origin of language, is an attempt to account for the theoretical understanding in its complex entirety. The genetic analysis carried out in that work, by taking account of, among other things, social interaction, deals with a sophisticated level of experience. This, in Condillac's mind accounts for its difficulty - the ideas being often confusing - as well as for its success. If Condillac was dissatisfied with that work, it is because it is limited to a high level of description that needed to be grounded in a more radical and detailed account of the development of the prereflective basis of the understanding. Because it operates at a high level of description the *Essai* is incomplete. It is a partial account which needed to be filled in. If the *Essai* errs it is because it has missed certain steps out and the *Traité* represents an attempt to provide a more complete description.

Where the *Essai* had taken the vision of an extended world for granted the *Traité* needed to establish it. The *Traité* goes below the level of conscious experience to find what is enveloped within it and that from which it is generated. The original experience, had itself to be analysed into its elements so as to its forgotten basis. And while the *Essai* had been able to theorise, Condillac appeared to see the need to move in the direction of an experimental proof. The *Traité* deals with the pre-linguistic state of man - a state in which his openness to sensation guarantees a more immediate proof of his sensationalist epistemology, while remaining alive to the impasse of appeal to any actual experiment. Thus the demonstration of the *Traité* deals with the process of learning to see, hear, etc. which is not available to ordinary recollection. The origins of the understanding are necessarily
forgotten and so cannot be consciously accessed. In this sense they do not form any part of our psychological make-up, and so no part of the project of the *Essai*.

Hence the construction of the statue's understanding does not operate according to any rationale that can be given independently of experience. Rather it is to experience that the appeal must made if the manner of its development is to be made explicit. The order of the connection of ideas must be shown at every point to be logically unnecessary, and yet must be self-evident in the light of our own experience. Now, for Condillac, the order in which sensations connect up is determined by physiological need. Thus insofar as the *Traité* appeals to the prelinguistic encounter with sensation it appeals to the reader's capacity to empathise with our most fundamental physiological needs. Natural impulse becomes the motor propelling the development of the faculties and the evolution of a coherent phenomenal world. The *Traité* is, therefore, a kind of phenomenology of the physiological account given in the *Essai*. Condillac stretches the limits of experience, attempting to bring the physiological mechanism into the ambit of his psychological analysis, attempting, that is, to make explicit what is hidden within the sensible.
To understand the manner in which Condillac attempts to recall the forgotten process it will be necessary to explain in what recollection consists within the analysis of the Traité. The structure of memory will clearly be of crucial importance to Condillac's conception of his own enterprise. Condillac's method attempts to recall a process of development and in so doing determine the extent of human understanding. But the manner in which the process of recollection itself distorts the original development troubles the entire project. In the analysis of the appearance of memory therefore, we can expect to uncover the structure of the tensions that figure Condillac's work.

Now, memory like all the operations of the mind can be no more than sensation transformed. But memory holds the privileged position of being the first transformation and as such is the key to the development of the understanding. Consequently to uncover the conditions for the original transformation we need to look to Condillac's conception of the nature of immediate sensation.

For Condillac we do not immediately possess all the ideas that sensation can contain \[\text{renferme}\]. Sensation transforms itself by unfolding what is contained implicitly within it. It is unfurled \[\text{déployé}\] through analysis. [TS p170 & p260] But sensation is not analysed by the mind since the mind is not distinct from sensation and consequently the dynamic of its 'de-velopment' requires a certain activity immanent to the sensible origin. Thus sensation, for Condillac, is not purely passive. It involves at the outset an active process of selection. That is, there is an immanant tendency for
sensations to disentangle [démêlent] themselves. [TS p260] As we have seen in the example of vision, Condillac distinguishes seeing and looking [voir and regarder]: between, that is, an undifferentiating first glance and the activity of isolating elements and reconfiguring them. This activity is essential to sensations because they contain some quantum of pain or pleasure or a certain degree of vivacity [vivacité] relative to each other. Pain and pleasure are the première mobile of the faculties. [TS p23] This means that attention is always focussed on one sensation at the expense of others as determined by the needs of the organism. There is no absolute indifference in sensation for to feel is to feel good or bad relative to some other sensation. We never simply see therefore, but are always engaged in a process of looking. But this is not to say that the attention is distinct from the sensation. Attention is not an innate faculty, for sensation is attention. [TS p291-2] The relative vivacity of the sensation just is what paying more attention consists in. At the beginning of the Traité we learn that to attend to a sensation is identical with being the sensation. In this state the statue is what it senses: it is no more than a 'modification of itself', or a certain 'manner of being' [manièrè d'être]. [TS p15]

However without memory the statue is confined to attending to one manner of being and is unable to relate it to any other. As the statue smells its first smell its whole being is occupied with the odour. It is unable to experience anything else. Even so the odour it smells does not entirely vanish when the rose is taken away, but is 'retained'. "The attention paid" to the odour, Condillac explains, "retains it." [L'attention qu'elle lui a donnée, la retient encore". S.p19] The stronger the attention paid to the smell, or which is the same thing, the more vivacious the smell, the stronger the impression retained. Therefore Condillac writes that: "When our statue is a new odour, it has present that which it had been the moment before
There are therefore two manners of sensing within it". "Lorsque notre statue est une nouvelle odeur, elle a donc encore présente celle qu'elle a été le moment précédent [...] Il y a donc en elle deux manière de sentir". TS p19

The statue retains what it was, but simultaneously experiences present sensations. Attention thereby becomes double - what Condillac calls double attention [TS p292] - focussed on what it is and on what it retains. These two manners of sensing divide the statue between what it is and what it has. It is the present sensation, and simultaneously has the past one: has, that is, what it was. The 'being' of the past is transformed into a 'having' in the present.

We might now ask how these two manners of sensing are to be distinguished. How does the statue know which it has and which it is? Condillac answers 'for us' and 'for it'. For us they "differ only because one relates to an actual sensation and the other to a sensation which is no longer, but of which the impression endures". But the statue "[u]naware that there are objects acting on it, unaware even that it has an organ; [...] only ordinarily distinguishes the memory of a sensation from an actual sensation, by sensing feebly what it has been, and sensing forcefully [vivement] what it is." "Il y a donc en elle deux manières de sentir, qui ne diffèrent, que parce que l'une se rapporte à une sensation actuelle, et l'autre à une sensation qui n'est plus, mais dont l'impression dure encore. Ignorant qu'il y a des objets qui agissent sur elle, ignorant même qu'elle a un organe; elle ne distingue ordinairement le souvenir d'une sensation d'avec une sensation actuelle, que comme sentir foiblement ce qu'elle a été, et sentir vivement ce qu'elle est." TS p19

Memory, then, is a manner of sensing which is ordinarily weaker than a present sensation. Differing degrees of vivacity among sensations thereby distinguish memories from present
sensations. But, as we saw, a degree of vivacity is no more than a degree of attention. Accordingly a past sensation is no more than one weakly attended to. Inevitably, if memory is to be conceived in terms of attention, the recollection of a past sensation is, for the statue, identical to weak attention to a present sensation. Its perception of succession is equivalent to attention to sensations of differing degrees of vivacity in one moment. It follows that what is ill-attended to is of the same category as what is partially forgotten. Both are defined by the fact that they are not as forceful as some other sensation. And by the same token, what we are less attentive to in the present is indistinguishable from what is temporally displaced in memory. There is, therefore, a sense in which what the statue ignores when its attention is originally occupied with the rose is already the forgotten.

Attention is therefore originally double, because Condillac claims that it is determined by a differential in vivacity. It is the product of a contrast between differing degrees of pleasure and pain: between, that is, at least two sensations. The statue can only be fixated with a smell because it contrasts with some other less vivacious sensation. Consequently, the supposition of an original and unitary odour with which the statue is completely occupied must be read as an idealisation. That is to say that there is never in fact an moment of pure seeing without looking, since attention is originally engaged in discrimination. And if attention is originally double in virtue of the fact that it excludes a weaker sensation, it must originally have the structure of memory.

I argued earlier that a philosophy of experience that needs to account for an aspect within perception of which we are not aware needs a category which can operate at the border of consciousness. The degree of attention or of retention fulfills this function in the Traité. But the 'ill-attended-to', that
which borders experience, is indistinguishable from the fading memory. By this elision Condillac posits a continuum between experience and its conditions of possibility, which is thought in terms of successsion or development.

It seems, then, that retention (memory) and attention are formally identical. Indeed, this need not surprise us since memory can contain no more than what was implicit in attention. Now, this is not to say that Condillac explicitly wants to identify what is past with what occupies less attention. For, as we have seen, vivacity is what determines how forcefully an impression is retained. Further, lack of vivacity is not a defining characteristic of a remembered sensation because the past sensation is only ordinarily weaker. It does happen, according to Condillac, that the impression retained is stronger than the present sensation. And this, in Condillac's terminology is the work of the imagination: imagination being a kind of memory which is forceful enough to efface a present sensation.

But it is important to realise that these observations are made from a position that transcends the experience of the statue. These distinctions between memory or imagination and a present sensation cannot be made by it. For the statue is unaware of a difference between the manners of sensing in terms of their origin, that is in terms of whether they are caused internally or externally. [TS p21] The most forceful sensation must be indistinguishable from what presently occupies the attention: a less forceful one from what is unattended and retained. The objective distinction between present sensation and retained impression can only be made for us. Objective succession therefore is still beyond the ken of the statue and will have to await the discovery of a world of beings other than itself. [TS p30]
In what sense, then, can Condillac claim that there is any dimension of succession in this primitive doubling of attention? If both manners of sensing are simultaneous, in what sense is one taken to be 'before' the other? It seems to me that the distinction only makes itself felt in the rhetoric of the Traité through a distinction between 'being' and 'having'. What is attended to is what the statue is, while what is retained, or not attended to as forcefully is what the statue has.

Now, for the Condillac of the Traité, sensations are not ideas. He writes:

A sensation is not yet an idea so long as one thinks of it as sensible [comme un sentiment] that is, as confined to a modification of the soul. If now I feel pain, I would not say that I have the idea of pain, but that I feel it.

["Une sensation n'est point encore une idée, tant qu'on ne la considère que comme un sentiment qui se borne à modifier l'ame. Si j'éprouve actuellement de la douleur, je ne dirai pas que j'ai l'idée de la douleur, je dirai que je la sens. TS p304"]

The recollection of the sensation transforms it into an idea. 
"[I]f I recall a pain that I have had, the memory and the idea are now the same thing." ["Mais si je me rappelle une douleur que j'ai eue, le souvenir et l'idée sont alors une même chose". TS p304] Thus a sensation retained is no longer a sensation, but the 're-presentation' or idea of a sensation. It would seem that the retention of sensations separates them from the being of the statue. The idea is an idea of sensation, an idea of a manner of being and thereby distinct from it. At the same time, if the statue is its sensations, then ideas are what it has. The doubling of attention produces a double genitive. Ideas are the ideas of the statue, that is they belong to, or a retained
by it, while at the same time they are ideas of a certain manner of being.

However the having of an idea is also a kind of sensing or a manner of being. That is, the statue feels that it has what it is alongside being what it is: and this feeling or sensing is itself a manner of being. The statue is unable to distinguish a sensation from an idea. Indeed it is only because the having of an idea is also a sensing or a manner of being that it can be related to its other manner of being. It is only because both are attended to that they can be related. But the manner of being which is the sensation displaces the manner of being which is the idea. Attention passes, as Condillac has it, from one manner of being to the other. And in so doing, the one becomes what is negated qua being, and becomes what is had. This negating function is the very work of attention, since attention focuses on one sensation at the expense of the other. Because the idea is both a manner of being and a manner of having the statue reaches an awareness of having been: that is of succession. This process can also be expressed the other way around. That is, the passing of attention from one manner of being to another generates a kind of weakened attention which is distinct from the being of the statue. The statue comes to have the weakened sensation. It has, in other words, what it is. But in coming to have it, the manner of being is displaced into the past, so that it has what it was.

In this analysis Condillac attempts to give an account of the perception of succession in terms which are supposedly immanent to sensation. The retention of a sensation produces a doubling in the being of the statue through a kind of genitive inflection. The statue is said to be with ideas, it has them, as opposed to being them. But because having is a kind of being, that is, because ideas are also sensations, a contrast is possible which sets up the temporal displacement. It is perhaps no coincidence that the past tense of être is formed
with *avoir*. The possession of a manner of being allows it to become what the statue has been - *a été*. This appears possible because negating what it is; is to sense that is not what it has been (*n'est plus ce qu'elle a été*).

What this shows is that Condillac's account of the development of the faculties places the sign function in the first transformation of sensation. The original production of an idea is precisely a retention of an impression which then functions as a sign for the original sensation. The doubling of attention means, however, that the original sensation itself cannot be sensed immediately. It is a having of being rather than a simple being. To the extent that it is an idea or sign, it cannot coincide with the original sensation. Therefore the original sensing of a manner of being cannot be thought because, by definition, it is not an idea. The origin of thought thereby reenacts the dilemma which structures the *Traité*. We can only come by ideas by in some sense losing or forgetting the original experience. The *première expérience* is necessarily absent insofar as it is the condition of possibility of experience. Indeed the imagined statue itself functions as a sign for the absent original. It is recalled to usurp the place of a present sensation with what is necessarily forgotten.

Significantly the immanent generation of memory from attention is conducted through a linguistic distinction between being and having which makes of the sign function a passage from past to present. The temporal displacement is grounded in the generation of the genitive. The doubling of attention is an engendering, or begetting of ideas, which leads to the statue's development. And because this is a having of being, the idea becomes what has been [*a été*]. It would seem then, that in trying to put ideas before words in order to ground their possibility, Condillac merely reinscribes them at the origin. For the first transformation of the understanding consists in
the production of a sign for the original sensation. And this function is itself given credibility through a distinction which operates less through any difference between the being or having of a sensation which could be verified in experience, as on a linguistic difference.

The fundamental point, however, is that the discussion can only make sense because of a repeated shift between the perspectives 'for it' and 'for us'. The statue cannot of itself make the distinctions which power the analysis. Rather the narrative operates through a dialectic between its and our perspective: between the beginning of the work and its completion, sensation and idea, 'being' and 'having' and so forth. Condillac's reconstruction of the order of the development of experience cannot be experienced by the statue because it cannot make the distinctions attributed to it. It cannot distinguish ideas from sensation, having from being. And yet the distinction between what is imagined (the idea of what it has), and the immediate sensible experience of being, orients the progression of the work. The reconstruction in imagination of the statue's development is told with ideas and in words. As such the narrative describes what the statue 'has' or 'has been' and so does not coincide with the being of that development.

Indeed, we have seen that the original transformation from sensation to idea cannot strictly speaking be recalled since it is precisely the condition of possibility of recollection. Paradoxically it is only after the fact, through the imagined reconstruction, that this original development can be seen for the first time. In the dialectic of 'for it' and 'for us', therefore, both must come first. The original experience leaves no traces and yet needs to be retraced. What is necessarily forgotten needs nonetheless to be recalled. But the very reconstruction of the chain of ideas perverts the original order of its construction. The true order never coincides with the recollected one, not simply because errors and detours need
to be eliminated in the ideal reconstruction - a point that Condillac recognises when he admits that the narrative of the Traité may not be true in all details [TS p32] - but more importantly in virtue of the very fact of its being a reconstruction. The Traité - qua reconstruction of an original experience - must include a distinction that the statue could not make between its own perspective and the reader's, between the position within a process of development and that reached at its completion. In other words, the formal character of the treatise belies the content of what it attempts to narrate, hence Condillac's prefatory Avis. It is through the uneasy shifting from the statue's perspective to ours and back that Condillac develops his système de l'homme [TS p289] while any deployment of a distinction between these perspectives must be illegitimate since it has not yet been discovered. Its operation therefore is out of place: not a part of the proper order of development. And so it is that the system can only be understood if (paradoxically) the development is both followed step by step from the position of the statue, and surveyed as a whole once it has been completed. Condillac writes:

The whole system of man is born of sensations: a complete system in which all the parts are connected and mutually supporting. It is a series [enchainement] of truths: the first observations prepare for those that must follow, the latter confirm those that preceded them. If for example, when reading the first part one begins to think that the eye really could not judge by itself of size, figure, situation and distance, one is totally convinced when one learns in the third how touch gives it all these ideas.

['C'est donc des sensations que naît tout le système de l'homme; système complet dont toutes les parties sont liées, et se soutiennent mutuellement. C'est un enchaînement de vérités: les premières observations préparent celles qui les doivent suivre, les dernières confirment celles qui les ont précédées. Si, par exemple, en lisant la première partie on commence à penser que l'œil pourroit bien ne point juger par lui-même des grandeur, des figures, des situations et des distances, on est tout-à-fait convaincu, lorsqu'on apprend dans la

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troisième comment le toucher lui donne toutes ces idées."
TS p289]

Later discoveries support the earlier, but at the same time the later can only be reached via the earlier. And what is true of the solution to Molyneux's problem is true of the structure of the whole explication. The proper development is always folded back on itself. And the extent to which the correct order cannot be ascertained, the Traité cannot be complete. While the reconstruction supposes the statue can recall an original identity between sensing and being, we have seen that this must necessarily escape recovery. And yet Condillac's strategy for its completion operates by trying to produce a coincidence between the idea and the sensation. Such a coincidence would, as is clear, bring the being and the having of the statue together and enable it to completely recover the sensible origin of ideas. Such a coincidence would also make the imagined statue more than a mere reconstruction. Further it would produce an identity between the demonstration of the first principle of empiricism, and what is presupposed in the demonstration, namely that all knowledge derives from sensation. We need now to turn attention to the problem of how a world of beings independent of the statue is constructed. For it is in response to this challenge that Condillac seeks the coincidence in question: finding it in touch.
Chapter 6: Berkeley and the problem of idealism

In this chapter I will be focussing on Condillac's attempt to refute idealism in the Traité des sensations. This discussion will develop my interpretation of Condillac's sensationalism and in so doing provide the basis for the arguments in Part II where I try to show that Condillac's system is underpinned by a monadology. The problem that Condillac needs to address is highlighted by Diderot in his Lettre sur les aveugles. Diderot notes the similarity in the positions of Condillac and Berkeley and implies that the Essai fails to develop beyond the idealist tenor of its opening lines where it announces that: "Whether we raise ourselves [...] to the heavens; or descend into the abyss we can never leave ourselves; and it is only our own thought that we can perceive". ["Soit que nous nous élevions, pour parler métaphoriquement, jusques dans les cieux; soit que nous descendions dans les abîmes, nous ne sortons point de nous-mêmes; et ce n'est jamais que notre propre pensée que nous apercevons." [LA pp114-115 & E p6]

Diderot challenges Condillac to escape the idealist trap; a challenge which the Traité is often seen as taking up. The difficulty that Condillac will have in refuting Berkeley derives, according to Diderot, from the fact that the principles of both thinkers are identical. Both begin with sensation as the unique source of human knowledge. If experience is conceived exclusively in terms of sensation then, Diderot suggests, the first principle of empiricism leads to an unpalatable consequence, namely idealism, and Condillac's radical sensationalism would appear to develop into system which is untenable. Why this should be Diderot does not make clear. He does not tell us what precisely he has against this "extravagant system which could only, it seems to me, owe its
birth to the blind; [which] to the shame of the human spirit and of philosophy, is the most difficult to combat although the most absurd of all", "Système extravagant qui ne pouvait, ce me semble, devoir sa naissance qu'à des aveugles; à la honte de l'esprit humain et de la philosophie, est le plus difficile à combattre, quoique le plus absurde de tous". Despite Diderot's worries Condillac's commitment to sensationalism does not waver after the Essai. Indeed the Traité is precisely concerned to complete the demonstration of the principle that all knowledge is no more than sensation variously transformed. But for Condillac, the project to refute idealism is closely allied to that of establishing empiricism's first principle. Because if the demonstration is to be persuasive it will have to show that the second tenet of empiricism - that sensations are the consequence of the action of material objects on the sense organs - is integral to the first.

By bringing into question the empiricist commitment to the principle that sensations are caused by the impact of material objects on the body, Berkeley focuses attention on what has first to be done if experience is to be reduced to sensation: that is, to give an account of how we get an idea of extended objects at all. The problem of how to establish the independent existence of objects is posterior to that of how the perception of objects is generated from sensation. But it is on the former problematic that Berkeley concentrates in the New Theory and with which Condillac is primarily concerned in the Traité. Condillac sets the question up, like Berkeley, by concentrating on how visible ideas come to be projected onto objects. In the section dealing with the statue limited to sight Condillac poses Berkeley's question: namely how we acquire the habit of attributing sensations that are within to an outside. For "if the mind only perceives [sensations] as manners of being, which are concentrated in it, it would only see itself in its sensations: it would therefore be impossible to discover that
it has a body, and that beyond this body there are others". ["Or, si l'ame ne les apercevoit que comme des manières d'être, qui sont concentrées en elle, elle ne verroit qu'elle dans ses sensations: il lui seroit donc impossible de découvrir qu'elle a un corps, et qu'au-delà de ce corps il y en a d'autres". TS p98] If, in other words, there is no distinction for the statue between its sensing and its being, the problem becomes to account for how the sensible sign comes to represent that which transcends sensation.

The way the Traité is set up already suggests that its primary concern is to resolve this dilemma. The statue's mind is encased in a marble skin which cuts it off from the world of objects outside. [TS p11] Condillac's project is to account for how the spirit trapped within the skin develops a perception of an outside on the basis of sensations. It is significant that the framing of the problem 'for us' presupposes the second empiricist principle: Condillac's experiment operates by presenting the statue with objects which affect its sense organs. This presupposition suggests a parallel between Berkeley's question and the problematic of reading the Traité both from within and outside the experience of the statue. For the question Condillac poses is how the statue is to discover the perspective imposed on it at the outset but hidden from its view. How is it to discover the parameters of the experiment? — discover, in other words, that sensations are caused by the influence of objects on its sense organs. Although 'for us' it is active in respect of memory and passive in respect of sensation, so long as the statue cannot make this distinction it will be unable to have an idea of beings other than itself. The discovery of this distinction becomes the discovery of the perspective 'for us' which is required for it to appreciate that there is more involved in sensation than manners of its being. Given this parallel we can expect Condillac's solution to the problem of how we come to see distance to involve the same hermeneutic circularity which figures the construction of
the Traité. As I hope to show, the origin of the development of
the perception of objects involves positing the necessity of an
outside at the beginning. What will need to be assessed is
whether this circularity is vicious or not.

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By concentrating on the problem of how the statue comes by an
idea of external objects, rather than on how the existence of
objects is to be established beyond doubt, the Traité steers
away from the kind of refutation of idealism that Diderot had
in mind. Because Condillac confines himself to making
sensationalism appear commensurate with experience he need only
describe the process by which the perception of objects derives
from sensation. Having shown that objects appear, he does not
go on to attempt any further justification of this appearance,
since it is, on Condillac's terms, justification enough of
their existence. Condillac wants to collapse questions of right
into questions of fact. For a justification of a belief is
understood to be identical with a genealogy of it which finds
its origin in a primitive fact or principle verified by
experience. The only possible proof of the existence of
external objects will be conducted in terms of the genesis of
the idea of them, for "the only way to acquire knowledge is to
return to the origin of our ideas, and from there follow their
generation". [My emphasis. "[L]e seul moyen d'acquérir des
connaissances, c'est de remonter à l'origine de nos idées, d'en
suivre la génération et de les comparer sous tous les rapports
possible". E p27] Any further question cannot be answered and
so does not concern him, just as by the end of the Traité it
does not concern the statue. "[I]t matters little to me," it
confesses, "to know with certainty whether things exist or
not". [[I]l m'importe peu de savoir avec certitude si ces
choses existent ou n'existent pas." TS p264] There is, for

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Condillac no need to have any further certainty in this respect. Sensation is sufficient to give the statue the needs that inevitably lead it to relate to objects as if they were real, and its dependence on the objects onto which it projects its sensations does not permit it to doubt their existence. [TS p244] Condillac's refutation of idealism operates on the one hand by showing how sensations lead to a perception of an outside and on the other by insisting that any effort at further justification of the existence of objects is frivolous. Given this, we can also expect Condillac's modification of Berkeley's new theory to contain a tension between a strict sensationalism and the presupposition of realism. The recovery of the realist perspective, the perspective 'for us', must be rendered in terms of the development of the statue. But I hope to show that, at the same time, our interpretation of this development is made possible by a realist prejudice, that is, by the presupposition of the second principle of empiricism.

Now, the new theory of how we see extension is only a strategic move for Berkeley since it is left unanswered how touch is supposed to provide us with contact with spatially extended objects. Only in the later works does Berkeley elaborate his considered position concerning the non-existence of a material world and deny that touch does provide such knowledge. The appearance of extension to touch is treated in the same manner as the appearance of secondary qualities to sight in that it has no privileged relation of resemblance to any material world. For once the link between primary qualities and the world becomes arbitrary, the supposition that there is a material world beyond sensation to be signified by the complex of sensible qualities loses its support. The language of vision does not signify a transcendent reality, but another series of sensible qualities. And the world is an appearance resulting from this conspiracy among the senses.
Now, while attempting to refute idealism the *Traité* operates, as had the *Essai*, very much within the parameters determined by Berkeley in the *New Theory*. That Berkeley's eventual conclusions are not necessitated by those of the *New Theory*, is, I think, what Condillac wants to establish. That is, he hopes to arrest the line of inquiry at the point where the perception of external objects is explained, without going on to ask whether the supposed judgement implied in this perception is justified. At the same time, what this means is that Condillac will have to find in touch a manner of sensing which can produce of itself the perception of extension and contain the motor by which the statue can develop the perspective 'for us'.

However, before turning to Condillac's analysis it will be necessary to recall certain difficulties that problematise Berkeley's position and which Condillac will need to address. Berkeley's equation between language and sensation enables him to argue that some intelligence speaks this language to the eyes of mankind. [Applff] In *Alciphron: or the Minute Philosopher* the argument operates by drawing a parallel with the evidence of the existence of other minds from the use of language. Words indicate the existence of thoughts, and in the same way the language of vision indicates the existence of the Author of nature. "[Y]ou have as much reason to think the Universal Agent of God speaks to your eyes," Berkeley writes, "as you can have for thinking any particular person speaks to your ears." [Ap172] If, as Berkeley does, one takes the language of vision to be an objective structure given prior to, as opposed to generated by, experience, it is required that there be some authorial intention; some intelligence which speaks this language.

This fascinating version of the argument from design is no ad hoc explanation for coherence among sensations. It is not an unsophisticated appeal to occultism. But, I want to suggest, it
is Berkeley's theory of language that regulates his theory of vision and gives the argument its plausibility. For if a language is necessarily meaningful to the extent that some idea is intended in the mind of a speaker when using a word, then clearly (if sensation is a language) there must be an Author of nature speaking to our eyes.

We saw that Berkeley's account of the articulations within vision is insufficient to explain the possibility of learning the language. To elaborate on that impasse: if the perception of extension results from the relative confusion of sense impressions and is only an appearance, some difference needs to be employed between this appearance and what is really involved in this fusion of elements, ie. God's speaking. But in this case there can be no positive characterisation of the real cause of the language of perception and the apparent cause. One would not know whether a certain visible image appeared to signify a particular tangible one or only appeared to. What is needed therefore, is for sensation itself to contain its own regulative principle. But this principle must involve transcending the merely apparent. Sensation must be able to indicate something which transcends it for only then can appeal be made to an independent criterion which can determine how the visible ideas are to be connected with the tangible ones. A transcendent God cannot perform this function since we have no direct access to His thinking. If such transcendence cannot be found among sensations ordinarily conceived, Condillac will need at least some sensations to function both as sensations and as principles of regulation. They must be both sensation and idea: containing their own dynamic through which they can signify.

Condillac is able to move beyond Berkeley in giving a genetic account of the existence of the language of sensation. His novel theory of language, and its origins makes possible his rejection of Berkeley's conclusions as regards a transcendent
guarantor of the regularity among sensations; and as an immediate consequence, as regards the nature of the external world. Once language is no longer seen purely synchronically, an explanation of its appearance can be given which does not fail because of its need to make a transcendent appeal either to a divine speaker, or to a material world of primary qualities. For Condillac the meaning of words is not guaranteed by the ideas in the mind of a speaker, but by the evolution of a language from a primitive language of action. Concomitantly, if perception is generated from the synthesis of elements under their own dynamic, Condillac can escape the need for a synchronic account of the articulations within vision and consequently undermine the appeal of Berkeley's transcendent speaker. For if it is only the conjunction of percepts that leads to coherence, it is the generative forces immanent to the sensible that govern the synthesis which need to be understood. In this way Condillac attempts to keep his account within the realm of the sensible and avoid reference to any extrinsic principle of regulation.

The Traité attempts to trace the synthesis of the original units of sense firstly within the realm of one sense and then synaesthetically. The vision of extension is explained through an analysis of the synthetic possibilities contained within the sensations of touch which lead to the production of signifying relations with those of sight. The question of the origin and development of language and the possibility of the perception of extension thereby become equivalent problematics. Both require that there be a certain naturally occurring potential for simples to become connected. This potential is given to the mind as the degree of pleasure or pain which a sensation affords, not merely by arbitrary association. Primitive needs govern the order in which percepts will be connected since the mind will seek to prolong pleasurable sensations and avoid the painful.
For Condillac, the signifying relations set up in this way between sensations are in one sense arbitrary, for there is no resemblance between ideas of sight and of touch. Yet for the ideas of sight to become connected with those of touch there must be within the realm of the tangible the possibility of the perception of extension: or which is the same thing, must be the possibility of these sensations being signs of extension. It is required that immanent to touch there be a directedness toward something transcendent which can operate as a criterion for correct, as opposed to apparent connections. Implicit in the most fundamental operations of sensation there needs to be a signifying function which will ground the possibility of the development of the vision of space and provide a criterion for what are to count as legitimate connections between the sensations of vision and touch; for without such a criterion the language could not be learnt. This immanent signifying function, while located in touch must, to be convincing, pursue the logic of our most primitive needs. It must, in other words, appear commensurate with experience. What this means is that the genetic analysis will presuppose what it intends to demonstrate - namely the existence of something that transcends sensation.

We can therefore expect Condillac's modification of Berkeley's new theory to have the following features. It will reflect the hermeneutic circularity which structures the Traité as a whole. The genealogy of the statue will culminate with the discovery of an external world; while, paradoxically, this perspective was already given at the beginning of the work. Secondly this development will be persuasive to the extent that it coheres with experience. While the reader adopts a position outside the experience of the statue, the dynamic of the narrative is oriented by its capacity to appeal to what we would experience if we were the statue. Thirdly, if Condillac is to explain how the language of vision is to be learnt, at the origin there will need to be the experience of transcendence. That is
Condillac will need to describe touch such that it can function both as a manner of being of the statue and yet transcend the mind.

The first point to be made with regard to Condillac's analysis of touch is that the Berkeleyan solution to Molyneux's problem, which Condillac adopts in the Traité, merely displaces the fundamental difficulty. For if ideas of touch, no less than those of sight, are simply manners of being of the mind which are, as Condillac has it "concentrated in it [and] do not extend beyond it", then an account of how touch provides knowledge of extension is still required. ["Les sensations n'appartenant qu'à l'ame, elles ne peuvent être que des manières d'être de cette substance. Elles sont concentrées en elle, elles ne s'étendent point au-delà." TS p98]

Instead of following Berkeley beyond the New Theory to draw the seemingly inevitable conclusion that touch cannot provide any knowledge of objects any more than sight, Condillac appeals to a primitive awareness of immersion in our corporality. The statue limited to the sense of touch is reduced to the minimum degree of sentience. But even this minimum involves awareness of the action of parts of the body on each other, of the movements of breathing and so forth.[TS p89] Condillac terms this state sentiment fondamental. Clearly reminiscent of the notion of the première expérience, this sentiment is the unique origin of the life of the organism. It is at this jeu de la machine "that the life of the animal begins, and on which it uniquely depends". [Je l'appellerai sentiment fondamental; parce que c'est à ce jeu de la machine que commence la vie de l'animal: elle en dépend uniquement." TS p89]
Appeal to this sentiment fundamental amounts to a denial of the principle that all sensation is originally concentrated solely within the mind. For although the statue limited to touch would not immediately encounter its body, the original state contains within it the potential for attributing distinct sensations to different bodily organs. In other words, Condillac takes the fact that we perceive extended objects as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that all sensation is originally no more than a manner of being of the mind. His argument is that the perception of extension is only possible if the original sensible units from which it is constructed are themselves extended. For a continuum cannot be formed from unextended units.

It is clear that we will only move from our sensations to the knowledge of bodies if they produce the phenomenon of extension, and since a body is a continuum, formed by the contiguity of other extended bodies, the sensation which represents it must be a continuum formed by the contiguity of other extended sensations.

"Il est donc évident que nous ne passerons de nos sensations à la connaissance des corps qu'autant qu'elles produiront le phénomène de l'étendue, et puisqu'un corps est un continu, formé par la contiguïté d'autres corps étendus, il faut que la sensation qui le représente, soit un continu formé par la contiguïté d'autres sensations étendues." S p97

This property is unique to touch and as such this argument may appear as a refusal on Condillac's part to stay true to sensationalist principles. On what basis, one might ask, can Condillac make an exception of touch such that it alone is originally extended? Condillac's response is to appeal to a 'fertile truth', [une vérité féconde] namely that "we can never do something with design unless we have already done it without having had the intention to do it". ["[I]l ne nous arrive
jamais de faire une chose avec dessein, qu'auvant que nous l'avons déjà faite, sans avoir eu le projet de la faire." TS p98] It follows from this truth that nature begins everything in us. In the beginning, Condillac tells us, knowledge is uniquely the work of nature. And he draws the conclusion from this that "the first discovery that a child makes is his own body. Though it is not strictly the child that makes it, but nature which shows it to him ready-made [toute faite]." ["la première découverte que fait un enfant, est celle de son corps. Ce n'est donc pas lui proprement qui la fait, c'est la nature qui la lui montre toute faite." TS p98] Without this discovery the child would not be able to occupy itself with its needs. And since children do survive they must be led to such an understanding. Now, the fact that the child is aware of its body demonstrates for Condillac that nature presents the sensations to the child not merely as modifications to its mind, but as such modifications which are themselves caused by modifications to its sense organs. This awareness of a second order of modifications means that its self must be 'spread and repeated' throughout all parts of its body. [TS p99]

Here Condillac appeals to a primitive 'fact', what he would term a 'principle' which is verified by experience. The body is given, 'ready made' as it were, as an original and indubitable experience. It must, on this account, be an inescapable fact that sensations of touch are originally extended and embodied and consequently they cannot be further reduced to inextended qualitative modifications to the mind. If we are to be persuaded of this, it will be because our attempt to place ourselves in the position of the statue limited to touch reveals the sentiment fondamental that Condillac describes. Our most primitive experience is of immersion in the body. At this point Condillac ceases to ask questions and the inquiry into the origins of the understanding cannot be pushed further back. For the fundamental sentiment is precisely the principle which begins the inquiry into the development of touch. By what
manner nature provides the child with knowledge of its body cannot itself be discovered within an inquiry into the understanding, since the reasons precede experience. The fact that it does is, Condillac says, "all that we can know on the subject". ["C'est tout ce que nous pouvons savoir à ce sujet." TS p99]

While Condillac's phenomenology of touch operates by an appeal to our capacity to empathise with the experience of the statue, it must simultaneously be interpreted in terms of the requirement that there be a kind of sensation which can function both as sensation and idea. Condillac needs a manner of sensing which will originally be a sign of something that transcends the mind; namely the body. Without such an original signifying potential there could not be any criterion by which sight could become articulated by its association with touch, because any such articulation must make appeal to a distinction between real and apparent. Now, we saw that a sensation is not an idea, or a sign, until it has been recalled. Once recalled the sensation shifts from a state of the statue's being to what the statue has. Touch however, Condillac informs us is unique among the senses in that it presents itself originally both as a sensation and an idea.

The present sensation of solidity, like the past one, is the only one which in itself is at once sensation and idea. It is a sensation by the relation it has to the mind which it modifies; it is an idea by the relation it has to something exterior.

["La sensation actuelle comme passée de solidité, est seule par elle-même tout à-la-fois sentiment et idée. Elle est sentiment par le rapport qu'elle a à l'ame qu'elle modifie; elle est idée par le rapport qu'elle a à quelque chose d'extérieur." TS p304]
In other words, the present sensation of touch is originally a sign without needing to be recalled in memory. It originally signifies something exterior to what is immediately present to the mind. To touch, therefore, is both to sense a modification to one's being, and simultaneously to sense that one has the modification. This double function is distinct from that of memory since the first touch is already an idea, without needing to be recalled.

There is then an original doubling of attention implicit in tangible sensations. Just as the doubling of memory was the original moment of the transformation of sensation, and the origin of the perception of succession, the doubling of touch becomes the origin of the development of a sense of extension. Condillac requires that touch have this double function because if all the contents of the mind were only either sensations or ideas of sensations there could be no perception of anything beyond it. The statue would remain unable to make the distinction between ideas and sensations. However, the coexistence of idea and sensation in touch provides the statue with the basis for distinguishing the two. This in turn enables the statue to distinguish the memory of a sensation from a present sensation: distinctions all of which bring the statue closer to the perspective 'for us'.

Because the sensation of touch is originally also an idea or a sign of something Condillac places the sign function once again at the beginning of his analysis. In touch lies the possibility of learning the language of sensation since it is already characterised as directed toward what it is not. The sense of touch is directed beyond itself, containing within it the potential to transcend what it is in itself. But Condillac needs to produce a phenomenology of this process of doubling if it is to be persuasive. And he seeks the plausibility for his contention that touch can be both idea and sensation in the experience of solidity. To sense solidity, he argues, is
necessarily to be aware of a mutual exclusion between two bodies. As a consequence it is necessarily double: both a sensation in itself, and an idea of what is excluded by the sensation. In touch the statue becomes aware of what it is and of what is excluded by that being.

For what is peculiar to this sensation is to represent two things at once which exclude each other by being outside of each other. The soul will not perceive solidity as one of its modifications in which it only finds itself; it will necessarily perceive it as a modification in which it finds two things which exclude each other, and consequently will perceive it in these two things.

[Puisque le propre de cette sensation est de représenter à-la-fois deux choses qui s'excluent l'une hors de l'autre, l'ame n'apercevra pas la solidité comme une de ces modifications où elle ne trouve qu'elle-même; elle l'apercevra nécessairement comme une modification, où elle trouve deux choses qui s'excluent, et par conséquent elle l'apercevra dans ces deux choses." TS p103]

Given this analysis, touch can form the basis for the statue to make the distinction between a sensation and the memory of it. For tangible ideas, insofar as they contain the sense of being produced by modifications in the body, distinguish themselves from those ideas which are produced within the mind. Thus the discovery of a distinction between the inner and outer of the mind which is implicit in touch enables the statue to discover a distinction between passive and active states, which in turn allow it to distinguish memory from sensation. Thus these can only be distinguished with certainty in terms of the difference between their immediate origin, as either produced within the mind, or by the action of objects on the body.

If Condillac hoped to characterise memory as the upsurge of a present sensation displacing the past one; in touch the idea and sensation are brought together into one moment. This then
is not a naively ad hoc manner of escaping the idealist trap, because Condillac's claim is that if we attend to the primitive sensation of touch we will perceive that it is necessarily double. I argued in the discussion of memory that the doubling of attention that occurs in memory must already be in attention itself. And this coincidence of idea and sensation is given explicit assent by Condillac in the analysis of touch. To attend to the tangible sensation is simultaneously to attend to it as an idea.

The coexistence of sensation and idea demands that the latter be projected, for the sensation displaces the idea. But because the idea and the sensation are both the same sensation under different descriptions instead of this 'having' being temporally displaced as in memory, it is projected into space producing the sense that one has a body. It would seem that the very co-existence of the two descriptions prevents the idea being conceived in terms of a fading sensation displaced in time. The activity of attention that operates in touch, insofar as it involves coexistence and the perception of coexistence is the basis for the perception of extension. [TS p130]

Again the linguistic distinction between what the statue is and what it has makes itself felt as that which orientates the doubling and projection. The structure of instituted languages, it would seem, determines how the language of sensation is to be learned. To make the implicit nature of the tangible explicit and thereby amenable to experience, Condillac employs the distinction between a manner of being and a manner of having. For in touch the statue experiences a modification to its being while simultaneously experiencing that modification as produced by what it has. This point is paralleled in the distinction between voir and regarder. A distinction made in language which has significant implications for the generation of the understanding from sensation. What one sees is what one is. But in order to generate an idea of the visible sensation
one must attend to one element at the expense of the other, that is to say, one needs to look. And, as we shall see, it is only when touch develops the eyes' capacity to look that the vision of extension unfolds. According to Condillac: "[i]t is on the difference between these two words that the state of the question depended", and he asks "[w]hy does this difference which does not escape the most minor grammarian escape philosophers?" ["C'est la différence qui est entre ces deux mots, que dépendoit l'état de la question. Or pourquoi cette différence qui n'échappe pas aux plus petits grammairiens, échappe-t-elle aux philosophes?" [TS pl71] The slightest attention to grammar enables the philosopher to resolve the issue of how the sensible can generate a perception of extension. What this suggests is a further sense in which the pre-linguistic development of the statue is mediated through language. In the logic of the Traité, which should now be familiar, language must be the medium through which Condillac retraces the pre-linguistic development.

We saw that there was a duplication of the self presupposed in setting up the experiment of the statue: namely that of the perspectives 'for the statue', and 'for us'. This doubling is re-enacted within the experiment itself, both in terms of memory and of touch. Just as our reading of the Traité involves being both within and without the statue, the process by which the statue can move from its prison within, to a discovery of what is without, and so arrive at the position 'for us' must reinscribe the duplication in question. Touch functions both as the inside of the mind's development and a signifier of the extended surface of the skin. To see the significance of the skin in Condillac's account we need to return to the statue as it makes its first tentative movements. The description of the folding of the skin will provide the phenomenological basis for the formal requirements Condillac searches for in his analysis of touch.
In Condillac's analysis the initial movements of the statue's limbs do not follow any conscious design, but the dictates of nature. At this stage it does not yet know that it is composed of parts which can fold back against each other. But at the moment when it places its hand on another part of its body it discovers itself, as Condillac puts it, to be outside of itself. He writes:

The statue learns [...] to know its body, and to recognise itself in all the parts that compose it; because as soon as it places its hand on one of them, the same sentient being responds in a way from one to the other: "It is me". If it continues to touch itself, everywhere the sensation of solidity will represent two things which exclude each other and which at the same time are contiguous, and everywhere the same sentient being will respond one to the other: "It is me, it is me again!" It feels itself in all the parts of its body. Thus it no longer confuses itself with its modifications.

["La statue apprend donc à connoître son corps, et à se reconnaître dans toutes les parties qui le composent; parce qu'aussitôt qu'elle porte la main sur une d'elles, le même être sentant se répond en quelque sorte de l'une à l'autre: c'est moi. Qu'elle continue de se toucher, partout la sensation de solidité représentera deux choses qui s'excluent et qui en même temps sont contiguës, et partout aussi le même être sentant se répondra de l'une à l'autre: c'est moi, c'est moi encore! Il se sent dans toutes les parties du corps. Ainsi il ne lui arrive plus de se confondre avec ses modifications". TS pl05]

The response produced by the skin folding in upon itself constitutes a replication of the self. In the reply of the sentient being to itself the mutual response of two manners of being, of two sensations is produced. But the folding of the skin back upon itself allows for a kind of doubling which is unlike that of memory because both can simultaneously be

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manner of being. Because both responses are simultaneous they produce the sense of a coexistence of manners of being, and since they exclude each other, both are also manners of having. Because to touch oneself is simultaneously to experience the self-same sensations as manners of being which exclude each other, this exclusion has to be projected into the perception of extension. The very simultaneity demanded by the mutual exclusion produces the sense of coexistence. Further auto-affective exploration produces a multiplication of selves, and an awareness of body unfolds as the multiplication of internal difference becomes synthesised in the self-identity, the contiguity of the skin.

Thus by folding in on itself the statue's skin comes to discover itself, and this in turn enables the statue to begin to discover the world. For when the statue's experience of solidity does not involve any response it discovers bodies that are not its own, and it begins to articulate a distinction between itself and a world of objects. Objects are discovered precisely because the sensation of solidity is necessarily double, and what does not form part of the contiguity of the skin does not respond to the statue's touch. In solidity therefore Condillac finds a manner of sensing which he hopes can contain a transcendent aspect within it. Touch operates at once as pure sensation, while paradoxically it simultaneously indicates a realm which transcends the sensible. The experience of solidity has a sense or direction which determines the organism to direct itself toward what it is not.

It is in this manner that Condillac attempts to fulfil the requirement that a structure immanent to sensation produce the perception of an external world. As we have seen, Condillac avoids appealing to any external ordering principle through a diachronic analysis of perception; that is through a generative account from an indubitable beginning in the sensation of solidity. A central implication of this approach is that the
It is only through handling the world that what is immanent to touch is spread out [déployé] and projected beyond the mind. The generative account means that the statue cannot remain passive in respect of sensation. Rather it directs the statue toward an active engagement with what does not respond to its touch. Sensation then does not represent the world as merely in consequence of the statue's reaction to it. For the statue is immediately concerned with the satisfaction of its needs and the sentiment fondamental involves the statue in interactivity at the outset.

We have seen that it is need, or relative degrees of pleasure and pain, that unravels the initial confusion. [TS p136] Need is, Condillac writes, "the germ of all that we are". ["les plaisirs et les peines comparés [...] Voilà le germe de tout ce que nous sommes". TS p267] It is because a sensation contains some degree of desirability relative to other sensations, that a dynamics of construction begins in which a delineation between the ego and the world is the inevitable consequence. The statue comes to call need "the light in which I view objects in their relation to me; it illuminates them in different ways, enabling me to distribute them in various classes, and those that its rays do not reach are condemned to darkness where I cannot discover them". ["la lumière qui éclaire les objets suivant les rapports qu'ils ont à moi: elle répand sur eux différents jours pour me faire distribuer en différentes classes; et ceux qui sont soustraits à ses rayons sont ensevelis dans des ténèbres où je ne puis les découvrir." TS p262] Objects that do not engage the interest of the statue in its pursuit of pleasure will remain confused and partly unconscious: in darkness. Need is what 'disconfuses' or analyses by directing the attention, and in so doing powers the generation of the statue's world. This genetic approach gives Condillac the means to refute idealism by rejecting the necessity of any further proof as to the existence of objects.
after having established, firstly, that they appear and secondly, that we think of them as distinct in themselves.

We have seen that Condillac conceives of this process in terms of the sense of touch. But the implications of the privileging of touch over sight have far reaching consequences for epistemology and for the manner in which the mind encounters a world. The statue, we are told, determines its own limits en tâtonnant, that is to say by feeling its way or by experimentation. [TS p107] The dynamic process whereby the world is disclosed is one of trial and error. But this active attempt to handle the world while originating with touch is soon extended to the other senses. The eyes, for example, engage in an active analysis through which the visible field is constructed. But the capacity properly to look, as opposed to see, is only possible under the guidance of the sense of touch. Originally the statue will 'perceive' [aperçoit] several colours without noticing [remarquer] any one in particular, since its attention is shared and encompasses them confusedly. [TS p76] The initial view of the eyes is undiscriminating and disengaged. It is the hand that teaches them to look beyond themselves and perceive extension. The immediate visible sensations are 'disconfused' as touch makes explicit what they contain. In a word it unfolds - déploie - the universe. [TS p260]

Thus Condillac posits a confused beginning, that which is seen, which is subsequently disconfused by looking. But because attention and sensations are not in reality distinct he can say that "sensations, by their nature, tend to disconfuse themselves [se démêler]. ["Les couleurs sont donc par leur nature des sensations, qui tendent à se démêler" TS p76] This is because in order to look, the eye must know how to direct itself toward one object rather than another and then to follow an order of contiguous parts across what it is observing. But this presupposes that the eye knows the order to be discovered.
The eye cannot direct itself toward any part of an object until it knows of extension and only touch can determine the position of objects. [TS p170]

The hand by fixing sight on different parts of a figure in succession, engraves them in the memory: it leads the brush, so to speak while the eyes begin to scatter light and colours outside which they first experienced in themselves.

["C'est la main, qui, fixant successivement la vue sur les différentes parties d'une figure, les grave toutes dans la mémoire: c'est elle qui conduit, pour ainsi dire, le pinceau; lorsque les yeux commencent à répandre au-dehors la lumière et les couleurs qu'ils ont d'abord senties en eux-mêmes." [TS p176]

The statue describes the moment of first opening its eyes thus:

I open my eyes to the light, and at first I see only a luminous and coloured cloud. I touch, I advance, I touch again: a chaos disentangles itself [se débrouille] insensibly beneath my gaze [mes regards]. In a way, touch decomposes light; it separates colours, distributes them on objects, disentangles [démêle] an illuminated space, and in this space of sizes and figures, it leads my eyes up to a certain distance, opens the way for them by which they must carry themselves far over the earth and raise themselves to the sky: before them, in a word, it unfolds [déploie] the universe.

["J'ouvre les yeux à la lumière, et je ne vois d'abord qu'un nuage lumineux et coloré. Je touche, j'avance, je touche encore: un chaos se débrouille insensiblement à mes regards. Le tact décompose en quelque sorte la lumière; il sépare les couleurs, les distribue sur les objets, démêle un espace éclairé, et dans cet espace des grandeurs et des figures, conduit mes yeux jusqu'à une certaine distance, leur ouvre le chemin par où ils doivent se porter au loin sur la terre, et s'élever jusqu'aux cieux: devant eux, en un mot, il déploie l'univers." TS p260]
This phenomenological description, however, relies on the previous observations that can only be made from the perspective outside the statue. Further the appeal to experience is always grounded in Condillac's rhetoric in a grammatical distinction: a distinction between what the statue is and what it has. This distinction can only be made by the statue after it has acquired the sense of touch, which in turn makes possible that between what the statue sees and what it looks at. Solidity contains for the statue a distinction between what it is and what it is not. And what it is not, that which does not respond to its touch, is projected beyond itself. The object is that which is to be possessed in order to afford the statue pleasure. Touch is then able to teach the eyes to project what they see. What they are is transformed into what they look toward. The seeing which was confined to the being of the eyes now becomes their possession, because the object which the statue 'has' can constitute part of its being while simultaneously transcending it. Through the distinction of being and having, therefore, Condillac gives credence to the ambivalent position of the sense of touch. The groping hand simultaneously is what it experiences and has what it grasps. And once again the interlacing of linguistic and the phenomenological categories raises the question of which should be more original. It should by now be clear that the answer to this question must remain undecidable.

We have seen that the doubling which originally occurs within the realm of the tangible permits the 'disconfusion' of the ideas of sight. Touch, through its association with sight, is able to teach the eyes to look. What this amounts to is a confusion of touch and sight. Their respective ideas, Condillac tells us, se mêlent or fuse together. This confusion then infects sight with the capacities originally found in touch alone. Thus just as the skin discovers the world through folding against itself and objects, so the eyes come to unfold and spread colour across objects. The metaphorics of the
production of an extended visible world operate almost exclusively in terms of the unfurling and spreading of a sensible surface. The eyes, in other words, appear 'skin-like' in Condillac's text. The unfolding skin unfolds and explicates what is contained within what the statue sees. The eyes are taught not to see 'only in themselves' but to deploy colour across an extended space. This process of looking is an analysis of what is contained within visible sensations. The significance of such a metaphorics will be explored further in Part II when I discuss Leibniz's use of identical terminology. What is significant here is that the image of the sensitive membrane used metonymically for all the senses lends support to a certain elision between the notion of logical analysis of a concept to bring out what is implicit within it and that of the three-dimensionality, or transcendence from a two-dimensional surface. The mind moves beyond the confines of itself by unfolding what is contained within. What operates along the surface, namely sensation can then appear as purely immanent, while nonetheless containing a hidden or implicit potential for transcendence.
Chapter 7: The Body of Condillac's Statue

Condillac's change of heart from the Essai to the Traité consists in allowing what is hidden from consciousness to play a role in its construction. We have seen that to become conscious, that is to experience, is to 'disconfuse' an original, undifferentiated series of sensations and that this disentangling involves bringing to awareness what was only partially perceived. Within a genetic epistemology what is confused is primarily to be conceived in terms of what is forgotten. Consequently the dynamic of 'disconfusing' is always a development: an unfolding in time as attention, by doubling itself, selects elements from the chaos.

We have seen, however, that in the Traité it is in the sense of solidity, as well as in memory, that attention is originally doubled and therefore that the development of advanced thought is grounded in touch. This privileging of the skin and of the tangible has interesting epistemological consequences and before turning to Condillac's relation to Leibniz it will be worth examining them in more detail. For as we shall see in Part II, Condillac's conception of the sensible skin finds interesting parallels with certain models of perception that Leibniz develops.

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Condillac's account of the role of the body in the development of human knowledge marks a significant shift from the Cartesian paradigm that Locke inherits. For Descartes the body is the
prison of the soul and his project begins with the attempt to engineer its escape by making a real, substantial distinction between matter and mind. But the mind of Condillac's statue escapes the confines of the skin that encases it precisely through an affirmation of an original confusion between it and its body. It discovers a world of objects and so comes to acquire knowledge by immersing itself in the walls of its prison. No longer is the confusion of mind and body conceived to be the origin of error. For while the Cartesian mind hopes to disentangle itself from base bodily need and escape into a realm of pure thought without any corporeal correlate, Condillac takes the fallen state since concupiscence to be the starting point for philosophy.

As I have said this shift is intimately bound up with the privileging of touch over sight in the development of the understanding. For while in Descartes's system the senses are the source of all confusion, they are not equally deceptive. Certain sensible ideas aspire to the heights of pure thought. And it is vision that Descartes elevates above all the others in the hierarchy of the senses. In the Dioptrique, vision is described as the noblest of all senses because it is least tainted by union with the body. The eye is the organ of clarity and distinctness, and only with clear and distinct ideas can we achieve certainty. As such to conceive is to render transparent to the light of reason. And theoretical knowledge is represented as an idealised ocular inspection.

This ideal intellectual gaze, as Michel Foucault points out in La Naissance de la clinique, feeds a certain conception of the understanding as "mute and without gesture". To elevate vision is to elevate a disembodied and detached attitude to perception. The eye feels no impact from the world and it leaves its object untouched. Theoretical knowledge is, therefore, disinterested; it surveys from a distance, neither asking questions of its objects nor becoming involved with it.
Thus the specular conception of the activity of thought sustains the real distinction by assisting in the mind's dissociation from the body.

Condillac's decomposition of the statue produces a new hierarchy of the senses. The noblest sense will be the one that is able to reunite the disparate experience produced by the decomposition. The synergy between the senses is developed through the work of the sense of touch since it is touch that originally discovers the objects to which the others attribute their ideas. We have seen that this new hierarchisation is also to be found in Diderot's similar decomposition in his *Lettre sur les sourds et les muets*. Condillac follows Diderot in taking the eye to be superficial while regarding the hand as the organ which enables us to uncover the depths in things. The eye can only perceive of itself a flat surface. The hand as the principal organ of touch is capable of folding itself into different shapes, and this very flexibility lends itself to the acquisition of diverse ideas. The articulation of its limbs is what allows it to develop from basic sentience of itself to the discovery of bodies. [TS ch.12]

Our confused state has become primary. Condillac's task is to explicate the indubitability of the intimate union of mind and body. Condillac's reunion of mind and body produces a generative and carnal conception of the understanding. Thought cannot be disembodied since touch is originally embodied and to sense and to think are the same thing. Thus need is no longer an obstacle to knowledge but its motor.

However Condillac's notion of the sensible skin is not a passive receptor but an active, folded explicator. The Cartesian detached vision is, on Condillac account, capable only of seeing confused aggregates. In order to perceive primary qualities, sight requires the aid of touch and an active engagement with the original confusion. [TS p76]
Recognition of objects is not conceived by Condillac in terms of rational cognition, but is instinctive and corporeal: gestural rather than specular. Condillac's body replaces Cartesian speculation, as impulse replaces reason. It is because the statue operates with practical knowledge, with confused ideas, that confusion becomes the precondition for the possibility of speculation. Touch grounds the development of vision as impulse is the basis for the development of reason. The statue first acts out what later it can say and it is through the performance of the original language of action that instituted languages and theoretical understanding develop.[TS p221]

This is also born out of Condillac's theory of the origin of language. Language for Descartes is the primary tool of reason. Its generative potential demonstrates the creative possibilities which characterise thought as against the deterministic behaviour of matter. But while for Condillac language is the germ of the understanding, it is not simply the medium in which thought expresses itself, for it is precisely the physical basis which enables thought to develop. The origin of language lies, for Condillac in the gesture which expresses the needs of the organism. The language of action is an expression of our practical engagement with the trials of life. It is primarily social and pragmatic. Now, since on Condillac's account human knowledge is grounded in this gestural origin, he develops an epistemology which is not imagistic and representational. Condillac's sentiment fondamental is the experience of an active handling and analysis of things. Gesticulation involves a corporeal recognition - the hand that salutes the friend is not involved in a cognition of representation but is originally interactive. The needs of the organism expressed first in the language of action ground the possibility of instituting words and consequently signs originally denote the operations of the body. It is therefore no accident for Condillac, that the operations of the mind are
conceived in terms of those of the body; for example in the notion of mental inspection or the mind's eye.

Since on Condillac's account, the development of the statue beyond the condition of animals depends on its ability to acquire a language, its ability to reason is grounded in its practical engagement with the world and not in a disinterested intellectual vision. The gestural origins of thought thereby implicate it in its world in the same manner as the skin of the statue is folded against itself and objects.

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But Condillac's appeal to the primitive fact of the experience of embodiment which grounds the development of the understanding, is not unproblematic. 'For us' the original confusion of sensation is amenable to analysis only because it admits of distinctions at a pre-conscious level which are themselves grounded in the physical mechanisms of perception. What is 'for us' a physical distinction becomes evidence for a preconscious distinction 'for the statue'. Condillac argues that:

It appears beyond doubt that they [sensations] arrive [in the mind] without confusion: for would the author of nature have taken the precaution of disentangling them with such care on the retina, if he were to allow them to become confused further on?

["il paroît hors de doute qu'elles y arrivent sans confusion: car l'auteur de la nature aurait-il pris la précaution de les démêler avec tant de soin sur la rétine, pour permettre qu'elles se confondissent à quelques lignes au-delà?" TS p76]
Thus beneath the level of consciousness, but nonetheless in the mind, Condillac posits distinctions of which the statue cannot be aware. Elements of sense are thereby presupposed which make possible their subsequent disentangling through analysis. In other words consciousness begins as confusion so that it can recover a more original unconfused state. This appeal to physiology is bound up with the reversal of the prioritisation of lumine naturale over impetus naturales and the elevation of the body in the genesis of thought. However, although Condillac tries to prove the empiricist principle by showing it in action, ultimately this appeal to a natural mechanism in the brain is a way of reinstating a structure common to experience and the world. Here the solution to the problem of what guarantees the coherence of sense experience is that elements are connected up as they are by the natural order. The Traité hoped to recover this natural system for consciousness through a genetic psychology, but ultimately the conditions of possibility, or the parameters of the experiment always precede consciousness and escape recovery. The dilemma for Condillac's empiricism is that no matter how far back the inquiry is pushed there remains the need for it to delimit itself through an appeal to what grounds it: to physiology. The primitive apprehension of the phenomenal body is itself explained in terms of an appeal to a natural system.

Now, if sensations represent because it is natural that they be connected up in a certain manner we begin to see the fundamental importance of Condillac's theory of language. Eventually the original sign, the beginning of experience, cannot be arbitrary, cannot be a matter of inference. There can be no judgement concerning the relation of sensation to anything further. But at the same time there cannot be a necessary connection which can be apprehended by thought. Rather, nature reasons for man and for the statue. It is the growth of the understanding under the motor of natural, unconscious need that sees to it that ideas come to be
connected together in such a way that we believe in an external world. What this means is that the language of sight is not an arbitrary system. That particular features of it signify certain spatial positions of objects and so on is assured by the natural order. It is a system of natural signs grounded in physiology. In the Part II we will see that it is in Leibniz that Condillac can find a way of approximating to a recovery of this natural system within his analysis.

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In this Part I have developed certain themes that arise in the *Essai* and *Traité* in order to show the ubiquity of a certain tension that organises Condillac's radicalisation of Locke's empiricist project. Condillac's philosophy moves beyond Locke in several key respects. It replaces Locke's description of the extent of human knowledge with a genetic account whereby the extent of knowledge is to be understood in terms of its development from a primitive root. I have argued that this approach provides Condillac with a critical tool to dispense with erroneous philosophical systems. It also provides him with the means to escape certain aporias in the sensationalist account of perception, in particular that of how to give an immanent account of the production of the perception of extension. Condillac also replaces the specular conception of the acquisition of knowledge with an embodied or gestural engagement with the world. I have argued that this shift is made possible in the first instance by a privileging of the sense of touch over sight. The shift however is made possible at a more fundamental level by the problematic of how to begin. Condillac searches for a genuine principle from which to develop a new philosophical system. But at the same time his project is precisely to establish such a system. I have expressed the hermeneutic circularity implicit in this approach
in terms of the problematic of where to place language in his genetic epistemology and have drawn out the implications of this tension for the Condillacian themes with which I have been dealing. The principle to be established must, as we have seen, be presupposed in the beginning. I want to argue that although this circularity is at one level vicious, it is nonetheless endemic to the project. Condillac believes that all truths are analytic. As we saw in the Introduction a demonstration is for Condillac always conducted through an analysis of what is contained implicitly in what is to be explicated. An explanation just is a complete unfolding and spreading out of the content of the what is to be explained. The principle to be explicated therefore, must be already implicit at the beginning of any analysis and an explication of it will be its proof. It is in this sense that we need to understand Condillac's claim that a well-made system makes itself. For if an account of the generation of, for example, human knowledge is required which avoids appeal to any principle which transcends experience, then knowledge must be identical with experience. Sensation must transform itself under its own dynamic, just as the system of man must create itself.

We have also seen however that the self-containment of the system of man involves the attempt to limit the inquiry into it. Condillac's inquiry only sustains itself by excluding what is not proper to it. Consequently his analysis is never complete: indeed cannot be completed because, for example, it must posit a physiological mechanism lying beyond its ken. Although empiricist modesty makes a virtue of the necessity of appeal to a primitive fact, this modesty is disingenuous. For it belies a will to completion which drives the project to search for an ever more radical point of departure for its analyses. It is for this reason that the Traité attempts to dig beneath the analyses of the Essai and provide an account in terms of experience of processes that precede consciousness. But in order to begin this attempt to stretch the limits of the
inquiry Condillac needs to posit a realm beyond those limits. The attempt to think immanence always involves him in transcending the limits he sets himself. In Part II we will see how Condillac attempts to complete his delimitation of the realm of proper inquiry through a definition of its origin, namely sensation.
In the introduction to the Encyclopaedia D'Alembert credits Condillac with having dealt the mortal blow to what he calls the goût de système. Condillac had succeeded once and for all in defining the limits of legitimate inquiry by exposing the abuses of language that seduce the imagination into spurious metaphysical speculation.¹ In the Essai Condillac accuses Leibniz, of trying to reason about objects beyond our grasp; likening him to child who thinks that by crossing a field he will be able to reach out and touch the sky. [E pp3-4] We have seen, however, that at the time that Condillac was writing the Essai, he was also preparing Les Monades, a dissertation which comes down in favour of Leibniz's metaphysics. The problem for an interpretation of Condillac's philosophy becomes therefore to understand how the legitimate inquiry of the 'good' metaphysics might incorporate a monadology at its inception despite its efforts not to go beyond the limits drawn by sense experience. In what follows I shall suggest that the influence of Leibniz on Condillac's thought is pivotal to his efforts to legitimate his empiricist project, and that paradoxically, the attempt to determine a space for legitimate inquiry implicates the 'good' metaphysics in the 'bad'. It will be by tracing the tensions that originate in Locke's Essay, that I shall try to show that Condillac's efforts to complete Locke's project are allied to a disguised, or, as it were, 'forgotten' [oublié] adherence to a system of monads.
A central difficulty for a sensationalist epistemology is how it is to delimit sense experience and so define 'sensation'. For Condillac's project this dilemma can be expressed in terms of the effort to determine how the proper method of inquiry is to be distinguished from the 'bad' metaphysics without becoming involved in it. For the legitimation of sensationalism is identical with its definition. I shall argue that the impetus behind Condillac's development of his own monadology lies not only (as has been supposed) in a desire to rescue the immaterial soul from the more dangerous implications of the new philosophy; but more importantly in the need to find a point of genesis for experience, a principle, or beginning by which to determine its realm.

The ultimate purpose of such delimitation is to find a justification for a belief in an external world. It will be through a radical reappraisal of the sensible, that sense can be made of what lies beyond it. The point to recognise here is that the duty of Condillac's, as indeed of any sensationalism, is to provide an account of what lies beyond its limits. For it is in terms of what transcends the sensible that sensation itself can be delimited and defined, and the principle of human understanding uncovered.

In the *Traité des systèmes* Condillac declares that "everything is so closely tied together in Leibniz's system that one must either accept or reject it in its entirety". ["tout est si bien lié, dans le système de Leibnitz, qu'il faut, ou tout recevoir, ou tout rejeter." TS pl64] Yet, paradoxically, *Les Monades*, is divided into two sections; the first a refutation of the doctrines he takes to be false or unproven, and the second an appraisal of what (he says) "is certain in the system of monads*. [LM pl44] What then needs to be addressed is what status monadology has in Condillac's thought; and what it means for him to try and legislate between the legitimate and illegitimate aspects of previous systems in order to recover a
solid basis for empiricism. The problem will be how far the incorporation of any element of a monadology inevitably infects the realm of the new philosophy. We need to ask whether Condillac can draw a line between the region of monads and of the knowledge available to man in this world and how far the critique of a system leads Condillac to acquire a 'taste' for it.

The project of the *Essai* and the *Traité* is characterised as an effort to establish the universal applicability of the Aristotelean maxim (and empiricism's first principle) that nothing is in the soul that was not first in sensation. Consequently Condillac will need to resist Leibniz's insistence on making an exception of the soul itself. [NE.p88] We have seen that the intention to reduce the form of experience to its immediate sensible contents leads Condillac in the *Essai* to the view that the mind is completely transparent to itself. So as one might expect, Condillac's critique of Leibniz in *Les Monades* revolves around his concern to resist appeal to any contents of the mind of which one is not aware: that is, to resist the view that whatever is written in the soul would require deciphering. These include the Leibnizian doctrines of partial or minute perceptions and innate ideas. Condillac writes of Leibniz's account of partial perceptions:

The most natural observation to make on the subject of this insight, is that we have no idea of a state in which the soul would have perceptions without being conscious of them. Effectively the only ideas we have are those we take from experience...

["L'observation la plus naturelle au sujet de cet éclaircissement, c'est que nous n'avons point d'idée de cet état où l'âme aurait des perceptions sans en avoir conscience. En effet nous n'avons d'idées que celles que nous tenons de l'expérience..." LM p127]
What is interesting however is that despite this criticism of Leibniz, Condillac is able to remark that Leibniz himself recognised that all our knowledge comes from the senses. "[A]ll our knowledge comes from the senses. Locke proved it and the Leibnizians recognised it." 

"[T]outes nos connoissances viennent des sens. Locke l'a prouvé, et les Leibnitiens le reconnaissent." LM pl17] In other words it would seem that Condillac conceives of Leibnizianism in such a way that the empiricist maxim can be salvaged from it. And this suggests that Condillac is prepared to conceive of a sensationalism which does not adhere unreservedly to the thesis that consciousness must be transparent to itself. Indeed we will see that Condillac's reduction of the faculties to sensation and its transformations in fact takes account of certain Leibnizian insights into the necessity of an obscurity or confusion within consciousness which were discussed in the Part 1. Condillac's development of a more sophisticated notion of sensation, in other words, involves a Leibnizian metaphysics.

Condillac's difficulty is that while his inquiry must confine itself to sensation and its transformations, what is to be taken as sensible is not easily determined from within experience. Condillac's reaction to this is to shift what counts as 'sensation' for the purposes of different inquiries. The example of the Traité in which he tries to recover a physiological process for consciousness has already been discussed. The injunction on any inquiry into what is not first given in sensation is therefore strategic. Consequently we need to conceive of the relation of consciousness to its conditions as a more complex negotiation in Condillac's thought than some of his overt protestations against partial perceptions and innate ideas might suggest.
Condillac's efforts to delimit his own project begin as an attempt to complete Locke's. And so it is to Locke's Essay we need to return in order to determine the shortcomings Condillac wanted to eliminate. In this way it will be shown how the dissatisfactions with how the empiricist project had been defined inevitably lead Condillac to the prima facie unlikely move of incorporating elements of Leibniz's system within his philosophy. Now, it is in the introduction to the Essay that the problematic of defining the limits to legitimate empiricist inquiry is set up. By drawing out the internal tensions that arise out of the first few lines of that work where Locke defines his aims we will begin to see the impetus behind the direction Condillac takes, and specifically what is at stake in his insistence on the need to eradicate an innate capacity of reflection.

The paradox of beginning the Lockean project is expressed in the second sentence of the Essay. "The understanding", Locke writes, "like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object." [EHI p5] The attempt to set the understanding at a distance from itself may be beset with difficulties, but is regarded nonetheless as coherent in principle. Locke is blind to the internal dilemma which threatens to stall his inquiry at its outset. The very analogy he chooses brings into relief a difficulty he avoids discussing: namely, how an eye could ever enter its own visual field; how the same thing can be both instrument and object of the one inquiry.

Locke says that the extent of the understanding is confined to certain sorts of object, those to which it is 'proportional'. Other sorts of object, he argues, are necessarily out of reach. The task of his Essay is to dissuade us from letting our thoughts loose into the darkness of the 'vast ocean of Being' where nothing can be determined. [EHI p8] It is useful to
determine the extent of our capacity to know even if we cannot fathom all the depths of that ocean. Here another version of this circularity looms. For Locke hopes to define the limits of inquiry by its proper objects, and to attempt to define the proper objects by the capacity of the understanding. How we might ask can the extent of being be known to exceed the limits of the known? Is this not to lay claim to what is out of reach? to define the limits by an extrinsic criterion, while affirming that any criterion must be immanent to the understanding? What is more, if, as he says, the limits of the understanding need to be found before speculation can begin, what tool is to be used to find those limits? Again, what guarantee is there that the understanding is 'proportional' to itself? In resituated the understanding at a distance from itself can it still be within its own grasp? As Locke proceeds to list those objects that lie beyond our understanding at no point does he try to show that the understanding itself lies within reach. In other words, he never attempts to establish that 'reflexion' is possible.

The point here is not to explore the labyrinth of these familiar epistemological binds, but rather to ask how Locke avoids confronting the dilemma: how he can assume it unproblematic that we be capable of reflecting on the operations of the mind in the same manner in which we encounter other objects. The answer lies in the ill-thought out conflation of the inquiry and its object that operates throughout Locke's text. It is never clear whether he is discussing the limits of his inquiry, or the limits of human understanding as such. The threat of the mise en abîme accompanies each attempt to describe the limits, but is warded off by this uncomfortable identification.

At the same time as identifying the two however Locke retains a sense of their being distinct. In other words he operates with two antagonistic models of the inquiry/understanding which are
never clearly distinguished. In the one his inquiry is, as we have seen, identified with the understanding. According to this model the inquiry follows the development of the understanding, as it were, internally; without being distinguished from it. All the contents of the mind are given transparently as sensation and the operation of the faculties can be described since words are regarded unproblematically as the outward expression of ideas. Thus Locke's Essay would on this model be a simple description of the contents of the mind.

However Locke also employs a model which places the understanding outside the inquiry as its object and consists in a speculative reflection upon "the operations of our own minds within us". [EHI p78 emphasis omitted] The mind is able to examine itself because of an innate and disinterested capacity of reflexive speculation. For, as we have seen, while Locke claims that there are no innate speculative principles, an exception is made for the capacity to make a spectacle of oneself. [EHI p78] And it is through reflection that a distinction can be made between the proper and improper use of the tools of understanding.

These two models are expressions of the two channels that Locke cites as the "only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings", namely sensation and reflection. [EHI p78] Both are conceived as irreducible preconditions for human understanding and, consequently, of the inquiry into it. The first model involves the inquiry in an immanent description of the manner of the appearance of sensation; the second sets the understanding at a distance so as to effect a critical engagement with it.

However, the distinction between these two models cannot be sustained. Locke oscillates between the identification of object and inquiry which risks (qua immanent) failing to be critical; and distinguishing them, which threatens to fall into
a paradox of infinite regress. For the movement of reflection is construed as a species of knowing distinguished only by its peculiar object, namely the understanding. As such Locke comes to conceive it as a kind of 'sense' albeit an 'internal' one. He writes:

This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly be called internal sense. [EHI p78 Emphasis modified.]

Although Locke wants reflection to be an irreducible capacity—something essential to thought, it nonetheless operates in the same manner as the other senses, that is as a kind of window giving onto its object. Reflection is peculiar only in that it gives onto itself. To reflect is to make the eye of the understanding its own object. Thus Locke's notion of reflection is modelled on his notion of sensation. If sensation is the reception in the mind of an external stimulus, reflection becomes the reception of an internal stimulus. In other words, reflection can itself be conceived as the impression of a particular object because Locke's empiricism presupposes an object as that which causes sensation.

But while reflection is conceived in terms of sensation, the external senses are themselves mediated through reflection. If the mind is transparent to itself it is because to sense is to be aware that one senses. This is implied in the thesis that it is meaningless to speak of an idea of which one is not aware. For to be aware of the contents of the mind, namely sensations, is to be able to reflect upon them. The mediation of sensation through reflection is also in evidence from the fact that the very distinction that Locke operates between the two channels can only be made in a reflective moment. Both sensation and
reflection must be considered as operations of the mind upon which we are able to reflect if he is to discuss them at all. Further, only through reflection are the subject and object of the understanding distinguished. That is to say, that knowledge of the object beyond the sensation is only possible if one reflects upon sensation in itself in order to make a judgement on its basis. Thus, to the extent that sensation is conceived as the reception of a stimulus caused by something lying outside the mind, it presupposes reflection. Put another way, the extent to which the first model of the inquiry fails to remain purely immanent to sensation, but makes reference to the transcendent object causing it, is the extent to which it is figured by reflection. For the very distinction between the sensation and the object that causes it could only be made reflectively. Thus if sensation can only be described in virtue of our capacity to reflect then the inquiry is necessarily infected at the outset by reflection.

It would seem therefore that both sensation and reflection, and the two models of the inquiry they spawn, presuppose each other: to understand and to inquire into the understanding both involve self-transparent sensation and an original capacity to reflect. Locke's inquiry is at once identical with the development of the understanding - an attempt to conduct an immanent description of its contents - and a reflective determination of its operations.

In the first place this means that the limits of the inquiry into the understanding should be the same as the limits of inquiry as such. To understand the understanding just is to understand, in the same way as to sense is to be aware that one is sensing. Locke avoids an infinite regress by eliding the two. And yet, at the same time, this self identical operation contains an internal division of self-reflexivity expressed in the inclusion of an original faculty of reflection. For it will only be through Locke's reflections that the limits of human
understanding can finally be set. Thus just as for Descartes in the idea-of-an-idea there is no difference between the idea and its object; so for Locke while the idea is "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks" [EHI p9], the idea-of-an-idea must at the same time be identical with the idea; both within, and placed at a distance from itself: both a kind of sensing and a capacity for reflexive speculation.  

Locke's incorporation at the beginning of the inquiry of a mechanism whereby the eye of the understanding can see itself is what Condillac finds unacceptable. Reflection itself needs to be reduced to sensation; apperception to perception. Since, as I have argued, Locke's notion of reflection is bound at the outset to his model of sensation, this reworking of Locke will have implications for Condillac's conception of the sensible. If sensation cannot originally presuppose reflection, it cannot originally presuppose any object which causes it. For as we have seen only in reflection is any distinction to be made between the subject and object of thought. Any discovery of a world of objects must be posterior to the development of a reflective capacity and the realisation of the perspective 'for us'. Thus Condillac cannot conceive of the mind purely in terms of the passive reception of stimuli from without. If sensation is not originally conceived in terms of reflection the development of apperception must be produced through a dynamic which is immanent to the sensible. It cannot, in other words, be explained as the product of a passive reception of stimuli, be they originally internal or external.

What is more, if Condillac cannot presuppose reflection, the thesis of the mind's self-transparency to its own contents begins to be undermined. For, as we have seen, such self-
transparency is bound up with Locke's account of reflection. If the mind cannot reflect upon itself from the outset, then there is no reason to suppose that its contents need be originally open to inspection. Condillac's radical empiricism ought to engage with the development of the faculties without presupposing a capacity to reflect upon them. Consequently if Locke's attempt to identify the understanding with the inquiry into it is always mediated by reflection, Condillac's reworking must attempt to think that development in a manner which is truly immanent to it; an attempt which paradoxically (for reasons already touched upon), will need to take account of an aspect to sensation of which we are not fully aware.

The seeds of Condillac's rethinking of the sensible already lie in the first book of Locke's Essay. For from the outset Locke expresses certain reservations about his camera obscura model of the mind and its implication that the understanding is a totally passive receptacle of external stimuli. [EHI p129] It is significant that the attack on the doctrine of innate ideas does not attempt completely to efface an inborn structure from the understanding. On the contrary, Locke admits "that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men". [EHI p35] We have encountered one such tendency in Locke's notion of reflection, the incorporation of which tempers his rejection of any 'innate speculative principles'. But Locke also reserves a place for a limited version of 'innate practical principles' in his account of the internal 'unease' or potential which drives the understanding. Thus although, according to Locke, there are no innate principles as traditionally understood, there are nonetheless certain "principles of action lodged in men's appetites". [EHI p34]

If the model of the camera obscura appears to leave no room for Locke's inclusion of an appetitive drive, he does make a passing allusion to an alternative image which might. I want briefly to discuss this image here as we will have occasion to
discuss a similar model that Leibniz evokes in Chapter 12 below. Contrasting our hope for a complete vision of reality with our actual limited condition Locke writes;

It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant, who would not attend his business by candle light, to plead that he had not broad sunshine. The candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes. [EHI p7]

Here our capacity to understand originates within the mind. What we are able to grasp is determined not by the nature of the objects, but by that of an inner flame or faculty. The understanding is not merely a dark room into which light flows, but a lantern projecting its own light to illuminate the outside. If the self is the source of knowledge, the understanding is no longer purely passive or disinterested. Rather the objects it discovers are determined by the needs of the organism. The light of reason is naturalised as a faculty driven, and therefore limited by our requirements: by impetus naturales.

Now, the clash between these two models of the understanding; the one expressing the attempt to delimit it by the grasp of an inner faculty, or potential (the lantern), and the other by objects outside (the camera obscura), can represent the antagonism between the two conceptions of the inquiry discussed above. For these two models are distinguished by the position accorded to the inquiry: either as internal to the mind, as immanent description of the sensible potential (lantern), or external to it by which it is represented as a as a receptacle of impressions (camera obscura). The lantern begins with the mind as the determination of what can be known, and the camera with the objects which impress upon it. Now, the understanding conceived as the object upon which the inquiry reflects, presents it as passive and determined by the influence of
objects. When Locke reflects on the understanding it appears as a passive receiver of impressions: a receptacle or camera. But if reflection is to be reduced to sensation, sensation cannot be conceived in terms of passive reaction to stimuli. When the mind is identified with the inquiry, it must be involved in an active process of self discovery and a creative determination of the world. As such the model of a lantern projecting its light becomes more appropriate.

Consequently if Condillac is to rework Locke by forging an immanent account of the development of the faculties we can expect him to move away from the model of the camera obscura, informed as it is by Locke's conception of reflection, and toward the model of the mind as a lantern. We will see that this shift is in evidence in Leibniz's discussion of Locke below (Chapter 10). What will be shown is that Locke's camera obscura is forced to give way to an alternative, and essentially Leibnizian conception, because of Condillac's project to reduce reflection to sensation transformed.

Paradoxically however, the development of an alternative model begins as a reworking of the camera. The analysis of the shortcomings of this model leads under its own dynamic to the construction of the alternative. Thus the reduction of reflection to a more primary sensible origin does not begin with the deployment of the lantern model; does not begin, that is, with an identification of the dynamic of the development of the understanding, with the inquiry into it. Rather, such a model is to be developed out of the camera by a reversal of the direction by which the mind is determined. The senses need to be transformed from apertures permitting light to enter the darkened room into beacons projecting the inner light of the understanding onto an as yet undifferentiated and undetermined world. In this manner the mind comes to determine itself under its own dynamic.
This projection effected by the senses of a world of objects, which Condillac needs to describe, must develop from Locke's central metaphor, for reasons already discussed in the Introduction and in the discussion on method in Chapter 4. For, as we saw, the discovery of the principle of the understanding (the radical sensible origin), is detoured through and evolves from the errors of the past. It is uncovered precisely through an analysis which gradually fills in the gaps in previous systems. The elimination of Locke's presupposition of reflection, therefore, by providing an account of its genealogy from sensation, begins as a critique of Locke's system.

What this means is that when Condillac assumes the reflective perspective in the Traité - the perspective 'for us' - it is at once for it to critiqued as a prejudice, and to be established at the end of the inquiry. Condillac dramatises the Lockean paradox involved in assuming an innate capacity to reflect by himself beginning with this prejudice, in order subsequently to demonstrate its genealogy from sensation. For, as we saw, the perspective 'for us' is reduced to the perspective 'for the statue' only by setting up the thought experiment reflectively.

What will emerge is that the development of a new model of the understanding is involved in a dialectic with the old. The lantern does not completely replace the camera as the preferred model, because the truth of the second empiricist principle (which the camera expresses), while assumed, is also to be established. When Condillac opens the senses of his statue he is at once letting the world flood in, and allowing the world to be formed by the outward flow of the inner light: both assuming a world of objects to be discovered (assuming the perspective 'for us'), and explicating what is contained implicitly within the sensible. The latter explication should in the final analysis coincide with the assumption from which it develops.
But before we can trace the transformation of Condillac's conception of the understanding we need to continue our analysis of Locke's failure to reduce all the operations of the mind to sensation. What need to be made evident are the difficulties that Locke could see in the way of such a reduction as indicated in his efforts to negotiate the tension between his picture of the understanding as originally unfurnished, and his admission of certain minimal inborn faculties.

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Locke declares at the outset that an examination of the essence of the mind lies out of the way of his inquiry. He will confine himself to the "faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with." [EHI p5] The understanding in itself is the substratum to the cognitive operations with which he is concerned and cannot itself be known. Nothing positive can be said about the understanding in itself. It is merely 'blank' or 'empty'. Consequently it would seem that the inquiry can only follow the direction of knowing in its practical application. The modest refusal to offer any account of the essential nature of the mind in order to confine the inquiry to its operations, is closely allied to the critique of innate ideas. Prior to experience it is an undifferentiated 'faculty'; that which facilitates action through the passive reception of impressions. The best we can then hope for is a description of its reactive operations.

But if Locke's project were to become purely descriptive, it would lose the critical distance required to delimit its own space. It would have no principle of differentiation (be it generative, or eternal) by which to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate inquiry, and so separate the proper from the
improper objects of the understanding. In some sense, then, the
attack on innate ideas, if pushed too far, threatens to
undermine the empiricist project by denuding it of its critical
tools. The understanding would become a brute fact, defined by
whatever happens to befall it.

Consequently, the critical leverage with which to draw limits
to what can be known requires a minimal appeal to the nature of
mind in itself, as it were, prior to any particular operations.
Locke, as we have seen, is forced back from the ideal of an
unfurnished interior to the mind, to admit certain 'inherent
faculties' which are not altogether passive; whence Locke's
uneasy distinction between 'natural faculties' and the innate
inscriptions he attacks. The former are characterised by and
large by instinct, appetite or natural impulse, the latter by
law-like principles: characters written in the mind by the hand
of God. [e.g. EHI pp9-10] Locke wants the 'natural faculties'
to be a pure potentiality; an undifferentiated capacity
awaiting activation through experience. Yet they are always
minimally articulated prior to experience as inclinations
toward pleasure and aversions to misery. [EHI p27] So Lockean
faculties are ambivalently placed as inactivated capacities and
a minimal active inclinations to differentiate. They sit on the
threshold between a total absence of characterisation,
(characterised by absence) and minimally discernible traces of
in-born 'faint ideas'. [EHI p44]

While these natural faculties might be regarded as essentially
no different from innate inscriptions, as Leibniz argues in his
critique of the Essay, [e.g. NE p71] Locke resists this by
allying them with the non-linguistic. As we have seen, Locke
tries to argue that any pure potential cannot be already
articulated, but is forced to admit of an articulation within
the faculties. He cannot, therefore, differentiate his
faculties from innate inscriptions through the approximation of
the former to an original homogeneity. Rather than see his
project collapse, Locke invites us to determine this difference as that between instinct and reason; the 'natural' as opposed to the conventional linguistic order; thereby privileging the Cartesian impetus naturales over reason.

It is for this reason that the majority of Locke's arguments against innate ideas involve demonstrating the incoherence of thinking that words or laws could be written in the mind prior to any experience, or to learning any language. If there were innate characters, they could be more easily read than the imprint of sensation and so we would be aware of them. And even if we could read them we would not know what they referred to or how to apply them. Further, he argues, God would not engrave words of vague signification on our souls, and yet we have no clear idea of many supposedly innate ideas. On Locke's account, it is not by having rules couched in abstract terms that we know moral truths; rather we abstract the meaning of these terms from particular instances and so construct general rules. Universal consent proves only the extent of our subjugation to convention and our tendency to think in terms of linguistic categories. What Locke is resisting, in other words, is the notion that the mind might be already linguistically organised: that there might be an innate, non-conventional language. [EHI p38]

Locke also resists the interpretation of reflection as an innate inscription, not by taking it as a natural impulse, but by placing it on the interface between the external world and the empty cabinet of the mind as a kind of sense: a 'window'. [EHI p129] So while he tries to hold to the view that there can be no middle term between innate idea and pure capacity; saying that all ideas can only be either innate or adventitious, [EHI p11] ironically, reflection is ambiguously placed on the interface between these terms. Thus, as we saw, it is both something essential to thought and to the mind, but also a kind of sense. Because sensation defines the knowable, if reflection
produces knowledge it must itself be adventitious. And Locke's innate capacities suffer a similar treatment. They are at once produced internally as instinctive appetites and adventitiously through experience.

As Condillac tries to complete Locke's project by reducing the whole understanding to sensation transformed he will also run the risk of reducing his philosophy to banal description. By eliminating occult properties, such as natural faculties, and an original capacity to reflect, Condillac finds himself at the limit of empiricism's capacity to say anything. He must therefore generate its story in the tensions between the senses, on the frontier between an empty room and an unknowable world. And so Condillac identifies appetite with, and reduces reflection to, sensation. Condillac will place appetite within the interface where Locke placed reflection, and reflection is reduced to sensation transformed.

Thus Locke's resistance to the notion of an original linguistic order to the mind is overcome as Condillac places the generative capacity within sensation. Sensation becomes identified with a certain quantum of physiological need; it is appetitive. This provides sensation with the generative possibilities that enable it to become articulated like a language, without being ordered by innate principles. In other words, Condillac attempts to think the 'impetus naturales' and language together in the notion of the linguistic generation and development of the sensible. This is a completion of the naturalisation of reason we discussed in Part I. Condillac's innate language of action is distinct from innate principles in virtue, firstly, of being instinctual, and secondly, of being generated immanently from the sensible. It cannot, therefore, be construed as a transcendental structure that conditions experience since it is not logically distinct from the construction of experience.
Thus Condillac takes up Locke's attempt to identify the inquiry into the mind's operations with those operations. But, as we have seen, this identification can only be reached by first distinguishing the two, distinguishing the perspectives 'for us' and 'for the statue'. The impossibility of an eventual synthesis troubles the development of the text as Condillac tries to elide the object of inquiry with its activity. A synthesis would amount to an identity between the process of development of the understanding and of the inquiry into it. It would leave behind the picture of the understanding as having any essential and immutable nature. But this uncomfortable identification, always operates in an ambiguity concerning the relation of the inner to the outer; both through a paradoxical attitude to the origin of our understanding as both internally produced and externally determined, and across the interface between the two. And it is through a rethinking of that which operates on this interface, namely sensation, that these dilemmas begin to find a new expression. It is this middle which needs to be examined in Condillac, so as to find an immanent and generative account which does not need to make appeal to innate capacities conceived as immutable categories in the manner of Kant.

And yet the failure to make the identification (which was discussed in Chapter 4) means that Condillac cannot abandon the notions of an underlying and essential nature to the mind and of an external world of material objects. Thus Condillac's conception of the understanding continues to employ a notion of a substantial soul. In other words he departs from Locke's modest refusal to commit himself on the issue of what kind of thing the essence of the mind might be. Where Locke resists being drawn, Condillac finds himself bound to venture an hypothesis; not because of a desire to resist the materialist implications of Lockean empiricism, but because it is required by the nature of his attempt to complete Locke. This is because Condillac's acceptance of some natural and instinctual
structure which inheres in the sensible leads to the positing of some substantial basis to it. That sensations are needy directs Condillac back to account for this in terms of the needs of the soul. Sensations have some degree of pleasure and pain because of the relation between the mind and the world which it expresses, because, that is, the mind is embodied. The relata thus appear as what was implicit within the sensible. Thus while the focus of the account is on sensation, sensation contains within it two substantial relata, namely the soul and the world. If the mind cannot be characterised as a tabula rasa it must be structured by an interactive process between mind and world. As we saw in the Traité Condillac's inquiry must posit a ground which lies beyond its ambit; it must presuppose a basis to account for the manner of the appearance of sensation.

This departure from Locke is significant. For it is perhaps on the different conceptions of the nature of 'substance' that the philosophies of Locke and Leibniz diverge. And my contention is that Condillac's claim that knowledge can be had of the substantiality of the soul amounts to a move beyond Lockean modesty and toward a Leibnizian metaphysics. We need, then, briefly to discuss Locke's critique of the concept of 'substance' and its implications for his conception of the understanding in order to understand how Condillac is able to depart from his mentor.

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In the first Book of the Essay Locke attacks the view that we have an innate idea of substance. Further it is an idea, he says, by which we can come neither through sensation nor reflection. It is, in other words, no idea at all. By definition, 'substance' is whatever lies out of reach of actual
experience, as it were, under the ideas we do have. Locke continues his critique of the notion of substance in Book II. [EHI p245] For Locke several simple ideas are united in the mind and applied to a substance, while the idea of the substance remains no more than the sum of its sensible qualities. Words come to refer to these complexes and we think of them as simple ideas, for the word allows us to consider as simple "the complication of many ideas together". [EHI p245]

Locke likens European thinkers to the "poor Indian philosopher" according to whom the world is supported by an elephant. [EHI p140] He writes: "the Indian [...] was asked what the elephant rested on, to which his answer was, a great tortoise; but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad-backed tortoise, replied, something, he knew not what." [EHI p245] The Latinate terms 'substance' and 'accident' blind us to the obscurity of the notions they purport to designate. By translating into the vernacular, Locke tries to demonstrate that there is no real content for these terms. Substantia is 'under-propping', inhaerentia, 'sticking on'. [EHI p140] Each term sustains the other, while neither can be reduced to any positive experiential content. Substance is what supports accidents and accidents are what inhere in substances.

Our idea of substance remains in the dark, for it is definable only as what we do not know. Thus Locke can argue that any thought of the substantiality of the soul is necessarily obscure. Whether it be material or not is impossible to determine. As he had already said at the beginning of the work, he will not concern himself with questions of the essence of mind. In such debates we find ourselves beyond the horizon "which sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things". [EHI p9] Whichever side of such issues one attends to the difficulties in forming any clear idea of it will lead one to the other.
It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge; and he who will give himself leave to consider freely and look into the dark and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarce find his reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the soul's materiality: since on which side soever he views it, either as an unextended substance or as a thinking extended matter, the difficulty to conceive either will, whilst either alone is in his thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side. [EH II.p142]

The interior nature of substance is here what is too dark and intricate to see. Peering into the nature of the soul is like trying to fathom the depths of being beyond our reach. Our blindness to either hypothesis binds each to the other in a labyrinth in which neither pole of the antinomy can be made visible. In the darkness nothing can be determined, and any putative determination leads away from itself into its opposite. In the same way as with the notions of substance and accident, the non-idea is characterised by this movement in which each position leads to the other, either in mutual support or mutual antagonism.

Now, Locke's critique of substance has implications for the status of his own inquiry. When he again employs the salutary lesson of translating substantia to establish its proper meaning, it is defined as that which 'stands under'. "[W]e call that support substantia; which, according to the true import of the word, is, in plain English, standing under or upholding." [EHI p245 Emphasis modified.] It would seem, then, that its true import is the same as the object of Locke's inquiry, in plain English, the 'under-standing'. The understanding now appears as this unknowable substratum to the appearance of ideas. It would seem, therefore, that the object of inquiry must lie beyond its grasp. And this is to be expected if the inquiry can only describe the operations of the understanding. But to the extent that Locke's project, in the hands of Condillac, becomes to give some account of the underlying
nature of the mind prior to particular acts of understanding, it is becoming involved with what ought to remain beyond its ambit. For Condillac, following Locke, the understanding assumes certain minimal appetitive tendencies which, to be properly accounted for, invite speculation as to what underlies them. Properly to understand the understanding appears to involve getting beneath its operations to uncover its ground or support. Thus Condillac begins by assuming that there is a substantial soul trapped within the body of his statue. It forms along with the world of material objects, a natural system which accounts for the dynamics of sensation. Paradoxically, this support remains dark since the immanent description of the development of the understanding cannot begin with any knowledge of its own substantial ground. It lies in the depths beyond the reach of the development of sensation. But while it is assumed 'for us' is must also be implicit 'for the statue'. For in the final analysis of the sensible, the existence of the substantial soul, along with the world of material objects, will come to be explicated.

So it is that Condillac is led to negotiate the boundary which delimits legitimate speculation, and, under the influence of Leibniz, to begin to inquire into what underpins the sensible. For Leibniz, the argument that we can know nothing of what lies beyond experience, is morally as well as philosophically blind. Empiricists and the wicked alike think there is nothing beyond experience: no substance and no afterlife. By this logic however, he argues, the existence of the Antipodes could never have been predicted. [NE p163] The far side of the world represents for Leibniz that which lies beyond immediate experience, but which can nonetheless be known. For knowledge can be extended by projection on the basis of the known to the unknown. The uncharted realm below can be determined to exist, for it is through the analysis of experience that discoveries are made. The discovery of the Antipodes through mathematical inquiry, is equivalent to the discovery of the other world
through metaphysical inquiry. Mathematics proves the Antipodes exist in advance of experience, just as metaphysics proves the after life in advance of our death.

For Condillac the attempt to provide an immanent description of the development of the understanding posits a dynamic within sensation in virtue of which it projects a world of objects. To establish this position he develops Locke's admission of certain minimal innate faculties or tendencies into the understanding. And although these tendencies are placed within the realm of the sensible as generative possibilities, because the inquiry can never completely coincide with the process of generation there is always the requirement that a substantial and essential nature to the mind, as well as a world of objects, be posited. The sensible can never quite be analysed in a purely immanent fashion, and consequently Condillac is bound to begin the inquiry by making reference to a substantial basis for the process of perception. The invocation of the statue is essentially a provisional acceptance of the camera obscura model. This model functions to account for the appearance of the dynamic in question and will be produced out of that dynamic. Sensation therefore, remains articulable both in terms of being the interface between two realms, the world of material objects and immaterial soul, and as that in terms of which such relata are constructed.

Thus Condillac's attempt to understand the understanding tends toward an elision between object and inquiry. Insofar as they are distinct at the beginning of the Traité, 'for us' and 'for the statue', the inquiry becomes the effort to delve beneath the mind's operations. And insofar as they are identical the movement of inquiry/understanding involves an explication of an implicit distinction between mind and matter contained within the sensible. But these antagonistic developments are not separable within Condillac's treatise. For the second development implies the first in the final analysis: sensation
is unfolded until mind and matter are uncovered. And the first is required as a presupposition enabling the second to develop: for the statue can only unfold the sensible with the aid of insights gained once it has been unfolded.

For if to understand is to 'stand under' an object, to be impressed by it; for the understanding to stand under itself implies both an internal distinction and an immanent explication. To get beneath itself, the mind must uncover what is contained implicitly within it, while this implicit side must at the same time remain out of reach of a complete account. Thus the difference between 'standing under' and 'under-standing' expresses the hermeneutic circularity that plagues the endeavour to inquire into the understanding: the endeavour, that is, to stand under that which stands under. To avoid the mise en abîme the picture of the understanding as a receptacle for impressions needs to be complicated by the model of it as a projector of sensations: a lantern producing the world from out of its internal nature. In other words it gives way to a model of inquiry as an immanent description of its development.

Locke's paradigmatic non-idea, namely 'substance', is, I have suggested equivalent to the understanding. As such we might expect it to resist positive characterisation, for the attempt to determine its nature must be made in the dark. But the understanding cannot merely passively stand under a world of objects, for to understand itself the understanding must get beneath its own operations and uncover its internal determinations. And even the ambition to give no positive determination to the understanding, as expressed in the model of the camera obscura, cannot itself escape this bind. It too inevitably gives way to its opposite: into an attempt to provide some essential and innate structure to the mind accounted for in terms of certain natural appetites. But if, as Locke claims of the inquiry into substance, neither pole of the
antinomy can be positively determined, we cannot expect the lantern model to be sustainable either. The privileging of the inner over the outer and vice versa, becomes increasingly fraught as each realm leads back into the other. It is within the dynamic of the tension between these realms that Condillac articulates their interface, namely sensation. For his analysis of sensation is conducted through the supposition of an interior and exterior in order for it ultimately to rediscover the two relata to have been already implicit in their interface.

Locke sees the notion of substance as such, and the substantial nature of the soul in particular, as illegitimate objects of inquiry. Thus it is only insofar as the understanding is not substantial that it could be a legitimate object of inquiry; that is insofar as it consists purely of activity. But the very denial of legitimacy to the inquiry into the nature of the soul, the insistence that it is no more than an empty container, or undifferentiated sheet, is caught within the illegitimacy it tries to escape. The debates over innate ideas, and over whether or not the soul has any substantial character, are themselves caught in a circle: a paradox which is the object of this inquiry. The true origin of ideas takes on a certain ambiguity. At one moment originating within the mind, and at another in objects beyond it. Two principles, two sources of knowledge are kept in an uneasy tension and are constantly collapsing into each other. The labyrinthine question of the origin of ideas, for both rationalist and empiricist leads to the opposed position. And it is Condillac who speaks with both voices; working at once on his completion of Locke and on his own monadology. It is with the negotiation of these two projects which I shall be dealing in the final chapters. What we will find is that Condillac's rethinking of sensation allows it to take the place of innate ideas in the antinomy we are discussing. Thus, in the hands of Condillac, the ambiguity concerns whether the source of knowledge lies...
immanently within sensation (as the first principle of empiricism would have it), or in objects outside the mind (as would the second).
Chapter 9: Condillac's Leibniz

This chapter will show how Condillac's perceived duty to complete the Lockean reduction takes a Leibnizian turn. In the attempt to draw the epistemological limits ever more strictly the crisis that Locke avoids confronting becomes increasingly intense, so that, paradoxically, the need to negotiate with what Locke refused to think; what is beyond the limits of proper inquiry, becomes ever clearer. As Condillac hones the language of empiricism by a more rigorous definition of the 'good metaphysics', he is forced into a negotiation with the 'bad'. What we need to ask first is how we are to read Condillac in the light of the fact that these two seemingly incompatible levels coexist in his thought, and to do this we need to understand better how the two relate. This chapter will begin to answer this question so that it can subsequently be established that by speaking with these two voices Condillac is trying to articulate the sensible interface between these two realms.

The obvious place to look to see what is produced out of the meeting of these two levels of Condillac's thought is Leibniz's Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain. For it is here that Leibniz's system of monads meets Locke's Essay. While conducting a comprehensive critique of the shortcomings of Locke's approach Leibniz also develops the line of contact between the two philosophies. I will try to trace Condillac's negotiation of these two levels through two models of the mind which Leibniz introduces in order to correct Locke. I want firstly to deal with Leibniz's proposed revision of Locke's camera obscura model; a revision which marries, or perhaps compromises the requirements of 'rationalist' system building with those of empiricism and so can function as the site of the
negotiation in question. As we shall see, the second model, the magic lantern, focuses the tensions in question in an equivalent manner while offering us an alternative perspective (See below Chapters 10 & 12).

However before turning to the camera obscura I want to make some remarks about some of Condillac's comments on how to read Leibniz. This is partly by way of justification for my intention to read Condillac's project through these models; but also in order to map out the ground on which Condillac negotiates the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' metaphysics. Condillac introduces his exposition of Leibniz in the *Traité des systèmes* with these words:

Leibniz exposed his system only very summarily. To have the key to it, we must search in several of his works to see if anything has escaped him that could shed light on it. Sometimes he appears to be trying to envelop himself; and, wary of shocking received opinions, he approximates to ordinary ways of speaking, and gives us to understand the opposite of what he means. Perhaps also having dealt with the different parts of his system several times over he was constrained to vary his language according as he developed his ideas.

["Leibnitz n'a exposé son système que fort sommairement. Pour en avoir la clef, il faut chercher dans plusieurs de ses ouvrages s'il ne lui est rien échappé qui soit propre à l'éclaircir. Quelquefois il paroit avoir dessein de s'envelopper; et, craignant de choquer les opinions reçues, il se rapproche des façons de parler ordinaires, et fait entendre le contraire de ce qu'il veut dire. Peut-être aussi que, pour avoir traité les différentes parties de son système, à diverses reprises, il a été contraint de varier son langage à mesure qu'il a développé ses idées." OPI pl51]

The means of expression are compromised by ordinary ways of speaking such that Leibniz is forced to pitch his language between two registers. These registers are often distinguished
as what can be said 'strictly speaking', and what is true within the limitations of our ordinary speech. Leibniz frequently engages in strategic arguments that presuppose a position that in metaphysical rigour he does not adhere to. The fuller development of his ideas is supposed to supersede such loose talk. Thus, to use Condillac's example, according to Leibniz, "the plenum can have no more reality than the void; it is only a phenomenon, an appearance; yet, from the way in which he speaks of it, one would think that, against his principles, he takes it for something real." ["le plein ne doit pas avoir plus de réalité que le vide; ce n'est qu'un phénomène, une apparence; cependant, à voir la manière dont il en parle, on croiroit que, peu d'accord avec ses principes, il le prenne pour quelque chose de réel." [OPI pl51] Leibniz strategically accepts that we are caused to perceive objects. Yet strictly the appearance of both extension and matter is produced internally.

The two levels may appear antagonistic, but are supposedly resoluble by recovering the expressions of ordinary language within the language of metaphysics; recovering the provisional position held to for the sake of argument, within the deeper structure. The implicit metaphysical basis of a position is enveloped within the work. Not always explicitly stated, it needs to be uncovered, or unfolded. As Condillac has it, language is forced to alter as the ideas are developed; it shifts in order to accommodate the broader picture, and to recover the underlying system. And consequently to explicate Leibniz must involve making this lower level system explicit.

The way that Condillac recommends reading Leibniz is, I believe, of a piece with his method of philosophical inquiry. One might have expected this since Condillac argues that the same method should be followed in every field of human knowledge. For as we have seen, for Condillac explanation consists in an analysis which lays bare the genesis and
development of the object of inquiry. The underlying structure contained implicitly within a system needs to be uncovered through its decomposition into simples.

Since analysis, or what comes to the same thing, experience, is the proper use of signs, Condillac is able to equate experience with a language. To explicate the understanding becomes a cryptographic analysis, a process of deciphering this language into what underlies it. Just as for Leibniz there are characters engraved so deeply on the mind as to become obscured and in need of deciphering, so for Condillac there can be recesses in experience which are only confusedly perceived. But these gaps are not requisites of experience in the sense of being necessarily outside it; for they must, in principle, be recoverable for consciousness. We must at least be potentially aware of whatever is to count as part of an explication of experience, even though, as a matter of empirical fact, certain ideas remain confused. He writes:

Everything in nature is distinct, but our minds are too limited to see it all distinctly in detail. We analyse in vain. Things always remain that we cannot analyse, and that, for this reason, we see only confusedly. The art of classification, so necessary for having precise ideas, illuminates only the principal points; the intervals remain obscure, and in these intervals the middle classes are confused.

["Toute est distinct dans la nature; mais notre esprit est trop borné pour la voir en détail d'une manière distincte. En vain nous analysons; il reste toujours des choses que nous ne pouvons analyser, et que, par cette raison, nous voyons que confusionnément. L'art de classer, si nécessaire pour se faire des idées exactes, n'éclaire que les points principaux: les intervalles restent dans l'obscurité, et dans ces intervalles les classes mitoyennes se confondent." OP2 P381]
For Condillac, the process of making one thing distinct involves making something else confused. The development of one idea involves the envelopment of another. But what is confused in one instance can always become distinct through a new analysis. We need to think of consciousness, the soul, as that which at once complicates or confuses, by making connections and that which explicates, distinguishes and decomposes. Consciousness is, then, a confusion and dis-confusion in continual play.

Hence it is little wonder that according to Condillac, Leibniz envelops himself as his ideas develop. The development of a philosophical system, like the development of the understanding, must obscure things as it clarifies. The analysis cannot make everything distinct at once, but inevitably is caught in the bind that its attempt at a complete explication involves making provisional claims which disguise that explication. Leibniz's hope for a complete analysis into the language of monads is in vain, since, while one part of the system is explicated, another must be obscured.

To see more clearly how precisely this method of reading is supposed to operate, we need to ask what can be made of Condillac's conception of a 'key' in this passage. How does the key operate to decipher Leibniz's system? In response, what is immediately clear is that the key enables Condillac to develop the system in order to uncover the true, or original meaning, enveloped within the means of expression. Now, for Condillac, the language of a system needs to be analysed into an original, 'innate' language; the language of action, the elements of which are provided by need and its natural expression.[OP.II. pp396ff.] This analysis operates by reducing the complex semantic content of the system to its sensible origin. The language of Leibniz therefore needs to be reduced through different levels of expression down to the root language: namely that which is uncovered through the de-velopment of its...
ideas, and that in terms of which the strategic arguments that pander to ordinary ways of speaking are to be justified.

Significantly we are told that the key to the system is to be found in what may have escaped Leibniz. The steps which Leibniz overlooked, or forgot, need to be filled in by Condillac in order to provide a full explication of his philosophy. Just as the forgotten natural origins of the faculties in the language of action are what explains them and justifies us in their use, so the forgotten details of a system need to be recovered in order for the proper development of ideas to be shown. Condillac is suggesting that the keys to understanding Leibniz's philosophy, lie in what appears incongruous within it. By filling in the gaps Condillac does not intend to refute the system but rather to expose the deeper metaphysical structure which supports it. The points of slippage or incongruity, Condillac suggests, indicate the moments at which Leibniz's ideas develop, and therefore, form the basis for analysing back to the root language.

On this interpretation of Condillac's comments, what escapes Leibniz are not conceived simply as points at which he errs. They are not what needs to be uncovered in order to expose the system's faults. For, as we have seen in the critique of other thinkers, the forgotten steps in past philosophies are as much pointers to a more complete account, as they are faults to be eradicated. Thus the exegesis of Leibniz's system that the passage quoted above introduces is not intended to be a critique, but a completion of Leibniz. Condillac writes: "I will make this philosopher speak; but I will not make him say anything he did not say, or would not have said had he himself undertaken to explicate his system in its entirety and without detours. ["[J]e ferai parler ce philosophe; mais, je ne lui ferai rien dire qu'il n'aït dit, ou qu'il n'eût dit s'il eût lui-même entrepris d'expliquer son système dans toute son étendue, et sans détour." OPI p86] The exposition of Leibniz
attempts to demonstrate its internal consistency by eliminating its errant moments. Interestingly, even Condillac's subsequent objections do not try to demonstrate inconsistency. Leibniz's system is admitted to be self-consistent, and its integrity is demonstrated through an analysis which directs us back to the underlying metaphysical ground.

But here we come across a problem. For what precisely is the key to Leibniz's text by which its underlying system is exposed? One might think that it could not be found in the language of action, since Leibniz's system is not a sensationalism. If not, however, the exegesis must search for a different key, and Condillac must be using a different method. He would then be analysing Leibniz into a systematic and 'bad' metaphysical language, in order subsequently to show that this language cannot be cashed out in terms of experience. Certainly it would seem that the critique operates by reducing Leibniz to a few basic tenets and subsequently demonstrating that this, the language of monads, is not reducible to sensation and therefore that we can have no ideas corresponding to the terms used.

On this interpretation of the Leibniz chapter in the Traité des systèmes, the initial exposition shows the consistency of the system on its own terms by tracing the development into a monadological language. The subsequent critique argues that this deeper language does not itself reduce directly to sensation. Thus Condillac demonstrates that the superficies of Leibniz's system are to the monadological language as all legitimate thought is to the language of action. If Leibniz's system is false it is because monadology is not reducible to sensation in a proper analysis.

But the problem for such a reading is that, on his own terms, Condillac could not employ any key in the initial reduction that was not that of sensation. This is because Condillac wants
to claim that all our ideas, and all systems, whether true or false, are reducible to sensation, and the language of action. Hence to explicate a system is identical with an analysis of it in terms of the true origin of our ideas. To read Leibniz by a reduction to the underlying 'bad' metaphysics, or according to the principles of that metaphysics, would, therefore, be to employ a false method.

The problem becomes that if all systems are reducible to sensation, the difference between legitimate and illegitimate reduction is difficult to draw. How then is Condillac to conduct any critique of systems? How is a genetic analysis qua critique and qua justification to be distinguished? Condillac might answer that the exposition provisionally assumes a direct reducibility, and the critique subsequently tries to show the lineage to be illegitimate. The route by which the language reduces to sensation is not straight, or 'natural' but involves detour into error. So the initial reduction into the language of monads appears to operate according to the proper analytic method, but is subsequently shown to be a misuse of that method because the language of monads cannot be reduced directly to the language of action.

However this leads into a paradox of infinite regress. For the illegitimacy of a system's lineage is demonstrated only after the system has been explicated. But such a demonstration - itself a genetic analysis into a more primitive language - must also await a further analysis to establish the reduction was not direct or natural. The illegitimate system will always fail, in the final analysis, to be reduced to sensation. It can only ever approximate to such a reduction. The paradox is that the path of reduction must be shown to be crooked, but this can only be shown after the reduction is completed, by a further analysis. Thus if an analysis is only shown to be incomplete or inadequate by a further analysis it is unclear how the original
language is to be established. And without establishing it the system is always open to further analysis.

Another paradox can be generated in the opposing direction. For, the fact that the reduction to the language of monads is illegitimate (because it is a detour in the final reduction to sensation), is only made apparent in the subsequent demonstration that the language of monads itself does not reduce directly to sensation, that is, in the critique of monadology. But this means that the initial reduction-cum-explication was already incoherent which suggests that Condillac could not have given a systematic account of it in the first place. The provisional exposition should have always been, on Condillac's terms, unintelligible even if this is only made evident once the critique is made, because the critique shows that we can have no understanding of the terms used in the exegesis.

In a sense then, the exegesis must already have been a demonstration of incoherence, precisely because it shows the development of ideas in terms that are not those of the language of action. The exegesis, in other words must already be a critique. But at the same time the critique must be an exegesis to the extent to which it attempts to complete an analysis into sensation. In fact the critique is supposed to make the exposition intelligible, since it shows the true origin of the ideas it contains. At the same time the critique as demonstration of the proper method is made intelligible by the exegesis. For we are supposed to learn the proper method precisely by seeing where the other method goes awry. Thus if the exposition is intelligible it is because it reduces the system to sensation. And if the critique is intelligible it is because it has had to be itself detoured through the monadology. In sum the exegesis is a critique insofar as it fails to reduce the system to the language of action and thus exposes its unintelligibility. And the critique is an exegesis
to the extent that its reduction must succeed and make the system intelligible if it is to be an intelligible critique at all.

The way out of these paradoxes (to arrest the infinite regress and to make the exegesis meaningful), is, I suggest, to make an uncomfortable identification between exegesis and critique. If explication is an analysis into a systematic root language, the interpretative key which accounts for all that is written would have to be the language of action. That Leibniz can be allowed to provide a complete account of his philosophy without detours suggests that the language in which that philosophy is couched is legitimate.

To recapitulate, explication for Condillac consists in translating into an underlying language - a language of action the elements of which are sensible. And the method for such translation is analysis. Now, what escapes Leibniz's intention provides a glimpse of the metaphysics - the language of his monadology - which underlies and explains his summary pronouncements. But if the analysis does not employ the language of action as its key then it could only produce incoherence. Condillac cannot, if he hopes to be intelligible on his own terms, be attempting to reduce Leibniz to any language other than that of action. Since Condillac is, I want to claim, precisely concerned to provide a coherent account 'without detours' we are forced to assume that he takes Leibniz to be some kind of sensationalist: in other words that the language of monads is in some sense equivalent, or reducible to that of action.

If this is right then the analysis leading to the metaphysical basis, and the analysis into the language of sensation are not mutually exclusive as one might have supposed. My claim is that the reduction to an original language, qua critique of metaphysics, and qua exegesis of its underlying structure,
cannot be easily distinguished, and what this will ultimately mean is that the structure of 'sensation' begins to take on the weight of a metaphysical system in Condillac's philosophy. The legitimate lineage of a system from sensation is not easily distinguished from the illegitimate. The proper development of ideas which avoids detours into error, is not easily separated from the errant thoughts of over ambitious metaphysicians.

If critique and explication cannot be distinguished then it becomes unclear even in the Traité des systèmes (where Condillac is ostensibly trying to refute Leibniz), whether he adheres to, or rejects some kind of monadology. As Condillac allows Leibniz the space to provide a full exposition of what lies implicitly in what he has written, it is no longer clear whether Condillac is simply giving us an example of the abuse of systems. Can we easily distance these words from Condillac and take them to mean the opposite of what he wants to say? Or must we now read Condillac's critique, as he himself reads Leibniz, as an appeal to ordinary ways of thinking which disguises his true metaphysical beliefs.

As Condillac hands the narrative voice to Leibniz, the ambiguity as to who is really speaking begins to make itself felt. For Condillac immediately begins to lift passages wholesale from his own earlier dissertation, Les Monades. What then is the true origin of these ideas? Can Condillac sustain the explicit attempt to distance himself from the system he describes? It would seem not, for he concludes his critique by raising the possibility that it is he himself speaking in the Traité des systèmes. He writes: "Because I have refuted Leibniz's system some Leibnizians have said that I did not understand it. If that is so, the system of monads as I have exposed it is my own. I do not disavow it". [Emphasis added.] ["Parce que j'ai réfuté le système de Leibnitz, quelques Leibnitiens, ont dit que je ne l'ai pas entendu. Si cela est,
le système des monades, tel que je l'ai exposé, est donc de moi. Je ne le désavouerai pas." OPI pl64]

Condillac intends us to suppose that in the exegesis he says the opposite of what he means; and yet he allows for the possibility that he should accept full responsibility for what he has Leibniz say. And of course he is responsible. For the figure of Leibniz enters the dialogue in order to reproduce the words of Condillac from a work which recommends the system of monads. Condillac condemns but cannot disavow his own monadology. He cannot in honesty do so, since this is a case of self-plagiarism. And the problem appears to be how to decide whether to take the exposition of the system of monads as pending refutation, or whether the sensationalist epistemology is to be recovered within the discourse on monads, as in Les Monades.

What I have wanted to argue is that we cannot simply adopt either strategy of interpretation. For, as we have seen, exegesis and critique employ the same method, and cannot easily be distinguished. Condillac is precisely caught between these two; both voices are his own, and both are disowned. The exegesis of Leibniz, ostensibly awaiting a critique, is in fact also Condillac's own monadology. What this indicates is that the overtly empiricist works need, I would argue, to be re-read in the light of Les Monades not just as that from which they hope to distinguish themselves, but also as grounded in it. This is not to say we can simply devalue the attack on Leibniz's hubristic excesses. Empiricist modesty, its attempt to delimit itself, has to be taken seriously. Indeed, as I have suggested, it is precisely the seriousness of this enterprise that will lead Condillac into the ambivalent attitude to the systems he tries to refute. Thus the key to de-veloping Condillac's enveloped thought, to work through his attempts to disavow his dissertation, his refusal to acknowledge the origin of passages taken from that work, etc., is to be found in
reading what escapes this subterfuge, what erupts out of the
carefully crafted sensationalist epistemology. The key to
understanding the development of the ideas, is that there is
always enveloped within his words a counter-current to the
explicit rejection of the system of monads. His voice is always
double. While Condillac adopts one level of speaking, he
retains the metaphysical other sotto voce. The works he
published are cyphers for the underground metaphysics, which he
tries to keep in camera. What therefore needs now to be shown
is that the reduction to the language of sensation is at the
same time a reduction to monadology.
We have seen that for Condillac it is where Leibniz's approximation to ordinary language slips that he betrays his true metaphysical beliefs. The system is exposed through the slippage between registers when the development of ideas escapes or runs before their linguistic expression. I have also argued that this is the method we should employ in our reading of Condillac. For what Condillac diagnoses in Leibniz also figures his own project. The hidden, escaped meaning that Leibniz wants to say, (veut dire) is often the opposite of what is said. And in reading Condillac we need also to be wary of different levels of expression, since the completion of the Lockean project involves a development toward an underlying monadological system.

In the final three chapters, therefore, I propose to look at two models of the mind discussed by Leibniz which can be employed to represent the slippage between the two voices with which Condillac speaks and so can shed light on the relations that obtain between the languages of the 'good', and of the 'bad' metaphysics. The object of this discussion is to provide a framework by which to comprehend the ambivalence which is endemic to Condillac's philosophy. For these models are, I want to claim, points at which different levels of the system are brought together: moments at which a form of expression falls behind what it expresses and thereby betrays the points of development of ideas. The analysis of these models, the camera obscura and the lantern, will show that the development of the one leads to the positing of the other, but that this development is not a simple reduction and consequently that tensions between them must remain.
While both the models I want to deal with apparently only treat of an aspect of Leibniz's system, namely the relation of mind to body, because the system is, as Condillac has it, 'so tied together' such details mirror the whole. Leibniz's solution to the problem of the relation of mind to body, of perception to the world, makes that relation a special case of a universal principle of pre-established harmony. Thus although these models may appear anomalous within the system, they cannot be marginalised. That is, we cannot merely take them to be inadequate expressions of the system awaiting a fuller description. The anomaly is both a production and a reproduction of the internal tensions of the system as a whole.

Turning now to the first model, that of the camera obscura, it will be worth quoting in full from Locke's Essay.

External and internal sensation are the only passages that I can find of knowledge to the understanding. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the windows by which light is let into this dark room. For, methinks, the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little opening left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without; would the pictures coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of a man in reference to all objects of sight and the ideas of them.

On one reading of this passage the camera obscura is a classic expression of the Cartesian paradigm of the relation of mind and body. On this reading it is the understanding, that is to say thought, which is being likened to the camera. To conceive is to perceive images of things which lie outside the mind, beyond the walls that encase it and at a distance from it. Consequently the mind has no immediate contact with the realm
of material bodies and the physical process of perception lies beyond the camera, untouched by the understanding.

However another reading of the passage is encouraged by the very nature of the analogy. The mechanistic model is suggestive of the physical process of sense perception. Locke likens the windows of his darkened room to the organs of sense in order to illustrate his conviction that all knowledge comes from sensation. Thus the camera begins to take on the form, not of the mind, but of the body with its sense organs opening onto the world. The corporeal mechanism is subjected to a material influx which produces the images of objects within it. These images are painted, as it were, in the brain, much as the eye reproduces the images of objects on the retina. The mind is then able to inspect the images cast across the interior surface. On this reading, while trapped within the cell of the body, the mind is still distinct from the mechanical process which governs the behaviour of matter, and in particular the process of sense perception.

While the import for Locke of the camera is to emphasise the centrality of sensation to the development of thought, the specular Cartesian model remains. As such the understanding is essentially passive in respect of its object. However if I am right that this alternative reading is encouraged, this betrays an uncertainty as to how to characterise the relation between that which observes the physical impressions and the body in which they take place. What is undermined by the ambiguity is any clear distinction between the physical process leading to projected images and the perception of them. This is unfortunate for Locke, since the analogy of the camera is designed to encourage a rigid demarcation between the understanding and the process of perception. The walls of the room are erected to form a barrier between the inside of thought and the external material world. Any mediation between the two is kept to the absolute minimum, fed as it is
exclusively through the vanishing point of the camera's aperture. And yet the minimum requirement of the physical influx undermines the distinction. The physical mechanism is allowed to infiltrate the understanding itself infecting the mind with matter. The resulting confusion leads to a reconfiguration of the understanding as a material body operating according to the laws of efficient causation and corpuscular physics.

I'd like now turn to Leibniz's proposed revision of Locke's camera obscura model in his critique of Locke in the Nouveaux Essais. I hope to show how the ambiguity that troubles Locke's analogy encourages the development of an alternative. Leibniz's revision, by foregrounding the interpretation of the camera as a material body, is able to rework the relation between body and mind. Leibniz responds:

To increase the resemblance we should have to suppose that in the dark room there is a canvas to receive the species that is not uniform, but diversified by folds representing innate ideas; and, what is more, that this canvas or membrane, being stretched [tendue], has a kind of elasticity [ressort] or active force and even that its action and reaction is accommodated as much to past folds as to new ones coming from the impressions of the species. And this action consists in certain vibrations or oscillations, like those one sees in a taut [tendue] cord when it is touched so that it gives off a sort of musical sound. For not only do we receive images or traces in the brain, but we form new ones, when we envisage complex ideas. So, the canvas, which represents our brain, is active and elastic. This comparison would explain tolerably well what goes on in the brain; but the soul, which is a simple substance or monad, represents without extension this same variety of extended masses and perceives them.

"Pour rendre la ressemblance plus grande il faudrait supposer que dans la chambre obscure il y eût une toile pour recevoir les espèces, qui ne fût pas unie, mais diversifiée pas des plis, représentant les connaissances innées; que de plus cette toile ou membrane, étant tendue, eût une manière de ressort ou force d'agir, et même une action ou réaction accommodée tant aux plis passés qu'aux nouveaux venus des impressions des espèces. Et cette action
consisterait en certaines vibrations ou oscillations, telles qu'on voit dans une corde tendue quand on la touche, de sorte qu'elle rendrait une manière de son musical. Car non seulement nous recevons des images ou traces dans le cerveau, mais nous en formons encore de nouvelles, quand nous envisageons des idées complexes. Ainsi il faut que la toile qui représente notre cerveau soit active et élastique. Cette comparaison expliquerait tolérablement ce qui se passe dans le cerveau; mais quant à l'âme, qui est une substance simple ou monade, elle représente sans étendue ces même variétés des masses étendues et en a la perception." NE pl14]

Leibniz attempts to complete Locke's picture by the incorporation of a stretched canvas, or membrane within the camera, which, because of its elasticity, acts and reacts to physical influence from outside. The canvas is not a uniform white sheet or tabula rasa, but is originally folded or engraved with innate ideas. Leibniz's point here is to emphasise the active role of the understanding in organising the data of sense. Significantly the impressions struck upon the surface of the canvas are not understood as immediate resemblances or images of objects, but as material traces mediated through the internal constitution of the brain. The brain has a certain elasticity, a ressort, which means that the impressions do not remain inert within the understanding, and 'lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion', but are continually mixing and reacting with new impressions.

Leibniz's reading of Locke, whether perversely or otherwise, equates the camera with the body, and the canvas is introduced to perform the function of the brain. The body with its organs is transformed from a rigid inanimate mechanism, into an active extended mass, trembling at the touch of external objects. Leibniz abandons the ocular model; replacing the rhetoric of images, pictures, darkness and light, with the palpable figures of elasticity, oscillations and folds.
However, having excluded the mind from the camera Leibniz needs to reintroduce it into his account. Consequently, alongside the physical system Leibniz presents us with his vision of the non-extended monadic soul which perceives the traces in the brain, not now because of any causal impression, but because of the pre-established harmony. The mind, on Leibniz's account, is not subject to the physical process which leads to the vibrations and oscillations in the brain; but, nonetheless, its perception necessarily has this corporeal correlate. In the one model, therefore, we now find sensation conceived as internal action and reaction in the body to external events; and as the mirroring of these events in the soul through an ideal, or pre-established correspondence. The mind 'represents' the extended folds, only in virtue of an ideal correlation between its own modifications and those of other monads. Leibniz thereby draws a distinction between the closed system of the apperceptive, windowless soul, and the realm of substances in causal interaction with each other. Since there is no aperture through which matter might pass into the mind, the understanding itself cannot be modelled on the camera. Thus the distinction between the mind and the body is no longer articulated in terms of the within and without of the dark room, but in terms of a metaphysical distinction between efficient causation and monadic, that is to say, the mind's perception. In consequence we need to resituate the understanding, below the canvas as it were; that is, independent of the realm of corporeal mechanism but also coterminous with it. The canvas thus becomes at once the final term in a series of efficient causes (the brain) and, on its flip side, the internally generated appetitive perception of the mind.

This may appear to be a return to a dualism of mind and body. We have after all here a non-extended thinking substance metaphysically distinct from the body and matter. However the fact that the metaphysical distinction plays across either side of this membrane has, I think, significant consequences. The
crucial points of difference with the Cartesian picture are that while there is no causal influence between body and mind, the pre-established harmony demands that all thought concur with events in the body. Paradoxically, therefore, an approximation to an identity between thought and matter is being envisaged as the two are brought together on either side of the attenuated membrane.

However, to complicate the picture, that which the monadic soul represents, namely events on the canvas, must appear to be triggered by a physical influx from without. For to perceive is to perceive oneself as being caused to perceive by the physical process described in the analogy of the camera. Because for Leibniz, the soul is the principle of unity for the body, and that which animates it, it expresses, or represents the totality of the corporeal processes which produce perception. What it perceives, therefore, are not simply the images of things; the final terms in a series of efficient causes. Rather, perception is the representation of the entire process beginning among objects and reverberating through the body. Yet the monad's perception of itself as caused to perceive, is strictly speaking only a well grounded phenomenon. In metaphysical rigour perception is only ideally related to the causal process. More accurately still, the whole series of efficient causes from events in the world to movement on the canvas is only phenomenal. For in reality there is no direct influence between substances. And because the series of efficient causes is merely phenomenal it is contained within the monad. Thus what appears as the final term in the causal process recovers the entire series within the realm of final causation.

On Leibniz's model therefore, the camera as that which determines a rigid distinction between perception and things perceived drops out of the picture. The upper surface of the elastic membrane replaces it as the site of the material aspect
of sensation. The membrane cannot therefore simply represent the brain. Rather it comes to represent the entire sensitive surface of the body folding in against other bodies. Thus we need to understand the processes occurring on the canvas as akin to the material influx in its entirety. On its upper side material process, on its lower teleological perception: the two operating in tandem because of the pre-established harmony.

Leibniz's revision of Locke speaks at once of the material basis of perception, while that basis is itself recovered within the structure of perception. The modification to Locke's causal theory of perception incorporates that theory within what is perceived. In other words, two antagonistic explanatory schema attempt to ground each other reciprocally. And the membrane communicates between them because it is both governed by intrinsic denominations and external influence. The membrane is, as it were, half monad half matter. That these two levels of description, should come together in the camera obscura provides a key to thinking the relation between the ambitions of an empiricist project which are limited to an analysis of the sensible, and those of rationalist metaphysics and its determination to develop a system by which to account for sensation. This membrane expresses an ambiguity as to what conditions, and what is conditioned by perception since it both reacts to an outside, while this outside is incorporated within itself as an appearance. It communicates between internal appétition and external influence, action and passion, inner and outer, and so forth; acting as the veil between the real and apparent. The stretched canvas is both the sensitive skin of the organism and its principle of unity and appetitive self-development.

We can then read this membrane as the site of a negotiation between the empiricist adherence to a causal theory of perception and Leibniz's thesis of pre-established harmony. Leibniz develops Locke's camera and in so doing produces a
hybrid picture which is kept in an uneasy concord, as it were across the opposing faces of the membrane. Leibniz's metaphysically rigorous monadology coexists with what ought to be completely reduced or translated into it. But the modest empiricist attempt to confine itself to the sensible is allowed to remain. As such it can represent the manner in which Condillac is able to operate simultaneously with these two seemingly opposed doctrines. For his system, the upper side of the canvas represents the limit to legitimate speculation: the realm of the sensible. The analysis of sensation which brings what is folded within it to the surface however, leads to the stretching of the limits and the positing of its far side as the substantial basis which accounts for its appearance. And although Condillac's empiricist modesty forbids the move from known effect to unknown cause, by completing Locke's picture in the manner of Leibniz, he penetrates beneath the sensible surface and into 'bad' metaphysics.

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We have sketched how Leibniz's negotiation with Lockean empiricism might provide the framework for our understanding of Condillac's negotiation with Leibniz. Both philosophers are engaged in finding a line between the language of metaphysical rigour and the modest and limited inquiry of the new philosophy. Perhaps the central issue that this negotiation must focus on is, as I have argued, how sensation is to be construed, and in particular how the development of Locke's position leads to a complication of the self transparency thesis. Our discussion of this complication will deal with the points at which Leibniz takes issue with Locke; firstly on innate ideas, in the remainder of this chapter, and on partial perceptions in the next. Leibniz's modification of Locke centres on the issue of whether there are contents or
structures within the mind which are not transparent to consciousness. And it is a major concern of the Nouveaux Essais to refute the doctrine of the transparency of the mind to itself, and so to find a place for (among other things) implicit knowledge. Leibniz is primarily concerned to defend the doctrine of innate ideas against the objection that if they were indeed in the mind we ought to be immediately aware of them. Locke is unable to make sense of the notion of implicit knowledge since he cannot distinguish it from a potential to know. [e.g. EHI.p20] Locke writes:

[I]f these words (to be in the understanding) have any propriety, they signify to be understood. So that to be in the understanding and not to be understood, to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say: anything is and is not in the mind or understanding." [EHI.p12]

Leibniz agrees that we are not immediately aware of innate ideas, but tries to show that they are nonetheless to be found 'in' the understanding. [NE p63] His position is well expressed in another passage in which Leibniz tries to walk the line between the demands of innatism and empiricism. He refers approvingly to Socrates in the Meno [82b] leading the child to abstruse truths by questioning him and writes:

One could construct these sciences [arithmetic and geometry] in one's study and even with eyes closed, without learning anything from sight or even from touch of the needed truths; even though it is true that one would not envisage the relevant ideas if one had never seen or touched anything. For it is an admirable economy on the part of nature that we cannot have abstract thoughts that have no need of something sensible, even if it be merely characters such as the shapes of letters, or sounds; though there is no necessary connection between such arbitrary characters and such thoughts."
On peut donc se fabriquer ces sciences dans son cabinet et même à yeux clos, sans apprendre par vue ni même par l'attouchement les vérités dont on y a besoin; quoiqu'il soit vrai qu'on n'envisagerait pas les idées dont il s'agit si l'on n'avait jamais rien vu ni touché. Car c'est par une admirable économie de la nature que nous ne saurions avoir des pensées abstraites qui n'aient point besoin de quelque chose de sensible, quand ce ne serait que des caractères tels que sont les figures des lettres et les sons; quoiqu'il n'y ait aucune connexion nécessaire entre tels caractères arbitraires et telles pensées.

The thinking here is complicated because Leibniz's position develops within the space of a few lines. Initially the suggestion is that truths of reason could be discovered independently of sense experience. The rationalist might shut himself within his windowless cabinet and philosophise without aid from outside. Sensation is placed firmly in a position of logical posteriority to innate ideas. However the truths so discovered would be empty of sensible content; blind and deaf to the world. Leibniz's evokes the notion of pensées sourdes elsewhere. (He also uses the Latin expression cogitationes caecas, i.e. blind thoughts.) Such thoughts are 'empty of perception and sensibility', ["vides de perception et de sentiment" NE.p146] in the same manner as are the characters used in algebra. Blind thoughts are indispensable in calculation when awareness of the content would distract from the logical and mathematical relations which can be expressed in symbols alone. Just as we are able to calculate without having the objects of calculation before us, so we are able to discover truths of reason without invoking truths of fact.

Such a position is clearly antithetical to the empiricisms of Locke and Condillac. However as the line of thought develops, Leibniz concedes a more positive role to the sensible. For it turns out that the senses are the 'occasion' for the discovery
of what is innate and we could not think without them. [NE p63-64] Sensible signs function as symbols which make possible the manipulation of abstract ideas. Elsewhere he expresses his conviction "that created minds and souls never lack organs and never lack sensations, as they could not reason without symbols." ["J]e suis persuadé que les âmes et les esprits créés ne sont jamais sans organes et jamais sans sensations, comme ils ne sauraient raisonner sans caractères." NE p166]

In other words, in order for the soul to bring what is folded within itself, to the surface of the canvas, it is required that it first be impressed by external signs. That which is intrinsic to the mind can be made explicit or apperceptive only through the imprint of an external world. Leibniz thereby admits (albeit strategically) the necessity for some extrinsic determination of internal states. The modification made to the camera obscura is supposed to illustrate this need for an external stimulus to activate the implicit forces, which lead to the mind's self discovery. For it is only by reflecting upon the sensible that we come to reflect upon the operations of the mind. "The senses provide the material for reflection, and we would not think about thought if we did think about something else, that is to say about the features that the senses provide." ["Les sens nous fournissent la matière aux réflexions, et nous ne penserions pas même à la pensée si nous ne pensions à quelque autres chose, c'est-à-dire aux particularités que les sens fournissent." [NE p166] In this way Leibniz provides a place for the sensible as a necessary (although not a sufficient) condition for the development of the understanding.

We have seen that in this strategic critique of Locke, Leibniz takes the sensible to be the final term in a causal series beginning outside the mind. In the camera obscura sensation is whatever appears on the surface of the canvas which is not generated from within. Thus, Leibniz's argument that there can
be characters within the mind which are not immediately legible, is informed by the distinction between what is folded within, (innate ideas) and what impresses from without (the sensible). The marks across the surface can be easily read, whereas those buried between folds need to be unearthed or deciphered.

Condillac reduction of reflection to sensation takes the same route and is informed by the same distinction. For on his account, it is only by first allowing the attention to roam from one sensible idea to another and noticing similarities and differences that the attention can finally reflect upon the mind itself. [TS p293] The reflective moment requires sensible signs to mark the operations of the mind and only in this way can the mind discover the principles governing its own development. But at the same time its development is immanent to the sensible. Thus the appearance of a distinction between the operations of the understanding and sensation, both develops from sensation and presupposes a distinction between the sensible and the nature of the mind in itself: that is, it presupposes a distinction between what is folded within the sensible surface and what is imprinted from without. Sensation then, on the model I am ascribing to Condillac, is initially conceived from the position 'for us' as caused from without, while containing within it the potential for the development of the understanding. Simultaneously, however, since from the position of the statue the sensible cannot be transcended it must contain within it the potential for forging a distinction between what is caused internally and what externally which will in turn permit the development of the perspective 'for us'. This paradoxical position, which we discussed earlier is illustrated in Leibniz's modification to the camera obscura for which a distinction between sensations and innate ideas is made on the basis of a strategic distinction between internal and external determination which must be superseded from the metaphysically rigorous perspective.
What is important for Leibniz and Condillac is not that sensation come from without, although this operates as a strategic assumption, but that the sensible signs appear to come from without. For, I want to argue, the fact that these sensible signs appear not to have a necessary connection with thought, is integral to the notion that they direct it. That is to say, it is necessary that these sensible marks appear not to proceed from the soul's own internal nature, if it is to decipher the characters written within it. For, as Leibniz would have it, if we could manipulate abstract innate truths themselves, they would already be before us and there would be no need to discover them. If the signs used to stand for the ideas could be transparently seen to have a necessary connection with them it could only be because we had a complete understanding of those signs and of what they represent. It is because finite minds cannot manipulate naked abstractions that sensation becomes the key which unlocks innate ideas. The soul needs to be given an arbitrary language in order to decipher what is engraved within it; and only with such a language can a finite mind rouse the active forces which govern it. Thus, to come to perceive the necessity of the characters within the soul, we need first the appearance of contingency and it is in the tension between contingency and necessity that knowledge develops.

This view of the role of sensation in the development of the faculties becomes central to Condillac's project. In his work the role of arbitrary 'sensible marks' to thought is analysed such that 'sensation' is able to transform itself from the raw material into the organising principle of experience. As we have seen, in the Essai Condillac argues that we are only able to attend to one thing at a time, and so sensible signs are required as marks with which to unite a plurality. (This idea is also suggested in the Nouveaux Essais.[NE p61]) The arbitrary sign subsequently frees thought to pursue its own course since after the institution of language the mind is no
longer condemned to connect percepts together as dictated by a process forced upon it. [E pp.19-21]

But for both thinkers this appearance of contingency of the arbitrary sign, must cohere with the internal development of thought. There is an 'admirable economy' between what is perceived to emanate from outside the mind with what is inside, which enables the faculties to develop. That is, there must be some regularity given implicitly in experience between the occurrence of certain sensible marks, say words, and the appearance of particular thoughts in the soul. For Condillac such coherence is the condition of possibility for the bringing to consciousness of its own internal nature and is accounted for by the 'natural' concurrences established by God in the language of action. The soul needs to perceive impressions as not proceeding from its own nature which occasion specific internal developments, in order not merely to discover that nature, but to develop. And experience is an cryptanalysis which employs the key of the imprint of sensation to uncover what is inscribed within the canvas.

Thus the understanding is itself caught within the tension between different levels of explanation we have identified operating in Leibniz's camera obscura. The development of the understanding involves the explication of its own internal nature through the appearance of what is extrinsic to it. It never achieves a full explication which would recover the extrinsic within itself because its comprehension is always strategic and incomplete. Therefore, Condillac can be read as a describing the understanding in its limited condition in which it necessarily appears to be confused with the body and for which sensation presents itself to us as if caused by the influence of external objects. In metaphysical strictness Condillac does not adhere to the second principle of empiricism but to a form of occasionalism. As he expresses it in the Essai: "The soul being distinct and different from the body,
the latter can only be the occasional cause of what it appears to produce in the soul." But since the fall the soul "has become as dependent on the senses, as if they were the physical cause of what they only occasion". ["L'ame étant distincte et différente du corps, celui-ci ne peut être que cause occasionnelle de ce qu'il paroît produire en elle [...] elle est devenue aussi dépendante des sens, que s'ils étoient la cause physique de ce qu'ils ne font qu'occasionner". [E p7] But his empiricist modesty demands that he study the mind in its present condition, that is to say, a state in which sensation appears to be caused by the action of objects. The impossibility of a complete analysis of sensation means that the appearance of perceptions being caused must remain. This necessity is implicit in sensation insofar as it is confused. The metaphysically exact view - the one reached after a complete analysis - remains beyond the ambit of experience, and to that extent, for Condillac, should not engage our attention. Nonetheless it remains the case that (strictly speaking) the development of the mind must be governed by an internal dynamic, a conclusion that can, according to Les Monades, be established in good empiricist fashion. For, Condillac writes, "experience appears to prove that there are monads which change according to an internal principle. These are our souls". [L'expérience paroît prouver qu'il y a des monades qui changent par un principe qui leur est interne. Telles sont nos âmes." LM p174] And, as with Leibniz, the dynamic of this change involves the appearance that sensation is caused by the impact of objects from without.

One consequence of Condillac's move away from the second principle of empiricism is that he can no longer make the claim that all knowledge is adventitious. Not only are some principles of action innate, but sensation itself is produced internally. For this reason Condillac comes to collapse this distinction between sensation and principles of action. For as we have seen sensation contains within it the dynamic in
question. Sensation itself is conceived as originally a spur to action, originally containing a quantum of pain or pleasure.

But this development in Condillac's thought requires some account of the appearance of regularity within the sensible such that it can operate to organise thought. As is well known, Leibniz takes it to be evidence, not for any causal interaction with an objective world, but for the real, metaphysically pre-established harmony. Thus Leibniz can say that "if sensible traces were not required then the harmony between soul and body [...] would not obtain". ["si les traces sensibles n'étaient point requises, l'harmonie préétablie entre l'âme et le corps [...] n'aurait point lieu". NE p61] But because there is no causal connection, the link between thought and sensible mark cannot in the final analysis be arbitrary. It is simply that the mind needs to perceive them as arbitrary if it is to discover its own nature; while in metaphysical rigour there is a natural and necessary connection between sensible marks and abstract thought. Thus the metaphysical conformity between thought and the world appears to entail that we perceive a conformity, which the mind takes to be a causal interaction with it.

Once again, then, we see that each level supports the other. Thought needs a language of sensible marks in order to operate. The possibility that such marks have a regular connection with thought is guaranteed by, and therefore is evidence for, the harmony of mind and body although it appears to be a consequence of a chain of efficient causes. Thus, strictly speaking, this is not a harmony of two series, those of final and efficient causation, of inner and outer perception, of necessity and contingency; rather, Leibniz wants to recover the latter within the former. Thus while we may need the appearance of sensible, arbitrary marks, these marks are in reality always interior, necessary, and of the order of final causation. What is required is precisely the appearance of an outside. What is
necessary to the development of thought is the appearance that it be dictated to from without. This appearance is the consequence of the natural limitations of our faculties. The understanding develops but can never completely understand itself and is therefore caught within a strategic or incomplete picture and within the tensions this implies.

This provides the framework for Condillac's refutation of idealism. For it is enough to show that a condition of possibility of thought is the appearance of a causal interaction with an external world. And significantly it is precisely because of the limitations of our condition, condemned as we are, according to Condillac, to acquire knowledge only from sensation, that we perceive ourselves to be caused to perceive. Like Leibniz, strictly speaking, the argument cannot be that we are caused to perceive, and therefore that there must be a conformity between sensation and the world since this would beg the question. Rather it is that the coherence produced from within sensation that needs explication. How this coherence might be explained, and whether it is in any sense justified, however, requires a move beyond the ambit of sensationalism, both beyond the walls of the camera, and below the surface of the canvas: both toward the presumption of a world of objects and to the recovery of this appearance within a metaphysical harmony of substances which justifies it. For it is only in terms of this harmony that our limited condition can be determined as the reason for which we perceive ourselves as caused to perceive.

And yet my contention is that even Leibniz's monadology cannot unproblematically account for this appearance within a lower level explanation. Both levels are implicated within each other; and what this offers up is the possibility of an account of human understanding which while admitting a central place for sensation is also alive to the need to make reference to what is not sensible (or rather reference to what is hidden
within the sensible). The connections along the surface of the canvas imply a realm above, outside the camera, and an underground metaphysics. The depth cannot be forever hidden, but must be recoverable in principle since otherwise Condillac would be operating beyond the limits he sets (for example when he speculates about what happens before concupiscence). That is to say, what is hidden must be located along the surface, only folded within and thereby potentially unfolded, cryptanalysed and made conscious. The hidden meaning buried with the folds of the canvas needs to be exposed through the key of sensation. It is with this sort of model of what lies outside of immediate awareness that I think Condillac operates and in terms of which we need to understand his conviction that we never escape our own thinking. [E p6]

By way of concluding this section I will briefly recapitulate on the development of ideas that Leibniz pursues and on its parallels with Condillac's. We have seen that Leibniz provisionally accepts the empiricist model of the camera obscura; accepts, as Condillac has it the position 'for us' and the second empiricist principle. As we saw with Condillac this assumption is ultimately to be subsumed within a lower level account - an account operating in terms of what is immanent to the understanding. Leibniz imagines that what are most vividly perceived, are indentations on the surface of the canvas as the body's sense organs are impressed upon by external objects. The model is then used to illustrate Locke's error. According to Leibniz it is the confusion of the mind with the body that means that it is inclined only to notice these sensible effects. It is liable to take sensations, the movements across the surface of the canvas, as its only contents. However the positing of a confusion of mind and body is not strictly accurate since there is no causal interaction between substances. This means that this assumption is itself to be superseded in the same way as Condillac's presupposition of a distinction between mind and body (expressed in the perspective
'for us') is to be recovered within the perspective of the statue. For Leibniz, the crucial first step in advanced thinking is for the mind to train itself to realise that its own nature consists not simply in this passive reaction to external stimulus, but also contains certain innate active principles, buried beneath the surface. This step moves us beyond empiricism, and beyond the thought processes of the beasts; those of 'simple empirics', producing reflection. [NE p39] But the proper understanding of what is 'in' the mind, must be preceded by the activation of innate ideas by contingent impressions. This realisation in turn allows for the final leap to the understanding that all perception unfolds in this way; that no impression is made by external objects. And we have come full circle. The proviso that nothing is in the mind that was not first in sensation, except the mind itself is further qualified by the realisation that sensation itself was already in the mind.

If thought is obliged to trace this path, the movement of any inquiry into the understanding must itself set off from empiricism's appeal to a causal theory of perception through to the discovery of innate ideas: from the camera obscura model to pre-established harmony. Condillac's development from Locke must also begin with the assumption of the second principle of empiricism in order finally to reduce it to the first. Develop, in other words, from the assumption that all knowledge is determined from without, through the acceptance that this external determination is required for the development of the interior of thought, and finally to subsume the external influence within what is immanent to the sensible itself.

It is in this sense that Condillac can say that Leibniz recognised the empiricist principle that all knowledge begins with sensation. Leibniz accepts Locke's point that innate ideas are not immediately apparent, but this is because they need to be deciphered. They are analysed through the deployment of
sensible signs and are thereby mediated by a language of sensation. For Leibniz it is precisely because there is an 'admirable economy', a pre-established harmony between the development of thought and the action of other substances that sensation is able to direct our thinking. Although, at the same time, this possibility relies on the sensible trace appearing to us as an arbitrary sign.

This original sign must appear arbitrary and yet, in a metaphysically rigorous account, approximate to having a necessary connection with the world. But Condillac is not able to follow Leibniz in laying claim to knowledge of the necessity of this connection. He can only affirm it to be grounded in the 'natural' system which is the precondition for the possibility of the discovery of an external world. And even if it were argued that Leibniz is able to recover the route to his lower level along with its empiricist origin within his metaphysics, a Condillacian genetic epistemology is forbidden from following. Because while Condillac may pursue this development of thought, the justification remains genetic. That is, it must be made in terms of the origin, not the final realisation. Thus whereas for Leibniz a case can be made for keeping the different levels apart, so that the one is always recovered by the other without contradiction; for Condillac there must always remain a tension. He cannot move to the metaphysically complete account, but remains rooted in the limited understanding to which our condition in this world condemns us. Condillac's philosophy recognises the necessity of holding onto a strategic position. While it may hope to recover the position 'for us' by the end of the Traité, we have seen that this recovery cannot be completed. In this sense sensation remains the radical origin of human knowledge, in principle recoverable but not recoverable all at once in a complete account of its relation to knowledge. For Condillac the metaphysically rigorous account remains incomplete and the origin of natural
connection, while necessary, remains unrecovered and inexplicable.

What this means is that Leibniz's philosophy holds out the possibility of a lower level language, in which the production of the sensible surface can be conceived in terms of final causes. The surface extends to infinity and it is only the local view that produces the illusion of contingency. A complete account would demonstrate that each perception necessarily corresponds to developments within other substances. But for Condillac the surface of the canvas is extended indefinitely. There is no metaphysical guarantee underpinning the appearance of contingency which an infinite analysis of sensation would establish. We can only ever approximate to such an account. In other words, Condillac remains true to Lockean empiricism to the extent that it is a philosophy of efficient causation; while at the same time stretching indefinitely the region of what it can know.
Leibniz's image of the folding and unfolding of the sensible surface as the site of the development of the understanding is mirrored in Condillac's analysis of touch in the *Traité*. There it is the folding in upon itself of the skin which enables the statue to come to discover its body and a world of objects. Implicit in this active folding are the seeds of the development of the sensible into a projection of something lying beyond it. We saw in the discussion of touch in Chapter 6 that for Condillac it is because the perception of solidity is originally a sign of something that it can ground this development. Again it is because the sensible is conceived to be originally double, or folded against a world beyond it, that it comes to fold in against itself and construct a perception of bodies. The outside world is paradoxically both contained within the folds of the sensible surface and understood as transcending it: both immanent to the development of the statue, and presupposed in the perspective 'for us'.

Thus, as I have argued, the means by which sensation comes to be projected beyond the mind are already implicit within sensation from the outset. But this is only demonstrable if we follow the development of the statue from the perspective that transcends its experience and which itself explicitly presupposes that projection. By this paradoxical logic Condillac walks the line between innatism and Lockean empiricism. No ideas are innate. But neither does sensation immediately reveal all that can be known. Rather, implicit within the sensible are the means for its own analysis, because sensation is originally allied to a system of natural signs. [0PII p401ff.] This implicit aspect is evident 'for us' but not immediately for the statue. The capacity of the statue's skin
to fold against itself and the world, therefore, operates like Leibniz's folded canvas as the innate precondition for the possibility of the development of the understanding. In the hands of Condillac this folding represents the original signifying function of sensation which needs both to project beyond itself, while being conceived as immanent to the sensible. The fold generates a difference between sensation and what lies beyond it from within itself. For in the fold we find an image for this capacity of the sensible to signify what is implicit. The fold is both different from and identical with itself: the place at which the self encounters itself, but also where it encounters what it is not, precisely because the encounter of the skin with other bodies includes these others within the perception so produced. Bodies generally are in this sense both continuous and discontinuous with the body. Like two sides of the fold, the sensation of solidity signifies a hidden aspect within the sensible which when de-developed is projected beyond itself. It is both immanent to the sensible and a sign for what is not immediately given in sensation. These folds, which, for Leibniz represent innate ideas, can be equated in Condillac both with sensation and the organs of sense. For the tangible apprehension is at once sensation and idea, at once 'concentrated in' the mind and located in the body. For Condillac this original capacity is transformed from an innate idea into an innate language because no ideas can predate the analysis of the original apprehension of sensation. Ideas just are the product of analysis, which, to begin, must de-ploy a language prepared in advance.

The elements of the language of action are born with man and these elements are the organs that the author of nature gave us. Thus, there is an innate language, even though there are no innate ideas. In effect, it is necessary that the elements of some kind of language, prepared in advance, precede our ideas; because, without some kind of signs, it would be impossible to analyse our thoughts in order to realise what we think, that is, to see distinctly.
"Les élémens du langage d'action sont nés avec l'homme, et ces élémens sont les organes que l'auteur de notre nature nous a donnés. Ainsi il y a un langage inné, quoiqu'il n'y ait point d'idées qui le soient. En effet, il falloit que les élémens d'un langage quelconque, préparés d'avance, précédassent nos idées; parce que, sans des signes de quelque espèce, il nous seroit impossible d'analyser nos pensées, pour nous rendre compte de ce que nous pensons, c'est-à-dire, pour le voir d'une manière distincte."
[0PII.p396]

To have an idea is to have a distinct idea. Therefore while sensation contains within it all the ideas we can acquire, not all of them are immediately given to the statue. For sensation is not immediately distinct, but involuted and confused. To bring it to the surface of the canvas requires analysis, an unfolding which makes the sensible distinctly visible. For, as we saw, to attend to or make distinct, just is to convert the sensation into an idea or a sign.

In the Essay, ideas develop from the original confusion as the innate language of action comes to be employed as a tool of analysis. The sensible is decomposed through the active deployment of signs. In the Traité memory and touch function as natural signs with which sensation is transformed into a system of signs. In both the Essai and the Traité, therefore, it is by implicit reference to what lies below the surface of the sensible that the dynamic of the construction of the understanding gets underway.

What is given implicitly in sensation, then, cannot be conceived simply as an uncritically assumed reference to what lies outside sensation as its material cause. Rather it needs to be thought, for the statue, as contained within the sensible as the unanalysed elements folded within. In this section I want to look at the role that the concept of insensible elements within sensation plays in Condillac's philosophy and
how they might fit into the model of the camera obscura that I have been sketching.

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As is well known, Leibniz envisages a continuum between a molecular conscious awareness and its elements. The genetic requisites of experience come in this way to be conceived as themselves elementally experiential - only beyond the grasp of consciousness. We are able consciously to perceive only aggregates of sensations which themselves cannot be discerned. The canvas within the camera obscura can be read as the site of the continuum between what is apperceived and partial perceptions, since the clarity or vividness of a sense impression is consequent upon a fusion or (confusion) of obscure traces on its surface. What this means is that what is hidden from consciousness consists of those elements that are tied together, folded in, or confused.

Now, Condillac's analysis of the understanding into its genetic elements should be complete once it reaches the lowest elements that still count as experiential. Consequently he resists postulating requisites which are not themselves in experience. For this reason he argues against Leibniz's contention that there are elements within the sensible which are not themselves experienced. And yet Condillac's opposition to partial perceptions can only be half-hearted. We have already seen that he is led to speak of the weakness of attention to certain perceptions which lead us to forget them. Attention has to be applied to sensation to disentangle the confusion and recover what was only obscurely perceived. Because for Condillac we always discern less than we see, the proper deployment of signs, or analysis, becomes the means by which what is hidden is brought to consciousness. That is to say that certain
sensible marks or relatively vivid impressions, become the loci around which other impressions cluster, fusing together and so distinguishing themselves. Habitual associations form in experience which are determined by certain naturally concurring sensations, and this forms the basis for the institution of artificial signs which frees the mind to pursue thoughts at will. We have seen that the analysis of the understanding itself must retrace this same process, since the empiricist inquiry must attempt to match the process of experience. It disentangles through an explication of the role of signs in the ordering of experience. Thus, as Condillac writes: "We will be capable of analysing our thoughts only insofar as they are the work of analysis." ["On ne sera capable d'analyser ses pensées au'autant qu'elles seront elles-mêmes l'ouvrage de l'analyse." OPII p378] Like Leibniz he takes sensible marks to be required by the mind, not just for it to come to experience, but specifically for it to come to understand its own operations. And as analysis is the motor of knowledge (ie. experience), so it is that of understanding the conditions of experience.

Condillac's acceptance of the possibility of degrees of attention; degrees of clarity, shows that he is prepared to negotiate the boundary between what is transparently given in sensation and some further hidden aspects which cannot immediately be brought to consciousness. In so doing Condillac moves toward accepting something akin to Leibniz's conception of petites perceptions and away from a strict adherence to the self-transparency thesis advocated by Locke. This move however has significant implications for Condillac's conception of how the mind relates to the world. To see this we need to give an account of how the analysis of the contents of the mind, on Leibniz's model, can lead to a demonstration of the necessary conformity between mind and body.

We have seen that Leibniz's revised camera obscura presents perception as the mind's apprehension of a physical process
terminating in the brain. Elsewhere in the *Nouveaux Essais* Leibniz tells us that the preconscious, petites perceptions correspond to physiological events through some 'natural' connection. At this 'atomic' level there is no arbitrary relationship between percept and physical event. The apparent lack of necessity in the relation of the perception of secondary qualities and the material process that occasions them is due to confused perception of compounds. Sensations veil the real only because they are confused: because we do not distinguish what they contain. If colours could be deciphered we would approximate to an unmediated relation with the world. Partial perceptions must therefore have a relation of resemblance with their corresponding efficient causes. Somehow, at the pre-conscious level, perception has a (virtually) unmediated correspondence. To quote from the *Nouveaux Essais*:

It must not be supposed that ideas such as those of colour and pain are arbitrary and that there is no relation or natural connection between them and their causes [...] I would say rather, that there is a kind of resemblance, not a complete one and, as it were, in terminis, but expressive, or in a relationship of order, as an ellipse or even a parabola or hyperbola resemble in some way the circle of which they are the projection on a plane, since there is a certain exact and natural relation between what is projected and the projection which is made from it, each point of one, corresponding through a certain relation, to each point of the other [...] It is true that pain does not resemble the movement of a pin; but it might thoroughly resemble the motions which the pin causes in our body, and represent these motions in the soul, and I have not the least doubt that it does.

["Il ne faut point s'imaginer que ces idées comme de la couleur ou de la douleur soient arbitraires et sans rapport ou connexion naturelle avec leurs causes [...] Je dirais plutôt qu'il y a une manière de ressemblance, non pas entière et pour ainsi dire in terminis, mais expressive, ou de rapport d'ordre, comme une ellipse et même une parabole ou hyperboles ressemblent en quelque façon au cercle dont elles sont la projection sur le plan, puisqu'il y a un certain rapport exact et naturel entre ce qui est projeté et la projection qui s'en fait, chaque point de l'un répondent suivant une certaine relation à chaque point de..."
What precisely could this resemblance consist in? One way to understand what he has in mind is to appreciate that for Leibniz perception operates on a continuum in which each effect responds to its antecedent cause. If nature 'makes no leaps' we may take it that sensation blends with its material cause, such that there is no determinate distinction. As such the two realms might begin to resemble each other. The approximation would consist in an infinitesimal difference of two converging series, those of final and efficient causation. Two series, in fact, converging across the opposing surfaces of the canvas as its sensible content is gradually deciphered. The elemental correspondence could only be made explicit at the end of an infinite analysis through which all the perceptions of the monad have been analysed out and all that is true of it made explicit. So Leibniz says in the *Monadologie* that:

*[A]ll bodies feel the effects of everything that happens in the universe; such that someone who could see everything could read in each one what happens throughout [...] But a Soul can read in itself only that which is represented distinctly there; it cannot develop in one go all of its folds [*replis*], since they extend to infinity.

*["T]out corps se ressent de tout ce qui se fait dans l'univers; tellement que celuy qui voit tout, pourroit lire dans chacun ce qui se fait partout [...] Mais une Ame ne peut lire en elle-même que ce qui y est représenté distinctement, elle ne saurait développer tout d'un coup tous ses replis, cars ils vont à l'infini."*1]
an analysis would provide a complete understanding of the way the universe fits together as a whole and so would constitute divine knowledge of the linking of all things. It follows that the point at which one might uncover a local correspondence between the elements of perception and their corresponding material 'cause', is the same point at which that necessity would fall away in a complete account of the interconnections between all substances. Thus, if a correspondence can be assumed between local perception and the world, it is guaranteed by the structural fit, a 'relation of order', between monadic perception as a whole and the entire universe. This is what Leibniz is suggesting in likening the relation to that of a figure and its mathematical projection, in which each point corresponds in virtue of the structural congruity. Consequently the 'resemblance' at issue concerns less any supposed apprehension of an affinity between a particular perception and the world. At the local level no such resemblance could be perceived. But because each sensation fits into the grander picture it is in some sense adequate to or true of the world for our purposes. The knowledge that an infinite analysis would demonstrate the natural connection of perception and world, provides the guarantee underpinning the assumption of a resemblance at the local level of finite and confused perception. Finite perception is in this sense a particular expression of the universe, a peculiar and confused projection; too impoverished for us to reconstruct the whole from it, but nonetheless adequate for our needs.

Condillac however does not think that each monad represents the whole universe - even obscurely. [OPI p163, LM p135ff.] Which is to say that the internal perceptions of a monad are not a sufficient basis for deducing how its perception connects with all other monads. Condillac refuses to countenance the possibility that even a divine mind might complete the analysis. The reason for Condillac's resistance to this thesis lies in his opposition to Leibniz's use of the notion of
infinity. The concept of infinity cannot be drawn from sense experience except negatively, and consequently sense can only be made of an indefinite analysis. [OPI p163; LM p154ff.] The smallest elements can never appear to have any natural connection, because, for Condillac, there can be no infinitesimals of sense, no limit point at which the series would converge. Every analysis, therefore, leaves a gap: an arbitrary connection between the lowest elements which still count as sensible and the world. Finite minds, as Leibniz himself accepts, operating by analysis, necessarily leave gaps, 'middle classes' which will be confused. Further, no analysis of sensation can ever complete the demonstration of its connection with the world, because the sensible can never be brought into a single intuition. The surface of the canvas, in other words remains folded, it cannot be stretched out to infinity and be completely ex-plicated and ex-plained. There must remain a hidden, implicit side which cannot be brought to consciousness.

However, as we have seen, Condillac still seems wedded to the belief that the fact that sensation does connect with the world in a systematic way can be known, although any detail of how is unknowable. Sensation determines the organism to behave in particular ways in the effort to satisfy its needs, and to that extent its perception must be adequate to the world. The contents of the mind may not contain sufficient information from which to reconstruct everything, but they are nonetheless rooted in the natural system. The assumption of a system forms the basis of a justification of the belief in the external world, while it lies beyond the point at which any positive characterisation of the relation between perception and the world could be given. In other words, Condillac stretches the analysis of sensation but the elements he uncovers can only be related to the world in virtue of his appeal to a natural harmony between mind and body which ties the organism into its environment.
For Condillac, then, the analysis of perception leads to an indefinite convergence of the series of final and efficient causation. And since the analysis of perception cannot be carried to infinity, a realm beyond explanation, beyond experience, must remain. The natural system lies in this realm: in the realm of efficient causes. It is on the far side of possible explanation since insofar as a cause is efficient, it is inexplicable or arbitrary. Hence Condillac's reluctance to engage in speculation about the mechanisms underlying perception and the law which determines us to have particular sensations on the occasion of particular movements in the body. [e.g. E p56] Because the two series can never coincide, the physical mechanism which underpins sensation is never fully recovered within a complete metaphysical explanation. It can only be given a strategic, empirical, or naturalistic, basis. Thus where the limit to explanation lies, where the canvas divides efficient from final causes, remains to be determined by the particular analysis. If the limit is not metaphysically determined, where it lies will depend on the inquiry; will depend on the particular direction analysis takes.

Thus, in the Essai, for example, despite his reluctance to be drawn, Condillac gestures toward a ground for the supposed correspondence between sensation and world in an natural connection between organism and its environment established by the author of nature. The different elements of sensation are just the articulations of the organisms need, and if we construct a picture of the universe which is in conformity with these needs, we will produce a mode of action that corresponds to it. The elemental seeds of sense are assumed to have a structural fit with the world because they are spurs to action which succeed in allowing the organism to develop and survive. [e.g. TS p119,] If the child is able to survive, for Condillac, it can only be because its sensations teach it what it needs to know about its environment. Pleasure and pain are part of the essence of sensation and to the extent that they govern our
engagement with the environment, they are adequate to it. [e.g. TS p101ff.] The structure fits because the natural system of sensation and environment are rooted in a point of original, elemental contact. This moment of contact cannot be shown, since the natural connection is necessarily beyond analysis because not completely recoverable within the sensible. These elements are not infinitesimal, but indistinct; inhabiting the as yet unanalysed realm on the limits of the inquiry.

Now, because the analysis cannot be completed the hybrid picture of Leibniz's camera remains in place. No reduction of final to efficient causes is possible. Put another way, no analysis of sensation intended to establish the first principle of empiricism, can demonstrate the second. Thus Condillac retains the second principle of empiricism as a presumption precisely because it cannot be completely accounted for within sensation narrowly conceived. Both principles are assumed at the outset of the inquiry and the final confluence of the two which would be the completion of the proof of each is warded off by the difference of the two sides of the attenuated membrane within the camera obscura.

We have pursued Condillac as he moves away from a Lockean theory of perception for which the percept resembles or pictures, in favour of an approximation to a systematic correspondence of elements. At its ideal metaphysical limit (on Leibniz's model) a complete analysis of perception would reveal a sign system in which no distinction operates between signifier and signified; (or a system of identical propositions in which no difference comes into play between subject and predicate). But this limit lies beyond human knowledge. The reason for the existence of a language of action cannot be given and therefore a gap in the explication remains.

If the connection between mind and body remains arbitrary (that is, not determined within the the logic of the analysis, but
presupposed by it), we have seen that there is nonetheless a global reason for that connection articulated through need. This correspondence would make sense globally in a complete although finite analysis. Complete, that is, as far as the inquiry is concerned; but not metaphysically so. Condillac incorporates the Leibnizian notion of a system which at once grounds the possibility of objective experience, while remaining natural. The natural world is a well-formed language, but not a metaphysically necessary structure. It lies firmly within the realm of efficient causation, and Condillac's empiricism refuses to provide a complete account in terms of final causation. Thus a natural boundary interrupts the analysis. A boundary articulated by arbitrary, or 'natural' connections. But although it is empirical, the boundary is not uncovered at the root of the analysis; the radical origin must be indistinct and therefore reconstructed as an assumption. If it could be uncovered in an infinite analysis it would be a metaphysical truth, not an empirical supposition. Condillac's refusal to 'get lost in the infinite', of which he accuses Leibniz, means his inquiry must be arrested by appeal to an original 'fact' of our immersion in corporality and the world of extended objects.

But if this natural process must remain outside conscious awareness how could Condillac countenance such speculation? One answer is just to say that Condillac is caught in a dilemma. It would seem that the conditions under which sensations appear need at once to be brought within the ambit of the sensible and left beyond it. To posit a natural system which guarantees some adequacy between sensation and its material cause is to stretch the bounds of the inquiry. Since the inquiry is to be limited to the sensible, such speculations must stretch what counts as sensation, what counts as legitimate inquiry, and what might be recovered by analysis. The concept of indefinitely converging series appears to hold out the possibility of a point at which the conditions will be brought into the realm of the
conditioned; and yet the assumption that there is a connection between the sensible and something beyond it cannot itself be brought into the realm of the analysis. The injunction remains on the inquiry into the relation of sensation to the rest of the natural system and so questions as to why the organism should be immersed in the world and how the correspondence operates are not be answered. Condillac merely appeals to the première expérience and the sensation of solidity which, he claims, entail within themselves reference to what lies beyond. This primitive fact cannot itself be accounted for. Thus the canvas, is stretched, but remains intact.

To explore further why Condillac might feel able to assume some correspondence, it will be useful to make clear the parallels between Condillac's theory of perception and of the origin of language in which the natural signs of the language of action ground the apparently arbitrary system of advanced linguistic behaviour. The very possibility of instituting signs lies in a natural connection or correspondence between internal sensation and its outward expression. The inquiry into its origin which seeks to establish its role in the development of the faculties, cannot reveal why vocal expression should be naturally connected to certain internal states. That it is, is the necessary condition for the possibility of instituted signs and should be confirmed in experience. Similarly it would seem that any escape for Condillac from the threat of idealism will be through this Leibnizian conception of a natural connection between sensation and physical event, if, that is, this connection could be seen as a requirement of the development of the understanding. But the nature of this connection could not be known, and no local resemblance could be recovered for consciousness, because no total understanding of the sensible is possible. Thus while touch signals something lying beyond it, it cannot recover the nature of that against which it folds.
Analysis can proceed no further than the elemental seeds of sense: cannot uncover what is not itself the product of analysis. These seeds, like the natural signs of the language of action, have a connection with their outer expression which cannot be accounted for within the inquiry. In some sense the distinctness of simples offers up the necessity of their correspondence. Although arbitrary as far as the inquiry is concerned they are nonetheless transcendentally necessary to it. We need, therefore, to distinguish two senses of 'arbitrary'. Distinct sensation is the basis for all knowledge, the grounds for an unknowable conformity. As such the connection that obtains between it and anything further is inexplicable. It is arbitrary in the sense that there is no way of accounting for it within the inquiry. In the same way the language of action can be termed arbitrary. No explanation is possible of why particular cries should be linked to their corresponding internal states. Confused sensations however, are arbitrary in a different sense, namely to the extent that they diverge from this original, unknowable conformity. Just as the phonemes of natural languages appear arbitrary, so do secondary, and for Condillac, primary qualities. The task of a genetic epistemology is to demonstrate the adequacy of such appearances by uncovering their lineage to the original elemental language of sensation and action.

The distinctness of an idea comes, therefore, to be conceived as entailing accuracy of correspondence. Or rather degrees of distinctness are what determine correspondence and the limits of the inner and outer; not because of any resemblance between any 'primary' qualities with the object in itself, but through a relation of order pre-established within the natural system. What all this means is that the degree to which an analysis has been carried through, being the degree of the distinctness of the ideas it uncovers, is the degree of correspondence between the idea and the real. Just as the analysis of a philosophical
system will demonstrate its validity in terms of its genealogy from the natural language of action.

But these signs come from without both as the arbitrary requirement of thought, and as the outer expression of the interior, for example in crying out in pain. We can only decipher the interior with the aid of apparently arbitrary sensible marks from outside; but at the same time we can only begin to recognise such elements because of an original natural connection between inner experience and its expression. The possibility of abstract thought lies in the harmony of mind and body. Sensible marks are required to begin analysis, and these marks precisely do correspond, however arbitrarily it may appear, to inner states since they are grounded in the language of action. A system of arbitrary signs can only be instituted because of a natural connection between inner state and its outer expression. So the possibility of experience, and of an inquiry into its limits, presupposes a correspondence between mind and body. That there is a coherence suggests there is a natural connection prepared in advance, while the nature of the connection need not be known. As Condillac has it: "[0]ur outward appearance is fated to represent everything that happens in the mind. It is the expression of our feelings and judgments, and when it speaks, nothing can be hidden. ["Aussi notre conformation extérieure est-elle destinée à représenter tout ce qui se passe dans l'ame: elle est l'expression de nos sentimens et de nos jugemens; et, quand elle parle, rien ne peut être caché." OPII p396]

To say that this correspondence is fated is to say that it is not explainable. It is the condition of possibility of inquiry into the understanding and by laying bare the primitive elements of the language of action everything becomes clear. Nothing can then be hidden because it would all be brought to the surface. When the canvas is completely unfolded, the distinction between inner and outer disappears since it is
always only the product of the folding of the surface. And yet such a complete unfolding can only be held out as an ideal and, as we have seen, some elements must always remain hidden.
Earlier I contrasted Locke's camera obscura model of the mind with that of a lantern projecting an inner candle light out into the world. In this final chapter I want to turn to this latter image to complete the development of the camera analogy that we have been pursuing. Leibniz does not directly pick up on Locke's image of the candle, but does evoke a similar vision in another context; in a discussion of freedom of thought. Leibniz tells us that we exert control over those thoughts that proceed from the mind's own nature, whereas those that depend on the body are involuntary. This latter category come to us partly from without through the objects which affect our senses and partly from within as a result of the (often insensible) impressions which remain of earlier perceptions, which continue their action and mix with the new ones.

"[I]l nous vient des pensées involontaires, en partie de dehors par les objets qui frappent nos sens, et en partie au-dedans à cause des impressions (souvent insensibles) qui restent des perceptions précédentes qui continuent leurs actions et qui se mêlent avec ce qui vient de nouveau." NE p139

Involuntary thoughts are not confined to present impressions, but include all that which enters the understanding as a result of the effects of objects on the sense organs. That is to say, as we learned from the camera obscura passage, that they include the reverberations of past impressions. These 'traces' of previous perceptions continue to exert an influence over the
progression of thought. Leibniz now goes on to discuss this class of involuntary thoughts:

We are passive in this respect, and even when we are awake, images (by which I understand not only representations of shapes, but also those of sounds and other sensible qualities) come to us without being called as in dreams. In German they are called fliegende Gedanken, as one might say 'flying thoughts' [pensées volantes], which are not in our power, and which are sometimes full of absurdities which give scruples to upright people and exercise to casuists and directors of consciences. It is like a magic lantern which makes figures appear on the wall as one turns something inside. But our mind, on becoming aware of some image which returns to it, can say: 'Stop!' and bring it to a halt, so to speak. Further, the mind enters as it sees fit into certain trains of thought which lead it to others. But this happens when neither the internal nor external impressions prevail.

["Nous sommes passifs à cet égard, et même quand on veille, des images (sous lesquelles je comprends non seulement les représentations des figures, mais encore celles des sons et d'autres qualités sensibles) nous viennent, comme dans les songes, sans être appelées. La langue allemande les appelle fliegende Gedanken, comme qui dirait des pensées volantes, qui ne sont pas en notre pouvoir, et où il y a quelquefois bien des absurdités qui donnent des scrupules aux gens de bien et de l'exercice aux casuistes et directeurs des consciences. C'est comme dans une lanterne magique qui fait paraître des figures sur la muraille à mesure qu'on tourne quelque chose au-dedans. Mais notre esprit, s'apercevant de quelque image qui lui revient, peut dire: halte-là, et l'arrêter pour ainsi dire. De plus l'esprit entre, comme bon lui semble, dans certaines progressions de pensées qui le mènent à d'autre. Mais cela s'entend quand les impressions internes ou externes ne prévalent point." NE p139]

There is no suggestion here that Leibniz intends his magic lantern to be a corrective to Locke's image of the candle light of the understanding. The immediate issue does not concern the limits of what appears in the mind, but the extent of the mind's control over what appears. And yet, as will become
clear, there is a link between the extent of the understanding and of the mind's control of its thoughts. As we have seen, Locke's empiricism hopes to show that the understanding, is delimited by that which impresses on the sense organs (as reflected upon by the 'inner sense'). All thought originates in external determinations; in impressions appearing to the mind as sensations. This means that the understanding is determined by what is not in the understanding and there would appear to be no room for self-determination.

But we have also seen that Locke is not able to accept the implications of this, the camera obscura analogy of the mind, not least because with no internal determination there is no will. If we be free to choose to pursue a particular train of thought, there must lie within the understanding an internal activity, or certain natural 'faculties'; and this is expressed in the image of the inner candle light. [EHI p7 & EHII ch.21] Empiricism's inability to reduce all thought to a causal movement from outside to inside, leads in Condillac, to a complication of the camera model. The sensible is no longer merely an impression, but involves projection. This counter-current is required by Condillac's effort to forge an active conception of the development of thought.

Leibniz and Condillac agree with Locke (albeit strategically) that one is free to the extent that one can direct one's thinking or action without coercion from without. [EHI p209] Freedom of thought is possible when external impressions do not dominate the mind. But significantly, this realisation leads to the discovery of objects outside the mind. For as Philalètehe, espousing Locke's view in the Nouveaux Essais, puts it, we can know that the mind does not derive simple ideas from within and therefore that they must be caused by something acting on the soul. [NE p309] The idea of an outside therefore derives from the distinction between ideas that are the product of

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'reflexion' (complex ideas), and those produced by the outer senses (simple ideas).

Although Leibniz must ultimately reject any such argument given that it entails a causal theory of perception, it does contain an insight he wants to hold onto; namely, that ideas of sense do not contain explicitly their sufficient reason. Because sensation does not immediately reveal the reason for its appearance it is ascribed to objects outside. Similarly, Condillac argues that it is insofar as sensations do not proceed from any internal source that they come to be regarded as caused by objects. While for Leibniz this argument cannot prove that there is a realm of efficient causes, since we cannot truthfully judge of an outside on the basis of confused sensation, he does not deny that we make such judgements.

On Leibniz's account, the confusion of a sensation indicates something insensible that is mixed up within it. And it appears efficiently caused to the extent that no immediately evident teleological account of it can be given. Sensation is incomplete therefore it has a sense; or signification contained within it. The full recovery of its meaning which would determine the object in itself, would show the appearance of that object in reality to have been folded within. Thus sensation projects what is implicit and unrecovered beyond itself as the thing in itself. But what needs to be understood, is that the fact that it cannot be recovered does not mean it can be done away with by finite minds. For it is precisely in the nature of the incomplete (confused) sensation that it demand completion, although this completion cannot be fulfilled.

Effectively, for Leibniz, the soul represents a realm of efficient causes to itself, because there is a disjunction between sensation and its sufficient reason; because, that is, the reason is not explicit. Thus the extent to which we
perceive ourselves to be subject to the body, to sensation, is the extent to which we are confused about the true origin of ideas. And conversely, our sensations are confused only insofar as they conceal their true reason for being. So the appearance of an outside is articulated through the degree to which we are confused about the origin of our ideas. If, counter-factually, all perception could be understood (i.e. seen to be reasonable, or to follow necessarily) everything would be perceived to be produced internally, that is, as it really is. But sensation cannot appear to proceed from the interior since to appear uncontrolled and confused just is to appear to be determined extrinsically.

Now, it follows that for Leibniz the appearance of gap between the sensation and its sufficient reason determines the sensation as an (apparently) arbitrary sign, making it seem to be the product of efficient causation. But if we ever want to do away with the idealism this implies we will have to say that sensation only appears arbitrary; that is, it only appears to be connected with some object which is not perceivable in itself. In reality it is a necessary or natural sign, within which the thing in itself is given implicitly. What Leibniz wants Locke to realise is that a world of objects cannot be recovered if sensations form a system of arbitrary signs, and consequently that idealism is only to be avoided if the outside is contained within sensation. A superficial Lockean conception of sensation is an insufficient basis for the production of objective experience. The required complication of that conception involves inscribing the outer within the depths of the sensible - between the folds of its surface.

It is in the light of this Leibnizian picture of the appearance of material objects that we must understand Condillac's completion of Locke. On Condillac's account the ultimate origin of the sensible cannot be demonstrated because the analysis of it cannot be completed. The underlying reason for the
appearance of sensations cannot be unearthed from within the inquiry - from the position of the statue. Indeed, Condillac admits that even 'for us' it remains mysterious why certain sensations are associated with certain bodily movements. So it is that the sensible retains a hidden aspect which demands that we project it beyond the mind. The second principle of empiricism, therefore, is implied in the failure to complete the demonstration of the first. That is to say, the assumption of a material cause underlying the mind's apprehension of sensation is a consequence of the very incompleteness of the genetic analysis of sensation.

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We can now return to Leibniz's fliegende Gedancken in order to indicate their similarity to sensation in respect of being outside of our control. Like the original impression, they appear to 'come to us' unbidden. And it is, I suggest, for this reason that Leibniz tells us that they, come to be projected beyond the mind as a lantern projects images onto a wall. For if the traces 'comes to us without being called' (sans être appelées) and are not comprehended or within our control, the mind will take them, as it takes impressions, to emanate from without.

But how exactly does the iteration of such images produce control over thinking? How, that is, does the mind halt the image and embark 'as it sees fit' on a train of thought. Before addressing this question we need to assess what is at stake in the claim that sensations arrive without being called. First of all we must consider that what is not summoned or named (appelé) is not controlled, it is, in other words, involuntary. Like the sensible impressions from which they derive, flying thoughts appear without reason. Their progression contains
absurdité, for they appear confused both to the ear and to the understanding (entendement). The mind is deaf to what has no name and cannot order it within a rational frame. And our thoughts remain involuntary to the extent that we have no signs to direct them, no name by which to call them and so no means of 're-calling' them. This projection of flying thoughts is, then, intimately linked to their being 'absurd' and capricious.

While Leibniz must (strictly speaking), take all thought to be produced internally and projected outside, he is concerned that this metaphysical level coexist with, or accommodate, the empiricist level in which the opposing direction prevails. The magic lantern is interesting if read as an effort to do just this. For fliegende Gedancken are conceived at the one level as images which are originally produced from without and that subsequently become falsely projected. They are a special case of the soul's behaviour in which what has become part of internal activity comes to be projected outward. Strictly speaking, however, flying thoughts cannot be restricted to a special case, because, as I have been suggesting, they cannot distinguish themselves from sensation more generally. Because for Leibniz, in metaphysical rigour, any image, can only appear to come from without and all are in reality projections of developments within. The appearance of extrinsic determinations of our perceptions is produced internally because of our limited self understanding. Consequently, we need to extend the domain of fliegende Gedancken, such that they come to represent the originals of all the mind's ideas.

To expand, what is placed outside in the example of flying thoughts is a past impression redirected. But at the metaphysical level, the outside is the projected external cause of the original impression: the well-founded illusion of extended objects. Now, my contention is that the illusion that we are caused to perceive, is made possible by, or at least needs to be understood in terms of, the former particular case
of an illusion, namely when we project day-dream images. This is suggested by the observation that while images must originally appear to come from outside in order to be projected, it is also the case that the possibility of supposing perception to come from without in the first place must be the general case of which flying thoughts are merely a particular example. That is, it is always by 'turning something on the inside' that we produce the appearance of images coming from outside. The appearance of an influx is at one level that which is subsequently redirected in peculiar moments of daydreaming, but more accurately is originally itself a projection. Fliegende Gedancken, therefore, represent at one level what they are indistinguishable from at another, and the key to understanding the nature of the perception of objects as such lies in the mechanism of flying thoughts.

We can now observe the operation of this key as we return to the question of how flying thoughts come to ground a controlled progression of thought. The problem raised earlier is to understand how Leibniz envisages the transition from involuntary to voluntary thoughts. For this transition is the point at which Leibniz can move from the model of the mind as a passive receptacle to an active projector, or, in Condillac's terminology, from the perspective 'for us' to that 'for the statue'. Flying thoughts, in other words, represent the point of tension between what can be rationally explained from within the monad's perception of itself and what necessarily escapes this, namely the material world of efficient causes. For, as we have seen, Leibniz accepts that the mind requires 'sensible marks' in order for it to discover itself. These (apparently) externally produced marks leave traces. Indeed, it is precisely by leaving traces that they can mark our thinking and enable it to develop. But these traces are external determinations not interiorly connected to thought and in this sense, remain arbitrary. Clearly, then, sensible marks look very much like flying thoughts. Yet, paradoxically, the sensible mark is
supposed to be what directs thought, not what leads it away from the true path. The question becomes, then, how Leibniz understands the transition from the external determination which is absurd and confused, to the arbitrary sign. How can the uncontrolled impression which escapes reasoned control come itself to direct thought?

I argued earlier that the sensible mark directs \textit{because} it is arbitrary. But the story of flying thoughts provides us with a picture of a process of transition which on the face of it is difficult to envisage. At the same time it will generate certain insights into Condillac's attempt to describe the development of thought from sensation. We will see that the lantern provides us with a mechanism by which to envisage the role of the latter realm as that which is at once projected by the mind as a well founded illusion, and deployed by the mind to develop itself.

What is clear from the camera and lantern passages is that the traces of past impressions influence the 'progression' of our thought. But the mechanism of this influence needs to be teased out. Within the camera we saw that the canvas has a certain 'action' and 'reaction' accommodated to present and past impressions. The sensible is in one sense just that which appears on the upper surface of the canvas in a present impression. But it is constituted both by present impressions and by the ('often insensible') marks that sink between creases along that surface. The brain has a 'ressort' which allows impressions which have sunk into these crevices to spring back up. The traces return to present perception to become part of the representation of 'extended masses' by being projected back into the causal sequence whence they came. Speaking at the level of efficient causation we might say that this \textit{ressort} functions to make impressions \textit{ressortir}; to be projected beyond the mind. Of course speaking metaphysically strictly both the impression and the trace leave for the first time, since both
are produced internally. And to speak more strictly still their very departure is an appearance produced internally.

In the magic lantern passage this process of projection is made explicit. The impression is returned to the outside to the extent that something is turned on the inside; as if to suggest at once a mechanism which turns back the visiting impression, and a connection between the repeating image produced by the rotating lantern and the projection of its inner light. It should become clear that there is indeed a link between the reappearance of the impression and its redirection, or reapplication to an outside; and that both are crucial to the development of finite thought.

To establish this we must start with the moment of transition from the sequence of flying thoughts to an ordered progression. For while sensible images lead the mind astray, sensible marks are required for it to take control. What seems initially clear, as I have said, is the suggestion that we become self-aware because of a repeated image. Perhaps, then, it is the recognition of a returning image that provides the condition for the mind to take control of itself and become apperceptively aware of its operations and to arrest the random flight of thought.

Now if the transition occurs with the return it must be the transformation from sensation to idea that we discussed in Chapter 5 that is the condition for the development of controlled thought. The recurring image, Leibniz tells us, is stopped, frozen, as it were, and used as a mark from which the mind can embark on its own train of thought. Iterability is a function of the ressort of the brain; the something which turns on the inside. In Condillac's words, the sensible image resurfaces because of a kind of 'habit'. It is the brain's tendency to reproduce the impression which provides the basis for memory and for representation. This retention of the
impression is, we saw earlier, the first transformation of sensation. It is the moment at which the statue first becomes able to distinguish what it has from what it is. Indeed it is the doubling of attention which allows for the dialectic between the positions 'for us' and 'for it' which drives the statue's development.

But this doubling of attention, as we saw in the cases of touch and memory, cannot itself be explained. It must ultimately be a primitive fact. Condillac, characteristically overstepping the ambit of his inquiry, accounts for it in terms of the material organism which underlies it. "All the phenomena of memory depend on the habits contracted by the movable and flexible parts of the brain." ["Tous les phénomènes de la mémoire dépendent des habitudes contractées par les parties mobiles et flexibles du cerveau". OPII p390] Significantly, this ressort has its seat not only in the brain but in all the organs of the body. [OPII p391] For as we saw before, the canvas does not simply represent the brain but the entire sensitive surface of the organism. Thus memory, like touch, is rooted in the mechanisms of the material body. Although no more than modifications to the being of the statue's mind, both form the hinge through which contact is made with the body. Touch and memory operate on the interface between monadic perception and efficient causation, along either surface of the reverberating canvas. An interface which transforms the forgotten or absurd original experience (constituted by fliegende Gedanken or impressions) into a recalled and controlled thought.

If it is the resurfacing of these sensible marks that is the occasion for thought to take control of itself, then we can read Leibniz as laying the ground for a more rigorous account of sensation's immanent conditions of development: the kind of account, moreover, that Condillac requires for his effort to complete Locke. For if the projection is produced by the manner in which that sensible surface springs back, it is the dynamic
within the sensible that produces an orientation and a 'directedness' to an outside. It is by thinking the sensible as embodied and essentially bound into a structure of repetition that Condillac can avoid Locke's unseen problem of idealism and provide sensation with a 'sense' or direction which is immanent to it and does not rely on an uncritical appeal to an outside. This rethinking of sensation may allow for a solution to the Lockean paradoxes involved in taking what produces sensation to be unknowable. The manner in which sensation produces objective experience must also be that in which it produces controlled thought, because what can be known (i.e. what can be brought into the mind through sensation), is not for Leibniz what is outside but what is produced from within by a process which unfolds what is contained in sensation. Or as Condillac has it, what can be analysed is only what is itself the product of analysis.

However we need also to consider that while the returning images initially appear absurd and therefore outside our control, or as originating within bodily organs outside the mind, the recurrence is produced internally. As such it is in them that the beginnings of self control lie. In the capacity to reproduce the image lies the possibility of employing it to mark thought. The flying thought may still be involuntary, may have a material basis, but is nonetheless the condition for volition. Flying thoughts represent the sensible in its aspect as internal production (as opposed to external imposition), and as such hold out the possibility of self control. Although absurd and thus forgotten, they are nonetheless the conditions for memory. For it is the recurrence which makes us aware of them and enables them to become incorporated within some rational system through their transformation into names.

Thus the impression, like the flying thought, returns in order to ground the development of controlled thought. Because it is repeated it becomes, in Condillac's terms, an idea. In other
words, prior to its resurfacing it is of necessity hidden from, or forgotten by consciousness - hence its absurdity. The idea, qua sign for the original impression, can summon ideas associated with it. But as a locus for a confusion of ideas this sign is blind to the content of what it signifies. And consequently that content must be projected beyond the mind. Thus the mechanism turning within the lantern is both what makes the image repeat and what makes what is hidden return to the outside. The repetition must be precisely that which produces the illusion of an outside because it becomes the name of something in the moment of its iteration. Its representation allows it to signify what is connected with, or implicit in it.

If we read Condillac's analysis of touch in this light we find that insofar as it is both idea and sensation it must be originally repeated. Thus touch, as we saw earlier, needs to be conceived in terms of the returning image, that is, in terms of memory. And conversely memory needs to be conceived in terms of the tangible. For to remember is for the sensible surface to reproduce a certain configuration of its parts. The hand remembers by taking on the form it had previously adopted to grasp something. [OPII p391] The sensitive surface tends to reform itself according to past actions, it tends to act and react, because of a certain ressort.

But it is an immanent repetition which originally signals a transcendent world. For since the 'reason' or cause is not given in the sensation itself it appears absurd. But while the confused and arbitrary sign is directed toward an unknown outside, that is, toward something the content of which remains obscured, it must also (in the manner of an algebraic symbol, i.e. as a blind thought), signify a hidden content. In this way we have the means to manipulate thought without recalling its content to mind. And this allows us to begin a process of
thinking which might gradually decipher what is contained within; namely, the full meaning of each sensible sign.

We have seen, then, that the surd or blind image (the sign marking controlled thought) is deaf to its content; just as impressions are blind to their cause. In flying thoughts we have the point of transfer from absurd flying thought to sensible mark, from the forgotten original experience to the recalled process of the mind's development. They represent impressions from without which are captured, reproduced and projected back by the mind. And at the same time they represent the paradigm case of the sensible as (strictly speaking) originally produced within and projected out. And it is this latter, more rigorous, account that is crucial to our understanding of Condillac's attempt to find an immanent description of the projection of sensations. For it is the confused aspect associated with, and implicit in a sensation which leads to its projection. This projection is what must, strictly speaking, account for the possibility of its being repeated, while less strictly the repetition accounts for the projection. For it is precisely by projecting the image that the original sensation is repeated this time outside the mind. This projection makes an idea of the sensation and allows it to mark the development of thought.

Thus the statue's discovery of the distinction between intrinsic and external determinations through touch is bound up with that between the mind's passivity and activity as articulated through the relative confusion implied in the sensible. Inner and outer are discovered by taking control over the development of thought and thus overcoming passivity. But it needs to be borne in mind that, ironically, this position can only be established by a complete analysis which would produce this distinction out of sensation. Each realm recovers the other, 'for us' within 'for it' and vice versa.
Now such a complete Leibnizian analysis would demonstrate the manner in which the whole of the mind's contents fit together. There would be no implicit or hidden aspect and consequently no distinction of outer and inner. The signifier would not distinguish itself from what it signifies. But in Condillac's language of action the connection between internal sensation and outer expression remains unexplained, just as the nature of the correspondence between sensation and object cannot be known. If an infinite analysis cannot be completed an implicit aspect must remain within experience which is signalled as the realm of arbitrary connections and efficient causes. In other words, if, as Condillac has it, thought progresses by marking out and analysing a confused original experience, it will always contain a hidden aspect, 'middle classes' or blind thoughts which have not yet been deciphered. This confused aspect is what limits the inquiry and keeps it empiricist.

Nonetheless, Condillac must assume that the language of sensation is completely decipherable at the ideal limit of his inquiry. Although the analysis remains indefinite, and consequently the harmony between inner and outer cannot be recovered, the fact of such harmony needs all the same be presupposed. For the trajectory of this project signals the possibility of a complete description at its limit, a limit which would incorporate Condillac's empiricism within a monadological metaphysics. His 'bad' metaphysical excesses, however, remain implicit - apocryphal. What is explicitly stated in the works he published always retains an empiricist modesty and holds back from making totalising metaphysical claims. But insofar as his philosophy signals such a monadology as its ground, his empiricism is precisely what needs to be progressed beyond in a full analysis of its own development. Thus Condillac's philosophy, just like Leibniz's, must say the opposite of what it would mean (veut dire) in a final analysis into its underlying language. We can accuse Condillac, of the
same sin of which he accuses Leibniz, namely explicitly advocating doctrines that he implicitly denies.

The tensions within Condillac's writings were perhaps inevitable all along. The theoretical works, qua controlled trains of thought, must be blind to their content and to their forgotten conditions of possibility. This, for Condillac, is as much as to say that language necessarily develops more slowly than the development of thinking that it directs. The arbitrary sign does not fully explicate the chain of thoughts that it initiates and marks. Indeed it is because the sensible sign stands outside of the progression of thought that it can direct the interior. Thus to say explicitly the opposite of what one means implicitly, must, for Condillac, be integral to the very structure of the progress of thought, since it is the structure of the sign or blind thought. Explicit marks direct the implicit, just as Condillac's canonical texts signal the hidden apocrypha. Thus, if in the progression of his thought Condillac ends up saying the opposite of what we want to, on his own terms this can only be the inevitable consequence of the fact that a philosophical language must lag behind the chain of ideas it initiates.

It would seem then that the harmony of language and thought must be strained. Condillac's means of expression has necessarily departed from the original language of action; and his works must, therefore, invite misunderstanding. Although in a complete analysis the blind thought might harmonise with its name, so long as Condillac's philosophy remains modest and contents itself with an account of experience in this world, its language must be out of synchrony with what it implies. To this extent the very modesty of empiricism betrays a detour in its own genealogy. For to say the opposite of what one intends, is a case where the harmony of sensible sign and thought appears not to obtain. And if, as Condillac contends, this can only happen if one's language has strayed from the true
genealogical path, then his philosophy must be illegitimate. And yet it would seem that any advanced (instituted) language must err in this respect. It will always fall short of the proper balance or harmony of sensible mark and the development of thought. The language of philosophy, in other words, must be blind to its own content.

Nevertheless, we need to recall that Condillac needs to suppose that his meaning would finally - within a complete metaphysical account - be recovered, or harmonise with his words. Even the blind thought retains a knowledge that there is a content which runs ahead of the manipulation of symbols, even if that content is not brought to mind. Blind thinking is simply the refusal to make positive claims concerning the nature of that content. It remains modest, empiricist and arbitrary, rather than demonstrable, harmonious and monadological. In the final language of metaphysics all contents would come only when called, and thus be readily recallable. As with the instinctive language of action from which it evolves, for the final theoretical understanding everything would be laid bare and nothing hidden. All thoughts would be annexed to their true names. If Condillac holds out the ideal for his philosophy of the recovery of its lineage to the language of action, he simultaneously accepts himself to be unable to complete such a recovery within a theoretical metaphysics. Thus his own reflective flight of thought remains blind to the original content of the language it tries to recover. It can never coincide with what is contained implicitly within the practical metaphysics, for the reflective attitude introduces a fissure between language and its content. A fissure which accounts for his dissimulation over the development of his own philosophical enterprise. Thus the canonical texts remain blind to his own flying thoughts: his own attempt to reach out and touch the sky. But still it is Les Monades which expresses what Condillac ultimately wanted to say.
Conclusion

We may recall that, in his discussion of Molyneux's problem, Locke speaks of naming objects by touch. [EHI p114] The sensible idea is the name for the object and it needs to be learned such that it may be used to recall the thing to mind. For Condillac, however, the issue is not to recall any supposed thing in itself, or some common referent of a series of sensible signs. The first principle of empiricism, that all knowledge derives from sensation, demands that the appearance of objects be accounted for in terms which are immanent to the sensible. It would seem, therefore, that the attempt to demonstrate the second principle of empiricism, must begin by explicating the first. What this comes to mean, is that the sensible sign cannot name a transcendent object, and that (the appearance of) transcendence must be contained within the sensible name. We also saw that Locke's assumption of a faculty of reflection is bound up with his presupposition of a causal theory of perception. I argue that the consequence of this is that Condillac's reduction of reflection to sensation must have implications for his treatment of the problem of idealism. Indeed, what has been established is that Condillac's solution to the idealist dilemma involves demonstrating that the appearance of an outside is integral to the possibility of thought's inquiry into itself.

This element within Condillac's enterprise is of particular significance. Condillac implicitly accepts what Kant would soon explicitly claim, namely that the Lockean and Berkeleyan conception of immediate sense experience is an insufficient basis on which to work outwards to discover an objective world. Condillac realises that the condition of possibility for the experience of objects lies in an original distinction between
inner and outer discovered in touch. This involves the development of the understanding in a reference to a quasi-transcendent aspect to experience at its origin, namely the confused, which itself signals an original immersion in corporality. For somewhat paradoxically the perception of objects involves an awareness that one is not immediately aware of all that is perceived. But whereas Kant argues that the conditions of possibility for objective experience cannot be discovered within the content of sensation (since, as one might say, what is in experience cannot of itself signal what is not), and therefore that they must be a discovered within the form experience takes, that is, in conformity to laws; Condillac hopes to uncover its conditions through a radical search into its content, into, that is, the origin of all experience.

Thus Condillac's demonstration begins as a quest to uncover the unique principle of development of sensation, a quest which leads him to the primitive experience/experiment of the liaison d'idées. We saw however, that this sensible origin, qua condition of possibility for consciousness, cannot be recovered by consciousness. The original experience remains confused and hidden from reflective awareness. For, as the statue recollects, "at the first moment of my existence I knew nothing of what went on within me; and as yet I could disentangle nothing". ["Au premier moment de mon existence, je ne savois point ce qui se passoit en moi; je n'y demelois rien encore." TS p258]

For sensations to be apprehended they must be reflected upon and disentangled, they must, that is, become ideas. Condillac accounts for a sensation's transformation into an idea in terms of its relative vivacity within the original confused sensible manifold. Such a sensation distinguishes itself from the confusion in virtue of a 'natural' connection between it and the organism's needs. The forcefulness of the sensation leads
to its retention in attention and this repetition transforms it into a sensible mark for the original. In other words its return, effected by the 'ressorts' of the organism, transforms the impression into an idea; an idea of the impression. I have shown that this transformation is as one with the sensation becoming a sign, since the idea is only distinct from sensation because it stands in for its absence. This recurrence is, therefore, for Condillac, the most fundamental development of sensation. For while sensation is the germ of the whole understanding, signs are what govern the possibility of the development of thought. It is through this transformation that the understanding and the inquiry into it can turn in on themselves, become reflective, and develop an ordered explication of the original sensible confusion. For analysis is no more than the proper use of signs.

On Condillac's account, what the sensible mark signifies is the series of confused sensations connected with it. The sign comes to facilitate the discrimination of this original confusion by marking it out. However, the particular train of associated ideas marked by the sign cannot itself be brought to mind in a single intuition. In this sense what is signified by the sensible sign remains confused and obscure. Indeed the very process of its emergence into consciousness, obscures the content of what it signifies. For to think is to order a sensible content which remains unnoticed, or to which the mind is blind. As Leibniz has it, the mind requires 'blind thoughts', because the very finitude of our thinking cannot recall everything at once. Signs are required so that thought can develop without the content of what is signified distracting it.

This is not to say that Condillac takes the hidden aspect of thought to be unrecoverable. On the contrary it is amenable to a continual process of 'dis-confusion' as signs are deployed to further analyse it. Thus signs initiate a process by which to
recover for consciousness what is obscured by its attention to particular elements. What is signified begins as what is confused by contrast with what marks it, and the process of thought is that of a recovery of what was only obscurely perceived. Thus the series of sensations connected to a particular sign unfolds as it progresses: making distinct what is implicit within it. It is in this sense that Condillac takes the recurrence of the sensible mark to initiate a controlled train of thought that unfolds according to the interconnections between signs. Further, the process of demarcation of the original confusion of the première expérience through the use of signs, becomes an immanent principle of delimitation of human knowledge. Condillac's empiricism attempts to describe the limits of thought through an account of the internal dynamic of its construction.

It is in this manner that Condillac hopes to escape the idealist trap Diderot warns him of, for involved in this process is the production of the appearance of external objects. And I have argued that the solution to the idealist dilemma produced by Locke's way of ideas is informed by Leibniz's rethinking of the sensible. This is because on Leibniz's account the absurd or confused aspect of sensation originally signals an unknowable outside, while simultaneously being that which empowers thought and enables it to develop itself. What is implicit within the sensible mark appears outside of the mind's control. And because it appears not to emanate from within it is projected beyond the mind. The process of analysis of this confused content (the train of sensations connected to the sensible mark), is, therefore, the process whereby the mind articulates a distinction between inner and outer. The implicit content of the sign, needs to be unfolded by first being projected, only subsequently to be made distinct when it returns.
Condillac envisages the mind taking control of its thoughts and simultaneously determining the limits of its world through this process. I have tried to show that the appearance of bodies outside the mind at one level, is produced by (or is identical with) repetition at another. The recognition of recurrence of the sensible which Condillac calls 'memory' involves us in the possibility of a progression; in a development or a temporal orientation in thought. At the same time the original doubling in the sense of solidity involves the apprehension of an external cause.

An allegory for these processes is described in the *Traité des sensations*. The statue discovers an objective world through the sense of solidity and the process of auto-affective exploration. In an equivalent manner the statue comes to experience succession through the retention of a vivid sensation which transforms it into an idea in memory: the transformation of what it is, into what it has. Both operations consist in the ordering of a confused sensible content by sensible marks, and the projection of that content into the past, or into the world. The very fact of being blind to the content of sensation demands such projection. What is implicit or forgotten is what lies beyond the limits of consciousness. It is for this reason that the sensation of touch is originally a sign of something. The confused aspect signalled by the distinct ideas of touch produce the sense of solidity: produce, that is, the sense of something beyond the distinct. Thus the implicit aspect becomes projected as the material cause of the vivacious sensation. The thing in itself can thereby be regarded as what is implicit within sensation: that which has not yet been made distinct. [TS p98-99] We can say, therefore, that the projection is a product of the return of the sensation and that the implicit aspect within sensation is the condition of possibility of the development of thought and of the perception of an objective world.
Through projection the mind distinguishes itself from its modifications; distinguishes, in other words, what it is from what it has. This in turn, as we have seen, allows for a distinction between activity and passivity and for that between the perspectives 'for us' and 'for the statue'. Touch is the hinge or point of transition for Condillac between inner and outer: that which holds both together. And the return of the sensible mark in memory produces a distinction between being and having which orients thought within a temporal progression. We have encountered the site of these transitions in two images from Leibniz's *Nouveaux Essais*: in the transformation of *fliegende Gedanken* into sensible marks, and in the folds of the sensitive membrane within the camera obscura.

Following Leibniz, therefore, for Condillac it must be the very finitude or limitation endemic to human understanding that produces the appearance of the body and bodies generally, as well as of succession or development in thought. But the confusion within sensation is not imposed on the understanding so much as the condition of possibility for its development. The *première expérience*, it should be recalled, is of a confused manifold. Experience proper is the ungoing process of untangling this confusion. Thus for Condillac, unlike Locke, the effort to define the limits of what can be known is not given in advance of the practice of their determination through analysis. What is implicit within experience determines the mind to take control of itself and pursue a dynamic of self-discovery. It follows that any limits to what can be known are not imposed from without by the nature of being, nor from within by the nature of our capacities, but are indeterminate, because contained virtually within the sensible.

Thus Condillac's empiricist modesty involves a certain peculiarity. For, on his account, thought determines its own limits. It is limited only to the extent that its analysis is not yet complete, indeed cannot be completed. The inquiry into
the conditions of the production of the understanding, therefore, remains open ended, while finite: in a word indefinite. In Leibniz's image, the inner folds of the sensible develop indefinitely, for the canvas can never be completely explicated and all its contents laid flat before us. The cryptanalysis will always resolve itself into a language which contains elements which remain implicit, forgotten or confused.

In this sense Condillac's inquiry parallels the development of the understanding. The confused aspect of sensation is projected outside the mind as what is not immediately sensed (the past sensation, the thing in itself) and comes to be viewed as what causes or grounds the appearance of what is distinctly perceived. And equivalently, the inquiry into the understanding posits a realm beyond its parameters, to which it is blind and which conditions it (the natural system). Condillac's suspicion of the concept of infinity, itself a product of his empiricist modesty, means that his analyses must be limited by an appeal to what lies beyond them and conditions them. The indefinite analysis may stretch the canvas on which Condillac inscribes the empiricist project indefinitely, but cannot coincide with the metaphysical account that lies on its opposing face.

Rather than ever achieving any metaphysically pre-established harmony in the manner of Leibniz, therefore, Condillac's inquiry is condemned to an ongoing quest for a complete recovery of one realm within the other. There is no synthesis between the empiricist and monadological levels. The perspectives 'for us' and 'for the statue' never completely accommodate each other. The natural system can never be fully explicated within sensation, and nor can sensation be fully accounted for in terms of the natural system, since the implicit conditions of possibility for the understanding are never fully explicable within the inquiry. Thus, on the one hand the experience of solidity is explained in terms of the resistance
of material objects to the body, and memory in terms of a physical mechanism which retains impressions. And on the other the appearance of bodies affecting the senses is explained in terms of what is implicit in the sensible. Two forms of explanation ground each other. Thus the development from 'for it' to 'for us' is also an evolution in the opposite direction. There is no synthesis because the analysis must be indefinite if it is to remain modest and retain limits.

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Condillac's critique of Leibniz involves retracing the development of ideas which leads to the construction of a monadology. But the demonstration of its failure to understand its own principle of generation becomes a genealogy of Condillac's own philosophical system. If the advantage of the new philosophy lay in its being reflectively aware of the manner of its own production, then the fact that it is detoured through a monadology must mean that it contains certain aporia. And this should not surprise us, since, for Condillac, blind spots are inevitably produced by any progression of thought. Thus the failure of Condillac's system to reduce itself to sensation without detours, and so complete its self-determination, must always have been integral to the project from the outset. In other words it must have begun with certain prejudices.

We have explored the operation of such prejudices or assumptions in some detail, in order to show how they resist being understood as an uncritical appeal to occult qualities. For while they are presupposed at the outset of the inquiry, they are also to be established at its end since the legitimation of a principle, for Condillac, is identical with the explication of it. Thus the two principles of empiricism
should be seen to occupy opposing poles in the progress of the analysis. The one being presupposed in order for the other to be established. Both should be shown to be implied by the other and both must be presupposed at the outset. We have seen how these two poles develop in tandem across the narrative of the Traité.

Condillac's assumptions, his empiricist principles, are, then, both what begins the inquiry and what is established by it. And insofar as they condition the inquiry their demonstration is never completed. They remain the forgotten grounds which condition the progress of thinking and which can never be fully recovered within the genetic analysis of experience. If such assumptions betray the impossibility of completing the empiricist project, at the same time they demonstrate that such a completion would itself be its betrayal.

From this perspective Kant's endeavour appears as the betrayal of the empiricist ambition. For Condillac's project is, on my reading a critical one. That is, he attempts to uncover the conditions of possibility of experience. But it is required of his enterprise that the conditions be themselves recoverable within experience, not as its transcendental structure, but as its genetic components. For explanation, for Condillac, can only ever mean explicating what is contained within what is to be explained. The elements so discovered must contain the generative possibilities that determine the realm of human understanding. The advantage of this genetic approach lies in the fact that it does not impose limits which are logically prior to experience. In other words, Condillac's project refuses to place any transcendental limitations on possible experience or inquiry. Any such limits would need to be produced internally. By equating the genealogy of knowledge with its legitimation, what conditions any system of thought must be empirical. And in order to construct a system which takes the conditions of possibility of experience to be
generative, Condillac conceives of knowledge in terms of a linguistic structure. Sensation becomes a language grounded in natural connections, not transcendental categories. There is, as Condillac has it, an innate language but there are no innate ideas: there is a natural system, but no transcendental structure.

While the system that grounds the possibility of thought is natural, it does not involve, I would argue, any naively pre-critical appeal, because Condillac remains alive to the need to open the system itself up to a further analysis. 'Nature' does not stand unambiguously as the transcendental ground for human understanding. For Condillac's naturalisation of these grounds opens them up to indefinite critique (analysis). It is for this reason that Condillac is continually stretching the bounds of what is to count as 'sensation'; constantly reconfiguring the nature of that which delimits knowledge. The space of human understanding is one of relations produced by the demarcations which order the original confusion. For Condillac there can be no point at which the conditions themselves resist being analysed in terms of the conditioned. The conditions of possibility for experience remain - at the ideal limit - recoverable. In principle they are always decipherable from within experience, always in other words immanent to inquiry.

The integrity of this approach of which I spoke earlier, consists in its ambition to complete the inquiry, coupled with the modest acceptance that this ambition will never be realised. While any particular inquiry cannot be completed the dynamic of the act of understanding continues (despite itself) with the effort to stand beneath what it attempts to explicate. In stretching the limits it is oriented by the attempt to bring its conditions of possibility, its assumptions, within its own ambit, while accepting, albeit implicitly, that the dynamic of the inquiry is interminable.
The natural language of action is one such assumption. That touch be originally double is another. Both assume some inclusion of what is to be accounted for within the material which is to be analysed. To employ a Kantian terminology, both are attempts to make intuitions visible by incorporating the conceptual within them. The tangible is already an idea. Originally more than a pure Kantian intuition, it comes to account for the possibility of conceptualisation. We have seen that this means that the true origin always remains hidden from view. The original experience cannot be recovered. When the blind man first opens his eyes he can discern nothing. If the original intuition remains blind it is not because it needs to be ordered by concepts, but because it becomes distinct only through the repetition that transforms it into an idea. Whatever precedes the returning impression (memory), and the experience of solidity cannot themselves form part of the object of inquiry. They are necessarily forgotten in its development. If it is possible for the statue to distinguish a present sensation from a remembered one, therefore, it can only be because it 'nature' makes the distinction for it. Because, that is, the mind is bound together with the physiological mechanism of the body. At this point Condillac can only appeal to the language of action, the natural system of signs that ties the narrative of the development of the statue in with the world of material bodies. Sensation can be recalled and transformed into an idea because the idea is give as produced by what transcends the mind. The statue discovers its body because, as Condillac says: "memory speaks to us [...] in a language of action". ["[L]a mémoire nous parle en quelque sorte un langage d'action." OPII p391]

The appeal to a natural system as the condition of possibility for experience may fail to provide a universal and objective basis for knowledge. But insofar as these conditions are naturalised rather than transcendentally necessary they do not resist recovery within a further analysis. The conditions of
possibility are elastic and natural rather than rigid and immutable. The sensible surface, which it is Condillac's ambition to decipher, is always open to further analysis. Experience, in other words, is open ended: the sensitive surface of the organism remains amenable to indefinite unfolding.

We have seen that Condillac steers a middle way between Lockean empiricism and Leibnizian rationalism. And if Kant is right in his diagnosis that: "Leibniz intellectualised appearances, just as Locke [...] sensualised all concepts of the understanding" we may in Condillac have discovered a thinker who provides an alternative to Kant's negotiation of these two extremes. For Condillac however, as we have seen, it is not a synthesis, but a dynamic tension which is required. Condillac does not follow Leibniz's attempt to erect a complete "intellectual system of the world" in which sensible representations are merely confused and limited perspectives on a universe which is rationally ordered. Condillac's monad does not mirror the whole universe because we cannot know the essential nature of souls. So long as a complete analysis is impossible, there must remain a distinction between the representations of sense and of reason. But neither does Condillac sensualise all thought. For sensation itself becomes in his hands the principle of generation of thought. Rather than erect a rigid distinction between these two poles Condillac posits a dynamic continuum. Resisting a radical Kantian disjunction between the workings of the understanding and the givens of sense, Condillac's project becomes an ongoing quest to uncover the immanent conditions hidden within the folds of the tensile interface of the sensible. The conditions of experience, qua generative, are always open to further inquiry in a cryptanalysis of the language of sensation.

The inherently paradoxical character of such a project has led to Condillac's exclusion from the central narrative of the
history of philosophy. But when Maine de Biran accused Condillac of confounding "the active force which transforms with the material transformed" ["la force active qui transforme avec les matériaux transformés"]^3, he puts his finger on something important. For it is precisely Condillac's attempt to think these together which is significant in his negotiation between rationalism and empiricism. And it is also precisely this attempt which the Kantian philosophy finds unpalatable. Maine de Biran's criticism is unfortunate however, not simply in its misconstrual of the significance of Condillac's attempt to think the material and organising principle together, but also in that it represents the beginning of the decline in Condillac's influence. A decline which led Le Roy in 1937 to lament the dearth of serious engagement with Condillac's philosophy.^4 Biran's attack is perhaps the root cause for Condillac's loss of favour among the 'Idéologues' and the subsequent decline in interest in his philosophy.^5 If two centuries after his death his work on language has been the impetus behind a renewal of interest in Condillac's philosophy, perhaps now is the time for us to re-evaluate the significance of his attempt to think of sensation in terms of a self generating linguistic system, and experience as the dynamic of its analysis, and to ask whether it might provide an alternative trajectory out of the Enlightenment to the critical philosophy.
NOTES

Introduction

[1] We see this structure of critique, rupture and redefinition in such varied works as Bacon's Novum Organum (1620), Descartes's Meditations (1641) and Discourse on Method (1637), and Locke's Essay (1690).

[2] Compare this with the French translation of Locke's work which Condillac would have used (he didn't read English) and which bore the full title Essai philosophique concernant l'entendement humain où l'on montre quelle est l'étendue de nos connoissances certaines, et la manière dont nous y parvenons. Trans. by. P.Coste, Amsterdam, 1700.


[4] In a note Condillac quotes Bacon from the Novum Organum (book 1, par.97) calling on a philosopher to forge an unprejudiced empirical philosophy. E p115.


[8] The French 'oublier' carries along with the sense of the English 'forgetting', those of 'omitting' and 'neglecting'. Accordingly this could also be translated: "I tried to fill in what this philosopher left out, or missed". There is, in other words a stronger semantic connection in the French between Locke's forgetfulness and the incompleteness of his Essay. For the most part I will be translating 'oublier' with 'to forget', because I want to retain the sense of a temporal displacement between the exposition and the original process of reasoning, as well as to stress the generative aspect of Condillac's account of human knowledge.

[9] Here Condillac is opposing 'ouvrages de raisonnement' to 'ouvrages faits dans l'enthousiasme', such as odes. For a discussion of the misplaced pages see Derrida (1973), pp61ff.
[10] e.g. Knight (1968) and Le Roy (1937). For a discussion of the perception of the influence of Leibniz on Condillac see Bongie's introduction to Les Monades. [LM p15ff]


[12] Condillac's letters to Gabriel Cramer at the time he must have been preparing the Dissertation make no mention of it despite their frequent discussions of Leibniz. Condillac (1953)

[13] The prejudice in question was the belief that the eye can see immediately without need of being taught by touch.

[14] By this I mean that Condillac's notion of 'esprit' becomes the centre of his monadology. The psyche (soul, mind) remains the object of study in the Essai and to that extent he does not embark on a metaphysics of substance, and resists being drawn on the question of the essential nature of mind and matter. But while the human understanding remains the focus, the completion of Locke leads to a monadologised psyche - a psyche which is no more than 'sensation transformed' - and from the present state of which its future states might be deduced.

Chapter 1

[1] Condillac does not want to eliminate all Cartesian elements. Specifically he is concerned to retain an immaterial (and immortal) soul and distances himself from Locke's remarks concerning the possibility of thought being a property of matter. A fuller examination of Condillac's thoughts on the essential nature of the soul will have to be postponed to another study.

[2] In the same way as "l'idée de 'soeur' n'est liée par aucun rapport interieur avec la suite de sons s-o-r qui lui sert de signifiant", so too the object has no internal relation to the series of sensible impressions which indicate its presence. Following Saussure usage, just as the word 'arbitrary' should not be thought to suggest that there is free choice as to what is signified by a word; so to say that the sense impression is 'arbitrarily' connected with the object does not mean that the connection is irregular. Saussure, (1972), p100.

[3] The use of the term 'nature' is intriguingly ambivalent in Descartes. It is both a source of truth and of error. It can deceive insofar as it is in the 'nature' of man to be a compound of mind and body [e.g. PWDII,pp57 & 61; OD VII, 82 & 87] but not insofar as his essential 'nature' is a thinking substance. The natural light, which allows for clear and distinct seeing (understanding) is contrasted to the composite nature of mind and body, a state of con-fusion which obscures and confuses intellectual vision. Descartes admits in his sixth Meditation that the lessons of this composite nature are to
avoid pain and seek pleasure. To this extent he agrees with Condillac; finding in 'nature' a teacher to be trusted for the practical business of survival. He even declares that "there is no doubt that everything that I am taught by nature contains some truth". But qualifies this with the proviso that: "There are many other things which I may appear to have been taught by nature, but which in reality I acquired not from nature but from a habit of making ill-considered judgements." Meditations [PWDII p56; OD VII 82]


Chapter 2

[1] Part 1, Section 6: 'Of some judgements which have been attributed to the soul without foundation, or solution to a metaphysical problem'. ['De quelques jugemens qu'on a attribué a [sic] l'ame sans fondement, ou solution d'un problème de métaphysique.' E pp53 ff].

[2] In 1728 William R. Cheselden published an account of a successful cataract operation on a thirteen year old boy who had been blind most of his life in the Philosophical Transactions. On regaining his sight the boy had, we are told, certain difficulties learning the language of vision. For "having too many objects to learn at once, he forgot many of them; and (as he said) at first he learn'd to know, and again forgot a thousand things a day. One particular only (tho' it may appear trifling) I will relate; having forgot which was the cat, and which the dog, he was asham'd to ask; but catching the cat (which he knew by feeling) he was observ'd to look at her steadfastly, and then letting her down again, said, So Puss! I shall know you another time". Here Cheselden, like Locke, interprets his patient as learning a language of vision in which the sensible impressions of objects are their names. Knowing the cat is knowing its sensible name. Philosophical Transactions, 402 (1728), 447-450, quoted in Morgan (1977), p19.


[5] Berkeley also chides Locke for the same error when he remarks in the Commonplace Book (1944) that: "Locke's great oversight seems to be that he did not begin with his third Book at least that he had not some thought of it at first. Certainly the two first books don't agree with what he says in the third." Capitalisation modified and abbreviations expanded. Note 717.


Chapter 3

[1] e.g. Wittgenstein (1958) 224ff.

Chapter 4


[2] The 'Extrait Raisonné' did not appear in the original text of 1754, but was added to the revised posthumous edition of Condillac's works (1798).

Chapter 6:

[1] e.g. Knight (1968) p79.

Chapter 7


Chapter 8


[2] As Bongie argues in his introduction to Les Monades e.g. p43.

[3] Condillac is criticising Wolf's attempt to be selective in the doctrines he takes from Leibniz. He makes a similar comment on p60 in his critique of Justi's prize essay on Leibniz which he says is too quick to attribute blatant contradictions to him. We shall have occasion in Chapter 10 to discuss Condillac's conviction that Leibniz's philosophy must be read with considerable attention in order for its coherence to be seen.
Chapter 9

[1] Descartes expresses the thesis of the self-transparency of the idea by arguing that ideas have both a 'formal' and an 'objective' reality. "The idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the understanding, not really and formally as it exists in the heavens, but objectively, ie. as objects usually exist in the understanding". (Descartes, Med. 1st Obj. Cous. i. 371) But the idea also has a formal reality. Thus the cogito is both a thinking and a thinking of thought. Perception and apperception are one, which of course means the mind is transparent to itself.

Chapter 10


Chapter 12


Conclusion

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