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Importing credibility through exchange rate pegging
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UNSPECIFIED (1997) Importing credibility through exchange rate pegging. ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 107 (442). pp. 687-694.
Full text not available from this repository, contact author.Abstract
This paper employs an optimal taxation framework in order to study the credibility of monetary policy-making in an open economy. Since inflation is, in part, uncontrollable due to stochastic disturbances, the authority's actions cannot be monitored perfectly when the exchange rate floats, thus implying that reputational forces may become ineffective. In contrast, pegging the nominal exchange rate to a low-inflation currency allows perfect monitoring, because the exchange rate is, in principle, controllable. For this reason, exchange rate pegging may import credibility and result in the best reputational equilibrium, even though the authority retains the discretion to devalue unexpectedly.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | ECONOMIC JOURNAL | ||||
| Publisher: | BLACKWELL PUBL LTD | ||||
| ISSN: | 0013-0133 | ||||
| Official Date: | May 1997 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | 107 | ||||
| Number: | 442 | ||||
| Number of Pages: | 8 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 687-694 | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published |
Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge
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