UNSPECIFIED (1997) Convergence and coordination in the EU: A dynamic games approach. In: 1995 IFAC / IFIP / IFORS / SEDC Symposium on Modelling and Control of National and Regional Economies, JUL 02-05, 1995, GOLD COAST, AUSTRALIA.

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Abstract

This is a normative study with theoretical and empirical aspects of the impact of the Maastricht Treaty's (1991) convergence conditions. The study is carried out in a dynamic game context. Starting from the Treaty, four possible scenarios are compared: a noncooperative scenario, a cooperative scenario, a noncooperative convergence scenario and a cooperative convergence scenario. In these last two scenarios, the EU Member States pursue a restricted policy. This restriction is implied by the convergence criteria. Copyright (C) 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd.

Item Type:	Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Subjects:	T Technology > TL Motor vehicles. Aeronautics. Astronautics T Technology > TK Electrical engineering. Electronics Nuclear engineering
Journal or Publication Title:	CONTROL ENGINEERING PRACTICE
Publisher:	PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
ISSN:	0967-0661
Date:	April 1997
Volume:	5
Number:	4
Number of Pages:	6
Page Range:	pp. 561-566
Publication Status:	Published
Title of Event:	1995 IFAC / IFIP / IFORS / SEDC Symposium on Modelling and Control of National and Regional Economies
Location of Event:	GOLD COAST, AUSTRALIA
Date(s) of Event:	JUL 02-05, 1995
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/17858

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