UNSPECIFIED (1997) And perfection in repeated common interest games. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 18 (2). pp. 141-158. ISSN 0899-8256

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

We consider a wide class of repeated common interest games perturbed with one-sided incomplete information: one player (the informed player) might be a commitment type playing the Pareto dominant action. As discounting, which is assumed to be symmetric, and the prior probability of the commitment type go to zero, it is shown that the informed player can be held close to her minmax payoff even when perfection is imposed on the equilibrium. (C) 1997 Academic Press.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC JNL-COMP SUBSCRIPTIONS
ISSN:	0899-8256
Date:	February 1997
Volume:	18
Number:	2
Number of Pages:	18
Page Range:	pp. 141-158
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/17985

Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge

Request changes to a record

Actions (login required)

View Item