Carvajal, Andrés M.. (2007) Individually-rational collective choice. Theory and Decision, Vol.62 (No.4). pp. 355-374. ISSN 0040-5833

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Abstract

There is a collection of exogenously given socially-feasible sets, and, for each one of them, each individual in a group chooses from an individually-feasible set. The fact that the product of the individually-feasible sets is larger than the socially-feasible set notwithstanding, there arises no conflict between individual choices. Assuming that individual preferences are random, I characterize rationalizable collective choices.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Group decision making, Conflict resolution, Consumer economics
Journal or Publication Title:	Theory and Decision
Publisher:	Springer Netherlands
ISSN:	0040-5833
Date:	May 2007
Volume:	Vol.62
Number:	No.4
Page Range:	pp. 355-374
Identification Number:	10.1007/s11238-007-9027-5
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Copyright Holders:	Springer Netherlands
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/18

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