Union-oligopoly sequential bargaining: Trade and industrial policies
UNSPECIFIED (1996) Union-oligopoly sequential bargaining: Trade and industrial policies. In: 1993 Warwick Summer School on the New Macroeconomics, WARWICK, ENGLAND, 1993. Published in: OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES, 48 (4). pp. 640-663.Full text not available from this repository.
This paper considers the efficacy and the desirability of home government tariff and subsidy policies when labour market structure and asymmetries in the firms' size matter. In a Cournot-Nash duopolistic sector, a unionized home-firm competes against a non-unionized foreign firm. The home firm-union choose wages and employment in a two-stage Nash bargaining game. The second stage corresponds to the Cournot-Nash game with the foreign firm. Firms may play in strategic substitutes or complements. As the home bargainers recognize that market shares are determined by relative marginal costs, they may use the wage stage strategically. Home government policy choices critically depend upon the bargaining structure and general equilibrium spillovers.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES|
|Publisher:||OXFORD UNIV PRESS UNITED KINGDOM|
|Official Date:||October 1996|
|Number of Pages:||24|
|Page Range:||pp. 640-663|
|Title of Event:||1993 Warwick Summer School on the New Macroeconomics|
|Location of Event:||WARWICK, ENGLAND|
|Date(s) of Event:||1993|
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