Chater, Nick and Oaksford, M. (Mike) (1996) Deontic reasoning, modules and innateness : a second look. Mind & Language, 11 (2). pp. 191-202. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00040.x

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Abstract

Cummins (this issue) puts the case for an innate module for deontic reasoning. We argue that this case is not persuasive. First, we claim that Cummins' evolutionary arguments are neutral regarding whether deontic reasoning is learned or innate. Second, we argue that task differences between deontic and indicative reasoning explain many of the phenomena that Cummins takes as evidence for a deontic module. Third, we argue against the suggestion that deontic reasoning is superior to indicative reasoning, either in adults or children. Finally, we re-evaluate Cummins' interpretation of differences in children's performance on deontic and indicative versions of Wason's selection task.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	P Language and Literature B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Journal or Publication Title:	Mind & Language
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc
ISSN:	0268-1064
Official Date:	June 1996
Dates:	Date Event June 1996 UNSPECIFIED
Volume:	11
Number:	2
Number of Pages:	12
Page Range:	pp. 191-202
DOI:	10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00040.x
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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