Deontic reasoning, modules and innateness: A second look
UNSPECIFIED. (1996) Deontic reasoning, modules and innateness: A second look. MIND & LANGUAGE, 11 (2). pp. 191-202. ISSN 0268-1064Full text not available from this repository.
Cummins (this issue) puts the case for an innate module for deontic reasoning. We argue that this case is not persuasive. First, we claim that Cummins' evolutionary arguments are neutral regarding whether deontic reasoning is learned or innate. Second, we argue that task differences between deontic and indicative reasoning explain many of the phenomena that Cummins takes as evidence for a deontic module. Third, we argue against the suggestion that deontic reasoning is superior to indicative reasoning, either in adults or children. Finally, we re-evaluate Cummins' interpretation of differences in children's performance on deontic and indicative versions of Wason's selection task.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||P Language and Literature
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
|Journal or Publication Title:||MIND & LANGUAGE|
|Publisher:||BLACKWELL PUBL LTD|
|Official Date:||June 1996|
|Number of Pages:||12|
|Page Range:||pp. 191-202|
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