Reputation in perturbed repeated games
UNSPECIFIED. (1996) Reputation in perturbed repeated games. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 69 (2). pp. 387-410. ISSN 0022-0531Full text not available from this repository.
The paper analyzes reputation effects in perturbed repeated games with discounting. If there is some positive prior probability that one of the players is committed to play the same (pure) action in every period, then this provides a lower bound for her equilibrium playoff in all Nash equilibria. This bound is tight and independent of what other types have positive probability. It is generally lower than Fudenberg and Levine's bound for games with a long-run player facing a sequence of short-run opponents. The bound cannot be improved by considering types playing finitely complicated history-dependent commitment strategies. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY|
|Publisher:||ACADEMIC PRESS INC JNL-COMP SUBSCRIPTIONS|
|Official Date:||May 1996|
|Number of Pages:||24|
|Page Range:||pp. 387-410|
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