On the provision of excludable public goods
UNSPECIFIED. (1996) On the provision of excludable public goods. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 60 (1). pp. 111-130. ISSN 0047-2727Full text not available from this repository.
Self-selecting households consume an excludable public good via enabling expenditures-e.g. on TVs and licence fees for broadcasting. We characterise voluntary consumers at an arbitrary all-or-nothing price, and the optimal price a revenue-constrained welfare-maximiser facing voluntary consumers chooses. These are compared with those from universal provision of the public good via a uniform tax. We show that, inter alia, demand for the good might increase with price; self-selection will produce under-provision. Numerical welfare comparisons show that either mandatory or voluntary participation can be superior, depending on society's income dispersion and inequality aversion.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA LAUSANNE|
|Official Date:||April 1996|
|Number of Pages:||20|
|Page Range:||pp. 111-130|
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