Wage interactions: Comparisons of fall-back options
UNSPECIFIED (1996) Wage interactions: Comparisons of fall-back options. In: Annual Conference of the Royal-Economic-Society, 1995, UNIV KENT, CANTERBURY, ENGLAND.Full text not available from this repository.
This paper examines the role played by wage comparisons in pay bargaining when workers have a fall-back option. The effect on wages due to wage comparisons can be difficult to distinguish from the effect of the fall-back wage. It is shown that the use of wages of a recognised 'pay leader' resolves this problem. The empirical work employs a unique panel of data covering 32I unionised bargaining units in the UK chemicals industry between I978 and I989 Results support anecdotal reports of pay leadership and suggest that wages elsewhere matter because comparisons are important to workers. In this sense, the results support the notion that 'fairness considerations' drive wage interactions.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||ECONOMIC JOURNAL|
|Publisher:||BLACKWELL PUBL LTD|
|Number of Pages:||12|
|Page Range:||pp. 495-506|
|Title of Event:||Annual Conference of the Royal-Economic-Society|
|Location of Event:||UNIV KENT, CANTERBURY, ENGLAND|
|Date(s) of Event:||1995|
Actions (login required)