UNSPECIFIED. (1996) A noncooperative analysis of Hotelling's location game. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 12 (2). pp. 165-186. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

We study the location equilibrium in Hotelling's model of spatial competition. As d'Aspremont et al, have shown, with quadratic consumer transportation cost the two sellers will seek to move as far away from each other as possible. We show that the location game possesses an infinity of mixed strategy Nash equilibria. In these equilibria coordination failure invalidates the principle of ''maximum differentiation'' and firms may even locate at the same point. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC JNL-COMP SUBSCRIPTIONS
ISSN:	0899-8256
Official Date:	February 1996
Dates:	Date Event February 1996 UNSPECIFIED
Volume:	12
Number:	2
Number of Pages:	22
Page Range:	pp. 165-186
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/19070

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