A noncooperative analysis of Hotelling's location game
UNSPECIFIED (1996) A noncooperative analysis of Hotelling's location game. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 12 (2). pp. 165-186. ISSN 0899-8256Full text not available from this repository.
We study the location equilibrium in Hotelling's model of spatial competition. As d'Aspremont et al, have shown, with quadratic consumer transportation cost the two sellers will seek to move as far away from each other as possible. We show that the location game possesses an infinity of mixed strategy Nash equilibria. In these equilibria coordination failure invalidates the principle of ''maximum differentiation'' and firms may even locate at the same point. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR|
|Publisher:||ACADEMIC PRESS INC JNL-COMP SUBSCRIPTIONS|
|Number of Pages:||22|
|Page Range:||pp. 165-186|
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