Arida, P., E. Bacha and A. Lara-Resende (2005), “Credit, interest, and jurisdictional
uncertainty: conjectures on the case of Brazil”, in Giavazzi, F. and Ilan Goldfajn (eds.),
Inflation targeting and debt: the case of Brazi, MIT Press.
Bhattacharya, S. and E. Detragiache (1994) “The role of international institutions in the
market of sovereign debt”. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 96 (4) 515-529.
Binmore, K. (1992): Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory. D.C. Heath.
Bleaney, A. (2004) Argentina's Currency Board Collapse: Weak Policy or Bad Luck? The
World Economy, 27, 5, 699-714
Borensztein, E. and P. Mauro (2002). "Reviving the case for GDP-indexed bonds."
International Monetary Fund Seminar Series No. 2003-62: 1-24.
Borensztein, E. and P. Mauro (2004) “The case for GDP-indexed bonds” Economic Policy,
19 (38) pp 165-216, April.
Bruno, E. A. (2004). El default y la reestructuración de la deuda. Buenos Aires, República
Argentina, Nueva Mayoría.
Buchheit, L (2005) “The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts” Chicago
Journal of International Law. 6(1) pp.333-343.
Buchheit, L and J. Pam (2003) “The Pari Passu Clause in sovereign debt instruments”
Working paper. Harvard Law School. http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs
Bulow, J. and K. Rogoff (1988) "Multilateral negotiation for rescheduling developing
countries debt” IMF Staff Papers.,644-57, December.
Bulow, J. and K. Rogoff (1989) "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt".
Journal of Political Economy, 97,no. 1, February:155-78.
Calvo, G. (2005) “Perspectivas financieras de América Latina. Ya es hora de celebrar?”
presented at “Desencadenar el Crédito: Como ampliar y estabilizar la banca” in Madrid, 27
Jan 2005.
Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioural game theory: experiments in strategic interaction.
Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
Damill, M., R. Frenkel and M. Rapetti (2005) “The Argentinean Debt: History, Default,
and Restructuring”. Working Paper of Initiative for Policy Dialogue. Columbia University.
April.
Dreher, A. and Jensen N. (2003) "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of
the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions" Mimeo. Yale University Leitner Working
Paper No. 2003-04
Fernandez, K. and R.B. Fernandez (2004) “Willingness to pay and sovereign debt
contracts” Mimeo. Universidad Del CEMA
Fischer, S. (2001) ‘The International Financial System: Crisis and Reform’ Lionel Robbins
Lectures. Mimeo. LSE.
Ghosal, S. and K. Thampanishvong (2005), “Sovereign Debt Crisis: Coordination,
Bargaining and Moral Hazard” CSGR WP: 159/05. Warwick University. UK.
Izquierdo, A. (2004) Sudden Stops, the Real Exchange Rate and Fiscal Sustainability in
Argentina. The World Economy 25, 7, Page 903-923.
Kohlscheen, E. (2005) “Sovereign Risk: Constitutions Rule” Mimeo. University of
Warwick
Kohlscheen, E. and O’Connell (2004) “A Sovereign Debt Model with Trade Credit and
Reserves”. Mimeo. University of Warwick.
Krueger, A. (2002) A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring. Washington DC:
Internationally Monetary Fund.
Leech, D. (2002), “Voting Power in the Governance of the IMF”, Annals of Operations
Research, 109:373-395
Manzini, P. and M. Mariotti (2001) “Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Bargaining with
Arbitration,” Games and Economic Behaviour, 37, 170–195.
Mauro P. and Y. Yafeh (2003) “The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders” IMF Working
Paper: 107. Washington
Merlo, A. and C. Wilson (1998) “Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining”.
Economic Theory 11, 39-55
Miller, M. and J. García-Fronti (2003) “Argentina in Default: The Renegotiation Game”.
Mimeo. University of Warwick. (Also available online at:
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/keytopic/global/)
Miller, M. and J. García-Fronti (2004) “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Ending delay,
promoting growth”. Mimeo. University of Warwick.
Miller, M. and J. Garcia-Fronti (2005) “Bargaining and sustainability: a technical note on
apply the Merlo-Wilson model” Mimeo, University of Warwick. Available on line at
http://www.csgr.org
Ministerio de Economía y Producción (2005). Informe Económico Trimestral N°51, April ,
Buenos Aires, Argentina.
(Available at http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/informe/informe51/indice.htm )
Muthoo, A. (1999): Bargaining Theory with Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Nash, J. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica, vol. 18, 155-162
Nash, J. (1951). "Non-cooperative Games," Annals of Mathematics, 54, 286-295.
Roubini N. and B. Setser (2004a) “The reform of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Process: Problems, Proposed Solutions and the Argentine Episode”. Mimeo. April.
Roubini N. and B. Setser (2004b) Bailouts or Bail-ins? Responding to Financial Crises in
Emerging Economies. . Washington DC.: Institute for International Economics
Reinhart C. Rogoff K. and M. Savastano. 2003. “Debt Intolerance.” Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity 1: 1–74.
Rubinstein, N. (1982) “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model" Econometrica, Vol. 50,
No. 1. (January), pp. 97-110.
Schwarcz, S. L. (2000) “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganisation
Approach”. Cornell Law Review, 85(4) pp.956-1034.
Sgard, J. (2004) “IMF in Theory: Sovereign Debts, Judicialisation and Multilateralism”
CEPI PP No 2004 –21 (December)
Sgard, J. (2005) “La dette argentine et le déclin du FMI” Lettre du CEPI N° 241
Shiller, R. (1993) Macro Markets: creating institutions for managing society’s largest
economic risks. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Taylor, J. (2002) “Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A US perspective”. Mimeo. Washington,
DC: US Department of the Treasury
Williamson, J. (1995) What role for Currency Boards? Policy Analyses in International
Economics No. 40. Washington, DC: IIE