Maaser, Nicola and Napel, Stefan, 1972- (2005) Equal representation in two-tier voting systems. Working Paper. University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Coventry.

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Abstract

The paper investigates how voting weights should be assigned to differently sized constituencies of an assembly. The one-person, one-vote principle is interpreted as calling for a priori equal indirect influence on decisions. The latter are elements of a one-dimensional convex policy space and may result from strategic behavior consistent with the median voter theorem. Numerous artificial constituency configurations, the EU and the US are investigated by Monte-Carlo simulations. Penrose’s square root rule, which originally applies to preference-free dichotomous decision environments and holds only under very specific conditions, comes close to ensuring equal representation. It is thus more robust than previously suggested.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Voting research, Representative government and representation, Monte Carlo method, Power (Social sciences)
Series Name:	Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)
Publisher:	University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	December 2005
Number:	No.185
Number of Pages:	29
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1918

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