Lane, Jan-Erik (2005) International organisation analysed with the power index method. Working Paper. University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Coventry.

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Abstract

The period of globalisation has seen more and more of international and regional organisation. Setting up an organisation with a group of state entails a resolution to the following two questions: (1) How are votes to be allocated? (2) What aggregation rule is to be employed? International and regional organisations display some interesting differences in how they have approached these two questions choosing a regime. The power index framework offers a convenient method for analysing these constitutional differences. It may be linked with the basic framework in constitutional economics – Wicksell’s classic approach, which entails that players very much use their preferences for the power to act and the power to prevent action when deciding the regime to be employed.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	J Political Science > JC Political theory J Political Science > JZ International relations J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	European Union, International organization, Power (Social sciences), Voting research -- European Union countries, European Union countries -- Politics and government
Series Name:	Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)
Publisher:	University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	November 2005
Number:	No.181
Number of Pages:	18
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
References:	Buchanan, J.M. (1989) Explorations into Constitutional Economics. Austin: Texas A&M University. Buchanan, J.M. and Tullock, G. (1962) The Calculus of Consent.. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Felsenthal, D.S. and Machover, M. (1998) The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Felsenthal, Dan S., and Moshe Machover (2004) “A priori Voting Power – What is it all About? In Political Studies Review, Vol 2: 1-23. Lane, J-E and Maeland, R. (2000) “Constitutional analysis: The power index approach”, European Journal of Political Studies, Vol 37: 31-56. Leech, D. ((2002a) "An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices," Political Studies, 50(1) March, 1-22. ----------------- (2002c), "Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund", Annals of Operations Research, 109, 375-397. ----------------- (2002c), "Computation of Power Indices", University of Warwick: Warwick Economic Research Papers, No. 644. ----------------- (2003d), "Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games", Management Science,. 49(6), June, 831-837. Tsebelis, G. (2002) Veto Players. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wicksell, K. (1967) “A New Principle of Just Taxation”, in Musgrave, R.A. and Peacock, A.T. (eds) Classics in the Theory of Public Finance. New York: St Martin’s Press.
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1922

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