UNSPECIFIED (1995) REPUTATION AND COMMITMENT IN 2-PERSON REPEATED GAMES WITHOUT DISCOUNTING. ECONOMETRICA, 63 (6). pp. 1401-1419. ISSN 0012-9682

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Abstract

Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of the players. If there is a possibility that a player is an automaton committed to a particular pure or mixed stage-game action, then this provides a lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payoffs to a normal type of this player. The lower bound is the best available and is robust to the existence of other types. The results are extended to the case of two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analyzed the restricted class of conflicting interest games.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions Q Science > QA Mathematics H Social Sciences
Journal or Publication Title:	ECONOMETRICA
Publisher:	ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY
ISSN:	0012-9682
Date:	November 1995
Volume:	63
Number:	6
Number of Pages:	19
Page Range:	pp. 1401-1419
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/19366

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