REPUTATION AND COMMITMENT IN 2-PERSON REPEATED GAMES WITHOUT DISCOUNTING
UNSPECIFIED. (1995) REPUTATION AND COMMITMENT IN 2-PERSON REPEATED GAMES WITHOUT DISCOUNTING. ECONOMETRICA, 63 (6). pp. 1401-1419. ISSN 0012-9682Full text not available from this repository.
Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of the players. If there is a possibility that a player is an automaton committed to a particular pure or mixed stage-game action, then this provides a lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payoffs to a normal type of this player. The lower bound is the best available and is robust to the existence of other types. The results are extended to the case of two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analyzed the restricted class of conflicting interest games.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Q Science > QA Mathematics
H Social Sciences
|Journal or Publication Title:||ECONOMETRICA|
|Number of Pages:||19|
|Page Range:||pp. 1401-1419|
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