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REPUTATION AND COMMITMENT IN 2-PERSON REPEATED GAMES WITHOUT DISCOUNTING
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UNSPECIFIED (1995) REPUTATION AND COMMITMENT IN 2-PERSON REPEATED GAMES WITHOUT DISCOUNTING. ECONOMETRICA, 63 (6). pp. 1401-1419. ISSN 0012-9682.
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Abstract
Two-person repeated games with no discounting are considered where there is uncertainty about the type of the players. If there is a possibility that a player is an automaton committed to a particular pure or mixed stage-game action, then this provides a lower bound on the Nash equilibrium payoffs to a normal type of this player. The lower bound is the best available and is robust to the existence of other types. The results are extended to the case of two-sided uncertainty. This work extends Schmidt (1993) who analyzed the restricted class of conflicting interest games.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions Q Science > QA Mathematics H Social Sciences |
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Journal or Publication Title: | ECONOMETRICA | ||||
Publisher: | ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY | ||||
ISSN: | 0012-9682 | ||||
Official Date: | November 1995 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 63 | ||||
Number: | 6 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 19 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 1401-1419 | ||||
Publication Status: | Published |
Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge
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