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BUSINESS BORROWING AND CONTROL - A THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURIAL TYPES

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UNSPECIFIED (1995) BUSINESS BORROWING AND CONTROL - A THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURIAL TYPES. SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS, 7 (4). pp. 291-300.

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Abstract

A formal model of the bank borrowing decision by the small firm is provided to explain why some entrepreneurs borrow and others do not, and why some businesses grow and others remain stationary over long periods.

Loan capital is productive and increases the firm's revenue but brings the business under the control of the bank. Profits generated by borrowing are a 'good' increasing owner utility whereas control is a 'bad', reducing it. The consequent tradeoff between borrowing and control implies that the business' optimum will involve borrowing less than the amount tt;at maximises profits. If owner control-aversion is strong enough equilibrium may involve a corner solution with the business being entirely self-funding. The above result holds under conditions of symmetric information and zero credit rationing.

Dynamic analysis distinguishes one group of entrepreneurs (Movers) whose preferences towards control evolve through time and their control-aversion diminishes, from another group (Stayers) whose preferences remain stationary. For the Movers borrowing increases over time up to a profit-maximising optimum whereas for the Stayers independence of control is maintained but at the expense of non-growth.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Journal or Publication Title: SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMICS
Publisher: KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBL
ISSN: 0921-898X
Official Date: August 1995
Dates:
DateEvent
August 1995UNSPECIFIED
Volume: 7
Number: 4
Number of Pages: 10
Page Range: pp. 291-300
Publication Status: Published

Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge

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