Grimalda, Gianluca (2004) A game-theoretic framework to study the influence of globalisation on social norms of co-operation. Working Paper. University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Coventry.

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Abstract

A game-theoretic framework is developed to study the evolution of social norms in a society. The two main theoretical assumptions underpinning the model are, first, that agents have some kind of “social” preferences, in addition to standard “self-interested” preferences. Second, individuals modify their behaviour over time in accordance to the “imitation of the most successful agent” paradigm. A stylised model of social interactions is developed, along with concepts of static and dynamic equilibria. After social preferences are specified in accordance with the normative expectation theory, an analysis of the type of equilibria in public goods interactions is provided. Finally, the impact on co-operation of a change in a society’s modes of behaviour, which may be seen as a result of migration or the impact of global communication media, is studied.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory J Political Science > JZ International relations
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Game theory, Globalization -- Economic aspects, Cooperation, Social norms
Series Name:	Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)
Publisher:	University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	November 2004
Number:	No.151
Number of Pages:	40
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1966

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