Conconi, Paola and Perroni, Carlo (2004) The economics of special and differential trade regimes. Working Paper. University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Coventry.

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Abstract

We examine the theoretical rationale for the granting of temporary Special and Differential (S&D) treatment to developing countries, both in its protection and market-access components under the WTO agreements. S&D rules constitute the centerpiece of the WTO's strategy for integrating developing countries into the trading system, but have been criticized--both on theoretical and empirical grounds--as being ineffective. We show that seemingly non-reciprocal, limited-duration S&D treatment can be rationalized as a transitional equilibrium feature of a self-enforcing international agreement between a large developed and a small developing country, where the two sides have a joint interest in helping the developing country to overcome a policy commitment problem.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HF Commerce J Political Science > JZ International relations
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	International trade, Economic development, Commercial treaties, Commercial policy, Developing countries -- Economic conditions
Series Name:	Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)
Publisher:	University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	July 2004
Number:	No.143
Number of Pages:	39
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), European Commission (EC)
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1971

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