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Redistributive politics under optimally incomplete information

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Gabrieli, Tommaso (2008) Redistributive politics under optimally incomplete information. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2279438~S15

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Abstract

This thesis wants to contribute to the understanding of the role of collective beliefs and incomplete information in the analysis of the dynamics of inequality, growth and redistributive politics. Extensive evidence shows that the difference in the political support for redistribution appears to reflect a difference in the social perceptions regarding the determinants of individual wealth and the underlying sources of income inequality. The thesis presents a theoretical framework of beliefs and redistribution which explains this evidence through multiple politico-economic equilibria. Differently from the recent literature which obtains multiple equilibria by modeling agents characterized by psychological biases, my framework is based on standard assumptions. Multiple equilibria originate from multiple welfare maximizing levels of information for the society. Multiplewelfare-maximizing levels of information exist because increasing the informativeness of an economy produces a trade-off between a decrease in adverse selection and an increase in moral hazard. The framework provides a new micro-foundation of incomplete information as an institutional feature and answers various macroeconomic policy questions with different models.

Item Type: Thesis or Dissertation (PhD)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
J Political Science > JC Political theory
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Distribution (Economic theory), Distributive justice, Information asymmetry, Equilibrium (Economics)
Official Date: November 2008
Dates:
DateEvent
November 2008Submitted
Institution: University of Warwick
Theses Department: Department of Economics
Thesis Type: PhD
Publication Status: Unpublished
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: Polemarchakis, Herakles ; Ghosal, Sayantan ; Blackorby, Charles, 1937-
Sponsors: Fondazione di Piacenza e Vigevano (FPV) ; University of Warwick. Dept. of Economics (UoW)
Format of File: pdf
Extent: 187 leaves : charts
Language: eng

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