UNSPECIFIED (1995) THE CONFIDENCE HEURISTIC - A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, 16 (1). pp. 97-113. ISSN 0167-4870

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

The paper analyzes two-person decision-making problems where information is asymmetric. A model is proposed in which information is revealed according to a social norm, whereby more confidently expressed arguments signal better information, and it is shown that efficient revelation of information can take place, and decision-making is based on expressed confidence (''the confidence heuristic''). This process leads to group polarization. The model is generalized to take account of the possibility that some individuals may act irrationally or in a prejudiced manner. If the number of prejudiced individuals in the population is sufficiently large, then the norm will break down.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Journal or Publication Title:	JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
ISSN:	0167-4870
Date:	March 1995
Volume:	16
Number:	1
Number of Pages:	17
Page Range:	pp. 97-113
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/19913

Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge

Request changes to a record

Actions (login required)

View Item