THE CONFIDENCE HEURISTIC - A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
UNSPECIFIED (1995) THE CONFIDENCE HEURISTIC - A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY, 16 (1). pp. 97-113. ISSN 0167-4870Full text not available from this repository.
The paper analyzes two-person decision-making problems where information is asymmetric. A model is proposed in which information is revealed according to a social norm, whereby more confidently expressed arguments signal better information, and it is shown that efficient revelation of information can take place, and decision-making is based on expressed confidence (''the confidence heuristic''). This process leads to group polarization. The model is generalized to take account of the possibility that some individuals may act irrationally or in a prejudiced manner. If the number of prejudiced individuals in the population is sufficiently large, then the norm will break down.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV|
|Number of Pages:||17|
|Page Range:||pp. 97-113|
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