Besfamille , Martin and Sanguinetti, Pablo (2003) Formal and real fiscal federalism in Argentina. Working Paper. University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Coventry.

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Abstract

In this note we describe, on the one hand, the formal institutional structure of the Argentine fiscal federalism. Then, on the other hand, we show how fiscal federalism really works in Argentina. We analyze data on fiscal behavior of the federal and provincial governments during the nineties. The goal of this note is precisely to point that one of the main issues of the current situation in Argentina is precisely the difference between ‘formal’ and ‘real’ institutions. At the heart of such difference is the lack of enforcement of national laws and formal inter-provincial agreements. We illustrate this by studying how formal rules to the provincial borrowing have functioned during the last decade.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	F History United States, Canada, Latin America > F1201 Latin America (General) H Social Sciences > HG Finance
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Fiscal policy -- Argentina, Debts, Public -- Argentina, Local government -- Argentina, Local finance -- Argentina, Argentina -- Economic conditions
Series Name:	Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)
Publisher:	University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	May 2003
Number:	No.115
Number of Pages:	19
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
References:	1. Dillinger, W. and Webb, S. (1999) “Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies Argentina and Brazil”, Policy Research Working Paper 2121, The World Bank. 2. Kiguel, M. and Lopetegui, G. (1997) “Entendiendo el riesgo país”, Documento de Trabajo 125, Universidad del CEMA. 3. Lane, T. (1993) “Market discipline”, IMF Staff Papers, 40: 53-88. 4. Nicolini, J. P., Posadas, J., Sanguinetti, J., Sanguinetti, P. and Tommasi, M. (2002) “Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National Governments and the Bailout Problem: The Case of Argentina”, Research Network Working Paper R-467, Inter-American Development Bank. 5. Nicolini, J. P., Sanguinetti, J. and Sanguinetti, P. (2000) “Análisis de alternativas de financiamiento de la educación básica en Argentina en el marco de las instituciones fiscales federales”, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, mimeo. 6. Piffano, H. (1998) “La asignación de potestades fiscales en el federalismo argentino”, Documento de Trabajo 4, CEDI, Fundación Gobierno y Sociedad. 7. Saiegh, S., Sanguinetti, P. and Tommasi, M. (2001) “Fiscal Federalism in Argentina: Policies, Politics, and Institutional Reform”, Economía (Review of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association), Spring, 157-200. 8. Sanguinetti, J. y Zentner, A. (2000) “El endeudamiento de los gobiernos subnacionales: el caso de las provincias argentines”, Paper prepared for the XII Regional Seminar on Fiscal Policy, ECLAC, Santiago, Chile. 9. Sanguinetti, P. (2002) “Federalismo Fiscal y Estabilidad Macroeconómica: son los límites alendeudamiento provincial la solución? Lecciones de la experincia de Argentina”, Presentación en la Conferencia sobre Viabilidad de la Deuda Pública de los Estados, Universidad Panamericana, México D.F.. 10. Tanzi, V. (1996) “Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects”, in Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. Washington: World Bank. 11. Zentner, A. (1999) “Algunas cuestiones macroeconómicas del federalismo argentino”, Económica, La Plata, 45: 325-360.
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/2004

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