Self-enforcing international agreements and domestic policy credibility
Conconi, Paola and Perroni, Carlo (2003) Self-enforcing international agreements and domestic policy credibility. Working Paper. University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Coventry.
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Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/wo...
We explore the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy credibility when both must be self-supporting. Our arguments are presented in the context of a two-country, two-period model of dynamic emission abatement with transboundary pollution, where government policies suffer from a time-consistency problem. In the absence of repeated interaction, any form of coordination – between governments, and between governments and their respective private sectors – improves policy making. Nevertheless, under repeated interaction international policy spillovers can make it possible to overcome the domestic credibility problem; and, conversely, the inability to precommit to policy domestically can help support international policy cooperation.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance
J Political Science > JZ International relations
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||International economic relations, International obligations, Game theory, Stochastic analysis, Intergovernmental tax relations|
|Series Name:||Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Number of Pages:||33|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), University of Warwick|
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