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Self-enforcing international agreements and domestic policy credibility

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Conconi, Paola and Perroni, Carlo (2003) Self-enforcing international agreements and domestic policy credibility. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation. Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation) (No.114).

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Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/wo...

Abstract

We explore the relationship between international policy coordination and domestic policy credibility when both must be self-supporting. Our arguments are presented in the context of a two-country, two-period model of dynamic emission abatement with transboundary pollution, where government policies suffer from a time-consistency problem. In the absence of repeated interaction, any form of coordination – between governments, and between governments and their respective private sectors – improves policy making. Nevertheless, under repeated interaction international policy spillovers can make it possible to overcome the domestic credibility problem; and, conversely, the inability to precommit to policy domestically can help support international policy cooperation.

Item Type:

Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)

Subjects:

H Social Sciences > HG Finance
J Political Science > JZ International relations

Divisions:

Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation

Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):

International economic relations, International obligations, Game theory, Stochastic analysis, Intergovernmental tax relations

Series Name:

Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)

Publisher:

University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation

Place of Publication:

Coventry

Official Date:

July 2003

Dates:

Date	Event
July 2003	Published

Number:

No.114

Number of Pages:

Status:

Not Peer Reviewed

Access rights to Published version:

Open Access

Funder:

Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), University of Warwick

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