UNSPECIFIED. (1994) PAY DISCRIMINATION AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN THE LABOR-MARKET. JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE, 60 (2). pp. 177-188. ISSN 0931-8658

Abstract

Recent work has shown the prevalence of monopsony power in labor markets characterized by low pay. Monopsony has long been offered as a potential explanation of labor market discrimination. Yet, in the case of gender discrimination, most studies suggest that female labor supply is more elastic than that of males which, in a standard monopsony model, would imply higher pay for females. In the current paper we develop a theoretical framework capable of reconciling these empirical phenomena. We also attempt to explain: (i) the puzzle regarding the apparent trade-off between profits and discrimination in the standard neoclassical treatment of discrimination associated with the work of Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973) and (ii) the apparently paradoxical increase in female relative employment at a time of a significant rise in the relative price of female labor.

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