TARIFFS FOR A FOREIGN MONOPOLIST UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
UNSPECIFIED (1994) TARIFFS FOR A FOREIGN MONOPOLIST UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION. In: European Research Workshop in International Trade, JUN, 1992, LISBON, PORTUGAL.Full text not available from this repository.
When the domestic government is better informed about demand in the domestic market than a foreign monopolist that exports to the domestic market, the domestic government can use its tariff to signal about demand. In the signalling equilibrium, the domestic government uses a tariff which is larger than the optimal tariff under complete information. However, it is possible that welfare in the signalling equilibrium is lower than welfare when the domestic government is uncertain about demand. The domestic government can avoid the cost of signalling by delegating tariff-setting to a revenue-maximising agent.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV|
|Number of Pages:||16|
|Page Range:||pp. 249-264|
|Title of Event:||European Research Workshop in International Trade|
|Location of Event:||LISBON, PORTUGAL|
|Date(s) of Event:||JUN, 1992|
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