STRATEGIC TRADE-POLICY AND RETALIATION
UNSPECIFIED (1994) STRATEGIC TRADE-POLICY AND RETALIATION. In: Meeting of the International-Economics-Study-Group, NOV, 1990, LONDON SCH ECON, LONDON, ENGLAND.Full text not available from this repository.
This paper analyses the effect of retaliation with countervailing tariffs on the profit shifting argument for export subsidies. When the domestic country pursues a policy of laissez-faire it may be harmed by a foreign export subsidy. However, when the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy it will always gain from a foreign export subsidy. The optimal domestic response to a foreign export subsidy is a partially countervailing tariff, and faced with such a response the foreign country will be deterred from subsidising exports. There is no profit shifting argument for an export subsidy when there is retaliation.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV|
|Number of Pages:||14|
|Page Range:||pp. 75-88|
|Title of Event:||Meeting of the International-Economics-Study-Group|
|Location of Event:||LONDON SCH ECON, LONDON, ENGLAND|
|Date(s) of Event:||NOV, 1990|
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