STRATEGIC TRADE-POLICY AND RETALIATION
UNSPECIFIED (1994) STRATEGIC TRADE-POLICY AND RETALIATION. In: Meeting of the International-Economics-Study-Group, LONDON SCH ECON, LONDON, ENGLAND, NOV, 1990. Published in: JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY, 6 (1). pp. 75-88.Full text not available from this repository.
This paper analyses the effect of retaliation with countervailing tariffs on the profit shifting argument for export subsidies. When the domestic country pursues a policy of laissez-faire it may be harmed by a foreign export subsidy. However, when the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy it will always gain from a foreign export subsidy. The optimal domestic response to a foreign export subsidy is a partially countervailing tariff, and faced with such a response the foreign country will be deterred from subsidising exports. There is no profit shifting argument for an export subsidy when there is retaliation.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV|
|Number of Pages:||14|
|Page Range:||pp. 75-88|
|Title of Event:||Meeting of the International-Economics-Study-Group|
|Location of Event:||LONDON SCH ECON, LONDON, ENGLAND|
|Date(s) of Event:||NOV, 1990|
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