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Green and producer lobbies: enemies or allies?

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Conconi, Paola (2001) Green and producer lobbies: enemies or allies? Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation. Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation) (No.78/).

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Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/wo...

Abstract

We employ a common agency model to study the influence of green and producer lobbies on the determination of trade and environmental policies. We focus on two large countries that are linked by trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that the nature of the relationship between the lobbies and the relative effciency of unilateral and cooperative policy outcomes depend crucially whether governments use one or both policy instruments, whether they act in a unilateral or cooperative manner, and the size of the ‘emission leakages’ and the associated transboundary spillovers.

Item Type:

Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)

Subjects:

H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)

Divisions:

Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation

Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):

Lobbying, Environmentalism -- Political aspects, Agriculture and politics, Commercial policy, Environmental policy -- Citizen participation

Series Name:

Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)

Publisher:

University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation

Place of Publication:

Coventry

Official Date:

July 2001

Dates:

Date	Event
July 2001	Published

Number:

No.78/

Number of Pages:

Institution:

University of Warwick

Status:

Not Peer Reviewed

Access rights to Published version:

Open Access

Funder:

Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), University of Warwick

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