WAGE BARGAINING WITH ENDOGENOUS PROFITS, OVERTIME WORKING AND HETEROGENEOUS LABOR
UNSPECIFIED (1994) WAGE BARGAINING WITH ENDOGENOUS PROFITS, OVERTIME WORKING AND HETEROGENEOUS LABOR. REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, 76 (2). pp. 329-336. ISSN 0034-6535Full text not available from this repository.
This paper estimates the role of insider power in wage determination in a unionized industry, examining the direction and magnitude of biases which may arise through failure to control for variation in both hours of work and the composition of the labor force and through failure to control for the endogeneity of measured profits. Furthermore, by examining the extent to which rent-sharing is related to exogenous demand shocks rather than to potentially endogenous productivity, we provide a test of the bargaining and ''pure'' efficiency wage models. finding that the majority of the insider weighting can be explained by the bargaining model.
|Item Type:||Journal Item|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
H Social Sciences
|Journal or Publication Title:||REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS|
|Official Date:||May 1994|
|Number of Pages:||8|
|Page Range:||pp. 329-336|
Actions (login required)