UNSPECIFIED (1994) WAGE BARGAINING WITH ENDOGENOUS PROFITS, OVERTIME WORKING AND HETEROGENEOUS LABOR. [Journal Item]

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Abstract

This paper estimates the role of insider power in wage determination in a unionized industry, examining the direction and magnitude of biases which may arise through failure to control for variation in both hours of work and the composition of the labor force and through failure to control for the endogeneity of measured profits. Furthermore, by examining the extent to which rent-sharing is related to exogenous demand shocks rather than to potentially endogenous productivity, we provide a test of the bargaining and ''pure'' efficiency wage models. finding that the majority of the insider weighting can be explained by the bargaining model.

Item Type:	Journal Item
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences
Journal or Publication Title:	REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Publisher:	MIT PRESS
ISSN:	0034-6535
Date:	May 1994
Volume:	76
Number:	2
Number of Pages:	8
Page Range:	pp. 329-336
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/20417

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