ACQUISITION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS
UNSPECIFIED (1994) ACQUISITION AND DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS. ECONOMIC INQUIRY, 32 (3). pp. 498-510. ISSN 0095-2583Full text not available from this repository.
In imperfectly competitive markets, incentives for the acquisition and dissemination of information by prices is significantly affected by strategic considerations, Since prices reveal information, firms possessing market power may choose to set prices which are either biased or not adjusted to all available information so as to distort their information content. Even when information is costlessly available strategic considerations may lead firms to remain uninformed. These results are illustrated in a simple Stackelberg model with price-setting firms where the pricing game is preceded by an information acquisition game.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||ECONOMIC INQUIRY|
|Publisher:||WESTERN ECONOMIC ASSOC INT|
|Number of Pages:||13|
|Page Range:||pp. 498-510|
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