Conconi, Paola (2001) Strategic trade policy and the threat of regionalism. Working Paper. University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, Coventry.

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Abstract

We examine the formation of trade agreements when markets are characterized by imperfect competition and governments can alter the strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms through the use of import tariffs and export subsidies. Using a simple three-country model of intra-industry trade, we show that whether preferential trade agreements are stepping stones or stumbling blocs towards the attainment of multilateral cooperation depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation and industry concentration. However, when import tariffs are the only available policy instrument, global free trade is always sustainable. Our analysis provides a rationale for the recent attempts to strengthen international rules against the use of export subsidies. It also suggests that focusing on one dimension of strategic interaction only might result in drawing incorrect conclusions about the outcome of the trade negotiations.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HF Commerce J Political Science > JZ International relations
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Competition, Imperfect, Commercial policy, Regionalism (International organization), Tariff, Export duties
Series Name:	Working papers (University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation)
Publisher:	University of Warwick. Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	June 2001
Number:	No.73/
Number of Pages:	31
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC), University of Warwick
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/2052

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