UNSPECIFIED (1994) THE DESIGN OF AUCTIONS AND TENDERS WITH QUALITY THRESHOLDS - THE SYMMETRICAL CASE. In: Annual Conference of the Royal-Economic-Society, UNIV YORK, YORK, ENGLAND, 1993. Published in: ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 104 (423). pp. 316-326.

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Abstract

Three designs of auctions with quality thresholds are considered. The quality threshold is not known with certainty by the bidders. In one scheme quality plans submitted by potential bidders are evaluated first and price bids for only those plans which have been approved are invited. The second scheme has price bids first to yield a priority for scrutinising quality. A third has simultaneous decisions on price and quality. The model yields an equivalence result. The use of reserve prices to produce social optimality is then investigated. The theory is used to discuss the recent auction for UK television franchises.

Item Type:	Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Publisher:	BLACKWELL PUBL LTD
ISSN:	0013-0133
Date:	March 1994
Volume:	104
Number:	423
Number of Pages:	11
Page Range:	pp. 316-326
Publication Status:	Published
Title of Event:	Annual Conference of the Royal-Economic-Society
Location of Event:	UNIV YORK, YORK, ENGLAND
Date(s) of Event:	1993
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/20538

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